Central Europe

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed recent impact craters in Pikuzy and Molodizhne.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored the transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government-controlled to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as in Novoazovsk, an area near the border with the Russian Federation.*
• The SMM monitored a public gathering in Hlyboka district, Chernivtsi region, in relation to churches changing affiliation in the district.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 260 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 85 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including nearly 80 per cent of the explosions, were recorded in areas north, south, south-west, west and north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). In Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard three explosions 500-700m north-east of its location, and the patrol immediately left the area.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (about 40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Recent impact craters in Pikuzy and Molodizhne

In Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a fresh crater in the garden on the south-eastern side of a house on Pobeda Street. The SMM assessed that the crater was caused by an impact of a 30mm round. A female resident of the house told the SMM that she had been home when the impact from shelling that she said had been from automatic grenade launcher rounds had happened.

On 6 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted between 20 to 30 recent craters assessed as impacts of mortar (120mm) rounds about 2km south-west of Molodizhne, about 150m north of road T0504. (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019 and SMM Daily Report 1 February 2019.)

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 7 February, positioned north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and inside the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

7 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) south-east of Malynove (19km north-east of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) on the northern edge of Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitated and monitored the transfer of persons convicted before the conflict in Luhansk region

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region. Both a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer and a member of the armed formations told the SMM that 33 persons had been transferred.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works at the Krasnohorivka Gas Distribution Station in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and to monitor the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

Public gathering related to churches changing affiliation in Hlyboka district

In Hlyboka (23km south of Chernivtsi), the SMM observed a gathering of about 250 people (aged 40-70 and about 60 percent men) affiliated with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) in front of the Hlyboka district administration building who were singing and praying in old Slavonic and Romanian languages. Some of the people were holding posters criticizing the change of church affiliation to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) by local parishes. The SMM also observed about 50 people (mostly men, aged 40-70) standing nearby. A representative of the Hlyboka district administration (male in his fifties) addressed the protestors and said that the authorities would not interfere with the decisions by individual parishes on affiliation and stated that if problems appeared, everyone was invited to address his or her concern to the district administration. The SMM observed between 30 to 40 police officers present and a calm situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was again stopped at the entrance of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) by three members of the armed formations who denied the SMM access to the settlement as well as to continue moving east toward the border with the Russian Federation, citing “ongoing special forces operations in the area.”

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational during the reporting period and winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

read more

VIENNA, 8 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his concern regarding the recent decision of the Supervisory Board of the public service company UA:PBC in Ukraine to dismiss Zurab Alasania from the chairmanship post at the organization.

“This speedy decision is worrying as it may negatively affect the independence and viability of the public service media in Ukraine, particularly ahead of two major elections this year,” said Désir.

On 31 January, at its regular meeting, the Supervisory Board of UA:PBC voted for the early dismissal of Alasania from the post of Chairperson of the Board due to lack of qualifications, based on allegations that some of his actions were incompatible with the mission, purpose and principles of the public broadcaster.

“Since its establishment UA:PBC has, in a relatively short period of time, undertaken important steps in transitioning from state-controlled to public service media, and achieved progress in setting standards of professional journalism, even if the reforms need to be continued,” stated Désir. “This transition has been a challenging process, particularly due to the significant budget cuts in the broadcaster’s activities over the last two years.”

“I reiterate that any expectations of the public service media to provide reliable, high-quality and informative programming are only possible when it is independent and financially sustainable,” cautioned Désir.

The Representative noted concerns raised by various prominent Ukrainian media experts and civil society organizations regarding the decision.

“I hope that the members of the Supervisory Board will ensure the independence of UA:PBC in the future and the development of a genuine public service media free of political interference,” concluded the Representative.

Désir previously raised concerns regarding the developments surrounding the public service broadcaster in Ukraine. See: https://www.osce.org/fom/351561, https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/397358 and https://www.osce.org/fom/357316.

read more

410970 Communication and Media Relations Section Katharina Kandt Statement by OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Miroslav Lajčák, conference on Combating Antisemitism in the OSCE Region, Bratislava, Slovakia 5 February 2019

Exploring new opportunities and sharing best practices in the fight against anti-Semitism was the focus of the first conference organized by Slovakia as 2019 OSCE Chair, which concluded on 7 February 2019 in Bratislava.

The Conference on Combating Anti-Semitism in the OSCE Region brought together representatives from OSCE participating States and international organizations, as well as civil society, academia and the business sector, to discuss diverse and complementary approaches to addressing anti-Semitism. The Conference was a follow-up to the International Conference on the Responsibility of States, Institutions, and Individuals in the Fight against Anti-Semitism in the OSCE Region, organized by Italy, the 2018 OSCE Chair, in Rome last year.

Opening the meeting on 5 February, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Miroslav Lajčák, Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, highlighted the worrying trend of anti-Semitism and intolerance across the OSCE region. He particularly stressed the need for action against hate speech. “Throughout history, anti-Semitism has never stopped at words,” he warned. “Our generation has a duty to punish and prevent words of hate.”

Other high-level speakers at the opening session, including Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs Karin Kneissl, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, the Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Ingibörg Gísladóttir, the CEO of the World Jewish Congress Robert Singer, the President of the Central Union of Jewish Religious Communities in Slovakia, Igor Rintel, and the Chair’s Personal Representative on Combating Anti-Semitism Rabbi Andrew Baker, joined Mr. Lajčak in calling for action to promote tolerance and inclusion across the OSCE area.

The need to do more in reaching out to young people was a recurring theme of the conference. OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger advocated for the use of education as a tool in promoting tolerance and non-discrimination: “Tackling anti-Semitism requires a comprehensive approach and educational initiatives are essential for preventing all forms of intolerance and discrimination,” he said.

The CEO of the World Jewish Congress, Robert Singer, argued: “We must find new ways to reach young people, whatever their nationality or religion, so they will be able to learn the lessons of history’s greatest tragedy.”

Similarly, Foreign Minister Lajčák underlined the need to tell the stories of the Holocaust to young people – not only so they understand the risks of anti-Semitism, but also so they can help us to “detect the warning signs”.

Statements delivered by delegates of OSCE participating States focused attention on worrying trends, while advocating for urgent action. In interactive panel discussions, participants elaborated on various measures to mitigate adverse effects of anti-Semitic behaviour and hate speech on Jewish communities and also reflected on the historical context of anti-Semitism. The discussion centred on long-term approaches and strategies for combating intolerance and hatred towards Jewish communities and individuals, including through education, social media engagement, and partnerships with civil society networks, local communities, and religious leaders.

Warsaw, 7 February 2019 – Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), today expressed her regret over the decision by the Ukrainian authorities to block Russian citizens from taking part in the ODIHR election observation mission for the 31 March presidential election in Ukraine.

In a letter to Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ODIHR Director also expressed her deep disappointment at the passing today by the parliament of a law that would formalize such a restriction.

Gísladóttir wrote: “The decision to deny the possibility of accreditation to citizens of one participating State is without precedent and contravenes commitments made by all participating States to invite observers from any other OSCE participating States that may wish to observe election proceedings to the extent permitted by law …”.

She underlined that observers sent to take part in ODIHR election observations missions do not represent their respective countries, but rather the entire OSCE. They are obliged to follow ODIHR’s election observation methodology and are bound by the Office’s strict code of conduct for election observers, including remaining strictly impartial and not intervening in the election process in any way.

The ODIHR Director also stressed that the inclusion of election observers from all OSCE participating States that choose to contribute is a central principle of her Office’s election observation mandate. She highlighted that this was one of a concrete range of human dimension commitments the countries have made, such as in strengthening democratic institutions and practices, including democratic elections.

Urging further reflection on the issue, Gísladóttir wrote that these common commitments “establish clear standards for participating States’ treatment of each other and, without exception, apply equally to each participating State. Their implementation in good faith is essential for relations between states.”

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission followed up on reports of a van hit by small-arms fire in Chermalyk.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable possible demining activities in Luhansk region and repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM monitored a public gathering in Kyiv related to funding for housing for internally displaced persons.
• The Mission followed up on reports of an attack against a civil activist in Kropyvnytskyi, Kirovohrad region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Yasynuvata and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 85 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), south of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Follow-up on reports of a van hit by small-arms fire in Chermalyk

The SMM followed up on reports that a van of a funeral company had been hit by small-arms fire in Chermalyk on 2 February. On 4 February, at the yard of the funeral company in Zoria (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a green van with a fresh hole in the outer lower right corner of the right-hand front door and a corresponding burn mark on the inner door frame, as well as another fresh hole below the roof line on the right-hand side and a corresponding hole in the front left-hand side door. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by bullets (7.62mm in calibre). On the same day, a woman (in her sixties) in Chermalyk told the SMM that she was at the cemetery with a representative of the funeral company and three cemetery workers on 2 February and that she had been trying to enter the van when she had heard the sound of bullets hitting it around 12:30 (see SMM Daily Report 4 February 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 5 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted 18 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in four rows across the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).

During the day on 6 February, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area and inside the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines:

Non-government-controlled areas

5 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) close to a house near Kalynivka (55km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a probable mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near residential houses on the western outskirts of Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Non-government-controlled areas

5 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 11 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk);
• 17 tanks (T-64), nine towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above);
• 21 tanks (11 T-64 and ten T-72), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six anti-tank guns (MT-12), nine towed mortars (2B11) and eight surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk);
• 11 tanks (ten T-72 and a T-64) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 12 towed howitzers (ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and two 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khrustalnyi (54km south-west of Luhansk).

Government-controlled areas

6 February

The SMM saw:

• nine self-propelled howitzers (2S7 Pion 203mm) on low-bed trailers and a probable self-propelled howitzer (2S5 Giatsint-S, 152mm) on a truck near Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

5 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMD-2) near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk).

6 February

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Zhelanne Druhe (29km north-west of Donetsk); and
• three IFVs (BMP-2) in Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• reinforced positions and fresh signs of digging (not visible in imagery from 27 October 2018), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, east of Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol) for the first time.

Non-government-controlled areas

5 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three IFVs (BMP-1) close to destroyed homes near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three IFVs (BMP-1) near Zhovte.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure and of possible demining activities

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water conduit near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and snow removal near the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).  The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an assessment of the situation for possible demining activities at a school in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and near a kindergarten in Stanytsia Luhanska. At both locations, a representative of the State Emergency Service told the SMM that no explosive devices had been found. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

Demining activities

In Hranitne (government-controlled 60km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw four members of the State Emergency Service carrying mine detectors and wearing personal protective equipment, accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), conducting demining activities inside a fenced-off area around a functioning kindergarten. Representatives of the State Emergency Service later on told the SMM that they had found and cleared two exploded shells outside the fenced-off area about 100m north of the kindergarten: one from an IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) and another from an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw no traffic crossing the border in either direction.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 21 cars (four with Ukrainian and 12 with Russian Federation licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates), a bus (with Russian Federation licence plates), 63 trucks (53 covered cargo trucks, six tank trucks and four with “toxic” and “flammable” markings – of which 23 with Ukrainian, 11 with Russian Federation, one with Georgian and six with Belarusian licence plates, and 21 with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine.

Public gathering in Kyiv related to funding for housing for internally displaced persons

The SMM observed a gathering organized by a non-governmental organization advocating for the rights of internally displaced persons (IDP) who have participated in the ATO. At the corner of Instytutska and Bankova Streets, the SMM saw about 100 people (90 per cent men, ten per cent women), some carrying banners indicating they were from Lviv and Kyiv regions and others with flags of, amongst others, Svoboda, Sokil and Aidar. Speakers addressed the participants with messages criticizing what they said was a lack of sufficient funding allocated in the 2019 budget to enforce a provision supplying adequate housing to IDP ATO veterans. The SMM saw about 35 police officers present.

Follow up on attack against a civil activist in Kropyvnytskyi, Kirovohrad region

On 4 February, the SMM met with a civil activist in Kropyvnytskyi (formerly Kirovohrad, 206km west of Dnipro), to follow up on media reports of an attack against him on 26 January. The SMM saw that his right eye was blood-shot and that there was a cut just below it. He told the Mission that he had incurred the injuries after he had been attacked outside his home by two men on the evening of 26 January. On 5 February, in Kropyvnytskyi, a representative of Kirovohrad Regional National Police told the SMM that the attack on the civil activist had likely occurred as a result of his work and added that the investigation continued under Article 296 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), preventing the Mission from travelling west towards Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing the need for prior permission from their superiors. After about one hour of waiting at the checkpoint, the Mission was allowed to proceed.
• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing the need for prior permission from their superiors. After about 35 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint, the Mission was allowed to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 5 February, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational during the reporting period and winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

read more

410925 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A two-day annual meeting of the Civil Society Coalition against Torture and Impunity in Tajikistan, hosted by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, was held on 1 and 2 February 2019 in Dushanbe. 

Some 40 members and key partners of the Coalition from across the country discussed the 2019 activities, strategies and plans for 2019-2020.

The discussion focused on existing challenges and proposals for further activities within the strategy framework. Participants emphasized the importance of strengthening co-operation with the Prosecutor General’s Office to discuss torture and ill-treatment cases, as well as partnership with the state bodies in conducting independent monitoring of places of deprivation of liberty.

The Coalition is expanding its co-operation with various stakeholders, including government agencies, lawyers, psychologists and social workers. In 2018, Coalition members worked more closely with the Union of Lawyers of Tajikistan in conducting educational activities for lawyers on the rights of victims of torture and ill-treatment, including  compensation for victims and their family members.

Coalition members took an active part in providing alternative reports to the UN Committee against Torture and interacted with the Office of Human Rights Guarantees of the Executive Office of the Republic of Tajikistan in developing the National Plan for Implementation of Recommendations of the Committee against Torture, which was adopted on 24 January 2019.

The Coalition plays a leading role in promoting litigation to protect victims of torture and ill-treatment, and in providing rehabilitation services for victims of torture and their families. 

“We have been closely working with the OSCE since the establishment of the Coalition, constantly expanding our co-operation,” said the head of the Coalition, Nurmakhmad Khalilov, director of the NGO Center for Human Rights. “OSCE support has enabled us to build the capacity of lawyers in human rights protection and to increase access to justice for victims of torture and their families,” said Khalilov.

410868 Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Ilona Kazaryan

Enhancing the electoral participation of persons with disabilities was the focus of discussion during a conference co-organized in Skopje by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Mission to Skopje on 6 February 2019.

The event brought together 55 participants (30 women and 25 men), including representatives of national authorities and disabled persons’ organizations. The participants included officials from the State Election Commission, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and the Ministry of Education and Science, as well as representatives of political parties, the Interparty Parliamentary Group for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and international organizations. ODIHR invited leading experts in the field from Austria, Slovenia and United States. 

The event raised the participants’ awareness about the limited participation of persons with disabilities in electoral process. It also helped to identify measures that can reflect OSCE commitments and address ODIHR’s electoral recommendations aimed at improving the situation. 

Key topics discussed were challenges and obstacles to the inclusion of persons with disabilities in electoral process and how to create an enabling environment based on good practices and lessons learned in the region and elsewhere. 

“Electoral processes highlight accessibility issues, different levels of inclusion and legal capacity problems. These processes are an excellent indicator, a litmus test, of how committed a state is to a human rights-based approach to disability and to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,” said Goran Kustura, Secretary General of the National Council of Slovenian Organizations of Persons with Disabilities.

Ambassador Clemens Koja, Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, said: “We are glad to contribute to the important task of promoting and ensuring accessible voting for persons with disabilities. By protecting their rights and ensuring their full and effective participation in the conduct of public affairs, without discrimination and on an equal basis with others, we encourage their participation in public affairs.”

“The State Election Commission continuously implements activities for ensuring accessibility to electoral processes for persons with disabilities,” said Oliver Derkoski, President of the State Election Commission. However, to ensure comprehensive and equal access for this group of voters, which is our mutual goal, we require open co-operation with other institutions responsible for polling stations, as well as with the civic sector. In this way we can raise awareness of the needs in this area.”

The event part of ODIHR’s project Support to Elections in the Western Balkans, which is funded by the European Union and the Austrian Development Agency.

VIENNA, 6 February – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today raised his concerns over the amendments to the Press Act establishing a right of reply for physical and legal persons, which passed the first reading in the parliament of Slovakia last week.

The amendments to paragraphs 8 and 10 of the Press Act would grant a right of reply which will particularly apply to political actors or public officials who claim that their honour or reputation has been damaged in media reports. The Representative underlined that the Press Act already permits a right of correction for all individuals, including politicians. With the proposed version of the right of reply, regardless of the veracity of the statements, editors would be compelled to publish a correction, under the threat of paying damages between 1,660 to 4,980 euros. This would signify a return to a similar legal provision introduced in 2008 and repealed in 2011 following strong domestic and international opposition.

“I am seriously concerned that this will represent a regression of the legal environment in Slovakia, which enables the media to report freely and without political pressure on matters of public interest,” said Désir. “I call upon the parliament of Slovakia to repeal these amendments, to protect media freedom and investigative journalism, and to take into account the objections raised by the media and civil society in the country.” The Representative expressed regret that the concerned amendments were not reviewed by the Culture Ministry’s working group responsible for reviewing media freedom legislation.

The right of reply as foreseen in these amendments goes far beyond the existing right to correction. “This represents a high risk of undue and disproportionate interference in the editorial independence of the media, and must not lead to permanent pressure or self-censorship of the media,” stated Désir.  “Political actors must accept a high level of scrutiny and criticism, and the press must remain free to exercise its function without facing financial threats.”

The Representative concluded that the suggestion by the President of the CIS and the National Council to extend the right of reply to comments would exacerbate the situation further.

The RFOM previously issued a statement asking Slovakia to abandon the article in April 2008 (See: https://www.osce.org/fom/49620)

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission again observed military and military-type presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. It recorded ceasefire violations inside the area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as in Staromykhailivka and near Verkhnoshyrokivske. The Mission was prevented from continuing an unmanned aerial vehicle flight near the Zolote disengagement area*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (95 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), south-east and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and east, south-south-east and south-south-west of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 320 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 4 February, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) approximately 650m south of the area’s northern edge and 1km east of its western edge, and again spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near the road bridge (all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces).

Also inside the disengagement area, the same long-range UAV again spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) about 100m north of its southern edge and 800m west of its eastern edge (assessed as belonging to the armed formations), as well as three recent craters assessed as impacts of mortar (120mm) rounds about 50m north-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the area (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019).

On the evening and night of 4-5 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded ten projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east and south (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and ten projectiles at an assessed range of 2-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 5 February, positioned near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 4-5km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned near Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard over 30 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 4-5km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and over 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

4 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Ozarianivka (52km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 February

An SMM mini-UAV again spotted:

• four tanks (T-72) in revetted positions on the north-eastern edge of Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk) and adjacent fresh tracks on the ground (indicating that the tanks had moved recently).

5 February

The SMM observed:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

5 February

The SMM observed:

• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) near Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk);
• a tank (T-64) near Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk);
• a tank (T-72) near Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk);
• a tank (T-72) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk);
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) near Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (66km north of Donetsk); and
• eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 February

An SMM long-range UAV again spotted:

• four tanks (T-72) in a field near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn[4]

Heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

5 February

The SMM observed that:

• three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) were present and
• 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six towed howitzers (D-30), 28 mortars (15 2B11, 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and a BM-37, 82mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

4 February      

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (undetermined types) next to residential houses in Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk);
• six IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• an  armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk);
• three IFVs (BMP-1), six probable IFVs (BMP-1) and an ACV (undetermined type) near Zolote;
• an IFV (BMP-1) on the south-eastern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk); and
• two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two APCs (possible BTR-80) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).

5 February

The SMM observed:

• an APC (BTR-60) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an APC (undetermined variant) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BMP-1) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk);
• two APCs (one undetermined variant and one MT-LB MA) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate;
• an ACV (undetermined type) near Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) on the southern edge of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk);
• 31 APCs (MT-LB) and two APCs (MT-LB M), one with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23), in a compound in Pervomaisk;
• an ACV (undetermined type) in Berezivske (53km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Holubivka (51km west of Luhansk);
• five APCs (an BTR-80, three MT-LB and an MT-LB MA) and two IFVs (BMP-2) in a compound in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk);
• three ACVs close to a residential area in Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk)
• two ACVs (undetermined types) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk);
• an APC (BTR-80), a probable IFV (BMP-1), two trench diggers (an MDK-2 and a PZM-2) and an automatic jamming system (R-330ZH ZHITEL) in a training area near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk);
• three IFVs (BMP-1) and two probable IFVs (BMP-1) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk); and
• three IFVs (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2) near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk).

5 February

The SMM observed:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk).

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

At around 09:30 on 5 February, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 1,000 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 50 people queueing in the opposite direction. About two and a half hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 1,000 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 100 people queuing to travel in the opposite direction. Three women (aged 45-60) told the SMM that it had taken them four to five hours to cross the checkpoint of the armed formations and the entry-exit checkpoint.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), as well as to enable an assessment related to snow removal near the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• While the SMM was following up on reports of recent damage in a residential area of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (two armed) at a checkpoint in the town denied the Mission access to the area, citing the need for prior permission from their “superiors”. (The SMM’s passage at the same checkpoint was denied for “security reasons” the day before.)
• At a checkpoint south of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “security concerns”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 4 February, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over government-controlled areas close to the contact line in a western part of Luhansk region.[6]
• On 5 February, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north the Zolote disengagement area, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier approached the SMM and told it to discontinue the flight, saying that he was not informed about it. The SMM recalled its UAV and left the area.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras. The SMM camera in Chermalyk was not operational for most of the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

read more

KYIV, 6 February 2019 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today formally opened an election observation mission (EOM) for the 31 March presidential election in Ukraine. The mission’s deployment follows an invitation from the Ukrainian authorities.

The mission is led by Ambassador Peter Tejler and includes a core team of 17 experts based in Kyiv. ODIHR has also requested that OSCE participating States provide 100 long-term observers, who will be deployed throughout the country in international teams of two from 13 February. In addition, the Office will request that the participating States provide 750 short-term observers, who will arrive several days before election day.

The mission will assess the presidential election for its compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. Observers will closely monitor candidate registration, campaign activities, the work of the election administration and relevant governmental bodies, election-related legislation and its implementation, the media environment, and the resolution of election-related disputes.

In the course of its observation, the mission will meet with representatives from state authorities and political parties, as well as with candidates, and with representatives from civil society, the media and the international community. The mission will publish an interim report in the course of its work.

On election day, observers will monitor the opening of polling stations, voting, the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results.

The day after the elections, the mission, together with parliamentary delegations, including from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, will issue a statement of preliminary findings and conclusions at a press conference in Kyiv. ODIHR will issue a final report on the observation approximately eight weeks after the end of the electoral process.

For further information, please see https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/407660 or contact Francesca Boggeri, Media Analyst of the Election Observation Mission, on +380 67 339 6228 (mobile) or at Francesca.boggeri@odihr.org.ua 

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, on + 48 609 522 266 (mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of fund administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly increased from 7,766 to 7,787 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 187 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 13 this week (compared to 24 last week); seven of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and six into Ukraine (85 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, six families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when four families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and three into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (316 compared to 308 observed during the previous week). There were 167 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 149 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Stakhanov- Kyiv; Alchevsk-Kyiv; and Kyiv.  

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 735 to 762 (201 at the Gukovo BCP and 561 at the Donetsk BCP); 430 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 332 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” (sometimes “DPR”) plates.                                                                                           

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks slightly increased to 33 (compared to 32 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 162 to 189: of the total number of trucks scanned, 90 trucks (48 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 99 trucks (52 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 107 to 160 vehicles; 83 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 77 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on seven occasions, compared to four last week; the OTs assessed that six trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and another one to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the train bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

On 3 February at Donetsk BCP, the OT observed two ambulances. The first ambulance (which bore Russian Federation licence plates) arrived at 06:15 and went behind the main building until it returned towards the Russian Federation at 08:32. One minute before it left, another ambulance (also with Russian Federation licence plates) arrived from the Russian Federation and parked in the same place.

At 08:50, the second ambulance also left towards the Russian Federation. From its position, the OT was not able to see whether the vehicles actually crossed the border to Ukraine, or whether they remained in the “blind spot” behind the main building of the BCP, where the OT does not have permission to move.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 1 January 2019 to 5 February 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).               

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission heard and saw explosions assessed as impacts 70-100m east-south-east of its position near the Zolote disengagement area. It also recorded other ceasefire violations inside and near the disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as in Staromykhailivka and near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 95 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 65 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions (81) were recorded in areas east, south-east and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and south-west of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk).

On 2 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted six men assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, three of them lying on the ground in firing position and holding small-arms weapons, near Talakivka (government-controlled, 17km north-east of Mariupol). The Mission assessed this as probable live-fire training inside the security zone (in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone). (The SMM heard ceasefire violations in the area during the UAV flight, see SMM Daily Report 4 February 2019.)

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 320 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), including about 240 explosions assessed as mortar and artillery rounds, as well as inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (see the disengagement areas section below).

On 4 February, positioned near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, approximately 300m north of the disengagement area near Zolote, the Mission members heard three explosions assessed as impacts, and saw flames, smoke, soot and snow 70-100m east-south-east of its position. The SMM immediately left the area (see SMM Spot Report 4 February 2019).

Recent impact crater from shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 4 February, at 10 Vyrobnycha Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a recent crater about 3m from a single-storey house. The crater was covered in soot. The Mission could not determine the weapon used or the direction of fire. A man who identified himself as the owner of the house told the SMM the crater had been caused by shelling in the afternoon on 31 January 2019. The Mission also observed that the bottom part of a north-north-east-facing window pane of the above-mentioned house was covered with white tape. The owner said the window had been damaged by small-arms fire on 29 January 2019. (For previous observations from Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, see SMM Daily Report 4 February 2019.)

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 3-4 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded ten projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east and south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), five projectiles at an assessed range of 1-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and five projectiles at an assessed range of 1-3km east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 4 February, positioned near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north the Zolote disengagement area, the Mission heard five undetermined explosions and seven minutes of small-arms fire (uncountable shots), all at an assessed range of 2-3km east and south-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as nine undetermined explosions and about 50 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-5km north-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the Mission heard 30 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

4 February

The SMM saw:

• six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela10) at a train station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas:

2 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three armoured personnel carriers (BTR-80) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Talakivka.

3 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured command vehicle (BMP-1Ksh) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• a recent crater, assessed as caused by an impact of a 122mm or 152mm artillery round, about 250m from the nearest house in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

4 February

The SMM saw:

• a trench digger (PZM-2) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

2 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• ten infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 2 February, near Talakivka, an SMM mini-UAV spotted over 60 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid in six rows on a road leading to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and in an adjacent field. (For previous observations in that area, see SMM Daily Report 29 June 2018.)

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water conduit near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) as well as to enable an assessment related to snow removal near the bridge in Shchastia. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 February 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint south of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage on three separate occasions, citing “orders from superiors” and “special activities in the area”.
• At a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “security reasons”. When leaving the checkpoint, the Mission heard an undetermined explosion 2km south-west (see the ceasefire violations section above and the attached table).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

read more

VIENNA, 5 February 2019 – The Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM) will hold a conference on the safety of female journalists online (SOFJO), Expanding Opportunities for Freedom of Expression and Media Plurality, on Tuesday, 12 February, in Vienna.

To mark the occasion and to take stock of the work done to counter online abuse, the RFOM will present a Communiqué on Media Pluralism, Safety of Female Journalists and Safeguarding Marginalized Voices Online.

The Conference will gather women journalists, experts and practitioners on gender and media freedom from a number of OSCE participating States, to discuss the challenges of and opportunities for women journalists’ full participation online.

The RFOM, Harlem Désir, will open the conference together with the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović. The introductory remarks will be followed by a number of panels, including on adopting a gender sensitive approach to policy developments and challenges; the nature of online offenses and the role of technology; and taking stock of counter measures.

The conference will also include a screening of the recently released SOFJO documentary, “A Dark Place” and a policy lab organized by UNESCO and the Global Diplomacy Lab.

Members of the media are invited to cover the conference and panel discussions on Tuesday, 12 February 2019, at the Hofburg Conference Center Heldenplatz, 1010 Vienna.

Contact person for members of the media:

Jennifer Adams, Media Freedom Project Officer, Office of the OSCE Representative on

Freedom of the Media

Tel: +43 514 36 6813

E-mail: Jennifer.adams@osce.org

For further information about the Conference, please visit: 

https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/sofjoconference2019

For further information about the SOFJO project, please visit www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/safety-female-journalists-online

Follow @OSCE_RFOM to join the conference discussion on Twitter using the hashtag #SOFJO.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on facebook.com/osce.rfom.

read more

VIENNA, 5 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today condemned several threats against N1 TV and its journalists in Serbia.

According to reports, a deputy of the Serbian Progressive Party accused journalists from media outlet N1 TV on social media for recognizing the independence of Kosovo. This reaction triggered a wave of offensive and discriminatory statements on social media portraying N1 as “traitors” and “anti-Serbs”.

“Public figures must not create a hostile environment for journalists, since this could lead to serious pressure and threats against them,” said Désir.

In addition, N1 TV received a letter in which unknown perpetrators threatened the safety of their families and to blow up the outlet’s offices. These threats, which are reportedly connected to the media reporting on current affairs in Serbia, were shared with the police.

“Targeting and attacking journalists because of their work is an attack on freedom of expression which is a fundamental human right. I call on the Serbian authorities to do their utmost to identify and punish those responsible for these threats against N1 TV, and to ensure that journalists can perform their professional activities without being intimidated or threatened,” urged Désir.

The Representative underlined points 3 and 7 of the recent Decision on Safety of Journalists adopted last December at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Milan, which calls on participating States to: “condemn publicly and unequivocally all attacks and violence against journalists” and “urge political leaders, public officials and/or authorities to refrain from intimidating, threatening or condoning – and to unequivocally condemn – violence against journalists.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom. 

read more

KYIV, 5 February 2019 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission from the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 31 March 2019 presidential election in Ukraine, the mission will hold a press conference in Kyiv on Wednesday.

Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities.

The election observation mission, the office of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine operate independently, under their separate mandates.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 14:30, Wednesday, 6 February, in the Zoloti Vorota conference room of the InterContinental Kyiv Hotel, Velyka Zhytomyrska St., Kyiv.

For further information, please see https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/407660 or contact Francesca Boggeri, Media Analyst of the Election Observation Mission, on +380 67 339 6228 (mobile) or at Francesca.boggeri@odihr.org.ua (email).

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, on + 48 609 522 266 (mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl (email)

read more

On 4 February, an SMM patrol consisting of five members and two armoured vehicles was positioned near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, approximately 300m north of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), to monitor the security situation. 

Between 10:25 and 10:30, two patrol members, who were standing next to the vehicles, heard five undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km east and south-south-east. At 10:30, having just entered the vehicles, the SMM patrol members heard three explosions assessed as impacts, and saw flames, smoke, soot and snow 70-100m east-south-east. 

The SMM patrol immediately moved about 5km north to the eastern edge of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), where between 10:40 and 10:50, it heard an increasing number of ceasefire violations. The patrol left the area, and returned safely to its base in Sievierodonetsk (government-controlled, 74km north-west of Luhansk). SMM notified the Ukrainian Armed Forces side of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination and the armed formations about the incident.

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 1 and 2 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 2 and 3 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed fresh damage from small-arms fire to a school and a house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area, as well as near the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians waiting to travel to government-controlled areas at checkpoints in Kreminets and near Olenivka.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko and Bezimenne and in Voznesenivka, close to the border with the Russian Federation and as well as at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 1 and 2 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 25 explosions). The majority of explosions were recorded in areas south and south-south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 2 and 3 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 65 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and north of Yasynuvata and south-south-west and south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 1 and 2 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement areas section below).

Between the evenings of 2 and 3 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations and explosions were recorded in areas west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage from small-arms fire to a school and a house adjacent to a kindergarten

The SMM observed fresh damage to the three-storey building of a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations of damage to the same school, see SMM Daily Report 8 January 2019). At Myru Street, on the ground floor of the building, the Mission saw that the outer pane of a west-facing double-paned window was broken and that its inner pane was scratched. On the first floor, the SMM observed two corresponding holes in a west-facing double-glazed window (one in the outer pane and one in the inner pane) and a corresponding hole in an inner wall opposite the window. On the second floor, the SMM saw that the upper left corner of a west-facing double-glazed window was broken. On the same floor, 5m from the abovementioned window, it observed that the lower left corner of another west-facing double-glazed window was broken and saw a corresponding hole in the inner wall opposite the window. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by small-arms fire. Two school staff members told the SMM that the incident occurred in the early morning hours of 2 February and that no pupils had been present at the time.

At 2 Myru Street, about 150m north-west of the above-mentioned school building, the SMM observed fresh damage to a one-storey house (which is also located 30m from the building of a kindergarten under renovation). The SMM saw two corresponding holes in a north-facing double-glazed window (one in the outer pane and one in the inner pane), assessed as caused by a bullet (probably 7.62mm in caliber). A man, (55 years old) told the SMM that he was the kindergarten’s guard and that on the evening of 31 January, while he had been sitting inside the house, he had heard the sound of a bullet flying over his head and hitting the house.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 1 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), as well as two projectiles at an assessed range of 0.8-1.2km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 2 February, positioned inside the disengagement areas near Zolote and near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) as well as near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

On the morning of 3 February, positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote for 15 minutes, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 6-8km west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the same morning, positioned about 3km north of Petrivske for about one hour, the SMM heard nine shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 3 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

1 February

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Non-government-controlled areas

1 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four probable self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 probable towed howitzers (D-30) and six probable anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk);
• 21 tanks (11 T-64 and ten T-72) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 29 tanks (ten T-72 and 19 T-64) near Bile.

Weapons storage sites:

At permanent storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region:

2 February

The SMM saw that:

• 23 tanks (nine T-64 and 14 T-72), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

Indications of military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

2 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR variant) in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR variant) in Holubivske (51km west of Luhansk).

3 February

The SMM saw:

• a mobile jamming communication system assessed as R-330ZH “ZHITEL” entering a compound in Luhansk city.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 2 and 3 February, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk) and the DFS.

SMM facilitation of safe departure of civilians who reportedly came under fire in Chermalyk

On 2 February, following reports that three cemetery workers had come under fire at a cemetery in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to allow them to leave the area.

Long queues of civilians at checkpoints

On the morning of 3 February, at a checkpoint on highway H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a 500m-long queue of cars waiting to travel to government-controlled areas. Four people separately told the SMM that they had been waiting for hours and that the queue was moving very slowly. After about one hour, the SMM saw that the queue had only moved forward by 15m. On the same day, at a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a 700m-long queue of cars waiting to travel to government-controlled areas.

Border areas outside of government control

On 2 February, while at a border crossing point in Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 35 cars (six with Ukrainian, 13 with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and 15 with “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 21 covered cargo trucks (16 with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine, as well as 12 cars (four with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and six with “DPR” plates) and six covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

On 3 February, while at a border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed 15 trucks (eight with Ukrainian licence plates and seven with “LPR” plates), 16 cars (ten with Ukrainian licence plates and six with “LPR” plates) and around 60 pedestrians queuing to exit Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the Mission observed more than 40 cargo rail cars (whose content could not be assessed). After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM observed a man on a bicycle entering Ukraine.

Also on 3 February, while at a border crossing point in Uspenka for about one hour and a half, the SMM saw ten cars, six trucks, two buses and two minivans exiting Ukraine, as well as 18 cars (four with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates and ten with “DPR” plates), three buses (one with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), one minivan (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 2 February, a member of the armed formations denied the SMM entry to a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• On 3 February, at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 3 February, at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 3 February, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), preventing the Mission from travelling west towards Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). The Mission saw a civilian car travelling through the checkpoint in the direction of Pikuzy.
• On 3 February, at a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one of them armed) again denied the SMM passage west, citing “orders from their superior”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 2 February, at a checkpoint on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing the need for prior permission from his superiors. After about 45 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint, following an intervention by senior members of the armed formations, the Mission was allowed to proceed. (See SMM Daily Report 23 January 2019).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

read more

VIENNA, 4 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his concern regarding a court verdict to terminate the activity of the newspaper Novye Kolesa Igorya Rudnikova in Kaliningrad.

On 1 February the Kaliningrad Regional Court, upon the request of the local branch of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media of Kaliningrad region (Roskomnadzor), a governmental watchdog, ruled to terminate the activity of the newspaper following two warnings issued by the same authority.   

“This decision, along with other negative developments around the newspaper in recent years, has a negative impact on media pluralism and access to information and I hope it will be reversed on appeal,” stated Désir. “Any restrictive sanctions imposed on the media should be strictly necessary and proportionate to the actual harm caused, and the case law should take note of the freedom of the media in line with international standards and OSCE commitments.”

Earlier, in April 2018 the Representative also expressed his concern about the seizure of copies of the Novye Kolesa Igorya Rudnikova newspaper and vendors’ refusal to distribute it following the arrest of its editor Igor Rudnikov, who continues to serve a pre-trial detention since November 2017 (see: https://twitter.com/OSCE_RFoM/status/982191136373587969  and https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/402110). Reportedly, the publishing house has also declined to print the newspaper since April of last year.

read more

VIENNA, 4 February 2019 – The Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM), together with the European Parliament, European Commission and EU Delegation to the OSCE, will host a panel discussion on 5 February, to debate issues of safety in the digital space and related challenges for media freedom.

The Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, will speak on a panel together with the Head of the UK Delegation to the OSCE, Ambassador Sian MacLeod and Austrian journalist and author, Ingrid Brodnig. The panel discussion will be moderated by the President of Reporters without Borders Austria, Rubina Möhring.

The panel discussion takes place on 5 February at 17:30, at the Haus der Europäischen Union (Wipplingerstrasse 35, 1010 Vienna), and will be followed by a small reception afterwards.

This event is open to the public; please register with maria.perez-lopez@eeas.europa.eu to ensure your participation.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He/she provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on facebook.com/osce.rfom.

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 25), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (60 explosions).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 31 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On 1 February, the same camera recorded an illumination flare in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 1 February, at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw that the some of the pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (tailfins of 120mm mortar rounds) which it observed for the first time on 30 January were no longer present (see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019). A member of the armed formations told the Mission that they had been removed on 31 January.

On the evening of 31 January, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two muzzle flashes at an assessed range of 1-2km north (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Positioned north and west of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

1 February

The SMM saw:

• two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

31 January

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• seven stationary tanks (T-80) near Aslanove (85
• km south of Donetsk); and
• four anti-tank guns (MT-12), two tanks (T-64), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and two self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 1 February 2019).

1 February

The SMM saw:

• three tanks (T-64) near Manhush (25km south-west of Mariupol);
• six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Dianivka (formerly Kirovske, 38km north-west of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018); and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Holubivka (81km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

1 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Saxon) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk);
• two APCs (BTR-70) parked in the yard of a house near Malynove (19km north-east of Luhansk); and
• an APC (MT-LB-variant) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

31 January

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) in Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk); and
• two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1 and a BMP variant) near Lozove (52km north-east of Donetsk).

Mine near Verkhnoshyrokivske removed

On 1 February, the Mission saw that a device it had seen fastened to a tree near a road about 1.4km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) on 7 November 2018 and assessed as a MON-100 anti-personnel type mine (see SMM Daily Report 8 November 2018) was no longer present.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and a water conduit near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 19 cars (five with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) and five covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) exit Ukraine and four cars (one with Russian Federation and two with Estonian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates enter Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the Mission saw two men and a woman (in their fifties) exit Ukraine and two men (in their forties and fifties) enter Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge.

Other impediments:

On 31 January, staff at two schools in Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM it needed permission from senior members of the armed formations to visit the facilities.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

read more