Central Europe

PRISHTINË/PRIŠTINA, 16 January 2019 - The OSCE Mission will present a report tomorrow on the state of shelters for the victims of domestic violence in Kosovo.

The report provides an overview of the municipal mechanisms on protection from domestic violence Kosovo-wide, identifies the challenges shelters face, and gives recommendations to the relevant institutions on how to improve the provision of services to these victims.

Opening remarks will be delivered by the Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Ambassador Jan Braathu; National Co-ordinator on Domestic Violence / Deputy Minister of Justice Naim Qelaj; Executive Director of the Agency for Gender Equality, Edi Gusia ; Minister of Labour and Social Welfare  Skënder Reçica; and representative of the Kosovo Shelter Coalition, Nazife Jonuzi.

Media are cordially invited to cover the event tomorrow, 17 January 2019, at the Hotel Swiss Diamond, Prishtinë/Priština, starting at 10:15 hrs.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons was 9,000 at both BCPs. It was not possible to compare the data regarding persons crossing the border to the previous reporting period, as no information regarding this category was  provided to the OM.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits was 9,000 per day at both BCPs[1].

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 16 this week (compared to 13 last week); 11 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and five into Ukraine (63 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, six families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and eight were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when three families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and four into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                        

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (412 compared to 319 observed during the previous week). There were 199 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 213 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, no “irregular” route or destination was noted. The OM could observe bus destinations: Kyiv, Pervomaisk – Kyiv; Rovenky – Kyiv; and Stakhanov – Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 130 to 441 (138 at the Gukovo BCP and 303 at the Donetsk BCP); 233 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 208 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation, Lithuania and in Belarus.                                                                                           

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 44 (compared to 28 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 28 to 47: of the total number of trucks scanned, 19 trucks (40 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 28 trucks (60 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 72 to 91 vehicles; 49 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 42 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on six occasions, compared to three last week; the OTs assessed that three trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the other three to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

On 9 January, at 08:02 the OM at Donetsk BCP observed an ambulance with inscription “Urgent Medical Help” (written in Russian) crossing from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. While crossing the border, the ambulance used its red-blue flashing lights.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 11 December 2018 to 15 January 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Due to the Russian national holidays, the OM was not able to receive and process the usual data on persons crossing at the two border checkpoints during the last two weeks.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Small arms were fired in the direction of an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Chermalyk, Donetsk region and close to SMM patrols in Popasna and Kriakivka, Luhansk region. 
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and an armoured combat vehicle in the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions as well as to enable the  removal of an unexploded ordnance in Kriakivka, Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at two border crossing points with the Russian Federation near Izvaryne and Sievernyi.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 75), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded mainly at south-easterly and south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas south-south-west, south-west and west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

On the morning of 14 January, positioned on the eastern edge of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight across the contact line, the SMM heard twice in the span of five minutes uncountable bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km south-south-east. The Mission assessed the fire as aimed at the UAV, which at the time was flying about 1.2km south-south-east of the SMM's position. The Mission recalled and safely landed the mini-UAV (for a similar incident, see SMM Daily Report 14 January 2019).*

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside and close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see disengagement areas section below).

On the morning of 14 January, positioned at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on road T0504 near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire about 200m east of its position. The Mission left the area.*

On the same morning, positioned on the western edge of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) to facilitate and monitor the adherence to the ceasefire to enable the removal of an unexploded ordnance (UXO), the SMM heard a burst of small-arms fire, assessed as originating from the direction of a house used by military personnel, about 40m east of its position. The Mission left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 13-14 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 18 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east and south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and six projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km east-south-east and east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). It also recorded 18 projectiles in flight and an illumination flare, all at an assessed range of 1-5.5km east-south-east and south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 14 January, positioned about 1km south of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and 16 shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-3km south and west-south-west (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area). Positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and 41 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-3km north, south-south-west and west-south-west (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area). Positioned on the northern edge of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions as well as 26 shots of small-arms fire and 70 bursts of undetermined weapons, all at an assessed range of 2-3km west-south-west (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 1.2km from its western and northern edges (assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces). [3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

13 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 21 tanks (13 T-72 and eight T-64) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

13 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) in Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) in Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) in Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk);
• an IFV(BMP-1) about 200m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske; and
• two IFVs (BMP-1) 700m south of the disengagement area near Petrivske.

14 January

• an IFV (BMP variant) parked near an abandoned house in Svitlodarsk
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Halytsynivka (29km north-west of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

13 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an APC (BTR-80) in Luhansk city.

Presence of mines

The SMM saw for the first time two dark green square wooden boxes (with wires connected) attached to the metal gates of a sluice on the northern side of the Myronivskyi reservoir and close to a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Roty (government-controlled, 66km north-east of Donetsk). An unarmed soldier told the SMM about the presence of explosives on the sluice.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline in Pivdenne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) as well as to water wells in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the removal of an UXO (a 125mm tank projectile), reportedly located in the front yard of a residential house at 4 Naberezhna Street in Kriakivka. After about two hours, a representative of the Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM that the UXO had been removed (see above).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians exiting Ukraine as well as five pedestrians entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two buses with Russian Federation licence plates exiting Ukraine. The Mission also observed seven cars (four with Ukrainian and two Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates), 12 covered cargo trucks (four with Ukrainian and two Russian Federation licence plates, and six with “LPR” plates) as well as a bus with Russian Federation licence plates and six pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about ten minutes, an unarmed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three pedestrians exiting Ukraine. After about ten minutes, an unarmed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Fire at the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra

In Kyiv, in the late afternoon hours of 14 January, the SMM saw a fire on the territory of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. The Mission observed that a two-storey building located at 23 Lavrska Street was on fire. The SMM saw 20 firefighters and 30 representatives of the State Emergency Services on the building’s roof extinguishing the fire and seven fire brigade trucks parked at the site. A female representative of the State Emergency Services told the SMM that the building had been on fire since the afternoon hours and that firefighters had difficulties in accessing the construction due to the risks posed by the blaze. The main engineer at the complex stated that the building had not been used for the past six years. The SMM observed that the fire was extinguished in the early evening hours. A police officer stated that an individual had been detained on suspicion of arson.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight in areas south-east of Chermalyk, the SMM heard twice in the span of five minutes uncountable bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km south-south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which landed safely.
• While positioned at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near Popasna, the SMM heard a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire about 200m east of its position.
• While positioned on the western edge of Kriakivka, the SMM heard a burst of small-arms fire about 40m east of its position.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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409148 Silvia Belloni, Councilperson with the Milan Bar Association, addresses event participants. Milan, 15 January 2019. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Identifying and building a regional approach to countering hate crime was the focus of an event organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Milan Bar Association and the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, in Milan on 15 January 2019.

The discussion was based on the review of activities and lessons learned during ODIHR's two-year project Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crime, which aimed to improve the collaboration among criminal justice professionals and civil society within four OSCE countries – Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Poland. In Italy, the project was implemented in the administrative region of Lombardy.

Participants explored the impact of project activities, including thorough and customized training on hate crime provided to all criminal justice stakeholders. They also examined the results of a detailed review of 13,000 judgements by the Court of Milan that was conducted during the project and highlighted the importance of improving support for hate crime victims.

“Hate crimes have a direct impact on local communities. This project gave us the opportunity to assess the situation in Lombardy in detail,” said Christie Edwards, Deputy Head of the ODIHR Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department. “For example, our review of rulings shows that courts rarely take into account the bias motivation of perpetrators. Based on this clear conclusion, we can help local authorities adjust their policies accordingly. This may include establishing hate crime data recording systems, directing training programmes for law enforcement, upgrading inter-agency co-operation and improving outreach to communities at risk.”

Silvia Belloni, Councilperson with the Milan Bar Association, said: “As a direct result of the training provided to local lawyers, the Milan Bar Association will start including free legal aid to victims of hate crimes as part of our current assistance efforts. I am happy to present this initiative in the hope that it will inspire our colleagues in other regions to copy our model.”

ODIHR recently published a comprehensive toolkit based on the project's activities in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Poland. This includes training packages, methodologies and guidelines on how criminal justice actors, public institutions and civil society can effectively address hate crime.

CHISINAU, 15 January 2019 – The election observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) for the 24 February parliamentary elections in Moldova will hold a press conference in Chisinau on Wednesday, 16 January 2019, on the occasion of the formal opening of the mission’s activities.

Matyas Eorsi, the head of the ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities. The mission's deployment follows an invitation from the authorities of Moldova.

The ODIHR election observation mission will partner with delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament for observation on election day, and for the release of a preliminary statement of findings and conclusions on the day after the elections.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 14:00, Wednesday, 16 January, in the LOFT meeting room on the mezzanine floor of the Radisson Blu Leogrand Hotel; Mitropolit Varlaam 77, Chisinau, Moldova 

For further information, please contact Alice Colombi, ODIHR EOM Media Analyst, at +373 (0)68 692055 or  alice.colombi@odihr.md.

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 11 and 12 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Between the evenings of 12 and 13 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• Small arms were fired in the direction of an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Chermalyk, Donetsk region.
• Small-arms fire damaged a house in a residential area of Chermalyk.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• Participants of a gathering in Kherson demanded the release of a Crimean Tatar activist reportedly detained in Simferopol.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a railway station in Voznesenivka, an area near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 11 and 12 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (34 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and south and south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 12 and 13 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south of the DFS, south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), as well as areas south and west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

On the morning of 12 January, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight across the contact line in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard uncountable bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of about 2km south-south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which at the time was flying over non-government-controlled areas about 1km south-south-east of the patrol’s position. The Mission recalled and safely landed the mini-UAV (see below).*

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 11 and 12 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (12 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 12 and 13 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Small-arms fire damaged a house in a residential area of Chermalyk

On 12 January, at 76 Myra Street in Chermalyk, the SMM saw a fresh hole in a corrugated metal sheet which was partially covering a south-facing window of a one-storey house. The SMM also saw another hole in the window pane behind the corrugated metal sheet. Inside the house, about 1.5m from the damaged window, the SMM saw a hole in a doorframe. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a single round (7.62mm) of small-arms fire from a south-south-easterly direction. About 2m south of the house, the SMM saw a hole in the west-facing wooden doorframe of a barn. Lodged inside the hole, the SMM saw a bullet (7.62mm) pointing north-north-west. The SMM assessed that the hole was caused by a round fired from a south-south-easterly direction.

A resident of the house (female, in her forties) told the SMM that the aforementioned window (in the bedroom) had been damaged on 11 January between 22:00 and 22:45. She added that she had taken shelter in the kitchen together with her husband, two children and a relative with limited mobility, due to ongoing fighting during that time. The same day, the SMM launched a mini-UAV over the area and heard bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV (see above).*

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 11 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded two bursts at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 5-8km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 12 January, the same camera recorded six projectiles at an assessed range of 0.5-1.5km east and east-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the evening and night of 12-13 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 12 projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4.5km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and one projectile at an assessed range of 1-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 13 January, the same camera recorded two projectiles at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 11 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as a mortar round at an assessed range of 3-5km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 12 January, while at the same location, the SMM heard 25 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-5km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 12 January, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapon storage sites[4]

Heavy weapons storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

12 January

• Six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing.

Heavy weapons storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13 January

• A surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) and 12 MLRS (BM-21) were present,
• Two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), 23 MLRS (BM-21) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) were again missing.

Indications of military in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

11 January

• Two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BMP-2, 30mm) in Svitlodarsk
• Two APCs (MT-LB) in Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk)
• Three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) north of the Zolote disengagement area
• Two IFVs (BMP variants) in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk)
• An IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk)

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline in Pivdenne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). It continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas not under government control

On 12 January, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for one hour, the SMM saw 30 cars (five with Ukrainian, 19 with Russian Federation licence plates and six with “DPR” plates) as well as a bus and a minibus (both with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 34 cars (seven with Ukrainian, 15 with Russian Federation, one with Lithuanian licence plates and 11 with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 13 January, while at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates), one truck with Ukrainian licence plates and five pedestrians (three males in their forties and two females in their thirties) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw three pedestrians (two females in their forties and a male in his thirties) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, at the railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM saw more than 60 cargo wagons, including 12 fuel tanks, all of which were assessed as empty. The SMM also observed 60 train wagons, loaded with coal, travelling towards the border with the Russian Federation. In the last wagon, the SMM saw two armed members of the armed formations. After about ten minutes, two members of the armed formations present at the railway station asked the SMM to leave the area.*

Participants of a gathering in Kherson demanded the release of a Crimean Tatar activist reportedly detained in Simferopol

On 12 January, the SMM saw about 50 people (mixed ages and gender) gathered in front of the Regional Administration building in Kherson in support of Kherson-based Crimean Tatar activist Edem Bekirov, who had reportedly been detained in Simferopol on 12 December.  Some of the participants were holding Crimean Tatar flags. The SMM saw five police officers securing the event, which ended without incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 13 January, at the railway station in Voznesenivka, two armed members of the armed formations asked the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 12 January, while conducting a mini-UAV flight in areas south-east of Chermalyk, the SMM heard uncountable bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of about 2km south-south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational and winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites (both in non-government-controlled areas) continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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COPENHAGEN, 14 January 2019 – With the persistence of a dangerous climate for journalists in many countries of the OSCE region, the leaders of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s human rights committee, Chair Margareta Kiener Nellen (MP, Switzerland), Vice-Chair Michael Georg Link (MP, Germany), and Rapporteur Kyriakos Hadjiyianni (MP, Cyprus), today called for increased attention to the importance of the safety of journalists. Recent developments demonstrate that journalists have been facing increasing repression, intimidation, physical attacks and restrictions on their freedom to work, they said.

Committee Chair Kiener Nellen expressed deep concern regarding new charges brought against the Azerbaijani anti-corruption blogger and chair of the media NGO Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, Mehman Huseynov. He has been detained on defamation charges since March 2017.

“As Mr. Huseynov’s expected release date is just weeks away, the initiation of new charges against him that could lead to a further imprisonment of up to seven years is deeply worrying. I am also deeply concerned about his health as he began a hunger strike in protest of the new charges against him,” said Kiener Nellen. She reiterated the call by OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir for the authorities to drop new criminal charges brought against him.

Highlighting recent data published by Reporters Without Borders, Hadjiyianni stressed that it was absolutely unacceptable that 80 journalists were killed in 2018, with 348 held in prison, and 60 being held hostage throughout the world.

“It is far too often that we hear about attacks on journalists and media workers,” he said. “In recent months we have seen the arrest, threats and attacks against journalists including in OSCE countries. I strongly condemn such unacceptable attacks which contribute to an atmosphere of intimidation and repression, harming all people. Journalists need to be able to carry out their work without fear of violence or retribution. The relevant authorities must investigate all attacks, bring the perpetrators to justice and ensure a safe working environment.”

Committee Vice-Chair Michael Link expressed concern about the freedom of expression and media and the safety of journalists particularly in Turkey and the Russian Federation. He deplored the continued intimidation and death threats directed at journalists of Cumhuriyet in Turkey as well as of the well-known Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta, twelve years after the murder of famed journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

“So-called ‘fake news’ has become a problem throughout the world, but we must be careful in legislating responses that may restrict freedom of expression,” said Link. “I urge my colleagues in the Russian Duma and other parliaments to prioritize freedom of expression, freedom of the media and the safety of journalists when considering legislation.”

The officers of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs welcomed the adoption of an OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on the safety of journalists on 7 December 2018 and reiterated the Assembly’s call on OSCE governments to “immediately cease the harassment, imprisonment and mistreatment” of journalists and restore their rights (OSCE PA Berlin Declaration 2018).

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VIENNA, 10 January 2019 – OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (Georgia) and Secretary General Roberto Montella welcomed the priorities outlined by the new OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovakia’s Minister for Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajcak, in his address to the OSCE Permanent Council today.

Noting that Lajcak’s agenda of preventing and mitigating conflicts, providing for a safer future and promoting effective multilateralism coincide with the Parliamentary Assembly’s focus on producing tangible results for the more than one billion citizens of the OSCE area, Tsereteli and Montella emphasized that the PA stands ready to work with the Chairmanship on developing common strategies.

“As PA President, I look forward to working with the Chairperson-in-Office on mediating, resolving and preventing conflicts, as well as promoting a safe and secure future and recommitting to effective multilateralism,” Tsereteli said. “Too many people are victims of unresolved conflicts and human rights violations, and we all must work to ensure that the OSCE is empowered with the instruments it needs to improve the situation for all our people. We see positive developments for example in Moldova, and this progress needs to be built upon and leveraged in other areas.”

President Tsereteli highlighted the numerous resolutions adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly. “The PA produces very important recommendations based on our debates which can always serve as useful guidelines for the OSCE,” he said. “We anticipate that the governmental side will take into account these resolutions and incorporate them into the acquis of the OSCE in order to build comprehensive security.”

Montella said: “I was pleased to hear the priorities outlined by Minister Lajcak today and his recognition that the tools exist to address our common challenges. One of these tools is the Parliamentary Assembly and the energy that our 323 dedicated parliamentarians bring to this organization. As the most direct link between the OSCE and the ‘end users of the OSCE product’ – the citizens we work for – the Assembly is in a unique position to help advance the worthwhile priorities outlined in Vienna today.”

Montella, OSCE PA Special Representative Amb. Andreas Nothelle and several staff members are participating in the opening of Slovakia’s OSCE Chairmanship in Vienna this week. Montella is representing the Assembly at the Annual Heads of Institutions meeting and senior policy staff are participating in regional working group sessions. Montella spoke today with the new Chairperson-in-Office on key issues in 2019.

Next week, President Tsereteli will address the OSCE Permanent Council and hold a series of bilateral meetings in Vienna. The President also plans to visit Moldova on 21-22 January for discussions in the capital with governmental and parliamentary leaders.

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COPENHAGEN, 14 January 2019 - The leaders of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s human rights committee, Chair Margareta Kiener Nellen (MP, Switzerland), Vice-Chair Michael Georg Link (MP, Germany), and Rapporteur Kyriakos Hadjiyianni (MP, Cyprus), today called for urgent steps by Turkish authorities to ensure the safety of Member of Parliament Leyla Güven, imprisoned pending trial.

In a letter earlier today to Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, the human rights leaders called for immediate attention to case. They have issued the following appeal:

“With worrying reports of a serious deterioration in Leyla Güven’s health, we urge the authorities to take urgent measures to alleviate the situation. On humanitarian grounds, we call for her immediate transfer to a hospital where she can get the adequate medical attention and treatment and enable contact with her lawyers and family.”

Kiener Nellen, Link and Hadjiyanni were responding to multiple reports that Leyla Güven, elected to parliament in Turkey in June last year, was in critical condition as her hunger strike enters its 65th day. Her deteriorating health has reportedly limited her ability to meet with lawyers and visitors.

The OSCE PA officials also expressed concern at the imposition of pre-trial detention, reiterating OSCE PA calls for such measures only “exceptional cases and when public security is at stake or when a suspect presents a genuine flight risk” (OSCE PA 2015 Helsinki Declaration).

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VIENNA, 14 January 2019 – The State Secretary of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Pascale Baeriswyl, will open Switzerland’s Chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation in Vienna on Wednesday, 16 January 2019.

Media representatives are invited to attend State Secretary Baeriswyl’s address to representatives of the OSCE participating States, in which she will present Switzerland’s priorities and objectives for its Chairmanship, which will extend up until the end of the Easter recess.

Media representatives are invited to cover her address from 10:00 am on Wednesday, 16 January in the Neuer Saal on the second floor of the Hofburg Conference Centre.

State Secretary Baeriswyl will also hold a briefing (in English) for media representatives in Room 525, tentatively at 12:00 noon.

Media representatives wishing to attend should confirm their attendance by sending an e-mail to press@osce.org, no later than 16:00 hrs, 15 January 2019.

The Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation rotates three times a year. It takes the lead in setting the agenda for each meeting of the Forum and brings attention to issues concerning the implementation of commitments adopted by the Forum. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations and saw military presence and anti-aircraft guns inside the Zolote disengagement area. It recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. 
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region.
• In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a protestduring which protestors expressed views critical of veterans and of the Ministry for Veterans Affairs.
• In Zhytomyr, the SMM monitoreda court hearing of a journalist accused of involvement in anti-state activities.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 34 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 55 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in south-easterly and south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and south and south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (12), compared with the previous reporting period (38 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, all shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire (about 1,400), were recorded in areas south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled 63km north-west of Luhansk) and north-west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 10-11 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and 14 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.5-2km east and east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 11 January, positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-8km south-east and south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the south-western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard two undetermined explosions and 35 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, one of them visibly armed, inside the disengagement area, walking towards Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

On 10 January, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted again two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on trucks: one 50m north of its southern edge; the second one about 800m west of its eastern edge and about 150m north of its southern edge. Both anti-aircraft guns were assessed as belonging to the armed formations. 

In the evening of 10 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission heard three undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-5km west-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 January

• A surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in the yard of a house assessed as used by military personnel on the northern edge of Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk) (seen also on 9 January, see SMM Daily Report 10 January 2019)

Non-government-controlled areas

10 January 

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), five tanks (three T-72 and two T-64 with engines removed) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

11 January

• 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk)

Weapons storage sites:

A heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

11 January

• 17 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), ten towed howitzers (nine D-30 Lyagushka, 122mmand one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five MLRS (BM-21) were again missing

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

10 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) south-west of Katerynivka;
• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (one BMP-1 and two BMP variants), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2), an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (one BMP-2 and one BMP variant), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an ACVnear Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk); and
• four ACVs near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

11 January

• two IFVs (one BMP-1, one undetermined variant) near Zolote-2/Karbonit
• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk)
• four APCs (two BTR-70 and two BTR-80) near Volnovakha (53kmsouth of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

10 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• six IFVs (BMP-1), an APC (MT-LB) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4A) near Sofiivka (see above);
• an ACV near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk);
• four ACVs near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk); and
• two ACVs near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk).

11 January

• An APC (BMP-1) near Smile

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the water distribution network in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Protest at the Kyiv City Palace of Veterans

On 11 January, the SMM saw about 40 people (men, 18-30 years old), half of them standing outside the main entrance to the Kyiv City Palace of Veteransat 11 Bastionna Street and the other half gathered near an auditorium on the third floor, expressing views critical of veterans and of the composition and organization of the Ministry for Veterans Affairs. Most of them werewearingblack and brown clothing with “C14” or “Municipal Varta” patches and the Mission observed that a meeting attended by about 200 people (mostly older men) was taking place in the auditorium and saw about 20 police officers located outside and inside the building. It saw no incidents.

Court hearing of a journalist in Zhytomyr

On 10 January in Zhytomyr, west of Kyiv, the SMM monitored a hearing in the trial of a journalist chargedunder articles 110, 111, 161 and 258-3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Trespass against territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine; High Treason; Violation of citizens' equality based on their race, nationality or religious preferences; Creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organization) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 2 October 2018). The court ruled to extend the journalist’s house arrest until 10 March 2019. In a corridor of the court building the Mission saw six C14 members (men, 15-24 years old) verbally insult the journalist. There it also saw seven police officers present.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 9 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.  
• About 1km north of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place in the past 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined.

Conditional access:

• The SMM was allowed to pass through a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) only upon the escort of a car of the armed formations during the SMM’s patrol in the settlement. A member of the armed formations at the checkpoint cited “unsafe situation” in the area as the reason.

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk was not operational and winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM followed up on reports of three civilians injured near Vasylivka as the result of an explosion and three civilians who reportedly died of heart attacks while at a checkpoint in Horlivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations in the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. 
• The Mission continued to observe hardships faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line related to inclement weather and long wait times. 
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a fire at a church in Rzhyshchiv, Kyiv region.
• The SMM observed a peaceful public gathering in Kherson.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including in all three disengagement areas. An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle was targeted by small-arms fire while flying near Popasna.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 55 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), west-north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in westerly and south-westerly directions of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 38 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (six explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Zolote (government-controlled 60km west of Luhansk), south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and westerly directions of Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). 

While positioned at the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight to observe a snow removal operation over the road T-0504, the SMM heard six bursts of small-arms fire approximately 1.5-2km east of its position, which it assessed as aimed at the UAV.  The mini-UAV lost altitude and the SMM lost control over the UAV and was unable to recover it. 

Disengagement areas[2]

On 10 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

The same day, positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 8-10km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 7-9km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned outside the disengagement area in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 700-800m east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).  

During the night of 10 January, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard six bursts of heavy-machine-gun and 20 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-5km west-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

Three Voda Donbassawater company workers injured in an explosion 

On 10 January, the SMM followed up on reports that three male employees of Voda Donbassawater company had been injured earlier the same day while clearing snow from a road running from Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) and leading to the First Pumping Station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk). At a hospital in Yasynuvata, the SMM spoke to all three men who said that an explosion had happened while they had been clearing snow just outside their work vehicle around noon. One of the men (56 years old) who said he was a mechanic for Voda Donbassahad bandages on the left side of his chest and back. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the man suffered 12 injuries to his chest and back assessed as caused by shrapnel and that he was in shock. A second man (in his fifties), who appeared to be in shock but did not have visible injuries, said he was a driver for Voda Donbassaand that he could not remember anything except the explosion. The SMM spoke with a third man (in his thirties) who said he was a mechanic for Voda Donbassaand saw that he had bruises on the left side of his face and arms and that he was shaking. He told the SMM he could not remember anything about the incident except the explosion. 

On 11 January, the SMM visited a compound of Voda Donbassawater company in Mineralne (non-government-controlled, 10km north-east of Donetsk) where it was led by an employee to a truck that they claimed was the same Voda Donbassatruck damaged on 10 January. The SMM saw a Zil-131 truck with a green cab and a yellow body. The yellow body had been burned out and there was a large hole on the right side of the body and a large hole on the left side of the body of the truck. The SMM assessed that the damage was likely caused by a 73mm projectile from an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) or a recoilless gun (SPG-9).

Three civilians died while waiting to cross the contact line in Horlivka

The SMM followed up on reports that three civilians (men in their eighties, seventies and sixties) had all died of heart attacks while at a checkpoint of the armed formations in Horlivka waiting to cross the contact line. At a morgue in Horlivka, staff told the SMM that three men of the same ages had been brought to the morgue from a checkpoint of the armed formations in Horlivka the same day and that they had died as a result of natural causes. 

Situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line

At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), around 9:30, the SMM saw about 3000 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 500 queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw another 500 people queuing at a nearby bus stop. About three hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw about 120 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and about 250 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas.

Between the two forward checkpoints of the armed formations on road H20 south of Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed a small tractor clearing snow from the road. The SMM saw about 150 people standing on a snow-covered road, waiting to travel from non-government-controlled areas through the forward-most Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint 3.5km north-east of Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk). While present the SMM observed 11 buses parked on the northern side of the checkpoint near Berezove. Three bus drivers (men in their forties) said they had regularly transported people between the forward-most checkpoints of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations, but noted that snowy road conditions made the roads difficult to pass.  

Additionally, while at the same Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Berezove, three women (two in their fifties and one in her eighties) told the SMM that they had been waiting for a bus for hours in the cold for transport between this checkpoint and the entry-exit checkpoint in Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), a distance of about 7km. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present said that the number of buses operating between those government-controlled checkpoints was insufficient, and that the situation was aggravated by bad road conditions due to the weather and heavy snowfall.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons storage sites:

A permanent storage site beyond respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

10 January:

• A tank (T-64) remains missing

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

10 January

• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Novotroitske
• An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:
  • an armoured personnel carrier  (probable BTR-80) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk)

Impact craters as the result of recent shelling near Sakhanka

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted six recent impact craters, assessed as caused by mortar rounds (two from 120mm and four from 80mm) fired from a westerly direction, near positions of the armed formations about 1.5km west of Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 97km south of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure 

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to electricity lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), to conduct an assessment for water repairs in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), repairs of water wells in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) as well as water pipelines in Horlivka. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk). 

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds reportedly related to water payments across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk). 

Public gathering in Kherson

The SMM monitored a peaceful public demonstration against rising electricity costs organized by a civil society organization. In Svoboda central square, the SMM saw about 150 people (mixed gender, mostly middle-aged), some holding signs critical of electricity costs, and four people speaking with a representative of the Kherson Regional State Administration. The SMM did not observe police presence at the demonstration.   

Follow up on reports of fire at a church in Rzhyshchiv

On 9 January, the SMM continued to follow up on a reported fire at the 19thcentury Trinity church in Rzhyshchiv (65km south-east of Kyiv) (see SMM Daily 3 January 2019). At the church, the SMM saw that a door on the south side of the church was missing and that it had been boarded up and black smoke marks on the door frame and adjacent wall. Inside the church on the same wall the SMM observed smoke damage as well and could still smell smoke in the church. Police in Kyiv told the SMM that the fire is being investigated under Article 194 of the Criminal Code (Intentional destruction or damage to property). 

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 9 January 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.  

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight east of Popasna, the SMM heard six bursts of small-arms fire approximately 1.5-2km east of its position, which it assessed as aimed at the UAV. The mini-UAV lost altitude and the SMM lost control over the UAV and was unable to recover it. 

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational. In the reporting period winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its  camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 11 January 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, published today a legal review of two laws on the fight against the manipulation of information, which were adopted on 20 November 2018 by the French parliament. The review was shared with the French authorities in November.

The laws are specifically designed for electoral cycles, during which the spread of disinformation may harm the functioning of democratic institutions. The laws allow the judiciary to act against disinformation if the disinformation is manifest, widely and artificially distributed and if it could lead to disturbing the public peace or the sincerity of the vote. The laws also confer new responsibilities upon the French media regulator, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA), which will have the authority to act against any media distributing disinformation.

The legal review examines the new laws in the context of international principles on freedom of expression. It includes an analysis of the risks related to the scope of the law, the definition of “false news”, which could fail to recognize the nature of the journalistic work, especially within the very short 48-hour deadline for judicial response. It also places greater responsibility on the Internet platforms, whose interpretation of the scope of the content to be taken down could be much broader than the previous judgments of the Conseil Constitutionnel and of the European Court of Justice.

On the extension of the powers of the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel, the review notes that the new laws do not contradict the relevant international obligations of France.

In its recommendations, the review explores the possibility of introducing a new legal statute for Internet platforms. The review also proposes enhancing media literacy and supporting the self-regulation efforts of the media community to enhance quality journalism, in particular through certification and fact-checking.

The legal review (only available in French) can be found here: https://www.osce.org/fr/representative-on-freedom-of-media/408872

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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VIENNA, 10 January 2019 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, expressing his concern over the sentencing of investigative journalist Pelin Ünker.

On 8 January 2019, Ünker was convicted by the Second Criminal Court of First Instance to one year, one month and 15 days in prison, and fined 8,660 Turkish lira (approx. 1,380 euros) for “insulting” and “slandering a public official”. The lawsuit was filed by former Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and his two sons, in response to her publications in 2017 on the “Paradise Papers” related to their alleged offshore companies.

“While I fully support the right of any individual to protect their reputation, this should not lead to imprisonment of journalists for their investigative work,” said Désir, emphasizing that public officials, due to their public role, should endure a higher level of scrutiny.

In his letter the Representative recalled the Decision on Safety of Journalists adopted at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Milan, which calls on participating States to“ensure that defamation laws do not carry excessive sanctions or penalties that could undermine the safety of journalists and/or effectively censor journalists and interfere with their mission of informing the public and, where necessary, to revise and repeal such laws, in compliance with participating States’ obligations under international human rights law.”

“I hope thatPelin Ünkerwill be acquitted on appeal,” concluded Désir.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission continued to monitor the situation of civilians near the contact line.
• The Mission saw a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines in Klynove, Donetsk region.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk Region.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 70), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at south-westerly and north-westerly directions of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including six explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).  

Disengagement areas[2]

On 9 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 4-6km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Civilian fatality observed in Horlivka

In front of its premises in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw the body of a deceased woman (69 years old) surrounded by three medical personnel and four members of the armed formations as well as an ambulance and two cars of the armed formations parked nearby. The husband of the deceased woman told the SMM that in the late afternoon hours of 9 January they were walking past the SMM premises when the woman had suddenly collapsed. The husband also told the SMM that they had been queuing all day at an armed formations’ checkpoint near Horlivka to travel to government-controlled areas for pension-related issues, but were unable to cross because of long lines.

Situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line

At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), at 10:00, the SMM saw about 170  people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 15 queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw another 40 people queuing at a nearby bus stop. About three hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw about 800 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and about 100 people queuing in the opposite direction.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

9 January:

• A surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in the yard of a house assessed as used by military personnel on the northern edge of Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk)

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 January:

• A tank (T-72) loaded on a transporter parked next to a road near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

9 January

• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), and four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (a BMP-1 and three BMP variants)  near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)
• An armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-1) near Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk)
• A combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk)
• An IFV (BMP-1) near Mykolaivka (77km west of Luhansk)

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines in Horlivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.          

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 9 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational. In the reporting period winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 10 January 2019 – The major challenges facing the OSCE region and beyond demand more co-operation and more dialogue than ever before, said Slovakia’s Minister for Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák, when presenting the priorities of the Slovak Chairmanship to the Permanent Council in Vienna today.

In his opening remarks, Lajčák pointed out that all the tools needed to overcome current security challenges already exist. “In fact, many lie right here, at the OSCE,” he added.

Elaborating on the Chairmanship’s priority of conflict prevention and resolution, Lajčák drew attention to the human suffering caused by protracted conflicts.

Special attention will be given to the situation in and around Ukraine. Reminding the Permanent Council of the need for ongoing support to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and announcing his visit to Ukraine next week, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office said he will focus on opportunities for dialogue. “If there is any way to immediately alleviate the situation for people on the ground, we must take it,” he said.

Lajčâk also acknowledged positive momentum, when it comes to the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, the recent intensification of dialogue and the decrease in ceasefire violations and casualties in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the resumption of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meetings in Ergneti.

Introducing the Chairmanship’s second priority - a safer future - Lajčák said that if the OSCE is to make a difference in the lives of people, it cannot focus only on the challenges of today.

“We are still in the dark about the role communications technologies, artificial intelligence or energy innovations will play in our security landscape, years from now.  But one thing is certain: we need to start thinking about it - and talking about it - more.”

As custodians of the present and future, he called for young people to have a greater say, adding that they are coming up with new ways to prevent violent extremism, counter climate change and spur sustainable development.

Turning to the Chairmanship’s third priority – effective multilateralism - the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office pointed out that today’s security challenges cannot be addressed by one country alone.

However, Lajcak stressed that “at a time when we are in urgent need of cooperation, we are seeing our multilateral systems coming under increasing threat.” He warned that “the lessons we have learned from history, which tell us that compromise and co-operation are the only way forward, are being ignored.”

Chairperson Lajčák said Slovakia was committed to promoting co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations such as the UN, with non-governmental organizations and international and regional actors in the field, and with think tanks, women’s groups and youth networks. Later, he noted that Slovakia will work to bring to life a vision in which peace, human rights, gender equality, and the rule of law are a reality for all.

Having reminded the representatives of the OSCE’s 57 participating States of the need to urgently reach agreement on the organization’s budget for 2019, Lajčák concluded with a statement on Slovakia’s commitment to the OSCE Chairmanship: “We are determined to be impartial, fair and honest in our role as partners and mediators,” he said. “I look forward to close co-operation with the OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, as well as the OSCE’s institutions, executive structures, and field operations.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including 16 explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds, were recorded at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however no explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (six explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).  

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned in the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

5 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khersones (87km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

6 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) at a compound in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

5 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) and a probable armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) and six IFVs (BMP-2) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), an APC (MT-LB) and two IFVs (BMP variant) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

8 January

• An APC (BTR-60) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk)
• An APC (BTR-60) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) moving east in a residential area of Orlivka (22km north-west of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

6 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and to water wells in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) (for previous related de-mining activities near Nyzhnoteple see SMM Daily Report 15 November 2018). It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 

Delay:

• At a checkpoint near Ozerianivka (non-government controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM that it was not allowed to continue towards Ozerianivka without written permission from senior members of the armed formations. After about 20 minutes at the checkpoint, following an intervention by senior members of the armed formations, the Mission was allowed to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational. In the reporting period winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 9 January 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, expressed his serious concern about the situation and health condition of the imprisoned blogger and chair of the media NGO Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, Mehman Huseynov, and called on the authorities to drop new criminal charges brought against him. Huseynov has reportedly been on a hunger strike since late December 2018.

In his letter, the Representative said: “It is deeply worrying that the latest incident occurred just before Mehman Huseynov’ expected release from prison in March 2019 and that the new charges may entail his imprisonment for up to 7 additional years.”

“I call on the authorities to drop new criminal charges against Huseynov and to release him as soon as possible,” Désir added.

According to reports, on 26 December 2018 Huseynov was involved in an incident with a prison guard. The authorities subsequently launched an investigation into the case and transferred the blogger to a pre-trial detention facility in Baku. Huseynov denies the accusations made against him in connection with the incident and, in protest, has reportedly started a hunger strike, which has resulted in the serious deterioration of his health.

The Representative also asked the authorities to look into the reports about Huseynov’s health problems and to grant him urgent professional medical care.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 4 and 5 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Between the evenings of 5 and 6 January, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• Between the evenings of 6 and 7 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The Mission saw fresh damage from gunfire to a functional school and a store in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a peaceful public gathering related to the granting of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted in Staromykhailivka, near Starolaspa and near Leonove, close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 4 and 5 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (eight explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas north-west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 5 and 6 January, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 50), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded again at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk.

Between the evenings of 6 and 7 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations, including all explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and again at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 4 and 5 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside and close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement areas section below).

Between the evenings of 5 and 6 January, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. All explosions were recorded in areas south-west of Putylyne (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 6 and 7 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, six explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Man injured as a result of gunfire in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

The SMM’s access to the area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) has been limited in recent months due to a deteriorating security situation near that location. On 5 January, at a bus station in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, a man (in his fifties) who identified himself as a bus driver told the Mission that one of his passengers had been injured on 22 September 2018 when the bus had been hit by a bullet near the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area. He said the bus had been travelling along its usual route from Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) to Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. At the station, the Mission saw a bus with a hole in a metal luggage rack located above the third window on the bus’s left side. It assessed the damage as caused by small-arms fire. The wife (in her thirties) of the injured passenger told the SMM that on 22 September 2018 a shard of glass had caused a cut to her husband’s ear while he had been on the bus from Pervomaisk to Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. She said he had heard a loud noise and seen the window next to him shattering. An employee (woman, in her forties) of a bookshop near the bus station in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka told the Mission that on 22 September 2018 she had seen a bus with a broken window arriving at the station and one of its passengers holding his hand over his ear.

Fresh damage from gunfire to a functional school and a store in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 4 January, on the third floor of a school building at Myru Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM saw a hole in a partially shattered pane of a west-north-west-facing window. On the first floor, the Mission saw another hole in a partially shattered window pane and another partially shattered window pane of two west-north-west-facing windows.

At 12a Myru Street, about 100m north-east of the above-mentioned school, the SMM saw a hole in the north-west-facing exterior wall of a shop building.

In both cases the Mission assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. Four women (in their forties and fifties) who identified themselves as residents of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka told the SMM there had been gunfire in this area in the afternoons of 25 December 2018 and of 1 January, and in the evening of 4 January.

Disengagement areas[2]

In the early morning and evening of 5 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 20 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-4km east and east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard two bursts of undetermined weapons at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south (assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned on the southern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, it heard a shot and 12 bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 6 and 7 January, positioned close to the disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

On 5, 6 and 7 January, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

On 6 January, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation near the disengagement area.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

4 January

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• 20 tanks (11 T-64 and nine T-72), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 12 towed howitzers (D-30, Lyagushka, 122mm), 12 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 28 tanks (13 T-64 and 15 T-72) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 3 January 2019).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

5 January

• An armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Avdiivka
• An APC (MT-LB) in Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk)
• A combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk)

7 January

• An anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

5 January

• An infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk)

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) (5 January) and near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) (5 and 6 January) and to power lines near Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) (6 January). It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Public gathering in Kyiv related to the granting of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine

On 7 January, in Kyiv, the SMM monitored a peaceful public gathering at the Sofiiska Square in front of the Saint Sophia Cathedral (24 Volodymyrska Street) to mark the reception of the tomos by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. In the morning the Mission saw about 300 and in the afternoon about 7,000 people (mixed gender and ages) gathered at the Sofiiska Square (about 500 people were queueing to enter the premises of the Cathedral, reportedly to see the tomos which was on display inside) and the nearby Mykhailivska Square. At and near the Sofiiska Square, it saw at least three dialogue police officers, four National Guard buses and two mobile-detention trucks.

On the same day, inside the main church of the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra complex (15 Lavrska Street) the SMM saw about 2,000 people (mixed gender and ages) participating in a liturgical service on the occasion of Orthodox Christmas. Inside and outside the complex, the Mission saw four law enforcement officers as well as a police car parked near the main entrance.

Public gathering in Novooleksiivka

On 4 January, in Novooleksiivka (189km south-east of Kherson), the Mission monitored a peaceful public gathering in support of a detained Crimean Tatar activist. Near a mosque at 14 Zlahody Street, the Mission saw about 120 people (mixed gender and ages), some of them holding banners reading “#FreeEdemBekirov”, and one police officer nearby.

Other observations

On 4 January, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point in Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson).

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see  below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access

• On 5 January, at a checkpoint near Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from travelling westwards toward Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), citing “ongoing kinetic activity and poor road conditions”.
• On 6 January, at a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage toward the settlement, citing “lack of prior notification of the SMM’s intentions” and “unpassable roads due to winter weather”.
• On 6 January, near Leonove (non-government-controlled, formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk), three members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a border crossing point in Leonove, citing “poor road conditions”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.  
• On 7 January, at a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational. Between the evenings of 4 and 5 January and between the evenings of 6 and 7 January, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). During the reporting period the data on persons crossing was not available.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

Due to the Russian national holidays, the OM was not able to receive and process the usual data on persons crossing at the two border checkpoints usually received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits observed crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 47; twenty-one of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and twenty-six into Ukraine (all these crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting period, twenty-six families were observed overall (thirteen crossing into the Russian Federation and thirteen into Ukraine).

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed overall 1,096 buses (576 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 520 bound for Ukraine).

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the “irregular” route “Stakhanov-Kyiv” was noted.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the total number of trucks noted by the OTs was 1,380 (484 at the Gukovo BCP and 896 at the Donetsk BCP); 697 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 683 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation and in Belarus.

Among them, the OTs observed 106 tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

The total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP was 290: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 96 trucks (33 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 194 trucks (67 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[1] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation.

During the reporting period, 343 minivans were observed (176 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 167 into Ukraine).

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the last three weeks, the OTs heard trains on eleven occasions; the OTs assessed that seven trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the other four to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.On 27 December, the OTs observed two ambulances at the Donetsk and Gukovo BCPs (one at each BCP). The ambulances arrived at the BCPs from the Russian Federation and after a while returned without crossing the border into Ukraine.

The first ambulance arrived at 09:36 at the Gukovo BCP and parked behind the main building until it crossed back into the Russian Federation at 09:55.

At 15:15, another ambulance (with Russian Federation licence plates) arrived at the Donetsk BCP. The OT observed at least two persons inside (a driver and a passenger). The vehicle parked outside the main building while the passenger from the ambulance entered the main building. At 15:45, the ambulance returned to the Russian Federation.

In each instance, the OTs did not observe any injured persons, or patients inside the two vehicles.           

 

Convoy

On 20 December at 08:20 (Moscow time), the eighty-second[2] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of 22 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 22 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 20:57 on 20 December (for more details see: https://www.osce.org/observer-mission-at-russian-checkpoints-gukovo-and-donetsk/407522 ).

 

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 4 December to 8 January 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

[2] According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the eighty-fourth Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the eighty-second convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

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