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The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements”.  Its monitoring was restricted by third parties and security considerations *.  In Minsk the Chief Monitor of the SMM chaired the Trilateral Contact Group's Working Group on Security.  The SMM observed continuing ceasefire violations in and around Donetsk over an extended period during night and daytime hours.

In Minsk the SMM Chief Monitor chaired the Trilateral Contact Group's Working Group on Security. The participants intensively discussed security issues, in particular the situation in and around Shyrokyne but did not reach an agreement.

The SMM observed continuing ceasefire violations in the area of “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk.  From two observation  points,  the SMM heard over 300 explosions caused by incoming and outgoing heavy weapons fire, including artillery, and mortar during the night period from 20:48 hours on 18 May to 02:02 hours on 19 May and during the daytime period of 09:10 until 17:25 hours on 19 May.[1]  The SMM observed that the explosions occurred at locations to the west, north, north-east, and south of its Donetsk city centre and Donetsk central railway station positions at distances ranging from 2km to 8km from its positions. The SMM concluded that the explosions had occurred in or around the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk airport (10km north-west of Donetsk), Spartak (10km north-north-west of Donetsk), and the southerly part of Donetsk city, as well as government controlled Pisky (7km west of Donetsk) and Opytne (12km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM met with the Ukrainian Armed Forces Major-General and the Russian Federation Armed Forces Colonel-General at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination  (JCCC) HQ in Soledar (government-controlled, 77km north-north-east of Donetsk). The incident logs provided to the SMM by each party differed in attribution of responsibility, but both logs showed a total of 71 ceasefire violations, representing an increasing level of fighting in the general area of Donetsk (“DPR”-controlled) and in the directions of Horlivka (“DPR”-controlled, 43km north-east of Donetsk), and Pisky (government-controlled, 7km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM, jointly with JCCC officers representing both Russian Federation Armed Forces and Ukrainian Armed Forces, travelled to Pisky (government-controlled, 7km north-west of Donetsk), where it met with the Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander of a unit located in the south-eastern part of Pisky, who informed that during shelling in the evening of 18 May two soldiers were wounded, one seriously. The SMM was then guided to a spot allegedly impacted by a white phosphorus mortar grenade. According to one of the soldiers, the shelling occurred around midnight on 18 May. The SMM noted a crater of less than 1m in diameter and 50cm deep, and assessed it to be an impact of an 82mm mortar. Although both representatives of the JCCC claimed incoming white phosphorus mortar grenades were observed, the SMM was not able to confirm their usage, based on available evidence and analysis at the scene.

The SMM observed that the overall security situation in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) remained relatively calm for the fourth consecutive day, but the SMM heard 56 explosions late in the day at a distance of 5km E of SMM observation point at Sopyne (government-controlled 4.5km west of Shyrokyne, 16km east of Mariupol), from 17:45 to 18:04 hours.

In Mariupol (government-controlled, 103km south of Donetsk) at 10:00 hours, a group of around 25 citizens of various ages and including women and children, held a demonstration in front of the local SMM patrol hub. They expressed their opposition to proposed plans for the disengagement of forces in Shyrokyne, which they believe would make Mariupol vulnerable to attack. Many were wrapped in Ukrainian flags and some held placards. The SMM engaged with the protesters, listening to their concerns and explaining that the sides present in the JCCC worked out a plan to protect civilians in Shyrokyne.  After 10 minutes, the protesters dispersed. Some 10-15 media representatives covered the event, which took place in a peaceful and quiet atmosphere.

In the Luhansk region the SMM observed that the overall security situation remained calm.

In government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM spoke to three male interlocutors in their sixties who told the SMM that they are unable to plant their crops this year for fear of mines in the fields. The interlocutors’ concerns are based on information about mines apparently communicated to the villagers by soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and by an SMM-investigated incident on 24 March 2015 where a women lost her leg due to a mine.

The SMM spoke to the “mayor” of “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Krasnodon (43km south-east of Luhansk), who told the SMM that agriculture has suffered because of the conflict with 6000 out of 24,000 hectares in the district of Krasnodon affected by mines and unexploded ordnance. The district “emergency situations institution” has managed to clear approximately 4000 hectares and is expecting to clear the remaining 2000 hectares in the next few months to be able to plant. According to the interlocutor, agriculture is considered the second most important economic resource in this district, just after mining. It presently generated 12% of revenues for Krasnodon. According to the interlocutor, 4500 people work in agriculture, mostly for the 117 agricultural enterprises located in the area.  As a result of the conflict, production of vegetables has fallen (from formerly 230 hectares being cultivated to now 30 hectares).

Despite claims that the withdrawal of heavy weapons has been completed, the SMM observed nine tanks (T-72) in the general vicinity of Torez (“DPR”-controlled, 58km east of Donetsk). The SMM also observed a total of another eight tanks (T-64) in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, four in government-controlled areas and four in “LPR”-controlled areas.

The SMM, along with representatives of the European Union Advisory Mission and Amnesty International, visited two allegedly Russian soldiers at the Central Military Hospital in Kyiv, where the two men are detained and under strong guard. The short 10-minute visit was conducted as part of the SMM monitoring function, under the supervision of the State Security Service of Ukraine. The responsible doctors told the SMM and the other international visitors that the two men were being treated after being injured in fighting around the town of Shchastya (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk). (See the SMM daily report of 19 May 2015 (http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/158871).

The SMM attempted to escort an OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) delegation to Donetsk from Dnepropetrovsk. However, while en route near Slavyanka (government-controlled, 123km east of Dnepropetrovsk), the ODIHR delegation received a phone call from “DPR spokesperson” Denis Pushilin and were advised the “DPR” would not allow them to come to Donetsk. The ODIHR delegation then travelled to Kramatorsk with the SMM.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Odessa, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lviv.

* Restrictions on SMM access and freedom of movement:

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by third parties and security considerations including the lack of information on whereabouts of landmines.

The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere.

• The SMM was stopped by two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers approximately 400m from a UAF military position near Luhanske village (government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). Access to part of the village was denied on the grounds that it was a restricted military area.

• The SMM dispatched a patrol to a heavy weapons holding area previously monitored by the SMM. The Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander did not allow access to the site on the grounds that an appointment was necessary.

• The SMM visited a “DPR” shooting range near Ternove (“DPR”-controlled, 163km north-east of Donetsk) and spoke to the personnel at the location. The SMM was informed that the SMM would not be able to observe the heavy weapons for security reasons.

 

[1]  For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

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• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 15 May 2015

Turkey’s foreign relations, particularly with European capitals and Washington, have been plagued for decades by the debate of whether to use the term genocide in reference to the massacres and forced relocation of the Armenian community of Anatolia from 1915 to 1918.

(B2) Les militaires français déployés au nord du Mali dans le cadre de l’opération Barkhane ont réussi à « neutraliser » deux des principaux chefs d’AQMI et d’Ansar Eddine. « Dans la nuit du 17 au 18 mai, les forces spéciales françaises ont conduit une opération dans le Nord du Mali. Quatre terroristes ont été tués au cours des combats. Parmi eux figurent Amada Ag Hama alias « Abdelkrim le Touareg » et Ibrahim Ag Inawalen alias « Bana », deux des principaux chefs d’AQMI et d’Ansar Eddine. ». Après avoir « mis hors de combat Ahmed El Tilemsi, haut responsable du MUJAO » cette opération, « porte un nouveau coup dur aux groupes armés terroristes sahéliens » indique un communiqué du ministère français de la Défense.

Crédit : DR / EDA

<p>">(B2) Le prix de thèse EDA-Egmont a été décerné cette année à <p>">Andrea Gilli, chercheur du <p>">Center for Security Studies, de l’Université de Prague, pour sa thèse intitulée « Unipolarité, changement technologique et fabrication d’armes, alliances industrielles dans l’industrie européenne de défense ».

« La lutte contre le problème de la coopération en matière d’armement est non seulement hautement politique, mais aussi très technique » a souligné le professeur Sven Biscop d’Egmont, président du jury. « <p>">Gilli a très bien réussi, avec audace. Sa thèse est la plus instructive, et reste très lisible pour les universitaires et les praticiens. Contrairement à de nombreuses thèses sur des sujets européens, Gilli ne cherche pas à apporter un festival de bonnes nouvelles. Au contraire, il démontre pourquoi la coopération en matière d’armement est le plus difficile là où intuitivement on pouvait s’y attendre que ce soit plus évident. De cette leçon austère, on peut tirer des implications politiques et dessiner une façon d’agir pour l’avenir <p>"> ».

<p>">Le lauréat recevra une bourse de 2000 €. Mais aura surtout « l’occasion de partager ses vues avec les dirigeants de haut niveau lors de la prochaine Conférence annuelle de l’AED le 16 novembre prochain » a complété le directeur de l’AED, Jorge Domecq.

Huit thèses avaient été soumises au jury du prix, présidé par le Professeur Sven Biscop, et composé de Jorge Domecq, directeur de l’Agence européenne de défense, du Général Patrick de Rousiers, président du Comité militaire de l’UE, de Antonio Missiroli, directeur de l’Institut d’études de la Sécurité de l’UE, de Hilmar Linnenkamp, ​​conseiller au SWP et des professeurs Jolyon Howorth (Université de Bath / Université de Yale) et <p>"> Richard Whitman (Université de Kent).

Créé en 2013, le prix EDA-Egmont vise à stimuler la recherche dans le domaine de la défense européenne, de la sécurité et de la stratégie. ll récompense <p>"> les travaux de recherche entrepris dans le cadre d’une thèse de doctorat effectuée dans une institution académique reconnue. L’année dernière, il avait été décerné à Benjamin Pohl pour un travail sur les opérations de la PSDC (lire : Et le prix est décerné à …)

(NGV)

Plenartagung : EU-Importeure von Zinn, Tantal, Wolfram und Gold für die Herstellung von Verbrauchsgütern müssen durch die EU zertifiziert werden, um zu gewährleisten, dass sie keine Konflikte anheizen oder Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Konfliktgebieten fördern. So lautet die Position des Parlaments zu dem entsprechenden Gesetzentwurf, die die Abgeordneten am Mittwoch mit 402 Stimmen, bei 118 Gegenstimmen und 171 Enthaltungen angenommen haben.

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2015 - EP

Le chanteur belge Stromae est en tourn�e africaine. Ecout�es au premier degr� ou pastich�es, les chansons de son album "Racine carr�e" illustrent la politique du continent.

D’où vient cet intérêt des sociétés chinoises pour le football européen ?

C’est un mouvement global. Les pays asiatiques sont passionnés de sport, et les paris y sont extrêmement importants. Et on voit de plus en plus de fortunes, personnelles ou de groupe, qui se sont constituées et cherchent à investir dans le sport car elles ont compris, après d’autres, qu’il est un élément de visibilité rapide et populaire. Ils peuvent se faire connaître de façon sympathique.

Pourquoi la France en particulier ?

C’est le bon moment car les clubs ne sont pas chers. Ledus a payé 7 millions pour Sochaux, qui est club historique en France, dispose d’un potentiel intéressant en termes important d’image, de notoriété. Au contraire, en Angleterre les prix sont prohibitifs et l’Allemagne interdit des partenaires étrangers majoritaires dans ses clubs. Le foot italien et espagnol se porte économiquement mal. Donc la France paraît attractive et moins onéreuse.

Est-ce la même motivation que le Qatar ?

Le Qatar a montré l’exemple. Le succès économique des Chinois est plus ancien, mais leurs investissements à l’étranger plus récents. Des fortunes se tirent la bourre et, pour se distinguer, se servent de leur surplus économique dans le football.

Cet engagement est-il durable ?

Cela dépend si ce sont des investissements personnels ou de société. On a vu avec Mammadov pour Lens que quand une personne est seule, elle est soumise aux aléas et le vent peut tourner. Avec Rybolovlev à Monaco aussi, son divorce lui a coûté cher, et même s’il est resté, il a dû changer de politique. Les investissements d’une firme sont plus pérennes que ceux d’un milliardaire.

Faut-il se réjouir l’arrivée de capitaux étrangers en France ?

Pour un club comme Sochaux, c’est forcément une bouffée d’oxygène par rapport à leur situation : le club est descendu l’an dernier, le propriétaire historique (PSA-Peugeot, ndlr) ne peut pas mettre d’argent, le centre de formation n’est pas mis en valeur comme avant… Même si l’investissement chinois n’est pas à long terme, s’il leur permet de revenir en Ligue 1 dans les deux ans, ce sera déjà ça ! Il y a plein de clubs à vendre. Et pour suivre sportivement, leurs dirigeants savent que les capitaux étrangers sont les bienvenus.

A folytatódó ukrán konfliktus ellenére a másfél évvel ezelőtti viharos vilniusi találkozónál jóval nyugodtabb keleti partnerségi csúcstalálkozónak adhat otthont csütörtökön és pénteken a lett főváros. Moszkvának az a bejelentése is javíthatja az általános közérzetet, hogy már nem áll az EU és Ukrajna közötti mély- és átfogó szabadkereskedelmi megállapodás 2015. január 1-i hatályba léptetésének az útjába, amit úgysem tudott volna megakadályozni.

Positives Signal für die Innovationskraft der deutschen Wirtschaft: Die Zahl der Arbeitnehmer sogenannter MINT-Berufe steigt dank der Zuwanderung aus dem EU-Ausland und Indien. Die Unternehmen leiden dennoch unter einem latenten Fachkräftemangel - auch aufgrund von Ausländerfeindlichkeit in den ostdeutschen Bundesländern, mahnten Experten und Wirtschaftsverbände bei der Vorstellung eines aktuellen Gutachtens.

DROI will hold an exchange of views jointly with the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence with Mr Habib Essid, Prime Minister of Tunisia. This will be Mr Essid's first visit to the European Parliament following his appointment as Prime Minister in February this year.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Meurtre de Zoran Đinđić : peines confirmées en appel pour Miloš Simović et Sretko Kalinić
Serbie : la justice espagnole autorise l'extradition d'un des meurtriers de Zoran Đinđić
Serbie : « le clan de Zemun est définitivement démantelé »
Les dernières heures des « guerriers des Balkans » : la fin de la mafia serbe ?

/ B 92, Serbie, Défense, police et justice

Avec l'arrivée de producteurs venus des affaires, le conformisme des sociétés de financement ne laisse guère de place à l'épanouissement de cinéastes originaux. Les nouveaux auteurs doivent oublier l'idée de vivre de leur création et apprendre la débrouille. / France, Art, Audiovisuel, Cinéma, Culture, (...) / France, Art, Audiovisuel, Cinéma, Culture, Entreprise, Finance - 2014/10

/ Allemagne, Travail, Chômage - Europe / Allemagne, Travail, Chômage - Europe

Plenáris ülés : A balkáni országban kialakult politikai helyzetről vitázik az EP szerda délután Federica Mogherini uniós külügyi főképviselővel. Macedónia Volt Jugoszláv Köztársaság 2005 decembere óta uniós tagjelölt ország, az elmúlt napokban viszont a kormányellenes és kormánypárti tüntetések apropóján szerepelt a hírekben. A plenáris vita előtt Alojz Peterlét, az országgal foglalkozó parlamenti küldöttség elnökét kérdeztük.

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2015 - EP

A szenátus után a képviselőház is elutasította ma az államfő kérését, hogy elemezzék újra és módosítsák az erdészeti kerettörvényt. Klaus Johannis többek között azt a cikkelyt kifogásolta, amely megakadályozná, hogy egy cégcsoport monopolhelyzetbe jusson a favásárlás során. Az államfő a versenytanács felhívása nyomán azt mondta, ez a korlátozás sérti az uniós piaci versenyre vonatkozó törvényeket. Mivel a parlament elutasította az államfő kifogásait, Klaus Johannisnak az eredeti formában kell kihirdetnie a törvényt. Másodszor már nem fordíthatja vissza a parlamentben. Az erdészeti törvény körül kialakult vita és az illegális fakivágások elleni országos tüntetések következtében az államfő bejelentette, hogy az illegális erdőkitermelés kérdését a Legfelsőbb Védelmi Tanács is megvitatja a júniusi ülésén.

The return of a majority Conservative government following the May 2015 general election in the UK has made the Conservative Party’s plans for reforming human rights law in the United Kingdom a likely prospect. It is recalled that on 3 October 2014, the Conservative Party published a policy document that sets out its proposal to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and replace it with a British Bill of Rights.

In addition, the policy document raises the prospect that the UK might withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) though this is less clearly formulated. It expresses a general desire for the UK to remain part of the ECHR, but only if ‘the Council [of Europe] will recognise these changes to our Human Rights laws’. It contains the warning that in ‘the event that we are unable to reach that agreement, the UK would be left with no alternative but to withdraw from the ECHR, at the point at which our Bill comes into effect’.

The Conservative Party’s election manifesto repeats the party’s intention to ‘scrap’ the HRA and replace it with a British Bill of Rights. It also promises to ‘curtail the role of the European Court of Human Rights’ but, in contrast to the policy document from October 2014, does not mention withdrawal from the ECHR, so that one must presume that this is not a manifesto commitment.

These plans raise a host of legal questions, some of which were discussed at a workshop held at Edinburgh Law School in February, which had received the support of a UACES Small Events Grant.[1] The product is a policy paper. The following are its key findings.

It is axiomatic that the HRA can be repealed by Act of Parliament. However, any attempt to repeal and/or replace it would need to take into account the devolution settlement. The legal situation in this respect is not obvious.  Repeal of the HRA might trigger the Sewel Convention so that the devolved legislatures might need to be asked for their consent. Depending on timing, at the point at which an Act repealing the HRA is passed, the Convention may be enshrined in statute following the recommendations of the Smith Commission. This might make a repeal if not legally impossible then politically very difficult. For instance, the Scottish government seems opposed to a repeal. As regards Northern Ireland, a repeal would at present run counter to the UK’s international treaty obligations under the British-Irish Agreement, which was incorporated in, and agreed as part of the UK-Ireland obligations under the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. The Agreement places the UK under an international treaty obligation to ‘complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the ECHR’.

If the HRA is replaced by a British Bill of Rights it might require the consent of the devolved legislatures. In substantive terms, it would provide Parliament with the opportunity to provide for the protection of additional (non-Convention) rights. Having said that, the political dynamic surrounding the possible repeal of the HRA suggests that rights protected will be curtailed rather than expanded. Moreover, it would also allow Parliament to introduce certain procedural changes, such as no longer making it mandatory for courts ‘to take into account’ the case law of the ECtHR or to read legislation ‘as far as it is possible to do so’ compatibly with Convention rights.

In the unlikely event that the HRA were not replaced (or if a replacement leaves significant gaps in the human rights protection), individuals would still be able to rely on common law remedies, as far as they exist, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in cases in which the UK has acted within the scope of EU law. Given that the Charter is based on the ECHR, in some areas a repeal of the HRA might not lead to the desired result.  Moreover, if the UK remains a party to the ECHR the right to lodge a complaint with the ECtHR would still exist.

Withdrawal from the ECHR is technically possible with six months’ notice.  It would, however, have wider consequences for the UK’s other international commitments in that long-term membership of the Council of Europe may become impossible and a withdrawal from the ECHR may be incompatible with the UK’s commitments as a member of the European Union. Importantly, it would not relieve the UK of the duty to comply with judgments already handed down by the ECtHR, for instance on prisoner voting. Moreover, the UK would also be setting a negative example internationally.

[1] The workshop consisted of presentations by Ed Bates, Christine Bell, Colm O’Cinneide, Fiona de Londras, Sir David Edward, Alan Greene, Paul Johnson, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, and Tobias Lock.

 

The post The Legal Implications of a Repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Withdrawal from the ECHR appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A Gazdasági Világfórum által kétévente felállított ranglistán 141 ország szerepel. A besorolásuk nem arra vonatkozik, hogy melyik országokat érdemes meglátogatni, hanem arra, hogy melyik országban éri meg leginkább a turisztikai ágazatba befektetni. A világranglistát a nyugat-európai államok vezetik, az első három helyezett Spanyolország, Franciaország és Németország. Románia ezzel szemben nem csak világszinten, hanem a régióban is rosszul teljesít, Magyarország és Bulgária több pozícióval is megelőzi országunkat. A Transindex portálon közölt elemzés szerint Románia a viszonylag rossz helyezését leginkább a légi és közúti infrastruktúrában és az üzleti környezetben tapasztalt hiányosságok, illetve a természeti erőforrásokhoz való viszonyulás miatt kapta.

A képviselőház illetékes szakbizottságai pozitívan véleményezték azt a jogszabálytervezetet, amely szerint július 1-től a munkáltatók legtöbb 6000 lejes vakációs jegyet kell adjanak alkalmazottaiknak. Az intézkedés az állami és a magánszektorra egyaránt vonatkozna. A cégek az így elköltött összeget leírhatnák adójukból. A munkavállalók csak a hazai üdülőközpontokban használhatnák fel az értékjegyet. A kezdeményezést a parlamentnek is el kell még fogadnia.

Una lectura cuidadosa y distinta de la impopularidad del presidente. No le ha ido tan mal como a los gobernantes de países vecinos y –sobre todo- la causa de su mala imagen bien puede convertirse en su mayor activo. ¿Qué debe hacer entonces?