Central Europe

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw fresh damage from gunfire to a Culture House in non-government-controlled Holubivske.
• The SMM saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Verkhnoshyrokivske, and at a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, more explosions (about 130), compared with the previous reporting period  (95 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), including 56 undetermined explosions; in areas north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk); and at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (19), compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

 

Fresh damage from gunfire to Culture House in Holubivske

At 41 Shyroka Street in the north-western part of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw that a fragment of plaster on the bottom part of the north-west-facing brick wall of the Culture House was ripped off. The Mission also saw that three ground-floor windows in the same wall were shattered. On the ground beneath the shattered windows it saw shards of glass and two metal fragments which it assessed as the tailfin of a 73mm round from a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) or an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon. The Mission assessed that the damage to the building was fresh and caused by a 73mm round fired from a northerly direction. It also saw another object, assessed as the tailfin of a 73mm round from a recoilless gun (SPG-9) or IFV (BMP-1) cannon, embedded in the ground about 10m east of the building. The Mission assessed that this round was also fired from a northerly direction.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM continued to monitor the situation and facilitate activities in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 27 August, the SMM camera in the parking lot south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight and nine airbursts, all at an assessed range of 2-3km north-north-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 28 August, inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw that the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge as well as the former forward position of the armed formations south of the bridge’s broken section continued to be dismantled. The SMM also saw 20 members the State Emergency Services of Ukraine conducting demining activities on the western side of the road about 300-400m north of the broken section of the bridge. On the eastern and western sides of the southern edge of the broken section, it saw two members of the armed formations burning tyres, branches and logs which produced dense black smoke.

The Mission saw up to seven members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them on the southern edge of the broken section of the bridge and near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.[2]

In the afternoon, the SMM saw four deminers from government-controlled areas inspecting the area below the broken section of the bridge and four deminers from non-government-controlled areas standing nearby.

 

Other disengagement areas[3]

In the early morning hours of 28 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two illumination flares at an assessed range of 1.5-2.5km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. Also in the early morning hours of 28 August, the SMM camera in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) recorded an airburst at an assessed range of 4-6km east, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area. During the day on 28 August positioned in two locations in Popasna, the Mission heard five undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at easterly directions at an assessed range of 3-6km, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation. It again accessed its camera site in Petrivske.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

27 August

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 120mm) near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Chernenko (21km north-east of Mariupol);
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol); and
• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) near Novoselivka (31km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (probable T-64) near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

25 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• a tank (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 22 August 2019);
• 15 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2019); and
• nine tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 23 August 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region*

28 August

The SMM noted that four anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

28 August

The SMM noted that five mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were again missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

27 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol);
• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Chernenko;
• two self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4) near Vynohradne;
• an APC (BTR-70) near Prymorske (39km north-east of Mariupol); and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Novoselivka.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP-2) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

28 August

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-80) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Mines at destroyed Donetsk International airport and near Dokuchaievsk

On 26 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 132 anti-tank mines within the area of the destroyed Donetsk International airport: the first group of 60 mines was laid in three rows across the former runway; the second group of 50 mines was laid in three rows across a former taxiway, 900m south-west of the first group; and the third group of 22 anti-tank mines was laid in three rows on a former taxiway about 150m south of the second group. These mines were assessed as not recent and belonging to the armed formations.

On 28 August, the Mission saw for the first time five anti-tank mines (TM-62) on the side of a road near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the northern edge of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). Next to the mines, it saw a mine hazard sign (a red square with skull and crossbones).

Situation at checkpoints along the contact line

At the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw that ten new containers with processing booths were operational. The Mission observed about 60 cars queuing to travel to non-government-controlled areas and about 30 cars queuing to travel in the opposite direction. A member of the armed formations at the checkpoint told the SMM that additional processing booths had been opened on 27 August. Two civilians (men, mixed ages) – one travelling towards non-government-controlled areas, the other one travelling towards government-controlled areas – said that the waiting times at the checkpoint had decreased after the new facilities were opened.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk) and Hladosove (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk). It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw 14 cars (four with Russian Federation and two with Georgian licence plates, and eight with “DPR” plates) as well as eight covered cargo and two tanker trucks (all with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing demining activities”.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer did not allow the Mission to check the serial numbers of the weapons present at the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after 30 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 27 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas between Pleshchiivka (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk) and Soledar (government-controlled, 79km north of Donetsk); Vidrodzhennia (government-controlled, 66km north-east of Donetsk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk); and Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Komyshuvakha (government-controlled, 68km west of Luhansk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 27 and 28 August, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

428738 Andrii Dziubenko Memorandum on Understanding and Cooperation between the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine Promoting a culture of dialogue

Henrik Villadsen, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (PCU) and Kostiantyn Vashchenko, the Head of the National Agency of Civil Service of Ukraine, signed a memorandum of understanding to promote wider use of conflict management approaches in public service. The signing ceremony took place on 29 August 2019 at a ceremony in Kyiv.

According to the memorandum, the Project Co-ordinator will provide expertise, organize and run dialogue events, deliver training in conflict prevention and management, dialogue negotiating, as well as in mediation to build the capacity of civil servants. To make the effort sustainable, the PCU also will elaborate learning tools for continuous personnel education and re-training.

“Well-organized and professionally facilitated dialogue can be an important tool for officials to plan and implement reforms and policies. It is a good approach to engage all the key stakeholders, even those who strongly disagree with proposed measures,” said Villadsen. “We hope that joint efforts to make dialogue a part of organizational culture for governmental institutions will help increase the transparency and efficiency of state authorities, but also contribute to diminishing conflict potential in their work.”

The PCU-supported efforts to improve organizational culture in the civil service are aimed at further assisting the ongoing public administration reform. As part of its co-operation with the Agency, the Co-ordinator has already provided training seminars on basic dialogue-related skills to its personnel. It has also supported a series of strategic meetings and dialogues for this office to help its staff members to streamline the vision of its mission. Currently the PCU is running awareness-raising events on conflict management for HR personnel of State Oblast and Rayon Administrations.  

ERGNETI, 29 August 2019 - The 95th Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting was held in Ergneti, co-facilitated by Erik Høeg, Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), and Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, Special Representative for the South Caucasus of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, on 29 August 2019.

Høeg provided an overview of events since the last IPRM meeting on 18 July 2019. He noted that recent developments along the administrative boundary line (ABL) had negatively impacted the overall security situation, in particular relating to the recent, highly-concerning occurrences in the Gugutiantkari and Tsnelisi areas.

The co-facilitators emphasized the importance of continuing dialogue in lowering of tensions and reminded participants to focus on the challenges of the conflict-affected population.

While recalling a number of instances where the EUMM managed hotline was used effectively, they stressed the need to keep exchanging information through all available communication channels, especially providing early warning of activities with a view to reducing tensions.

The meeting was marked by a series of intense exchanges on the topic of Tsnelisi between participants. Regrettably it was impossible to complete  discussions on all agenda points as the meeting was disrupted.

The next meeting is scheduled for 2 October 2019.

428699 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

A three-day training seminar on anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing concluded on 29 August 2019 in Nur-Sultan. Some 50 government officials from law-enforcement agencies and the judiciary took part in the event.

Experts from Israel and Lithuania as well as national trainers familiarized participants with best practices in the investigation and prosecution of money laundering cases, forfeiture of illegally-acquired assets and interagency co-operation with key stakeholders including the Financial Monitoring Committee. They also engaged the participants in practical exercises on how to turn financial intelligence into evidence, search for criminal assets and apply non-conviction confiscation.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan, the Financial Monitoring Committee of the Finance Ministry, the Academy of Law Enforcement Entities under the Prosecutor General’s Office and the United States Embassy in Nur-Sultan.

The seminar is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance and combat money laundering and terrorism financing.

VIENNA, 28 August 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed today’s court ruling in Ukraine to release from pre-trial detention journalist Kirill Vyshinsky, the chief of the RIA Novosti Ukraina office in Kyiv.

“I welcome the release of RIA Novosti Ukraina journalist Kirill Vyshinsky today in Kyiv,” said Désir. “I called for his release and intervened on his behalf numerous times with the Ukrainian authorities.”

In May 2018, the Ukrainian security services raided the office of RIA Novosti Ukraina and arrested Vyshinsky on charges of high treason. In July 2018, he was presented with additional charges and his pre-trial detention was extended several times. The Representative previously intervened with the Ukrainian authorities to release him, recalling that “journalists should not under any circumstances be imprisoned for their journalistic work and must have the right to freely express opinions and dissenting views, even those that could be considered controversial.”

Today, the Appeals Court of Kyiv ruled that Vyshinsky was set free from pre-trial detention under personal obligation to attend his trial and inform the court on his whereabouts and work, as well as to refrain from contacting witnesses in his case.

“The release of a journalist is always positive, and I welcome that Kirill Vyshinsky is finally free after such a long and difficult pre-trial detention,” said Désir, “I thank him for his kind words on the intervention of my Office in his case, and I call for all charges against him to be dropped at the next hearing set for 16 September.”

“On this occasion, I also call for the release of all other detained journalists and authors in the OSCE region, in particular Roman Sushchenko and Oleg Sentsov in Russia,” stated Désir. The Representative recalled the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists, which urges the “immediate and unconditional release of all journalists who have been arbitrarily arrested or detained, taken hostage or who have become victims of enforced disappearance” in participating States.

The Representative has previously raised his concern on this case in his public statements, see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/401453, https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/381370 and https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/401867, as well as tweets and correspondence with the authorities, see https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/424907?download=true.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
• An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system in violation of withdrawal lines near non-government-controlled Chystoe Ozero.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines for the first time near civilian houses in government-controlled Pisky.
• An SMM long-range UAV spotted a train in non-government-controlled Khartsyzk.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Nova Marivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, more explosions (95), compared with the previous reporting period  (32 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), in areas north of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), and in areas north-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and all of the explosions were recorded in areas east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and south-west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 26 August, on the northern edge of the metal section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) about 240m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations, inside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw metal scaffolding for the first time. A member of the armed formations (wearing an armband with “JCCC” written on it) told the SMM that the scaffolding had been installed to facilitate repairs to the bridge. [2]

On 27 August, inside of the disengagement area, the Mission saw at least 20 deminers of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine, as well as eight members of the Stanytsia Luhanska Forestry Service, conducting demining activities and clearing vegetation west of the road, about 300-400m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. It also saw at least five members of the SES using a crane and a dump truck to remove structural components from the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge.

On the same day, inside the disengagement area, between the former forward position of the armed formations near the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the Mission saw a senior member of the armed formations as well as six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. The SMM also saw at least eight members of the armed formations removing structural components from their former forward position and relocating sand-filled tyres to a location beside a previously observed blue container about 40m south of the broken section of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

In the early morning hours of 27 August, the SMM camera in Popasna recorded three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km east-south-east as well as a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote but within its 5km periphery. About ten minutes later, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an illumination flare at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On 27 August, about 350m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM again saw a spool wire stretched across the T-1316 road, rendering it impassable. About 50m further north, the SMM saw for the first time ten signs with “Mines!” written in Russian on both the eastern and western edges road.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

26 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Chystoe Ozero (14km south-west of Donetsk).

27 August

The SMM saw 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

27 August

The SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) south-west of Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).

Heavy weapons permanent storage site

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

27 August

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

23 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-2 and a probable BMP variant) near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk).

24 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).

26 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four IFVs (three BMP-1 and a BMP-2) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle near Yasnobrodivka (25km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

25 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and three armoured communication vehicles (R-145) on three APCs (two MT-LB and a BTR-80) in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk);
• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk); and
• an ACV near Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk).

26 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two probable ACVs near Chyrylianske (formerly Oktiabrske, 62km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014, and
• an ACV in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk).

Presence of mines near Vodiane and in Pisky and mine hazard sign near Nova Marivka[5]

On 24 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 21 anti-tank mines laid across road T-0519 about 2km north of Vodiane (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Mariupol) and again spotted 50 anti-tank mines on its south-eastern edge. On 26 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 25 anti-tank mines laid in two rows on the edge of a road and extending south-west to the wall of an abandoned civilian house in Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk), as well as ten additional anti-tank mines laid across the same road in a single line about 100m east-south-east of the previous mines.

On 27 August, on a road east of Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw again trees laid across the road with a sign reading “Stop! Mines” as well as a sign reading “No passage” on the southern side of the road, both in Russian.

Train carrying cargo north-west through Khartsyzk

In the early morning hours of 27 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a train consisting of two locomotives and 60 half-full cargo wagons moving north-west towards the train station in Khartsyzk (non-government-controlled, 26km east of Donetsk), about 50km north-north- west of the border with the Russian Federation.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of a well near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), and to power lines near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). A representative of the electrical company “DTEK” told the SMM that repairs to power lines near Chermalyk had been completed.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for an hour, the SMM saw 18 cars (five with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as six with “DPR” plates), 22 covered cargo trucks (ten with Ukrainian licence plates and 12 with “DPR” plates), nine buses (one with Georgian licence plates and eight with “DPR” plates), and 34 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine. It also saw 22 cars (three with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 11 with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates, two fuel tankers with Ukrainian licence plates, two buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates), a motorcycle (plates not identified), and 23 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians (a man and woman in their 60-80s) entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing demining activities”.
• At a checkpoint south of Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to the settlement, citing “risks to the security of the SMM.”
• On a road east of Nova Marivka, the SMM saw trees laid across the road as well as a mine hazard sign, preventing passage to the settlement.
• About 350m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM’s passage was prevented by a spool wire stretched across the road T-1316.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after 19 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 26 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).[6]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 26 and 27 August, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] In the SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019, 12 anti-tank mines seen near Shchastia were inaccurately reported as located south of the bridge. The mines were located about 160m north of the bridge.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

VIENNA/Tokyo, 29 August 2019 – Representatives of OSCE participating States, OSCE Asian Partner countries, international organizations, academia and private sector will meet at the 2019 OSCE Asian Conference in Tokyo on 2 and 3 September to discuss efforts to achieve comprehensive security in the digital era.

On Monday, 2 September the conference will be opened by Toshiko Abe, State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Alessandro Azzoni, Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE, Chair of the Contact Group with the OSCE Asian Partners for Co‑operation, and Paul Bekkers, Director of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General.

Three thematic sessions will cover specific areas of comprehensive security in the digital age, namely on tackling ICT security risks, the digital economy as a driver for promoting co‑operation, security and growth, as well as the risks to the safety of journalists.

Additionally, a side event will look into co-operation between OSCE Field Operations in Central Asia and neighbouring Afghanistan on border management for enhancing security and building partnerships.

The OSCE enjoys excellent co-operation with its five Asian Partners: Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, who collectively display a great interest in and commitment to the OSCE. The Partnership provides a platform for political dialogue and practical engagement by fostering productive collaboration and sharing best practices on issues of mutual concern.

The opening session on Monday, 2 September, from 9.45 to 10.30, and the closing session on Tuesday, from 12:00 to 13:00, are open to the media.

The conference will take place at the Conference room 760 (7th Floor), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Media representatives wishing to attend the conference are kindly requested to register (①Name ②Title ③Company ④Passport NO. ⑤pen or camera) by sending an email to ohseisaku@mofa.go.jp, Megumi KUSUBASHI (Ms.), Press Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, (+81) 3-5501-8295, by 13:00 on Friday, 30 August 2019 (JST).

BRATISLAVA /  BRUSSELS / GENEVA, 28 August 2019 -  The recent developments in the Gugutiantkari area have raised tensions on the ground and have humanitarian consequences for the local people.

As with all such fencing, the newly erected structures hinder freedom of movement for people living there, prevent them from reaching their orchards and threaten access to irrigation water.

Our visit is part of the GID Co-Chairs’ continual efforts to address the potential effects of this and other developments, ahead of the OSCE-EUMM-led Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting on Thursday 29 August.

We have been and will continue to be in contact with all relevant actors, drawing their attention to this and other pressing issues, and call on them to make full and responsible use of the existing mechanisms for communication to resolve the current and other concerns.

VIENNA, 28 August 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, expressed his concern today regarding the recent detentions of several journalists in Turkey, following public demonstrations in different Turkish cities after the removal of several mayors in south-east Turkey.

“Journalists should be guaranteed safe working conditions at all times, including while covering protests, and no journalist should be imprisoned in retaliation for their work,” said Désir.

Journalist Ziyan Karahan, who works for the Kurdish service of the Mezopotamya News Agency, and Jinnews reporter Yelda Özbek were detained in Diyarbakır on 19 and 20 August, respectively, and were released a few days later. Also on 20 August, the correspondents of Mezopotamya News Agency, Ahmet Kanbal and Mehmet Şah Oruç, as well as Jinnews reporter Rojda Aydın and journalists Nurcan Yalçın and Halime Parlak, were taken into custody by the police in Mardin. They were later released on 27 August.

In addition, on 22 August, Taylan Özgür Öztaş, a reporter for the Özgür Gelecek newspaper, and Tunahan Turhan, a reporter for the Etkin news agency, were detained in Istanbul. A writer and columnist for the Evrensel Daily, Ayşegül Tözeren, was taken into custody by the police on 20 August, following a midnight raid on her Istanbul home. All three were released from custody under judicial control measures on 23 August.

The Representative recalled that the 2007 Special Report on Handling of the Media during Political Demonstrations: Observations and Recommendations published by his Office states that “law-enforcement officials have a constitutional responsibility not to prevent or obstruct the work of journalists during public demonstrations, and journalists have a right to expect fair and restrained treatment by the police.”  

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom

428645 Communication and Media Relations Section

An interactive three-day Training-of-Trainers (ToT) course on mainstreaming gender in border security, organized by the OSCE’s Border Security and Management Unit of the Transnational Threats Department, concluded on 28 August 2019 in Vienna.

Twenty gender focal points from border security-related agencies of OSCE participating States learned about the principles of adult education, public speaking techniques and communication skills. They were trained on how to successfully convey the concept of mainstreaming gender to their leadership as well as to colleagues in their agencies and how to overcome resistance to this concept.

The participants, members of the OSCE Gender Equality Network, engaged in practical exercises on identification of cases of gender discrimination and sexual harassment, within their institutions but also in communities. They discussed possible ways forward to increase the participation and to achieve the successful recruitment of female border and police officers. The gender focal points also shared good practices and success stories on how to integrate a gender perspective in their work.

This ToT course is one of the main results of an extra-budgetary programme made possible by the financial contributions of Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway. In addition to this and several other training courses and activities, an online training course on mainstreaming gender in the security sector was developed in 2018.

Border security focal points from Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan attended the course.

428525 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Officials from the OSCE, the Government of Tajikistan and civil society representatives met on 23 August 2019 to discuss their joint activities for 2020.

New initiatives will be launched next year, with existing areas of co-operation on economic development, anti-corruption and disaster risk reduction significantly expanded.

The meeting, known as the Partnership Platform, brought together representatives from 25 government agencies, as well as 40 civil society groups.

The Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, Valeriu Chiveri, noted that the meeting marks the start of an exciting period of renewed co-operation: “Over the next year we will be initiating a large number of new activities across all three dimensions. We accomplish more when we work together, and I am delighted that we will be co-operating with over 70 government and civil society partners in 2020 to deliver tangible benefits for all citizens.”

Muzaffar Huseinzoda, Tajikistan’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, underlined that “development of economic and social life, increasing the livelihood of people, bringing a  quality approach to education and science, taking care of the environment, sustainable development, as well as the human dimension are the main priority areas of our co-operation with the OSCE.”

Ambassador Jan Bory, representing Slovakia as the OSCE Chair, emphasized the importance of the event, noting that “the OSCE-Tajikistan Partnership Platform can help translate the words spoken between Chairperson-in-Office Lajčak and President Rahmon during their meeting in May 2019 into concrete actions.”

The Deputy Head of the OSCE Secretariat’s Action Against Terrorism Unit, Fejzo Numanaj, representing the OSCE Secretariat, highlighted Tajikistan’s active role in the OSCE, most notably its chairing of the Forum for Security Co-operation this year. “The country plays an important role in promoting regional security and stability, and we are pleased to support these efforts as best we can. It is a signal of our commitment that the OSCE has based some of its largest regional co-operation initiatives in Dushanbe, most notably on border security and management,” he said.

The Partnership Platform was launched in 2018 to reinforce co-operation between the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and Tajikistan on the basis of genuine partnership, local ownership, openness and transparency.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
• It observed ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM spotted a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near residential houses in government-controlled Chabanivka.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Bezimenne and Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (32), compared with the previous 24 hours (23 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), southerly and easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and southerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations compared with the previous 24 hours. All ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).                                             

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM observed that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and of the armed formations immediately south of the broken section of the bridge, both inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), continued to be dismantled.

On 25 August, the Mission saw a senior member of the armed formations accompany the delivery of a blue container (dimensions 3m x 5m x 2.5m) with a door and at least three windows to a location 40m south of the broken section of the aforementioned bridge. The SMM observed that the container was empty and that “JCCC” was painted on it. [2]

On 26 August, the Mission saw at least 20 deminers of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine, some equipped with metal detectors, as well as eight members of the Stanytsia Luhanska Forestry Service, conducting demining activities and cleaning vegetation west of the road about 300m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. It observed four members of the SES operate a crane and a dump truck and remove three concrete slabs from the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge.

The Mission saw at least 11 members of the armed formations continue to dismantle their former forward position south of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge by removing tyres, sandbags, ammunition crates and wooden logs from the position and throwing them to an area east of the bridge. South of the aforementioned former forward position, the SMM saw at least seven members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. It also again observed the aforementioned blue container 40m south of broken section of the bridge (see above).

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the night of 25-26 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded four projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east and two illumination flares at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

24 August

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) about 40m from civilian houses and about 120m from a school building in Chabanivka (66km north-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

25 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB-M) with a mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk);
• two APCs (BTR-80) in a military compound in Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk);
• five armoured combat vehicles (ACV) under camouflage netting near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk); and
• three ACVs under camouflage netting near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

26 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle and an ACV near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw

• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near residential houses in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near residential houses in Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk).

Train near Sukhodilsk

In the early morning hours of 26 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a train consisting of a locomotive and 12 empty coal wagons moving east through the train station in Sukhodilsk (non-government-controlled, 38km south-east of Luhansk), about 20km west of the border with the Russian Federation.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw a bus (number plates not visible) and two pedestrians (a woman and a man in their fifties) entering Ukraine. It also saw 34 cars (15 with Ukrainian and 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “LPR” and two with “DPR” plates), three buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation number plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates) and 15 pedestrians (eight women and seven men between 45 and 60 years old) exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw no pedestrians enter or exit Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “demining activities”.
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, denied the SMM passage west.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 25-26 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying between Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying between Stepanivka and Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).[5]
• An SMM mid-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying UAV near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as caused by probable jamming.6

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 23 and 25 August, the SMM cameras in Berezove, Kriakivka and Svitlodarsk were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAVs’ positions.

COPENHAGEN, 27 August 2019 – With wildfires sweeping across large swaths of the Arctic region and the Amazon rainforest, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly leaders are calling for both emergency short-term responses and increased long-term attention to addressing the planet’s environmental challenges, including curbing climate change and protecting biodiversity.

Georgian parliamentarian Sofio Katsarava, Chair of the OSCE PA’s economic and environmental committee, called the Arctic and Amazon fires a wake-up call for humanity.

“What we are seeing take place in the rainforests in Brazil, as well as forests in Alaska, northern Canada and Siberia, are a clear indication that climate change is taking a toll in alarming and unpredictable ways,” Katsarava said. “As temperatures rise, fires are getting bigger, hotter and more frequent. This, in turn, has an impact in exacerbating climate change – the fires both release carbon into the atmosphere and destroy ecosystems’ ability to absorb carbon, creating a feedback cycle which only intensifies the climate crisis.”

Katsarava welcomed the decision by the G7 to offer logistical and financial support to help fight the Amazon fires, but urged that additional action be taken to investigate the causes of the fires, and to reverse policies that may be contributing to them, such as deforestation.

The OSCE PA’s Special Representative on Arctic Issues, Norwegian parliamentarian Torill Eidsheim, expressed concern over the situation in the Arctic, saying that the recent fires there are additional proof that the region is facing an unprecedented environmental crisis.

“We have long been aware that the Arctic is undergoing alarming changes, with record warming leading to ice caps melting and loss of habitat for animals. Now, following the hottest July ever, we are seeing unprecedented fires sweep across the Arctic region,” said Eidsheim. “This is a concern not just for the Arctic but for the whole world. As the ‘Earth’s refrigerator,’ as scientists call it, warming in the Arctic has an impact for the planet as a whole.”

She noted that melting glaciers in Greenland and other areas of the Arctic, record high temperatures in Alaska and fires across the region are driving dangerous feedback loops resulting in more warming.

“As Special Representative on Arctic Issues, I call on my colleagues across the OSCE area to take this situation seriously and do whatever they can to help protect the Arctic, and to address the climate crisis with the greatest sense of urgency,” Eidsheim said. “Our health and well-being, as well as the health and well-being of future generations, are at stake.”

Eidsheim was appointed Special Representative on Arctic Issues and Katsarava was elected Chair of the Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment in July.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 13,793 to 13,968 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of 164 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 14 this week compared to 11 last week: seven of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and seven into Ukraine (86 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, seven families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and five were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when nine families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and seven to Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (543 compared to 483 observed during the previous week). There were 284 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 259 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Luhansk- Sevastopol and Alchevsk-Luhansk-Yalta-Sevastopol.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 991 trucks (compared to 981 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (560 at the Gukovo BCP and 431 at the Donetsk BCP); 632 of these trucks crossed to the Russian Federation and 359 crossed to Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and the Russian Federation and with “LPR” plates. Trucks with licence plates from Poland were noted during the reporting week. The Gukovo BCP continued to experience more cargo traffic than Donetsk (in particular due to a significant number of cargo trucks crossing from Ukraine to the Russian Federation).

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 62 (compared to 65 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which could include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 98 to 80. 59 trucks (74 per cent) were bound for Ukraine, the remaining 21 trucks (26 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly decreased from 161 to 159 vehicles; 73 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 86 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 13 occasions; the OTs assessed that eight trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and five to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. The OTs also observed cars with licence plates from Belarus, Georgia, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland; cars with “DPR” plates were also observed.

During the reporting week, the OTs at both BCPs noticed helicopters flying along the border within the Russian Federation airspace on four separate occasions:  

• on 20 August at 09:46, the OT at Donetsk BCP observed a camouflaged helicopter

Mi-8/Mi-17 type, which flew over Donetsk BCP. The aircraft came from the east and continued flying in a northerly direction;

• on 21 August at 9:57, the OT at Gukovo BCP observed a Mi-8 helicopter which came from the north and continued to fly in an easterly direction;
• on 26 August at 10:34 a helicopter was observed flying from the east in a north-easterly direction above the Gukovo BCP. The helicopter was dark green in colour. On the same day at 13:02, also another helicopter was observed. This aircraft arrived from the same direction as the previous one and had same colours.

During the reporting week, the OTs at both BCPs observed ambulances on four separate occasions:

• on 22 August at 16:15, an ambulance bearing the inscription “Urgent medical help -112” (in Russian) arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side and parked next to the main building. Due to the heavy traffic and its position, the OT was not able to monitor the situation. At 16:26, the ambulance returned to the Russian Federation;
• on 23 August at 19:15, an ambulance with licence plates from the Rostov Region entered the Gukovo BCP from the Russian Federation and parked near the main building at the place designated as a customs control zone. The ambulance bore the inscription “urgent medical help – 112” (in Russian). Inside the vehicle two paramedics were observed. One of them left the ambulance carrying a medical suitcase and went towards to a passenger car parked in the exit queue. At 19:28, the paramedic returned and the ambulance travelled back to the Russian Federation;
• on 26 August at 10:23, an ambulance entered the Donetsk BCP area from the Russian Federation and parked near the checking area. The vehicle bore the inscription "urgent medical help" (in Russian) and licence plates from the Rostov Region of the Russian Federation. A paramedic was observed leaving the vehicle and returning shortly after. At 10:41, the ambulance drove back towards the Russian Federation. On the same date at 17:56, the same ambulance arrived from the Russian Federation and parked near the checking area of the BCP. Shortly after, at 18:03, the ambulance drove back towards the Russian Federation.

During the reporting week, the OTs at both BCPs observed police vehicles:

• on 22 August at 12:40, one police vehicle with Russian Federation licence plates entered the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The OT observed two policemen inside the car. At 12:53, the police car drove back towards the Russian Federation;
• on 25 August at 14:05, the OT observed one police vehicle entering the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation which parked in front of the border checking area. At 14:50, one minibus with tinted windows arrived from Ukraine and quickly underwent border control procedures. The minibus had "Republic of South Ossetia (RSO)" plates. At 14:58, the minibus crossed into the Russian Federation escorted by the police car with its flashing lights and siren turned on.

Among the other observations, on 24 August at 14:14, a white minivan with dark brown stripes on both sides and the inscription – Ritual Service "VOZNESENIE" (in Russian) with Russian Federation licence plates entered the Donetsk BCP from the Ukrainian side; one person was observed inside the minivan. The vehicle underwent customs procedures and crossed into the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 23 July to 27 August 2019, please see the attachment here.    

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

428603 Marina Živaljević

In order to support media in Montenegro to improve their convergent reporting skills, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro is organizing ten-day in-house training courses for six media outlets from 22 to 31 August 2019 in Podgorica.

The training is focusing on improving techniques for reporting and editing copy from the field, saving time and costs of production.  It also aims to assist media outlets in establishing cooperation and synergy amongst different departments within a given media house. The training will be conducted within each respective media house, enabling participants to freely interact with one another and facilitating the sharing of ideas and approaches between management and front line journalists.

Opening the first session, Daniel Blank, Media Programme Manager at the OSCE Mission, said: “This training is designed to support our partners in establishing closer co-operation and synergy within the different departments of their media houses and improve reporting techniques in the field, as well as editing techniques, to create appealing and informative media products for audiences.”

Three experts, Lamija Alečković, media expert in  new media products; Tena Perišin, a journalist and professor of Journalism Studies at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, and Dejan Oblak, video and mobile journalism expert and assistant at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb, are facilitating  the sessions.

Alekčković said that convergence in taking news from print, radio and  television for   distribution on digital platforms requires a new strategy, as digital content has its own laws and end products.  A multimedia approach in creating and launching of products is necessary, especially to reach a younger audience.

Perišin reflected on converting and integrating different media into one production process, without compromising on the quality of the journalism: “Maintaining credibility through this transition is crucial. While new media have brought speed to the process, often at the expense of verifying the accuracy of information, good practice shows that this need not be the case,” she said.

Part of the training is dedicated to the use of mobile phones in presenting and producing video stories for  portals. Oblak explained that "mobile phones are used often to produce  short videos as well as documentaries. What distinguishes a professional from an amateur is their knowledge of the audiovisual language and journalistic skills."

These training courses are a partial fulfillment of the committment of the OSCE to support professionalism of the media.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 23 and 24 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• Between the evenings of 24 and 25 August, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
• The Mission spotted a weapon in violation of the withdrawal line in government-controlled Avdiivka.
• The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• The Mission monitored public gatherings on the occasion of National Flag Day and Ukrainian Independence Day in various cities.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 23 and 24 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (12), compared with the previous reporting period (46 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas between Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 24 and 25 August, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (23), compared with the previous 24 hours. More than half of the ceasefire violations were again recorded in areas between Pyshchevyk and Verkhnoshyrokivske and at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 23 and 24 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations with a similar number of explosions (12), compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 24 and 25 August, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (one), compared with the previous 24 hours.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 25 August, the SMM saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and of the armed formations immediately south of the broken section of bridge, both inside the disengagement area, continued to be dismantled.

The Mission saw three members of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine with metal detectors inspecting sand and tyres south of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It observed a crane loading tyres from the position’s walls and roof as well as onto a truck that later left the disengagement area. It also saw that sand from the former forward position was being loaded onto a truck which also left the area.[2]

The Mission saw at least five members of the armed formations removing sand-filled tyres as well wooden logs from their former forward position and throwing them under the bridge. Near the former forward position, the SMM saw at least four members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them.[3]

On the afternoon of 24 August, the Mission saw up to six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them on the southern edge of the broken section of the bridge and near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, as well as up to five members of the armed formations cutting vegetation on the eastern and western side of the bridge’s broken section.

Other disengagement areas[4]

On the night of 23-24 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded ten projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On the following evening and night, the same camera recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km east-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and an illumination flare at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 24 and 25 August, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

24 August

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

24 August

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted ten tanks (type undetermined) near Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

22 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) on the north-eastern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) and a new trench about 40m long (not seen in imagery from 22 August 2019) on the settlement’s southern edge.

23 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two ACVs near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk);
• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an ACV near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk); and
• an ACV in Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk).

24 August

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) in Avdiivka and
• an ACV near the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area).

 

Anti-tank mines south of the bridge in Shchastia and near Verkhnoshyrokivske

On 22 August, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across road H-21 south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 24 August, the Mission saw for the first time an object, assessed as an anti-tank mine (TM-62M), in the ground south of the road from Verkhnoshyrokivske to Pyshchevyk, about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

On 24 and 25 August, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Public gatherings on occasion of National Flag Day and Ukrainian Independence Day

On 23 and 24 August, the SMM monitored peaceful gatherings on the occasion, respectively, of National Flag Day and Ukrainian Independence Day in Dnipro, Kropyvnytske (Kirovohrad region), Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Chernivtsi and Lviv; the events gathered, on average, between 100 and 1,500 people (mixed gender and ages). In Kyiv, the SMM saw at least 25,000 people (mixed gender and ages) gathered at the Independence Square and Bohdana Khmelnytskoho Street.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 24 August, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “the SMM’s safety”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 25 August, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM passage only after 25 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 23-24 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Prokhorivka (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 23 and 25 August, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

[2] In the section on the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska of the SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019, the fragment “On 24 August (outside of the reporting period), the SMM saw Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel removing sand-filled tyres from the walls and roof of their former forward position north of the broken section of bridge. The SMM also saw Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel using a crane to remove nine large concrete slabs from an area south of the former forward position” should have read “On 24 August (outside of the reporting period), the SMM saw workers removing sand-filled tyres from the walls and roof of their former forward position north of the broken section of bridge. The SMM also saw workers using a crane to remove nine large concrete slabs from an area south of the former forward position.”

[3] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[4] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

BRATISLAVA, 26 August 2019 – On 9 and 10 September 2019, policy makers and national security advisers from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation, as well as experts and practitioners from international, regional, and sub-regional organizations, academia, and civil society will gather in Bratislava to exchange views, lessons learned and good practices in the area of Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R).

An effective, accountable, and inclusive national security sector with full respect for human rights, gender equality and the rule of law contributes to long-term comprehensive security and lays the foundation for peace and sustainable development for a state and its people.

With this in mind, the 2019 OSCE Chair identified Security Sector Governance and Reform, a long-term Slovak priority, as the focus of its fourth thematic conference organized in Bratislava.

Over the course of two days, conference participants will discuss good practices and lessons learned in strengthening the effectiveness and sustainability of national SSG/R processes and how to make best use of the OSCE’ existing capacities in support of national efforts.

Drawing on findings from regional workshops and other activities organized by the Chairmanship 2019, participants will explore:

• Good practices and lessons learned to prevent conflict, sustain peace and promote comprehensive security
• National approaches to cope with today’s complex security environments
• Ways to utilize the OSCE experience and expertise in support of nationally-owned SSG/R processes
• Efforts to strengthen the OSCE’s approach drawing from experiences of multilateral actors

OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovak Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák, OSCE Secretary-General Tomas Greminger and Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivica Dačić, will open the conference.

Slovak State Secretary and Special Representative for the 2019 OSCE Chairmanship Lukáš Parízek, will deliver closing remarks.

Media representatives are invited to cover the conference’s opening session starting at 10:00 on Monday, 9 September 2019, and the closing session, from 12:30 to 13:00, on Tuesday, 10 September 2019,  at the Grand Hotel River Park, Dvořákovo nábrežie 6, Bratislava.

The conference is organized by the Slovak OSCE Chair in close cooperation with OSCE executive structures, within their respective mandates.

Media representatives wishing to attend the opening and/or closing sessions must register by 3 September 2019 by sending an e-mail to registration.osce@mzv.sk and viola.martonova@mzv.sk to obtain the registration form.

Updates and latest news from the Slovak Chair can be followed via https://www.osce.org/cio or on Twitter at @Slovakia_OSCE

Kunduz Rysbek

A three-day national table-top exercise (TTX) on preventing and countering the use of the internet for terrorist purposes, for some 30 Kyrgyz representatives from diverse backgrounds and perspectives, including representatives of government, law enforcement, civil society, media, academia and the private sector, began on 26 August 2019 in Issyk Kul.

The exercise is organized within the framework of the Seventh Expert Meeting on Counterterrorism organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, in co-operation with the Action against Terrorism Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department

The TTX is being held in the format of interactive discussions around a fictional scenario developed by the Action against Terrorism Unit that serves as a realistic and strategic-level case study based on real-world events and emerging online terrorism-related threats relevant to Central Asia.

The TTX is facilitated by a number of international experts from the OSCE, ODIHR, UNODC, the UNCTED-led Tech Against Terrorism initiative, the Center for Studying Regional Threats, the Kaspersky Lab, and the Security and Human Empowerment Solutions, who will highlight best practices on addressing contemporary challenges emanating from the use of the Internet by terrorists while respecting privacy and freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and religion or belief.

“We try to engender a ”whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approach to discussing challenges, sharing best practices, and developing policy solutions to tackle the challenges posed by terrorists online,” said Alexander Eliseev, Acting Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, at the opening of the Expert Meeting. ”The OSCE is particularly well placed to provide such a platform for dialogue and exchanges of information, good practices and lessons learnt. We are facilitating meaningful and constructive dialogue focused on a comprehensive approach to security and that is our strength.”

The Table-top exercise will result in the development of Actionable Policy Responses and Recommendations aimed to further increase the efficiency of national efforts to prevent and counter the exploitation of the internet by terrorists and violent extremists. These recommendations will then be shared with the national authorities to help them in formulating relevant human-rights compliant and gender mainstreamed policies and frameworks for preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism online, and to integrate these recommendations into broader strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism.

This is the third national table-top exercise on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes organized in the OSCE area. The Action against Terrorism Unit plans to conduct similar events in Central Asia and South-Eastern Europe in 2019 and 2020.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw damage to a farm near Novoluhanske.
• On 23 August, it saw members of the armed formations taking down a wall at their former forward position and personnel from the State Emergency Services of Ukraine cutting trees and branches inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM spotted weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near government-controlled Raihorodka and non-government-controlled Ternove.
• It saw new anti-tank mines south of the bridge in Shchastia.
• An SMM long-range UAV spotted a cargo train heading south-west as well as a cargo train probably loaded with coal in Kumshatske.
• The long-range UAV spotted vehicles and people in a field west of the border with the Russian Federation in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled areas at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske, in Sosnivske and Naberezhne, and at a border crossing point near Izvaryne.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (46), compared with the previous reporting period (69 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however, no explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions). All ceasefire violations were recorded at westerly directions of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Damage to a farm near Novoluhanske

The SMM saw damage to two buildings at the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk). At the administration building, the Mission saw a hole in an east-north-east-facing ground floor window but could not assess the cause of damage. At a pig barn about 150m south-east of the administration building, the SMM saw about 15-20 holes in a south-facing outer wall, a hole in a south-facing window, assessed as fresh, and a hole in another south-facing window along with a corresponding hole on a south-facing wall inside of the barn, both assessed as caused by small-arms fire. An employee at the farm (a woman in her forties) told the SMM that she had been in the barn with other employees on the morning of 18 August when she had heard shooting and took shelter in a corridor. Shortly thereafter, she said she heard a bullet impact the window (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM saw at least 21 personnel of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine, as well as four vehicles (including a white armoured vehicle), entering the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk). On the same day, inside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw eight Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, six members of the SES cutting trees and branches in fields west of the road and north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), as well as a bulldozer, a dump truck, and a crane parked near the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The SMM also saw that a shuttle bus and golf cart continued to operate between the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the broken section of the bridge and back. On two occasions, at the EECP north of the bridge, the SMM saw 500-800 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and 150-400 queuing to enter. Throughout the day, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw a steady flow of pedestrians.

At the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw four members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them, as well as five members of the armed formations removing sand-filled tyres from a wall of the position to a location about 10m south. [2] On the same day, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw six contractors constructing a shelter of a humanitarian organization.       

On 24 August (outside of the reporting period), the SMM saw Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel removing sand-filled tyres from the walls and roof of their former forward position north of the broken section of bridge. The SMM also saw Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel using a crane to remove nine large concrete slabs from an area south of the former forward position. At the same time, the SMM saw members of the armed formations removing sand-filled tyres from the walls of their former forward position immediately south of the broken section of bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

Positioned in the central part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk), while conducting a mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight over the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 24 shots and five burst of small-arms fire about 1-2km west (unable to assess as inside or outside of the disengagement area), assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 2km west. Shortly thereafter, while returning the UAV, the SMM heard three additional shots of small-arms fire about 1-1.5km north-north-west (assessed as outside of the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery), assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.3km north-north-west. The SMM safely landed the UAV and heard an additional two shots of small-arms fire at a distance of about 1.5km north-west (assessed as outside of the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery) before it left the area.*

While positioned about 2km north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard four shots of small arms fire at a distance of about 1km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On the same day, the SMM accessed its camera site in Petrivske for the second time since June 2018 and conducted maintenance.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled

21 August

An SMM UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in a compound near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see the SMM Daily Report 22 August 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

22 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) in a military compound on the eastern edge of Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted nineteen tanks (eight T-64 and 11 undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (see above).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

23 August

The SMM noted that six MLRS (BM-21), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 11 towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm), and a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk

23 August

The SMM noted that 93 tanks (26 T-64, 36 T-64-B, 30 T-72, and a T-80), seven towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm), nine towed mortars (six 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three PM-38) and four mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

21 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near a school building in Raihorodka and
• five APCs (BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

22 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• a probable infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near residential houses in Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP variant) near Novotoshkivske; and
• four IFVs (a BMP-2 and three BMP variants) near Orikhove (57km west of Luhansk).

23 August

The SMM saw:

• three APCs (a BTR-80, a BTR variant and a type undetermined) in Stanytsia Luhanska and
• an APC (BTR-70) and a heavy-machine-gun (DShK, 12.7mm) north-east of the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.

Non-government-controlled areas

On 23 August, near a checkpoint of the armed formations on road C-051532 between Styla (34km south of Donetsk) and Petrivske, the Mission again saw four members of the armed formations digging inside deep trenches.

Anti-tank mines south of the bridge in Shchastia

The SMM saw 12 new anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in the western lane of the road H-21 south of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), as well as 15 previously observed anti-tank mines laid across the entire road further south.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Trains near Kumshatske

On the night of 22 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable fuel cargo train (with 20 wagons) moving south through the train station in Kumshatske (non-government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) towards Sofiivka (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), as well as a stationary train (with at least 50 wagons), assessed as probably carrying coal, at the same train station.

Vehicles spotted in a non-government-controlled area near Manych

On the night of 22 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable cargo truck and two cars stationary in a field, about 3.5km north-east of Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk), in an area adjacent to the border with the Russian Federation where there are no official border crossing points, as well as a cargo truck stationary at a junction about 2.5km south-west of Manych. About ten minutes later, in the same area, it spotted another truck driving west on a dirt road about 400m west of the border. After about 30 minutes, the UAV spotted around six people walking west in a field between the border and the aforementioned truck and two cars. About five minutes later, it spotted two cars (probably the aforementioned ones) driving west towards Manych, as well as an additional third car, also moving west towards Manych.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 22 cars (four with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as ten with “DPR” plates) and one bus with “DPR” plates entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 24 cars (five with Ukrainian and 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates, one bus with “DPR” plates, and two pedestrians (women in their thirties and fifties) exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians (males) entering Ukraine and 13 pedestrians (eight females and five males) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw one car with Russian Federation licence plates, two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates), one bus with Ukrainian licence plates, and 25 pedestrians entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw seven cars (three with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation, and one with German licence plates), five covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates as well as two with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates), and 11 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, once citing an “ongoing operation in the area” and once citing the SMM’s refusal to show its patrol plan.
• At the eastern entrance to Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 78km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing orders from superiors.
• While at a shop in Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations approached the SMM and asked to see its patrol plan, then told the Mission to leave the village, citing orders from superiors.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM was allowed to proceed only after 18 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 22-23 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying between Petrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) and Yurivka (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk) and between Bulavyne (non-government-controlled, 54km north-east of Donetsk) and Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying between Yurivka and Bulavyne.[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two storage sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission continued to monitor the situation in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near non-government-controlled Bile.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (69), compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east and south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and at south-easterly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (15), compared with the previous reporting period (26). All ceasefire violations, were explosions and were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM saw 37 personnel of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine, as well as five vehicles (including white armoured vehicle), three trucks, a crane and a bulldozer entering the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and heard chainsaw being operated around 50m west of the road, north of the broken section of the bridge. During the same day, the Mission saw up to 24 SES personnel and seven vehicles (including white armoured vehicle and a crane), parked near the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 21 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a remnant of an object stuck on a tree on the southern bank of the river, around 15m south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), assessed as an exploded remnant of OG-9 projectile. On 22 August, the Mission saw that the tree had fallen down.

Inside the disengagement area, around the area south of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw two deminers from non-government-controlled areas cutting vegetation, as well as members of the armed formations wearing an armband with “JCCC” written on it.[2]

The SMM saw that the shuttle bus and a golf cart continued operating between the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the broken section of the bridge and back.

Other disengagement areas[3]

Positioned inside the disengagement near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

22 August

The SMM saw four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

21 August

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in a compound in Syrotyne (71km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• at least five tanks (T-80) south of Krasna Hora (76km north of Donetsk); and
• at least six tanks (T-64) and six surface-to-air missile systems (three 9K35 Strela-10 and three 9K33) near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 August

The SMM saw nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons permanent storage sites[4]

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

22 August

The SMM could not verify seven tanks (T-72) as their serial numbers were covered with paint.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

22 August

The SMM could not verify seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) as their serial numbers were covered with paint.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

21 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• at least three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Popasna;
• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and three ACVs (type undetermined) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk); and
• two IFVs (probable BMP variant) near Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk).

22 August

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk); and
• an APC near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas 

20 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• three ACVs (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk); and
• an ACV (type undetermined) in a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV north of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

21 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (probable BRDM-2) in a compound in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

New trenches near Zernove, Molodizhne and Petrivske

On 20 August, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a new trench running north-east to south-east for about 100m, as well as an extension to an existing trench running for about 20m south-west to north-east in a training area south of Zernove (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 5 August 2019).

On 21 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a 30m-long trench running north-west into a field from a treeline with a mortar firing position about 500m north-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) (not seen in imagery from 5 May 2019).

On 22 August, near a checkpoint of the armed formations on road C-051532 between Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and Petrivske, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations digging inside deep trenches, partially covered with logs, as well as unoccupied camouflage-netted firing position located around 20m north of the trenches.

Situation at checkpoints along the contact line

At a checkpoint on highway H-15 near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM again saw at least 280 cars, 22 buses and over 300 pedestrians queueing to travel towards government-controlled areas and at least 30 cars and around 25 pedestrians in the opposite direction.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing engineer works along the road”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.