Central Europe

WARSAW / VIENNA, 30 July 2019 – Governments must increase their efforts to combat trafficking in human beings and put the human rights and needs of victims at the centre of all responses, the OSCE said on the occasion of the World Day against Trafficking in Persons.

“Trafficking in human beings is a heinous crime. It has never been so easy for perpetrators to carry out, and at the same time so difficult to combat,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. “Governments need to clearly acknowledge the influence of the expanding and highly profitable sex industry on the demand for trafficking. They also have the primary responsibility for protecting the rights of the exploited and for halting demand for goods and services produced by trafficked people. In order to make real progress in tackling this phenomenon, states need a far-sighted approach that includes co-operation far beyond national borders.”

In addition to  co-operation with other countries, with civil society, and with international organizations, there are a number of effective and sustainable solutions that governments can make use of in order to reduce demand. These range from new and often stronger legislation to information campaigns for potential victims and for the general public, to make consumers aware that their shopping habits may support companies making a profit out of exploitation.

Particular attention must be paid to the plight of women and girls. Trafficking is highly gendered, with female victims accounting for over 70 per cent of all detected trafficked persons. Creating and strengthening national referral mechanisms, which are the building blocks of effective regional and international co-operation to combat trafficking and enable co-operation between all the state agencies as well as civil society, should therefore be a priority.

“As we observe World Day against Trafficking in Persons, it is imperative that we address the gap between the scale of the problem and the scale of our response,” said OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger. “Huge numbers of victims remain in the shadows and traffickers continue to operate with impunity.  Governments across the OSCE need to urgently send a message of zero tolerance for human trafficking through increased investigations, robust prosecutions and penalties proportionate to the seriousness of this crime.”

More also needs to be done for the long-term rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors of trafficking.

“We need to listen to survivors and learn from their experiences,” said Valiant Richey, Acting OSCE Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. “Technology and the internet in particular are providing traffickers with new opportunities to enlarge the market for human trafficking. The insights and advice of survivors can allow us to develop strategies to take effective countermeasures.”

Governments can help to empower victims by providing a wide-ranging legal framework that guarantees vital services such as access to healthcare, housing, legal counselling, a recovery and reflection period, a temporary or permanent residence permit, education, vocational training and work, compensation, protection before, during and after a criminal trial, the erasure of criminal records in line with the non-punishment principle, respect for privacy and data protection, protection from unsafe return, and the right to seek asylum.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary 

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 26 and 27 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. It recorded no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. 
• Between the evenings of 27 and 28 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM observed damage from gunfire to a document processing booth of the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka.
• An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle was hit by small-arms fire near Pervomaisk.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and maintenance work to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure, including drilling of water wells near Raivka.
• The SMM saw long queues at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints of the armed formations in Kreminets, Zaichenko, and Novoazovsk and at a border crossing point near Izvaryne.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 26 and 27 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions).

Between the evenings of 27 and 28 July, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 30), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at an assessed range of 1-4km in southerly directions of the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and in northerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 26 and 27 July, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, the SMM had recorded ceasefire violations, including 21 explosions.

Between the evenings of 27 and 28 July, the Mission recorded ceasefire violations, including ten explosions; whereas it recorded none in the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and west of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

Damage from gunfire to a document processing booth at the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Marinka

On 28 July, at the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole about 1.5m above the ground in the east-north-east-facing side of a container, used as a document processing booth, and a corresponding in the west-south-west facing side of the same container. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire.

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) hit by small-arms fire near Pervomaisk

On 28 July, positioned at the west-north-western outskirts of Pervomaisk, while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 13 shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 2km west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which at the time was flying 2km west. The SMM safely landed the UAV but noted it had sustained damage: broken hitch of the camera, a hole in the chassis and missing propellers, assessed as caused by small-arms fire.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

In the morning hours of 27 July, the SMM saw a crane mounted on a truck (MAZ type) and another truck (MAZ type) and seven men in civilian clothing going through the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP and continuing towards the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

During the day on 27 July, at the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP, the SMM observed about 1,100 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and about 30 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, on the same day, the SMM saw about 40 people queueing to travel towards government-controlled areas and a steady flow of people travelling in the opposite direction.

On 27 and 28 July, the Mission saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)[2] between the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP and their former forward position.

During the same period, it also saw up to ten members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the southern edge of the broken section of the bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.

On 28 July, the Mission observed metal bars on the ground and a dug up area where a wooden shelter belonging to an international humanitarian organization was previously dismantled near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.

Between the evenings of 27 and 28 July, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and one shot of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 26 July, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 1km east of its western edge and about 800m north of its southern edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (see below). On 27 July, positioned north of Petrivske, the SMM heard seven shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, at an assessed range of 2-3km south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area. During the same day, the SMM saw a military truck (Ural type) entering the Petrivske disengagement area near its north-eastern edge and about three minutes later. The SMM could not see if the truck was loaded. On 28 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the Mission observed a calm situation.[4]

During the night of 27 July, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area and three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-6km north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. During the day of 28 July, positioned at the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion, at an assessed distance of 3km north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area, but within its 5km periphery. During the same day, positioned at the west-north-western edge of Pervomaisk, the SMM heard 13 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area, but within its 5km periphery (see above).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

28 July

The SMM saw two tanks (T-64) near Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

24 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) in the south-eastern outskirts of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

25 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a trench digger (PZM-2) and a 150m long trench under construction, running from east to west, along the edge of a forested area, near Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk).

27 July

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a BMP variant), one of them parked beside a residential house and less than 150m from a school, and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM variant) in Popasna; and
• three personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (one man and two women), appearing to control a white UAV tablet and, ten minutes later, a white UAV on the ground near the mentioned personnel, in Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

24 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable armoured combat vehicle under camouflage netting in a residential area of Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

26 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an APC inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (see above); and
• two APCs (BTR variant) in the eastern outskirts of Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

27 July

• The SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

Anti-tank mines near Shchastia and in Nyzhnie Lozove, including some for the first time, and mine hazard signs near Volnovakha

On 24 July, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted at least 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across road H-21 south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted, for the first time, 26 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in the fields in two rows on the eastern side of the road M-03, 30m east on the same road, about 2.2km west of Nyzhnie Lozove (non-government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk). Approximately 2.7km north-west of the said mines, on road M-03, the same UAV again spotted 39 anti-tank mines, about 5km south-east of Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk), near the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 27 July, while passing through the road H-20 north-east of Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time about five mine hazard signs with an icon of unexploded ordnance (UXO)  and a writing in red in Cyrillic.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 27 July, the Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk). On 27 and 28 July, the SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). On 27 and 28 July, positioned at two different locations, the SMM heard four explosions, seven bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and 112 shots of small-armed fire, at an assessed range of 3-4km from DFS.

Long queues at checkpoints

On 27 July, at the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed up to 300 cars and ten buses waiting in line to enter non-government-controlled areas. It also saw 90 people (mixed ages and genders) gathered in front of the checkpoint, 14 of whom (four women, ten men; 30-60 years old) told the SMM that they were protesting against the long checkpoint procedures, allegedly due to the implementation of a “regulation” by the armed formations (see SMM Daily Report 17 June 2019).

People apply for “LPR passports” in Holubivka

On 27 July, in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 20 people (mixed genders, 18-75 years old) queuing outside of a building. A man and a woman (both about 45 years old) in the queue told the SMM that they had been queuing to apply for “LPR passports” and planned to apply for Russian Federation passports. During the same day, in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two men, a woman and a child queuing outside of a building. A 25-year-old man told the SMM that he had applied for “LPR passport” and plans to apply for Russian Federation passport to seek employment opportunities there.

Border areas outside government control

On 28 July, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw two cars with Russian Federation licence plates and seven pedestrians (two men and five women) entering Ukraine. The Mission also saw two cars with Russian Federation licence plates and 28 pedestrians (13 men and 15 women) exiting Ukraine. After about 20 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

During the same day, while at the border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 35 minutes, the SMM saw two men entering Ukraine and 13 pedestrians (eight men and five women) exiting Ukraine. At the border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the Mission saw 12 pedestrians (four men and eight women) entering Ukraine and six pedestrians (three men and three women) exiting Ukraine. 

SMM monitored religious processions organized by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) dedicated to the 1031st anniversary of the baptism of the Kyivan Rus

On 27 July, the SMM monitored a religious procession of several thousand people (70 per cent women and 30 per cent men), organized by the UOC outside the Saint Volodymyr descent. The SMM saw them marching towards the Ukrainian Parliament and later reaching the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra. The Mission saw around 1,000 law enforcement officers in the vicinity. After about 45 minutes, participants started dispersing peacefully.

On 28 July, the OCU served a procession at the Saint Sophia Cathedral, gathering around 1,500 people (mixed genders) and around 800 clergy. The SMM saw 50 law enforcement officers in the vicinity. The participants of the mass moved towards the Saint Volodymyr descent and reached the monument of the Volodymyr the Great, at which point the Mission noted several thousand people (mixed gender and ages) gathered. The people dispersed peacefully. At the same time, a religious liturgy held by the UOC gathered around 3,500 people in Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra.  

SMM observed a calm situation south of Kherson region

On 28 July, the SMM observed calm situations at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 27 July, at a checkpoint on the southern edge of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), eight armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south towards road H-15, citing a “requirement to obtain a permission from those in control”.
• On 27 and 28 July, at a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “ongoing demining activities in the area”.
• On 28 July, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 28 July, at a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), four members of the armed formations denied SMM passage citing “requirement for pre-arranged escort by those in control”. While present, the SMM saw civilian traffic in both directions across the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 

Delay:

• On 27 July, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again only allowed the SMM to proceed after about one hour of waiting.   

Other impediments:

• On 27 July, an SMM mid-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying in the vicinity of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).[6]
• On 28 July, while conducting a mini-UAV flight at the west-north-western outskirts Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58 west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 13 shots of small-arms fire about 2km west, assessed as aimed at the UAV.
• On 28 July, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Zernove (non-government-controlled, 33km south of Donetsk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position. 

VIENNA, 29 July 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir,  expressed his concern today about a series of attacks against journalists and the obstruction to media activities during an election-related demonstration on 27 July in Moscow.

According to various reports, on 27 July at least 15 media workers working or contributing to various media outlets, including Novaya Gazeta, RBK, the Associated Press, Meduza, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Deutsche Welle, Mediazona, The Village, Wikinews and others, were assaulted, detained or had their equipment damaged by police while covering a public demonstration in Moscow. The Representative also noted that the Editor-in-Chief of the Dozhd news channel, Aleksandra Perepelova, was summoned and questioned by the Investigative Committee in relation to the media outlet’s coverage of the rallies in the city.

“I deplore all incidents where media workers were harshly treated or were obstructed by law enforcement while covering Saturday’s demonstrations in Moscow. The media plays an important watchdog role, and journalists should be guaranteed unhindered access to public events as well as safe working conditions at all times, including while covering protests,” Désir said. “I call on the Russian authorities to investigate all incidents involving journalists.” 

The Representative recalled the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists, adopted last December, “recognizing the crucial role of journalists in covering elections […], expressing serious concern about threats and violent attacks that journalists can face in this regard”, and calling on participating States to publicly and unequivocally condemn such acts.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported roundtable discussion on environmental challenges in Kazakhstan’s Almaty region, with the participation of some 35 representatives from the local authorities, the business community and environmental NGOs was held on 29 July 2019 in Taldykorgan.

The one-day event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in partnership with the Association of Environmental Organizations.

It focused on planned development of tourism infrastructure in the nearby Sharyn Canyon and the potential effect of the infrastructure on the local landscape and biodiversity. Participants also discussed current environmental issues in Almaty region and how to address these in a discussion with government officials, environmental leaders and representatives of the tourism industry.

The event was part of the Programme Office’s long-term efforts to promote the green economy and sustainable development principles to strengthen environmental security in the host country.

COPENHAGEN, 28 July 2019 - Following reports of detention of more than 1000 protesters in central Moscow over the weekend, the leaders of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's human rights committee expressed concern about respect for the freedom of peaceful assembly in Russia. Committee Chair Kyriakos Hadijyianni (MP, Cyprus), Vice-Chair Michael Link (MP, Germany) and Rapporteur Susana Amador (MP, Portugal) called on the authorities to fully respect fundamental freedoms and OSCE commitments.

The demonstrations in central Moscow were organized by protesters against what they consider inappropriate decisions by election administrators to refuse registration to opposition candidates in upcoming local elections. Saturday's demonstration was not approved by the authorities.

"Russia, as all OSCE countries, has guaranteed its people the right of peaceful assembly. Unfortunately, the mass detentions and violence by police this weekend show that this fundamental freedom is not being respected. Peaceful citizens should not be punished for turning up and expressing their opinion," said the three leaders of the General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions, noting that Article 31 Of the Russian Constitution states that "Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to assemble peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, meetings and demonstrations, marches and pickets". 

Observers deployed by the OSCE for previous elections have repeatedly concluded that freedom of assembly was not respected. Following the 2018 presidential election observers concluded that "freedom of assembly has effectively been curtailed by the arbitrary application of ... restrictions".

Željka Šulc

A two-day training course on the fight against smuggling and illegal trade in art and cultural property concluded on 26 July 2019 in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The event was organized jointly by the OSCE Mission to BiH, the Centre for the Fight against Trafficking in Art and the Agency for Education and Professional Training of the BiH Ministry of Security.

The training course brought together representatives of law enforcement agencies from across BiH, the country’s Indirect Taxation Authority and Centres for Education of Judges and Prosecutors of Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH.

“The main aim of the training course was to raise awareness and understanding on this particular subject matter to counter this criminal activity at the first and second lines of border checks, as well as to strengthen related investigative and prosecutorial capacities,” said Selma Zekovic, Acting Head of the Department of Security Co-operation of the OSCE Mission to BiH. “There is a need to improve inter-agency co-operation in responding to this problem in a systematic manner, including in co-ordination with relevant agencies in BiH, international organizations, the private sector and educational institutions,” Zekovic added.    

“According to BiH stolen artwork database at the Centre for Fight against Trafficking in Art, authorities have been searching for 180 art works from the Tuzla International Gallery of Portraits, BiH Art Gallery, Eastern Bosnia Museum and Mulabdic private collection. The number of stolen works, according to the available information, is much higher. The list includes not only works of fine art, but also museum artefacts, manuscripts and archaeological findings illegally excavated on locations throughout BiH and sold on the black market,” stated Dženan Jusufović, President of the Centre for the Fight against Trafficking in Art.

Over the course of the two days, a wide array of topics related to smuggling and illegal trade of art was addressed, including the legislative framework, practical measures in prevention of art smuggling and the current state of art smuggling and illicit trade in the region. The Centre for the Fight against Trafficking in Art also presented the Manual on Export and Import of Art to Bosnia and Herzegovina, produced with the support of the OSCE Mission to BiH.

426710 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

The OSCE Mission to Moldova supported an exposure visit for a group of 16 social service providers to a centre for counselling domestic violence aggressors in the district of Drochia, in the north of Moldova on 23 and 24 July 2019. The service providers from the left bank of the Dniester/Nistru River and the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia had an opportunity to learn from the unique experience of the Drochia Centre, which has pioneered working with both domestic violence perpetrators and survivors.

The visit sought to support service providers in their efforts to effectively address cases when the lives and security of women are at risk and to reduce cases of domestic violence in Moldova. According to the recent the OSCE-led Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women, two in five women in Moldova (40 per cent) say that they have experienced physical and/or sexual violence at the hands of a partner or non-partner since the age of 15. In addition, many women have heard of services to help affected women; however, very few have actually accessed those services.

The centre for counselling aggressors in Drochia was established in 2014 in line with the provisions of the Moldovan law on prevention and elimination of domestic violence. During the visit, the Centre’s workers shared good practices of setting up multidisciplinary teams of police officers, medics, educators and social service providers to address domestic violence cases. Co-operation between local police officers and the service provider has resulted in a growing number of perpetrators referred for rehabilitation to the centre.

“When a survivor of domestic violence returns home, she gets trapped in the same cycle of violence and the conflict may eventually escalate. Regular meetings with a couple affected by domestic violence and a simultaneous process of rehabilitating an aggressor are vital to conflict mediation,” explained Simion Sirbu, Director of the Centre in Drochia. “Counselling sessions for the perpetrators are organized two or three times a week and a full rehabilitation programme lasts from six to eight months.”

Natalia Savcina, executive director of the NGO Women’s Initiative in Tiraspol, mentioned that “this event served as a platform for sharing good practices and should be replicated on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River.”

“It was a valuable exchange of experiences for us. We want to create a space where women can feel safe and receive assistance benchmarked against the best international standards,” noted Natalia Nichitina, a project co-ordinator with the NGO Vesta, in Comrat.

Prevention of domestic violence is on the agenda of the Working Groups on Human Rights and Social Protection facilitated by the OSCE Mission under the Transdniestrian settlement process. Chisinau and Tiraspol have recently demonstrated a strong interest in exchanging views on best practices of setting up shelters for affected women.

The OSCE recognizes that violence against women is not only a threat to the person, but is also a wider security concern impacting communities and societies at large. Since 2016, the OSCE Mission has carried out a series of workshops across Moldova for over 980 law enforcement officers to improve their capacity in dealing with the cases of domestic violence.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A man was injured from a probable anti-tank mine while driving his tractor near Nikishyne.
• The SMM saw damage from shelling to a residential house in Nova Marivka. 
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and maintenance work to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure, including to power lines and water pipelines.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in Nova Marivka and at checkpoints of the armed formations in Kreminets and near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however fewer explosions (five), compared with the previous reporting period (11 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at an assessed range of 0.3-1km south of the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and in areas south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (21), compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). Over half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man injured from probable anti-tank mine near Nikishyne

On 26 July, medical staff at a hospital in Yenakiieve (non-government-controlled, 41km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that a man (in his thirties) had been admitted on 19 July with fractures in his right leg caused by an explosion of a possible anti-tank mine. On 27 July (outside the reporting period), the man told the SMM over the phone that he had been driving his tractor on the afternoon of 19 July on an unpaved road covered with vegetation near Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk) when he had heard a loud explosion. On 23 July, at the residence of the injured man in Olkhovatka (non-government-controlled, 52km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw damage, assessed as caused by a probable anti-tank mine (TM-62), to the wheels and chassis of a tractor, as well as parts of the tractor dismantled nearby. A friend of the abovementioned man, living in his same residence, told the SMM that he had found him lying on the road on 19 July with injuries to his right leg, and then drove him to the hospital in Yenakiieve.

Damage from shelling to a residential house in Nova Marivka

On 23 July, at a one-storey house on the main street in Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw that the west-facing wall and large parts of the asbestos plate roof had collapsed and at least five windows on the east-, north- and south-facing walls of the house were shattered. About 6m west of the house, the SMM saw that the asbestos plate roof and east-facing wall of a summer kitchen had collapsed, and at least two east-facing windows were shattered. The SMM assessed all of the abovementioned damage as recent and caused by a 152mm artillery round fired from a westerly direction. The SMM did not enter the property as a member of the armed formations present asked the Mission to leave the area.* Outside the house, the SMM saw a woman (in her forties) with injuries to her leg and hand who told the Mission that she had sustained the injuries after she had heard an explosion while at the abovementioned house on the night of 9 July.   

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) near the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw a crane and a truck, both stationary. The SMM saw a minivan with “Luhansk Oblast Roads” in Russian written on it and a trailer enter the disengagement area at the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) with six men in civilian clothing inside. The same men then began collecting garbage along the road in the area between the EECP and the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as dismantling road signs on the western side of the road about 100m south of the aforementioned forward position. The SMM saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” [2] written on them) inside the disengagement area, four near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge and two on the southern part of the broken section of the bridge.

In the afternoon, at the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP, the SMM observed about 2,000 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and about 80 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. Near a shelter belonging to an international organization, the SMM saw that a woman (75-80 years old) had fainted and was being assisted by staff of the organization. The same staff told the SMM that more than 3,000 people in the past two weeks had visited their shelter to seek assistance for medical issues related to the hot weather.

At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, on the same afternoon, the SMM saw about 50 people queueing to travel towards government-controlled areas and a steady flow of people crossing in the opposite direction.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening of 25 July, positioned on the northern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions and about 190 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, at an assessed range of 3-7km east-south-east, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 26 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

26 July

The SMM noted that the site was abandoned and six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21, Grad, 122mm) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

26 July

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

24 July

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) in Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM-mid-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured personnel carriers (a BTR-60 and a BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near residential buildings and a trench digger (PZM-2) and two combat engineering vehicles (probable IMR-3) in a maintenance facility, all in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); and
• an IFV (BMP-2) in a residential area of Vodiane (15km north-west of Donetsk).

25 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two probable armoured combat vehicles near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk).

26 July

The SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

On the same day, the SMM saw a helicopter (possible MI-8 variant) flying in a northerly direction at an altitude of 60-70m about 2km north-east of Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

Recent craters spotted near Mineralne and probable cleared minefields near Slavne

On 24 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted about 12 recent craters, assessed as impacts of rounds of 30mm automatic grenade launcher (ASG-17) and 82mm mortar, near the forward positions of the armed formations about 2.5km north-west of Mineralne (non-government-controlled, 10km north-east of Donetsk).

On the same day, north-east of Slavne, an SMM mini-UAV spotted about 250 craters in a field north of a road and 30 craters in a field south of the same road about 120m from residential houses (not seen in imagery from 8 April 2019), spaced out in three lines running from north to south, assessed as former minefields that had been recently cleared.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines supporting the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), power lines near Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, a water pipeline near the EECP near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), as well as maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report of 20 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “demining activities” on the first occasion.
• At a checkpoint on the southern edge of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), eight members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage south towards road H-15, citing a “special operation”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On 23 July, while following up on reports of damage to a residential house in Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk) a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing a “special operation” (see above).
• On 26 July, on seven occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over areas near Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) and Troitske (government-controlled, 30km north of Donetsk).[7]

 

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[6]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan SDGs SDGs:  17 - Partnerships for the goals

An OSCE-organized week-long simulation exercise on countering drug-related money laundering concluded on 26 July 2019 in Koschi, near Nur-Sultan. It took place at the Law Enforcement Agencies Academy under the General Prosecutor’s Office.

Some 20 police officers, prosecutors, representatives of the State Revenue and Financial Monitoring Committees, along with representatives of private entities, took part in the live-action training event.

The training exercise was developed for the law enforcement officers involved in investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases related to laundering the proceeds derived from the illicit drug trafficking and trade, also using on-line tools and instruments. The participants were also familiarized with the peculiarities of co-operating with private entities that are used by the criminals to hide their illegal activities. Professional actors were involved in simulating activities of a transnational criminal group involved in drug trafficking and trade.    

The event was organized in co-operation with the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Programme of the US Embassy in Nur-Sultan and the Law Enforcement Agencies Academy under the General Prosecutor’s Office. The training exercise was supported by the Central Asian Regional Information and Co-ordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC).

The simulation exercise is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year effort to promote good governance, combat money laundering and terrorism financing, as well as illicit trafficking and trade of drugs, including using online instruments. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw damage from small-arms fire to a shop in Dokuchaievsk, reportedly on 18 July.
• The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska and observed an assessment of the broken section of the bridge in preparation for future repairs.
• It saw anti-tank mines and fresh craters inside of the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw for the first time unexploded ordnance in Nova Marivka and a remnant of a rocket-propelled grenade in Verkhnoshyrokivske.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and Popasna.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (11), compared with the previous reporting period (32 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including nine of the explosions, were recorded in areas east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), north of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), and at westerly directions of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, and no explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions). Over half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east of Buhaivka (non-government-controlled, 37km south-west of Luhansk) (assessed as live-fire exercises outside of the security zone) and east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Damage from small-arms fire to a shop in Dokuchaievsk

At a shop on Lenina Street in the north-western part of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in a south-south-west-facing wall, assessed as recent and caused by small-arms fire, as well as a corresponding scorch mark on the floor inside the shop. A worker at the shop (a woman in her thirties) told the SMM that she had been at work on the afternoon of 18 July when she heard shooting and left. She showed the SMM a bullet (7.62mm) that she said she had found with the damage when she returned to work the next day (for previous observations on Lenina Street, see SMM Daily Report of 17 July 2019).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 25 July, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM saw four engineers from government-controlled areas and two engineers from non-government-controlled areas convene at the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) and inspect the bridge together, including the steel section of the bridge over the river. The engineers from government-controlled areas told the SMM that they had completed a full technical assessment of the entire bridge in preparation for future works and that there was a mutual understanding with the engineers from non-government-controlled areas about the technical requirements to repair the bridge.

On the same day, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw three Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) [2] on the northern edge of the broken section of the bridge, a senior member of the armed formations near the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge, and at least eight members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the former forward position and the checkpoint of the armed formations inside the disengagement area. On the afternoon of the same day, at the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP), the SMM observed about 1000 people (mixed ages and genders) queuing to enter government-controlled areas. Five women (in their seventies) told the SMM that they had been queuing to enter government-controlled areas for 3-4 hours.

Outside of the disengagement area, the SMM camera near the Prince Ihor Monument (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded a vehicle with “JCCC” written on the sides and hood transporting over 50 mine hazard signs.

On the evening and night of 24-25 July, while in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 24 July, positioned on the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers walk into the disengagement area. A senior official of the Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM that the soldiers were conducting a visual inspection of the T-1316 road. About an hour later, the SMM saw the three soldiers exit the disengagement area. On the same day, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw for the first time three anti-tank mines in vegetation about 5m west of the road between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations, as well as an 82mm mortar tailfin embedded in the ground on the eastern edge of the road. About 1km north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM saw five craters on the T-1316 road and four on the western side of the road, assessed as fresh and caused by 120mm mortar rounds. About 250m north of the checkpoint, the SMM again saw a spool wire stretched across the T-1316 road, rendering the road impassable. For the first time, near the spool wire, the SMM spotted a mine hazard sign and blue tape on a tree about 4m north-east of the road.

On the evening and night of 24 July, the SMM camera on the northern edge of Popasna recorded five projectiles in flight at an assessed distance of 2-4km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. During the day on 25 July, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1km north-north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

24 July

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 12 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (11 probable BTR-70 and a BTR-60) in Avdiivka.

25 July

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• seven IFVs (BMP-1) on the northern outskirts of Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

25 July

The SMM saw two APCs (MT-LB) on the southern outskirts of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Nova Marivka and remnant of exploded rocket-propelled grenade in Verkhnoshyrokivske

In Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time an unburned 12.7mm incendiary round laying in the middle of the main road about 10m north of a residential house.

On the same day, on a road west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw for the first time a remnant of an exploded rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) lying in the centre of the road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, to a water pipeline near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk, to electrical infrastructure near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), and to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM saw 37 cars (nine with Ukrainian, ten with Russian Federation, one with Georgian, and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as 16 with “DPR” plates), one refrigerator truck and one milk tanker truck (with Ukrainian licence plates), four buses (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates), and six pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 13 cars (five with Ukrainian, four with Russian Federation, and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates) and 23 pedestrians (three females, mixed ages, and 20 males, aged 35-55) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report of 20 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “demining activities” on both occasions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On five occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over areas near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), and Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).
• On the evening of 24 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference on two occasions while flying over Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), once assessed as caused by jamming and once assessed as caused by probable jamming.  The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over Petrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk). [6]    

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position. 

Communication and Media Relations Section

Promoting a green economy and resource efficiency was the focus of a workshop held in Yerevan, on 24 and 25 July by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA). The event was organized in co-operation with the Government of Armenia.

The event brought together representatives of government, Aarhus Centres, civil society, academia and the private sector, as well as regional and international partners. The workshop is part of a cross-regional project addressing the transition to a green economy and resource efficiency in the OSCE region.

“We welcome the OSCE’s engagement in supporting Armenia in our efforts to transition to a green economy, including through strengthening the capacities of Aarhus Centres in this area, both in our country as well as in the wider OSCE region," noted Maya Martirosyan from the Department of Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia.

During the workshop, national and international experts presented best practice examples of international and domestic initiatives and discussed the role of civil society and the national Aarhus Centres in contributing to the efforts in this area.

The event also enabled participants to discuss the Aarhus Centres´ Road Map on Green Economy and Resource Efficiency and identify avenues for their further engagement on this topic.

The event included a field trip to the Lukashin Agricultural Association Consumer Co-operative in the village of Lukashin in the Armavir Marz district. The participants visited a farm designed and managed to maximize sustainable development of rural communities as well as to ensure active involvement of the local population in the improvement of their living conditions. Through environmentally sound and sustainable agriculture practices, the co-operative also contributes to raising awareness of the peoples’ rights to be healthy and to live in a healthy environment.

“I am happy to share our experience and underline the importance of joint efforts of the private sector, civil society and the government to fulfil our common goals,” said Vardges Davtyan, the Chairperson of the Lukashin Agricultural Association. “I hope our example will be an inspiration for others to contribute to this common effort.”

The workshop was part of the OSCE project Promoting the Engagement of Aarhus Centres in Green Economy and Resource Efficiency.

426752 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities visits Moscow, discusses inter-ethnic relations in Russian Federation and situation of Russian minorities in other OSCE participating States

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Lamberto Zannier visited the Russian Federation from 22 to 26 July 2019, for the second time since taking up his mandate in 2017. Zannier continued his dialogue with the Russian authorities about minority issues both inside and outside Russia and took stock of inter-ethnic relations in the Republic of Tatarstan. 

In Moscow, the High Commissioner met with the Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and several committees of the State Duma to discuss minority issues in the OSCE region, with a particular emphasis on the areas of language, education and citizenship. He also exchanged views with representatives of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs and presented the nine sets of thematic recommendations issued by the HCNM.

“I noted Russia’s extensive experience with managing inter-ethnic relations and encouraged the authorities to make use of the expertise of my office regarding integration with respect for diversity,” he said.

In Kazan, the High Commissioner had the opportunity to make a first-hand assessment of inter-ethnic relations in Tatarstan, where several languages are recognized as official languages. In his meetings with the Chairperson of the State Council and Republican authorities Farid Mukhametshin, Zannier discussed the impact of recent changes to both the education policy and to the legal arrangements between the Federal Government and the Republic.

“Tatarstan has a long tradition of promoting constructive and harmonious relations between the different peoples living in the region. It is important that changes in language and education policy at the federal level take its specific situation into account, including regarding the teaching of the Tatar language,” said Zannier.

The High Commissioner also visited Kazan Federal University, one of the oldest universities in the Russian Federation, and explored opportunities for further co-operation.

COPENHAGEN, 25 July 2019 – In order to better address relevant challenges in the OSCE area OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (Georgia), entering his second term, appointed this week a new Special Representative and a new Special Rapporteur.

With a view to support more transparent policy-making, effective anti-corruption strategies and alert OSCE parliamentarians of significant threats to security and stability that corruption poses, the President appointed Irene Charalambides (Cyprus) as Special Representative on Fighting Corruption.

Working in close co-operation with the OSCE PA’s Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment, the Special Representative on Fighting Corruption is mandated to:

• Raise awareness in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly regarding the urgency to effectively combat corruption at all levels;
• Promote a greater understanding of the security threats stemming from corruption, of its detrimental effects on our societies, and of its pervasive links with other forms of serious crime, such as organized crime and terrorism;
• Facilitate co-operation on anti-corruption issues within the OSCE PA among all Delegations, including in terms of possible follow-up to relevant OSCE PA recommendations;
• Promote high-level partnerships with the OSCE Chairmanship, OSCE executive structures and with relevant international stakeholders on issues related to combating corruption.

The OSCE PA adopted a resolution on combating corruption co-sponsored by Charalambides at the recent Annual Session in Luxembourg.

“Amidst widespread calls from our citizens for increased transparency and accountability, I firmly believe that the OSCE PA could play an even more prominent role in this domain,” said President Tsereteli.

Last month the OSCE PA President was in Cyprus for a two day visit, encouraging continued engagement in parliamentary diplomacy to tackle enduring challenges and underlining the important partnership between Cyprus and the OSCE.

Charalambides was first elected as MP in 2011. Within both the House of Representatives as well as in the context of her mandate as head of the Cyprus delegation to the OSCE PA, the issue of preventing and combating corruption has maintained a central position on her agenda. In the Cyprus House of Representatives, she has submitted a Private Bill for the protection of whistleblowers and spearheaded efforts to increase transparency in the judiciary and the House of Representatives, as well as to bring to the forefront issues and documentation proving corruption that played a significant role in the banking crisis that hit Cyprus.

In order to fight the disinformation and fake news that invades the media environment and results in the erosion of confidence, polarization of politics and widespread confusion on important matters, OSCE PA President Tsereteli appointed Luca Santolini (San Marino) as Special Rapporteur on Disinformation and Propaganda.

“Disinformation and fake news clearly pose a serious danger to democracy and its core values, and to put it simply, there is no democracy without responsible and professional journalism,” said President Tsereteli.

This appointment also aims at welcoming the involvement of San Marino in fighting disinformation on the international stage and demonstrates that all OSCE participating States, regardless of their size, can contribute to our shared agenda, the President said. A high-level conference on the dangers of disinformation took place in San Marino on 10 May 2019, with OSCE PA Secretary General Roberto Montella addressing the participants.

Working in close co-operation with the OSCE PA’s Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions, the Special Rapporteur on Disinformation and Propaganda:

• Represents the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at relevant international conferences;
• Promotes partnerships with the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media as well as the OSCE Chairmanship, other OSCE executive structures and with relevant international stakeholders on issues related to the promotion of media literacy and resilience to misinformation;
• Informs the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly of steps taken to counteract disinformation including related to strengthening national legislation to promote high-quality journalism, developing norms and standards that apply equally to both traditional and digital platforms, and encouraging accurate and diverse media content, while ensuring compliance with international legal guarantees of the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the media;
• Considers relevant developments in the OSCE region and advises the President on any further steps to be taken.

Santolini, a former Captain Regent (Head of State) of the Republic of San Marino, has been a member of parliament  since 2012 and Head of the Sammarinese Delegation to the OSCE PA since 2016. He holds a university degree in international relations and a specialization in publishing, media and journalism from the University of Urbino. In the past, he worked as a journalist and in the e-commerce sector and is now in charge of communication in his political movement. He is a strong supporter of San Marino’s active engagement in multilateral fora on the topic of fighting disinformation and fake news and has also been active in the PA's Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment on climate change issues.Earlier this month President Tsereteli reappointed:

• Benjamin Cardin (United States) as Special Representative on Anti-Semitism, Racism and Intolerance;
• Hedy Fry (Canada) as Special Representative on Gender Issues;
• Christopher Smith (United States) as Special Representative on Human Trafficking Issues.
• Pascal Allizard (France) as Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs;
• Mark Pritchard (United Kingdom) as Special Representative on South East Europe.

President Tsereteli said “I'm happy to continue working with such motivated and professional colleagues”.

426713 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

A two-day roundtable discussion supported by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan  on the sustainable management of the Zhaiyk (Ural) river basin ecosystem, which traverses Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, concluded on 26 July 2019 in Oral, Kazakhstan.

The discussion brought together some 70 participants from Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation representing government authorities, national experts, academia and civil society with the aim of promoting the 2016 Agreement between Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on the Conservation of the Zhaiyk/Ural River Basin Ecosystem.

Participants discussed the main challenges in managing the transboundary river basin and reviewed co-operation opportunities in the context of best international practices.

An expert from the United Kingdom, invited by the Office, and national experts from Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation presented their studies on the sustainable use of the river basin and identified areas of enhancing inter-state co-operation.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan; the Ecology, Geology and Natural Resources Ministry; the regional administration of Western Kazakhstan, and the Makhambet Utemisov West Kazakhstan State University.  

It is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to contribute to the transboundary dialogue on water and to raise awareness among state institutions about the sustainable management of water.

426602 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported workshop on facilitating the rehabilitation of prisoners convicted of violent extremism, including returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters, through risk assessments and effective classification measures concluded on 26 July 2019 in Nur-Sultan.

The three-day workshop gathered some 50 participants comprised of officials from Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs Prison Committee and National Security Committee as well as representatives of academia and civil society. They learnt about methods and practices applied in penitentiary systems in the treatment of prisoners convicted of violent extremist crimes and exchanged ideas with local experts together with experts from Canada and Kyrgyzstan.

Presentations included key areas and methods of classification of prisoners convicted of violent extremism crimes, risks and needs assessments, as well as rehabilitation and probation for released prisoners. Participants also discussed the problems and lessons learnt in the development and application of a prisoner classification system.

The workshop was organized as part of a UN global initiative of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) focused on preventing violent extremism in prisons.

The programme is co-funded by the European Union, the Government of the Netherlands and the UNOCT.

The OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan support to this workshop was part of its long-term support to projects to counter violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism in the host country.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of fresh craters inside and near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled Vidrodzhennia and near Lysychansk.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Zaichenko and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (32), compared with the previous reporting period (35). The majority of the ceasefire violations, including almost half of the explosions, were recorded in areas north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas north-north-east of Stepne (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 24 July, the SMM saw a truck crane, a truck and five personnel of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine driving from the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) into the disengagement area and stopping at the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) (all later left the disengagement area). Near the former forward position, the Mission saw three Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).[2] It also saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) - two near the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge and three near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 22 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of about 30 recent craters inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk): about five located about 1.2km north of its southern edge and 1.2km west of its eastern edge, about 15 located 800m north of its southern edge and 1.7km east of its western edge, and about ten located near its southern edge and about 2km west of its eastern edge. The imagery also revealed about 20 craters located outside of the disengagement area 100-500m west of its western edge. Outside the disengagement, the same imagery revealed the presence of five probable armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the disengagement area (all not seen in imagery from 7 July 2019). On 22 July, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) on the southern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), about 50m north of the disengagement area.

On 24 July, positioned 500m north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 17 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On the same day, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

23 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) parked between houses in Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk).

24 July

The Mission saw two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

19 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 13 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 20 July 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

24 July

The SMM noted that:

• 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were present and
• a towed howitzer (2A36) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were missing for the first time, and four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

24 July

The SMM noted that 28 tanks (T-64) and six mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) remained missing.

Indications of military, military-type and other presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

21 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a new earthen bridge over a trench about 200m east of the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska.

22 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) on the southern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) (see above).

Aerial imagery available the SMM revealed the presence of five probable ACVs near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Zolote disengagement area (see above).

23 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an ACV and four IFVs (BMP-1) near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and a trench extension running from north to south for about 100m about 2km east of Zalizne (not seen in imagery from 31 May 2019).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

24 July

The SMM saw:

• five IFVs (BMP-2) near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk) and
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

21 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed a new 75m-long trench extension running from east to west, east of road P-22 about 1km south-east of the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (not seen in imagery from 7 July 2019).

23 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an ACV near Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk) and
• eight ACVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters near Svobodne

On 21 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of eight fresh craters in a training area near Svobodne (non-government-controlled, 73km south of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 7 July 2019).

Mines near Olenivka and demining activities near Novomykhailivka

About 2km south-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-20 near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission again saw two anti-tank mines (TM-62M) in the median between road lanes. Next to the mines, it saw a mine hazard sign with “Danger, Mines” written in Russian and English.

The SMM saw four SES personnel with metal detectors conducting demining in fields east of  road O-0531 about 4km north of Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict

The SMM monitored the security situation in both government- and non-government-controlled areas to support a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas across the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to electrical infrastructure near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), and to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report of 20 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “orders from superiors”.
• At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “ongoing demining activities in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• A mini-UAV flight experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming while flying near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

This report is for the general public and the media. 

SUMMARY

On 25 July at 06:39 (Moscow time), the eighty-third[1] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of 9 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 9 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 13:46 on 25 July.

DETAIL

Leaving the Russian Federation

On 25 July at 06:39, the Observer Mission observed the arrival of a Russian convoy at the gate of the Donetsk BCP. The convoy consisted of 9 cargo trucks; some of them belonged to Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), others were civilian trucks with MES covers. Some cargo trucks also bore the inscription “Humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation” (in Russian). At 06:39 the vehicles entered the customs control area and queued in three lines. Once the convoy arrived, the vehicles were visually checked from the outside by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers. The truck drivers rolled up/opened the tarpaulins of the trucks and the border guards and customs officials performed a visual observation from the outside. Two dogs were present and used by Russian Federation border guards to check the vehicles from the outside.

Three Ukrainian border guards and two customs officers were observed accompanying their Russian counterparts; they also performed a visual observation of the vehicles from the outside (without entering the trucks’ cargo space). They had clipboards in their hands and were taking notes. By 06:53 all of the vehicles had left the BCP towards Ukraine.

Returning to the Russian Federation

At 13:40, the convoy returned and queued in the customs area. The tarpaulins of the trucks were opened and Russian Federation border guards and customs officers visually checked the returning convoy from the outside. Ukrainian representatives – three border guards and two custom officers – were present during this check. The Ukrainian officials also performed visual checks of the opened trucks from the outside. By 13:46 all 9 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation.

[1] Based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the eighty-third convoy that has crossed into Ukraine through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs. However, so far all these convoys crossed through the “Donetsk” BCP.

426500 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

On 25 July, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch, and the Defence Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Pavel Voicu, paid a joint visit to the military base in the city of Floresti in the north of Moldova. The visit offered an opportunity to assess the implementation of the OSCE Mission’s project on explosive risk mitigation. The project is run in co-operation with the Ministry. It aims at improving the general safety and security of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova living in the close vicinity of the ammunitions depots.

At the military base, the Head of Mission and the Minister personally reviewed procedures of visual inspection of ammunition and the implementation of best international practice of physical security and stockpile management by the National Army. Head of the Mission Neukirch also handed over to Brigadier General Igor Gorgan, Chief of the National Army General Staff and Commander of the National Army, the keys of two medical first-aid and sanitary containers.

“The Mission supports the National Army of Moldova in its efforts to ensure proper and secure management of the storage of small arms and munitions, which will make Moldova safer and set a good example for the region,” Neukirch said.

Minister of Defence Voicu expressed his appreciation for the OSCE’s contribution to helping Moldova in fulfilling the country’s international and national commitments and responsibilities with respect to small arms and light weapons (SALW) as well as conventional ammunition.

The Mission has been supporting the Ministry of Defence in the area of SALW since 2006. To this end, the National Army of Moldova was assisted in destroying outdated conventional ammunition and upgrading the management and security of the remaining stocks. Most recently in 2016, multiple storage facilities were renovated and security and surveillance systems were installed. The Mission has also facilitated training for Moldovan officers in physical security and stockpile management.

426494 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

Strengthening rule of law -compliant criminal justice responses to terrorism was the aim of a two-day seminar for over 30 Turkmen practitioners from relevant government agencies and the bar association which concluded on 25 July 2019 in Ashgabat.

Organized by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat jointly with the Action against Terrorism Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, the seminar focused on good practices detailed in the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF) Rabat Memorandum. These cover effective terrorism prevention and prosecution measures, while emphasizing respect for human rights and other applicable international law.

Experts in the criminal justice field presented the legal parameters and practices developed in Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom, as well as the technical assistance provided and good practices promoted by the OSCE in this area.

In her message to the seminar’s participants, Natalya Drozd, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, said: “The complex nature of terrorism requires efficient approaches to investigation, which includes collection and sharing of relevant information among all agencies involved.”

“This seminar marks an important milestone in the activities of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat in the area of promoting the rule of law. Apart from the GCTF memorandum, it also builds on prior related work by the OSCE in Turkmenistan. This included efforts towards a whole-of-society approach to addressing violent extremism, on countering the use of the internet for terrorist purposes, as well as this year’s high-level regional conference on countering terrorist financing and organized crime.”

At the seminar, experts and participants discussed effective co-ordination mechanisms among domestic government agencies and the importance of international co-operation, particularly when addressing terrorism. The seminar also highlighted the need to ensure the protection of all parties involved in terrorism cases, as well as for the development of policies for an effective and human rights -compliant approach to the incarceration and subsequent reintegration of convicted terrorists back into society.

The event in Ashgabat was the tenth in a series, with seminars previously having taken place in Nicosia (2014), Skopje, Sofia, Tashkent (2015), Sarajevo (2016), Pristina, Nur-Sultan (2017), Issyk-Kul and Budva (2018).

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• A boy was injured due to the detonation of an explosive device in Khrestivka and a girl was injured due to shelling in Pervomaisk, reportedly on 15 and 20 July.
• The Mission saw recent damage caused by shelling to a Cultural House in Pikuzy and to a residential building in Pervomaisk, reportedly on 20 July.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM continued to monitor the operation of a shuttle bus service in government-controlled areas north of the bridge.
• It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• An SMM UAV spotted the presence of a train and aerial imagery revealed the presence of vehicle tracks and a trench extension near the border with the Russian Federation.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines, some for the first time, near Krasnohorivka, Staromykhailivka, Marinka and the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of critical civilian infrastructure, including the drilling of wells in Raivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Shevchenko and in Nova Marivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (35) compared with the previous reporting period (seven). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and east-south-east and south-south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).        

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (one) compared with the previous reporting period (five) (see other disengagement areas section below).

Following the beginning of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 21 July, the SMM recorded in total 524 ceasefire violations (54 explosions, 82 projectiles in flight and 388 shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire).

Boy injured by explosive device in Khrestivka on 15 July

The SMM followed up on reports of a boy injured by the detonation of an explosive device in Khrestivka (formerly Kirovske, non-government-controlled, 45km east of Donetsk). At building 9b in the Molodizhnyi neighbourhood in Khrestivka, the SMM saw a boy (aged 11) with splinter marks and red scratches on both legs and two small holes on his left thigh and left thumb. The boy and his grandmother (aged 50) told the SMM that he and his sister were in the yard of the building in the early afternoon of 15 July when the boy had picked up what he thought was a bicycle part from a pile of logs next to a picnic gazebo. According to him, a small pin dislodged from it, and he heard a sound similar to a firecracker. He dropped the object and, as it was falling, he heard a louder detonation and he said that his legs were hit by shards and lumps of metal. According to the grandmother, she was not present when the explosion occurred and took the boy to the local hospital after learning about the incident. On 21 July, a nurse at the hospital in Khrestivka told the SMM that the boy was treated for minor injuries on 15 July.

Damage due to shelling in Pikuzy reportedly on 20 July

The Mission followed up about reports of damage caused by shelling on 20 July in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). In Pikuzy, at 31 Akhmatovoi Street, within a 30m radius of the Cultural House, the SMM saw three craters, one of which had a 120mm mortar tailfin embedded in it, as well as pieces of the concrete curb lying on the ground near the craters and shrapnel marks on the concrete surface near one of them. The SMM assessed two of the craters as caused by 120mm mortar rounds (one of which was unexploded in one of the craters) and the third one was assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round. The SMM could not assess the direction of fire. Seven residents (six men and a woman, aged 50-60) told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the early morning of 20 July (for previous observations near the same building, see SMM Daily Report 9 July 2019).

Girl injured and recent damage due to shelling in Pervomaisk reportedly on 20 July

At 40 Rokiv Peremohy Street 14 in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a hole in the middle of a window pane in a north-facing wall on the third floor of a five-storey residential building. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a projectile (weapon type unknown) that had exploded near the building (but could not assess the direction of fire). The SMM spoke with three residents of the building (a man and two women, aged around 70) who said that they were in their apartments in the early evening hours of 20 July when shelling had occurred. On 23 July, a woman who had been admitted to the hospital following shelling in Pervomaisk on 20 July told the SMM that her daughter (aged 14) had also suffered a minor injury to her left hand but had not been hospitalized. On 21 July, another woman who had also been hospitalized and a man who was present at the scene following the incident told the SMM that the girl had suffered a minor injury to her hand. The SMM previously reported  eight civilian casualties (including a deceased woman and an injured girl, aged 4) and damage to a residential building assessed as caused by shelling on the same street on 20 July (for more details, see SMM Daily Report 22 July 2019).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 22 July, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted six people in military-type clothing, two of them digging, about 650m south of the checkpoint of the armed formations.

On 23 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a parked car and four deminers in a field about 250m south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska (and 350m west of the road). On the same day, also inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)[2]  at the former Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the broken section of the bridge and two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) near the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge.

The Mission again saw a bus transporting people in government-controlled areas north of the bridge from an area about 250m south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP to the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and back, leaving approximately every 20 minutes.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the morning of 23 July, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion at an assessed range of 1km north-north-west, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 21 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM again revealed the presence of a tank (type undetermined) 300m west of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) (see below) and a vehicle position seen for the first time near previously observed trenches on the western outskirts of Petrivske about 100m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area. On 23 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

21 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM again revealed the presence of a tank (type undetermined) 300m west of the disengagement area near Petrivske (see above).

22 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Bokovo-Platove (54km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019);
• two towed howitzers (2A36 Giantsit-B, 152mm), two MLRS (BM-21) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at a training area near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk);
• three MLRS (BM-21) and three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019);
• seven MLRS (BM-21) at a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 July 2019); and
• eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

18 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 22 tanks in a training area near Ternove; and
• ten tanks and 18 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

19 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 22 tanks and four surface-to-air missile systems at a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

22 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in a training area near Ternove (see above);
• 19 tanks (T-64), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and ten towed howitzers (D-30) at a training area near Miusynsk; and
• 26 towed howitzers (types undetermined) in Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019).

Other weapons observed[5]

Non-government-controlled areas

18 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four probable pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and three probable pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (see above).

19 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 33 pieces of towed artillery or mortars (types undetermined) and 21 pieces of self-propelled artillery or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[6]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

23 July

The SMM noted that:

• 26 MLRS (eight 9A52-2 Smerch-M, 300mm, 12 BM-27 Uragan, 220mm; and six 9A53 Uragan-1M, 220mm) remained missing and
• 14 MLRS (six 9A52-2 and eight BM-27) were present.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

23 July

The SMM noted that 92 tanks (26 T-64, 36 T-64B and 30 T-72), ten mortars (six 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and four M120-15 Molot, 120mm), seven towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm) and three towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type in the security zone[7]

Government-controlled areas

21 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-variant) east of Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk) and an armoured combat vehicle (probable BMP variant) north-east of Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) .

22. July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) in a residential area of Krasnohorivka.

23 July

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Roty (66km north-east of Donetsk).

22 July

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), three new positions and a newly fortified trench, about 750m north-west of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska (not seen in imagery from 16 June 2019), as well as a recent position about 50m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area and about 350m east of the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP (not seen in imagery from 2 June 2019), all outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.

A train, vehicle tracks and a trench extension near border with Russian Federation

On 18 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a trench extension and recent ground levelling about 3km west of Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, non-government-controlled, 28km east of Luhansk) and about 2.3km south of the border with the Russian Federation. The same imagery revealed the presence of recent vehicle tracks, likely from non-agricultural vehicles, on a dirt road that leads to the border with the Russian Federation (in an area where there are no official border crossing points and no roads) about 1km east of Korolivka (58km south-east of Luhansk) and about 700m west of the border.

At 01:28 on 23 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a train, including 23 tank cars and 13 open rail cars, stationary at a railway station in Kvashyne (non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Donetsk) and at 01:46 of the same day, it again spotted the train moving south-east near Vyselky (72km south-east of Donetsk) heading towards the border with the Russian Federation.

Presence of mines and mine hazard signs 

On 21 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 20 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows running from north to south for about 60m in a field about 1.5km north-east of Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) as well as 34 and 21 previously seen anti-tank mines, all near forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the northern edge of and about 3.5km east of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

The UAV spotted for the first time three anti-tank mines on the north-western outskirts of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) laid across the road leading towards Krasnohorivka and ten anti-tank mines laid across a road on the north-western outskirts of the area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre).

About 700m north of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed for the first time an improvised mine hazard sign (consisting of two wooden planks and a stick with “MINES” written in Russian language) in a field next to a local road.

On the eastern edge of Chermalyk, the SMM saw that a previously seen mine hazard sign which had been attached to a rope extending across a road leading to a cemetery, was on the ground by the side of the road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk),

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). On 23 July, positioned near the DFS, the SMM heard nine shots and bursts of small-arms fire, at an assessed 1km southerly direction from its location and eight undetermined explosions, at an assessed range of 5-6km west-south-west of its location.

Security situation along Sea of Azov coast in Donetsk region and south-east of Kherson region

The SMM continued to monitor the security situation along the Sea of Azov coast in Donetsk region and at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea and observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 15 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At the eastern entrance of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol) citing orders from his superior.
• In Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the settlement citing a “special operation” in the area, or to wait for a senior member of the armed formations to “authorize” the presence of the SMM.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again  allowed the SMM to proceed after about 17 minutes of waiting.   

Other impediments:

• On 23 July, a mid-range UAV flight experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk).
• On the evening of 22 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over Nyzhnia Krynka (non-government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk), Sadove (non-government-controlled, 44km east of Donetsk), Kvashyne (non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Donetsk) and Vyselky (non-government-controlled, 72km south-east of Donetsk). The same UAV experienced signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming while flying between Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk).[8]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.  Between the evenings of 22 and 23 July, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[7] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[8] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.