Central Europe

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and in Shchastia.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (eight), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (five), compared with the previous reporting period (12 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south of Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and north-west and east-north-east of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement areas section below).

Disengagement areas[2]

In the early morning hours of 4 January, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded four projectiles in flight (two from north-north-east to south-south-west and two from north to south) at an assessed range of 1-1.5km east-north-east and east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 4 January, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and 40 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned on the southern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard eight shots (five of small-arms fire and three of undetermined weapons), all at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and five shots of undetermined weapons at an assessed range of 1-2km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-7km south and 15 shots of small-arms fire, a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire and a shot of an automatic grenade launcher (AGL), all at an assessed range of 2km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the morning of 4 January, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard eight bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and nine bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area). [3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

New mine hazard signs

The SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign, a red rectangle with “Distance to minefield 300 metres. Access allowed only in protective gear” written in Ukrainian in white letters, on the southern side of a local road about 2km south-east of Kryva Luka (government-controlled, 98km north of Donetsk). The Mission also saw for the first time a mine hazard sign, red with white lettering reading “Mines” in Russian, posted on a fenced gate outside the entrance to a compound in Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 64km north-west of Donetsk).

Hardships faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

The SMM saw two metal containers being constructed at the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45 north-east of Donetsk). The Mission also saw 20 people (mostly elderly women) in a tent of the State Emergency Services placed at the same checkpoint. A representative of the State Emergency Services told the SMM that the high number of people in the tent was due to the holiday season and that they had all been denied passage due to issues with their documentation.  

The Mission also saw a slippery road surface at the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) causing difficulties for civilians (particularly elderly people) to walk.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw 27 cars (four with Ukrainian, 14 with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates as well as eight with “DPR” plates) leaving Ukraine and no traffic in the opposite direction.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see  SMM Daily Report 4 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.  
• North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place in the past 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational and winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of the majority of other SMM cameras.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Between the evenings of 2 and 3 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The Mission recorded about 450 ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area and observed military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM’s access was also restricted near non-government-controlled Izvaryne and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 2 and 3 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (seven), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 2 and 3 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (12), compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the morning of 3 January, positioned 1.8km north of Petrivske for about an hour, the SMM heard about 450 bursts and shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) and three shots of small arms fire 1km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 2 January, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) in a revetted position west of road T1316 and north of a railway bridge, inside the Zolote disengagement area (about 900m south of the disengagement area’s northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. During the day on 3 January, positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km east-south-east (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 3 January, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

2 January:

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• three tanks (T-72) south-west of Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

2 January:

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four tanks (T-72) about 1.5km west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk); and
• a probable heavy weapon (type undetermined) near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

3 January

• A tank (type undetermined) near Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk)

Weapons storage sites beyond withdrawal lines

Heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

3 January

• A self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing
• New weapon observed present for the first time

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

2 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two probable armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) and one probable IFV (BMP variant) about 1km north-west of Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk)
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) north-east of Artema (26km north of Luhansk)

3 January

• An anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on a military truck in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)
• An IFV (BTR-3) near Myrne (63km south of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

2 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an APC (MT-LB) fitted with an anti-aircraft (ZU-23, 23mm) about 1km west of Molodizhne.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw three pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine and 29 pedestrians exiting Ukraine. After about 20 minutes, an unarmed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw six pedestrians entering Ukraine and five pedestrians exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a checkpoint at the northern entrance to Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), five members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding towards the city centre or from traveling east. The SMM saw civilian cars passing the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 4 January 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovakia’s Minister for Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák, will present  Slovakia’s Chairmanship programme and priorities for the OSCE to its Permanent Council on Thursday, 10 January in Vienna.

Journalists are invited to cover the speech set to begin at 10:00 on 10 January at the Hofburg’s Neuer Saal, 2nd floor.

A press conference by Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák and OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger will take place after the formal Chairmanship’s inauguration, at 12:30 in Room 533, 5th floor. The press conference will be held in English.

Journalists wishing to attend are required to send an e-mail requesting registration to press@osce.org, no later than 9 January at 18:00.

Slovakia took over the Chairmanship of the Organization from Italy on 1 January 2019.

Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák will outline Slovakia’s OSCE Chairmanship priorities, with a focus on preventing, mediating conflict and mitigating its humanitarian impact while focusing on the people it affects; providing for a safer future; and promoting effective multilateralism. Particular attention will be given to protecting and improving the lives of people in the OSCE region.

Updates and the latest news from the Slovak Chairmanship can be followed via https://www.osce.org/cio and the Twitter account @Slovakia_OSCE.

The OSCE Permanent Council is a decision-making body gathering representatives of all 57 participating States of the Organization and 11 Partners for Co-operation. It convenes weekly in Vienna to discuss developments in the OSCE area and to make decisions.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Between the evenings of 30 and 31 December 2018, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• Between the evenings of 31 December 2018 and 1 January 2019, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• Between the evenings of 1 and 2 January, it recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The Mission observed damage caused by gunfire to a residential building in Dokuchaievsk and to a fire station building in Slovianoserbsk.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Artema.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a railway station and border crossing point not under government control in Voznesenivka and near Sofiivka.
• The SMM saw damage caused by fire at a chapel and followed up on reports of a fire at another chapel in Kyiv region.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 30 and 31 December, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 35 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion). Over a third of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 31 December 2018 and 1 January 2019, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 55 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk and at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk). In the early morning of 1 January, the SMM camera at the DFS recorded 40 undetermined explosions and 18 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-west to south-east), all at an assessed range of 0.2-4km south and south-south-west.   

Between the evenings of 1 and 2 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (about 30), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at north-easterly directions of Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), easterly directions of Svitlodarsk and easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 30 and 31 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (no explosions) compared with the previous 24 hours (three explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-westerly directions of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 31 December 2018 and 1 January 2019, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded north-west and south-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 1 and 2 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous 24 hours. Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded south of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk). 

Small-arms fire directed at SMM unmanned aerial vehicle

On 2 January, while flying a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire about 600-800m north-east of its position, assessed as directed at the mini-UAV, which at that time was flying 1km east-north-east of the patrol’s position.*

Damage to residential building caused by gunfire in Dokuchaievsk

On 2 January, at 98 Lenina Street in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw three holes (one 3-5cm in width and two smaller ones taped over), in a south-west facing window in the second floor apartment of a residential building. The SMM assessed that the holes were caused by gunfire, but could not assess if recent.

Damage to fire station building caused by gunfire in Slovianoserbsk

On 2 January, about 50m west of a checkpoint of the armed formations in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw a fresh hole with scorch marks surrounding it in the east-facing wall of a fire station building, assessed as caused by small-arms fire from an easterly direction.

Fresh impact crater near Molodizhne

On 1 January, the SMM saw a fresh crater on the northern side of road T-0504 around 700m west-north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations about 2km south-west of Molodizhne, assessed as caused by a mortar round.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 31 December, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted a stationary vehicle, assessed as a military ambulance, with four Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel standing near it about 1km south of the northern edge and 1.2km east of the western edge of the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 1 January, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

On the evening of 31 December, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded two illumination flares at an assessed range of 1-3km south (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and three illumination flares at an assessed range of 1-3km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 2 January, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard five shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km west-south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 31 December 2018 and on 1 and 2 January 2019, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed calm situations.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

2.  January 2019

• A self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

30 December 2018

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 22 tanks (ten T-72 and 12 T-64) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 19 tanks (eight T-72 and 11 T-64), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 12 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in these areas see SMM Daily Report 29 December 2018).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

31 December 2018

• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) on the road north of the Petrivske disengagement area leading from Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) to Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)

1 January 2019

• An armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) in Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk)

2 January 2019

• Two IFVs (BMP-1) at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Zolote disengagement area

Non-government-controlled areas

31 December 2018

• Two IFVs (BMP-2) at a compound in Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk) 

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a probable APC (MT-LB) and a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) next to a non-functional school used by the armed formations in Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk)

1 January 2019

• Three APCs (MT-LB) near Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk)

2 January 2019

• Six APCs (MT-LB), one with a mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2), in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk)

Presence of mines and new mine hazard signs

On 31 December, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in a single line across a road leading from Viktorivka to Bohdanivka (for similar observations in this area see SMM Daily Report 29 November 2018).

On 31 December, the SMM saw for the first time two mine hazard signs, red with white lettering reading “Danger mines” in Russian posted on a fence outside the entrance to a compound in Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

On 2 January, the SMM saw for the first time at least eight mine hazard signs placed on the walls and in the broken windows of a compound in a residential area at the southern end of Lenina Street in Dokuchaievsk. The signs read “Mines” in Russian with red background and white lettering.  

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to power lines near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) on 31 December and to a water pipeline near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) on 31 December 2018 and 2 January 2019. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas not under government control

31 December

While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two cars (with Ukrainian licence plates) and a pedestrian (man, about 65 years old) exiting Ukraine and one car (with Ukrainian licence plates) and 12 pedestrians (seven men and five women, 30-60 years old) entering Ukraine. After about ten minutes, an unarmed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

At the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka, the SMM saw 20 stationary coal wagons on the tracks, but was unable to observe the contents. After five minutes, an unarmed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Follow up on reports of fires at chapels  

On 28 December, the SMM followed up on reports of fires at two chapels of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Kyiv region.

At Archangel Michael’s chapel in the Haiok district of Bila Tserkva (80km south of Kyiv), in a fenced-in area, the SMM saw that a makeshift chapel made out of tin had burned down. The SMM saw that the structure was still standing but the windows and door had been destroyed; smoke marks were visible. Inside the chapel, the SMM saw that everything had been destroyed. Two representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the area told the SMM that the fire had taken place on the night of 18-19 December 2018.

A representative of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Rzhyshchiv (65km south-east of Kyiv) told the SMM by phone that he had seen smoke rising from the 19th-century Trinity church in the town around 07:00 on 9 December. He added that the smoke had caused damage to a side door and the interior of the church.

Public gatherings in Lviv, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk and Kyiv

On 1 January, in Lviv, Dnipro and Ivano-Frankivsk, the SMM saw peaceful gatherings of approximately 400, 200 and 250 people respectively, to mark the 110th anniversary of Stepan Bandera’s birth. In Dnipro, some participants wore black clothing and balaclavas and carried torches as well as shields with tridents on them. In Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv, some participants carried flags including from the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists. On the same day, in Kyiv, the SMM saw two similar events with approximately 2,500 and 250 participants (mixed gender and ages) respectively. Some participants carried torches and flags including Svoboda party, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and Pravyi Sektor. A total of about 150 police officers secured both gatherings, which dispersed peacefully.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Kharkiv and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 31 December, at a border crossing point in Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 31 December, at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 2 January, while approaching Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it access further, citing that the area was “military territory”. Another two armed members of the armed formations verbally abused SMM staff in the second vehicle. After the SMM vehicles moved 500m away, the same two armed formations members followed the SMM and aggressively said “This is the last time I’m going to tell you to leave.” The SMM then left the area. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

On 31 December, at a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia, a member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

Delay:

• On 2 January, at a checkpoint of the armed formations on the northern edge of Slovianoserbsk, an armed member of the armed formations refused the SMM passage north to Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk). After 20 minutes, the member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to pass through, following consultation with his superior. 

Other impediments:

• On 2 January, while flying a mini-UAV near Artema, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire assessed as directed at the mini-UAV. The SMM retrieved the UAV undamaged and left the area.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 30 December 2018 and 1 January 2019, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka, Svitlodarsk and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational. Between the evenings of 1 and 2 January, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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Bratislava, 1 January 2019 – “The Slovak 2019 OSCE Chairmanship aims to be ambitious in promoting dialogue, trust and stability in the OSCE area, and in supporting the good functioning of the organization. But we also have to be realistic: challenges and complexities are rife. Any further deterioration in the safety and lives of people in our societies is unjustifiable,” said today Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák as he assumed the post of Chairperson-in-Office of the regional security organization.

The Slovak Chairmanship will focus on three areas for action in 2019: preventing, mediating and mitigating conflict while focusing on the people it affects; providing for a safer future; and promoting effective multilateralism.

Preventing and mitigating conflict

Slovakia will prioritize efforts to prevent new conflicts from breaking out, while mitigating the humanitarian consequences of existing ones.

“The ongoing crisis in and around Ukraine is one of the most critical issues for our common security,” said Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák. “Slovakia will actively engage in all efforts to reduce tensions, build trust and facilitate dialogue. During our Chairmanship, we will work towards much-needed improvements in the living conditions of the affected population through targeted projects. We will support the full implementation of existing commitments, including those to fully respect the ceasefire and withdraw heavy weapons. Ensuring safe and unimpeded access for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission is essential.“ 

“Slovakia also intends to make best use of the unique expertise of the OSCE’s institutions, executive structures, as well as its field operations, to promote democratic governance and the rule of law, improve resilience to security challenges, promote sustainable policy responses and support reforms when requested.”

Providing for a safer future

Regarding Slovakia’s second priority, Lajčák stressed that “rapid technological change, digitalization and innovation offer vast opportunities, but can also pose challenges. To provide a secure future for all, we must ramp up our efforts to engage with youth; strengthen tolerance and non-discrimination; use the OSCE toolbox to prevent radicalization and violent extremism leading to terrorism; promote sustainable development; and manage enhanced connectivity and cyber security.”

Effective multilateralism

“During its Chairmanship, Slovakia will promote meaningful and open dialogue among states as well as with non-state actors. Effective multilateralism strengthens trust in institutions and improves security for all,” stressed the new Chairperson-in-Office. A defender of multilateralism, he said that Slovakia will support the development of the OSCE's strategic partnerships with international organizations.

In the lead-up to 2019 already, Slovakia advocated for a strategic approach to prioritizing and ensuring adequate funding for OSCE activities. “We must ensure that the OSCE’s tools and platforms are adaptable to our rapidly changing security environment. This requires more substantial co-operation and a commitment to providing the OSCE with adequate human and financial resources,” Lajčák insisted. 

“Overall, Slovakia will dedicate its Chairmanship to bringing the OSCE closer to the people it is working for. We are determined to promote gender mainstreaming throughout the OSCE’s work. And we aim to improve people's safety and security” Lajčák concluded.

Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák will present Slovakia’s priorities to the OSCE Permanent Council on 10 January in Vienna.

Follow the Slovak Chairmanship on Twitter at @Slovakia_OSCE

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Following the beginning of a recommitment to the ceasefire on the occasion of New Year and Christmas festivities at 00:01 on 29 December, between the evenings of 28 and 29 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period.
• Between the evenings of 29 and 30 December, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission was also restricted in Michurine, Starolaspa, near Zaichenko and at two border crossing points with the Russian Federation near Izvaryne and Sievernyi.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 28 and 29 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 37 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations and all explosions were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk). About 30 per cent of the ceasefire violations (114), including six explosions, were recorded after the beginning of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 29 December.

Between the evenings of 29 and 30 December, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous 24 hours.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 28 and 29 December, the SMM recorded six ceasefire violations and no explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). All ceasefire violations were recorded north-west of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk) after the start of the recommitment to the ceasefire.

Between the evenings of 29 and 30 December, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded north-west and south-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Following the beginning of the recommitment to the ceasefire, the SMM recorded in total 355 ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

On 30 December, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer and two Ukrainian Border Guard Service officers at three checkpoints in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region told the SMM they had received instructions to respect the recommitment to the ceasefire. Two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at another checkpoint in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region told the Mission they had not received such instructions. At two checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas Donetsk region, two members of the armed formations told the SMM they were aware of the recommitment. In a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region, another member of the armed formations told the Mission they had signed a document stating they would not violate the recommitment to the ceasefire unless specifically instructed to do so by superiors.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 29 and 30 December, positioned close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

On 30 December, positioned close the disengagement near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

29 December

• An anti-tank guided missile system (RK-3 Corsar, 107mm) moving south near Myronivka (64km north-east of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

30 December

• A surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) moving south-west near Almazna (55km west of Luhansk)

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

29 December

• An anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) mounted atop a truck near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk)

30 December

• An armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) and an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk)
• Three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)
• An armoured recovery vehicle (BREM variant) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk)

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 29 and 30 December, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to power lines near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and a water pipeline near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas not under government control

29 December

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and about 60 people (40 men and 20 women, mixed ages) enter Ukraine as well as eight people (five men and three women, mixed ages) exit Ukraine. After about 30 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw six people (men, 16-20 years old) enter Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw six people (men, 20-30 years old) enter Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

29 December

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• In Michurine (non-government-controlled, 61km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave immediately as it was not permitted to stop in the settlement.
• At a checkpoint near Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from entering the settlement, citing “the safety of the SMM”.

30 December

• Two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), preventing the Mission from travelling west towards Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south towards Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). They cited “the SMM’s safety”. The Mission saw a civilian car travelling through the checkpoint from the direction of Pikuzy.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Conditional access:

• On 29 December, at a checkpoint on road H15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to pass only after he had inspected the SMM vehicle’s trailer.

 

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka, Svitlodarsk and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM continued to observe hardships faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line: it saw the body of a deceased man at a checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and in Shchastia.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area, in areas south of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement area section below), in areas south and south-west of Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk) as well as in areas west and north-west of Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 27 December, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 20 projectiles in flight and three bursts, all at an assessed range of 1.5-4km east-south-east, south-east and south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), five projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km east and east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) as well as three projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km east and south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 28 December, the same camera recorded three projectiles at an assessed range of 1-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard nine shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and eight shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same day, in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a car with military licence plates with three Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel on board entering the disengagement area.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites[3]

Non-government-controlled areas

27 December

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• 20 tanks (ten T-72 and ten T-64) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 20 tanks (12 T-72 and eight T-64), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), two mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and nine probable anti-tank guided missile systems (9P135 Konkurs, 135mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (the UAV also spotted over 60 armoured combat vehicles, mostly infantry fighting vehicles, and about 450 persons in full combat gear assessed as preparing for live-fire exercises).

28 December

• A tank (type undetermined) on road M04 in Yurivka (27km west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas:

27 December

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-80) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas:

28 December

• An unidentified mini-UAV in flight from east to west about 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk). While leaving the area, the SMM saw three members of the armed formations standing about 50-75m east of road T0504; one of them was holding a control unit, which the SMM assessed as being the controller of the previously observed UAV.  

Hardships faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw the body of a deceased man inside an ambulance. Medical staff told the SMM that the man (aged 65-80) had arrived earlier the same morning and had felt unwell, while waiting to cross toward government-controlled areas. A few hours later, near the same checkpoint, the SMM saw a woman (aged about 80) on board of an ambulance. A representative of an international organization told the SMM that the woman had complained about heart problems after having crossed from government-controlled areas and she would be transported to a hospital in Luhansk.  

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), power lines near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), a power station in Katerynivka, as well as repair works to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and repair works to restore electricity to a monastery in Donetsk city’s Kyivskyi district (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of the city centre). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk); repair works to power lines supplying the DFS were completed on 27 December (see SMM Daily Report 28 December 2018), thus restoring power supply to the DFS.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 28 December 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]           Armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines near Buhaivka and Khrustalnyi.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure.
• In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a gathering in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation
• In Kherson, the SMM monitored a court hearing at which the pre-trial detention of the former editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine was extended.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Novoazovsk and Voznesenivka close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area, including six explosions assessed as impacts at an assessed range of 300-500m south of the SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), in areas south of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas north, east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (four explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and east of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement area section below) and south-west of Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

In the early morning hours on 27 December, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day, positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and three bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-3km south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the Mission heard seven undetermined explosions and 43 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 4-5km west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1-3km east and an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-10km west. Positioned north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the Mission heard seven shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-east. All the above ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

26 December

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 14 towed howitzers (D-30, Lyagushka, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

27 December

• 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk)

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

26 December

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• eight tanks (T-64), three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10), five mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and a probable anti-tank guided missile system (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) in a training area near Buhaivka; and
• 11 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons storage sites

A heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), ten towed howitzers (nine D-30 and one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five MLRS (BM-21) were again missing. Three additional self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing for the first time. The SMM also observed a new weapon for the first time.

Indications of military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Non-government-controlled areas

26 December

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• five infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2) north-west of Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

27 December

• An armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk)

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

At 10:00 on 27 December, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw about 1,300 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and no people queueing in the opposite direction. About three hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the Mission observed about 100 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 350 people queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema, power lines near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), as well as repair works to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and repair works to restore electricity to a monastery in Donetsk city’s Kyivskyi district (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of the city centre). Positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), it heard an undetermined explosion 500-700m north-west of the location of the repair works.

The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to power lines supplying the DFS.

Border areas not under government control

At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three pedestrians (one man and two women, in their fifties) exiting Ukraine and four pedestrians (two men and two women, aged 40-50) entering Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM saw about 100 stationary coal railcars (unable to see whether full or empty) and six tank railcars (five with “Caution! Sulphuric acid” written in Cyrillic on their sides). After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.*

Public gathering in Kyiv

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation at 27 Povitroflotskyi Avenue. The Mission saw 15 people (mixed ages and genders), some of whom were displaying signs with the names of Ukrainian political prisoners being reportedly held in the Russian Federation, as well as seven National Guard officers. The gathering ended without incidents.

Court hearing in Kherson

In Kherson, the SMM monitored a court hearing on the extension of pre-trial detention of the former editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine, arrested in Kyiv on 15 May 2018 on charges of high treason under Article 111.1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (see SMM Daily Report 13 July 2018). The court ruled that the defendant would remain in custody until 27 January 2019.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint at the northern entrance to Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), four members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from traveling south, citing “orders from their superiors”.
• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, an armed member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area of the railway station.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

Delay:

• At an armed formations’ checkpoint near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM was allowed to pass through after about 30 minutes.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 23 and 24 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Between the evenings of 24 and 25 December, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• Between the evenings of 25 and 26 December, it recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• An armed man in camouflage clothing damaged an SMM vehicle and verbally insulted its patrol members in Khoroshe, Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• It observed for the first time unexploded ordnance inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at checkpoints of the armed formations near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Starolaspa, at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and near Izvaryne, a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 23 and 24 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at northerly and westerly directions of the central railway station in Donetsk city (6km north-west of the city centre) and at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). On the evening of 23 December, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an explosion assessed as an impact at an assessed range of 500-700m south.

Between the evenings of 24 and 25 December, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 270 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly and south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk. On the evening of 24 December, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 10-50m north-east.

Between the evenings of 25 and 26 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 50 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly and southerly directions of Svitlodarsk, at south-westerly directions of the DFS and south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 23 and 24 December, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 60), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement area section below).

Between the evenings of 24 and 25 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 70), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at northerly and westerly directions of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km of Luhansk) and at south-easterly directions of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) (see the disengagement area section below).

Between the evenings of 25 and 26 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Zolote.

SMM vehicle damaged by an armed man in camouflage clothing

On 24 December, while monitoring the security situation in Khoroshe (non-government-controlled, 36km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw that a car stopped nearby and that five armed men in camouflage clothing emerge from the car. Shortly thereafter, one of the men, who was visibly intoxicated, approached an SMM vehicle and pulled the rear windshield wiper and the OSCE flag off the vehicle. He then walked away while verbally insulting nearby SMM patrol members. The SMM left the area. (For previous similar incidents, see SMM Daily Report 4 January 2018.)

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 23 December, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-4km at south-easterly directions (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and two projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The following day, the same camera recorded two explosions assessed as impacts at an assessed range of 2-3km south (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as an explosion assessed as an impact and five projectiles, all at an assessed range of 0.8-1.5km at easterly directions (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 24 December, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and about 150 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-2km west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as 12 undetermined explosions and eight bursts, all at an assessed range of 2-3km north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned on the eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a car with military plates carrying two persons in camouflage clothing drive out of the Zolote disengagement area.

On the evening and night of 24-25 December, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 20 projectiles at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). The same camera recorded a projectile at an assessed range of 1-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and two projectiles at an assessed range of 1-5km south-east (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area). In the late afternoon of 25 December, the camera recorded six projectiles at an assessed range of 1-2km east and east-south-east (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On the evening and night of 25-26 December, the same camera recorded 14 projectiles at an assessed range of 2-3km east-south-east and south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as an undetermined explosion, seven projectiles and two bursts, all at an assessed range of 1-5km at easterly directions (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The camera also recorded nine projectiles at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east and south-west as well as an undetermined explosion and two projectiles at an assessed range of 2-5km east-south-east and south-south-east (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 24 December, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard about 20 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km at south-westerly directions (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and about 30 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 4-6km south-south-west (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 25 December, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM saw a metal object assessed as a mortar (possibly 82mm) tailfin, embedded in the ground 1-1.5m west of the road and about 270m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

24 December

• Ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)
• A self-propelled howitzer (2S1) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north-east of Donetsk)

26 December

• 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) at the railway station in Bakhmut

Non-government-controlled areas

24 December

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two tanks (T-72) near Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk).

26 December

• Two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk)

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

24 December

• Eight self-propelled howitzers (2S7 Pion, 203mm) moving south in Pokrovsk (former Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk)
• Nine self-propelled howitzers (2S7) moving south near Novotroitske (57km north-west of Donetsk)
• A surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) and three tanks (T-72) at the railway station in Bakhmut
• Two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) near Shyroka Balka (11km south-west of Mariupol)
• Four self-propelled howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Azovske (22km south-west of Mariupol)

25 December

• Nine tanks (T-64BV) in Pokrovsk
• Two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk)

26 December

• Four tanks (T-64 variants) at the railway station in Bakhmut
• A surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Kalchyk (24km north of Mariupol)

A SMM mid-range UAV spotted five tanks (T-72) near Druzhne (63km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 December

• Four tanks (type undetermined) at a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)

25 December

• Eight tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk)

Weapons storage sites beyond the withdrawal lines*

Permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

25 December

• 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64), 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) remained missing.

Permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

26 December

• Six tanks (five T-64 and a T-72) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

25 December

• Three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (one BMP-1 and two BMP variants) and three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2), including one parked about 30-40m from a residential house, near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)

26 December

• Three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Popasna
• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk)
• A helicopter (MI-8) flying from east to west about 1km south-east of Kleban Byk (48km north of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

22 December

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 13 armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB), an armoured recovery vehicle (VT-55) and a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) in Kadiivka.

Presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO)

On 24 December, on Stratonavtiv Street in Donetsk city’s Kyivskyi district (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of the city centre), the SMM observed for the first time metal objects, assessed as remnants of a detonated multiple launch rocket system (Grad-type, 122mm) rocket, laying on the ground about 50cm south of the road. The Mission saw that the objects were rusted and partially covered in snow. The following day, the SMM saw for the first time a metal object, assessed as a 120mm mortar round, about 25-50cm south of a road in the Oktiabr mine compound (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre), about 100m south of the SMM camera site. On 26 December, the Mission saw for the first time a metal object, assessed as a remnant of an undetermined weapon round, in a field about 10m from the nearest house in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk). The SMM was not able to determine whether the abovementioned UXO were recent.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines near Popasna on 24 December; water pipelines near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) on 25 December; and the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), power lines near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) on 26 December. On 24, 25 and 26 December, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining and repair works to restore electricity to a monastery in Donetsk city’s Kyivskyi district. On 24 and 25 December, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. On 26 December, following the reported loss of power supply to the station the night before, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to power lines. Workers from the Voda Donbassa water company told the SMM that the interruption in power supply might have been caused by adverse weather conditions.

Border areas not under government control

24 December

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 14 cars (six with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw a car (with Ukrainian licence plates) and a van (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw a car with Russian Federation licence plates exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM observed no people entering or exiting Ukraine.

25 December

At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for five minutes, the SMM saw five cars (two with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates), a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and three pedestrians entering Ukraine as well as 19 pedestrians exiting Ukraine. An unarmed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw six pedestrians exiting and four pedestrians entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 25 December, at a checkpoint near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from passing through.
• On 25 December, the SMM could not access a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, as no guards were present to open the locked gate.
• On 25 December, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 26 December, two members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) again prevented the SMM from entering the village, citing possible risks to “the security of the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 23 and 24 December, the SMM cameras in Berezove, Hranitne, Krasnohorivka, Oktiabr mine, Svitlodarsk and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational. Between the evenings of 24 and 26 December, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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KYIV, 27 December 2018 – Today, the Trilateral Contact Group has adopted the following Statement on recommitment to the ceasefire on the occasion of New Year and Christmas festivities:

“The Trilateral Contact Group, with the participation of representatives of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, reiterate their full commitment to a permanent ceasefire on the occasion of New Year and Christmas festivities, starting at 00:01 (Kyiv Time) on 29 December 2018.

The sides shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the ceasefire is sustainable.

For the purpose of monitoring, the sides shall also ensure safe and secure access of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission throughout the whole territory of Ukraine, in accordance with its mandate.”

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KYIV, 27 December 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and to the Trilateral Contact Group, Martin Sajdik, and the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Ertugrul Apakan, welcomed today the sides’ recommitment to the ceasefire on the occasion of the New Year/Christmas festivities.

The recommitment, which is due to come into effect at 00:01 (EET) on 29 December 2018, requires that the sides take concrete measures, said Ambassador Sajdik. “A meaningful, sustainable and long-lasting ceasefire requires that orders to cease fire are issued, discipline is maintained and the safe and secure access of the OSCE SMM throughout Ukraine is ensured in accordance with its mandate,” he said. “Promises made to people in eastern Ukraine must be kept.”

Ambassador Apakan said that the recommitment was specifically made to minimize risk to the civilian population. “This time of year is a time for hope and healing, when families come together and the gift of life is renewed and embraced,” he said. “They want and deserve peace.”

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Vienna, 26 December 2018 - Following the publication, on 24 December 2018, of the interview conducted by the German newspaper Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung with OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, several incorrect translations and out of context quotes have been published in various media outlets.  In order to avoid any misinterpretation of Secretary General Greminger’s words, we would like to share the original article, which is the only correct version:

INTERVIEWOSZE-Chef: "Die Sicherheitslage in Europa ist besorgniserregend" - Von Thomas Ludwig 

For any further information, please contact the OSCE Communication and Media Relations Section.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 21 and 22 December, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Between the evenings of 22 and 23 December, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• It observed damage caused by gunfire to civilian properties in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• It continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Marinka.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Novolaspa and Izvaryne, an area of Luhansk region close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 21 and 22 December, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (85), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and at south-westerly and north-westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 22 and 23 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 110 explosions), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly and southerly directions of Svitlodarsk, including about 70 explosions.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 21 and 22 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (45 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Kruta Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 22 and 23 December, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Slovianoserbsk (non-government controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), including about 40 explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds at an assessed range of 5-15km north-west, and west-north-west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), including about 20 bursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) fire.

Damage caused by gunfire in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district

On 23 December, the SMM saw fresh damage to four civilian properties in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), all assessed as caused by 23mm or 30mm rounds. At 24 and 26 Bilorichynska Street, the SMM saw holes and shattered windows on the west-facing sides of two two-storey apartment buildings. At 6 Kosareva Street, the Mission saw a shattered west-facing window of a two-storey apartment building. At 70 Udachna Street, the SMM saw two shattered west-facing windows of a two-storey apartment building. Four civilians (men and women, aged 50-70) each residing in these apartment buildings told the Mission that their buildings had been damaged on the evening of 20 December.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 15 December, on the south-eastern edge of Zolote-4 (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), about 40m north of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted recent damage to the roof of a four-storey building, assessed as caused by small-arms fire and possible 82mm mortar rounds. The UAV also spotted recent damage to the east-facing side of the building, assessed as caused by undetermined weapons, as well as nearby trenches and Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel. The SMM was not able to determine the direction of fire.

On the night of 22-23 December, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight (one from north-north-east to south-south-east and the other from north-east to south-west) at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the day on 22 December, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and about 30 bursts and shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-3km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3] The following day, positioned at the same location, the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 23 December, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same day, positioned at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard 18 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-4km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

22 December

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (eight 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and six 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

23 December

• Ten self-propelled howitzers (six 2S3 and four 2S1) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka

Non-government-controlled areas

22 December

• 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) 

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

21 December

• A surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north-east of Donetsk)

22 December

• Four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka

Beyond the withdrawal lines

A heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

22 December

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), ten towed howitzers (nine D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four MLRS remained missing.

Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn:[4]

A heavy weapons holding area beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

23 December

• Three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) were present and
• 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six towed howitzers (D-30) and 28 mortars (15 2B11, 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37, 82mm) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

20 December

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• A probable armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-60) near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk) and
• Six infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

22 December

• An IFV (BMP variant) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk)
• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Pravdivka (38km north of Donetsk)
• Four APCs (MT-LB) near Keramik (28km north-west of Donetsk)
• Two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk)

23 December

• An APC (MT-LB) near Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk)
• An IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote

Non-government-controlled areas

On 22 December, the SMM saw five members of the armed formations digging two trenches on either side of road M03 about 1km north-north-west of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission also observed freshly dug 300m-long trenches connected to road T0519 near Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol).

Presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO)

On 22 December, the SMM saw for the first time two metal objects assessed as mortar tailfins on the northern side of road H15, about 500m south of the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk).

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Marinka

On 22 December, on road H15 about 50m east of the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka, the SMM saw about 200-300 people queuing at a bus stop. Six of them (men and women in their fifties and sixties) expressed concern to the Mission that people have to wait up to eight hours for a bus, which according to them arrives once an hour or less frequently, to cross the area between the abovementioned Ukrainian Armed Forces position and the forward position of the armed formations near Oleksandrivka.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 22 December, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station. Ukrainian Armed Forces representatives of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that workers from Voda Donbassa water company had not been able to complete assessments of water pipelines near Zalizne due to gunfire nearby (the SMM heard 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire in the area and facilitated the departure of the workers from there). On 22 and 23 December, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for 15 minutes, the SMM saw 28 cars (11 with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one Lithuanian licence plates, and five with “LPR” and two with “DPR” plates) and 34 covered cargo trucks (19 with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation, three Georgian and four with Belarusian licence plates, and four with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw a car (with Ukrainian licence plates) and 14 pedestrians entering Ukraine and four pedestrians exiting Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 22 cars (17 with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates) and five pedestrians exiting Ukraine and four pedestrians entering Ukraine. The SMM did not observe anyone operating the border crossing point in Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for 25 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians exiting Ukraine and four pedestrians entering Ukraine. The SMM did not observe anyone operating the border crossing point in Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 22 December, at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.
• The same day, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a man injured due to gunfire in Chermalyk.
• The Mission observed damage to a house caused by shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and by small-arms fire to a post office in Holubivske.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• It monitored public gatherings in Odessa and Lviv.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), including about 75 explosions. Positioned in the eastern outskirts of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion and five bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 45 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-south-east of Novoaidar (government-controlled, 49km north-west of Luhansk) (all assessed as live-fire exercise outside the security zone).

Man injured by gunfire in Chermalyk

The SMM followed up on reports of a man (in his fifties) wounded by small-arms fire in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). On 17 December, at a military hospital in Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), medical staff told the SMM that a man (in his fifties) had been admitted on 16 December with a gunshot wound in his left thigh which they assessed as caused by a 5.45mm bullet. According to the medical staff, the man was still in hospital. In Chermalyk, the wife of the wounded man told the SMM that on the morning of 16 December, while inside their house on the north-east edge of Chermalyk, she had heard her husband shouting that he had been shot, immediately after he had left the house.

Damage caused by shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 21 December, at 9 Poshtova Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two shattered windows and numerous holes (assessed as caused by shrapnel) on the north-facing wall of a one-storey residential house.  A west-facing fence 6m north-east of the house was missing six wooden planks and broken parts of the planks were lying on the ground nearby. The Mission observed a tailfin of a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm), or infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon round on the ground next to the fence. The SMM saw a fresh crater covered in snow, around 6.5m north of the house. A gas pipe running along the aforementioned damaged fence had been fixed with tape. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a self-propelled gun or IFV (BMP-1) cannon fired from a north-westerly direction. The owner of the house (man, in his sixties) said the damage had been caused by shelling in the afternoon of 14 December.

Damage caused by gunfire in Holubivske

On 21 December, at 1A Cooperativna Street in Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw a fresh hole and a 5.45mm bullet lodged in the north-west-facing wall of a one-storey building of a functioning post office. An employee of the post office (woman in her forties) told the SMM that when she had left the post office at about 16:00 the previous day, she had not observed any damage to the wall.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 21 December, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 14 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-4km north-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and three bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60 west of Luhansk), the SMM recorded 11 projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east at an assessed range of 2-4km east (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area).  

During the day on 21 December, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and eight undetermined explosions as well as 15 shots of small-arms, all at an assessed range of 1-4km west-south-west (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area). [3]

On the same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

21 December

• 22 self-propelled howitzers (19 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and three 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) at a railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk)
• A self-propelled howitzer (2S1) near Bakhmut, heading north-west
• Nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)
• An anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being towed by a military truck about 2km east of Spirne (96km north of Donetsk), heading south
• Three tanks (T-64) about 2km south-south-west of Bila Hora (67km north-west of Luhansk)

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

21 December

• Four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

21 December

• Two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk)
• Three APCs (BTR-70), an IFV (BMP-2)  and an APC (MT-LB) towing an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk)

• Five IFVs (BMP-1) and a mine layer (GMZ-3) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk)
• A IFV (BMP-1) in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (60km west of Luhansk)
• An APC (BTR-60) and three IFV (BMP-2) near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk)
• Two IFVs (BMP-2) and two APCs (BTR-70) near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk)
• An APC (BTR-70) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk)

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

At 10:15 on 21 December, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM again saw about 1,500 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and about 400 people queueing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw another 500 people queuing at a nearby bus stop. At about 12:15, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 800 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 300 people queuing in the opposite direction. Two elderly women told the SMM that it had taken them five hours to cross from non-government- to government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near Zalizne, as well as to damaged houses in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Other developments

In Odessa, the SMM saw about 70 people (men and women, aged 20-30) in front of the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. About 40 participants were holding flags and wearing clothing with insignia of the National Corps. The SMM saw also ten individuals known to it as members of Automaidan. Participants also carried banners displaying photos of alleged illegal constructions in Odessa and messages in Russian criticizing politicians and constructions. An individual gave a speech and several participants poured red ink and tore the flag of a political party and then placed several pieces of the torn flag on the main door of the prosecutor’s office and on the pavement in front of the door. The SMM observed 15 police officers.

In Lviv, the Mission saw about 500 people (mainly men aged 20-55) in front the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. It observed four individuals known to the SMM as members of Right Sector and others participants holding banners critical of corruption, authorities and their alleged inability to investigate crimes against pro-Maidan activists. The Mission saw that the participants marched to the Regional State Administration. During the march, they were chanting slogans, and at both locations the Mission saw several individuals holding lit smoke flares. Four police cars and about 20 law enforcement officers were moving with the participants and another 30 law enforcement officers were in front of each of the above mentioned buildings. The Mission observed a calm situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 21 December 2018 ). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 22 December 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed serious concern following a court decision in Azerbaijan ordering a well-known investigative journalist Khadija Ismayilova to pay a high fine for an alleged tax debt.

“It is deeply worrying that Khadija Ismayilova continues to face difficulties by state institutions, which hinder her professional activity as a journalist. In recent years, she has had to endure numerous cases of harassment and intimidation for her critical reporting,” Désir said. “I call to end these practices, as they are detrimental to freedom of expression in the country.”

On 21 December, the Baku Economic and Administrative Court, upon the claim filed by the Ministry of Taxes, ordered Ismayilova to pay fine of over 23 thousand euros for alleged failure to pay taxes while she worked as the local bureau chief for Radio Free Europe.

In her defence, Ismayilova claims amongst other things that she was not responsible for RFE financies and that there RFE and the Tax administration are in dispute over this issue as there is an agreement between Azerbaijan and RFE on tax exemption.

Earlier in December 2017, the Representative raised his concern regarding the suspension of Ismayilova’s bank accounts and called on the authorities to ensure that the journalist has access to all finances and can resume unrestricted travel (see: https://www.osce.org/fom/363206).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• The Mission observed convoys of trucks marked “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Izvaryne, an area of Luhansk region close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 200), compared with the previous reporting period (about 350 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas south, south-east and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (six explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), west and north of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), as well as in areas south-west of Khoroshe (non-government-controlled, 36km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the night of 19-20 December, while on the north-eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-2km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 20 December, positioned close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

20 December

• A mortar (probable 2B16 Nona-K, 120mm or M120-15 Molot, 120mm) on the western edge of Orlivka (22km north-west of Donetsk), heading west
• 24 self-propelled howitzers (17 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and seven 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) at a railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk)
• An anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) about 1.5km south-east of Zolotarivka (85km north-west of Luhansk), heading south

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

20 December

• Two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm), 14 tanks (T-64) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) parked at a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk); two additional anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148), heading south-east from the railway station
• Three anti-tank guns (MT-12) and seven tanks (T-64) in Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

19 December

• An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:
  • four infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an armoured ambulance (MT-LB S) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk)

20 December

• An APC (BTR-60) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)
• Four IFVs (BMP-2) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk)
• Two IFVs (one BMP-1 and one BMP-2) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

20 December

• Two APCs (type undetermined) in a compound on the north-eastern edge of Luhansk city
• An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
  • an APC (MT-LB variant) on the eastern edge of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

At 09:40 on 20 December, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM again saw about 1,500 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and people crossing but no queue in the opposite direction. At about 12:15, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, it observed about 700 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and people crossing but no queue in the opposite direction. A woman (in her forties) told the SMM that it had taken her and her family about three and a half hours to cross from non-government- to government-controlled areas. According to her, the length of the queue and the waiting times were unusual.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), water pipelines near Popasna and near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, as well as to damaged houses in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of power lines near government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw 42 cars (26 with Ukrainian and 12 with Russian Federation licence plates as well as four with “LPR” plates), 45 covered cargo trucks (17 with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation, 17 with Belarusian licence plates as well as six with “LPR” plates) and 20 people (mixed ages and genders) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw five pedestrians (four males and a female aged 30-60) entering Ukraine. After about 20 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw seven pedestrians (five men aged 40-60 and two women aged 30-50) exiting Ukraine and one pedestrian (male, aged 60-70) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw three pedestrians (women, aged 35-60) entering Ukraine and no traffic in the opposite direction.

Convoys marked with “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions

On the morning of 20 December, in Donetsk city, the SMM saw a convoy of 30 white cargo trucks (all with Russian Federation licence plates) with “Humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation” written in Russian on their trailer canopies, as well as a car with “DPR” plates and seven vehicles marked “MChS” (with white-on-black “DPR” plates), entering a warehouse on Baumana Street. A few hours later, the SMM saw a convoy, assessed as the same one previously observed in Donetsk city, on road H20 about 5km east on Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) heading east.

On the same morning, on the southern outskirts of Luhansk city, the SMM observed a convoy arriving from a southerly direction. The convoy consisted of two cars (with Russian Federation licence plates), a white van (no markings, undetermined licence plates), two white trucks (with Russian Federation licence plates), 17 cargo white trucks, of which many had “Humanitarian aid from Russian Federation” written in Russian on the trailer canopies (with Russian Federation licence plates) and two cars marked “MChS” (with Russian Federation licence plates). The SMM saw the convoy entering a compound at 2a Rudnieva Street in Luhansk city. The SMM also observed the same convoy earlier on the same morning in Izvaryne, heading north. (For previous observations of a similar convoy, see SMM Daily Report 26 October 2018.)

Other developments

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 1,000 people (mostly women, aged 40-70) in front of the Parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street. The SMM observed some of the people praying and others holding banners critical of certain draft laws proposed to introduce changes on how certain religious organizations would be named. The SMM also saw at least 250 National Guard officers and 200 police officers in front of Parliament, as well as 12 National Guard trucks, four police buses and six police cars parked nearby. It observed no incidents during its presence.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoints near Pyshchevyk and Maiorsk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 21 December 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, organized on 19 December in Bishkek the first Central Asia Judicial Dialogue, to discuss how to protect freedom of expression while combating violent extremism.

During the event, judges representing higher and appellate courts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan discussed national approaches, current legal trends and best practices in cases involving freedom of expression and freedom of the media, including online content, and policies for countering terrorism and violent extremism. The event was opened by Chairman of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court Erkinbek Mamyrov, representative of the Cabinet of Ministers Chingiz Esengul, and Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek Pierre von Arx, together with Harlem Désir.

“This was the first important step towards establishing information exchange between members of the judiciary on issues relating to safeguarding freedom of the media while countering extremist narratives. I hope in the future the circle of participants can be expanded to include journalists and media lawyers,’ said Désir.

Willem Frederik Korthals Altes, a judge from the Netherlands, and Leonid Nikitinskiy, member of the Human Rights Council of the Russian Federation, gave presentations at the event, moderated by Otabek Rashidov, Programme Officer in the OSCE Transnational Threats Department/Action against Terrorism Unit.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has published an online database of election-related recommendations for the Western Balkans.

The database, which went online on 21 December 2018, provides a centralized and searchable collection of electoral recommendations to support institutions, stakeholders and civil society across the Western Balkans in their follow-up efforts.

“From its very beginning, ODIHR’s mandate has included not only the observation of elections, but also work with authorities, political parties and civil society to bring elections in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ODIHR Director. “This database builds upon our Office’s support in following up on election-related recommendations, and will also serve as a useful co-ordination instrument for stakeholders working on electoral reform.”

The database contains the texts of recommendations from previous observation reports and takes into account ongoing activities towards implementing the recommendations. The evaluation of such efforts will be conducted by subsequent election observation missions.

All OSCE participating Sates have committed to promptly following up on ODIHR election assessments and recommendations.

The database was created as part of the project Support to Elections in the Western Balkans, funded by the European Union and the Austrian Development Agency. The project provides assistance to five OSCE participating States: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The project is also providing assistance in Kosovo.

407528 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

More than 25 seaport security and law enforcement officials completed a five-day practical training course on port security management and procedures on 21 December 2018. The course, held at the Turkmenbashi International Seaport on the Caspian Sea, was organized by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

International experts from the United States and the United Kingdom presented the concepts of maritime security and border and borderlands, layers of risk, and key examples of transnational threats at marine borders such as drug trafficking, piracy and maritime terrorism. The participants discussed port security assessment and planning, emergency preparedness and security control administration.

“In May 2018, Turkmenistan inaugurated a new seaport on the Caspian Sea, which will become a regional hub connecting Europe and Asia,” said Dmitry Zagrotskiy, Officer-in-Charge of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“The increased capacity of the new port will require advanced training on modern port control and maritime security procedures, including marine border checkpoints, for the personnel of the port administration, and law enforcement agencies represented at the port,” he said.

“It is symbolic that guided by the priorities of Turkmenistan’s transport policy, the Centre organized this training course as a successful accomplishment of its activities in 2018, the year in which the Government proclaimed that ‘Turkmenistan is the heart of the Great Silk Road’”, concluded Zagrotskiy.

The training programme offered practical exercises and case studies addressing maritime security control and port security management procedures. It also included a visit to the port area to demonstrate methods of cargo and passenger control as well as vessel registration and management procedures.

The participants stressed the importance of using advanced screening techniques and equipment to efficiently counter transnational threats at marine borders.

SKOPJE, 21 December 2018 – A helpline for reporting threats, attacks and violence against journalists - 0800-11-011 – presented at the press conference today in Skopje by the OSCE Mission to Skopje in co-operation with the Independent Union of Journalists and Media Workers (SSNM).

The free helpline will operate 24/7 providing assistance and support to journalists and media workers in case of intimidation, threats, verbal or physical attacks, online harassment, gender-based violence, blackmail, and any other security related issue.

The operator will advise the journalists and media workers on how to act in specific situations by informing about them on available complaint mechanisms.

“An attack on a journalist is an attack on democracy. Threats and intimidations often lead to self-censorship, thus limiting the space for flow of ideas and opinions,” said Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje Jeff Goldstein.  “The OSCE, with its comprehensive approach to security, is working towards ensuring that media can operate more freely and that journalists can conduct their work without fear of intimidation or threats, and stay safe.”

Acting president of SSNM Zvezdan Georgievski said: “Quality journalism is not possible without conditions for safe operation of journalists and media workers. It is, therefore, crucial to provide our colleagues with the needed assistance when facing any kind of violence.”

As part of its efforts to increase the safety of journalists, during the press conference, the Mission also delivered a donation of vests and protective caps for the members of the Association of Journalists.

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