Central Europe

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 2 and 3 August, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• Between the evenings of 3 and 4 August, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours.
• A woman died from the detonation of a mine in Zaitseve. 
• The SMM observed shrapnel damage, which reportedly occurred on 27 June, to a functioning school in non-government-controlled Donetsk city.
• The SMM saw deminers from government- and non-government-controlled areas working inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• It heard ceasefire violations assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission continued to monitor the situation at checkpoints along the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, includingin the Zolote disengagement area due to a spool wire, as well as in Sosnivske and at checkpoints near Novoazovsk, Verkhnoshyrokivske and Zaichenko, all in non-government-controlled areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 2 and 3 August, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (19), compared with the previous reporting period (43 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-north-east of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 3 and 4 August, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (13), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-north-east of Maiorsk and at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 2 and 3 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (two), compared with  the previous reporting period (four explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 3 and 4 August, the Mission recorded a  similar number of ceasefire violations compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) andeast-south-east of Luhansk city (non-government-controlled), assessed  as part of a live-fire training exercise in the security zone in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone. 

A woman died from the detonation of a mine in Zaitseve on 25 July

The SMM followed up on reports of a woman (aged 61) who died as a result of a mine detonation in a non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) on 25 July. At a morgue in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), medical staff told the SMM that the body of the woman was brought in on 25 July and that she had died after stepping on a mine. On 31 July, the daughter of the woman told the SMM that her parents had been living in Horlivka and were visiting their house at 2 Brusilova Street (close to the contact line) in Zaitseve in the morning of 25 July. She added that, according to her father, her parents were together in the garden, when the mother had stepped on a mine. The SMM could not visit the abovementioned address due to security considerations.

Sharpnel damage to school in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city, reportedly on 27 June

On 3 August, at 1 Kalynovskoho Street, the SMM saw five shattered windows in a north-north-west-facing wall and a hole in an north-north-east facing window (on the first and second floors) of a functioning three-storey school building in the Trudivski area of non-government-controlled Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by shrapnel. School staff told the SMM that shelling had reportedly occurred in the early morning hours of 27 June and that at the time there had been only one security guard at the school. 

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 3 and 4 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a demining team of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine comprised of ten people and three vehicles (including an armoured vehicle), conducting demining activities in areas of about 125m on both sides of the road, from the northern edge of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) towards the northern edge of the disengagement area. 

On 2 August, the SMM saw a pile of 50 mine hazard signs in the area of the checkpoint of the armed formations south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. In the early afternoon of 3 August, the SMM saw six deminers from non-government-controlled areas using prodding sticks and metal detectors in an area west of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge with one member of the armed formations standing nearby.

In the late afternoon of 3 August, the SMM facilitated a meeting between one deminer from non-government-controlled areas and one SES deminer in the middle of the broken section of the bridge who discussed for approximately 15 minutes about demining activities.

On the same afternoon, the Mission saw nine deminers from non-government-controlled areas preparing a controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance (UXO) about 20m west of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge. Subsequently, from 18:45 to about 19:10 the SMM heard four explosions assessed as controlled detonations of UXO. On the morning of 4 August, the SMM saw four deminers from non-government-controlled areas with prodding sticks and metal detectors entering the dense vegetation on each side of the broken section of the bridge.

On 3 and 4 August, between the southern part of the broken section of the bridge and the parking area south-south-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations, the Mission continued to see members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them).[2] 

The SMM saw that pedestrians continued crossing the bridge without interruption while demining activities were conducted inside the disengagement area. On 3 August, the SMM saw SES medical personnel assisting several elderly people and persons with disabilities at the northern edge of the broken section of the bridge.

On 3 August, the SMM also saw that the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) outside the disengagement area and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge(inside the disengagement area) closed at 18:00 instead of 20:00. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and members of the armed formations told the SMM that the closures were due to the demining activities (detonation of UXO). The Mission also observed that the shuttle bus continued operating between the EECP and the broken section of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 3 August, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 28 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km south and south-south-east,assessed as inside the disengagement area near Zolote, and an undetermined explosion, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. 

On 4 August, the SMM noted that 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) and camouflage netting (assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces) located at the edge of road T-1316 inside the disengagement area near Zolote, had been removed (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 17 July 2019). Thus, the SMM traveled about 900m south-east on the abovementioned road until about 350m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, where it again saw a spool wire stretched across the same road, rendering it impassable. Consequently, the SMM travelled northbound and saw that after its passage the anti-tank mines and camouflage netting were being placed in their previous location.

On 3 and 4 August, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) the Mission observed a calm situation. 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

4 August  

The SMM saw eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) loaded on rail carriages at a train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

3 August

The SMM saw four tanks (T-72) near Rubizhne.

4 August

The SMM saw at least eight tanks (T-80) and four surface to-air-missile systems (9K35 Strela-10)all loaded on rail carriages at a train station in Rubizhne (see above). 

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

3 August

The SMM noted that seven MLRS (BM-21) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

2 August

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)spotted eight infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Pidlisne (70km north-west of Luhansk).

3 August

The SMM saw: 

• anIFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) (seen also on 4 August);
• anIFV (BTR-4) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk); and
• three IFVs (BMP-1) near Pylypchatyne (76km north-east of Donetsk).

4 August

The SMM saw:

• two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and  
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote-2/Karbonit.

Removal of remnant of exploded rocket-propelled grenade in Verkhnoshyrokivske and presence of UXO near Lebedynske

On 2 August, on a road west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a member of the armed formations remove the remnant of an exploded rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) which was lying in the centre of the road (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 July 2019).

On 3 August, the SMM saw for the first time two unexploded projectiles (14.5mm), about 20m apart, on the eastern side of a local road about 40m from a former agricultural compound on the eastern edge of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol): one in the soft shoulder of the road and the other embedded in soil next to it. About 20m west from the first projectile, the SMM also saw a 30mm projectile.

Situation at checkpoints along the contact line

On 4 August, at a checkpoint on highway H-15 in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw 400 vehicles queueing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 400 cars in the opposite directions.

SMM facilitation of the operation of civilian infrastructure 

On 3 and 4 August, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 4 August, while at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw nine cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 23 cars (six with Ukrainian and ten with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as seven with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 3 August, on two occasions, an armed member of the armed formations and a person in civilian clothes who introduced himself as a member of the armed formations denied the SMM entry in Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol) citing “orders from superiors”.
• On 4 August, two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) citing “an ongoing operation” in the area.
• On 4 August, an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) citing “demining activities” and “orders from superiors”. While at the checkpoint, the SMM saw civilian cars passing through the checkpoint.
• On 4 August, at a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “an ongoing operation in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On 3 August, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, a member of the armed formations again delayed the SMM passage with no specific reason provided and allowed it to proceed only after about 17 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint.

                                                  

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4]The SMM visited areas holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. One such site appeared to be abandoned.

[5]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

427154 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities is piloting a training course on diversity management for civil servants and public sector employees The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies

The office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities announced on 5 August 2019 that it is supporting diversity training courses for civil servants in Ukraine over the coming years, as part of its commitment to assist OSCE states working to manage diversity.

Integration is a process that requires all members of society to accept shared public institutions. They should feel that they belong to a common state and an inclusive society. This does not exclude the possibility of distinct identities, which are constantly evolving, multiple and contextual.

According to The Ljubljana Guidelines on the Integration of Diverse Societies, the civil service should reflect and accommodate the public it serves. State institutions should counteract and prevent discrimination, and work towards inclusion and effective participation.

This means that civil servants need opportunities to raise their awareness of the rich diversity in their society, and to develop the skills to manage diversity. This includes understanding the legal and policy frameworks, and learning practical skills to respond to the needs of persons belonging to minorities in their daily work.

In co-operation with Ukraine’s Culture Ministry, National Agency on Civil Service and Center for Independent Political Research, the High Commissioner on National Minorities has developed a training course on diversity management for civil servants and public sector employees. The course was piloted in June 2019. The objective of the project is to produce a training handbook and train future trainers, so that the course can be offered more widely on the national, regional and local levels from 2020 onwards.

All participants will be officially certified by Ukraine’s National Agency on Civil Service and the Ukrainian School of Governance.

Watch a short video about the training here.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw deminers from government- and non-government-controlled areas working simultaneously inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs of power lines and a phenol sludge reservoir.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations; however, there were more explosions (43) compared with the previous reporting period (17 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations, including 17 explosions, were recorded in north-easterly and south-easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). All ceasefire violations were recorded during the day time.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations (in total four explosions) compared with the previous reporting period (20 explosions). All the ceasefire violations were recorded at north-westerly directions of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a demining team of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine, comprised of ten people and three vehicles (including an armoured vehicle), on the northern edge of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk). It observed SES deminers carrying metal detectors and prodding sticks in field areas, from the northern edge of the broken section of the bridge up to about 125m north, about 30m on each side of the road leading to the northern edge of the disengagement area. The SMM saw deminers from non-government-controlled areas accompanied by three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them)[2], prodding the ground with sticks and cutting shrubbery with hatchets in fields on the western side of the bridge from the northern edge of the broken section of the bridge, extending south to the river.

At the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw three senior members of the armed formations.

During the same day, the SMM saw that pedestrians continued crossing the bridge without interruption while demining activities were conducted inside the disengagement area. The Mission also observed that the shuttle bus continued operating between the entry-exit checkpoint and the broken section of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

Positioned at the western edge of Kalynove-Borshchuvate, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned at the northern edge of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard two explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Petrivske, but within its 5km periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

1 August

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at a compound in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk) and
• three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

1 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) at a compound near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

1 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• ten tanks (T-72) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk) and
• three tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Svobodne in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

2 August

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) on the western edge of Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• three IFVs (BTR-4) equipped with anti-missile cages in a residential area of Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk);
• at least two IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP-1) at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote.

Non-government-controlled areas

1 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP variant) and five armoured combat vehicles in Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck in a compound in the eastern outskirts of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). Positioned near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), Kamianka and Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 110 ceasefire violations, including 39 undetermined explosions, assessed as near the DFS and the pumping station in Vasylivka.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Eight armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, citing the need of pre-approved permission to enter the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On eight occasions, on the evening and night of 1-2 August, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over government- and non-government controlled areas of Donetsk region.[5]
• SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, on four occasions while flying over areas near Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), on one occasion over Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), and on one occasion over Novohnativka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed demining activities by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM noted removal of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines near a road north of Petrivske; it observed that anti-tank mines on a road between Bohdanivka and Viktorivka remained in place.
• The Mission observed multiple launch rocket systems in violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs of power lines and water pipelines, and the drilling of water wells.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (17) compared with the previous reporting period (43 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (20), compared with the previous reporting period (24 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including half of the explosions, were recorded at westerly directions of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Positioned in Lozivskyi (non-government-controlled, 32km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 90 shots and bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km south-south west and west-south-west, assessed as part of a live-fire training exercise in the security zone in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a white armoured vehicle, assessed as belonging to the State Emergency Services (SES) on the northern part of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) as well as two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)[2] and ten SES deminers nearby, carrying metal detectors and prodding sticks. From the morning until 16:30, the Mission saw the deminers working in fields north of the broken section of the bridge using metal detectors and prodding sticks and cutting down bushes.

During the same day, the SMM saw that pedestrians continued crossing the bridge as well as members of an international humanitarian organization carrying a woman in her eighties on a stretcher, passing through the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. She was then transported in an ambulance towards Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk).

Inside the area, the Mission saw up to five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the southern part of the broken section of the bridge and the parking area south-south-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations.

Other disengagement areas[3]

Positioned at the northern edge of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), but within its 5km periphery. Positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area, but within its 5km periphery. 

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

On 28 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of seven multiple launch rocket systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk).

31 July

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) on the southern edge of Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk).

1 August

The SMM saw seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

28 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 16 tanks, four self-propelled howitzers or mortars and three towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Manuilivka; and
• 13 tanks, 11 self-propelled howitzers, 12 towed howitzers or mortars, and a surface-to-air missile system (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

30 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2), near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk); and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) on the eastern edge of Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

1 August

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-80) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk);
• two  anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk);
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near a residential area in Krasnohorivka; and
• a stationary IFV (BTR-4) east of Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk)

Anti-tank mines spotted again near Sakhanka and Bohdanivka and anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines removed near Petrivske

On 27 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted in total 16 anti-tank mines laid across road M-14, about 2.5km south-west of Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and about 1km north-east of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol), and an additional mine that was burned out, all assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 June 2019).

On 1 August, the SMM observed again three anti-tank mines laid across the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 150m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske, as well as 35 anti-tank mines about 225m further east across the same road, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 500m north-north-east of the northern edge of the Petrivske disengagement area, in a field 12m east of road CO51532, the SMM observed that at  least seven anti-personnel mines (at least four MON-100 and three MON-200) and three anti-vehicle mines (TM-83), previously reported, had been recently removed.

Trench extensions and recent impact craters near Vodiane and Pikuzy

On 30 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three trench extensions (20m to 60m in length), 1-2km north-east and east of Vodiane (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Mariupol) and two trench extensions (40m and 65m, respectively) 4km east of Talakivka (government-controlled, 17km north-east of Mariupol), all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The same aerial imagery revealed the presence of  two trench extensions (30m and 60m, respectively) 3.5km west of Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, non-government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and a 25m trench extension 1km north of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), all assessed as belonging to the armed formations. The same imagery revealed about 20 recent impact craters in the same area as the above trench extension 1km north of Pikuzy, as well as multiple recent impact craters about 2km north of Pikuzy. None of the above trench extensions and impact craters was visible in imagery from 14 July 2019.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka and dismantling of equipment at the wells of Kondrashivka in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) detonated due to wildfires near checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske

On 31 July, the SMM saw burning grass and wood at the eastern part of a tree line near a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and heard an explosion, assessed as detonation of a piece of UXO, at a distance of 500-600m west of its position. The Mission also saw wildfire approaching the treeline 200m east of the checkpoint.

Border areas outside government control

On 1 August, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the Mission saw 11 cars (two with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates), and a truck (cargo not visible) and a bus (both with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The Mission also saw 22 cars (four with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 11 with “DPR” plates) as well as four trucks (cargo not visible) and three buses, all with “DPR” plates, exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “orders from superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, four members of the armed formations delayed the SMM passage with no specific reason provided. After about 30 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint, the Mission was allowed to proceed.

Other impediments:

• An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.

427130 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

A five-day second stage of the OSCE-supported train-the-trainer course on detecting forged travel documents and identification techniques for 20 border service officers concluded in Almaty, Kazakhstan on 2 August 2019.

Experts from the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior developed a tailored programme for Kazakhstan’s officers of the National Security Committee’s Border Service. Participants continued learning about security features introduced into paper, security inks and different printing and personalization techniques. Experts presented some 80 samples of real and forged travel documents for the participants to analyse and assess its authenticity.

During a practical exercise the participants developed a system for alerting their colleagues to counterfeited travel documents.

Experts provided the participants with illuminated magnifiers, USB-digital microscopes and a Docubox device to allow the border control officers to apply their acquired skills. In addition to learning best practices in document verification, the future instructors were given guidance and practiced their skills on how to best teach these concepts to others. The seminar will be supplemented by another one-week course to complete the trainers’ preparation.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in co-operation with the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Programme of the United States Embassy in Nur-Sultan, the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC), and the Border Guard Service under the National Security Committee. The training course was supported by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s Travel Document Security Programme.

427040 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported training seminar on enhancing dialogue and co-operation between the courts and media concluded on 2 August 2019 in Shchuchinsk, Kazakhstan. Forty judges-co-ordinators, press secretaries, journalists and bloggers from the cities of Kostanay and Nur-Sultan and the Akmola, Karaganda, Kostanay, North Kazakhstan, Pavlodar regions took part in the event.

The three-day training seminar aimed to promote effective communication strategies between courts and the media, best practices in interaction with journalists and the general public through various channels and in different contexts, the role of the media in covering court proceedings, the proper framing of requests to access court acts as well as the use of conventional and social media.

An expert from Romania shared the experience of selected European countries in raising public confidence in justice systems and highlighted the international standards for communication and interaction between the judiciary and society and the media.

Participants also learned to prepare for public interviews and press conferences, handle conflict situations, interact and respond to critical materials in social media, and reviewed practical cases.

The concluding training seminar for the western regions of the country will be held in Aktau on 8 and 9 August 2019.

The seminar was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan, the Supreme Court, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Kazakhstan, the League of Court Journalists of Kazakhstan, Internews Kazakhstan, and the American Bar Association and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The seminar was part of the OSCE Programme Office’s long-standing efforts to enhance co-operation between courts and the media in the host country.

427145 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

The OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan supported a two-day seminar on anti- money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) on 1 and 2 August 2019 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Experts from Belarus, Slovenia and Ukraine familiarized 55 representatives from the National Bank of Kazakhstan, the Financial Monitoring Committee, second-tier banks, insurance companies and the securities market with open source intelligence, financial technologies, virtual currencies and web-based money laundering typologies.

The participants were introduced to money laundering schemes linked with corruption offences and to ways of identifying, assessing and mitigating related risks.

Representatives of Kazakhstan’s National Bank and Financial Monitoring Committee discussed the upcoming mutual evaluation of the country by a mission of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. They also identified areas for enhancing compliance with international standards and reviewed upcoming legislative changes related to AML/CFT.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance and combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism in the host country. It was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan, the National Bank of Kazakhstan, the United States Embassy in Nur-Sultan and the Association of Financiers of Kazakhstan.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw a fresh crater and unexploded ordnance near civilian properties on the western edge of Pervomaisk.
• An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted military hardware in the Petrivske disengagement area.
• An SMM mid-range UAV spotted anti-tank mines, some for the first time, near non-government-controlled Nyzhnie Lozove and Pikuzy.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of power lines and the drilling of water wells.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske and near the border with the Russian Federation, all in non-government-controlled areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (43) compared with the previous reporting period (eight explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations, including 34 explosions, were recorded in areas north-west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and at south-easterly and north-easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, all explosions (24), as in the previous reporting period (26 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-west of Raivka (non-government-controlled 16km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh crater and unexploded ordnance near Pervomaisk

The SMM saw for the first time an 82mm mortar tailfin embedded in the middle of road T-0504, about 200m from the closest civilian properties on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). About 7m north, in a field, the Mission also saw a crater assessed as fresh. It could not assess the type of weapon used and direction of fire.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Outside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw a civilian vehicle belonging to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine with three deminers on board entering and stopping at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). Inside the area, the Mission saw eight members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them)[2] between the southern part of the broken section of the bridge and the parking area south-south-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 31 July, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[4]

On the same day, positioned near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons[5]

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

31 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

31 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 11 tanks (types undetermined), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 13 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a training area near Miusynsk.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[6]

At a heavy weapon holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

31 July

The SMM noted that 30 tanks (T-64) remained missing.

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

30 July

The SMM noted that four MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) and 12 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were present and 33 MLRS (BM-27) and 32 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were missing.

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

31 July

The SMM noted that three MLRS (BM-21) were present and 20 MLRS (BM-21) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[7]

Government-controlled areas

30 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB), about 50m north of residential houses on the eastern outskirts of Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk).

31 July

The SMM saw:

• seven IFVs (BTR-4) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-60) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP variant) close to residential houses and a school in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), as well as a trench digger (type undetermined), an armoured medical evacuation vehicle (MT-LB S) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) in the eastern outskirts of the city.

Non-government-controlled areas

31 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (types undetermined) near Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk) and
• an ACV near Petrivske.

Mines, some spotted for the first time near Nyzhnie Lozove and Pikuzy and mine hazard sign near Kodema

On 27 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 200 anti-tank mines in a field west of road M-03, about 2kmwest-south-west of Nyzhnie Lozove (non-government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk). Approximately 300m north-east of the road, the same UAV spotted 200 anti-tank mines (about 175 for the first time and 26 previously observed). All the anti-tank mines were assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted that nine out of the previously observed 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) across road T-0519, about 50m south-west of the forward position of the armed formations in the south-western outskirts of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) were burnt out.

On 31 July, on the south-western edge of Kodema (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), about 150m south of  residential houses, the Mission saw for the first time two rows of bricks (3m in length) blocking the eastern lane of the road. On the western side of the road, the SMM also saw for the first time a mine hazard sign (with “Mines” written in Russian and Ukrainian) as well as wooden stakes covered by black plastic bags placed on the same road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), an assessment and repairs to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka.

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 31 July, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw three trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates), a bus (with “DPR” plates) and four pedestrians (three men and a woman) entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw three trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “an ongoing operation” in the area.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On six occasions, on the evening and night of 30-31 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government- and non-government controlled areas of Donetsk region.9
• On six occasions, two SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over areas near Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk).9
• An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over areas near Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk).[8]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] In the SMM Daily Report of 30 July 2019, four weapons were reported as missing at a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region. At the visited site, all previously observed weapons were actually present.

[6] The SMM visited areas holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. One such site appeared to be abandoned.

[7] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[8] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

WARSAW/BRUSSELS, 2 August 2019 – In order to acknowledge the suffering of victims and work towards greater tolerance, more efforts are needed to educate young people about the horror of the Roma genocide that took place during the Second World War, said the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the United Nations Human Rights Office for Europe in a joint statement on Roma Genocide Remembrance Day.

“Today is a day to honour the memory of the Roma and Sinti victims of the Nazi regime, but at the same time, learn from the past in order to combat the racist public rhetoric, hatred and discrimination we see in so many places across the OSCE today,” said ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir. “That is why acknowledgement and commemoration, but also awareness raising and teaching about the Roma and Sinti Genocide are essential in order to promote a more tolerant society.”

Governments have the responsibility to remember the Roma and Sinti Genocide, but also to ensure that school curricula and other educational initiatives engage with young people to discuss the potentially dangerous consequences of racist ideologies. ODIHR has been raising awareness and promoting education about the Roma and Sinti genocide during World War II since 2003. All countries across the OSCE region have committed to improving the situation of Roma and Sinti in their societies, including combating discrimination and working towards full equality of opportunity.

“We need to tell the truth about historical injustices and recognize the contribution of the Roma to Europe,” said Birgit Van Hout, head of the UN Human Rights Office for Europe. “To rebuild trust between Roma and non-Roma, Roma inclusion strategies should also address antigypsyism, bias and prejudice by the majority population.”

Seventy-five years after the liquidation of the so-called Gypsy family camp in Auschwitz-Birkenau, Roma and Sinti continue to suffer from intolerance, systemic racism and discrimination, and remain victims of racially motivated violence and hate crime. Up to 500,000 Roma and Sinti perished under the Nazi regime, with some 20,000 murdered in the notorious Auschwitz-Birkenau camp alone.

427031 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Representatives of Tajikistan’s government, international organizations and civil society working to combat human trafficking came together for a conference organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe on 25 July 2019 to mark the World Day against Trafficking in Human Beings.

The conference, held in Dushanbe, focused on how joint efforts can strengthen to the fight against human trafficking.

In his opening statement, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, Ambassador Valeriu Chiveri, said: “Co-operation with Tajikistan’s law enforcement agencies has been key for the Office’s work in this area. Just as important has been our fruitful co-operation with civil society organizations in raising awareness and capacity-building. The co-operation between government agencies and civil society is vital for establishing well-functioning referral mechanisms and providing support to victims, while tackling the actual crime and its root causes.”

Jonibek Kholikzoda, the Secretary of the country’s Inter-Ministerial Commission on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, said: “It is important that close co-operation between state bodies and civil society exists at all levels of state management and civil activity, as combating trafficking in human beings becomes difficult without focused and agreed joint efforts of these two entities.”

The conference participants also explored criminal justice responses to trafficking in Tajikistan, support services for victims and co-ordination of efforts in combating trafficking, as well as achievements and challenges in this regard.

The OSCE Programme Office made a commitment to ensure the functioning of the regular Platform for Dialogue, Knowledge and Experience-Sharing among key actors in the country dealing with anti-human trafficking efforts. 

COPENHAGEN, 1 August 2019 – Norwegian parliamentarian Abid Raja has been appointed as Chair of the OSCE PA’s Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism (CCT) and will take up his responsibilities immediately. OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) made the appointment Monday and also this week appointed Lisa Chambers (MP, Ireland) as Co-Chair of the CCT.

In his appointment letter to Raja, Tsereteli noted that under the leadership of the previous Chair, Greek parliamentarian Makis Voridis, the CCT has become a widely recognized and respected actor in the counter-terrorism arena, bringing increased focus and visibility to the work of OSCE parliamentarians in this domain.

“We significantly built on our oversight powers by developing an innovative parliamentary initiative pushing for the implementation of international counter-terrorism commitments on border security and information sharing,” Tsereteli wrote. “The Assembly leveraged on its convening and bridging powers through goal-oriented and innovative partnerships with the OSCE executive structures, the United Nations and other parliamentary assemblies.”

He also highlighted the Assembly’s policy-making ability by adopting two resolutions tackling priority issues related to counter-terrorism. At the recent Annual Session in Luxembourg, the Assembly adopted the resolution “The Challenges Related to Returning and Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” which urges OSCE participating States to bring to justice anyone who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in terrorist acts and to address challenges related to FTFs’ accompanying family members by developing legal frameworks to focus on their specific concerns, vulnerabilities and needs.

“It is a great honor to be a part of this committee,” Raja said today. “It’s a very important committee working to determine the reasons for extremism and terrorism in the OSCE area and to address those root causes. We must develop strong and effective policies both for the short-term but also in the long-term. I look forward working with politicians in the OSCE area and international bodies to combat all forms of extremism.”

“Unfortunately, with senseless violence continuing to claim innocent lives, this topic continues to be relevant to the international community,” Chambers said. “Parliamentarians have an important role to play in the international response, working in synergy with the OSCE executive structures and global stakeholders such as the United Nations through targeted initiatives.”

The CCT works to advance OSCE PA’s efforts in the field of countering terrorism with a special emphasis on cross-dimensional issues and explore innovative approaches in the OSCE region. It considers terrorism trends and develops forward-looking policy recommendations aimed at enhancing the role of the OSCE and supporting participating States efforts to implement effective and human rights-complaint counter-terrorism responses.

“In a world where many organizations actively work together to fight terrorism, the OSCE PA contributes through the unique perspective of the representatives of over one billion citizens to improve the implementation of relevant legislation and build more resilient societies,” added the OSCE PA Secretary General Roberto Montella.

For more information about the CCT, including a recent interview that Raja gave about its work as well as relevant resolutions and background materials, please click here.

MINSK, 31 July 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its working groups in Minsk on 31 July 2019:

“The cessation of fire agreed at the previous TCG meeting, yielded significant results: over this time, no civilian casualties due to shelling were recorded, while the number of ceasefire violations dropped significantly.

In this regard, I would like to welcome the sides’ efforts to commit to ceasefire. I urge them to continue to fully comply with it. I remind that the ceasefire is unlimited.

Likewise last time, the main topic of discussion in the TCG was the repair works of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska. Based on the agreement on the repair works and operation of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska reached last time, we came to a common understanding of the concrete next steps in this direction. Tomorrow, demining shall begin. This is a natural prerequisite for the repair works. Throughout the time of repairs, the checkpoint will function uninterrupted, although there may be temporary restrictions. Upon completion of demining, following the above agreement, the fortifications shall be immediately dismantled, and the repair works shall begin. Most likely, they will last several months. Draft plans of repair works were presented by a Ukrainian expert in the Humanitarian Working Group.

In addition to compliance with ceasefire, the Security Working Group discussed topical issues of disengagement of forces and hardware, in particular the dismantling of fortifications at Stanytsia Luhanska.

In this regard, I would like to sincerely commend the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission staff as they followed up on the disengagement of forces and hardware at Stanytsia Luhanska, as well as for their contribution to the preparation of the repair works at the bridge.

The Economic Working Group continued to deal with water supply issues in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR), including the financial situation of the ‘Voda Donbasa’ company.

Besides the repair works of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska, the Humanitarian Working Group exchanged on the questions related to preparation for a future exchange of detainees. Again, the discussion on this topic was constructive.

The Political Working Group continued to discuss the traditional topics on its agenda related to the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and local elections in in CADR and CALR.

Leaving for a short summer break, I once again urge the sides to do their utmost to fully commit to the agreed unlimited ceasefire.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted the return of anti-tank mines inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of critical civilian infrastructure, including power lines, water pipelines, and the drilling of water wells.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including at checkpoints of the armed formations near Veselohorivka, Verkhnoshyrokivske, and Yuzhna Lomuvatka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including eight explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (23 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and north-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded ceasefire violations, including 26 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no ceasefire violations). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east of Dmytrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Luhansk), assessed as a live-fire exercise outside the security zone, as well as north and east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 30 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a white armoured vehicle, belonging to the State Emergency Services, passing the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska Bridge (15km north of Luhansk) and driving into the disengagement area. Inside the disengagement area, the SMM also saw seven members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) [2] between the southern part of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska Bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations further south.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 24 July, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted that seven anti-tank mines (TM-62)  previously observed under a camouflaged net across road T-1316 about 1km south of the area’s northern edge were no longer present. On 28 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three anti-tank mines (TM-62) in the same location.

On 28 July, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2). On 29 July, also inside the disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a mine-resistant ambush protected vehicle (MRAP) (Varta). Both vehicles were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 30 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the Mission observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

30 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (9K22, Tunguska) at a compound near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

30 July

The SMM noted that:

• six tanks (T-72) and seven self-propelled mortars (2S9) were present; and
• one self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona, 120mm) was missing for the first time. 58 tanks (52 T-64 and six T-72), three self-propelled mortars (2S9), and 22 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

30 July

The SMM noted that two mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were missing for the first time and that four mortars (2B9) remained missing.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

30 July

The SMM noted that nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and eight towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

28 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk); and
• for the first time, a 200m-long trench and three bunkers (two under construction, one completed), about 30m north of a residential building near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), outside the disengagement area.

29 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (a BMP-1 and a BMP variant), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2U), and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a probable IFV (BMP variant) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk); and
• three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk).

30 July

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-2) and an APC (MT-LB) near Popasna; and
• an IFV (BTR-4) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

28 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable ACV near Petrivske, about 110m north of the disengagement area’s northern edge.

29 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP variant) near Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk);
• a probable IFV (BMP variant) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk); and
• two ACVs and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on an APC (MT-LB) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

30 July

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Metalist (7km north of Luhansk).

Presence of anti-tank mines near Bohdanivka and Nyzhnie Lozove

On 29 July, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 24 anti-tank mines (TM-62M) laid out in four rows across the road between Bohdanivka and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 170m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske, as well as 11 anti-tank mines (ten TM-62M and one TM-62P3) laid out in two rows about 140m further east across the same road and five anti-tank mines (TM-62M) in an adjacent field south of the road. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted seven probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across road M-03 about 2.5km west of Nyzhnie Lozove.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to enable repairs and the inspection of water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), Popasna and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM monitored security situation south-east of Kherson region

On 29 July, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 29 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint east of Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to Veselohorivka.
• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “engineering activities in the area.”

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations only allowed the SMM to proceed after 35 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On five occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming: once while flying over areas near Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), twice over Fedorivka (government-controlled, 32km north-east of Mariupol), and  twice over Novoselivka Druha (government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol).[7]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM visited areas holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s positions.

427007

More than 70 representatives of government officials, academia, NGOs and the media as well as members of the diplomatic community gathered in Tashkent to mark the World Day against Trafficking in Persons with a presentation of the ‘Guiding Principles on Human Rights in the Return of Trafficked Persons’, a publication by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)recently translated into Uzbek.

The event on 30 July 2019 was organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, ODIHR’s Anti-trafficking Programme and the National Human Rights Centre of Uzbekistan.

The presentation was opened by Tanzila Narbaeva, the Chairperson of the Senate of Uzbekistan’s parliament, the Oliy Majlis, who pointed out that “the presence of high-ranking Uzbek government officials at this event demonstrates the priority and commitment of Uzbekistan at the highest level to combat human trafficking.”

Akmal Saidov, the Director of the National Human Rights Centre, stressed the importance of international co-operation in addressing human trafficking along with national efforts to prevent and counter this crime.

Ambassador John MacGregor, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, said: “The OSCE is advocating for a victim-centered, gender sensitive- and human rights-based approach. Trafficked persons need understanding and assistance in restoring their rights, not judgement. Human trafficking is one of those topics that do not appear in the newspapers every day, yet human trafficking is at nexus of organized crime, often thrives on corruption, endangers economic growth, and creates cruel and inhuman treatment, and slavery.”

ODIHR Anti-trafficking Adviser Tatiana Kotlyareko said: “To promote policies, procedures and practices on return that comply with human rights standards, ODIHR undertook the development of the Guiding Principles on Human Rights in the Return of Trafficked Persons. The Return Guide is an important tool to support the implementation of regulations and laws in Uzbekistan, which can ensure international legal protections in the process of return for victims of trafficking.”

The presentation concluded with a screening of the film ‘Love Sonia’. ODIHR has been supporting viewings of the movie in different cities across the OSCE region. It tells the story of a 17-year-old girl fighting against the odds to find her sister, who is entangled in the world of global sex trafficking.

426959 Marina Živaljević

To support Montenegro’s public service broadcaster RTCG in its ongoing process of enhancing its professionalism and digitalization, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized an in-house training for RTCG staff in Podgorica from 29 July to 2 August 2019 with Stephen Herrmann, the former editorial director of the BBC’s Monitoring service.

“We are very much looking forward to this project and everything we’ll do for the citizens of Montenegro: finally, they will receive quality programming,” said RTCG General Director Božidar Šundić. “Training in modern journalism is something that the public service broadcaster has been lacking. This training will help us to define the activities we need to implement in order to meet the challenges of the future, both in terms of personnel and in technical terms.”

Herrmann said that the digital transformation in news, as in many other walks of life, presents many challenges that can be really difficult, but is also exciting and offers many opportunities.

“We will explore a mixture of practical skills, know-how around technology and undertake a broader discussion with the team on how to make a more effective organization as a whole. In that spirit I will be doing a number of sessions that will include journalists and listening to their ideas, because they know this organization and the audience,” he said.

Daniel Blank, the Media Programme Manager at the OSCE Mission, said that new online tools and platforms are constantly being created. “Many of them are useful for journalists. However, often it is not so obvious to know how to utilize them in a meaningful manner. Digital skills are not only about understanding the technological side, but, more importantly, to understand the constantly changing nature of the journalist’s interaction with audiences.”

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

An OSCE-supported conference on media legislation in Kazakhstan was held in Nur-Sultan on 31 July 2019 for some 25 government officials, representatives of international organizations, lawyers, journalists and media experts from across the country.

They discussed and analysed aspects of the country’s media legislation as it relates to anticipated amendments to the law.

The participants prepared a list of recommendations and a "road map" for legislators and media experts to further improve media legislation in accordance with international standards of freedom of speech. Participants also discussed good international and national practices on relations between the state and media, the legislative regulation of information on the internet, new media tools, defamation, the state financing of media, and other issues.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan in co-operation with the Adil Soz International Foundation for the Protection of Freedom of Speech, the Delegation of the European Union in Kazakhstan, the Article 19 NGO and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Regional Office for Central Asia.

The event is in line with the Programme Office’s activities aimed at promoting media freedom and freedom of expression in line with OSCE principles and commitments. 

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week. On 25 July, the eighty-third Russian convoy of nine vehicles crossed into Ukraine and returned through the Donetsk BCP.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 13,101 to 12,844 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of 26 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was seven this week compared to 24 last week: two of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and five into Ukraine (57 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, five families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and six were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when 13 families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and 12 into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (485 compared to 426 observed during the previous week). There were 240 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 245 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Yalta-Luhansk-Stakhanov and Luhansk-Yalta.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 945 trucks (compared to 1,084 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (554 at the Gukovo BCP and 391 at the Donetsk BCP); 588 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 357 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and the Russian Federation and with “LPR” plates. During the reporting week, the Gukovo BCP continued to experience more cargo traffic than Donetsk (in particular due to a significant number of cargo trucks crossing from Ukraine into the Russian Federation).

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 65 (compared to 50 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which could include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 61 to 88: of the total number of trucks scanned, 70 trucks (80 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 18 trucks (20 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly increased from 168 to 172 vehicles; 90 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 82 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 31 occasions; the OTs assessed that 19 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 12 to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. Cars with licence plates from Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania and Poland, as well as “DPR” and “Republic of Abkhazia” plates were also noted during the reporting week.

On 24 July at 01:05, a funeral services van with Russian Federation licence plates arrived at the Gukovo BCP from the Ukrainian side, underwent the border control procedures and crossed into the Russian Federation. The van bore the inscription “Ритуальный кортеж Плутон”.

On 26 July at 12:50, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a police vehicle with three people inside, entering the BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle parked near the main building. At 13:05, the police vehicle with all three people inside returned to the Russian Federation.

On 29 July at 12:50, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a military Mi-8 helicopter which flew over the Donetsk BCP inside the airspace of the Russian Federation. The aircraft came from the north and continued flying in a southerly direction.

Convoy

On 25 July at 06:39 (Moscow time), the eighty-third[3] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of nine vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All nine vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 13:46 on 25 July.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 25 June 2019 to 30 July 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                              

[3] Based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the eighty-third convoy that has crossed into Ukraine through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs. However, so far all these convoys crossed through the “Donetsk” BCP.

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

An OSCE-organized seminar on developing effective methods for protecting energy infrastructure from natural hazards was held in Ashgabat on 30 and 31 July 2019.

The two-day seminar was attended by representatives from a number of national ministries, including the State Commission of Turkmenistan for Emergencies, the Main Department of Civil Defense and Rescue Operations of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Health and Medical Industries, and the khiakimiliks (local government councils), among others.

Ambassador Natalya Drozd, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, said the seminar was important for Turkmenistan’s national and economic security: “As the largest regional security forum, the OSCE has a great potential to address emerging threats by sharing vast experiences accumulated by its participating States.”

Drozd drew attention to Turkmenistan’s geopolitical significance and underlined the role of effective international co-operation in ensuring the security of Turkmenistan’s national energy infrastructure. “Turkmenistan’s energy-producing capabilities are crucial not only on a national, but international level. Collaborative international and national efforts are therefore of fundamental importance to the effective protection of Turkmenistan’s energy infrastructure.”

The event was led by two international experts, who highlighted in their lectures the importance of an understanding of risk in establishing developed energy infrastructure, while also providing historic examples of major accidents in this field.

They conducted practical training sessions on how to organize the response to emergency situations and methods for the prevention and resolution of incidents. The sessions also explored dealing with possible energy deficits, forming effective plans of action to ensure the safety of the local population, and developing effective techniques for analyzing the potential consequences of a major incident.

The seminar concluded with a roundtable discussion on challenges in building resilience against natural and man-made disasters in Turkmenistan.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, including multiple launch rocket systems and tanks, on both sides of the contact line.
• In areas beyond government control, an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a convoy of eight trucks near the border with the Russian Federation where there is no official border crossing facility.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to power lines and water pipelines on both sides of the contact line, as well as to enable the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints of the armed formations near Zaichenko, Novolaspa and Tavrycheske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 23 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas west and north of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), where almost all of the explosions were recorded.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous 24 hours, it had recorded ceasefire violations, including ten explosions.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 29 July, inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern part of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).[2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 29 July, positioned near the disengagement areas near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

26 July

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• ten tanks (T-64) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) traveling north on a road about 3km north-west of Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk) and
• four tanks (T-64) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

29 July

The SMM again saw 22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

27 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-72) near Zoria (40km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

26 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 20 tanks (11 T-72 and nine T-64), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

29 July

The SMM noted that four mortars (three BM-37, 82mm and one 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were missing.

 

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

26 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB variant) near houses in Vodiane (15km north-west of Donetsk).

28 July

The SMM saw an acquisition radar system (P-19) and an APC (MT-LB S) west of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

29 July

The Mission saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• an IFV (BMP variant) in the western outskirts of Popasna.

Convoy spotted near the border with the Russian Federation

On the night of 22 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a convoy consisting of eight trucks (three probable tanker trucks), four of which with trailers attached. They were all stationary and facing east on a dirt road that runs along a tree line adjacent to the border with the Russian Federation about 2km south-east of Stepne (non-government-controlled, 72km south-east of Donetsk), where there is no official border crossing facility (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 13 July 2019).

Mines near Starohnativka

On 26 July, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted eight anti-tank mines laid across the road about 4km east of Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and to power lines near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

 

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 29 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the SMM’s safety”.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage west into the village, citing “no prior information about the visit”.
• At a checkpoint east of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage after the Mission refused to show its patrol plan.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again only allowed the SMM to proceed after about one hour of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 28 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
• On two occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over areas near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s positions.

426869 Marina Živaljević

A public consultation was organized today in Podgorica by the Ministry of Culture of Montenegro, with the support of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU) Delegation to Montenegro on the proposal for the law on Audio-Visual Media Services.  Participants included representatives of media companies and NGOs dealing with issues related to media.

In a lively debate, it was concluded that Montenegro, as an EU candidate country, has to align its legislation with the EU’s Audio-visual Media Services Directive.

The Minister of Culture Aleksandar Bogdanović recalled that in 2018, a legislative review was initiated to align the media law with international standards, supported by experts from the European Commission, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and followed by a broad dialogue among all stakeholders.

“Due to the rapid development of the media industry, additional issues relating to the free and unobstructed work of electronic media need to be regulated by law. The draft Law on Audio-Visual Media Services, implementing the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council and amending the Audio-Visual Media Services Directive, was adopted at the end of 2018 by the European Parliament. In addition, the draft recommendations from the JUFREX Analysis of the Media Sector of Montenegro have been implemented,” said Minister Bogdanović. He emphasized that the Government is an constructive partner in the field of democratic and reform processes, based on EU standards of a regulated media environment and as an essential precondition for building an open, multicultural society, with full readiness for European integration.

The Head of the Co-operation Section at the EU Delegation to Montenegro, Hermann Spitz said that Montenegro, as an EU candidate country, has to align its legislation with the EU’s Audio-visual Media Services Directive and that the process needs to be inclusive, co-ordinated and transparent.

“The EU, together with our partners in the Council of Europe and the OSCE, is happy to provide expertise and help Montenegro with the Draft Law on Audio-visual Media Services. The set of three new laws, which are being prepared by Montenegro, as well as the ongoing call for a new Council of the Agency for Electronic Media, represent very good opportunities for improving Montenegro’s track record in the media field. This is something that citizens expect and that the EU will continue to monitor very closely,” said Spitz.

Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro Maryse Daviet recalled that two other media roundtable discussions took place this year: the first in February on the Draft Law on Media, and the second in March on the Draft Law on the public broadcaster, RTCG. “Both roundtable discussions gave the public the opportunity to discuss the proposed amendments, as well as to hear the analysis of a number of international media legislation experts. With this third roundtable discussion, we hope to provide you with the same opportunity,” said Daviet.

Key recommendations of the Media Sector Analysis from 2017 were the basis for the legal reforms in Media law, said Lejla Dervišagić, Co-ordinator for the Council of Europe delegation. “These reforms will be implemented in the second phase of the Council of Europe and EU’s joint JUFREX project: Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Media in South-East Europe, over the next three years,” she said.