Central Europe

430175 Marina Živaljević

In order to improve media professionals and students of journalism knowledge of media literacy, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro is organizing a six-day training course from 16 to 21 September 2019, in Podgorica, for 20 participants from the office of the Protector of Human Rights and Freedoms (Ombudsman), the Agency for Electronic Media  and journalism students.

Opening the training course, Daniel Blank, the OSCE Mission Media Programme Manager, said that the Mission has been regularly engaged in promoting media and information literacy. “In our fast changing world, with new technologies and media platforms emerging on a daily basis, media and information literacy is constantly changing,“ said Blank.

This training is part of a long-term strategy to better acquaint media professionals and young people with the latest knowledge and best practices in this field.

Two media literacy experts, Vanja Ibrahimbegović Tihak and Mihajlo Lahtov are facilitating the training.

Explaining the main purpose of the training, expert Ibrahimbegović Tihak said that the training will examine what media literacy means at the individual level, and on a societal level. “Today, there is no strict division between the creator and the consumer – we are both, which is why communication in the public process implies responsibility,” she said.

According to expert Lahtov, media literacy is an important component part of any democratic society. “Media literate citizens are more difficult to manipulate. They value and fight for freedom. Knowledge and education is the ticket to success. Media literacy is just that literacy for future generations who will be better and more professional citizens,” he said.

Participants agreed that in today’s world it is often difficult to check the validity and the source of information. The main goal of the training is to tackle the lack of knowledge and provide tools for a critical examination of media content.

The OSCE Mission recognizes the need for media literacy training programmes to educate media professionals about what it means to be able to “critically read the media”: to view media reports with a sceptical eye, to question and  investigate, not only to consume.  As part of the media literacy activities, the Mission recently launched the campaign on media literacy to encourage critical thinking in consuming media content.

430166 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Under-representation of people with disabilities in political and public life and examples of positive practice contributing to more inclusive parliaments, political parties and democratic institutions were discussed at a side event organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on 16 September 2019 during the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw.

“Over the past few years, ODIHR has improved the inclusion of people with disabilities in its work. However, much more needs to be done within the OSCE as an organization, as well as by participating States, to ensure equal participation of people with disabilities as full members of our societies,” said Tiina Kukkamaa-Bah, Chief of the ODIHR Democratic Governance and Gender Unit.

Among the 35 participants in the event were representatives of OSCE participating States, civil society organizations and disabled people’s organizations. The event featured the launch of the Guidelines on Promoting the Political Participation of Persons with Disabilities, which is intended as a practical resource for OSCE participating States to strengthen the ability of democratic institutions such as political parties and parliaments to engage and empower people with disabilities in political processes. The Guidelines are now also available in an easy-to-read format, which helps people with intellectual disabilities to access this information.

The side-event marks the end of the ODIHR project “Our right to participate – Promoting the participation of persons with disabilities in political and public life”. The project sought to raise awareness among different stakeholders at national and international levels of the importance of including people with disabilities in political and public life, as well as improved disability mainstreaming within ODIHR and OSCE executive structures.

WARSAW, 16 September 2019 – The velvet revolutions that swept Central Eastern Europe 30 years ago gave rise to a time of optimism that we need to recapture as threats to our democracies multiply, key speakers stressed as the annual human rights conference* hosted by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) opened in Warsaw today.

“It is with immense pride that I look back on the achievements of the underground opposition and the Solidarity movement I was privileged to lead,” said Lech Wałęsa, Nobel prize-winning leader of the Solidarity movement that helped bring about the transformations of 1989. “It was because of this country’s pivotal role in the peaceful revolutions of 1989 that the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights was set up in Poland, and I am impressed at the work ODIHR has done since then in strengthening respect for human rights and the rule of law in so many countries. But the backsliding we are seeing in both the new democracies in the East and the established democracies of the West make clear that the struggle is not yet over.”

Conflicts across the OSCE region and an increasing lack of solidarity with communities who find themselves excluded and discriminated against are making it all the more important to seek further dialogue and efforts to demonstrate the essential role of human rights in developing and sustaining our democracies.

“We need the conversations between states and civil society, and we need a platform to have them,” said Miroslav Lajčák, Foreign Minister of Slovakia and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. “The Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) is the place to be open, to be critical, but always respectful. HDIM is a pillar of the human dimension. And the human dimension is the heartbeat of the Helsinki process.”

This year’s conference will see more than 1,500 participants from across the 57 countries of the OSCE gathering in Warsaw for the two-week meeting. The format is unique, bringing together representatives of government, civil society, international organizations, and academia to review the progress made by national governments in fulfilling their commitments in the field of human rights, and at the same time discuss current and emerging challenges.

Safety of journalists, hate crime, and the challenges facing Roma and Sinti across the OSCE are this year’s special focus topics. Human rights are at risk throughout the OSCE region, not least from restrictions to fundamental freedoms and rising intolerance both on- and offline, putting pressure on the security situation within and between states.

“The years following 1989 were a time of hope, and rightly so,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ODIHR Director. “We have come so far in so many ways since then, but the challenges to human rights are growing, and we must overcome them in order to preserve our democracies and the values on which they are built. Those who are deliberately fuelling prejudice and hatred for the sake of short-term political gain cannot be allowed to polarize our societies any further.”

* This year is the 23rd annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM), organized and hosted by ODIHR.

430673 ODIHR presented its new Handbook for the Observation of Election Dispute Resolution at an event in Warsaw on 17 September 2019, on the margins of the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Handbook for the Observation of Election Dispute Resolution

As part of its efforts to develop and refine its election observation methodology, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) launched a new publication at an event in Warsaw on 17 September 2019, during the annual OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting.

The Handbook for the Observation of Election Dispute Resolution is intended to provide guidance to ODIHR election observation missions and teams on how to assess the resolution of election disputes as part of the overall observation of an election. Election observers pay close attention to the handling of election disputes, including such specific aspects as the availability of effective remedies, legal standing, accessibility and timelines for handling the cases. The handbook aims to establish a more systematic and comprehensive approach to observing this key part of the election process, thus contributing to further protection and promotion of the fundamental rights and freedoms necessary for ensuring democratic elections.

“We hope this new publication will provide valuable information not only for election observers, but also for a wider audience including election practitioners, judges, lawyers, political parties, voters and civil society organizations,” said Alexander Shlyk, Head of the ODIHR Election Department.

The methodology followed by ODIHR in its election observation activities is recognized for its systematic and comprehensive approach and serves as guidance for other international and citizen observer organizations.

CHISINAU, 16 September 2019 – OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger will visit Moldova from 17 to 19 September for talks with high-level officials in Chisinau and the political leadership in Tiraspol.

During his first visit to Moldova in his capacity as the OSCE Secretary General, Greminger will focus on advancing the Transdniestrian Settlement Process within the principles endorsed by all 57 participating States at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Milan in December 2018. He will also discuss the role the OSCE can play in ensuring transparency in the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armaments and in co-ordination of financial and technical assistance offered to facilitate their withdrawal and destruction. 

In addition, the OSCE Secretary General will discuss potential areas of OSCE engagement to support the reform agenda of the Republic of Moldova.

Media representatives are invited to a press briefing with OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger on 19 September, at 3:00 pm at the official delegations hall of the Chisinau International Airport.

For more information, please contact Anna Vorobeva, Spokesperson of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, at +373 22 887 846 (landline), +373 69 149 510 (mobile), e-mail: anna.vorobeva@osce.org

For further details please visit the website of the OSCE Mission to Moldova: http://www.osce.org/moldova/

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near non-government-controlled Tavrycheske.
• The SMM saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the disengagement area Zolote and observed military hardware inside the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM saw a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled Mariupol.
• It monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Prymorske. In government-controlled Shchastia, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM to stay there and the Mission could only leave the area after about two hours.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 160), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at easterly and southerly directions of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (11), compared with the previous reporting period (12 explosions). All ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-east of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM UAV near Tavrycheske

Positioned about 700m north-east of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 76km west of Donetsk), while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard about 30 bursts of small-arms fire about 1.8 km west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was also flying about 1.8 km west. Five minutes prior, the same mini-UAV had experienced signal interference near the same settlement, assessed as caused by probable jamming.* [2]

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 29 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw four workers with a crane cutting trees about 50m south of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Stantysia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk). The SMM saw five workers from non-government-controlled areas continuing dismantling the roof and southern part of the former forward position of the armed formations immediately south of the broken section of the bridge and a pile of tyres near the previously observed blue container (with “JCCC” written on it).[3] Later, on the same day, the Mission observed thick black smoke rising, assessed as caused by burning tyres, from the area of the former forward position of the armed formations.

On 30 August, the SMM saw two personnel of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine carrying out demining activities about 100m west of the road north of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The SMM saw seven workers from non-government-controlled areas shovelling dirt and sand, removing ammunition boxes filled with sand and wooden pillars from the roof of the former forward position of the armed formations.

On 29 and 30 August, the Mission continued observing dismantling of structural components of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge.

The Mission saw up to three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the southern edge of the broken section of the bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[4]

During the day on 30 August, positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk, the SMM heard seven outgoing explosions at an assessed range of 5-7km north-east, which it was unable to assess as inside or outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). Positioned on the eastern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 10-15km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 29 August, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (probable BTR-80) inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 1km east of its western edge and about 800m north of its southern edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

29 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on the northern edge of Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk)

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

30 August

The SMM saw two tanks (T-72) mounted on flatbed trucks on the northern edge of Mariupol.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

30 August

The SMM noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152 mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present and that six self-propelled howitzers (2S3) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

30 August

The SMM noted that 18 tanks (T-72) and seven mortars (M120-15 Molot 120mm) were missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

29 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP-2 and a BMP variant) in Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk); and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) on the eastern outskirts of Mariupol.

New trench extensions near Vodiane

On 25 August, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two new trench extensions (not visible in imagery from 11 August 2019): one 400m in length about 2.6km south-east of Vodiane (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Mariupol) assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the second one 210m in length about 1.3km south-east of Vodiane.

Presence of anti-tank mines near Dokuchaievsk and Shchastia

The Mission again saw five anti-tank mines (TM-62) on the side of a road near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the northern edge of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM again saw 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across road H-21 south of the bridge in Shchastia, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It also observed that 12 previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid on the western lane of the road H-21 north of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were no longer present.

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint on the western edge of Prymorske (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations did not allow the SMM to proceed towards Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33 km north-east of Mariupol), citing “demining activities in the area”.
• After the SMM flew a mini-UAV in the area of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at a checkpoint north of the same bridge told that the patrol to stay there while he clarified with his superiors whether to let the Mission leave without deleting the UAV imagery. After about two hours of waiting due to this, the situation was clarified and the SMM could leave the area without having deleted the imagery.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint north of the bridge near Shchastia, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM passage towards the bridge by car and only allowed it to proceed further on foot (see above).

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight north-east of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 76km west of Donetsk), the SMM heard small-arms fire assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which landed safely. Five minutes prior, the same UAV had experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming (see above).[7]
• An SMM mini UAV experienced signal interference while flying near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable jamming.
• Medical staff at a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to provide the SMM information about a civilian casualty without permission from senior members of the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

[3] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[4] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

VIENNA, 31 August 2019 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, strongly condemned today the shooting of the journalist, Levent Uysal, in Balıkesir, Turkey.

“I am deeply concerned about reports that a journalist was shot and injured in Turkey,” said Désir. “I call on the Turkish authorities to ensure that this attack is fully investigated and that those responsible are held accountable with the full vigour of the law.”

During the night of 28 August, Levent Uysal, the former owner of the now-closed newspaper, Yenigün, was shot in the leg by two perpetrators outside his home in the city of Balıkesir in northwest Turkey. He was immediately hospitalised.

“I am worried about the multiplication of violent incidents against journalists. This is the sixth grave attack since May this year in Turkey. More needs to be done to ensure that this deeply concerning trend is urgently reversed and that journalists are ensured a safe environment to work in,” the Representative said. “I wish Uysal a speedy recovery so that he can continue working unhindered,” stated Désir.

He also recalled the OSCE Ministerial Decision on Safety of Journalists, which calls on all participating States to “take effective measures to end impunity for crimes committed against journalists, by ensuring accountability as a key element in preventing future attacks, including by ensuring that law enforcement agencies carry out swift, effective and impartial investigations into acts of violence and threats against journalists, in order to bring all those responsible to justice, and ensure that victims have access to appropriate remedies”.

The Representative’s previous statements on physical attacks on journalists in Turkey are available at: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/420878; https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/419837

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. She provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• It monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period  (about 130 explosions). About 78 per cent of the total ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), whereas the majority of explosions were recorded at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (12), compared with the previous reporting period (19 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 28 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw four personnel of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine holding prodding devices and shovels and inspecting the broken section of the bridge, as well as taking photographs of the elements of the bridge and its surrounding areas. The SMM saw four deminers from non-government-controlled areas dismantling the roof and carrying sandbags from the former forward position of the armed formations on a trolley towards the previously observed blue container (with “JCCC” written on it), [2] about 30m south  near the said container, where the Mission saw around 30 sandbags, ten wooden logs and ten tyres. Inside the container, the SMM saw about 40 sandbags placed against its interior walls and ten on the roof of the container.

On 29 August, the SMM again saw six SES personnel carrying prodding devices and metal detectors, as well as four deminers from non-government-controlled areas carrying prodding devices going under the broken section of the bridge. Thereafter, the Mission saw four civilian engineers from government-controlled areas and two engineers from non-government-controlled areas carrying out an assessment of the broken section of the bridge.

On 28 and 29 August, the Mission continued observing dismantling structural components of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge.

The Mission saw up to seven members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the broken section of the bridge and near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

In the early morning hours of 29 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. Positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard two undetermined explosions and about 20 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at north-easterly directions at an assessed range of 500-700m, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

27 August

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and 30 ammunition crates in a trench north-east of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

28 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two tanks (T-72) and six Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, one of whom was aiming their weapon at the UAV near Zoria (40km north-west of Donetsk).

29 August

The SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in Kulykivske (232km south-east of Dnipro).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

29 August

The SMM noted that four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) were present and that six MLRS (BM-21) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites[5]

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

29 August

The SMM noted that seven mortars (four 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three PM-38, 120mm) and 54 tanks (34 T-64B1, nine T-64B and 11 T-64) were missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

27 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) north-west of Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk);
• a recent trench running from a treeline on the western edge of Katerynivka across a field to another treeline about 300m east (not seen in imagery from 19 July 2019);
• a recent trench running for about 50m north-east behind a building in the centre of Katerynivka, about 20m west of civilian houses (not seen in imagery from 19 July 2019); and
• a new trench running for about 35m north-east in a field about 60m west of civilian houses in the centre of Katerynivka (not seen in imagery from 29 May 2019).

29 August

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) near Popasna;
• an IFV near Zhelanne Druhe (29km north-west of Donetsk); and
• an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) in Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Presence of anti-tank mines near Petrivske disengagement area

On 28 August, on the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 23 anti-tank mines laid in four rows (TM-62), about 150m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Petrivske, as well as an additional 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows about 115m east from the previously-mentioned mines, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 3 July 2019).

Situation at checkpoints along the contact line

At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed about 200 cars and at least three minivans queuing to travel toward non-government-controlled areas and about 30 cars, three buses and four minivans queuing to travel in the opposite direction. At the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk, a representative of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine told the SMM that on 28 August, the EECP was closed from 13:00 to 14:00 due to reported gunfire near the settlement, and that the people waiting in queues were evacuated to a safe place. A representative of an international organization regularly present in the area also told the SMM that the EECP was closed for one hour.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline, to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to power lines near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk) and Hladosove (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk). It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells and to enable repairs to a radio communication tower near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Public gatherings in Kharkiv, Kyiv and Chernivtsi commemorating “Ilovaisk battle”

On 25 August, at Molodizhnyi Park in Kharkiv, the SMM saw about 35 people (mixed ages and genders) gather to commemorate the “Ilovaisk battle”, which took place in August 2014. On 29 August, the SMM saw about 1,000 people (mixed ages and genders) gather at Mykhailivska Square in Kyiv city and, in Chernivtsi city, saw people gathering at gravesites and a cathedral. The SMM saw that the gatherings were marked by speeches and prayers.

SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 28 and 29 August, the Mission continued to monitor the security situation along the Sea of Azov coast in Kherson region and at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea and observed a calm situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Dnipro.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing engineering works”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a weapons permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, three Ukrainian Armed Forces officers allowed the Mission to check the serial numbers of the weapons present at the site only after 45 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• An SMM mid-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying near Vesele (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable jamming.[7]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.

428789 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

An OSCE-organized training course in the interpretation of x-ray images for 20 customs and transport police officers working at aviation checkpoints took place in Ashgabat from 19 to 30 August 2019.

The two-week event began with a comprehensive overview of aviation security procedures and x-ray image interpretation techniques. An international expert from the United Kingdom addressed a wide range of topics, including checkpoint operator selection, radiation safety, recognition of explosive devices, firearms, exotic and improvised weapons as well as prohibited items, liquids and powders.

The course participants shared views on the process of hold baggage screening and alternative technology and search methodologies that can be used to complement x-ray screening.

“The OSCE is committed to assisting the OSCE participating States in building the capacity of police, customs and border officers and improving interagency co-ordination. This is done by providing consultative and technical support and organizing seminars and practical training at the national and regional levels,” said Natalya Drozd, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“This training course is part of the Centre’s activities aimed at enhancing the capabilities of police and customs officials at international airports and it is our belief that the event will contribute to the efforts of the host government to improve border control procedures and screening of passengers and baggage at airports,” she said.

The second week of the course featured a training of potential instructors, which covered course and lesson planning, teaching theory and methodologies, as well as presentation skills and examinations design. The experts emphasized the importance of computer-based training. The also discussed how to teach x-ray screening image interpretation and pre-selection testing of security personnel.

KYIV, 29 August 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made today the following statement:

“The unlimited ceasefire, agreed by the Trilateral Contact Group and in force since 21 July 2019, continues to be widely respected. The average number of ceasefire violations remains significantly lower compared to the period before the ceasefire took effect.

I am grateful to everyone involved for their efforts in this regard. At the same time, I call upon the sides to undertake everything necessary for ensuring a continued unlimited, sustainable and comprehensive ceasefire.

This is of particular importance in view of the upcoming new school year. Children have a right to a safe way to school as well as a calm and secure environment for studying.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw fresh damage from gunfire to a Culture House in non-government-controlled Holubivske.
• The SMM saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Verkhnoshyrokivske, and at a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, more explosions (about 130), compared with the previous reporting period  (95 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), including 56 undetermined explosions; in areas north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk); and at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (19), compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

 

Fresh damage from gunfire to Culture House in Holubivske

At 41 Shyroka Street in the north-western part of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw that a fragment of plaster on the bottom part of the north-west-facing brick wall of the Culture House was ripped off. The Mission also saw that three ground-floor windows in the same wall were shattered. On the ground beneath the shattered windows it saw shards of glass and two metal fragments which it assessed as the tailfin of a 73mm round from a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) or an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon. The Mission assessed that the damage to the building was fresh and caused by a 73mm round fired from a northerly direction. It also saw another object, assessed as the tailfin of a 73mm round from a recoilless gun (SPG-9) or IFV (BMP-1) cannon, embedded in the ground about 10m east of the building. The Mission assessed that this round was also fired from a northerly direction.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM continued to monitor the situation and facilitate activities in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 27 August, the SMM camera in the parking lot south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight and nine airbursts, all at an assessed range of 2-3km north-north-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 28 August, inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw that the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge as well as the former forward position of the armed formations south of the bridge’s broken section continued to be dismantled. The SMM also saw 20 members the State Emergency Services of Ukraine conducting demining activities on the western side of the road about 300-400m north of the broken section of the bridge. On the eastern and western sides of the southern edge of the broken section, it saw two members of the armed formations burning tyres, branches and logs which produced dense black smoke.

The Mission saw up to seven members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them on the southern edge of the broken section of the bridge and near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.[2]

In the afternoon, the SMM saw four deminers from government-controlled areas inspecting the area below the broken section of the bridge and four deminers from non-government-controlled areas standing nearby.

 

Other disengagement areas[3]

In the early morning hours of 28 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two illumination flares at an assessed range of 1.5-2.5km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. Also in the early morning hours of 28 August, the SMM camera in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) recorded an airburst at an assessed range of 4-6km east, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area. During the day on 28 August positioned in two locations in Popasna, the Mission heard five undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at easterly directions at an assessed range of 3-6km, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation. It again accessed its camera site in Petrivske.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

27 August

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 120mm) near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Chernenko (21km north-east of Mariupol);
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol); and
• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) near Novoselivka (31km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (probable T-64) near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

25 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• a tank (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 22 August 2019);
• 15 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2019); and
• nine tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 23 August 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region*

28 August

The SMM noted that four anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

28 August

The SMM noted that five mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were again missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

27 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol);
• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Chernenko;
• two self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4) near Vynohradne;
• an APC (BTR-70) near Prymorske (39km north-east of Mariupol); and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Novoselivka.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP-2) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

28 August

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-80) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Mines at destroyed Donetsk International airport and near Dokuchaievsk

On 26 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 132 anti-tank mines within the area of the destroyed Donetsk International airport: the first group of 60 mines was laid in three rows across the former runway; the second group of 50 mines was laid in three rows across a former taxiway, 900m south-west of the first group; and the third group of 22 anti-tank mines was laid in three rows on a former taxiway about 150m south of the second group. These mines were assessed as not recent and belonging to the armed formations.

On 28 August, the Mission saw for the first time five anti-tank mines (TM-62) on the side of a road near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the northern edge of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). Next to the mines, it saw a mine hazard sign (a red square with skull and crossbones).

Situation at checkpoints along the contact line

At the checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw that ten new containers with processing booths were operational. The Mission observed about 60 cars queuing to travel to non-government-controlled areas and about 30 cars queuing to travel in the opposite direction. A member of the armed formations at the checkpoint told the SMM that additional processing booths had been opened on 27 August. Two civilians (men, mixed ages) – one travelling towards non-government-controlled areas, the other one travelling towards government-controlled areas – said that the waiting times at the checkpoint had decreased after the new facilities were opened.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk) and Hladosove (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk). It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw 14 cars (four with Russian Federation and two with Georgian licence plates, and eight with “DPR” plates) as well as eight covered cargo and two tanker trucks (all with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing demining activities”.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer did not allow the Mission to check the serial numbers of the weapons present at the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after 30 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 27 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas between Pleshchiivka (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk) and Soledar (government-controlled, 79km north of Donetsk); Vidrodzhennia (government-controlled, 66km north-east of Donetsk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk); and Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Komyshuvakha (government-controlled, 68km west of Luhansk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 27 and 28 August, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

428738 Andrii Dziubenko Memorandum on Understanding and Cooperation between the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine Promoting a culture of dialogue

Henrik Villadsen, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (PCU) and Kostiantyn Vashchenko, the Head of the National Agency of Civil Service of Ukraine, signed a memorandum of understanding to promote wider use of conflict management approaches in public service. The signing ceremony took place on 29 August 2019 at a ceremony in Kyiv.

According to the memorandum, the Project Co-ordinator will provide expertise, organize and run dialogue events, deliver training in conflict prevention and management, dialogue negotiating, as well as in mediation to build the capacity of civil servants. To make the effort sustainable, the PCU also will elaborate learning tools for continuous personnel education and re-training.

“Well-organized and professionally facilitated dialogue can be an important tool for officials to plan and implement reforms and policies. It is a good approach to engage all the key stakeholders, even those who strongly disagree with proposed measures,” said Villadsen. “We hope that joint efforts to make dialogue a part of organizational culture for governmental institutions will help increase the transparency and efficiency of state authorities, but also contribute to diminishing conflict potential in their work.”

The PCU-supported efforts to improve organizational culture in the civil service are aimed at further assisting the ongoing public administration reform. As part of its co-operation with the Agency, the Co-ordinator has already provided training seminars on basic dialogue-related skills to its personnel. It has also supported a series of strategic meetings and dialogues for this office to help its staff members to streamline the vision of its mission. Currently the PCU is running awareness-raising events on conflict management for HR personnel of State Oblast and Rayon Administrations.  

ERGNETI, 29 August 2019 - The 95th Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting was held in Ergneti, co-facilitated by Erik Høeg, Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), and Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, Special Representative for the South Caucasus of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, on 29 August 2019.

Høeg provided an overview of events since the last IPRM meeting on 18 July 2019. He noted that recent developments along the administrative boundary line (ABL) had negatively impacted the overall security situation, in particular relating to the recent, highly-concerning occurrences in the Gugutiantkari and Tsnelisi areas.

The co-facilitators emphasized the importance of continuing dialogue in lowering of tensions and reminded participants to focus on the challenges of the conflict-affected population.

While recalling a number of instances where the EUMM managed hotline was used effectively, they stressed the need to keep exchanging information through all available communication channels, especially providing early warning of activities with a view to reducing tensions.

The meeting was marked by a series of intense exchanges on the topic of Tsnelisi between participants. Regrettably it was impossible to complete  discussions on all agenda points as the meeting was disrupted.

The next meeting is scheduled for 2 October 2019.

428699 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

A three-day training seminar on anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing concluded on 29 August 2019 in Nur-Sultan. Some 50 government officials from law-enforcement agencies and the judiciary took part in the event.

Experts from Israel and Lithuania as well as national trainers familiarized participants with best practices in the investigation and prosecution of money laundering cases, forfeiture of illegally-acquired assets and interagency co-operation with key stakeholders including the Financial Monitoring Committee. They also engaged the participants in practical exercises on how to turn financial intelligence into evidence, search for criminal assets and apply non-conviction confiscation.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan, the Financial Monitoring Committee of the Finance Ministry, the Academy of Law Enforcement Entities under the Prosecutor General’s Office and the United States Embassy in Nur-Sultan.

The seminar is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance and combat money laundering and terrorism financing.

VIENNA, 28 August 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed today’s court ruling in Ukraine to release from pre-trial detention journalist Kirill Vyshinsky, the chief of the RIA Novosti Ukraina office in Kyiv.

“I welcome the release of RIA Novosti Ukraina journalist Kirill Vyshinsky today in Kyiv,” said Désir. “I called for his release and intervened on his behalf numerous times with the Ukrainian authorities.”

In May 2018, the Ukrainian security services raided the office of RIA Novosti Ukraina and arrested Vyshinsky on charges of high treason. In July 2018, he was presented with additional charges and his pre-trial detention was extended several times. The Representative previously intervened with the Ukrainian authorities to release him, recalling that “journalists should not under any circumstances be imprisoned for their journalistic work and must have the right to freely express opinions and dissenting views, even those that could be considered controversial.”

Today, the Appeals Court of Kyiv ruled that Vyshinsky was set free from pre-trial detention under personal obligation to attend his trial and inform the court on his whereabouts and work, as well as to refrain from contacting witnesses in his case.

“The release of a journalist is always positive, and I welcome that Kirill Vyshinsky is finally free after such a long and difficult pre-trial detention,” said Désir, “I thank him for his kind words on the intervention of my Office in his case, and I call for all charges against him to be dropped at the next hearing set for 16 September.”

“On this occasion, I also call for the release of all other detained journalists and authors in the OSCE region, in particular Roman Sushchenko and Oleg Sentsov in Russia,” stated Désir. The Representative recalled the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Safety of Journalists, which urges the “immediate and unconditional release of all journalists who have been arbitrarily arrested or detained, taken hostage or who have become victims of enforced disappearance” in participating States.

The Representative has previously raised his concern on this case in his public statements, see: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/401453, https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/381370 and https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/401867, as well as tweets and correspondence with the authorities, see https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/424907?download=true.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
• An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system in violation of withdrawal lines near non-government-controlled Chystoe Ozero.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines for the first time near civilian houses in government-controlled Pisky.
• An SMM long-range UAV spotted a train in non-government-controlled Khartsyzk.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Nova Marivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, more explosions (95), compared with the previous reporting period  (32 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), in areas north of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), and in areas north-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and all of the explosions were recorded in areas east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and south-west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 26 August, on the northern edge of the metal section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) about 240m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations, inside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw metal scaffolding for the first time. A member of the armed formations (wearing an armband with “JCCC” written on it) told the SMM that the scaffolding had been installed to facilitate repairs to the bridge. [2]

On 27 August, inside of the disengagement area, the Mission saw at least 20 deminers of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine, as well as eight members of the Stanytsia Luhanska Forestry Service, conducting demining activities and clearing vegetation west of the road, about 300-400m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. It also saw at least five members of the SES using a crane and a dump truck to remove structural components from the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge.

On the same day, inside the disengagement area, between the former forward position of the armed formations near the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the Mission saw a senior member of the armed formations as well as six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. The SMM also saw at least eight members of the armed formations removing structural components from their former forward position and relocating sand-filled tyres to a location beside a previously observed blue container about 40m south of the broken section of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

In the early morning hours of 27 August, the SMM camera in Popasna recorded three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km east-south-east as well as a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote but within its 5km periphery. About ten minutes later, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an illumination flare at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On 27 August, about 350m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM again saw a spool wire stretched across the T-1316 road, rendering it impassable. About 50m further north, the SMM saw for the first time ten signs with “Mines!” written in Russian on both the eastern and western edges road.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

26 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Chystoe Ozero (14km south-west of Donetsk).

27 August

The SMM saw 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

27 August

The SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) south-west of Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).

Heavy weapons permanent storage site

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

27 August

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

23 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-2 and a probable BMP variant) near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk).

24 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).

26 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four IFVs (three BMP-1 and a BMP-2) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle near Yasnobrodivka (25km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

25 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and three armoured communication vehicles (R-145) on three APCs (two MT-LB and a BTR-80) in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk);
• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk); and
• an ACV near Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk).

26 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two probable ACVs near Chyrylianske (formerly Oktiabrske, 62km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014, and
• an ACV in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk).

Presence of mines near Vodiane and in Pisky and mine hazard sign near Nova Marivka[5]

On 24 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 21 anti-tank mines laid across road T-0519 about 2km north of Vodiane (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Mariupol) and again spotted 50 anti-tank mines on its south-eastern edge. On 26 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 25 anti-tank mines laid in two rows on the edge of a road and extending south-west to the wall of an abandoned civilian house in Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk), as well as ten additional anti-tank mines laid across the same road in a single line about 100m east-south-east of the previous mines.

On 27 August, on a road east of Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw again trees laid across the road with a sign reading “Stop! Mines” as well as a sign reading “No passage” on the southern side of the road, both in Russian.

Train carrying cargo north-west through Khartsyzk

In the early morning hours of 27 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a train consisting of two locomotives and 60 half-full cargo wagons moving north-west towards the train station in Khartsyzk (non-government-controlled, 26km east of Donetsk), about 50km north-north- west of the border with the Russian Federation.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of a well near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), and to power lines near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). A representative of the electrical company “DTEK” told the SMM that repairs to power lines near Chermalyk had been completed.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for an hour, the SMM saw 18 cars (five with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as six with “DPR” plates), 22 covered cargo trucks (ten with Ukrainian licence plates and 12 with “DPR” plates), nine buses (one with Georgian licence plates and eight with “DPR” plates), and 34 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine. It also saw 22 cars (three with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 11 with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates, two fuel tankers with Ukrainian licence plates, two buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates), a motorcycle (plates not identified), and 23 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians (a man and woman in their 60-80s) entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing demining activities”.
• At a checkpoint south of Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to the settlement, citing “risks to the security of the SMM.”
• On a road east of Nova Marivka, the SMM saw trees laid across the road as well as a mine hazard sign, preventing passage to the settlement.
• About 350m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM’s passage was prevented by a spool wire stretched across the road T-1316.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after 19 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 26 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).[6]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 26 and 27 August, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] In the SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019, 12 anti-tank mines seen near Shchastia were inaccurately reported as located south of the bridge. The mines were located about 160m north of the bridge.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

VIENNA/Tokyo, 29 August 2019 – Representatives of OSCE participating States, OSCE Asian Partner countries, international organizations, academia and private sector will meet at the 2019 OSCE Asian Conference in Tokyo on 2 and 3 September to discuss efforts to achieve comprehensive security in the digital era.

On Monday, 2 September the conference will be opened by Toshiko Abe, State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Alessandro Azzoni, Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE, Chair of the Contact Group with the OSCE Asian Partners for Co‑operation, and Paul Bekkers, Director of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General.

Three thematic sessions will cover specific areas of comprehensive security in the digital age, namely on tackling ICT security risks, the digital economy as a driver for promoting co‑operation, security and growth, as well as the risks to the safety of journalists.

Additionally, a side event will look into co-operation between OSCE Field Operations in Central Asia and neighbouring Afghanistan on border management for enhancing security and building partnerships.

The OSCE enjoys excellent co-operation with its five Asian Partners: Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, who collectively display a great interest in and commitment to the OSCE. The Partnership provides a platform for political dialogue and practical engagement by fostering productive collaboration and sharing best practices on issues of mutual concern.

The opening session on Monday, 2 September, from 9.45 to 10.30, and the closing session on Tuesday, from 12:00 to 13:00, are open to the media.

The conference will take place at the Conference room 760 (7th Floor), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Media representatives wishing to attend the conference are kindly requested to register (①Name ②Title ③Company ④Passport NO. ⑤pen or camera) by sending an email to ohseisaku@mofa.go.jp, Megumi KUSUBASHI (Ms.), Press Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, (+81) 3-5501-8295, by 13:00 on Friday, 30 August 2019 (JST).

BRATISLAVA /  BRUSSELS / GENEVA, 28 August 2019 -  The recent developments in the Gugutiantkari area have raised tensions on the ground and have humanitarian consequences for the local people.

As with all such fencing, the newly erected structures hinder freedom of movement for people living there, prevent them from reaching their orchards and threaten access to irrigation water.

Our visit is part of the GID Co-Chairs’ continual efforts to address the potential effects of this and other developments, ahead of the OSCE-EUMM-led Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting on Thursday 29 August.

We have been and will continue to be in contact with all relevant actors, drawing their attention to this and other pressing issues, and call on them to make full and responsible use of the existing mechanisms for communication to resolve the current and other concerns.

VIENNA, 28 August 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, expressed his concern today regarding the recent detentions of several journalists in Turkey, following public demonstrations in different Turkish cities after the removal of several mayors in south-east Turkey.

“Journalists should be guaranteed safe working conditions at all times, including while covering protests, and no journalist should be imprisoned in retaliation for their work,” said Désir.

Journalist Ziyan Karahan, who works for the Kurdish service of the Mezopotamya News Agency, and Jinnews reporter Yelda Özbek were detained in Diyarbakır on 19 and 20 August, respectively, and were released a few days later. Also on 20 August, the correspondents of Mezopotamya News Agency, Ahmet Kanbal and Mehmet Şah Oruç, as well as Jinnews reporter Rojda Aydın and journalists Nurcan Yalçın and Halime Parlak, were taken into custody by the police in Mardin. They were later released on 27 August.

In addition, on 22 August, Taylan Özgür Öztaş, a reporter for the Özgür Gelecek newspaper, and Tunahan Turhan, a reporter for the Etkin news agency, were detained in Istanbul. A writer and columnist for the Evrensel Daily, Ayşegül Tözeren, was taken into custody by the police on 20 August, following a midnight raid on her Istanbul home. All three were released from custody under judicial control measures on 23 August.

The Representative recalled that the 2007 Special Report on Handling of the Media during Political Demonstrations: Observations and Recommendations published by his Office states that “law-enforcement officials have a constitutional responsibility not to prevent or obstruct the work of journalists during public demonstrations, and journalists have a right to expect fair and restrained treatment by the police.”  

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom

428645 Communication and Media Relations Section

An interactive three-day Training-of-Trainers (ToT) course on mainstreaming gender in border security, organized by the OSCE’s Border Security and Management Unit of the Transnational Threats Department, concluded on 28 August 2019 in Vienna.

Twenty gender focal points from border security-related agencies of OSCE participating States learned about the principles of adult education, public speaking techniques and communication skills. They were trained on how to successfully convey the concept of mainstreaming gender to their leadership as well as to colleagues in their agencies and how to overcome resistance to this concept.

The participants, members of the OSCE Gender Equality Network, engaged in practical exercises on identification of cases of gender discrimination and sexual harassment, within their institutions but also in communities. They discussed possible ways forward to increase the participation and to achieve the successful recruitment of female border and police officers. The gender focal points also shared good practices and success stories on how to integrate a gender perspective in their work.

This ToT course is one of the main results of an extra-budgetary programme made possible by the financial contributions of Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway. In addition to this and several other training courses and activities, an online training course on mainstreaming gender in the security sector was developed in 2018.

Border security focal points from Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan attended the course.