Central Europe

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

Developing effective methods of providing assistance to the victims of human trafficking was the central topic discussed at an OSCE roundtable meeting in Ashgabat on 23 July 2019.

Representatives from a number of relevant Turkmen ministries and organizations were present. They included the Mejlis (parliament) of Turkmenistan, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Bar Association of Ashgabat and Women’s and Youth Unions, amongst others.

“Combating human trafficking and providing support for its victims remains a key priority for the OSCE’s Human Dimension in all 57 of its participating States,” said Ambassador Natalya Drozd, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

Drozd underlined the importance of co-operation between international organizations, civil society and other interested parties in order to develop effective anti-trafficking measures. “It is only through broad co-operation and joint activities that we may achieve the most positive results in our attempts to combat trafficking and provide all necessary support for its victims.”

Leading the event were two experts from Ukraine currently based at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna. They first presented the principles of the OSCE’s approach to combating human trafficking and practices in providing assistance to victims, before facilitating general discussions and group work.

Participants divided into groups discussed and prepared presentations on the provision of status of victims of human trafficking, the provision of a standardized support service to victims of human trafficking, and the regulation of the work of centres for the rehabilitation of victims of human trafficking. Group presentations were followed by a general discussion examining further steps for the preventing and combating of human trafficking in Turkmenistan.

The event also included a presentation by representatives of the General Prosecutor’s Office and State Migration Services of Turkmenistan on the country’s activities in the prevention and combating of trafficking in human beings.

NEW YORK , United States of America, 24 July 2019 – The successful management of diversity in society is key to avoiding conflicts, said OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Lamberto Zannier at the United Nations in New York on 19 July, as he led a discussion on how regional organizations play a key role in the prevention of conflict. 

“The recipe to counter an increasingly polarized geopolitical environment, and to prevent further tensions potentially arising from it, is inclusive policies that help to strengthen the cohesiveness of our diverse societies and, in turn, their resilience to conflicts and crises. Focusing on youth allows us to address the root causes of segregation and exclusion from the outset,” said Zannier.

Organized in co-operation with the OSCE’s 2019 Slovak Chairmanship, the event brought together various regional organizations, including the African Union, the League of Arab States, the European Union, the Organization of American States, the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation and the OSCE, as well as the United Nations, to explore practical approaches to conflict prevention. This group initially met in October 2018, answering the call of UN Secretary-General António Guterres for more work on conflict prevention.

Miroslav Jenča, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and Americas said: “The UN Charter provides us with a framework for co-operation on peace and security between the UN and regional arrangements. Together, we multiply each other’s strengths and can advance the broad prevention agenda.”

“Partnership between the UN and regional organizations is critical,” said Michal Mlynár, Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the UN. “Without regional organizations, the UN would not be able to deliver on its important mandate, especially in the area of conflict prevention.”

Zannier focused on concrete ways to prevent conflicts, and especially how regional partnerships can lend their expertise to this endeavour. He spoke on the role of youth in contributing to a culture of peace, dialogue and reconciliation.

“It is estimated that 408 million youth today live in a context affected by armed conflict,” said Jayathma Wickramanayake, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth. “It must be clear therefore that we need to engage young people not only as beneficiaries, but as equal partners in all our efforts, especially in our efforts to prevent conflict and build peace.”

As a follow up to the discussion, participants committed to continuous dialogue and exchange of experiences, as a way to build on and maximize each other’s efforts.

The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities is mandated to address inter-ethnic tensions at the earliest possible stage. In the 25 years since the institution has been working on conflict prevention, successive High Commissioners have amassed a vast body of experience in identifying and managing potential tensions before they develop into conflict.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw fresh damage caused by shelling to a civilian property in Olenivka, reportedly ten days ago.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Chermalyk and at an SMM mid-range UAV near Berezivske.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM continued to monitor the operation of a shuttle bus service in government-controlled areas north of the bridge.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to critical civilian infrastructure, including repairs to power lines near Betmanove.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Shevchenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (seven) compared with the previous reporting period (about 35 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).        

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (five), compared with the previous reporting period (about 155 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including five explosions, were recorded at southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Following the beginning of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 21 July, the SMM recorded a total of 410 ceasefire violations (18 explosions, 24 projectiles in flight and 368 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire).

Recent damage to civilian property in Olenivka   

On 22 July, in Olenivka (non-government controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), at 95 Pereizdna Street, near an inhabited house, the SMM saw a hole (7cm wide and about 25cm long) on the south-facing wooden door of a garage and about 20 cracks on the windshield of the car parked inside it. The SMM assessed the damage as recent and caused by an undetermined weapon. A resident of the house (a woman in her sixties) told the SMM that shelling had occurred at 02:00 on 12 July.

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM UAVs near Chermalyk and Berezivske

While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), while located 600m north of Chermalyk, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of about 1.8km north-west of the patrol, assessed as aimed at the UAV, also flying 1.8km north-west. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

On the same day, while conducting a mid-range-UAV flight at the south-western edge of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one burst of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed distance of about 1-2km west of the patrol, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.2-1.6km west. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 22 July, the SMM saw a white armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Kozak), assessed as belonging to the State Emergency Services passing the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) and driving south.

Inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)[2] at the entrance of the EECP, and two members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them, standing on the southern part of the broken bridge.

The Mission again saw a bus transporting people, mainly elderly, in government-controlled areas north of the bridge from an area about 250m south of the EECP to the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and back, leaving approximately every 15-20 minutes.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening of 21 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an illumination flare in vertical flight, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On the evening and night between 21-22 July, positioned on the northern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard about four explosions, 140 shots of small-arms fire and 75 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 20 July, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On 22 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

20 July

An SMM long-range UAV again spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) less than 50m from residential houses on the northern outskirts of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

21 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable surface-to-air missile system (9K35, Strela-10) in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

20 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) near Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (see above).

21 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP variant) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) about 70m east of a church in a residential area on the north-eastern edge of Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk).

22 July:

The SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 July

An SMM mini-UAV again spotted a fortified position, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, with four men (all visibly armed) involved in construction activity around the position, north of Stepove (27km west of Luhansk).

21 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three armoured communication vehicles (R-145) and one APC (MT-LB) chassis, and an APC (MT-LB) in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk); and
• four APCs (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) on the southern edge of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM saw an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4 variant) on the northern outskirts of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Demining activities near Kodema

On 22 July, the SMM saw a white mini-van and six persons in protective gear bearing the logo of an international organization in the fields on the western outskirts of Kodema (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), carrying out demining activities.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). On 22 July, the SMM heard three explosions, assessed as impacts at an assessed range of 2.5km north-east of the DFS and two explosions, assessed as impacts at an assessed range of 2km east-south-east of DFS.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 15 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “ongoing demining activities in the area”.
• At the eastern entrance of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol) without providing any specific reason.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed again after about 30 minutes of waiting.   

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire about 1.8km north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.
• While conducting a mid-range-UAV flight near Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one burst of machine-gun fire about 1 to 2km west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.
• On the evening and night of 20-21 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk), between Andriivka (non-government-controlled, 44km south-east of Donetsk) and Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), as well as between Nova Tavriia (non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk) and Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over areas between Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk).
• On three different occasions on 22 July, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 12,511 to 13,101 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of 70 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 24 this week compared to 22 last week: 15 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 9 into Ukraine (46 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, 13 families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and 12 were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when 12 families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and ten into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (426 compared to 451 observed during the previous week). There were 215 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 211 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Luhansk – Sevastopol and Luhansk-Yalta.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 1,084 trucks (compared to 1,001 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (635 at the Gukovo BCP and 449 at the Donetsk BCP); 707 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 377 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and the Russian Federation and with “LPR” plates. During the reporting week, the OT noticed a significant increase of truck traffic at the Gukovo BCP.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 50 (compared to 60 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which could include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP slightly decreased from 68 to 61: of the total number of trucks scanned, 46 trucks (75 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 15 trucks (25 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans significantly increased from 130 to 168 vehicles; 83 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 85 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 25 occasions; the OTs assessed that 11 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 14 to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. Cars with Lithuanian and Georgian licence plates were also observed.

On 17 July at 19:44, the OT observed one police vehicle type UAZ 469 with two police officers inside that arrived at Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The police car parked behind the main building. At 20:01, the police vehicle left the BCP towards the Russian Federation. On the same day at 20:06, the same police car, this time with flashing lights on, again entered the BCP area from the Russian Federation and parked next to the main building. The OT observed one police officer exiting the car and entering the main building. At 20:25, the police vehicle, with flashing lights on, accompanied by a young male sitting in the rear compartment of the car, returned towards the Russian Federation.

On 19 July at 00:22, the OT observed an ambulance with plate number with the inscription “LPR” entering the Donetsk BCP from Ukraine. There were two people inside the ambulance. The ambulance underwent border control procedures and left towards the Russian Federation.

On the same day at 08:32, an ambulance with “LPR” plates arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The OT observed two people inside. The ambulance underwent border procedures and left the BCP towards Ukraine.

On 19 July at 16:31, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a police vehicle entering the BCP control area from the Russian Federation. The police car stopped behind the main building. At 16:40, the vehicle drove back to the Russian Federation.

On 19 July at 03:50, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a civilian car carrying a coffin tied up on the top of the car arriving from Ukraine and crossing into the Russian Federation. A total of four passengers were observed inside the car (two females and two males).

On 21 July at 12:26, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a police vehicle with two people inside, entering the BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle parked near the main building. At 12:37, the police vehicle with one additional person inside returned to the Russian Federation.

On 22 July at 11:41, the OT observed an ambulance entering the Gukovo BCP area from the Russian Federation and driving behind the main building. At 11:58, the ambulance drove back to the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 18 June 2019 to 23 July 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                              

Communication and Media Relations Section

Strengthening the capacity of Kazakhstan to counter terrorist financing was the aim of a two-day train-the-trainers course held at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna on 22 and 23 July 2019. The event was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Global Programme against Money Laundering.

The course focused on the financial disruption of terrorist networks and on listing terrorists and terrorist organizations for sanctions pursuant to relevant UN sanctions regimes. The training process focused on localized scenarios based on real-life cases. Together with OSCE and UNODC international experts, the six national trainers who participated in the course will continue delivering training courses for Kazakhstan participants upon their return to their country.

The course helped the participants to understand how improving inter-agency co-operation can help to identify and disrupt terrorist financial networks. It highlighted specific instruments and techniques that could significantly improve their ability to counter terrorist financing. The activity is part of a comprehensive capacity-building programme to assist in the implementation of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and OSCE commitments and support national efforts in Central Asia. 

MARIUPOL, 23 July 2019 – Following up on their report of 8 July 2019, the Chair of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions, Kyriakos Hadjiyianni (MP, Cyprus) and former chair Margareta Kiener Nellen (MP, Switzerland) held a series of meetings yesterday in Mariupol related to the humanitarian situation in the heavily conflict impacted region of southeast Ukraine.

Chair Hadjiyianni thanked the Trilateral Contact Group for facilitating the recommitment by all sides to an unlimited ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, as agreed at the meeting held in Minsk on 17 July and as called for by OSCE parliamentarians in the 8 July Luxembourg Declaration. Civil and military authorities in place must now be held accountable for enforcing this ceasefire.

After observing the crossing of the line of contact at the Pyschevyk entry-exit checkpoint, visiting villages along the frontline with an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) patrol and talking to the local population, Kiener Nellen stated “No more dead, no more wounded! I urge to strictly respect International Humanitarian Law and to demilitarize all villages.”

Moreover, the parliamentarians hosted a roundtable with human rights stakeholders active in Donetsk Oblast to discuss the most pressing humanitarian priorities of the conflict affected population. Participants included the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, the UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross and representatives of several NGOs and internally displaced persons.

“To address the daily needs of those most affected, we need to hear directly from them, and the concerted engagement of humanitarian actors plays a key role in this regard. Protection of all lives must be prioritised” said Hadjiyianni. “We will continue to keep our eyes and ears open and fight for the human and civil rights of the people who are daily victims of the conflict violating them.”

Hadjiyianni and Kiener Nellen also referred to the Luxembourg Declaration adopted by the PA two weeks ago, that supported their calls for “an immediate and lasting ceasefire and for further efforts to address the humanitarian tragedy in the conflict-affected areas, including in particular through increased demining efforts and specific measures to facilitate freedom of movement along the contact line.” They stressed the need to repair the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge immediately and to delink the status of IDPs from the obtention of socials benefits.

The parliamentarians also applauded the tireless commitment of the monitors and officials of the SMM to Ukraine and expressed appreciation for their support provided in organizing their visit to the Mariupol region.

VIENNA, 23 July 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, sent to the Prime Minister of Albania, Edi Rama, a legal review on the amendments to the Law on Audiovisual Media in Albania, the Law on Electronic Communications, and other relevant provisions regarding the regulation of certain types of content provided through the internet.

This legal analysis is part of a long process of consultation between the Office of the Representative and the government during the drafting of the legislation. "I appreciate the constructive co-operation with the authorities, even if some improvements in the draft laws should still be introduced. I hope that our recommendations will be taken into account and that modifications will be introduced during the parliamentary process to ensure better compliance of the future legislation with international standards on freedom of expression and media freedom," said the Representative.

The review was prepared by Dr. Joan Barata Mir, an independent media freedom expert, and is an extended and updated version of the legal analysis that the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media published on 11 July. (https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/425453)

“I note that there have been important improvements compared to the drafts prepared earlier in the year. The last version of the draft Law on Audiovisual Media incorporates new provisions, which better and more precisely define the object and scope of the law, and mentions the need for the Audio-visual Media Authority (AMA) to respect international and regional standards when adopting its decisions. It is positive that the problematic provisions regarding domain name registration and blocking of online content have been removed, and that the proposal includes a specific adaptation of the right to reply to the new environment of electronic publications,” Désir said.

The Representative acknowledged that the draft does not confer competence to the AMA Compliance Committee with regards to the respect for moral, ethical or professional norms for electronic publication service providers. Furthermore, the current draft does not contain the general provision included in previous versions which seemed to give the AMA broad and discretionary blocking powers in cases of “violations of the dispositions of this law”, which will be restricted to cases of criminal offenses of child pornography, encouragement of terrorist acts or national security breaches.

In his letter to the Prime Minister of Albania, Désir pointed to several remaining issues that still need to be addressed, which he recommends to amend in the legislative process. The legal review proposes, in particular, to modify article 132/1 that gives the AMA the power to oblige electronic publications service providers to publish an apology, remove content or insert a pop-up notice in cases of violations of provisions in particular in the new article 33/1. In this article the reference to the “respect of privacy and dignity of citizens”, which is broad, gives to the AMA extensive new power that can have an impact on freedom of expression.

“The AMA or any administrative or regulatory body should not deal with matters of defamation, which must remain under the competencies of the courts,” Désir said.

The analysis also suggests a new wording for paragraph 3 of article 132, which establishes the possibility, in cases when electronic media services “may abet” criminal offenses of child pornography, encouragement of terrorist acts or national security breach, to “block access to the internet”. The proposed wording also aims at clarifying the competencies of the National Authority for Electronic Certification and Cyber Security (NAECES), the AMA and the Albanian Electronic Communications Regulatory Body (AKEP) in this area.

The legal review raises concerns about the powers granted to AKEP in the proposal to amend the Law on Electronic Communications, regarding the adoption of measures to protect a wide range of interests, including the country’s interests, public security, fundamental rights and any provision included in the Albanian legal system. These notions are too broadly defined and can be inconsistent with international standards of legal certainty, proportionality and necessity, and do not include specific rules on the way to ensure the protection of freedom of expression.

Moreover, article 133 in the draft law still refers to the very high economic fines to be imposed in cases of contraventions.

“I hope that the legal analysis, that includes a number of recommendations, will be useful in further discussions. My Office will continue to be closely engaged in this process, which needs to be inclusive for all relevant stakeholders until its conclusion,” Désir concluded.

The full text of the new legal review is available here: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/426152

426305 Marina Živaljević

The use of digital tools and platforms for promoting content to the general public is the topic of a five-day training course for employees of the Institution of the Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms of Montenegro and the Agency for Electronic Media, which began on 22 July 2019 in Podgorica. The course is organized by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro.

The first two-and-a-half days of the training course are organized for the employees of the ombudsperson institution, while the remainder of the course will be for representatives of both the ombudsperson and the Agency.

Opening the workshop, Daniel Blank, Media Programme Manager at the OSCE Mission, said that the important thing about social media is not just the techniques – how to engage on a certain platform, but it is also important to feel comfortable with this sort of interaction with citizens.

“It’s important to use the tools properly and place your institution in the middle of society. When it comes to the social media, there is always a bit of a fear, because it means a direct interaction. You should allow a real dialogue. It’s not just about ‘breathing out’, but also ‘breathing in’ – to listen to the audience, see their feedback and better understand their position. Get to know what they want from you,” said Blank.

Zdenka Perović, Deputy Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms said that the OSCE has provided great support since the foundation of this institution. “Since our primary concern is the protection of the rights of the citizens, it is very important that they are well acquainted with what the institution does. In that sense, we expect to become more open, in accordance with new times and communication requirements,” said Perović.

One of the trainers was Amela Odobašić, Head of Public Affairs at Communications Regulatory Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who said that the training course will be interactive. “You will learn not only how to open a profile, but you’ll receive advice on how to cope with all the challenges that social media brings,” she said.

The training is a part of the Mission’s ongoing project “Support to media institutions, information pluralism, freedom of media and the safety of journalists in Montenegro”.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 19 and 20 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and in Luhansk regions.
• Between the evenings of 20 and 21 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours.
• Following the beginning of a recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 21 July, in connection with the agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk on 17 July, the SMM recorded 79 ceasefire violations, including six explosions.
• A man died in a garden in Krasnohorivka due to gunfire. A woman died and several people, including a child, suffered shrapnel injuries in Pervomaisk.
• The Mission observed fresh gunfire damage to a garden in Krasnohorivka, to residential houses in Chermalyk, and fresh damage due to shelling to houses in Pervomaisk.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM continued to monitor the operation of a shuttle bus service in government-controlled areas, north of the bridge.
• The Mission observed ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and an infantry fighting vehicle inside the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government- and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed mines near Yasne and Slavne, some for the first time, as well as unexploded ordnance near Khrestivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and to monitor the security situation near the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske, Zaichenko and Petrivske.*
• In Kyiv, the SMM observed a commemoration event for a journalist killed three years ago.
• The SMM observed a calm security situation in several regions of Ukraine during the Parliamentary Elections.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 19 and 20 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 190), compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at easterly and southerly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 20 and 21 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 35), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east and south of Pyshchevyk and south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 19 and 20 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (four), compared with the previous reporting period (about 15 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east, south and south-west of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in areas east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 20 and 21 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 155), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna and at easterly, southerly and south-south-westerly directions of Zolote.

Following the beginning of the recommitment to the ceasefire at 00:01 on 21 July, the SMM recorded in total 79 ceasefire violations (six explosions, 22 projectiles in flight and 51 shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire).

Man died in garden in Krasnohorivka due to gunfire, SMM observed a fresh crater

On 20 July, in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), the SMM followed up on reports about a man (in his sixties) who had died as a result of gunfire. At 36 Chaikovskoho Street, the Mission saw what it assessed as fresh traces of blood near a crater in a garden about 100m south-west of a five-storey apartment building (see also below). The SMM assessed the crater to have been caused by fire from an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) or a self-propelled gun (type undetermined), but could not assess the direction of fire. The apartment building is located about 1km west of positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and about 2km west of positions of the armed formations.

At the same address, two residents (a man and a woman in their sixties) separately told the SMM that on the morning of 19 July, they had heard small-arms fire nearby, followed by a loud explosion in their neighbour’s garden. They said they had then seen the man, who had been working in the garden, lying on the ground with severe injuries to his left upper body, as well as severe burns to the rest of his body. They told the SMM that after 40 minutes an ambulance from Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) arrived and took the man to a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk).

At the hospital in Kurakhove, medical staff told the SMM that the man had been admitted to the hospital on 19 July, and that he had died immediately after being admitted from fatal injuries.

Woman died and several people, including a child, are injured by shelling in Pervomaisk

On 21 July, in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on reports about several civilians injured or killed on 20 July in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). At the morgue in Kadiivka, medical staff told the SMM that the body of a woman (in her fifties) with shrapnel wounds had been brought there on the evening of 20 July. In Pervomaisk, outside a nine-story residential building at 40 Rokiv Peremohy Street 11, a man (in his forties) told the Mission that he had seen how the woman, his neighbour, had died from shrapnel wounds during shelling on the evening of 20 July. The SMM observed minor cuts on the right hand of the man, which he said he had sustained during the shelling. At the same address, a woman (in her sixties) told the Mission that she had just returned from the hospital in Kadiivka, where she had received treatment for  injuries sustained when outside the building on the evening of 20 July.

In the hospital in Kadiivka, the Mission saw a man (in his forties) with a large bandage around his chest and a smaller bandage on his left arm. He told the SMM that he had been walking on Timoshenko Street in Pervomaisk in the evening of 20 July, when his chest and arm were hit by shrapnel. In the hospital the SMM also saw a woman (in her forties) with bandages and scratches to her right thigh, arm, neck and cheek. She told the SMM that she, together with six other people, had been outside 40 Rokiv Peremohy Street 11 in Pervomaisk in the evening of 20 July, when she had heard a loud explosion and felt pain in her right leg, neck and cheek. In the hospital, the Mission saw a man (in his thirties) who had bandages on his left thigh, abdomen and forearm, and who told the Mission that he had been outside the aforementioned address on 20 July when he heard an explosion.

At the children’s hospital in Luhansk city, the SMM saw a woman (in her thirties) and her daughter (three years old); the woman had a bandage on her left arm. She told the SMM that she still had some pieces of shrapnel in her arm, including in the bone, and that her daughter had suffered a shrapnel wound to her head and right eye. The woman told the Mission that she and her daughter had been outside their apartment building at the aforementioned address in the evening of 20 July when she had heard a projectile impact a building next to them.

Also on 21 July, at 40 Rokiv Peremohy Street 11 in the north-eastern part of Pervomaisk, on a north-north-east-facing wall of a nine-story residential building, the SMM saw more than 70 holes up to 10cm in diameter, 14 shattered windows, and broken glass on the ground, assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel, as well as a pool of blood. The SMM also saw more than 30 impacts in a garden 10m-25m north of the building, all assessed as fresh and caused by an airburst from an undetermined weapon.

About 1km south-east of the building, at a one-storey residential house at 14/1 Timoshenko Street, the SMM saw two craters in a garden – one about 10m east of the house and one about 20m south-west of the house – assessed as fresh and caused by rounds of an undetermined weapon. The SMM also saw five shattered windows on the east-south-east-facing wall of the house, two shattered sections of a wooden fence about 5m east of the house, and at least 50 holes in the fence, all assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel.

On the same day, at a compound of the armed formations about 450m south-east of 14/1 Timoshenko Street, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a hole in the roof of a building assessed as caused by an artillery round fired from an undetermined direction, as well as scorch marks on the concrete surface of a parking area about 5m-50m east, west, and north of the building and a completely burnt mini-van and crane in the parking area (not seen in imagery from 19 July 2019).

Fresh gunfire damage to three residential houses in Chermalyk

On 20 July, in Chermalyk, accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the JCCC, the SMM followed up on reports of shooting.[2] At 16 Nikitina Street, the SMM saw six holes in the north-westerly and north-easterly facing walls of a one-storey residential house, three holes in the electricity metre below the roof on the house’s north-facing wall, as well as multiple holes on the metal fence surrounding the yard on the north-eastern side of the house. Also, the Mission observed a fresh crater about 10m north-west of the house on the northern side of a road, with a tailfin and shrapnel pieces inside the crater, assessed as being parts of a grenade from a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm). The owner of the house (a woman in her forties) told the SMM that she had been at home in the evening hours of 19 July, and that electricity had been cut off as a result of shelling.

In a field about 20m north-west of the aforementioned house, the SMM saw a fresh crater with a tailfin and shrapnel pieces inside the crater.

About 100m north-west of the aforementioned house, at 3a Nikitina Street, the SMM observed eight holes in the north-western and eastern walls of a one-storey residential house, as well as four holes in the steel roofing plates above the aforementioned walls. On the ground in front of the walls, the SMM saw multiple shrapnel pieces. The owner of the house (a woman in her forties), told the Mission that she had been at home when the shooting had occurred in the evening hours of 19 July.

At 7 Nikitina Street, about 150m north-east of the house at 3a Nikitina Street, the SMM saw four holes in the south-west facing wall of a one-storey residential house, a hole in a window of the same wall, and five pieces of shrapnel lying on the asbestos-plated roof of a barn 5m north-east of the aforementioned house. Also, the Mission observed a fresh crater in a field about 15m north-west of the aforementioned house, with a tailfin and parts of a tube inside the crater. The owner of the house (a woman in her sixties) told the SMM that she had been at home when she had heard shooting in the evening hours of the 19 July.

The Mission assessed the above mentioned crater and damage to be fresh and caused by a grenade from a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fired from an east-north-easterly direction.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 19 July an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five persons working with concertina wire inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), about 100m south of its northern edge and 50m east of road T-1316.

During the day on 20 July, positioned inside the disengagement area, about 250m south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an explosion at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On the same day, the SMM observed five members of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in a field next to the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, inside the disengagement area. Also north of the bridge, it saw three de-miners walking along a barbed wire, in order to rescue a dog trapped in the wire.

On the same day, it saw six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with ”JCCC” written on them, two south of the broken section of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and four near the parking lot south of the aforementioned bridge. It also observed a senior member of the armed formations, accompanied by six men in civilian clothes, arrive at the parking lot. Two of the six men were carrying TV cameras and appeared to film an SMM camera located inside the disengagement area.

On 20 July, at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed about 300 people queuing to enter and around 500 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas. On 20 and 21 July, it observed that a shuttle bus was departing about every 20 minutes from a location near the EECP operated by officers of the Ukrainian Border Guard service, about 200m south of the disengagement area’s northern edge, travelling towards the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. Two women with disabilities (in theirs sixties) in wheelchairs separately told the SMM that they did not use the bus because it was inconvenient to access it. The bus driver (a man in his fifties) told the SMM that the bus had a lifting platform for wheelchairs. Four travellers (two women in their fifties and two men in their sixties) told the SMM that the introduction of the shuttle bus service was very positive.

On the same day, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 30 people queuing to access booths where their documents were being checked. It also observed four men dismantling a shelter near the aforementioned checkpoint. A women (in her sixties) standing near the checkpoint told the SMM that people suffered from the heat due to the lack of shade, as the shelter was being dismantled.

On 21 July, the SMM observed a triangular-shaped area (3m-4m) sealed off with a red and white tape about 100m east of the “Woman with Bread” monument near the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska. A Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the JCCC told the Mission that the area had been sealed off because of demining activities. On the same day, the Mission observed six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with ”JCCC” written on them at different locations south of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

In the evening hours of 19 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an illumination flare in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area, 16 projectiles in vertical flight of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) at an assessed range of 3-5km south (which were unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area) and two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. During the day on 20 July, positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk, the SMM heard six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 4-5km north-north-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same day, the SMM camera in Zolote also recorded about 110 projectiles in flight assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.  

During the evening of 20 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east, assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area. On the same evening, the camera recorded 92 projectiles in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south and south-south-east (which were unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area), as well as one undetermined explosion and ten projectiles in flight outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.  During the same evening, positioned in two locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 69 undetermined explosions, ten outgoing explosions and about 120 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

In the early hours of 21 July, after the start of the recommitment to the ceasefire, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 21 projectiles in flight (12 of which were unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area, and nine assessed as outside the disengagement area). At the same time the SMM, while on the northern edge of Popasna, heard two undetermined explosions and 51 shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 19 July an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant) inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 1.2km east of its western edge and about 800m north of its southern edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On 21 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons[5]

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines[6]

Government-controlled areas

19 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Pyshchevyk (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 8 June 2019).

20 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

19 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). In the same training area, the same UAV spotted 48 IFVs (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 6 July 2019); [7] and
• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and four towed howitzers (D-30) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 21 June 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

20 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 20 June 2019).

Non-government-controlled areas

19 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 20 tanks (18 T-64 and two T-72) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[8]

Government-controlled areas

19 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

•  a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) and a probable IFV (BMP variant) in Pyshchevyk; an
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Ulianivske (26km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM mid-range (UAV) spotted an IFV (BMP variant) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (probable BMP) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk);
• an ACV near Petrivske (24km north of Donetsk);
• 14 APCs (13 BTR-70 and one undetermined) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk);
• an ACV near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk); and
• an ACV near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4) with a mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Popasna.

20 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Lebedynske.

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-60) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) inside a concrete shelter outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.

21 July

The SMM saw:

• three APCs (BTR-70) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) inside a concrete shelter outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.

Non-government-controlled areas

21 July

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) near Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol).

Fresh craters east of Popasna

On 19 July, the SMM observed five fresh craters in a field about 1km east of a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the eastern outskirts of Popasna, as well as parts of exploded projectiles. It assessed the craters to have been caused by 120mm projectiles of a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm), but could not determine the direction of fire.

Mines near Yasne and Slavne, some seen for the first time, and unexploded ordnance (UXO) near Khrestivka

On 19 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time four anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) on road T-0509 about 1km north of Yasne (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the armed formations. The same UAV also spotted for the first time at least ten anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid in two rows across a road and extending north into a field, about 3.5km east of Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), and four anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid across the same road about 250m west of the aforementioned mines, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It also spotted for the first time freshly dug up holes, assessed as traces of recent demining, in two fields about 500m east and north-east of Slavne.

On 21 July, the Mission saw for the first time a piece of UXO, assessed as a possible remnant of a 122mm artillery shell, embedded in road T-0517 about 2km north of Khrestivka (formerly Kirovske, non-government-controlled, 45km east of Donetsk).

On the same day, the SMM observed about eight de-miners of the State Emergency Service in protective clothing and with metal detectors in a field marked with sticks and tape immediately north of the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

Entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Maiorsk temporarily closed

During the day on 21 July, at the EECP near Maiorsk, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the SMM that the EECP was closed due to the presence of UXO. After about 40 minutes, the SMM was allowed to cross toward non-government-controlled areas, although it saw civilian vehicles and pedestrians waiting. While crossing the EECP, the SMM saw eight SES de-miners in a field north of the EECP (see above). On the evening of 21 July, the SMM camera near Maiorsk recorded that the EECP remained open until 21:30; about 90 minutes beyond the scheduled hours of operation.  

SMM facilitation of the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk). It continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 20 July, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw two men exiting Ukraine on bicycles.

On the same day, while at a pedestrian crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw five pedestrians entering Ukraine and one pedestrian exiting Ukraine. Also on the same day, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka for about one hour, the SMM saw 26 cars (eight with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as ten with “DPR” plates), four covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) and 19 pedestrians entering Ukraine. The Mission also saw 17 cars (five with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates), seven covered cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two buses (with “DPR” plates, filled with passengers) exiting Ukraine.

Commemoration event for journalist killed three years ago in Kyiv

In Kyiv, the SMM observed about 100 people, including many journalists, at a commemoration event for journalist Pavel Sheremet, who was killed three years ago when the car he travelled in was blown up in the centre of Kyiv. Some of the participants held up posters with “Who killed Pavel?” written on them and demanded a renewed effort by law enforcement agencies to find the perpetrators.

SMM observed calm security situation in several regions of Ukraine during Parliamentary Elections

On 21 July, on the occasion of the Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine, the SMM observed a calm situation in Kyiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Radensk, Velyki Kopani, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Odessa, Dnipro and Kharkiv, as well as government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 15 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 20 and 21 July, at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “engineering activity” in the area on the latter occasion.
• On 21 July, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west towards Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south towards Sakhanka (non-government controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) on two occasions, citing an “ongoing anti-terrorist operation”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• During the evening and night of the 19-20 July, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and between Lastochkyne (government-controlled, (19km north-west of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), as well as due to jamming while flying between Kalynove (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk).[9]
• On 21 July, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference assessed as due to probable jamming while flying over areas near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] In the SMM Daily Report of 20 July 2019, weapons were misreported as missing at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region. At the visited site, all previously observed weapons were present.  

[6] In the SMM Daily Report of 18 July “12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm)” were misreported as in violation of withdrawal lines, while they should have been reported as present at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region.

[7] The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons

[8] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[9] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

KYIV, 22 July 2019 – Ukraine’s early parliamentary elections were efficiently run and respected fundamental freedoms. The campaign was nevertheless characterised by widespread malpractice and the misuse of political finance through a complex blend of business and political interests, international observers concluded in a preliminary statement published today.

The observation mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the European Parliament. The statement was presented at a press conference in Kyiv by: Ilkka Kanerva, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission, Madeleine Moon, Head of the NATO PA delegation, Sereine Mauborgne, Head of the OSCE PA delegation, David McAllister, Head of the European Parliament delegation, and Albert Jónsson, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission.

The election was run efficiently and professionally by the electoral authorities, who overcame challenges created by legal procurement rules and deadlines. At the same time, however, political parties replaced a significant number of election commission members at local level as late as election day, undermining the stability and efficiency of their work.

The parliamentary elections took place in the context of ongoing armed conflict and other hostilities in the east of Ukraine and the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation, which meant that voting could not take place in Crimea or the regions controlled by illegal armed groups.

Some 35.6 million people were eligible to take part in the elections. The international observers welcomed the fact that the simplified procedure for internally displaced persons, or IDPs, to change their voting address, has now been extended to all voters across the country. However, the lack of information and voter outreach resulted in few people benefiting from this change, which is a matter of regret.

Shortfalls were also noted in the area of media freedom. While the constitution guarantees freedom of expression, the five largest private media groups have a combined audience share of more than 70%, and both their editorial policy and political agenda is determined by the economic interest of their owners. At the same time, the relatively new public broadcasting company is chronically underfunded. The safety of journalists also remains a major concern.

There was otherwise a diverse field of candidates, who were able to freely convey their messages in a competitive campaign. Women were underrepresented, totaling only 23% of all registered candidates. Endemic vote buying was an issue of serious concern to the international observers, and resulted in at least 125 criminal investigations. There were further investigations due to the misappropriation of one political party’s name by a number of self-nominated candidates.

The current legal framework on campaign finances does not ensure transparency or accountability, despite a small number of legal amendments adopted since Ukraine’s last parliamentary elections. As presently implemented, it allows big donors to unduly influence politics through a system of clientelism and patronage.

The international election observation mission for the early parliamentary election was composed of 811 observers from 45 countries, including 719 ODIHR-deployed experts, long-term, and short-term observers, 60 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, 17 from NATO PA, and 15 from the European Parliament.

For further information, please contact:

Anna Di Domenico, OSCE PA: + 380 97 27 63 269 or + 45 60 10 83 80 anna.didomenico@oscepa.dk

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR: +380 671 645 814  or +48 609 522 266 katya.andrusz@odihr.pl

Andrius Avizius, NATO PA: +380 68 550 9645 or +32 477 871085 aavizius@nato-pa.int

Karl Minaire, EP: +32 477 85 45 78 karl.minaire@europarl.europa.eu

Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day train-the-trainer course on countering terrorist financing was organized in Vienna for Uzbek participants from 17 to 19 July 2019 by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Global Programme against Money Laundering (UNODC/GPML).

The course, which took place on the premises of the OSCE Secretariat, was led by international experts and tailored to Uzbekistan. It included country- and region-specific scenarios.

The training programme covered areas such as sources of information; national, regional and international threats; the requirements of a terrorist organization; money flows; and national case studies. The international experts reviewed the localized training material together with Uzbek national experts and went through the training methodology.

The six participants of the course will deliver training courses to local participants upon their return to Uzbekistan, jointly with international experts from the OSCE and UNODC/GPML.

The train-the-trainer course is part of a comprehensive multi-annual OSCE-UNODC capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in Central Asia.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Following a recommitment to the ceasefire which began at 00:01 on 21 July, in connection with the agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk on 17 July, the SMM continued to monitor the security situation.

From 00:01 to 16:00 on 21 July, the Mission recorded in total 75 ceasefire violations (three explosions, 21 projectiles in flight and 51 shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire). Almost all of these ceasefire violations (74, including two explosions) were recorded between 00:01 and 8:00 in Luhansk region, in areas east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). Between 8:01 and 12:00, the SMM recorded one explosion in Donetsk region, near Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk). The Mission recorded no ceasefire violations from 12:01 to 16:00.

The SMM continues to monitor the security situation and more details will be available in its daily reports.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission learned about readiness to observe the recommitment to the ceasefire by the Ukrainian side of the JCCC and the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk starting from 00:01 on 21 July.
• The SMM followed up on a woman who died of shrapnel injuries in Donetsk city.
• The Mission saw fresh damage caused by gunfire to civilian properties in Donetsk city and in Marinka.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM continued to monitor demining activities and the operation of a shuttle bus service in government-controlled areas north of the bridge.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to water pipelines near Horlivka and Maiorsk, as well as to power lines near Novokyivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (73) compared with the previous reporting period (35 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at north-easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).        

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (14), compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including ten explosions were recorded in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see also below).

On 20 July (outside the reporting period), the Ukrainian side of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)[2] informed the SMM in a letter, and the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk made public statements, about the readiness to observe the recommitment to the ceasefire starting at 00:01 on 21 July, in connection with the agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk on 17 July.

Woman died in Donetsk city due to shrapnel injuries

On 19 July, at a hospital in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled), medical staff told the SMM that in the evening hours of 18 July, a 68-year-old woman had been admitted to the hospital but died shortly after due to traumatic and haemorrhagic shock caused by multiple shrapnel wounds to her abdomen and legs. The SMM visited the house of the deceased woman at 7/2 Makarenka Street of Donetsk city’s Kyivskyi district (non-government-controlled, about 2.3km south-west of the contact line), where it saw a fresh hole (1m in diameter) in the north-west facing wall of the one-storey house and north-western side of its roof, as well as debris from the roof under the hole inside the house. The SMM saw fresh blood stains along the brick wall at the entrance of the house along with remains of used first aid material. A resident of 11/1 Makarenka Street (35m south-west of 7/2 Makarenka Street) told the SMM that on 18 July, between 17:00 and 18:00 he heard five loud explosions while at his house, with the first explosion hitting the house at 7/2 Makarenka Street, where a woman was injured while watering plants outside. Another man, resident of 4/1/2 Makarenka Street (about 45m north, located across 7/2 Makarenka Street) told the SMM that at around 17:00, while working on his car outside the house, he heard five explosions, and he saw the first explosion hitting the house at 7/2 Makarenka Street and heard a woman screaming outside the house.

Fresh damage to civilian properties in Donetsk city and Marinka

On 19 July, in Donetsk city’s Kyivskyi district, at 4/1/2 Makarenka Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole on the north-western side of the roof of a one-storey inhabited house, assessed as caused by a mortar round that had penetrated the ceiling and an internal wall dividing the living room and bedroom, where the SMM saw an entry hole on one side of the wall and exit hole on the other side where the SMM saw the mark left by the mortar tailfin. A woman (in her sixties), presenting herself as a resident of the house, told the SMM that on 18 July at 17:00 she was in the house while her husband was in the garage when she heard one loud explosion and she took cover in the basement where she heard the second explosion that hit her house. The husband (in his sixties) told the SMM that he was outside the house when he heard the first explosion at 7/2 Makarenka Street and heard a woman screaming (see above).

On the same day, in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), at 45 Prokofieva Street (approximately 1.5km west of the contact line), the SMM saw a hole (30cm in diameter) and five destroyed bricks in the left upper corner on the north-east facing wall of an inhabited house. The SMM saw another hole (8cm in diameter) on the left lower side of the same wall and shattered glass at the upper corner of the window located on the same wall. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and caused by 30mm projectile. A woman (in her forties) residing in the house, told the SMM that gunfire had occurred in the evening of 11 July when at around 22:30, while inside the house, she heard an explosion hit her house. At 54 Prokofieva Street, the SMM saw four fresh holes (3cm in diameter each) on the north-east facing side of a one-storey inhabited house. A man (in his seventies), presenting himself as a resident, told the SMM that on 11 July at around 22:20 he was inside the house with his wife when he heard gunfire.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 18 July, the SMM saw a white armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Kozak), assessed as belonging to the State Emergency Services (SES) passing the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) and driving south. Outside the disengagement area, 200m south of the EECP, the Mission saw six people conducting demining activity. The SMM also saw two members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them, standing on the southern part of the broken bridge.

On 19 July, inside the disengagement area, around 120m south of the EECP, the Mission saw five unarmed personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces laying concertina wire in a field west of the road leading to the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM also saw five members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them near the near the southern part of the broken bridge.

The Mission again saw a bus transporting people in government-controlled areas north of the bridge, mainly elderly, from an area about 250m south of the EECP to the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and back, leaving about every 15 minutes.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening and night between 18-19 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded ten undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-4km south-east and south-south-east and 16 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-5km south-south-east and south-west, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. The same camera also recorded 12 projectiles at an assessed range of 1-3.5km at south-easterly and south-westerly directions assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On 19 July, positioned at four locations near the disengagement area near Zolote, the Mission heard four undetermined explosions and 11 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 17 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a tank (type undetermined) 300m west of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) (see below). It also revealed multiple craters and probably destroyed defensive positions, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, in the south-eastern corner of the disengagement area (partly inside of the area), as well as at least 30 impacts about 600m east of it (all not seen in imagery from 26 Jun 2019). On 19 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

17 July

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a tank (type undetermined) 300m west of the disengagement area near Petrivske (see above).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

19 July

The SMM saw ten tanks (T-64) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

19 July

The SMM noted that 29 tanks (18 T-64 and 11 T-72), four towed howizters (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and nine mortars (82mm) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

18 July

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (types undetermined) near Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk);
• two communication vehicles (types undetermined) near Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk);
• an infantry fighting vehicle (probable BMP-1) about 100m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.

19 July

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk);
• three APC (BTR-70) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk);
• an APC (BTR-70) inside a concrete shelter outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.

Fresh craters near Vodiane and burnt grass areas near Pikuzy

On 14 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed a 50m-long extension of an existing trench and the presence of seven fresh craters about 1km west of Vodiane (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Mariupol), between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations. It also observed newly burnt areas of grass about 1km east and about 1.5km south-west of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) (all not seen in imagery from 02 Jul 2019).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a pump station near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), to power transmission lines in Novokyivka (non-government-controlled, 25km east of Luhansk), to water pipelines near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), to phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). In the morning of 19 July, the SMM saw and heard two impact explosions 500m south-east of the DFS and one hour after commencement of monitoring the security situation near Vasylivka, the SMM left the area due to ceasefire violations in the area.  

Border areas outside government control

On 19 July, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 17 cars (three with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as seven with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The Mission also saw 16 cars (six with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates) and one bus with Ukrainian licence plates, exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at the border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), for about nine minutes, the SMM saw 32 cars (11 with Ukrainian, 13 with Russian Federation, two with Georgian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and  five with “LPR” plates) queueing to exit Ukraine. After about nine minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at the border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw two female pedestrians entering Ukraine and three pedestrians (one man and two women) exiting Ukraine. While at the border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk), for about ten minutes, the SMM saw four pedestrians (two men and two women) exiting and no pedestrians entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 15 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on three occasions an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “orders from superiors” and “demining activities”.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• During the evening and night of the 18-19 July, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), between Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk), between Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), and, assessed as jamming while flying over Chasiv Yar (government-controlled, 62km north of Donetsk) and Paraskoviivka (government-controlled, 75km north of Donetsk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position. 

Kunduz Rysbek

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek on 19 July 2019 launched the first of four clean-up campaigns at Issyk-Kul Lake, in Kyrgyzstan, as an integral part of a roundtable discussion on the importance of the involvement of  public institutions and society, and public awareness on environmental issues. The discussion is taking place in Chok-Tal village and organized by the Issyk-Kul Aarhus Centre, the Clean Issyk-Kul Public Foundation, and the Chon-Sary-Oy ayil local authority with support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.

Aimed at preserving the local ecosystem and subaquatic life, the clean-up of the shore between Chok-Tal and Chon-Sary-Oy villages is being conducted by six professional divers and more than 100 local volunteers. According to local NGOs and authorities, the estimated volume of collected waste will amount to more than 2,000 metres of fishing nets as well as three cubic metres of plastic and other litter.

Marking the 20th anniversary of the OSCE presence in the Kyrgyz Republic, the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek will continue carrying out a series of clean-up activities throughout August on the shores of Issyk-Kul Lake, covering the shorelines between Toru-Aigyr and Tamchi, and between Temirovka, Grigorievka and Semionovka. The largest and final campaign is to be held in September in Cholpon-Ata with the participation of thirty representatives of local hotels and resort facilities, environmental services and public organizations from the entire Issyk–Kul region. 

The clean-up campaigns have been supported by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek since 2015.

425768 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe in co-operation with the Office of the Prosecutor General, the Ministry of Interior, the Supreme Court and other State agencies, organized a series of training courses on the Istanbul Protocol, which concluded on 13 July in Sarob, near Dushanbe. Some 150 judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials of Tajikistan participated in the courses.

Experienced forensic and medical experts delivered the training courses and familiarized the participants with the aspects of forensic medical examination of victims of torture, its identification for effective medical documentation, as well as techniques to interview victims of torture. 

This training initiative is in line with Tajikistan’s National Action Plan to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee against Torture for the years 2019-2022. The Istanbul Protocol serves as an international standard in the medical and psychological examination of the alleged victims of torture.

Thanking the counterparts for their good co-operation, Robert Heuer, Head of the Human Dimension Department at the OSCE Programme Office, said: “The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe stands ready to continue its support to the Government, the judiciary, as well as civil society actors, regarding implementation of the National Action Plan.”

426125 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe conducted a series of training courses from 28 June to 19 July 2019 on using social media to promote the work of Public Councils on Police Reform in Tajikistan. The courses were organized in Dushanbe, Gharm, Kulob and Khujand and brought together 100 participants, including members of the Republican, Regional and District Public Councils on Police Reform, as well as representatives of the country’s Interior Ministry.

Participants learned and practiced how to write comprehensive news articles and stories, create Facebook pages for the Public Councils, draft engaging posts, and analyse the performance of posts and how to effectively promote them. They also drafted practical social media strategies and posting plans to be used for promotion of Facebook pages.

Engaging communities online is regarded as an important step towards engaging the public more in police reform with the aim of bringing the police closer to citizens.  

“The main purpose of the course was to train the participants on how to properly promote their work using traditional and modern journalistic techniques,” said Izzatmand Salomov, one of the trainers of the course. “Since many people today use social media, we trained the participants on how to write short articles, posts and content tailored for social media. We also showed participants relevant tools and techniques of using mobile phones and applications for promoting their work.”

Askar Tursunov, member of the Public Council on Police Reform of Sughd region, said: “We used to inform the population about the police reform process only through meetings and traditional media channels. In this training, we learned skills of using social media and website management, which can help us to reach out to the online community and inform them about the work of the Public Councils on Police Reform.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• A man was injured by gunfire in Yasynuvata.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in training areas near non-government-controlled Miusynsk and Ternove.
• Inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM continued to observe the operation of a shuttle bus service in government-controlled areas north of the bridge.
• Trains were spotted moving east and west in non-government-controlled areas near the border with the Russian Federation.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to water pipelines near Holubivka and Maiorsk, as well as to powerlines near Spartak.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region near Zaichenko and Shevchenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however a similar number of explosions (35) compared with the previous reporting period (40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), east of Chernenko (government-controlled, 21km north-east of Mariupol) and south of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however fewer explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in areas west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).  

Man injured by gunfire in Yasynuvata

On 14 July, in Yasynuvata, the SMM saw a man (44 years old) with a wound covered with dark powder on the left side of his abdomen. On 15 July, medical staff at a hospital in Yasynuvata told the SMM that the man had been admitted on 5 July with a bruise abrasion on his left chest area caused by gunfire. The man told the SMM that he had been on the porch of his house at 17/2 Sevastopolska Street in Yasynuvata on the evening of 5 July when he saw a projectile hit the wall of his house and immediately felt something hit his abdomen. On 18 July, a neighbour (man, 70 years old) of the man told the SMM that he had heard gunfire on 5 July and later saw the abovementioned man on his porch with an injury to his abdomen. On 5 July, the SMM saw damage from gunfire to a different house on the same street (see SMM Daily Report 6 July 2019).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 18 July, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw eight members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them: two standing on and one standing south of the broken section of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), with all three using binoculars to observe areas north, and five others near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.[2] The SMM again saw a bus transporting people, mainly elderly, from an area about 250m south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint to the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and back, leaving about every 15 minutes.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening and night of 17-18 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 32 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-4km south-east and south-south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area, and 18 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 3-6km east and south-south-east, which were unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area, as well as about 120 projectiles in flight assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. During the day on 18 July, positioned on the western edge of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 70 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km west, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.  

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

17 July

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 17 July 2019).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three MLRS (BM-21), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), three probable towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two probable anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

17 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted three anti-tank guns (MT-12) near Yablunivka (49km north of Donetsk).

18 July

The SMM saw a tank (T-72) in the north-eastern outskirts of Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

17 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), 11 tanks (probable T-64) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 21 tanks (19 T-72 and two T-64) in a training area near Ternove (see above).

18 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 22 tanks (ten T-72 and 12 T-64), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), six anti-tank guns (MT-12) and three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019).

Weapons that SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

17 July

The SMM noted that seven self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm), three anti-tank guns (MT-12) and two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P149 Shturm-S, 130mm) were present and eight self-propelled howitzers (2S19), eight towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm,  eight anti-tank guns (MT-12) and three anti-tank guided missile systems (9P149) remained missing.

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

18 July

The SMM noted that nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) were present and four anti-tank guns (MT-12), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and two self-propelled mortars (2S9) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

18 July

The SMM noted that five mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

15 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in a residential area of Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk).

16 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four APCs (BTR-80) south of Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol).

18 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR variant) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk).

The SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Anti-tank mines near Shchastia and remnant of war in Yasynuvata

On 17 July, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted at least 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across road H-21 south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 18 July, in a residential area of Yasynuvata, the SMM saw a wire coil, assessed as a command wire from an anti-tank guided missile. A resident of the area (man, 60-70 years old) told the SMM that he had found it recently following shelling in the area. 

Trains spotted moving east and west in non-government-controlled areas near border with Russian Federation

On the evening of 17 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a cargo train consisting of 20 box cars departing the train station in Khartsyzk (non-government-controlled, 26km east of Donetsk) heading south-east. In the early morning hours of 18 July, the same UAV spotted a cargo train consisting of 20 tank cars and five open bulk cars in Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk, non-government-controlled, 60km south-east of Luhansk), about 10km west of the border, arriving from the east and passing westbound through the train station. The same train was later spotted arriving at the train station in Rovenky (non-government-controlled, 54km south of Luhansk), 40km west of the border, where the train’s engines were disconnected by people at the station.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to enable well drilling in Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and repairs to water pipelines near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 15 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing demining activities”.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage west into the village and westwards towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), citing “SMM’s security”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed again after about 25 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 17 July, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to probable jamming while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Sofiivka (former Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), and assessed as jamming while flying over Rovenky (non-government-controlled, 54km south of Luhansk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Avdiivka and Donetsk Filtration Station were non-operational during the reporting period.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM visited an area previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

KYIV, 19 July 2019 - International observers to the early parliamentary elections in Ukraine will present their preliminary conclusions at a news conference.

What:

• You are invited to a news conference of the international observers to the early parliamentary elections in Ukraine.
• The news conference is open to all and no accreditation is required to enter, but only questions from journalists will be taken.

Who:

Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions:

• Ilkka Kanerva, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the OSCE short-term observer mission

Followed by statements from:

• Madeleine Moon, Head of the NATO PA delegation
• Sereine Mauborgne, Head of the OSCE PA delegation
• David McAllister, Head of the European Parliament delegation
• Albert Jonsson, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission  

When:

15:00 on 22 July 2019

Where:

Premier Palace Hotel, Sofiyivsky Grand Hall, 5-7/29 T. Shevchenka Blvd / Pushkinska Street

If you cannot attend in person, follow the livestream here: www.facebook.com/osce.odihr [and www.oscepa.org]

The international election observation is a joint mission of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and the European Parliament (EP). The observation mission totals 811 observers from 45 countries, including 719 ODIHR-deployed experts, long-term, and short-term observers, 60 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA, 17 from NATO PA, and 15 from the European Parliament.

For more details, contact:

Anna Di Domenico, OSCE PA: + 380 97 27 63 269 or + 45 60 10 83 80 anna.didomenico@oscepa.dk

Katya Andrusz, ODIHR: +380 671 645 814  or +48 609 522 266 katya.andrusz@odihr.pl

Andrius Avizius, NATO PA: +380 68 550 9645 or +32 477 871085 aavizius@nato-pa.int

Karl Minaire, EP: +32 477 85 45 78 karl.minaire@europarl.europa.eu

426155 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Following Slovakia’s presidential election on 16 and 30 March 2019, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has published its final report summing up the election observation.

The election was competitive, pluralistic and respected fundamental freedoms. It was conducted in a professional manner, and the election administration enjoyed a high degree of public confidence. Nevertheless, the complaints and appeals mechanisms and the powers of the State Commission for Elections and the Control of Political Parties Funding (SEC), which has a mandate related both to the administration of elections and to party finance oversight, remained under-regulated or vague. At the same time, intolerant rhetoric in a number of online outlets played a substantial role in campaign discourse.

Key recommendations include:

• strengthening the administrative and financial capacity of the State Election Commission to ensure its full independence;

• promoting the independence and impartiality of the campaign finance oversight by entrusting the competence in campaign finance control to an independent institution;

• decriminalizing defamation and introducing a reasonable ceiling for damages in civil libel cases;

• ensuring the long-term pluralism of the media by strengthening the public broadcaster through adequate financing, while enhancing its independence through transparent management appointment mechanisms.

ODIHR deployed an Election Assessment Mission (EAM) on 6 March 2019 to observe the presidential election. The EAM focused on administration of election, legal framework, candidate and voter registration, conduct of the campaign and the media environment, oversight of campaign finance, and the electoral dispute resolution. All 57 countries across the OSCE region have formally committed to follow up promptly on ODIHR’s election assessments and recommendations.

VIENNA, 20 July 2019 – On the third anniversary of the murder of journalist Pavel Sheremet in Ukraine, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today reiterated his call on the Ukrainian authorities to step up their efforts in ending impunity for attacks on and murders of journalists.

“Three years on, Pavel Sheremet’s murder remains unsolved and continues to exert a chilling effect on freedom of expression, media freedom and safety of journalists,” Désir said. “The Ukrainian authorities have a duty to ensure that his murder, as well as all other attacks on and killings of journalists, are prosecuted and that the perpetrators and masterminds behind these crimes are brought to justice. Impunity for such crimes is unacceptable and breeds further violence.”

Sheremet, a journalist with Radio Vesti and the Ukrainskaya Pravda online media outlet, was killed in a car explosion on 20 July 2016 in Kyiv. He worked as a journalist in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia during his career.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom