Central Europe

406841 Andrii Dziubenko

An online, digital platform for monitoring the environment in conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine, and the first baseline assessment of a water monitoring programme in the Siverskyi Donets river basin were presented at an event in Kyiv on 17 December 2018. Both were delivered with the support of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine and are designed to be used by the country’s Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources and the State Water Agency to track the environmental situation in the region and keep the general public informed.

The online Donbas Environmental Information System, available to the public on the website of the Ministry (http://deis.menr.gov.ua), uses software and equipment provided by the Co-ordinator to gather, systematize, analyse and present information from various state-run monitoring posts in the region. The System will accumulate data on air and water quality, the state of forests and protected areas, and will also produce quarterly summary reports detailing the environmental situation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

A separate water monitoring programme has been developed to ensure permanent tracking of the water quality in the Siverskyi Donets river basin.  The OSCE Project Co-ordinator helped to define the locations from where water samples will be collected and the list of parameters to be analysed on a regular basis. To kick-start this programme, the Project Co-ordinator supported the advanced screening of surface and ground water, river sediment and fish that will serve as a baseline for future work. Such an analysis has never been conducted in Ukraine’s river basins before. From next year, Ukraine’s government has made such baseline assessments a requirement for all other river basins in the country.

“The Siverskyi Donets river basin is the main source of water for several million people, and it is at risk from direct and indirect effects of the conflict. At the same time, Ukraine has undertaken environmental reforms that promise to strengthen adherence to international commitments, including those of the OSCE,” said Jeffrey Erlich, Senior Project Officer of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator. “We therefore consider our co-operation with the Ministry of the Environment on providing timely and systematic environmental monitoring and information of critical importance.”

The tools aim to provide reliable data on issues identified by an environmental assessment conducted by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in 2017 in eastern Ukraine and subsequent recommendations for required priority actions (see the report in English and Ukrainian languages). These activities are part of the Project Co-ordinator’s assistance to the government’s response aimed at mitigating the identified risks to the environment. 

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded over 60 ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violations of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure as well as damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a compound near Donske.*
• The Mission monitored a public gathering in Kyiv.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 460 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) including about 30 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and impacts of artillery and mortar fire.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 310 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). About half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) and south-south-west of Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

In the late afternoon of 13 December, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1.5-4km south-east and south-south-east, 55 projectiles in flight (the majority from northerly to southerly directions) and one muzzle flash, all at an assessed range of 1.5-4km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south-south-west (all the above were assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as a projectile in flight (from north to south) at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).The following day, the same camera recorded a projectile in flight south to north at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the afternoon of 14 December, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

13 December

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm) under camouflage netting near Dyliivka (49km north of Donetsk); and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 December

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Novyi (54km west of Luhansk).

Indications of military presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

13 December

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Dacha (53km north of Donetsk); and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Ozarianivka.

14 December

• An IFV (BMP-1) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk);
• An IFV (BTR-4) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk);
• four anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk);
• An armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) and five IFVs (BMP-2) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and
• An IFV (BMP-2) near Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk).

The SMM also heard the sound of rotary wing aircraft (probably helicopter) flying in areas near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk).

Demining activities

The SMM saw that a previously observed piece of unexploded ordnance had been removed from the asphalt on road H-15 near the checkpoint of the armed formations east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Public gathering in Kyiv

The SMM saw a peaceful public gathering in front of the cross outside the Parliament building. The SMM saw about 200 people (mixed gender and ages) and ten priests, assessed as members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, leading the group in prayers. The SMM also saw ten law enforcement officers and four police buses, three buses of the National Guard and four anti-riot camouflaged transport vehicles stationary nearby. The SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 11 December 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was denied access to a compound in Donske (government-controlled, 57km south of Donetsk) by three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers who told the SMM it could not access the facility without “permission from superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place in the past 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 13 December, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying near non-government-controlled Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, 43km south-east of Luhansk) and Yasne (25km south-west of Luhansk). [4]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw fresh damage caused by gunfire to a residential building in Dokuchaievsk.
• The SMM recorded over 60 ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and 25 near the area.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle after it spotted hardware assessed as electronic warfare equipment near non-government-controlled Lozivskyi.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure as well as damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• The SMM monitored the transfer of persons convicted before the beginning of the conflict in 2014 from non-government-controlled to government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint near Starolaspa.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 460), compared with the previous reporting period (about 230 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at westerly directions of Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and north-east of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (ten explosions). About one-third of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Damage caused by gunfire to a residential building in Dokuchaievsk

At 85 Tsentralna Street in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in the frame of a south-west-facing window, in its windowsill and in the adjacent west-south-west-facing wall of a ground-floor apartment of a five-storey residential building. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by a 12.7mm or 14.5mm bullet. The playground of a functional kindergarten is located about 35m south-west of the building. A resident of the apartment told the SMM that in the early hours of 7 December, while inside his apartment, he had heard the sound of an object hitting a flower pot on a windowsill and hitting the wall of the apartment.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 13 December, the SMM again saw an anti-tank mine (TM-62 variant) about 10m west of road T1316, about 400m north-north-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

In the late afternoon of 13 December, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded ten explosions (nine assessed as impacts and one undetermined) and 51 projectiles in flight (28 from south to north, 13 from south-west to north-east, seven from north-east to south-west and three from north to south), all at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east and south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). The camera also recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to determine inside or outside the disengagement area) and an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area), as well as 20 projectiles (14 from north to south, three from south to north, two from north-east to south-west and one in vertical flight) and four bursts, all at an assessed range of 1-2km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 12 December, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 13 December, positioned near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation in the disengagement area.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

12 December

Government-controlled areas

• Four tanks (T-72) stationary at the train station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk)[4]

13 December

• Two tanks (T-72) stationary at the train station in Bakhmut
• A self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) being transported on a flatbed trailer moving east near Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled-areas

• Two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (In the same area, the SMM saw about 50 armed members of the armed formations and heard four explosions assessed as artillery rounds as well as ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all assessed as live-fire training.)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

13 December

• An anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk)
• An anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk)
• An armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Marinka
• Four anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23) near Umanske (25km north-west of Donetsk)
• Seven infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk)
• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) and an IFV (BMP-2) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

On 13 December, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted two military trucks with multiple masts, each with several antenna arrays, a generator unit and a trailer assessed as electronic warfare equipment near Lozivskyi (32km west of Luhansk) as well as four persons in camouflage clothing (three in green and brown and one in blue patterns) nearby. Shortly thereafter, the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 100-200m north, assessed as aimed at its UAV and originating from the location of the four persons. The SMM immediately left the area.*

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to a power line near Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) and to damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

SMM monitoring of transfer of persons convicted before the conflict in Donetsk region

The SMM monitored the transfer of persons convicted before the beginning of the conflict in 2014 from non-government-controlled to government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 11 December). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A member of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) again prevented the SMM from entering the village, citing “the security of the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Lozivskyi, the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 100-200m north, assessed as aimed at its UAV (see above).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational. Mist and fog limited the observation capabilities of the majority of other SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The sentence on weapons observed at the train station in Bakhmut (beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites) in SMM Daily Report 13 December 2018 should have read: four tanks (T-72) stationary at the train station in Bakhmut.

[5] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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406739 Marina Živaljević

The Government of Montenegro presented its national platform for suppressing violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) in Podgorica on 14 December 2018. It was developed by the Montenegrin Ministry of the Interior and the Center for Democratic Transition (CDT) with the support of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro.

Entitled Together against Violent Extremism, the national platform is designed to provide a better understanding of the roots of violent extremism and the importance of an open dialogue in engaging all segments of society in the fight against violent extremism and radicalization.

Opening the conference, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, said that terrorism is a denial of democracy and of human rights, which are at the very core of the OSCE.

“The OSCE and its 57 participating States view terrorism as one of the most serious crimes. The organization is committed to combating terrorism through its holistic approach to security through multi-sectorial dialogue and co-operation. By supplying the tools and support that society needs, we hope to strengthen the  democratic values of individuals and of our communities,” said Daviet.

“The OSCE works with government officials, practitioners, researchers and civil society to develop strategies, policies and good practices to prevent and counter terrorist radicalization, while upholding human rights and the rule of law,” said Daviet.

Minister of the Interior Mevludin Nuhodžić stressed the need for engaging “society as a whole” and applying a comprehensive and integrated social response based on a partnership amongst state institutions, civil society organizations, religious communities, academia, local self-governments, citizens and the media.

“Our goal is clear: citizens should recognize and challenge extremist messages and content on the Internet.  Society as a whole must stand together to resist and reject all terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism,” said Minister Nuhodžić.

CDT Executive Director Dragan Koprivica said that the National Platform is a living document that includes the opinions of all social actors.  “From here we plan to establish thematic groups and move to organize activities to meet the goals set today,” said Koprivica.

Today’s conference gathered participants from the parliament, government, executive agencies, local self-governments, educational institutions, youth associations, NGOs, media, religious communities, and diplomatic corps, who expressed their views and ideas on how to prevent and neutralize violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism.

VIENNA, 14 December 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today conveyed his concern about a new draft law in Russia which can impose excessive restrictions on media and citizens using their right to free expression online.

On 12 December a set of draft laws was introduced to the State Duma that introduce administrative liability, including 15-day arrest, for online speech that expresses in an insulting way disrespect to society, state, official symbols, the Constitution, and public bodies. Another part of the suggested provisions entails administrative fines for dissemination in the media and online of deliberately untrue information that presents threats to life, health, mass public disorder, a break in public services, or has other serious effects.

In his letter to the Russian authorities the Representative noted that the restrictions outlined in the amendments are vaguely worded, which could increase the already high number of interventions by state authorities in online speech. “I call on the parliamentary deputies to carefully scrutinize the draft before adopting it into law and to fully evaluate its possible negative effects on the free flow of information,” Désir said.

“This law could result in greater interference in online freedom of expression by the authorities and increase the potential for self-censorship,” Désir said.

Désir noted concerns about the draft law expressed by industry experts, the media community and civil society in the Russian Federation.

The Representative also pointed to his Office’s recent recommendations put forward to OSCE participating States, in particular in the publication Media Freedom on the Internet: An OSCE Guidebook (www.osce.org/netfreedom-guidebook).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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406769 Collin Sullivan from the nonprofit technology company Benetech discussing digital security culture during the workshop. Berlin, 14 December 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Building the capacity of human rights defenders to use open source investigation techniques for human rights monitoring projects was the focus of a training workshop, organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with the nonprofit technology company Benetech in Berlin from 10 to 14 December 2018.

The workshop was attended by 27 participants (14 women and 13 men) from across the OSCE region. They acquired specific skills needed to verify and analyze videos and images, investigate social media sources, and perform open source data collection and verification in collaboration with others.

“The digital space, as the new public space, contains a wealth of data that can be accessed, verified and used by human rights defenders to shed light on human rights violations,” said David Mark, ODIHR Human Rights Adviser and Capacity Building Co-ordinator. “Knowing how to collect that data, how to verify, analyze and cross-check it with information gathered in the field is a skillset we want to make accessible to as many human rights defenders as possible.”

“The training is very useful and informative for my work,” said Annie Kazarjan from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee. “Using new techniques, like performing advanced social media searches, checking metadata from pictures, and corroborating information from various sources, will allow me to better verify the information we are gathering as part of our human rights monitoring work. I am thankful that I could meet so many like-minded human rights defenders; it is important that we build a stronger community.”

In two sessions dedicated to digital security, participants learned how to use the digital space safely, protecting their sources and the information gathered. Several experts were invited for evening talks to discuss their experience with using open source methods to promote the advancement of human rights.

The workshop was part of ODIHR’s wider efforts to tackle challenges faced by human rights defenders in the OSCE region. Over the past three years, ODIHR has trained over 200 human rights defenders from the OSCE region on human rights monitoring, safety and security.

The progress Uzbekistan has made in combating corruption over the course of this year was the focus of an international conference and subsequent media forum organized by the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Uzbekistan with the support of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan and other international organizations on 13 and 14 December 2018 in Tashkent.

The conference, Anti-corruption Reforms in Uzbekistan: Achievements and priorities 2018, and the media forum brought together over 100 representatives from government agencies, civil society, the media and the private sector. It was the culmination of a week of events on anti-corruption, organized to mark the International Anti-Corruption Day on 9 December.

The media forum, held on 14 December, offered a platform for the government and its partners, including the OSCE, and media representatives to discuss the anti-corruption efforts, underlining the need for transparency and openness when it comes to combating corruption.

Additionally, the second day saw the award ceremony for the winners of the Uzbekistan Youth Against Corruption competition, which engaged young people in the process of establishing a zero-tolerance climate towards corruption in the country.

The support to the conference and media forum is part of ongoing efforts by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan in assisting the government to combat corruption and were organized as part of the project Supporting Uzbekistan in Implementing and Promoting Business Integrity Standards.

406643 Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

A one-week advanced training course for 15 Albanian border officers from various regions of the country on increasing their operational awareness regarding the detection of forged travel documents was conducted in Tirana from 10 to 14 December 2018.  The training was organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in co-operation with the OSCE Presence in Albania and the Security Academy of Albania. 

The training course provided the participants with up-to-date information on the latest trends in document fraud as well on the wide range of new security features available for travel documents.

During practical exercises participants learned how to use mobile document-checking devices and magnifiers to identify the main security features in passports, driving licences and foreign banknotes. The OSCE also handed over 15 high-quality magnifiers to each participant with the aim of supporting the technical capacities of Albanian law enforcement personnel.

The training curriculum was provided by the Austrian Interior Ministry, which has been adopted by the EU and its European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX). Since 2007 the course has been implemented by the OSCE on a national basis primarily in non-EU countries, using trainers from the pool of document specialists of the Federal Ministry of the Interior of Austria.

406400

Countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism was the focus of a workshop for regulators and policymakers organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan with the co-operation of the Department on Combating Economic Crimes under the General Prosecutor’s Office of Uzbekistan and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG) from 11 to 14 December 2018 in Tashkent.

Some 60 participants (of which around ten were female) took part in the workshop, which aimed at preparing them for the second round of mutual evaluations by the EAG; a process where regional peers evaluate each other’s compliance with international standards in this sphere.

The OSCE Project Co-ordinator’s support to the workshop is part of its ongoing efforts in assisting the government of Uzbekistan in countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

KYIV, 14 December 2018 – The Donbas Environmental Information System – an online, digital platform for monitoring the environment in conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine, and the first baseline assessment of a water monitoring programme, both delivered with the support of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, will be presented to the public at an event in Kyiv on Monday, 17 December 2018.

The outcomes of the advanced baseline chemical assessment of the Siverskyi Donets river basin will be presented together with the regulatory framework for the basin’s further monitoring. The basin is a major source of water needs for Ukraine’s Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which include areas affected by military activities that started in 2014.

The Information System and water monitoring programme will be used by the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine and the State Water Agency of Ukraine to track the situation and keep the general public informed.

The tools aim to provide reliable data on issues identified by environmental assessment conducted by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in 2017 in eastern Ukraine and subsequent recommendations for required priority actions (see the report in English and Ukrainian languages). These activities are part of the Project Co-ordinator’s assistance to support the government’s response aimed at mitigating those risks.  

The presentation will be led by Jeffrey Erlich, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, together with representatives of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine and the State Water Agency of Ukraine, environmental experts Nikolai Denisov, Zoi Environmental Network, Olekisiy Yaroshevych, Dmytro Averin.

Journalists are invited to attend the presentation starting at 12:00 noon at the conference hall of the President Hotel, (12 Hospitalna street, Kyiv), with registration starting at 11:30. A press briefing is to take place at 13:00.

Media representatives should confirm their attendance by sending an e-mail to Andrii Dziubenko, Programme Co-ordinator of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator, at andrii.dziubenko@osce.org by 10:00 on Monday, 17 December.

For more information about the event, please contact Andrii Dziubenko at +38 050 676 77 34.

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406730 Ivana Milatovic, OSCE Mission to Serbia

More than 100 high-level officials from South-Eastern Europe dealing with preventing corruption, together with senior representatives of Serbian institutions, civil society organizations and the media gathered for a regional conference in Belgrade on 13 and 14 December 2018 to mark International Anti-Corruption Day.

The conference, Implementation of Corruption Prevention Mechanisms, was jointly organized by the OSCE Mission to Serbia and the country’s Anti-Corruption Agency, with the support of Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation.

The discussion focused on the state of play, challenges and determinants to more effectively prevent corruption, having recognized that transparent and accountable institutions reinforce public trust and are some of the key components of good governance.“Corruption is a challenge affecting institutions and civil societies alike: that is why joining forces at both national and international level is essential to address it effectively. A key role is played by the OSCE, fostering dialogue and exchange of best practices among participating States, and assisting them in developing and implementing effective anti-corruption policies and measures,” said Professor Paola Severino, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for Combating Corruption.  “In this scenario, education can make the difference in raising awareness of the risks of corruption, as well as in promoting integrity, instilling the basic principle of legality and shaping civic and moral attitudes in individuals from a very early age.”

Ambassador Andrea Orizio, Head of the OSCE Mission to Serbia, said: “In the spirit of partnership and encouraging full local ownership of accomplishments, the OSCE Mission to Serbia has been assisting the host country and its institutions, since the very beginning, by providing sound expertise and fostering a regional approach as indispensable in the fight against corruption. We stand ready to further expand our co-operation with the anti-corruption bodies and all relevant stakeholders in this field in Serbia.”

Italy’s Ambassador to Serbia, Carlo Lo Cascio, added: “One of the most important legacies of the 2017 Trieste Summit is strengthening the independence of the anti-corruption institutions of the Western Balkan region. Fighting corruption is not only instrumental to the process of EU accession, but it is an objective per se. It helps Western Balkans partners in shaping a better business environment, stimulating foreign investment, and developing social cohesion and the rule of law. We will keep co-operating with Serbia in this field, also with the support of Professor Severino.”

Dragan Sikimic, Director of the Anti-Corruption Agency, said: “Strengthening the integrity on which all corruption prevention mechanisms are basically focused represents one of the most effective strategic and sustainable responses to corruption. In that regard, the Anti-Corruption Agency is committed to a whole-of-society approach, given that corruption cannot be prevented without the proper inclusion of other institutions, international partners, media, civil society organizations and citizens.”

Participants at the conference included officials from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Italy, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

The conference is a part of the OSCE Mission to Serbia’s wider commitments to support anti-corruption efforts in the country.

International Anti-Corruption Day is held annually on 9 December and marks the anniversary of the entry into force of the UN Anti-Corruption Convention in December 2005.

406748 Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje

The Prime Minister, government ministers and mayors of all 81 local self-government units in the country gathered on 14 December 2018 for a national conference organized by the OSCE Mission to Skopje and the Association of Municipalities (ZELS) to discuss the remaining challenges related to the decentralization process.

The Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, Clemens Koja, noted that decentralization is an important part of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and is designed to bring political power closer to citizens.

“Decentralization is a process that provides opportunities for greater inclusion and participation of citizens in decision-making processes. But at its ultimate extent, decentralization is about providing better services. Now is the time to rethink the process, join forces and decide on the next steps,” said Koja.

During the discussion, the Prime Minister, government ministers, and mayors discussed how to strengthen the implementation of the decentralization process.

“We are committed to deepening decentralization, because we believe we are ready for new challenges. Prior to this, we need adequate and stable funding. In short: we need decentralization that will provide financially stable municipalities,” said Petre Shilegov, President of ZELS and Mayor of Skopje.

406688 Marina Živaljević

Young people must take the lead in dismantling barriers and promoting genuine regional reconciliation that will create a better future in their countries and the Western Balkans. This  was a key conclusion of the conference Youth Exchange as Motor of Regional Co-operation, organized by Regional Youth Co-operation Office (RYCO) with the support of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro in Podgorica on 13 December 2018.

Maryse Daviet, Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, said that RYCO youth exchange projects have linked high school students across the region, promoting mutual understanding and creating conditions for positive change in society.

“RYCO enables young people to contribute in a positive way to regional co-operation. The OSCE Mission to Montenegro will continue to support RYCO activities,” said Daviet, welcoming the strong commitment of the Government of Montenegro to the RYCO initiative.

Minister of Sports Nikola Janović reiterated his government’s commitment to young people. His ministry has worked hard to establish the necessary preconditions for greater mobility, connection and co-operation amongst young people, both at the national and regional level, he said.

“In the era of digital connectivity in which we live, mobility is the best way to understand other cultures and values, acquire knowledge and experiences, and above all to expand standards and European cultural values” said Janović.

Djuro Blanuša, RYCO Secretary Genera,l said that RYCO’s vision is very clear: young people in the Western Balkans must have the opportunity to move freely, meet one another, build bridges of reconciliation and co-operation. “RYCO is here to make this possible,” he said.

“There is a need to work together to reduce inter-ethnic tensions, challenge stereotypes and prejudices, promote tolerance and mutual respect. Connecting young people through increased mobility and intercultural youth exchanges is good way to address these issues,” said Blanuša.

The conference included three discussion panels with ambassadors, Members of Parliament, representatives of RYCO, as well as organizations and schools supported by RYCO.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The prevention of domestic violence was the focus of the international conference on the development of crisis centres for victims of domestic violence which concluded on 7 December 2018 in Astana.

The two-day event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the National Commission for Women, Family and Demographic Policy under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (National Commission), UN Women, the UN’s Population Fund and the UN Development Programme.

It gathered some 150 members of the country’s parliament, the National Commission, law enforcement bodies and heads of the crisis centres from all the regions, as well as representatives of the national and local government, international organizations and experts from Austria, Germany, Montenegro, Romania and the United States of America.

Participants discussed best practices in preventing domestic violence and protecting victims, effective measures to tackle violence against women and girls, problems concerning the inter-agency response to domestic violence, and the activities of the crisis centres.

“We have achieved tremendous results in promoting gender equality and eliminating all forms of violence against women, and have formed our own model of family and gender policy as one of the key factors to combat violence against women,” said Yelena Tarasenko, the Deputy Head of the National Commission.

György Szabó, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, said: “In an effort to advance gender equality, the OSCE launched in 2012 the MenEngage Network which seeks to raise awareness of the influence men can have in ending gender-based violence and speaking out against all kinds of inequality.”

Zhanat Omarbekova, a member of the Committee for Social and Cultural Development of Mazhilis (lower chamber) of the country’s parliament, said: “We need to study the domestic violence-related issues in detail and, in order to address them, co-operation with non-governmental organization is required.”

The event was part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to assist the host country and civil society in preventing and combating domestic violence.

406685 Communication and Media Relations Section

Improving institutional interaction and furthering co-operation between the OSCE and the EU in areas of common interest across all three OSCE security dimensions – politico-military, economic and environmental and human – was the focus of the first-ever EU–OSCE annual high-level meeting, held on 12 December in Brussels.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, European External Action Service (EEAS) Secretary General Helga Schmid, Director of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, European Commission Director General for EU Neighbourhood and Enlargement Christian Danielsson and European Commission Director General for International Co-operation and Development Stefano Manservisi highlighted the close partnership between the EU and the OSCE, including its institutions, and their shared interest in maintaining peace and security in Europe and its neighbouring region.

The high-level participants discussed how to strengthen ongoing co-operation and how the structures, institutions and field operations of the two organizations could work together in strategic areas of interest, including conflict prevention and mediation,  preventing/countering violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism; countering trafficking in small arms and light weapons, cyber/ICT threats, cybercrime linked to organized crime, rule of law and democratic institutions, election support, the Women, Peace and Security (UNSC 1325) agenda and co-operation on uranium legacy sites.     

An expert discussion held in conjunction with the high-level meeting focused on potential co-operation to further common goals in Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and Central Asia, including with respect to the European Commission's Strategy for the Western Balkans and the OSCE’s flagship projects in Central Asia, such as its Border Management Staff College. Particular emphasis was put on co-operation between the OSCE and the EEAS on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace building.

This inaugural meeting was a follow-up to the exchange of letters signed on 22 June 2018 between the European Commission, the EEAS and the OSCE to enhance operational co-operation, including through regular consultations.

406634 Communication and Media Relations Section OSCE Guidebook Intelligence-Led Policing

Way in which proactive and intelligence and/or information-led policing approaches can enhance the fight against serious and organized crime were explored at a regional workshop for law enforcement representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and the Russian Federation conducted by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s Strategic Police Matters Unit in Minsk on 13 December 2018.

The workshop, held at the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, brought together participants to discuss and share information on recent trends in this area.

National and international practices on intelligence-led, proactive and multi-agency approaches in fighting serious and organized crime as well as relevant human rights and data protection considerations were introduced by experts from the OSCE, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Europol and the Swedish Police. The OSCE Guidebook on Intelligence-Led Policing was also presented by an expert from the Organization.

“The OSCE Guidebook on Intelligence-Led Policing presents useful tools that can improve traditional law enforcement practices in addressing organized crime and other security challenges,” said Ambassador Luca Fratini, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship.

The First Deputy Head of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, Alexey Bashan  said: "A successful fight against organized crime requires high-quality training of law enforcement officers and international co-operation between states and non-governmental organizations.”

Rasa Ostrauskaite, OSCE Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats, said: “We believe that national authorities and law enforcement agencies need to strengthen their information-led and proactive approaches in countering serious and organized crime – and the OSCE- recommended Intelligence-led policing model provides the conceptual and practical framework for this.”

The workshop aimed at enhancing the co-operation and exchange of information on organized crime-related issues, and also focused on how existing co-operation mechanisms, threat assessment methods and strategic planning can contribute to effectively countering serious and organized crime.

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw an apartment building in Antratsyt that had sustained shrapnel damage.
• The SMM observed a calm situation near all three disengagement areas.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure on both sides of the contact line and to damaged houses in Marinka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• The SMM monitored the transfer of detainees not related to the conflict from non-government-controlled to government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at checkpoints near Oktiabr Mine and Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 230), compared with the previous reporting period (about 320 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including ten explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (40 explosions). Most ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk).

Shrapnel damage to apartment building in Antratsyt

At 77 Petrovskoho Street in Antratsyt (non-government-controlled, 55km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw three holes in two west-facing windows of a second-floor apartment of a five-storey building. It saw fresh shrapnel damage to the western side of the building as well as to a nearby tree. It also saw fresh shrapnel damage to a fence about 40m west of the aforementioned building and a freshly severed tree branch about 1.5m west of the fence. The SMM assessed the damage to the building, the fence and trees as caused by the explosion of a device. The resident of the apartment (female, aged 70-80) told the SMM that she had heard an explosion near the house at around 7:30 on the morning of 10 December.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 12 December, positioned close to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

12 December

• A multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) heading north-east on road H-20

Non-government-controlled areas

11 December

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and three tanks (two T-72 and one T-64) in a compound in Luhansk city.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

12 December

Government-controlled areas

• Four tanks (T-64) stationary at the train station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled-areas

• Three stationary tanks (T-64) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

11 December

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 1km south-west of the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) and
• two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) near Artema (26km north of Luhansk).

12 December

• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) near Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk)
• Five IFVs (BMP-2) near Umanske (25km north-west of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

11 December

An SMM mini-UAV again spotted:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2), two amphibious transporters (PTS-2), 11 IFVs (six BMP-1 and five BMP-2) and 14 APCs (seven MT-LB, five BTR-70 and two BTR-60) in compounds in Luhansk city and
• two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) and five APCs (three MT-LB and two BTR-80) in compounds in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

12 December

• An APC (BTR-80) near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk)

Presence of mines and mine hazard signs

On 11 December, the SMM again saw two mine hazard signs near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint about 1.5km south-west of Novoselivka Druha (government-controlled, 23km north of Donetsk): one was a red and white square with “Mines” written in Ukrainian and the other one was a wooden plate with “Mines” painted in Ukrainian. Near Novoselivka Druha, the SMM also again saw another mine hazard sign (red and white with “Mines” written in Ukrainian) about 3-5m from the side of road H-20.

On 12 December, the SMM again saw an anti-tank mine (TM-62) near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) about 10m from the southern edge of road H-15. Near Luhanske (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM again saw a mine hazard sign (a wooden board with handwritten “Mine” in Russian) in a field approximately 1m west of road C061131.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema, to a water pipeline near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

SMM monitoring of transfer of detainees not related to the conflict in Luhansk region

The SMM monitored the transfer of detainees not related to the conflict from non-government-controlled to government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 11 December). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage at a checkpoint at the entrance of Oktiabr Mine (non-government-controlled, 8km north-west of Donetsk city centre).
• Two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), preventing the SMM from travelling west towards Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south towards Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Hranitne and Krasnohorivka were not operational. Mist and fog limited the observation capabilities of the majority of other SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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KYIV, 13 December 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group Ambassador Martin Sajdik made the following statement regarding the transfer of convicted persons from CADR to the territory controlled by the government of Ukraine:

“I sincerely welcome today’s transfer of convicted persons from certain areas of Donetsk region (CADR) to the territory controlled by the government of Ukraine.

It is the second transfer this week of persons convicted before the beginning of the conflict in 2014. Yesterday, such detainees were transferred from certain areas of Luhansk region (CALR). They will all serve their sentence in penitentiary institutions on the territory controlled by the government of Ukraine.

I once again express my deep appreciation to the sides for their constructive efforts. Convicted persons have received the opportunity of serving the remaining term of their sentence closer to their families and relatives.

I hope that both transfers will serve as a confidence-building measure and help increase trust among the sides for our future common work.

On the eve of the upcoming New Year and Christmas holidays, I especially call upon the Russian Federation and Ukraine as members of the Trilateral Contact Group to make all efforts to find solutions in the spirit of humanity for numerous remaining open issues, in particular in the humanitarian sphere.”

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VIENNA, 13 December 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today met with Olivera Zekić, a member of Serbia’s Council of the Regulatory Authority of Electronic Media (REM), to discuss issues related to REM’s operation, including external influence and the need for independence. The meeting in Vienna took place following a request from the REM Council’s Deputy President.

Désir stressed the important role that a regulator plays in implementing relevant laws and creating a pluralistic and balanced media landscape.

Désir expressed concern that, for a long time, the REM Council has been functioning with only six out of nine members, as the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia has failed to appoint members who were proposed by civil society organizations.

“It is essential that the Regulatory Authority works at full capacity with the representation of civil society, in accordance with the Law on Electronic Media. I urge the relevant authorities to appoint the missing members without further delay,” stated Désir.

The OSCE Representative noted a large number of complaints by the media organizations regarding the work of the Regulator and that the Regulatory Authority did not continue its good practice of publishing media monitoring results for important events such as the 2016 parliamentary and the 2017 presidential elections, and of acting on all complaints.

“The OSCE is very closely involved in the process of drafting a new media strategy in Serbia as requested by the highest Serbian authorities, and I am glad that the issue of Regulatory Authority of Electronic Media played a role in this process. An independent and strong regulator is vital to creating the framework for further reform of the media sector,” said Désir.

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406598 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported three-day train-the-trainer course for law enforcement personnel on risk profiling techniques, for use when developing a security system to prevent criminal acts during large-scale events, concluded in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, on 13 December 2018.

Some 30 mid-level officers from the Karaganda Police Academy under the Interior Ministry of Kazakhstan learned about observational psychology during public gatherings. Experts focused on topics including identifying the elements of risk profiles, crowd mentality and psychological and communicational methods of influencing an aggressive crowd. The participants also engaged in exercises designed to improve information exchange within police units, thus increasing team efficiency.

The officers also familiarized themselves with different tactics to conduct negotiations with leaders of public gatherings. A number of practical exercises provided the participants with the opportunity to apply their newly-acquired skills. A handbook for police instructors was disseminated at the event.

The training, co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the Karaganda Police Academy under the Interior Ministry, was led by experts from the private sector in Kazakhstan. The course was specifically developed for the Police Academy instructors so that they can go on to organize similar training sessions for their peers.

The event is part of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana’s activities to enhance security, increase accountability, and promote best practices in security at large-scale events.