Central Europe

VIENNA, 14 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his serious concern regarding the amendments to the Russian federal laws on Communication and on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information, which were adopted by the State Duma, in the first reading on 12 February.

“I am concerned by the vagueness and broadness of the objectives of the new legislation and the risk of restrictions to access to information,” Désir said. “While the aim is to ensure the sustainability of the Internet in the Russian Federation, the new powers given to the regulator over the routing of Internet traffic, along with the requirements for all Internet service providers to install technical mechanisms to withstand threats, may seriously affect the free flow of information. The central control mechanism over the Internet could also be used to cut access to the global Internet and impair the ability of the population to receive and impart information. I call on the Parliament to carefully review the proposed amendments by taking into account the transnational nature of the Internet and its important role for access to information and media pluralism.”

The draft law, among other things, proposes the introduction of new regulations on traffic routing and the granting of additional powers to the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) to increase the supervision of Internet control and traffic, manage the public communications networks, and restrict access to information deemed illegal under Russian law.  

“The Internet should be overseen by a regulatory authority which is protected from any external interference, while restrictions on online content should be balanced and transparent and imposed only in strict conformity with international law,” Désir added.

“I recall that at the Ministerial Council meeting in Milan in December 2018, in the Decision on Safety of Journalists the OSCE participating States reaffirmed that the right to freedom of expression includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers and in the Declaration on the Digital Economy, they committed to the greatest possible access to the Internet and acknowledged its benefits. They recognized that the free flow of and access to information, including on the Internet, are essential for the digital economy and beneficial to development.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Parliamentary openness and the improvement of the parliament’s interaction with civil society through the legislative process were the focus of an OSCE-supported international conference held in Astana on 14 February 2019.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the NGO Fund for Parliamentary Development in Kazakhstan.

Some 80 Members of Parliament, the Parliament Apparatus staff, representatives of state bodies, civil society, international organizations,academia and university students participated in the event. National experts from non-governmental organizations and academia, as well as a representative of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights delivered presentations on the event topics.

The conference aimed to promote dialogue between the parliament and civil society. The conference’s sessions focused on the current law-making process in Kazakhstan, ways to strengthen the openness and transparency of the parliament to the public, national and international standards and mechanisms of human rights protection, modalities of public participation in the legislative process in the parliament of Kazakhstan, and civic engagement in public decision-making process.

The conference was part of the Office’s activities aimed at enhancing the work of the parliament and strengthening its co-operation with civil society.

MINSK, 14 February 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 13 February 2019:

“Yesterday, we marked the fourth anniversary of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements.

This document, together with the Minsk Protocol and the Minsk Memorandum of September 2014, is the basis of the Minsk Agreements that also define our current work.

Unfortunately, a solution to the conflict has not yet come nearer. I mentioned this yesterday, along with Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, in my VTC briefing to the United Nations Security Council.

This meeting of the UN Security Council was convened on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Package of Measures. It has once again demonstrated the great concern of the international community about the situation in the east of Ukraine.

The meeting's participants –  representatives of both the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council, including those of Asia, Africa and Latin America – have highlighted the humanitarian aspect of the conflict and the necessity to ensure the protection of the civilian population.

The particular contribution of the OSCE to solve the conflict has been acknowledged as well.

Now as for the results of today's discussions in the Working Groups.

The Humanitarian Working Group has welcomed the transfer of thirty-three detainees not related to the conflict from certain areas of Luhansk region (CALR) to the government-controlled areas of Ukraine. The transfer took place on February 7, 2019. Today, the Working Group continued to discuss issues related to further transfers of such detainees.

The Economic Working Group considered topical issues of water deliveries. The participants have agreed that it is essential to introduce a simplified mechanism to pay for water delivered to CALR in the “Karbonyt” supply system. Also, the schedule of the audit for the “Voda Donbassa” company has been agreed upon, so that the ICRC can now start its work in this regard.

The Security Working Group has worked on ensuring sustainability of the ceasefire and on humanitarian demining near civilian infrastructure.

The Political Working Group took forward its exchanges on its well-known agenda, namely the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR as stipulated by the Minsk agreements.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.  
• The Mission observed craters assessed as caused by mortar rounds in residential areas in Pervomaisk and fresh craters inside the Zolote disengagement area. 
• The Mission saw weapons in violation on both sides of the contact line.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 310 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (430 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and at directions ranging from east-south-east to west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).  

On 12 February, positioned about 2.5km south of Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten outgoing explosions and saw three tanks (T-72) at about 2-3km west-north-west of its position. The SMM assessed this as probable live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone (see withdrawal of weapons section below).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). 

Disengagement areas[2]                                                                         

On 11 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)spotted at least 50 recent craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, inside the disengagement area near Zolote and about 600m north-east of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area.

On 11 February, on the north-western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted eight craters in the gardens of four houses (at a distance ranging between 6m and 50m from the houses), assessed as recent impacts caused by 120mm mortar rounds (for further observations in the same area, see SMM Daily Report 12 February 2019). About 1.5km east of this location and 300m south of the south-eastern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the same UAV spotted two armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) and four recent craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, near a position of the armed formations.

Between the evenings of 11-12 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), 42 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-4km east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). On the morning of 12 February, positioned on the western edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 12 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw: 

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) heading south on road H-20 near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three tanks (T-72) in Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk);
• a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and two probable mortars (one 2B11 and one 82mm type undetermined) north-east of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk); and
• four tanks (T-64) near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk).

11 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted: 

• two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a residential area of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM saw:

• three tanks (T-72)  at a training area near Sofiivka (see above).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Non-government-controlled areas 

11 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 18 towed howitzers (ten 2A65 Msta-B,152mm and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), two tanks (T-64, one without main gun) and a self-propelled mortar (2S9Nona-S, 120mm) north of Khrustalnyi (56km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn:[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

12 February

The SMM saw:

• three tanks (a T-64 and two T-72) present for the first time and noted that 33 anti-tank guns (30 MT-12 and three D-48, 85mm) and 12 towed howitzers (2A65) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Practika Kozak-2) in the yard of a residential house in Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk).

12 February 

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-60) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas 

10 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant) and an APC (BTR-80)in Novoselivka.

11 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck and two APCs (MT-LB) in Debaltseve.

On 10 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three impact craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, in a field about 2km north of Sentianivka.

On 11 February, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted about 70 recent craters, assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (82mm and 120mm) near positions of the armed formations west of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled,  96km south of Donetsk). 

On 12 February, the SMM saw a mast with an antenna and an unidentified UAV land next to four armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers on a concrete plot on the south-eastern edge of  Valuiske (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 11 February, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 63 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in two rows in a field near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces close to Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily 11 July 2018).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) and Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) as well as to power lines in Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk) and to water wells at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and to monitor the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable visual inspections related to the possible presence of explosive remnants of war and mines by members of the armed formations near a school and two kindergartens in Holmivskyi, as well as two schools in Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). 

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv. 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 12 February 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access: 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]The SMM visited heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, whose storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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411305 Communication and Media Relations Section

Forty policymakers, technical officers and private sector representatives from ten OSCE participating States and Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation completed a two-day sub-regional training course in Athens on how international cyber/ICT security mechanisms can enhance regional cyber stability.

The training course held on 7 and 8 February 2019, was organized by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the National Cyber Security Authority of Greece’s Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications & Media.

The participants learnt about regional and global efforts to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use of ICTs, in particular, the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) that have been developed by OSCE participating States. There was also a focus on encouraging representatives of OSCE participating States and the Mediterranean Partner States to build or strengthen ties with each other on confronting cyber/ICT security issues and exploring how these ties can be formalized through the OSCE as a platform.

On the first day, the training course featured multiple experts and discussion panels on the prevailing threats stemming from cyberspace in the region, the mechanisms that can be deployed to address them and how the Mediterranean Partners can be engaged in future OSCE cyber/ICT security efforts. The participants were joined by experts from Microsoft and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

On the second day, participants visited the premises of the EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and took part in an OSCE-led scenario-based discussion. Through four stages of an escalating fictitious cyber/ICT incident, participants were asked to flesh out their national perspectives, mitigation and national co-ordination policies, give their views on international co-operation with affected and/or suspected states, and clarify what roles the OSCE, as a platform and guardian of the CBM process, can play.

Communication and Media Relations Section

Strengthening security sector governance was the focus of an event jointly organized by the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 13 February 2019 in Yerevan.

A wide range of stakeholders, executive bodies, legislative oversight bodies, law enforcement agencies, as well as representatives of civil society took part in the event to discuss reform priorities and opportunities in the security sector.

The discussions marked the conclusion of a comprehensive OSCE needs assessment focusing on democratic control and oversight of the security sector, conducted with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in 2018. Findings of the assessment were presented at the event in order to identify future areas of OSCE assistance in strengthening the oversight of the security sector in Armenia.

Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia, Artak Apitonian, stressed that security sector governance and reform is one of the priorities of Armenia's co-operation with the OSCE. “Professional, efficient and accountable security institutions promote human rights and democracy, rule of law and good governance. Therefore, democratic oversight of the security sector constitutes one of the pillars of the OSCE comprehensive security," said Minister Apitonian.

Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, confirmed that Slovakia is a long-term supporter of SSG/R in multilateral organisations and will continue in these efforts during the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship this year. “This workshop is an important contribution to building a common understanding of the concept in the OSCE based on national and regional experience and needs,” stressed Ambassador Michalka and thanked Armenia for hosting this event.

Graziella Pavone, Human Rights Officer at ODIHR, said: "Security sector governance promotes an idea of security centred on individuals and their different needs, in the framework of the protection of human rights, compliance with the rule of law, strong accountability measures and gender equality.”

Support to ongoing reforms in the security sector is one of the priority areas that were agreed with the authorities of Armenia in the framework of the Armenia Co-operation Programme.

411329 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities

States need comprehensive and concrete policy advice on how to use media as a powerful tool for conflict prevention and social integration, said OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Lamberto Zannier as he presented The Tallinn Guidelines on National Minorities and the Media in the Digital Age in the Estonian capital on 13 February 2019.

The publication, the latest in the set of OSCE thematic recommendations produced by the OSCE High Commissioner, contains 37 concrete guidelines. They address issues arising from the fact that information and communication technologies continue to evolve at an exponential rate and have the potential to both unite and divide different groups in society.

More than one hundred media experts, policymakers and national minority representatives attended the launch event, which opened with remarks by Estonia’s President Kersti Kaljulaid, the country’s Foreign Minister Sven Mikser and OSCE High Commissioner Zannier. This was followed by an interactive expert discussion on best practices and challenges related to the role of the media and information technologies in diverse societies.

Reflecting on how today’s media could effectively be used by states to prevent conflict occurring in their respective countries, Zannier advocated the following recipe: “a combination of multilingualism reflecting the linguistic diversity in society; participation of various groups in media content production and delivery; and restraint by states in their interference in other countries’ affairs”. 

The launch of the Tallinn Guidelines is part of a concerted drive by Zannier to raise public awareness about the benefits of the OSCE High Commissioner’s thematic recommendations and guidelines for conflict prevention and encourage their practical application by governments. 

Why Tallinn? The Tallinn Guidelines are aptly named on two counts: Estonia’s reputation as an innovator, user and promoter of digital technologies on the one hand, and its continuous efforts to integrate Estonia’s diverse society, stated Zannier.

In keeping with the media theme, prior to the event a digital platform was set up at www.tallinn-guidelines.info to enable everyone interested in this subject to follow the live-streamed discussions, engage with the discussants, and access all related materials.

While in Estonia, Zannier will meet with representatives of the Ministry of Education and national minority representatives in Tallinn. He also plans to visit the city of Narva  where he will continue to discuss the situation concerning the integration process in this predominantly minority populated area, focusing on matters such as language, education, access to media and participation in public life for national minorities. Zannier will meet with local authorities, minority representatives, as well as with students and education professionals at the Narva College and one of the local schools with minority language education.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights United States, Mid-term Congressional Elections, 6 November 2018: Final Report

The final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the 6 November 2018 mid-term congressional elections in United States recommends that representation rights be provided for citizens resident in the District of Columbia and United States overseas territories.

The report, published on 13 February 2019, also recommends that restrictions on voting rights for persons with criminal convictions be reviewed to ensure that limitations are proportionate and that those rights be restored upon completion of sentences. It further recommends that the deprivation of the right to vote for persons with intellectual disabilities or those under guardianship be based on individualized assessments.

Lack of agreement in Congress to update a key aspect of the 1965 Voting Rights Act diminishes its effectiveness in safeguarding against discrimination on racial or linguistic grounds. Highlighting the need to ensure the right and opportunity of all citizens to vote, the report recommends that Congress update the formula for determining jurisdictions to be subject to Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, in line with the relevant Supreme Court ruling.

Noting that drawing the boundaries of electoral districts should respect the equality of the vote, not discriminate against any group and be free from political influence, the report recommends establishing independent bodies for this purpose, well in advance of elections.

The report states that campaign finance rules do not guarantee full transparency, and recommends that federal legislation be amended to require disclosure of the sources of funding for all non-profit organizations that engage in campaign activities.

The report also recommends that effective measures be put in place to ensure the safety of journalists and media, including protection against threats, intimidation and attacks.

Taking note of the robust technical support and co-ordination mechanisms that enhanced preparedness for cyberattacks, the report recommends providing sufficient and sustainable funding to replace aging voting equipment and improve cyber security.

While noting that election observation is regulated by individual states, the report highlights instances where observers were not allowed and recommends that legislation guarantee access to international observers invited by the United States authorities for all stages of the electoral process, in line with OSCE commitments undertaken by the United States Government.

Additional recommendations relate to improving the transparency of campaign finance, the secrecy of the vote, the participation of voters with disabilities, ballot access, early voting and the administration of elections. The report affirms ODIHR’s readiness to support the United States in its efforts to bring electoral legislation and practice further in line with OSCE commitments.

COPENHAGEN, 13 February 2019 – Some 45 observers from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly will deploy to Moldova for the 24 February parliamentary elections.

OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) will serve as Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission, following an appointment by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak. President Tsereteli has led numerous OSCE PA observer missions in the past, including in the United States, United Kingdom and Germany.

“Having experienced its share of political instability and gridlock, Moldova is for the first time holding parliamentary elections under a new mixed electoral system. Ensuring that these elections meet international standards and enjoy the trust of the Moldovan people is of utmost importance,” said Tsereteli.

President Tsereteli conducted a pre-electoral visit to Moldova last month, meeting in Chisinau with President Igor Dodon, President of Parliament Andrian Candu, Prime Minister Pavel Filip, Foreign Minister Tudor Ulianovschi, Chairman of the Democratic Party of Moldova, leading members from extra-parliamentary parties, and representatives of civil society and the international community.

Tsereteli has appointed OSCE PA Vice-President Kari Henriksen (MP, Norway) to lead the OSCE PA observer delegation. Vice-President Henriksen has extensive experience in politics in her home country and as an election observer with the OSCE PA.

“The changes to Moldova’s electoral system could have a far-reaching impact on issues as diverse as women’s participation, campaign finance and constituency delimitation. We look forward to seeing how these reforms are implemented and offering a full assessment based on our observations,” Henriksen said.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ election observation mission is headed by Matyas Eorsi, a former Member of Parliament in Hungary. It consists of 11 international experts based in Chisinau and 28 long-term observers deployed throughout the country who will be joined by an expected 200 short-term observers.

OSCE PA observers will be deploying throughout Moldova, along with OSCE/ODIHR observers, observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

It is the 11th time for the OSCE PA deploying election observers to Moldova since 1994. The elections will be assessed for their adherence to democratic commitments laid out in the OSCE’s Copenhagen Document of 1990.

Preliminary findings and conclusions of the election observation mission will be presented at a press conference in Chisinau on 25 February.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.  
• A man reportedly died of natural causes while waiting at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka to travel to government-controlled areas.
• The Mission observed gunfire damage at a school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and inhabited houses in Pervomaisk, as well as fresh impact craters in Slovianoserbsk.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area and near the Petrivske disengagement area.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also denied in Dovzhanske, close to the border with the Russian Federation, as well as at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk regions, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 430 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including nearly 60 per cent of explosions, were recorded at directions ranging from east-south-east to west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and south-west and west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (five), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man reportedly died of natural causes at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka

At a morgue in Horlivka, staff told the SMM that a man in his fifties had been brought to the morgue on 7 February. The man’s wife (in her sixties) and son (in his thirties) told the SMM that the man had been waiting inside a bus to cross a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka to travel to government-controlled areas when he had died. They told the SMM that the man had a history of heart problems and recently suffered a heart attack.

Damage related to shelling and shooting at a school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and inhabited houses in Pervomaisk, as well as fresh impact craters in Slovianoserbsk

At a school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a 15cm hole in the outer pane of a north-facing double-paned window. In the wooden frame of an adjacent window, the SMM observed a hole and a fragment assessed as from a small-arms bullet. The SMM assessed that the damage was fresh and caused by small-arms fire. The school staff told the SMM that the impacts had happened earlier the same morning and that classes had been suspended until 13 February. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 February 2019.)

In Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), at 11 Polova Street, the SMM observed a hole (about 1m in diameter) on the western side of the roof of a single-storey house and a shattered west-facing double-paned window. At 9 Polova Street, the SMM observed two holes, one on the western and another on the north-eastern side of a barn located about 10m from a house. About 25m away from the house, the SMM observed two impact craters and metal fragments. At 16 Polova Street, the SMM observed an impact crater in the north-facing side of a house. At all three houses, the SMM assessed that the damage was fresh and had been caused by projectiles (unable to determine the type) fired from a north-westerly direction. Three local residents (a woman and two men, all in their sixties) told the SMM that shelling had caused the damage the morning of 8 February. They added that an elderly couple had been in their house at 16 Polova Street at the time of the incident and that the elderly man had been hospitalized with heart problems afterwards. On Polova Street (near single-storey houses no. 9, 11 and 16), the SMM observed three impact craters within four to seven metres of each other in the middle of the street. The SMM saw fragments and a part of a tailfin assessed as from a recoilless gun (73mm) round near the craters. Both the craters and the fragments appeared to have been altered. The SMM could not determine the type of projectile or direction of fire. 

On 10 February, about 1km south-west of Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two fresh impact craters in the snow on both sides of road P-66. The following day, the SMM saw a third fresh impact crater about 400m north-east of the abovementioned craters. The SMM could not make further assessments due to security considerations.

Disengagement areas[2]                                                                         

On the evening of 10 February, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5km-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the evening of 11 February, the same camera recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). 

During the day on 11 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Positioned about 2km north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard a single shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw:

• three mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) being towed by military trucks about 6km north-east of Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) and
• four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) about 1km south-west of Lysychanskyi (77km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 February:

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a tank (T-64) near a house being used by the armed formations in Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw:

• four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

11 February

The SMM saw:

• at least three tanks (type undetermined) at a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn: [4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

11 February:

The SMM noted that 39 towed howitzers (26 2A65 and 13 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

10 February:

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near a residential house in Zolote-3/ Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

11 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured recovery vehicle (BMP variant) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 15 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Sofiivka (60km west of Luhansk) and
• a surveillance and acquisition radar system (P-19) near Fashchivka (60km south-west of Donetsk).

10 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) (of which one was parked in the yard of a residential house) and a TORN radio intelligence system on a truck (KamAZ) parked near a residential house in Novohryhorivka.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a water conduit near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk).  It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and three cars (two with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw a bus (with “LPR” plates, approximately 30 passengers on board) and two vehicles (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine. After about 12 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a military compound on the north-western edge of Donske (government-controlled, 57km south of Donetsk).
• At a border crossing point in Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area and that its monitoring was not “authorized”.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier and a private security guard denied the SMM access to the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place and that the road leading north was still mined.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations insisted on inspecting an OSCE trailer before allowing the SMM to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly increased from 7,787 to 8,342 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 169 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 23 this week (compared to 13 last week); 13 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and ten into Ukraine (96 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, five families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when six families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and four into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (352 compared to 316 observed during the previous week). There were 184 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 168 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Stakhanov- Kyiv; Rovenky-Kyiv; and Luhansk- Sevastopol.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 762 to 718 (219 at the Gukovo BCP and 499 at the Donetsk BCP); 364 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 354 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” (sometimes “DPR”) plates.                                                                                         

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 43 (compared to 33 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 189 to 269: of the total number of trucks scanned, 169 trucks (63 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 100 trucks (37 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 160 to 129 vehicles; 66 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 63 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on five occasions, compared to seven last week; the OTs assessed that four trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and another one to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the train bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. The OTs also observed one vehicle with Lithuanian licence plates which crossed the border towards the Russian Federation at Donetsk BCP on 10 February.

On 6 February at Donetsk BCP, the OT observed two black SUVs with tinted windows and without any specific signs which arrived from the Russian Federation side at 05:31. One of the vehicles was using flashing lights. The SUVs were accompanied by an escort car also using flashing lights. All vehicles passed the BCP towards Ukraine - with priority passage - and drove behind the main building. Due to the weather conditions and from its position, the OT was not able to observe the vehicles’ licence plates and/or any signs.

On 8 February, a group of cars arrived at Donetsk BCP from Ukraine at 16:21, passing the border control with priority passage. All three vehicles bore “Republic of South Ossetia” plates. The first vehicle was an escort car using flashing lights. The second vehicle, a black Toyota Land Cruiser, bore plates Nr. 001 PPP and the third vehicle, another black Toyota Land Cruiser, was also using flashing lights, with plates Nr. 100 PPP. All three cars left towards the Russian Federation.

On 11 February at 19:05, the OT observed an ambulance arriving at Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side. The ambulance passed towards Ukraine and went behind the main building. At 19:20 the same day, the ambulance left the BCP towards the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 8 January 2019 to 12 February 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

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KYIV, 12 February 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in Trilateral Contact Group, Ambassador Martin Sajdik, issued today the following statement:

“Today, we mark the fourth anniversary of the “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements”. Endorsed together with the Normandy Four Declaration of 12 February 2015 by the UN Security Council, this document – as well as the “Minsk Protocol” and the “Minsk Memorandum” of September 2014 – is the basis for the current work of the Trilateral Contact Group in seeking a peaceful resolution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Unfortunately, despite unanimous re-commitments to the Minsk Agreements, a solution to the conflict has not yet come nearer. In the region, confrontations are still ongoing, causing suffering to the civilian population and losses of human lives although their number was considerably reduced in the course of last year.

I am convinced that the only way to the peaceful resolution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine is the full and comprehensive implementation of the Minsk Agreements by all sides of the conflict. I once again call on them to display all targeted efforts in this direction.”

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VIENNA, 12 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, together with the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, today opened the Safety of Female Journalists Online (#SOFJO) conference, Increasing Opportunities for Freedom of Expression and Media Plurality.

“Online harassment of women journalists is escalating in the OSCE region and beyond, and has a significant impact on women’s participation in the field of journalism and ability of society to access information. This type of gender-based violence online targets women journalists with a barrage of sexually-explicit, violent and misogynistic abuse, in order to shrink the space that women are able to access online,” stated Désir in his opening address to conference participants. “I welcome the recent OSCE Ministerial Decision adopted last December, which takes into account the specific safety risks facing female journalists online. I hope this is only a first step, as participating States develop strategies to address this issue and expand upon progress made.”

Conference participants focused on the experiences of women journalists as well as expert insights on a range of topics related to online harassment, from trauma and advocacy to strategic litigation initiatives. Commissioner Mijatović, the previous OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, emphasized the importance of adopting a gender sensitive approach to policy developments and challenges in order to ensure the full participation of women online.

“Our societies cannot tolerate that female journalists are being coerced into silence due to online harassment. States must step up the implementation of the human rights standards they have adopted on the safety of journalists and on combating violence against women. They have the duty to adopt protective measures for female journalists and to encourage the private sector and the media to fight gender-based violence online,” said Commissioner Mijatović.

The conference also included a screening of the recently released SOFJO documentary, “A Dark Place”, and a policy workshop organized by UNESCO and the Global Diplomacy Lab. 

The Representative and Commissioner called on participating States to ensure that any meaningful and systematic response is grounded in a holistic approach with significant input from those journalists targeted with online abuse. To assist in this effort, the Representative launched a new Communiqué on Media Pluralism, Safety of Female Journalists and Safeguarding Marginalised Voices Online.

Among other recommendations, the Communiqué calls for media policies and strategies that address multiple layers of discrimination and obstacles to participation to ensure genuine plurality and a diversity of voices online.

“Democracy only thrives when all voices are able to fully participate in the online sphere. This communiqué is an indication of the continued commitment from the OSCE to continue to prioritize equal access, participation and freedom of expression for all,” stressed Désir.

“Today’s Communiqué gives new impetus to the need to counter online harassment of female journalists and calls on States to signal that online abuse of female journalists has no place in a democratic society,” said Commissioner Mijatović.

The Communiqué, recommendations and new research on legal responses to online harassment are available on the #SOFJO project website: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/safety-female-journalists-online

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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TBILISI, 11 February 2019 – Concluding his two-day visit to Georgia today, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák, stressed that stronger co-operation with Georgia, and a continued full commitment to the Geneva International Discussions and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism are high on Slovakia’s agenda as 2019 OSCE Chair.

In Georgia, Minister Lajčák welcomed the country’s dedication to reform: “I would like to commend Georgia on the steady progress it has made in strengthening democracy and good governance, as well as economic development. The OSCE stands ready to support the country in all three dimensions of security,” he stressed.

After visiting Odzisi near the administrative boundary line, Lajčák said: “This trip has given me a clearer understanding of the challenges and difficulties that people experience every day. A humanitarian approach to important questions such as freedom of movement and other topics should always be a priority.”

Handing over Slovak development assistance for a Cancer Screening Centre based in Zugdidi, Minister Lajčák expressed his belief that responding to people’s needs by partnering with local civil society organizations and conducting outreach among local communities is crucial for fast and effective support on the ground.

Accompanied by his Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák met with the political leadership in Tbilisi, including Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili; Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze; Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia, Irakli Kobakhidze; Minister of Foreign Affairs David Zalkaliani; and State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality Ketevan Tsikhelashvili. He also held consultations with Erik Høeg, Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission, as well as the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, George Tsereteli.

In his discussions, Minister Lajčák reaffirmed the OSCE’s strong support to Georgia in its efforts to address internal and external challenges, and emphasized opportunities for deepening engagement.

The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office encouraged partners to further actively engage in the Geneva International Discussions, and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.  Lajčák underlined that these platforms dealing with the consequences of the August 2008 conflict in Georgia remain crucial. “If we engage in dialogue with each other, we can achieve improvements for the people most affected by conflict – and we need to effectively use all platforms that can help this to continue.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 8 and 9 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 9 and 10 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• In Kadiivka, the Mission saw gunfire damage to a truck that was reportedly collecting coal as part of humanitarian aid.
• The SMM saw fresh mortar impact craters near residential houses in Kriakivka and near the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted in Khlibodarivka, near Verkhnoshyrokivske, near Izvaryne and Novoazovsk, close to the border with the Russian Federation, as well as at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*
• The Mission learned of a reported temporary school closure due to shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 8 and 9 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however more explosions (about 50), compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly areas of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and at south-easterly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 9 and 10 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), including six explosions assessed as impacts 0.3-1km from the SMM camera at the DFS and in areas south-east, south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 8 and 9 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 24 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 480 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and at south-easterly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 9 and 10 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and areas west-south-west and north-north-east of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

Damage from gunfire to a truck in Kadiivka

The SMM continued to follow up on an alleged incident of a truck, reportedly collecting coal as part of humanitarian aid, damaged by gunfire on the south-eastern outskirts of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).[2] In the north-western outskirts of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) at a repair shop, the SMM saw a truck with fresh gunfire damage visible on its left rear side. The SMM noted that the rear left tires of the truck had been replaced, however some damage was still visible, including a bent steel tailgate, bent and partly broken suspension leaf spring and bent left rear wheel well, as well as several 1cm holes, assessed as caused by shrapnel, under the tailgate. The SMM observed that the front licence plate of the truck matched a damaged licence plate observed by the Mission on 7 February at the site of the incident. A man (about 55 years old), identifying himself as the driver of the damaged truck, told the SMM that on 6 February, while driving south from Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) to Kadiivka to collect coal on behalf of an international organization, he had felt the truck “jumping”, after which he continued driving to safety for 1.5km.

Disengagement areas[3]                                                                         

Fresh mortar impact craters near the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area

On 8 February, the SMM saw 12 fresh impact craters on both sides of a road about 600m east of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote. About 150m east of the first impact site, the SMM saw five additional fresh impact craters on both sides of the same road. The SMM assessed that all abovementioned craters were caused by mortar rounds fired from a north-north-easterly direction (for similar recent observations near the same checkpoint, see SMM Daily Report 31 January 2019).

On the evening and night of 8-9 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 12 projectiles in flight (eight from east-north-east to west-south-west, three from south-west to north-east and one from north-east to south-west) at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and seven projectiles in flight from south-south-west to north-north-east at an assessed range of 1.5-3km east-south-east (one assessed as outside the disengagement area; the Mission could not assess if the remaining six projectiles were inside or outside the disengagement area).

On the evening and night of 9-10 February, the same camera recorded three projectiles in flight (one from west to east and two from north-north-east to south-south-west) at an assessed range of 1.5-3km east and south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area and two projectiles in flight from north to south at an assessed range of 1.5-3km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. During the day on 10 February, the same camera recorded a projectile in flight from south-south-west to north-north-east, at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.  

During the day on 9 and 10 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[4]

Fresh mortar impact craters near residential houses in Kriakivka

On the western outskirts of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed four fresh craters, two on either side of a road. The SMM assessed them as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a southerly direction. All craters were located around 30m west from the nearest inhabited residential house and 100m north-east from a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Two residents of Kriakivka (women, 35-60 years old) together told the SMM that they had heard shelling in the village on the evening of 8 February (for similar observations see SMM Daily Report 1 February 2019).

Reported temporary closure of the school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 8 February, while visiting the school of around 100 students in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), a female staff member told the SMM that their students had been sent home that day and will not be returning to school until further notice. She added that heavy shelling that morning had forced them to gather all the students in the basement for safety. The school has been damaged by gunfire on four occasions since 25 December 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 22 January 2019).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

9 February

The SMM saw:

• four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being towed by trucks moving east near Rivnopil (65km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 February

The SMM saw:

• two tanks (type undetermined) and a piece of self-propelled artillery (type undetermined) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn: [5]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

9 February

The SMM observed that two towed howitzers (D-30, Lyagushka, 122mm) and seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) remained missing.

Indications of military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Non-government-controlled areas

8 February

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (APC) and two APCs (BTR-80) in Luhansk city and
• an APC (MT-LB) in Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk).

Government-controlled areas

9 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three APCs (BTR-80) near Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM saw:

• an APC (Saxon) near Valuiske (20km north-east of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-60) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

9 February

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 9 and 10 February, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a power line in the area of Pervomaisk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and the inspection of a water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). It continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas outside of government control

On 8 February, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw 13 cars (four with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates) two minivans with Ukrainian licence plates and a bus marked “Moscow-Donetsk” with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw nine cars (two with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates), two minivans with Ukrainian licence plates, a covered cargo truck with Russian Federation licence plates and a bus marked “Moscow-Donetsk” with “DPR” plates entering Ukraine.

On 10 February, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed six cars (two with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation and two with Belarusian licence plates), three covered cargo trucks with Belarusian licence plates, and eight pedestrians (five women, 20-40 years old and three men, 18-35 years old) entering Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations approached the SMM and told it to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 9 February, the SMM was unable to enter a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region because the gate was locked. A civilian guard at the site told the SMM that the site had been closed and it should return on another day.
• On 9 February, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage twice through a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), citing “instructions from his superiors” and the need for “written permission to cross or for a list of destinations.”
• On 10 February at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 10 February, at the railway station in Khlibodarivka (government-controlled, 65km south-west of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM to leave the railway station and observe from outside of it.
• On 10 February, at a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), four members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) denied the SMM passage south to Novoazovsk and east toward the Russian Federation border, citing an “ongoing special forces operation”. While at the checkpoint, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in all directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Svitlodarsk and Chermalyk were not operational.

[2] The location of the alleged incident was in Holubivka, not in Holubivske as previously reported in SMM Daily Report 9 February 2019. 

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 11 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today called for criminal charges of supporting terrorism against journalist Svetlana Prokopyeva to be dropped, and raised concern about decisions by a Russian court to fine two media outlets in relation to this case. Prokopyeva is a journalist with Radio Ekho Moskvy (Echo of Moscow) and a contributor to various other media, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Russian Service. 

On 6 February, law enforcement officers searched Prokopyeva’s apartment, seized her computers, phones and files. They detained and interrogated the journalist on charges of “publicly justifying terrorism”. An investigation and a search were also conducted at Radio Ekho Moskvy’s editorial office in Pskov. 

On 6 and 7 February, the courts in Pskov fined Ekho Moskvy and the Pskovskaya Lenta Novostei media outlet about 2,000 and 2,700 euros respectively for Prokopyeva’s comments.

“I call on the authorities to carefully review the case and drop the charges brought against Prokopyeva, who had no involvement in any terrorist activity. Reporting on a terrorist attack should not be assimilated to the justification of terrorism. I also call for her equipment to be returned without delay,” Désir wrote in a letter to the authorities.

Reportedly, the charge, punishable by a prison sentence of up to seven years, stems from Prokopyeva’s comments on the radio, when she expressed her views regarding a terrorist attack in the Russian city of Arkhangelsk in October 2018 and criticized the authorities. The transcript of the programme was also later published on Pskovskaya Lenta Novostei.

“Journalists have the right to freely express views and opinions, including on issues that could be considered as controversial, sensitive, or offensive,” Désir said. “Under no circumstances should media workers and media outlets be targeted in retaliation for their work.” 

The Representative expressed hope that the decisions to fine Ekho Moskvy and Pskovskaya Lenta Novostei will be overturned in an appeal.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a man who died while at a checkpoint in Kreminets.
• The SMM followed up on reports of damage to a truck transporting coal on behalf of an international organization.
• It recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area and a ceasefire violation inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas in Donetsk region.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works and demining activities to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske, Staromykhailivka and Horlivka.*
• The Mission monitored a public gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Kharkiv. It followed up on reports of graffiti on a church in Zaporizhzhia.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 260 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south and south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 480 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion). The majority of ceasefire violations, including 385 explosions, were recorded at northerly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see the disengagement section below).

Man died while at a checkpoint in Kreminets

On 8 February, a doctor told the SMM that in the early afternoon hours of 7 February he had attempted to resuscitate a man (in his seventies) at a checkpoint on highway H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk). Staff at the morgue in Donetsk city told the SMM that the body of a man in his seventies had been brought in from the abovementioned checkpoint on 7 February and stated that the man had died of natural causes.

Reports of a truck transporting coal damaged by gunfire in Holubivske

On 7 February, the SMM saw metal fragments assessed as pieces of an anti-tank guided missile (type undetermined) on a local road on the south-eastern outskirts of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk). The Mission also saw two unarmed members of the armed formations conducting a search in the grass area adjacent to the road and a burned Ukrainian licence plate lying on the snow next to the same road. It also saw fresh scorch marks on the edge of each side of the road assessed as caused by an anti-tank missile fired from a northerly direction. On the same day, a representative of an international organization told the SMM that a truck delivering coal on behalf of the organization had been involved in an incident on the south-eastern outskirts of Holubivske.

Disengagement areas[2]

Between the evenings of 7-8 February, the SMM camera in Zolote  recorded an undetermined explosion and 24 projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 1-4km east-south-east, south-east and south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and nine projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the morning of 8 February, positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and two shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3km north (assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote 1/Soniachnyi (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds at an assessed range of 0.7-1.5km north-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) as well as four undetermined explosions and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 1.2-5km west-north-west and north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote 2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 18 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar or artillery rounds at an assessed range of 2.5-5km north-north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the same day, the SMM camera at Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded a muzzle flash at an assessed range of 2-3km north (assessed as inside the disengagement area).[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

7 February:

An SMM mini-unnamed aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• 26 tanks (T-64) in a wooden area near Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 1 February 2019).

8 February

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35, Strela-10) heading south on a road in a residential area of Krasnohorivka  (24km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

8 February:

The SMM saw:

• five tanks on the western outskirts of Andriivka (61km south of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

7 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (type undetermined) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

8 February

The SMM saw:

• four IFVs (BMP-2) near Zhelanne Pershe (29km north-west of Donetsk);
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) ( BTR-60) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• two APCs (Saxon and BTR-60) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Krasnohorivka;
• an APC (BTR-70) near Chermalyk;

• a trench digger (type undetermined) near Shchastia; and

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• five IFVs (four BMP-2 and one BMP-1), an APC (BTR-80) and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 7 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted again 11 anti-tank mines (nine TM-62 and two probable TM-62) laid across road H21 about 70m east of the bridge in Shchastia and six anti-tank mines (four TM-62 and two probable TM-62) laid across the same road 50m west of the bridge (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 10 August 2018).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure and demining activities

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water conduit near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), a water pipeline near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and to water wells at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining near a comprehensive primary and secondary school and a kindergarten in Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk). A representative of the State Emergency Service told the SMM that no explosive devices had been found in the area.

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds reportedly related to water payments across the bridge in Shchastia.

Public gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Kharkiv

The SMM monitored a public gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation at 22 Maksymilianivska Street in Kharkiv, where it saw about 90 people (mixed gender and ages), including about 40 people in grey camouflage uniforms and ten people wearing heavy duty overcoats with hoods and masks. Some of the protestors were holding Ukrainian and Right Sector flags as well as a poster in English reading “Occupiers Go Home”. The SMM saw some of them throw several artificial eggs containing green dye at the Consulate building. It observed about 80 law enforcement officers present (60 in front of the Consulate and 20 standing in a street nearby).

Graffiti on a church wall in Zaporizhzhia

The SMM saw graffiti (two letters “S” in the shape of a lighting strike) spray-painted in black paint on a wall of St. Oleksii Karpatoruskyi church (affiliated with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church) at 29 Peredatochna Street in Zaporizhzhia (105km east of Dnipro) and traces of liquid on the wall that partially covered the graffiti. A priest told the Mission that he had seen the graffiti for the first time in early morning on 7 February. 

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage on two occasions citing the need for prior permission from his superiors.

• At a checkpoint north-east of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage citing the need for prior permission from his superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.  

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), an unarmed member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to pass only upon the escort of a car of the armed formations during the SMM’s patrol in the settlement.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

Bratislava, 8 February 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák, today called the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin to discuss the upcoming 31 March 2019 presidential election in Ukraine. Among various issues addressed by the ministers was the support of OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in observing the upcoming election, provided in response to an official invitation from Ukraine.

Reiterating the Slovak Chair’s staunch and steadfast support for Ukraine, the Minister also expressed his deep regret about the 7 February passing of a law in the Vrkhovna Rada that would deny accreditation to international election observers, including within the ODIHR Election Observation Mission to Ukraine, who hold passports from the Russian Federation..

“The independence, impartiality and professionalism of ODIHR’s election observation is crucial,” Lajčák said, adding, “I am convinced that ODIHR’s request for accreditation of all its observers is in the best interest of the OSCE, Ukraine and its people. Observers sent to take part in ODIHR’s election observation missions represent the organization, not their respective countries.

Lajčák therefore called upon the Ukrainian authorities to continue to explore all possible avenues for a solution that would allow all ODIHR observers to be accredited for these elections.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

Ergneti, 8 February 2019 - The 91st Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting was held today in Ergneti. Mr. Erik Høeg, Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), and Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, Special Representative for the South Caucasus of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, co-facilitated the meeting, held in a constructive manner.  

Mr. Høeg provided a brief overview of events since the last IPRM meeting on 18 December 2018. He noted that the overall security situation had remained relatively stable but also highlighted developments related to the closure of controlled crossings points, ‘borderisation’ and activities by security actors that gave reason for concern. He urged all participants to continue to use the EUMM managed Hotline to deal with sensitive issues.

Discussions on the current closures of controlled crossing points ensued. Both Ambassador Michalka and Mr. Høeg emphasised their concern on the impact on freedom of movement, livelihoods, access to education and healthcare. The issue of documentation for crossing at controlled crossing points was discussed.

The topic of detentions featured during the discussions and the co-facilitators reiterated the importance of a humanitarian approach.

The case of the tragic deaths of Mr. Archil Tatunashvili and Mr. David Basharuli were addressed. The co-facilitators reaffirmed their readiness to support any exchange of information.

Regarding the recently reported instances of new ‘borderisation’, such as the barbed wire erected in the divided village of Didi Khurvaleti, both Ambassador Michalka and Mr. Høeg emphasised that such activities negatively affect the local communities living on both sides of the ABL.

Ambassador Michalka revisited ideas on recent grass fires and related issues. Dialogue on facilitating access to both drinking and irrigation water featured as well. Participants were encouraged to continue such exchanges and to focus on tangible results for residents living on both sides of the ABL.

All participants were invited to continue exchanging information via the Hotline on activities by security actors from both sides of the ABL.

The next meeting is tentatively scheduled for 20 March 2019.

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VIENNA, 8 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today welcomed a court decision in Northern Ireland recognizing journalists’ rights to protect the confidentiality of their sources.

On 6 February, the Northern Ireland Crown Court rejected an application brought against Sunday World investigative journalist Paula Mackin to reveal her sources and hand over journalistic material, as part of an ongoing criminal trial related to a series of investigative reports published by the journalist.

The application against Mackin was brought by Alex McCrory, one of the co-accused in an ongoing criminal trial involving Colin Duffy and Harry Fitzsimmons, the reason being a series of criminal investigative reports published by the Sunday World. The journalist informed the court that to reveal her sources would endanger both her life and that of her sources.

“I am pleased by the court’s decision recognizing the right of journalists to protect confidential journalistic sources and material,” stated Désir. “This right is crucial for investigative journalism and the ability of the media to report on issues of public interest.”

The court drew on a case previously raised at the European Court of Human Rights (Goodwin v United Kingdom), which concluded that a disclosure order requiring a British journalist to reveal the identity of a source, and imposing a fine for refusing to do so, constituted a violation of freedom of expression and information as protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

“This judgment is important for freedom of the media. Investigative journalism plays an essential role as a watchdog in societies and must be protected as a basic condition for media freedom,” concluded the Representative.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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