Central Europe

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed fresh impact craters in Kriakivka and Molodizhne as the result of shelling.
• The SMM observed a ceasefire violation inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as in non-government-controlled Izvaryne and Sievernyi, areas near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 25 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 75 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded mainly at southerly and south-westerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and in areas south-west and west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 165 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were explosions, of which about 95 per cent were recorded at south-south-westerly and east-south-easterly directions of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk), including about 40 explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds recorded in areas east-south-east of Kriakivka.

Fresh impact craters as the result of shelling in Kriakivka and Molodizhne

On the western edge of Kriakivka, the SMM observed a fresh crater on the northern side of a road. The snow around the crater was covered by soot, and small trees and branches north of the impact site were lacerated, which the SMM assessed as shrapnel and blast damage. The SMM assessed that a projectile had been fired from a southerly direction but could not assess its type or calibre. The SMM observed civilian houses about 100m from the crater and a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint about 250m from the crater.

About 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two fresh impact craters near road T-0504: the first, 5m north of the road, and the second around 50m south of the road. Due to security considerations, the SMM could not make further assessments.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 31 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a burst at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

30 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• 26 tanks (T-64) in a wooded area near Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk).

31 January

The SMM saw:

• a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) traveling north-west on T-1306 road in Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk) and
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) being transported on a flatbed truck traveling north-west on road T0516 near Ivanopillia (51km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

30 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019.)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

30 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Loskutivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

31 January

The SMM saw:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) near Sentianivka (44km west of Luhansk);
• six armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) on the eastern edge of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) in northern Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk), the phenol sludge reservoir in Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), power lines in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and water pipelines near the neighbourhood of Shakta 6-7 in Horlivka, as well as to enable an inspection of water wells at the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside of Government control*

While at a border crossing point near  Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for 11 minutes, the SMM observed 41 trucks (15 with Ukrainian, nine with Belarusian, seven with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as nine with “LPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. A truck driver in the queue told the SMM he had already been waiting 41 hours at the crossing point. Two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw four people exiting Ukraine and one person entering Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 11 minutes, the SMM observed four people entering Ukraine and no pedestrians exiting Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, told the SMM that it did not have “permission” to be present at the border crossing point and to leave the area. (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019.)
• At a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that there “is no cooperation between the “LPR” and the OSCE” and told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its   camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 1 February 2019 – Although there was a decrease in the level of violence following a recommitment to the ceasefire on the occasion of the New Year/Christmas festivities, an increase in ceasefire violations in recent weeks has again brought more suffering to civilians living along the contact line, the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Ertugrul Apakan, said in his address to the OSCE Permanent Council today in Vienna.

Briefing representatives of the OSCE’s participating States and Partners for Co-operation, Apakan called for a full and sustainable ceasefire and the full withdrawal of heavy weapons, in particular from populated areas. He also emphasized the threat posed by the continued presence of mines and unexploded ordnance. “We are hopeful that we will see in the coming months renewed efforts in the field of humanitarian mine action, to enhance safety around schools, kindergartens, hospitals, and entry-exit check points,” he said.

Citing the example of many women on the contact line – who have remained to ensure the maintenance of facilities critical to the well-being of the civilian population – Apakan said the priority must be on protecting civilians. “In line with the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship’s priorities, the Mission will increase its focus on people, on dialogue, and on peacebuilding,” he said. “Inclusivity is a crucial aspect of these efforts.”

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ATHENS, 1 February 2019 – A two-day regional conference on preventing trafficking in human beings through government procurement practices and measures, with a focus on the Balkan region, concluded yesterday in Athens, Greece.

The conference, organized by the Office of the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings in partnership with the Mayor’s Office of Athens, the Office of the National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ONR), the Athens Partnership and Bloomberg Associates, brought together over 200 participants from 15 countries.

Public procurement amounts to trillions of euros of public spending in the OSCE region.

Procurement and anti-trafficking experts, representatives of the city, regional and national governments, and representatives of international and non-governmental organizations explored how governments can leverage this purchasing power through their procurement practices and measures to help prevent human trafficking and labour exploitation in their supply chains.

During the conference, the Mayor of Athens, Yiorgos Kaminis, announced a new pilot program to develop policies and implement practices aimed at ensuring, to the fullest extent possible, that the City of Athens does not purchase goods manufactured or contract services provided by victims of human trafficking.

“Governments have a crucial part to play in working towards a supply chain that is free of human trafficking and forced labour – and not just at the national level,” said Heracles Moskoff, National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings. “We see with the City of Athens’s pilot programme a tremendous leadership role by a municipal government in this fight, and it is an example that we want to replicate throughout other cities in Greece.”

Valiant Richey, OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, noted the importance of the conference’s cross-sectoral group of stakeholders, including attorneys who have worked with trafficking victims, procurement and anti-trafficking officials, multi-national companies, and NGOs. “By bringing together all of the stakeholders who can play a role in developing important government anti-trafficking measures, we can ensure that our efforts can have a significant – and sustainable – impact, in Athens, Greece, the Balkans region, and beyond,” said Richey.

Rose Gill Hearn, former Commissioner of the New York City Department of Investigation during the Bloomberg Administration and Principal of the Municipal Integrity Practice at Bloomberg Associates, an international philanthropic consultancy and a co-organizer of the conference, said: “The City of Athens, through its anti-trafficking and public procurement pilot programme, is demonstrating its commitment to working against the scourge of labour exploitation in supply chains. We truly applaud Mayor Kaminis for supporting this conference and initiative to analyse how cities can use their buying power – collectively billions of euro – to safeguard against tainted procurement.”

The second day of the conference featured in-depth sessions on the recommendations of the OSCE’s Model Guidelines on Government Measures to Prevent Trafficking for Labour Exploitation in Supply Chains.  

Speakers discussed action that governments can undertake to prevent trafficking in supply chains, such as identifying industry-specific trafficking risks, training public procurement officials and vendors, implementing anti-trafficking due diligence in the procurement process, and developing monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.

This year, the OSCE will continue to lead efforts to address labour exploitation through responsible public procurement. The office of the Special Representative will run a series of workshops to strengthen the capacities of practitioners from OSCE participating States to prevent human trafficking in supply chains.

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PRISTINA, 1 February 2019 – The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly encourages all channels of dialogue, including parliamentary diplomacy, as a means to support and improve reconciliation and co-operation in the South East European region, British parliamentarian Mark Pritchard emphasized today in a visit to Pristina, Mitrovica and Gracanica.

Pritchard, who serves as the PA’s Special Representative on South East Europe, has met over the past two days with leaders including Ramush Haradinaj, members of parliament and religious figures, as well as representatives of the OSCE’s Mission in Kosovo.

In meetings, Pritchard has conveyed full support to the European Union-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, while reiterating the OSCE PA’s status-neutral approach. He has followed recent discussions regarding proposed border changes, the taxes issue and the transformation of the security forces, Pritchard said.

“Progress is urgently needed in the normalization of relations between Belgrade in Pristina,” Pritchard said. “For real progress to be made it is vital that dialogue continues in good faith and that provocative actions are avoided. As we saw in last week’s agreement between Skopje and Athens over the ‘Macedonia’ name issue, compromise is sometimes difficult but it is the only way forward. I hope that Pristina and Belgrade can follow the same spirit of compromise.”

The Special Representative emphasized that effective regional co-operation is vital for South East Europe and the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue plays a key role in this respect.

In meetings at OSCE Mission in Kosovo offices in Pristina and Mitrovica, as well as in Gracanica, Pritchard expressed support for the Mission’s work in promoting civic participation, developing democratic institutions, gender mainstreaming, promoting anti-discrimination mechanisms, advancing police training, and countering terrorism and cyberthreats. The Mission’s work in supporting the implementation of agreements stemming from the EU-facilitated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade is also vital, he said.

“As Prime Minister Theresa May recently stated, history has shown that a secure and stable Western Balkans region means a secure and stable Europe,” Pritchard said. “The work of the OSCE in the region has been indispensable in promoting that stability.”

He highlighted examples of the OSCE PA’s work in the region, including the visit of the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Migration to Serbia on 10-12 June 2018, and a visit of the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 5-8 June 2018.

Pritchard continues his programme with meetings with religious leaders in Gracanica and additional meetings in Pristina.

Photos of Special Representative's field visit are available on Flickr.

For a video of a recent interview that Pritchard gave about his work as Special Representative, please click here. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed fresh damage from shelling at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, as well as military presence in the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line; it also saw a high number of weapons, including about 60 tanks, beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas.
• It continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*
• The SMM observed that the wooden boxes at the Myronivskyi reservoir had been removed.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 75 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded mainly at south-easterly and south-westerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and in areas south-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM camera at the DFS recorded ceasefire violations, including explosions assessed as impacts, as close as 100-500m from the camera.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 165 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 25 explosions). More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north and west-north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

Fresh mortar impacts at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area

On 30 January, at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw nine fresh impacts, assessed as caused by mortar rounds, as well as nine tailfins of 120mm mortar rounds and two fuse tips located within a 4m radius of the impacts. At the same checkpoint, the SMM also saw fresh shrapnel marks on a north-facing concrete block (which had been moved 1m south of its regular position) and dents and fresh shrapnel damage on a north-facing wall of a prefabricated container. The Mission also observed the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round and fuse tip fragments 2m north of the concrete block. About 10m south of the same checkpoint, the SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (tailfin of a 120mm mortar round) covered with a used tire and tree branches and an improvised red square mine hazard sign with “Stop, Mines” written in Russian 2m south from the UXO, as well as the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round embedded in the asphalt of the road,. The SMM also saw three fresh mortar impacts and fragments of the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round nearby. The SMM assessed that all the above mortar rounds were fired from a west-north-westerly direction. An unarmed member of the armed formations told the Mission that there had been shelling in the early afternoon hours of 29 January.

On the evening of 29 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in flight (all from north to south) at an assessed range of 2-4km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the morning of 30 January, positioned near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and 12 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km east and north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Inside the Zolote disengagement area (south of the northern edge), the SMM saw three armed soldiers and a military truck  and two other soldiers about 200m west of the above soldiers.

Positioned on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two shots at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) close to residential areas in Zoloti Pisky (12km north-west of Donetsk);
• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a residential area in Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk); and
• a mortar (a probable 2B11) stationary near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk).

30 January

The SMM saw:

• two towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) being transported south on road H-21 near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three stationary mortars (2B11) in Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk) and
• seven stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 15 January 2019).

30 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a stationary tank (T-64) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm), two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and a surface-to-air-missile system (9K35) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 30 January 2019).

The SMM saw:

• four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) stationary on road H-21 near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

30 January

The SMM saw:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) being transported south on road H20 near Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk) and
• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and three tanks (T-72) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne.

Non-government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 58 tanks (55 T-72 and three T-64) at a training area near Ternove (see above);
• nine mortars (2B11), four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1), three tanks (T-64) and six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 18 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) at a compound in Zelenyi Hai (49km south-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top, two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) in Krasnohorivka and
• an APC (BMP-1KSh) near Shchastia.

Non-government-controlled areas

30 January

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two fresh craters, assessed as impacts of mortar (82mm) rounds next to road T0504, about 3.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

At 10:10 on 30 January, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw about 2,500 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and no people queueing in the opposite direction. About two hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 600 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 200 people queuing to travel in the opposite direction.  

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and water pipelines near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) as well as to enable an inspection of water wells at the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Wooden boxes removed at Myronivskyi reservoir in Donetsk region

The SMM observed that the two dark green square wooden boxes (and connected wires) previously seen at the metal gates of a sluice on the northern side of the Myronivskyi reservoir and close to a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Roty (government-controlled, 66km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 15 January 2019) were no longer there. An unarmed soldier told the SMM that the boxes had been removed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on 23 January.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia, an armed member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

Other impediments:

• On 29 January, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas north and north-east of Donetsk as well as in areas south-east of Luhansk.[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk was not operational. Winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its   camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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CHISINAU, 31 January 2019 – The Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch, today expressed his concern that recent developments with regard to the village of Varnita and the opening of a Transdniestrian socio-cultural centre in Moscow could undermine the trust and confidence built over the past years in the Transdniestrian settlement process.

“As the OSCE mediator in the Transdniestrian settlement process, I call on both Sides to keep to the course of constructive interaction and confidence building and to refrain from any unilateral actions which could be perceived as provocative or would lead to tensions,” Neukirch said.

He underlined that the 57 OSCE participating States confirmed at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Milan last December once again their commitment to a comprehensive, peaceful and sustainable settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders with a special status for Transdniestria that fully guarantees the human, political, economic and social rights of its population.

“It is equally clear that the village of Varnita is administered by the local authorities confirmed in the Moldovan local elections of June 2015,” the Head of Mission added.

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Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

TIRANA, 31 January 2019 - Transparency International published the results of its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2018 ranking Albania at place 99 among the 180 countries and territories included in the index.

Albania scored 36 out of 100 points, registering a drop of two points from the 2017 rating and a drop of three points from 2016.

"The lack of progress in fighting corruption remains one of the most serious problems confronted by many countries around the world, weakening democratic regimes by undermining citizen’s trust in democratic process. Corruption erodes public trust and slants economic growth in newly democratized countries. Unfortunately, most of the countries of South-Eastern Europe register a regress compared with last year. The negative trend in Albania is all the more worrying as it is a reversal of a notable improvement in corruption perceptions between 2013 and 2016", said OSCE Head of Presence Bernd Borchardt.

Transparency International notes that a possible cause of this reverse trend is the political stalemate that the country has seen in 2018, which led to the blocking of important anti-corruption reforms, while the continuation of the judicial vetting process and the setting up of new anti-corruption institutions are encouraging, but still to produce results.

"We see with concern the reverse in perceptions of corruption in Albania," said Borchardt. "The results of the index show that Albania still has to reform its system of public institutions, which is perceived as more corrupt than in the last two years."

Borchardt said that ongoing reforms including the vetting of the judiciary should be completed and new anti-corruption institutions set up: "We look forward to the establishment of the new anti-corruption institutions, and continue to call on public institutions and the rule of law agencies in Albania to proceed with the implementation of justice and anti-corruption reforms in line with international recommendations and obligations of the United Nations Convention against Corruption."

He stressed the role citizens and civil society can play: "Albanian citizens should refuse corruption and report any corruption cases to the government. Civil society should also continuously monitor public life in the country and report regularly on corruption-related issues, keeping the topic alive in the public space, while supporting the development of relevant legislation, institutions and expertise."

"The OSCE Presence in Albania regrets that the positive trend in public perceptions since 2013 was reversed in 2017 and even worsened in 2018. We remain committed to supporting Albania in its fight against corruption," concluded Borchardt.

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe donated forensic training equipment to the Forensics Department and Academy of Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry on 30 January 2019 in Dushanbe. The donated equipment includes six compact bullet catchers, four metal hardness testers, four laboratory scales, one microscope, thirty handbooks on forensic topics, five desktops, one projector with screen, and two digital video cameras.

Major-General Ikrom Umarzoda, Deputy Minister of Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry; Major General Farhodbek Shodmonzoda, the National Co-ordinator for Police Reform; Major General Fayzali Sharifzoda, Head of the Interior Ministry’s Academy; Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf Abdurahmonzoda, Deputy Head of the Interior Ministry’s Forensics Department as well as representatives of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe participated in the donation ceremony.

"This technical support will help to strengthen technical capacities of the Interior Ministry’s Forensics Department to effectively prevent and counter crimes and to protect the safety of the public,” said Major-General Ikrom Umarzoda, Deputy Minister of Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry.

Major General Fayzali Sharifzoda, Head of the Interior Ministry’s Academy noted the importance of the OSCE’s help for practical training of police officers.

“The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe supports the Tajik law enforcement forces in increasing their capacity to conduct evidence-based investigations, in accordance with modern approaches to policing,” said Acting Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe Fejzo Numanaj. “In close co-operation with the Interior Ministry, the OSCE offers systematic training for police officers and prosecutors on forensics-related topics, leadership and management, respect for human rights and gender mainstreaming. The Ministry’s forensic units play an important role in providing fair and timely criminal proceedings, and protecting the rights of citizens.”

MINSK, 31 January 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 30 January 2019:

“In my previous speeches, I have repeatedly stressed that safeguarding decent living conditions for civilians in the conflict zone is the key priority of our activities.

As you know, last year the number of civilian casualties has significantly decreased, reaching the lowest level since the beginning of the conflict. This trend continues. According to preliminary data of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, no civilian deaths have been registered since the beginning of this year until the day before yesterday.

This is a clear achievement of our work here, in Minsk.

Drawing on my more than three years of experience, I would like once again to emphasise my full commitment to the Minsk Agreements and personal conviction that they are indispensable and irreplaceable for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the east of Ukraine.

This is our common task – mine, that of the Coordinators of the Working Groups and of all the participants of the Minsk process – to do our utmost for their swift and full implementation.

At the end of last week, on 25 January 2019, a teleconference of Diplomatic Advisers of the Normandy Four took place. It was agreed to give priority to certain humanitarian issues, such as improved access to and crossing of the line of contact, the exchange of detainees, the preservation of vital civilian infrastructure and many others. Accordingly, these topics have become the subject to discussion today for the TCG and its Working Groups.

The Economic Working Group discussed topical issues of water deliveries, including preparations for the audit of the "Voda Donbasa" company. The intended duration of the audit is one year. Together with a few others, issues concerning the payment of pensions to residents of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR) were also considered.

This was the first meeting of the Economic Working Group that was led by its new Co-ordinator, the former German Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Ulrich Brandenburg.

On behalf of the TCG and myself, I once again congratulate Mr Brandenburg on his appointment and wish him success on this post.

In the Working Group on Security, the main topic of discussion was the general security situation in the conflict zone and issues of compliance with the ceasefire.

The Humanitarian Working Group paid attention, inter alia, to the discussion of issues related to the exchange of detainees.

The Political Working Group took forward its exchanges on its well-known agenda, namely the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR as stipulated by the Minsk agreements.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM observed more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*
• In Lviv and Chernivtsi, the SMM observed gatherings marking International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 90 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-westerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 25 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no ceasefire violations). The highest number of ceasefire violations was recorded west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh impact craters in Raivka       

At the checkpoint of the armed formations in Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw five fresh craters in a field about 15m north of the checkpoint and about 300m from the nearest residential building. The SMM assessed the craters were caused by mortar rounds (82mm), likely fired from a westerly or north-westerly direction. Members of the armed formations told the SMM that there had been shelling on the evening of 27 January. 

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 28 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded six projectiles in flight (four from north-west to south-east and two from north to south) at an assessed range of 1-4km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area), as well as a projectile in flight from south-west to north-east at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). In the early morning hours of 29 January, the same camera recorded two projectiles in flight from south to north at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 29 January, positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

29 January

The SMM saw:

• five stationary multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and
• five anti-tanks guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being towed by trucks near Metolkine (69km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

28 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• six tanks (T-72) and six self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm, two probable) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 28 January 2019).

29 January

The SMM saw:                  

• ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), an anti-tank guided missile system (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm), six self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm, two probable), 11 tanks (ten T-72 and one undetermined type) in the same abovementioned area of the railway station in Rubizhne;
• a tank (T-72) east of Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an anti-tank gun (MT-12) near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn[4]

Heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

29 January

• 63 towed howitzers (45 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and 18 2A36 Giatsint-S, 152mm) remained missing.

Indications of military in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

28 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) near Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol).

29 January

The SMM saw:

• an APC (Saxon) near Peredilske (24km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) east of Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to power lines in Berehove (non-government-controlled, 23km east of Luhansk) and a water pipeline near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk), as well as to facilitate inspection and repairs to a water conduit near Nyzhnie (government-controlled, 56km north-west of Luhansk) and Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point in Chonhar

On 27 and 28 January, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 28 January 2019).

Gatherings marking International Holocaust Remembrance Day

On 27 January in Lviv, the SMM monitored two public gatherings to commemorate International Holocaust Remembrance Day. At the first gathering, taking place on Chornovola Avenue, the former location of the Jewish ghetto during the Second World War, the Mission saw about 80 people (men and women, 60-80 years old) and seven police officers present. At the second gathering, on the location of the former Yanivskyi concentration camp on Omelian Kovch Street, it saw about 25 people (men and women, 60 years old) and three police officers present. The SMM also monitored a similar public gathering in Chernivtsi on 28 January. On Cheliuskintsiv Street, it saw about 70 people (mixed gender, mixed ages) and six police officers. During all three gatherings, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk was not operational. Winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that some of these sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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410453 Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day consultation between the OSCE and Kosovo authorities on how to set up an Advance Passenger Information (API) system to detect and thwart the movement of foreign terrorist fighters was organized from 28 to 30 January.

Twenty-five representatives from relevant agencies with responsibility for passenger processing, including members of the Police and Customs Administration, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Agency for Personal Data Protection, as well as legal and IT experts from the Ministry of Internal Affairs participated in the consultation.

Organized by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department with the support of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, this was the third in a series of consultation meetings on this topic held across the OSCE area.

The main purpose of the consultation was to provide legal and technical support for the smooth implementation of the recommendations included in the roadmap for setting up an API system that was drafted during a workshop in Prishtinë/Priština from 20 to 22 February 2018.

An independent consultant analysed the existing laws on aviation security and identified ways for improving them to grant government officials the legal authority to collect, process and store passenger data in a way that the rights to privacy and data protection are guaranteed. Furthermore, participants reviewed and updated the roadmap based on the conclusions of the discussions and agreed on the next steps for implementing an API system.

The first day of meetings was attended by Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj and Ambassador Jan Braathu, Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. In his speech, Haradinaj highlighted the added value of API systems to combat global threats like terrorism and organized crime, and stressed the importance of close co-operation among law enforcement agencies to ensure its effectiveness.

API systems are electronic communications systems through which biographic data from a traveller’s passport and flight details are collected by airlines and transmitted to border control agencies before a flight’s departure or arrival.

The OSCE will continue working with local authorities across the OSCE area to develop API implementation plans as part of the Organization’s activities to enhance border security. The next API consultations will take place in Tashkent from 4 to 6 February and Chisinau from 18 to 20 March.

BELGRADE, 29 January 2019 – Concluding a three-day visit to Serbia, Samuel Goda, the Special Representative of the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship on Youth and Security, highlighted the crucial role of youth in strengthening comprehensive security and co-operation. Goda reiterated that for Slovakia young people are key for a safer future in Europe.

Learning about the OSCE Mission to Serbia’s cross-dimensional initiatives with and for youth, Goda stressed the importance of the OSCE’s work to promote youth rights, strengthen inclusive youth policies and build capacities of young women and men in the areas of non-discrimination, media literacy and regional co-operation.

“Young women and men have unique perspectives on many key challenges of today’s world. We have to listen to their ideas and concerns,” said Goda, recalling the OSCE Declaration on the Role of Youth in Contributing to Peace and Security Efforts adopted at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Milan last month.

In his meeting with the Head of the Mission to Serbia, Andrea Orizio, Goda welcomed the Mission’s strategic approach to youth mainstreaming.

Head of Mission Orizio said: “Because of the cross-cutting nature of the challenges facing youth, the OSCE Mission to Serbia has been investing in youth across all our programmes. We are in the process of launching an innovative initiative that will allow us to embed a youth focus in all our activities in a systematic way, from the conception to the implementation of projects. We hope to serve as a role model for the region."

After an interactive exchange with youth-led civil society organizations, Goda was received by the Serbian Minister of Youth and Sports, Vanja Udovičić, to discuss how to promote the participation of young people.

“The OSCE provided substantial input on defining the goals for our National Youth Strategy,” said Udovičić. “We are looking forward to continuing the co-operation on projects through which young men and women will be engaged in strengthening security and peacebuilding in the region.”

The Special Representative later participated in the annual meeting of OSCE Youth Focal Points from field operations in the Western Balkans.

“Through their participation in inclusive education programmes and inter-communal dialogue, young people are making a real difference on the ground. The Slovak Chairmanship is committed to strengthening the organization’s ability to make better use of this expertise,” said Goda at the meeting. He spoke about the Chairmanship’s plans to support a young expert-led process, which will culminate in a Youth Forum in Bratislava.

While in Serbia, Goda also visited the city of Novi Sad to attend its inauguration as European Youth Capital. 

The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Special Representative on Youth and Security represents a youth voice within the OSCE and advises the Chairperson-in-Office on youth policy issues. He advocates for systematic youth participation and the positive role youth can play throughout the whole conflict cycle and in protracted conflicts. Learn more at ww.osce.org/youth, Twitter: @OSCEyouthSR and Facebook: www.facebook.com/OSCEyouthSR and by following #OSCEyouth across social media networks.

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VIENNA, 29 January 2019 – The rapid digitalization process taking place across the OSCE area is generating substantial changes in all spheres of life and carries many security implications, including in the economic and environmental dimension, the Parliamentary Assembly’s Nilza de Sena and Elona Gjebrea-Hoxha said today in Vienna.

National parliaments must keep abreast of developments in this field and respond appropriately with relevant legislation, de Sena said in an address to the First Preparatory Meeting of the 27th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum (EEF). She highlighted that human beings should remain at the center of the digitalization process and drew attention to the sharp increase of energy consumption and digitalization’s impacts on the labour market. Moreover, de Sena stressed that legal protection of personal data must be duly addressed.

A member of parliament from Portugal and Chair of the OSCE PA’s Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment, de Sena was speaking at session four of the EEF meeting, being held this week under the theme, “Promoting economic progress and security in the OSCE area through energy co-operation, new technologies, good governance and connectivity in the digital era.”

She was joined in Vienna by Gjebrea-Hoxha, a member of parliament from Albania and Rapporteur of the OSCE PA’s economic and environmental committee. Gjebrea-Hoxha also spoke today at the EEF, noting that the economy and the environment should be issues of focus of all governments. She emphasized the role of parliamentarians in promoting security and appreciated the support and recommendations of the OSCE on topics that are related to the daily lives of citizens and which need to be addressed properly with the support of all OSCE structures in co-operation with each other.

Gjebrea-Hoxha and de Sena held a series of bilateral meetings on the margins of the EEF. They met Monday with Ambassador Kairat Sarybay, Chair of the OSCE Economic and Environmental Committee, and Ambassador Radomír Boháč, Chair of the OSCE Permanent Council. Today they met with OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger and Vuk Zugic, Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.

In meetings, de Sena and Gjebrea-Hoxha have stressed that the OSCE area must be one of co-operation between OSCE countries and noted that the Organization can also serve as a trendsetter for the broader international community.

Satisfaction was expressed for the OSCE Slovak Chairmanship’s focus on the economic and environmental dimension as a priority. The PA members also expressed appreciation that the PA’s work was duly reflected in the latest Ministerial Council documents in this context, noting the need to continue advancing this good co-operation.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons was 7,766 at both BCPs. The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 8,277 to 7,766 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 194 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 24 this week (compared to 12 last week); 13 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 11 into Ukraine (79 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, four families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and three were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when three families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and three into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (308 compared to 327 observed during the previous week). There were 150 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 158 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Stakhanov- Kyiv and Kyiv.  

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 725 to 735 (239 at the Gukovo BCP and 496 at the Donetsk BCP); 390 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 345 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation.                                                                                           

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 32 (compared to 59 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 214 to 162: of the total number of trucks scanned, 97 trucks (60 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 65 trucks (40 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 123 to 107 vehicles; 58 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 49 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on four occasions, compared to same amount (four) last week; the OTs assessed that two trains was travelling to the Russian Federation and the other two to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. The OM also noticed vehicles with “DPR” plates and Belarusian licence plates.

On 25 January at 20:11 at Donetsk BCP, one police vehicle entered the BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle went behind the main building and was no longer visible to the OTs. At 20:30, the police vehicle returned from the area of the main building heading towards the Russian Federation. Later, same day at 20:39, the OTs observed one ambulance arriving at the BCP from the Russian Federation, which parked outside the main building. At 20:57 the same day, the ambulance returned in the direction of the Russian Federation. Due to parked trucks and buses, it was not possible to observe any more detail.

On 28 January at 08:00 at Donetsk BCP, the OTs observed one civilian car with a red flag and inscription “Referendum for Donbas” on the side of the vehicle. The side window was open with the flag attached to a wooden pole. The vehicle crossed the BCP from the direction of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 25 December 2018 to 29 January 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).          

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM observed a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a man who died while crossing the contact line in Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted near Horlivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions). The highest number of ceasefire violations was recorded in areas west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), while the highest number of explosions was recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, compared with the previous 24 hours, when the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, including one explosion.

Man died while crossing the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

The SMM followed up on reports that a man (68 years old) died while crossing the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) on 28 January. At the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), a representative of an international organization said that a man had collapsed at 13:45 near a humanitarian container used as a heating point and had not been able to be revived, despite having been provided first aid. A police officer at the same location told the SMM that the man had been traveling to non-government-controlled areas with his wife and son and that his body had been taken to the morgue in Stanytsia Luhanska.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned in the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

26 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• 14 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 28 December 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

26 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) stationary inside the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and two towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) waiting to be loaded onto trains.

28 January

The SMM saw:

• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a military compound near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk) and
• a military truck towing a mortar (2B9)  near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

26 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 19 tanks (18 T-64 and one T-72), 11 towed mortars (120mm) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at a training area near Buhaivka (weapons in violation seen at the same location, see above) and
• 11 tanks (ten T-64 and one T-72 with main gun removed) at a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk). (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 28 December 2018).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

28 January

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Saxon) about 3.5km north-east of Peredilske (24km north-west of Luhansk);
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck and two APCs (a BTR-60 and a Saxon), all in areas north-west of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk);
• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (a BMP-1 and a BMP variant) and an APC military ambulance (MT-LB type) on the eastern outskirts of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military vehicle on an APC (MT-LB) chassis west of Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

28 January

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military truck in Luhansk city.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to water pipelines near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) and to facilitate the inspection of water wells at a pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Public gathering in honour of Maidan activist

In Kyiv, on 26 January, the SMM observed about 80 people (mostly men, about 20-50 years-old) marching from Mykhailivska Square to an area near Dynamo Stadium in tribute to a Maidan activist who lost his life on 22 January 2014. Some participants were wearing camouflage military-style uniforms and others were carrying torches as well as flags, including those of the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People's Self-Defence and the Right Sector. The SMM observed 15 police officers present along the route and a bus of about 30 police officers in riot gear near the stadium. The SMM did not observe any incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an armed man wearing camouflage clothing told the SMM that it had to leave the area because his “superior” was not informed about the SMM’s arrival. The SMM explained its mandate, and the armed man then asked the SMM to wait. About ten minutes later, another man in camouflage clothing told the SMM it had to leave the area, as he had spoken with “people in Donetsk”, and that the SMM had no right to be present at the checkpoint or speak with civilians present.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska was not operational. Winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of the majority of the SMM cameras throughout the reporting period.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its   camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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BRATISLAVA, 29 January 2019 – Strengthening the security of Jewish people and communities, and the roles that education and Holocaust remembrance, media and social media, and civil society can play in combating anti-Semitism are the focus of a major conference to be opened by OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Foreign Minister, Miroslav Lajčák, in Bratislava on 5 February.

The conference is the first to be organized by Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship and will bring together government representatives, political leaders, as well as stakeholders from academia, civil society and the media to discuss diverse and complementary approaches to addressing anti-Semitism.

The participants will review the relevance of these approaches to the domestic contexts of OSCE participating States, and their applicability to strategies promoting tolerance and non-discrimination.

The conference is organized with the support of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

Alongside the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Minister Miroslav Lajčák the conference will open with remarks by: Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ODIHR Director; Ronald S. Lauder, President of the World Jewish Congress; Igor Rintel, President of the Central Union of Jewish Religious Communities in Slovakia; and Rabbi Andrew Baker, Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Anti-Semitism.

Media representatives are invited to cover the conference’s six opening speakers starting at 15:00 on Tuesday, 5 February 2019 at the Grand Hotel River Park, Dvořákovo nábrežie 6, Bratislava.

Media representatives wishing to attend must complete the registration form by 1 February, available at: https://www.cognitoforms.com/ODIHR1/CiOConferenceOnAntiSemitism2019

For further details, please contact:

Róbert Zoľák, at Slovakia’s Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs at +421 918 660 634 or robert.zolak@mzv.sk

or

Samuel Pavlíček, of Slovakia’s Vienna-based OSCE Chairmanship team, at +43 1 368 94 33 349 (telephone), +43 660 789 7544 (mobile) or samuel.pavlicek@mzv.sk

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A three-day national Table-top exercise on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes began on 29 January 2019 in Tashkent. The exercise, for some 45 representatives of the parliament, judges, investigators, law enforcement officers, relevant state institutions and agencies, the ICT industry, civil society, youth organizations, academia, and the media, is organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan in co-operation with the Action against Terrorism Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department.

The exercise will focus on developing national capacities to counter terrorist content online by enhancing international co-operation and the sharing of best practices in engaging with private companies and other non-state actors.

“As always, the OSCE promotes sharing of best practices among participating States,” said Ambassador John MacGregor, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan. “This event does precisely that, by providing information to state, academic, media, and civil society representatives. Moreover, there is recognition of the vital importance of further improving the role of public-private partnerships – for example, by working with social media companies like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Telegram, VKontake, and Odnoklassniki - in countering the use of the internet for terrorist purposes.”

The exercise centres on a fictional and interactive scenario developed by the Action against Terrorism Unit in collaboration with the Asia-Pacific Foundation. It serves as a realistic and strategic-level case study that is based on real-world events and emerging security threats relevant to Central Asia.

“Striking a fair balance between the methods to fight against terrorism and violent extremism online and protecting human rights can certainly be a challenging process”, said Rasa Ostaruskaite, Co-ordinator of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department. “This task can only succeed by taking a ‘whole-of-society’ approach when all stakeholders are fully involved from the start in the design of relevant responses.”

The exercise will include a number of presentations from international experts from Canada, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as advisers from the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. They will highlight relevant best practices on effectively addressing the threats posed by the exploitation of the Internet by terrorists while respecting privacy and freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and religion or belief, as well as the need to preserve global connectivity and the free and secure flow of information.

The exercise’s findings will lead to the creation of a road map outlining ways to improve the efficiency of efforts to address the threats posed by the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. They will help policymakers in formulating relevant, human-rights compliant and gender mainstreamed policies and frameworks on preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism online, and to integrate these recommendations into broader strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism.  

The seminar is part of a joint project with Uzbekistan aimed at providing assistance to national law enforcement agencies and relevant institutions from the non-governmental sector in building the capabilities of practitioners to effectively respond to terrorism-related threats in compliance with human rights and the rule of law.

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Between the evenings of 25 and 26 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period.
• Between the evenings of 26 and 27 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM observed damage from gunfire in residential areas in Chermalyk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. 
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area and near the Petrivske disengagement area. 
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area in Donetsk region.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate operations of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted near Kostiantynivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 25 and 26 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violationswere recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 26 and 27 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east and south-east of Svitlodarsk, west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk)(see the disengagement areas section below).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 25 and 26 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside and close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement areas section below).

Between the evenings of 26 and 27 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous 24 hours. 

Damage from gunfire to residential buildings in Chermalyk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 26 January, at 59 Naberezhna Street in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw two fresh impacts in two south-east-facing walls (close to the front door) of a single-storey house, assessed as caused by small-arms fire. The SMM also saw older shrapnel damage to the same walls. The owners of the house (a couple in their fifties) showed the SMM a bullet which they said they had found on the ground below one of the impacts. They told the SMM that their house had been hit twice by gunfire on 24 January and that they are afraid to leave their residence past the late afternoon hours due to the ongoing gunfire. 

On the same day, at 13 Vojkova Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw bullet holes in five west-facing windows (one bullet hole on the first floor, two on the third floor and two on the fourth floor) of a five-storey residential building. In a second five-storey residential building (next to the first one), the SMM saw a bullet hole in a north-facing window frame located on the second floor. The Mission assessed the damage as recent and to have been caused by small-arms rounds. According to three residents of the buildings (two women and one man in their sixties), the windows were hit in the early evening hours of 11 January. A resident of the damaged apartment on the first floor of the first building said that at the time she had been hiding with her two grandchildren in a back room of the apartment due to the ongoing gunfire.

On 27 January, on the playing field of the stadium in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (and 60m south-east of the closest residential house), the SMM saw a fresh crater (1.5m in diameter), assessed to have been caused by the impact of a mortar round or recoilless-gun (SPG-type) fired from a north-north-easterly direction. At the location, three civilians (two men and one woman, aged 20-40) told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the early morning hours of 27 January.

Disengagement areas[2]

Between the evenings of 25 and 26 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 23 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and 40 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east and east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

In the morning of 27 January, positioned about 3.5km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard 35 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-east and west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

On 26 and 27 January, positioned close to the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

27 January

The SMM saw:

• 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and three multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at a railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

25 January

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• two probable surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Syrotyne (71km north-west of Luhansk).

26 January

The SMM saw:

• five MLRS (BM-21) inside a military compound near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk) and
• three towed mortars  (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) loaded on three military trucks near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

27 January

The SMM saw: 

• 11 self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) at a railway station in Kostiantynivka and
• five self-propelled mortars (2S9) near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

25 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• four armoured combat vehicles (undetermined variants) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk);
• an armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) in Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk); and
• five armoured combat vehicles (undetermined variants) near Toshkivka (60km north-west of Luhansk).

26 January

The SMM saw:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM variants) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk);
• an armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) on the northern edge of Chermalyk
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) loaded on a military truck near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

25 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) near Lohvynove (59km north-east of Donetsk)

26 January

The SMM saw:

• two military vehicles with electronic warfare equipment (one with an antenna mast and the other with a square box for an antenna mast on its roof) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 26 and 27 January, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas outside of Government control

On 26 January, while at a border crossing point in Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 73 cars (eight with Ukrainian and 40 with Russian Federation licence plates, and 25 with “DPR” plates), 14 covered cargo trucks (eight with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Bulgarian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) and 14 pedestrians exiting Ukraine as well as 24 cars (two with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, and 14 with “DPR” plates), a bus with “DPR” plates and six pedestrians  entering Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM did not observe any vehicles or pedestrians crossing in either direction. 

The SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point in Chonhar

On 23 January, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point with Crimea in Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson).

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access: 

• On 26 January, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM access to a fenced cargo area at the railway station in Kostiantynivka.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 25 and 26 January, the SMM cameras in Svitlodarsk and Stanytsia Luhanska were not operational. Between the evenings of 26 and 27 January, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska was not operational. Winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of the majority of the SMM cameras throughout the reporting period.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 28 January 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today strongly condemned the arson attack on the studios of the France Bleu Isère radio station in Grenoble, France.

Last night, the premises of the France Bleu Isère public radio station in Grenoble were completely burned down. No victims were reported, but the damage was extensive - broadcasters, journalists and technicians cannot currently use the premises.

The fire appears to have been started in two areas of the premises and the front door was forced. There has been no claim of responsibility for the attack so far.

“I strongly condemn this criminal attack against France Bleu Isère. I urge the authorities to do their utmost to identify and arrest the perpetrators who must be brought to justice,” said Désir. “Such an attack is exceptionally serious and could have had dramatic consequences for human life. It amounts to an unacceptable threat and pressure against the journalists of the public service radio station who provide independent and pluralistic information.”

The Representative recalled that this is not an isolated incident involving journalists in France. In recent weeks, several media premises and journalists have been attacked.

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Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Ilona Kazaryan

SKOPJE, 28 January 2019 – The OSCE Mission to Skopje condemns attempts to market and sell the OSCE-sponsored Commentary to the 2010 Law on Criminal Procedure.

The Commentary issued in December 2018 is a comprehensive legal resource aiming to enable the consistent application of the Law on Criminal Procedure. The publication was produced by the OSCE Mission jointly with a number of national legal experts.

"The publication sponsored by the Mission will be distributed free-of-charge to the members of the legal community in the country," said Clemens Koja, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje. "The book, as well as other similar resources developed by the Mission, is intended to help them to contribute to strengthening the rule of law in the country," he added.

The Mission owns exclusive copyrights, titles and content related to the Commentary and strongly encourages the use of the official electronic version available at www.pf.ukim.edu.mk .

Hard copies of the publication will also be disseminated among legal practitioners in the coming days.