Central Europe

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw that demining works continued inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including multiple launch rocket systems near non-government-controlled Khrustalnyi.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, as well as to enable the removal of  unexploded ordnance between the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk and the checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued; the Mission observed the presence of mines close to the Petrivske disengagement area and inside the one near Zolote. SMM unmanned aerial vehicles were subjected to signal interference.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (65), compared with the previous 24 hours (17 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas north-north-east of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however no explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (eight explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw up to 12 deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities on both sides of the road, about 50-100m north of the northern wooden ramp of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

The Mission also saw about eight deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities on both sides of the broken section of the bridge, starting from the northern wooden ramp and further south. The Mission saw up to six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the bridge.[2]

The SMM saw that the shuttle bus continued operating between the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) outside the disengagement area and the broken section of the bridge. At the EECP the SMM observed about 700 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and about 20 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw a steady flow of people traveling in both directions. 

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening and night of 11-12 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3.5km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the evening of 11 August, the SMM camera in Popasna recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 11 August, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted 12 anti-tank mines laid in two rows across road T-1316 about 1km south of the area’s northern edge near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11. August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35, Strela-10) (one probable) near Chernenko (21km north-east of Mariupol).

12 August

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

10 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 2 August 2019);
• two towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk); and
• 22 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

12 August

The SMM saw:

• at least ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and
• three tanks (type undetermined) near Manhush (25km south-west of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• three tanks (type undetermined) at a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see the SMM Daily Report 18 July 2019) and
• 16 tanks and 16 pieces of towed artillery at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see the SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019).

10 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 20 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk);
• three tanks (probable T-64) near Khrustalnyi (see above); and
• five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and eight tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

10 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BTR-3DA) near the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) (outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range spotted an armoured combat vehicle near Pyshchevyk.

11 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armored personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk).

12 August

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military truck near Popasna and
• an IFV (BMP-1) on the north-western outskirts of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas[5]

10 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable IFV near Ozerianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 35km north-east of Donetsk).

Mines near the Petrivske disengagement area and between Pisky and Lozove

On 10 August, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted three anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 150m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske, as well as 33 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the same road about 100-200m further, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 11 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 40 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows across a road leading from Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk) to Lozove (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 1km south of the aforementioned mines, the same UAV again spotted 20 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows on the same road, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On 12 August, the SMM saw that two previously observed mine hazard signs about 2km north-east of Hannivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), one located about 15m east of the road and the other about 40m east of the road, had been removed.

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and of power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the removal of a previously reported piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) located in the middle of the road between the EECP in Pyshchevyk  and the checkpoint of the armed formations west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol). After about four hours, a representative of a demining team from non-government-controlled areas told the SMM that the piece of UXO had been removed. During demining activities, the SMM observed uninterrupted traffic towards non-government-controlled areas and in the opposite direction.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 10-11 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, non-government-controlled, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and Sadove (non-government-controlled, 44km east of Donetsk) and Khrestivka (formerly Kirovske, non-government-controlled, 45km east of Donetsk).6 
• On the night of 11-12 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Stepanivka and Hranitne (government-controlled, 78km south-west of Donetsk) as well as between Novopokrovske (government-controlled, 29km north-west of Donetsk) and Ivanopillia (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk). 6 
• On two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable jamming. [6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Petrivske and Kriakivka were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] In the last sentence of the indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone section of the SMM Daily Report 7 August 2019 “a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-3)” should have read “a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2).”

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                 

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 12,968 to 13,435 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of 289 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 17 this week compared to 28 last week: nine of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and eight into Ukraine (47 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, 14 families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and four were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when 18 families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and 13 to Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (465 compared to 476 observed during the previous week). There were 239 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 226 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Lugansk-Simferopol, Luhansk-Yalta and Yalta-Luhansk-Stakhanov.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 1007 trucks (compared to 988 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (600 at the Gukovo BCP and 407 at the Donetsk BCP); 626 of these trucks crossed to the Russian Federation and 381 crossed to Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, Georgia and the Russian Federation and with “LPR” plates. During the reporting week, the Gukovo BCP continued to experience more cargo traffic than Donetsk (in particular due to a significant number of cargo trucks crossing from Ukraine into the Russian Federation).

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 45 (compared to 49 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which could include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP significantly increased from 49 to 105, 91 trucks (87 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 14 trucks (13 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 165 to 140 vehicles; 66 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 74 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 26 occasions; the OTs assessed that 14 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 12 to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. The OTs observed cars with licence plates from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania and Poland; cars with “DPR” plates were also noted during the reporting week.

On 8 August at 07:40, the OT at the BCP Donetsk observed more than 20 bikers crossing as group from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. The motorcycles bore licence plates from the Russian Federation and "DPR" and also "LPR" plates. Most of the motorcycles displayed flags of the Russian Federation, and also of "DPR" and "LPR.

On 10 August at 11:00, the OT at the BCP Gukovo observed an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates which entered the BCP area from the Russian Federation which parked behind the main building. Inside the vehicle a driver and two paramedics were observed. The ambulance stayed approximately 20 minutes within the BCP area and, at 11:26, drove back to the same direction.

On 10 August at 17:55, the OT at the Gukovo observed a funeral service van with Russian Federation licence plates, which crossed into the Russian Federation from Ukraine.

On 12 August at 11:52, the OT at the BCP Donetsk observed a police jeep (bearing white and blue licence number plates, from the Rostov region) arriving from the Russian Federation which parked behind the main building. Two men in uniforms were observed inside the vehicle (wearing blue shirts). The vehicle stayed 13 minutes within the BCP area and at 12:05 returning towards the Russian Federation. Inside the vehicle, a man dressed in civilian clothes was observed, in addition to the mentioned police officers.  

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 2 July to 6 August 2019, please see the attachment here.                           

427703 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe SDGs SDGs:  8 - Decent work and economic growth

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe co-supported the Pamir Invest Forum in Khorog and Ishkashim in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) on 6 and 7 August 2019. The two-day forum brought together investors and foreign entrepreneurs to learn more about investing and implementing socio - economic programmes in the GBAO.

During the event, three plenary sessions were held which explored investment policy, the Free Economic Zones and the development of tourism. Participants learnt about entrepreneurial activities in the region and potential opportunities for international initiatives. The event also facilitated discussion of ways of elimination of administrative barriers to attract the local and foreign investment during the process of export and import of goods to and from the region.

The forum was organized by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the State Committee on Investment and State Property Management, the Committee on Tourism Development under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Local Executive Authority of the GBAO, and the Milal Inter Association of Entrepreneurs and Mountain Farmers, in close co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and the Aga Khan Foundation and other development partners.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 9 and 10 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Between the evenings of 10 and 11 August, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• In Troitske, two women sustained injuries due to shelling, prior to the recommitment to the ceasefire.
• The SMM saw that demining works continued inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area on 10 August.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines at the train station in Bakhmut.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka and facilitate the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• The Mission observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar and Crimea and in nearby areas.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Verkhnoshyrokivske, Zaichenko, Oleksandrivka and Kreminets.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 9 and 10 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (11), compared with the previous reporting period (35 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas between Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 10 and 11 August, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (17), compared with the previous 24 hours. More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), where among other ceasefire violations nine undetermined explosions were recorded.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 9 and 10 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Between the evenings of 10 and 11 August, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including eight explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. Almost half of the ceasefire violations were again recorded inside and near the Zolote disengagement area (see below).

Two women in Troitske sustained injuries due to shelling prior to the recommitment to the ceasefire

The SMM followed up on reports of two women (in their sixties) who sustained injuries due to shelling on 28 February in the eastern part of Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). On 4 March, the head of the Troitske administration (a man, in his thirties) told the Mission that on 1 March on Soniachna Street he had seen two women, both residents of the street – one with injuries to her leg, the other with injuries to her arm, both due to shelling. The SMM was unable to access the street due to security considerations.

In late July at a one-storey house at 20 Soniachna Street in Troitske, a woman (in her sixties) told the Mission that she lived there and that on the evening of 28 February she had been at home when she heard an explosion and saw one window pane breaking and pieces of broken glass hitting her leg. She also said that the roof of her house had been damaged. When the SMM was speaking with the woman it saw that three east-facing windows and the roof of the house had been repaired.

Also in late July, at 21 Soniachna Street, at a one-storey house across the street from the above-mentioned house, another woman (in her sixties) told the Mission that she lived there and that on the evening of 28 February she had been in the yard in front of her house when she saw and heard three impacts near the house at 20 Soniachna Street. She said that she had sustained injures to her arm and face from the ensuing pieces of shrapnel. She added that three west-facing windows of her house had been damaged. When the SMM was speaking with the woman it saw that three west-facing windows had been repaired.

Medical staff at the clinic in Troitske told the Mission that a woman (in her sixties) from 20 Soniachna Street with a cut to her leg caused by glass debris and another woman (in her sixties) from 21 Soniachna Street with injuries caused by shrapnel had been treated at the clinic on the morning of 1 March.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 10 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw up to 15 deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities on both sides of the road, about 100m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). The Mission also saw about ten deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities sides on both sides of the broken section of the bridge, starting from the wooden ramps. It also saw a senior member of the armed formations and two other members wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the bridge.[2]

On the same day, between 18:30 and 18:45, after the closure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) outside the disengagement area and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area), the SMM heard two explosions, assessed as controlled detonations of explosive devices, inside the disengagement area, near the broken section of the bridge.

On 11 August, the Mission saw two members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the bridge.

On both days, the SMM saw that pedestrians continued crossing the bridge without interruption and the shuttle bus continued operating between the EECP and the broken section of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening 9 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area, as well as a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On the evening of 10 August, the same camera recorded 12 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-2.5km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On 10 and 11 August, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

10 August

The SMM saw six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), nine self-propelled howitzers (seven 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and two 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the train station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 August

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35, Strela-10) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an anti-tank guided missile system (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km west of Donetsk).

10 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted seven self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) at the train station in Rubizhne (see above).

The SMM saw three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Fedorivka (87km north of Donetsk).

11 August

The SMM saw four towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) at the train station in Rubizhne (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

8 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-80) near Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol).

9 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an APC (BTR-70) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Myrne (63km south of Donetsk).

10 August

The SMM saw

• an APC (BTR-80) near Marinka (23km southwest of Donetsk) and
• seven infantry fighting vehicles (BMD-2) and two APCs (MT-LB variant) near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

Anti-tank mines near Nyzhnie Lozove, Luhanske and Shchastia and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the Trudivski area in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district

On 9 August, about 2.5km west of Nyzhnie Lozove (non-government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range UAV for the first time about 40 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across road M-03 and in a field east of the road. The mines were assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

The same UAV again spotted 39 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in four rows across road M-03, about 5km south-east of Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 700m, 1km and 1.7km south of these mines, respectively, the UAV spotted again 57 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in a total of five rows across the same road, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted at least 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across road H-21 south of the bridge in Shchastia, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 10 August, the Mission saw for the first time an object, assessed as a projectile from an MLRS rocket (Grad-type, 122mm) and not recent, embedded in the asphalt on Petrova Street in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre).

On 11 August, in the northern outskirts of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time six anti-tank mines (TM-62M) laid on the southern side of road T-0513, about 300m before the most forward checkpoint of the armed formations on that road.

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

On 10 August, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

On 10 and 11 August, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

On 11 August, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the recovery of the body of a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier between Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east from Donetsk) and Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

Calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar and Crimea

On 9 and 10 August, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea as well as in nearby areas.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 10 August at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations, denied the SMM passage on two occasions, citing an “ongoing operations in the area”. The Mission saw civilian cars passing through the checkpoint in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Conditional access:

• On 11 August, at a checkpoint on the southern edge of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after presenting the vehicles’ registration documents and the drivers’ driving licences.
• On 11 August, at a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), as the SMM stopped to interact with civilians crossing the checkpoint, a member of the armed formations told it, citing “regulations”, that it had to stop 500m away from the checkpoint if it wanted to talk to civilians.

Delay:

• On 11 August, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations delayed the SMM passage by about an hour, citing “ongoing demining in the area”. As the Mission was being delayed, it saw civilian cars passing through the checkpoint in both directions.
• On 11 August, at a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations delayed the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) by about 80 minutes, citing “ongoing activities in the area”.

 

Other impediments:

• On 10 August on two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) assessed as caused by probable jamming. [5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 9-11 August, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and Kriakivka were not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed damage from gunfire at a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM saw that demining works continued inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to water pipelines and electric lines.
• The SMM saw people in queue and others holding “LPR passports” in Alchevsk.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Staromykhailivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (35), compared with the previous reporting period (14 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), in areas south-west of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), including up to 1km north-east of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), and at south-westerly and westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).  

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations (and no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). All ceasefire violations were recorded inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Damage from gunfire at a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 8 August , at 3 Myru Street, in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM again observed damage to the three-storey brick building of a functioning school. The Mission saw two holes in two west-facing windows – one located on the first floor, the other located on the top floor. It also saw scratches on the wallpaper and a hole in the concrete wall opposite of the first window as well as a hole in the concrete wall and a scratch on the wooden door frame opposite of the second window, all assessed as the ricochets of two bullets. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms rounds. The nearest positions of the armed formations are located around 700m north of the school; it is the twelfth time that the Mission has reported on damage at this school since the beginning of the year.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 8 and 9 August, between 18:30 and 18:45, the Mission heard four explosions, assessed as controlled detonations of explosive devices, near the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). These explosions occurred after the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) outside the disengagement area and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area) had been closed (at 18:00).

On 9 August, the SMM saw 11 deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine conducting demining activities on both sides of the road, about 100m north of the broken section of the bridge. About 50m north of the northern edge of the broken section, the Mission also saw a truck full of rocks, a steam roller and a vehicle with 15 workers widening the pavement of the road leading to the bridge with asphalt.

The SMM saw at least six deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities in areas west of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge. It also saw a senior member of the armed formations and two others wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.[2]

During the same day, the SMM saw that pedestrians continued crossing the bridge without interruption. The Mission also observed that the shuttle bus continued operating between the EECP and the broken section of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening and night of 8-9 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two bursts, two illumination flares, two muzzle flashes and 20 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to east), all at an assessed range of 1.5-4km south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

9 August

The SMM saw seven self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• eight multiple launch rocket systems in a training area near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk) and
• four self-propelled howitzers in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

8 August

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) at a compound in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw three towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 21 tanks and a surface-to-air missile system in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and
• 21 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (see above).

8 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 12 tanks (a T-64 and 11 T-72, including one with its barrel removed) in a training area near Shymshynivka (see above) (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 18 July 2019).

Other weapons observed[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

7 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 18 self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 28 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

7 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• for the first time, a trench about 5km south-east of Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) (not seen in previous imagery from 19 July 2019) and
• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (BMP-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

8 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two APCs (BTR-80) in a compound in Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk) and
• eight IFVs (five BMP-1 and three BMP-2) near Novozvanivka (see above).

9 August

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Stepove (30km north-east of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) loaded on a truck near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM) loaded on a truck near Artema (26km north of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) and new trench extensions (not seen in previous imagery from 7 July 2019) in a training area near Novoselivka (see above).

8 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1), two ACVs (type unknown) and an APC (MT-LB) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk);
• a probable armoured reconnaissance command vehicle (BRDM-2) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-80) at a compound in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

Presence of anti-tank mines and probable unexploded ordnance (UXO)

On 8 August, about 2km north-east of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV again spotted nine anti-tank mines, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, laid across the western lane of dual-lane road H-21 leading to the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk). 

On 9 August, the SMM again saw 78 anti-tank mines laid across a road leading from Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk) to Lozove (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Donetsk), all assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On the same day, the SMM saw for the first time a probable piece of UXO in the middle of an asphalt road, about 200m of a residential area in the north-western edge of Lastochkyne (government-controlled, 19km north-west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled 16km north-east of Donetsk) as well as of power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); and to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) as well as maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region, related to water payments.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour and 15 minutes, the SMM saw 25 cars (six with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, 15 with “DPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and 12 pedestrians (mixed ages and gender) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 70 cars (11 with Ukrainian and 17 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 42 with “DPR” plates), 12 covered cargo trucks (four with Ukrainian and four with Belarusian licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and 18 pedestrians (mixed ages and gender) exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw a man entering Ukraine.

People apply for “LPR passports” in Alchevsk

In Alchevsk (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed about 30 people (mixed ages and genders) queuing in front of a building, including a woman (35 years old) who told the Mission that she had been waiting for an hour and that only four or five applications were accepted by the office each day. A man (25 years old) told the SMM that he applies for a “passport” issued by the armed formations in order to subsequently apply for a Russian Federation passport as he has lived and worked in the Russian Federation since 2014. The SMM saw a woman (55 years old), a boy (14 years old) and three men (25-35 years old) coming out of the aforesaid building holding an “LPR passport” in their hands.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations, two visibly armed, denied the SMM passage on two separate occasions, citing an “order from their superior” and asking for “a trip ticket”.
• At a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.                                                 

Other impediments:

• On the night of 8-9 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming while flying over areas near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Metalist (non-government-controlled, 7km north-west of Luhansk). [6]
• On 9 August, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying over Novoselivka (government-controlled, 37km north-east of Mariupol) assessed as caused by probable jamming.6

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw deminers from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and from non-government-controlled areas working inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a cargo train heading west in non-government-controlled areas near the border with the Russian Federation.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to water infrastructure and electric lines, as well as the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Kreminets.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 14 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), in areas south of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and in areas south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations (and no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (26 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On the afternoon of 7 August, the SMM saw six deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities in areas west of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk). At 18:35 and at 18:45, the Mission heard two explosions, assessed as controlled detonations of explosive devices, near the broken section of the bridge. These explosions occurred after the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) outside the disengagement area and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) (inside the disengagement area) had been closed (at 18:00).

On 8 August, the SMM saw deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine cutting vegetation and conducting demining activities on both sides of the road, north of the broken section of the bridge. About 100m north of the broken section, the Mission saw a truck and a crane and it also observed ten people removing the guard rail on each side of the road and cutting grass on the road’s shoulders, in the area where the shuttle bus turns.

On the same day, the SMM saw deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities in areas east of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge. It also saw three members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the bridge.[2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening of 7 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 6 August, aerial imagery available to the Mission revealed the presence of at least 30 craters (not seen in imagery from 22 July 2019) about 100m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge, about 2km west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on its southern edge.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

7 August

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• eight tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk) (on the same day the SMM also saw three tanks (type undetermined) firing in the training area, which was assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone);
• three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), about 600m east of a residential area in Zuhres (36km east of Donetsk); and
• five towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

7 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) without missile launchers in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk).

8 August

The SMM saw:

• 19 tanks (T-72) stationary at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and
• six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Zaliznianske (79km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four tanks (type undetermined) in a training area Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, 90km south-east of Donetsk).

7 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• eight tanks (T-72) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 3 August 2019); and
• three tanks (T-72) and 18 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65) in two compounds near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

On 6 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote.

7 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (two BMP-2, two BMP variants and one BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 5m trench near the most forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) (not visible in imagery from 19 July 2019).

8 August

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Peredilske (24km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted seven IFVs (BMP-1) near Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in a compound near Yashchykove (46km west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (MT-LB) in a compound in Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk).

Cargo train in non-government-controlled areas, near the border with the Russian Federation

On the night of 8 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a freight train with at least 50 hopper cars passing the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), located about 3km north-west of the border with the Russian Federation, and heading west.

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and power lines in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), and to a water pipeline near Yasynuvata, as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing operations in the area”.

Conditional access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint on the southern edge of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after presenting the vehicles’ registration documents and the drivers’ driving licences on the first occasion, and after inspecting its trailer on the second occasion.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.                                                 

Other impediments:

• On the night of 7-8 August, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) assessed as caused by probable jamming. On three occasions, the same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas of central and southern Donetsk region.[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

COPENHAGEN, 9 August 2019 – In reaction to recent developments in Kyrgyzstan, leading to the detention of former President Almazbek Atambayev, OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) issued the following statement:

“In light of recent events in Kyrgyzstan, I want to encourage the authorities and members of the opposition to exercise restraint and for calm to be restored in accordance with the country’s constitution and democratic values. 

As illustrated by several visits in recent years, as well as the organization of our 2018 Autumn Meeting in Bishkek, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly remains steadfast in its commitment to support Kyrgyzstan’s democratic consolidation and efforts to build a society based on law and order.

While the last presidential election was welcomed by OSCE observers as an orderly transfer of powers from one elected president to another, this did not preclude the pressing need to continue strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, especially as the country prepares for parliamentary elections in 2020. Following up on these commitments is crucial for Kyrgyzstan’s long-term stability and prosperity.” 

VIENNA, 12 August 2019 - Under the theme of “Transforming Education”, International Youth Day 2019 highlights the importance of making education more relevant, equitable and inclusive for young people across the globe.

Stressing the need to engage young people in efforts towards a safer and sustainable future, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák stressed: “For too long, young people have been shut out of our discussions, or dismissed as part of the problem. Now we know that we cannot achieve any of our goals or objectives without them. Young people are already contributing to comprehensive security, peace and sustainable development – and inclusive education can propel them forward.”

The Special Representatives on Youth and Security Alba Brojka and Samuel Goda recalled that with almost 38% of its population aged under 30, the OSCE is an important platform to foster youth participation in contributing to comprehensive peace and security efforts across and beyond Europe. “Young people have proven to be bridge-builders, experts and contributors to peace and security in the OSCE area. Quality education is crucial in strengthening youth engagement to address current and future challenges,” they stated. Brojka, who was recently appointed as Special Representative, highlighted that Albania, as the incoming OSCE Chair, will continue to see engagement with and for young people as a priority.

“From the Helsinki Final Act onwards, to the most recent Ministerial Council in Milan, OSCE participating States have repeatedly recognized the positive role that young people can play in all three dimensions of security, and how education can contribute to these efforts,” OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger noted. “But we must also turn commitments into a tangible reality for all.”

As part of its efforts to engage young people in its comprehensive approach to security, the OSCE has launched the “Perspectives 20-30” initiative to bring young experts and practitioners together in order to develop a vision for addressing current and future security challenges. With the support of the Slovak OSCE Chair, the OSCE-wide Youth Forum in Bratislava on 28 and 29 October 2019 will offer a platform for young people from the OSCE area and beyond to exchange ideas and engage in a frank, informal dialogue with each other and with delegates of participating States and OSCE Partners for Co-operation.

Learn more at www.osce.org/youth, and by following #OSCEyouth across networks

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw fresh damage from heavy-machine-gun fire to a functioning school and residential properties in Horlivka.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near non-government-controlled Novoselivka.
• The SMM saw deminers from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and from non-government-controlled areas working inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and expansion ofwater infrastructure and repairs of power lines as well as the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 70), compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk),all small-arms fire and assessed as part of a live-fire training exercise in the security zone in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone. 

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 26 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-east of Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk).

Fresh damage from heavy-machine-gun fire to a school and residential properties in Horlivka

At 30 Cherniakhovskoho Street (about 3km from the forward positions of the armed formations), in the Bessarabka area ofHorlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw two shattered windows (on the second floor) and a bullet hole (on the first floor) in a north-facing wall of a functioning three-storey school building, all assessed as fresh and caused by heavy-machine-gun bullets (12.7mm or 14.5mm) fired from a north-westerly direction. School staff told the SMM that the school had reportedly been hit by bullets in the early evening of 5 August and that at the time there had been no one at the school. 

On an adjacent street west of the school, at 11 Starobelska Street, the SMM saw two shattered windows and a bullet hole, all on the second floor in the north-facing wall of a two-storey residential building. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by heavy-machine-gun bullets (12.7mm or 14.5mm) fired from a north-westerly direction.  

On an adjacent street east of the abovementioned school, at 4 BakhaStreet, the SMM saw three bullet holes in the metal gate of a garage and a bullet hole in a metal gate of another garage, both located about 150m from residential properties. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and caused by heavy-machine-gun-bullets (12.7mm or 14.5mm) fired from a north-westerly direction. 

About 1.5km north-east of the previous locations, at 18/2 Tushynska Street, the SMM saw a bullet hole in a north-north-west-facing window and a fresh bullet hole in the inside wall (opposite of the abovementioned window) of a single-storey house. The owners of the house (a woman and a man, aged 50-60) told the SMM that they were not at home when the damage occurred and that they were notified by their neighbours that the damage had happened in the early evening of 5 August.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Novoselivka

On 7 August, positioned about 3.5km north of Novoselivka (non-government-controlled, 50km south-west of Luhansk), while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire about 350m south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 200m south of its position. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 6 August, the SMM saw that the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) outside the disengagement area and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk)(inside the disengagement area) closed at 18:00 instead of 20:00 (the SMM saw a written notification for the public at the checkpoint of the armed formations about its early closure).From 18:35 to about 18:45, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as controlled detonations of explosive devices. The SMM also saw seven deminers of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine with a truck and a crane about 100m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

On the morning and afternoon of 7 August, the SMM saw a team of five SES deminers with prodding sticks and metal detectors, conducting demining activities on the eastern side of the road, about 100m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

On the same day, the SMM saw about 18 deminers from non-government-controlled areas area conducting demining activities in areas west and at the base of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge. At the parking area south-south-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge,the SMM saw three members of the armed formation wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them.[2]  

Onthe morning of 7 August, at the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP, the SMM observed about 150 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and about 350 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, on the same morning, the SMM saw a steady flow of people traveling towards non-government-controlled areas and a steady flow of people crossing in the opposite direction. 

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening and night of 6 and 7 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded six projectiles in flight and two illumination flares, all at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-east(unable to be assessed whether inside or outside the disengagement area). On the morning of 7 August, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 7 August, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

6 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Kurdiumivka (54km north of Donetsk).

7 August

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Peredilske (24km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

5 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of six tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Zernove (70km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 2 July 2019).  

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

6 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Shumy (41km north of Donetsk);
• three armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) (probable BMP-1) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk);
• three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR variant) and an ACV near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk);
• two APCs (a BTR variant and a BTR-80), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an ACV, including near residential houses, in Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk);
• three IFVs (BMP-2) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk);
• an ACV near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk);
• an ACV near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk); and
• four APCs (BTR variant), an IFV (BMP-2), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-4K) in Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• seven IFVs (six BMP-2 and one BMP-1), two armoured  reconnaissance vehicles (BRM-1K) and a fire control vehicle (1VXX series) at a train station in Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk)and two APCs (BTR-80), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and two IFVs (BMP-2 and a BMP variant) near the same settlement.

7 August 

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

6 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• five ACVsand three IFVs (one BMP-1, two BMP variants) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) near Metalist (42km south-east of Donetsk).

Presence of mines, demining activities and mine hazard signs 

The SMM saw that two previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62M) in the median strip between road lanes about 2km south-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-20 near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were still present (for previous observations, see SMM Spot Report 25 February 2019).

The SMM saw a team of three SES deminers conducting demining activities in a field about 5.5km south of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). The Mission also saw about 20 people wearing uniforms of an international demining organization conducting demining activities in a field about 3km west of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk).

The SMM saw for the first time four mine hazard signs (with “Danger, Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian) of which three were attached to two trees and one was attached to a wooden stake on the eastern side of road O0531 at the north-eastern entrance of Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk).  

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure 

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk). 

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk)and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “ongoing demining activities” in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

                                                  

Other impediments: 

• On the night between 6 and 7 August, on one occasion, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), and on three occasions it experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government- and non-government controlled areas of Donetsk region.[5]
• On 7 August, while conducting a mini-UAV flight north of Novoselivka (non-government-controlled, 50km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire about about 350m south-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

[2]The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5]The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

KYIV, 08 August 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group, Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made today the following statement:

“I truly regret that on 7th August 2019 the Security working group of the Trilateral Contact Group was not able to hold its extraordinary meeting in form of a video-conference, as had been proposed by the Ukrainian side.

It is my strong belief that, in the spirit of the Minsk agreements, open discussions among all sides of the conflict are necessary for ensuring adherence to a sustained ceasefire as well as for finding a peaceful political solution to the conflict in the east of Ukraine.

I urge all sides to fully, entirely and unconditionally adhere to their recommitment to ceasefire that was agreed in the TCG and successfully came into force on July 21. Not only does the memory of past victims requires it, but also the demand of avoiding possible new ones, especially in the run-up period to the new school year”.

427394 Communication and Media Relations Section

A Central Asian regional seminar on demarcation and delimitation practices concluded on 7 August 2019 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The eighth of its kind, it built on the success of the previous events organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department/Border Security and Management Unit since 2011.

One of the key outcomes of the series is a practical Guidebook on Delimitation and Demarcation based on positive bilateral experience of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Lithuania was developed and launched by TNTD/BSMU in 2017.

This one and a half day seminar, organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department/Border Security and Management Unit (TNTD/BSMU), with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the Government of Kyrgyzstan, brought together 16 representatives from the national boundary commissions of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

“Clearly defined borders are beneficial to the livelihoods of border communities. They also promote wider regional security and stability, enable commercial exchanges, and the free movement of people. The OSCE created this forum in 2011 as an opportunity to share national delimitation and demarcation experiences, discuss good practices, challenges and the ways to resolve them,” said Dennis Cosgrove, Head of the Border Security and Management Unit.

Experts from Lithuania and Belarus shared their border delimitation and demarcation experiences and familiarized participants with legal and economic aspects of enclaves, within and outside of the OSCE area. Participants were also engaged in practical group exercises aimed at finding optional solutions in a fictional border delimitation and demarcation scenario through negotiations, harmonization of positions and development of unified approaches based on international and national legal frameworks.

“Individual states have to adopt pragmatic approaches to explore possibilities of increased cross-border co-operation and resolve any outstanding challenges related to delimitation, demarcation of borders and enclaves,” said Dr. Zenonas Kumetaitis, the former Head of the Boundary Commission of Lithuania.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw deminers from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and from non-government-controlled areas working inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM saw demining activities near Petrivske and accessed its camera site for the first time since 22 June 2018. 
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region and in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• Anti-tank mines were spotted near Talakivka, Pikuzy and Staromykhailivka, some for the first time.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of water pipelines and power lines, as well as the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 60) compared with the previous reporting period (27 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north and south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), including in areas 2-3km from the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), and at southerly and south-easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including no explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On the morning of 6 August, the SMM observed ten deminers of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine holding prodding sticks and metal detectors and cutting vegetation in areas up to 125m north-west of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) towards the northern edge of the disengagement area.

On the same day, the SMM saw ten deminers from non-government-controlled areas using prodding sticks and metal detectors and cutting vegetation in areas of about 60m west of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge.

At the southern wooden ramp of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw two senior members of the armed formations and two others wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, it also saw up to six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them.[2] 

During the same day, the SMM saw that pedestrians continued crossing the bridge without interruption while demining activities were conducted inside the disengagement area.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 5 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-east (unable to be assessed whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 6 August, the SMM saw three sappers of the armed formations with metal detectors sweep a 400m-long section of a road leading from Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) to Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), near the north-eastern edge of the disengagement area near Petrivske, where the SMM camera is also located. The SMM accessed its camera site for the first time since 22 June 2018.

On the same day, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) observed again two anti-tank mines laid across the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 150m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as well as 33 anti-tank mines about 225m further east across the same road, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

5 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) about 2km south of Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 August

The SMM saw seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Mykhailivka (74km south-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

5 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 16 self-propelled howitzers (ten 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and six 2S3 (five of these were also observed by an SMM patrol, see Daily Report 6 August 2019), a surface-to-air-missile system (9K35 Strela-10), six towed howitzers (D-30) and an anti-tank guided missile system (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

6 August

The SMM saw seven towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) near Oknyne (53km north-west of Luhansk).  

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region:

5 August

The SMM noted that 21 towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and 28 towed howitzers (D-30) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

3 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol).

5 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) in a residential area on the western edge of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); and
• two APCs (BTR-70) in a residential area in Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk).

6 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP-1) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM saw:

• three IFVs (BMP-variant) and two APCs (type undetermined) on the south-eastern edge of Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-3) and 14 IFVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines near Talakivka, Pikuzy and Staromykhailivka

On 3 August, about 5km east of Talakivka (government-controlled, 17km north-east of Mariupol), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 15 previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road leading to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and in an adjacent field. The same UAV spotted for the first time four anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid on the same road on the north-western edge of Pikuzy.

On 6 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two previously seen anti-tank mines near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) laid across the road towards Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) and near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “demining activities and security issues”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations asked the SMM to provide its patrol plan; when the SMM refused to do so its passage was denied and it consequently returned to government-controlled areas. When the SMM returned to the aforesaid checkpoint an hour and a half later, it was allowed to proceed.                                                 

Other impediments:

• On 5 August, on two occasions, an SMM-long range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).[6]
• On 6 August, on two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).7

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one site continued to be abandoned. 

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.

427268 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme in Dushanbe, in co-operation with the Office of the Prosecutor General and the Interior Ministry of Tajikistan, organized a series of training courses on justice for children from 24 July to 3 August 2019 in Khujand, Bokhtar and Dushanbe.

62 participants, including prosecutors, as well as police officers, attended the courses.

Participants enhanced their knowledge on children’s rights, child-friendly verbal and non-verbal communication and language, child development and child-related criminal and civil legislation, including relevant international standards on juvenile justice.

427250 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

High-level representatives from Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defence, the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and the United States Embassy participated in the official inauguration of a Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre of Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defence on 6 August 2019 in Dushanbe.

The establishment of the Centre was initiated under the Memorandum of Understanding between the OSCE extra-budgetary project “Integrated Co-operation on Explosive Hazards Programme” and the Defence Ministry signed in November 2017.

“Building sustainable capacities of the host country and supporting national ownership are at the core of OSCE´s approach,” said Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe Valeriu Chiveri. “The OSCE Programme Office will continue to provide a platform that enables the transfer of relevant competencies at the individual and institutional level.”

Lieutenant General Emomali Sobirzoda, First Deputy Minister of Defence/Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces of Tajikistan said: “The Armed Forces of Tajikistan are mandated to address explosive hazards threats. We are particularly satisfied that this regional training centre has become widely recognized among Central Asian states and beyond.”  

John Mark Pommersheim, Ambassador of the United States to Tajikistan said:  “The United States of America is a committed leader in humanitarian mine action, conventional weapons destruction, and the remediation of explosive hazards throughout the world, as well as a proud partner of the Mine Action Program here in Tajikistan. By alleviating these threats to civilian security, this program demonstrates core U.S. values that respect the dignity of every human being. The Republic of Tajikistan has accomplished much over the past 15 years.”

The project was part of the OSCE’s efforts to develop a co-operative mechanism among Central Asian states to address concerns and challenges stemming from the disposal of explosive hazards. It was supported by the U.S. Department of State, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands.

VIENNA, 7 August 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, expressed his disappointment today at a court ruling in Ukraine fining Hromadske TV for branding a nationalist organization as “neo-Nazi”.

Yesterday, the Commercial Court of Kyiv ruled that Hromadske TV lacked sufficient evidence when it published a tweet referring to C14, a far-right Ukrainian NGO, as a “neo-Nazi” organization. The tweet was published on 4 May 2018, after which C14 filed suit against the media outlet for defamation, on the grounds that it “harmed the reputation” of the NGO. In the court decision, the judge ruled that Hromadske TV must retract its statement and pay a fine of up to 3,500UAH (Euro 122). The media outlet will appeal the ruling.

“I am concerned with this court decision in Ukraine, as it sets a harmful precedent in the country and could have a dissuading effect on journalistic work,” said Désir. “Hromadske TV based its assessment on a serious journalistic investigation. The concerned group can contest this affirmation and deny it, but it is the right of the media to publish their view, in good faith, based on the information they gathered on the C14 organization and their members, many of whom declared that they joined the group because of its neo-Nazi orientation.”

C14 is known for holding nationalist views and for committing violent acts against minority groups, including Roma and LGBT, in Kyiv.

“It is important that journalists can report on political activities without fear of economic reprisals or penalties,” said Désir. “This decision represents a threat to critical independent journalism and I hope it is overturned on appeal.”

The Representative recalled the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists, which urges participating States to “ensure that defamation laws do not carry excessive sanctions or penalties that could undermine the safety of journalists and/or effectively censor journalists and interfere with their mission of informing the public.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

Communication and Media Relations Section

The OSCE Senior Adviser on Gender Issues, Amarsanaa Darisuren, visited the Russian Federation from 29 to 31 July 2019 with the aim of further enhancing links and co-operation in the field of gender equality. She held discussions with representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Labour and Social Protection, and Higher Education and Science, as well as the Office of the Prosecutor General and the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation. She also met with the Chair of the Women’s Union of Russia and the Chair of the national NGO Business Women of Russia.

The discussions focused on combating and preventing violence against women and girls, the economic empowerment of women, and their economic and social rights, and social protection. 

Darisuren was joined on the visit by Ambassador Argo Avakov, the Head of the Action against Terrorism Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department. He inquired about Russia’s experiences of women’s participation in the security sector, and the rehabilitation and reintegration of women perpetrators of violent extremism and women and their families returning from ISIL/Daesh territories.

The OSCE representatives received first-hand information on Russia’s progress in implementing its National Action Strategy for Women 2017-2022 through an inter-agency approach, as well as legislative developments on preventing, combating and prosecuting domestic violence. 

The OSCE delegation visited a new model shelter for women with children from low-income backgrounds who are survivors of domestic violence, and learnt how the shelter provides psychological support and programmes targeting men.

In her meetings, the Senior Gender Adviser encouraged making use of the OSCE as a platform for sharing good practices and experiences, and encouraged interlocutors from the various ministries to engage at OSCE events on gender equality.

The visit concluded with a roundtable presentation for representatives from various ministries on the methodology and recommendations from the OSCE-led Survey on the Well Being and Safety of Women. Participants were interested in how the results will be utilized by practitioners and inquired about the possibility of conducting similar research for the Russian Federation.

VIENNA, 6 August 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, expressed his deep concern today regarding the court ruling that blocked access to 136 news sites and social media accounts in Turkey, following a request made by the Gendarmerie General Command.

One of the URLs included in the verdict made by the Ankara 3rdPenal Court of Peace on Tuesday is Bianet.org, a news website and information resource known for its articles on human rights and coverage of trials related to freedom of expression in Turkey. Reportedly, following the shutdown of the website, more than 200,000 of its articles will be inaccessible. 

“I am deeply concerned by this decision to block access to a very respected independent media in Turkey and several online websites,” said Désir. “Blocking Internet sources is an extreme measure, which can only be applied in cases of gross violations of human rights, or if there is an actual threat to public order. Bianet is an important media reporting on issues of public interest. This decision represents a significant restriction on freedom of expression in Turkey and undermines media freedom commitments of the country.”

The Ankara Court referred to Article 8/A of the Internet Law on the protection of national security, public order, individual rights, lives and property. 

“I call on the Turkish authorities to review this decision and respect freedom of expression and independent media. Unhindered access to online news sources is key to ensure citizens can have access to credible and trustworthy information with a variety of viewpoints,” said Désir, stressing that this decision also confirms the need to reform the current Internet law and the procedures of the Courts of Peace.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Avdiivka.
• The SMM saw deminers from government- and non-government-controlled areas working inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• It heard ceasefire violations assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw long queues at checkpoints along the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of power lines, as well as the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (27) compared with the previous 24 hours (13 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (one) compared with the previous 24 hours (four explosions).

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Avdiivka

On 5 August, positioned on the eastern edge of Avdiivka, while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 75 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1.6km north-north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which at the time was flying in the same area. The SMM safely landed the UAV. While leaving the area, the SMM heard an additional ten shots of small-arms fire also at an assessed distance of 1.6km north-north-east of its position.*   

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On the morning of 5 August, the SMM saw a demining team of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine, comprised of ten people and three vehicles (including an armoured vehicle) entering the disengagement area. It observed aforesaid deminers holding prodding sticks and metal detectors and cutting vegetation, as well as conducting demining activities in areas of about 125m on both sides of the road, from the northern edge of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) towards the northern edge of the disengagement area.

On the same day, the SMM saw nine members of the armed formations, including three wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them, heading from the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge towards the broken section of the bridge.[2] During the day, the SMM saw deminers from non-government-controlled areas using prodding sticks and metal detectors in an area west of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge and a member of the armed formations standing nearby.

On the evening of the same day, following the closure of the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the checkpoint of the armed formations at 18:00, the SMM heard two explosions, assessed as controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the vicinity of the wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge inside the disengagement area.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 4 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area and three projectiles, assessed as outside the disengagement area, but within its 5km periphery.

On 5 August, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw a freshly dug, sand-bagged position, about 170m south of its northern edge and about 1km west of its eastern edge, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. Approximately 500-700m further south-west, the SMM saw another similar freshly dug, sand-bagged position facing the aforesaid position, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

5 August 

The SMM saw three multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a stationary convoy in Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

5 August 

The SMM saw five self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) loaded on rail carriages at a train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

5 August

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk);
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) inside a concrete shelter, under camouflage net, outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP variant) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk);
• two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP variant) and an APC (BTR variant) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

1 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) in the eastern outskirts of Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

Situation at checkpoints along the contact line

On 5 August, at a checkpoint on highway H-15 near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM again saw at least 350 cars queueing to travel towards government-controlled areas and at least 80 cars in the opposite direction. At a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw 60 cars queuing to travel towards non-government-controlled areas and about 100 cars and ten minivans in the opposite direction. Two women (one in her fifties and one in her seventies) told the Mission that they had been waiting to pass to government-controlled areas since 04:00.

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

On 5 August, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 5 August, at a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “an ongoing operation in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 5 August, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again delayed the SMM passage with no specific reason provided and allowed it to proceed only after 39 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint.

                                                 

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 75 shots of small-arms fire about 1.6km north-north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.
• On three occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                       

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 12844 to 12,968 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of 14 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 28 this week compared to seven last week: 10 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 18 into Ukraine (57 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, 18 families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and 13 were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when five families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (476 compared to 485 observed during the previous week). There were 244 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 232 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Lugansk-Simferopol, Luhansk-Sevastopol, Kyiv, Luhansk-Yevpatoria, and Luhansk-Yalta.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 988 trucks (compared to 945 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (582 at the Gukovo BCP and 406 at the Donetsk BCP); 631 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 357 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and the Russian Federation and with “LPR” plates. During the reporting week, the Gukovo BCP continued to experience more cargo traffic than Donetsk (in particular due to a significant number of cargo trucks crossing from Ukraine into the Russian Federation).

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 49 (compared to 65 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which could include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 88 to 49: of the total number of trucks scanned, 35 trucks (71 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 14 trucks (29 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 172 to 165 vehicles; 90 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 75 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 22 occasions; the OTs assessed that 13 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and nine to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian registration plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation registration plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. Cars with registration plates from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Lithuania, as well as “DPR” plates were also noted during the reporting week.

On 31 July 2019 at 15:12, the OT at the BCP Donetsk observed a police car with blue flashing lights which entered the BCP from the Russian Federation side. There were two uniformed police officers inside the car. It stayed approximately nine minutes at the BCP and at 15:21 left the BCP to the Russian Federation side as with the flashing lights turned off. While leaving the BCP, there was a civilian male inside the police car in addition to these two police officers.  

During the reporting period, the OTs at the Donetsk BCP observed ambulances on three distinct occasions.

On 1 August at 17:55, an ambulance arrived at the BCP from the Russian Federation and parked in front of the main building. At 18:06 the ambulance returned towards the Russian Federation with two civilian patients on board.

On 3 August at 12:05, an ambulance entered the BCP area from the Russian Federation and returned in the same direction at 12:31. The OT observed two paramedics and a driver inside.

On 4 August at 05:10 an ambulance with the inscription "Перевозка лежащих больных" (Transportation of lying patients) crossed through the BCP from the Russian Federation to Ukraine.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 2 July to 6 August 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

427202 Communication and Media Relations Section

Senior prosecutors and law enforcement representatives specialized in anti-human trafficking and cybercrimes from Belarus, Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia, Moldova, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States completed a two-day workshop on 31 July 2019 in Minsk on effective investigative techniques to combat human trafficking for sexual exploitation that is facilitated by new technologies.

The regional workshop was organized by the OSCE Secretariat and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus on the occasion of the World Day Against Trafficking in Persons.

Participants shared best practices in combating ICT-facilitated human trafficking for sexual exploitation by applying special investigative techniques, and in conducting proactive investigations of online grooming, recruitment, control and exploitation of victims.

“Trafficking in human beings is hugely influenced by modern technologies as they enable criminals to significantly cut costs and increase both the scope and the effectiveness of their operations. Most victims today have never seen their traffickers,” said Oleg Kravchenko, Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus in his opening remarks.

Among the solutions discussed were policies that limit the capacities of perpetrators to misuse ICT, promoting the development of technical tools to support the efforts of law enforcement agencies, using undercover operations to adapt to the methods deployed by the traffickers, partnering with the private sector, investing in capacity-building and expertise, and strengthening international co-operation.

“OSCE experts, in co-operation with other partner organizations, are ready to assist national experts in tackling new challenges and threats by facilitating the training of personnel and strengthening the capacities of OSCE participating States,” said Rasa Ostrauskaite, the OSCE Secretariat’s Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats.

Valiant Richey, OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings encouraged participants to use technology as a force multiplier in their efforts to end human trafficking.

“Despite its frequent misuse, technology can be an important asset for those involved in combating trafficking in persons,” he said. “Government authorities, non-governmental organizations, international organizations and private sector companies have at their disposal a wide range of technological tools that can be used to support their anti-trafficking efforts”.