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Russia is sending Thursday yet another convoy to Ukraine's crisis-torn Donbass.

The World Health Organization (WHO) today reported “a substantial increase” in the weekly total of new Ebola cases in Guinea and Sierra Leone and deployed a response team to the border with Guinea-Bissau because of its proximity to a recent cluster of cases in a neighbouring Guinean prefecture.

May 20, 2015 (KHARTOUM) - The controller-general of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, Ali Gawish, has vehemently attacked the stance of the government towards the death sentence issued by an Egyptian court against ousted president Mohamed Morsi.

Egypt's ousted Islamist President Mohamed Morsi sits in a defendant cage in the Police Academy courthouse in Cairo, on 8 May 2014 (Photo AP/Tarek el-Gabbas)

On Saturday, a court in Cairo sentenced to death Morsi and 105 co-defendants for allegedly taking part in a mass jailbreak during Egypt's January 2011 uprising that ousted then president Hosni Mubarak.

Sudan's foreign ministry spokesperson, Ali al-Sadig, said in press statements on Monday that “ongoing trials in Egypt are an internal matter and the [Sudanese] government does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries”.

Gawish, who spoke in a press conference in Khartoum on Wednesday, described statements of the Sudanese foreign ministry as “weak and confounded”, saying the spokesperson was unable to use suitable words to disguise his fear.

He expressed astonishment at the diplomatic talk that Sudan does not interfere in other countries' affairs, wondering why the foreign ministry did not describe Sudan's political and military participation in the “Decisive Storm” campaign against Yemen as interference in the latter's internal matters.

“Why they [Sudanese government] gave themselves the right to support General Khalifa Haftar in Libya while at the same time they consider the ongoing events in Egypt who is much closer to us an internal affair?” he exclaimed.

The controller-general said the regime in Sudan was part of the Muslim Brotherhood, pointing that several government officials are still proud of that fact.

He listed evidences for previous roles played by Sudan and Sudanese leaders in the Arab and Islamic worlds, lamenting the current situation in the country which reached the extent that the government considers what is going on in Egypt an internal matter.

“The fire which burns Egypt would soon reach Sudan and if the [government] is unable to take a clear stance towards issues, its rhetoric should be more prudent and not in this shameful manner,” he said.

Gawish also criticized the leader of the opposition National Umma Party (NUP), al-Sadig al-Mahdi, saying he is not qualified to advice the Egyptian president, Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi because he lives as a refugee in his country.

“Sadig's letter to [al-Sisi] in this regard was inappropriate because he is a refugee in Egypt and his letter was worthless. Although he initially justified measures taken by al-Sissi against the Muslim Brotherhood, he returned to advice him using weak language,” he added.

Earlier this week, al-Mahdi wrote an open letter to al-Sisi in which he criticized the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood before he asked him to grant the convicts from the group a general pardon.

The secretary general of the Islamic Constitution Front (ICF), Naser al-Sayed, for his part said that Egypt is facing a Zionist plot which seeks to extinguish the flame of the awakening which has emerged across the Muslim world.

“Egypt is the navel of the Arab and Muslim world and thus they seek to destroy it along with the Muslim Brotherhood which is considered the oldest and strongest and Islamic movement in the world,” he said

He added the Muslim Brotherhood was targeted because it is the only party capable of mobilizing Muslim peoples to counter the worldwide attack on Islam.

The ICF called on Sudanese peoples to take to the streets following Friday prayers to protest against the death sentences handed down to dozens of the Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt.

In 2013, Khartoum sought to strike a neutral tone following the move by the Egyptian army to overthrow Morsi after unprecedented multi-million strong demonstrations against him before it returned and described it as an "internal affair" that concerns Egypt's people, national institutions and political leadership.

Morsi is the first president to be referred to the mufti in Egypt's history. The opinion of the mufti is not binding to the court, but Egyptian law makes it necessary for judges to seek a religious point of view on any death sentence.

The court decision against Morsi and his aides drew condemnation from US, Turkey, Germany and the European Union (EU) with the rights group Amnesty International describing it as “nothing but a charade based on null and void procedure”.

(ST)

May 20, 2015 (ADDIS ABABA) – South Sudan's armed opposition faction led by former vice president, Riek Machar, said their forces have tactically withdrawn from the oil-rich Melut town which they captured on Tuesday from president Salva Kiir's government.

South Sudanese soldiers stand during President Salva Kiir's visit to an oil refinery in Melut, Upper Nile State, South Sudan on November 20, 2012 (Getty Images)

Melut town which the rebel forces controlled for the last 48 hours is the biggest town near the country's main oilfields of Paloch and the headquarters of Melut county in Upper Nile state.

Rebel leader's spokesman said the opposition forces on Wednesday afternoon made a tactical withdrawal to a few kilometres in the outskirts of the town, adding that they would move back to the town centre any time soon.

“Our forces have tactically withdrawn to a few kilometres outside Melut town in order to reorganize for next move,” Machar's spokesman, James Gatdet Dak, said in a press statement extended to Sudan Tribune on Wednesday.

He said the rebel forces have also remained in full control of the country's Thiangrial refinery site in the area, which they captured from the government forces on Tuesday.

He said the temporary withdrawal from town centre was meant to reorganize various forces and for careful planning to dislodge government forces from Paloch oilfields in a way that should avoid damage to oil facilities.

“Paloch oilfields have remained besieged and our forces are waiting for next order to move in. We intend to avoid a takeover that may damage oil facilities,” he said.

When contacted on Wednesday he told Sudan Tribune that ground assault on the main oilfields had not yet taken place, adding this would take place “anytime soon.”

He also accused government forces of preventing some of the oil workers to leave the oilfields, saying they were holding them hostage as human shield. The rebel leader's spokesman said Juba will be held responsible for the lives of the detained oil workers.

ANOTHER GUNSHIP SHOT DOWN

Dak said the rebel forces also gunned down another helicopter gunship on Wednesday, saying it fell in Melut town and could easily be verified independently.

“SPLM/SPLA is hereby announcing that its forces have shot down another helicopter gunship on Wednesday in Melut town, South Sudan,” Dak said.

“The gunship was carrying out air raid on positions of our forces near Paloch oilfields and inside Melut town when it met its fate. It fell inside Melut town and can be easily independently verified,” he added.

Last week the rebel group claimed that it downed a gunship over Upper Nile state's capital, Malakal and fell in the bushes. They said the gunship belonged to Uganda air force, a claim denied by the Ugandan military spokesman, Paddy Arkunda.

The statement on the latest shooting down of the second helicopter did not however said the identity of the aircraft.

(ST)

Die Sindelfinger Zeitung/Böblinger Zeitung erhält für ihr Infopaket „Zerreißprobe“, einer Serie über Geothermie-Schäden, den ersten Preis.

Or, what IR theory can teach you about living a happy and productive life.

From left front: Falah Mustafa Bakir, Qubad Talabani, and President Masoud Barzani meet with President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden (third and fourth from right front) in the White House, May 5, 2015.

After a perilous roller coaster ride in 2014, the question of independence for the Kurdistan Region moves back to the front burner.

With the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) latest victory in Ramadi, contentions its rapid advances had stalled must be revisited. In the wake of the visit to Washington by Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) president, Masoud Barzani, the question of KRG priorities and strategies might once again be changing.

The Islamic State’s blitzkrieg into Mosul last summer, and the failure of the Iraqi Army to do anything but flee, created a new capital for the self-described caliphate.  It caused a humanitarian disaster for Yezidis, Christians and others. And it fomented an urgency among many in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, who sensed that Baghdad could not defend the country, and so the Kurdistan Region (KR) would have to defend itself – independently.

ISIS’s pivot to Kurdistan later in the summer, threatening its capital, Erbil, was frightful and sobering. Even with the dedicated efforts of the Region’s militia (the peshmerga), the KRG and its people recognized it needed significant outside help from Europe, the United States and elsewhere to defend itself.

In September 2014, Haider al-Abadi became Iraq’s prime minister, replacing Nouri al-Maliki, in whom the KRG had no confidence. In December, Erbil and Baghdad reached an agreement that was supposed to resolve the struggle over oil exports and finances between Baghdad and Erbil. But it is not clear that the KRG believes Baghdad has lived up to its end of the agreement.

In May 2015, Barzani brought specific goals and a clear message to Washington. He spoke at the Atlantic Council and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). At each, he was pressed on the relevant issues:  does he believe he will get the necessary weapons that have been promised?  what is the status of Baghdad-Erbil relations?  What role do Iran and Turkey play in all this calculus? What is the status of the extra-constitutional extension of his term limits? And will – or when will — the Kurdistan Region make a formal move toward independence?

Barzani’s answers were clear. The Kurdistan Region is grateful, he emphasized, for the U.S. and allied air strikes against ISIS, and for humanitarian aid for the 1.5 million refugees. But, he continued, the peshmerga need the weapons that Western states have promised, in order to fight ISIS. Washington is debating whether to deliver the weapons directly, or continue to deliver them through Baghdad. Barzani said after his meetings at the White House, he was confident they would be received.

The defeat of ISIS is the first priority, Barzani clarified. Defending the Region but allowing ISIS to survive in Syria or other parts of Iraq would not be sufficient, he said, since they would remain a threat. The defeat of ISIS, Barzani explained, is a necessary step before the inevitable task ahead. The Kurdistan Region needs and is entitled to self-governance. After the defeat of ISIS, it will hold a referendum for the people to decide whether to voluntarily remain part of Iraq.  On May 6, Barzani elaborated:

“Right now our country is in a fight against ISIS. The fight is not over. But the – that’s why the issue of referendum has been delayed. Of course, the referendum will take place. The first step for that has taken place, when the parliament in Kurdistan approved the establishment of the Commission for Elections and for Referendum. That was the first step. It will take place when the security situation is better, when the fight against ISIS is over. And of course, the people of Kurdistan have to be given the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination for them to tell us and to tell the rest of the world what do they want, what’s their dream, what’s their aspirations.”

Barzani repeated this plan two days later:

“Of course, right now, the priority for all of us is fighting ISIS, to continue to push them out and away from our areas. But the process for the referendum to take place for the people of Kurdistan to determine their future and for the people of Kurdistan to exercise the right to self-determination is a process that has happened.  It will not stop and we will not step back on that process. We are determined, and we insist on continuing the path.”

What does the KRG need for independence?

The KRG and the Kurdistan Region need what any new or existing country needs: self-identity, security, an economy and international recognition. None of these is without complications.

Self-identity the Kurds have, but with some qualifications. The Kurds themselves have a clear awareness of their history and geography. They were promised, and then denied, their own state after World War I. Since the 1991 Gulf War, and especially since 2003, they have governed themselves with considerable autonomy, some material success, and efforts toward democracy. But most of the Middle East’s 30-35 million Kurds live outside the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, in neighboring Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Assyrians in Iraq, even before the rise and expansion of ISIS, had demands for their own autonomy, including in “disputed territories” controlled by the KRG.

Security is a more difficult matter. The risk from ISIS persists. Western air strikes on ISIS have provided vital assistance. Risks of terrorist attacks from ISIS inspiration continue as well, as arrests this week and in recent months demonstrate.

More significant security concerns may be related to the question of international recognition. Most critically, the KRG can only move forward if it knows that it has the support of the United States, or Baghdad, or both. It must know how Turkey and Iran will react toward their own Kurdish areas, and toward the KR itself. The name of a new country may be challenged, as Greece challenged the newly independent “Macedonia” after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Ideally, there will need to be at least an informal arrangement with the Kurdish areas in Syria. At the Atlantic Council and CFR, Barzani emphasized that any process would have to be diplomatic and peaceful, but that a vote on independence was inevitable.

Peshmerga soldier battles the Islamic State, December 2014.

Finally, security and international recognition are essential for any newly-independent Kurdistan economy. The KRG will have to provide its own funding; this means exporting oil. Since the KR is landlocked, that means exports through Turkey or Iraq. The United States and others will need to permit such sales on the world market, and the KRG will need legitimate buyers.

The new government will also need local and international legitimacy. After the celebration, the citizens’ demands will include real democracy.  The Barzani and Talabani families have done much in setting the KRG in the right direction, and in continuing to pledge a democratic future.  They will be challenged to sustain and improve their respectable treatment of religious minorities; to balance internal security concerns with protections for ethnic minorities; to minimize corruption; to resolve finance, oil, border, security questions within transparent rule of law, to develop a rich civil society, free and fair elections, and capable political parties, and to nurture a political environment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in law and in fact.  This was a difficult list for Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s; it may prove Herculean amidst the challenges of the Middle East.

Change of Plans?

A resurgence of the Islamic State, though, might force the KRG to reprioritize its “defeat Daesh, then vote on independence” strategy. Erbil may rely on good relations with the current Iraqi prime minister, but can it rely on the next one? Will Baghdad be able to coordinate support from Shiite militias, Sunni tribes, the Iraqi Army, and Western air strikes? Will Baghdad devote more resources to protecting Karbala and Najaf, at the expense of Sunni or Kurdish areas?  If Baghdad cannot protect major cities like Mosul and Ramadi from ISIS – will the Kurds decide they are better off alone?

Barzani laid out his priorities (without a specific timeline): defeat ISIS, then a referendum.  There is no evidence so far that the Obama administration is ready to give up the Bush/Obama commitment to a single, unified, peaceful, democratic Iraq.  But last summer the facts on the ground changed quickly and frequently. The question now will not be how vigilant are Erbil, Washington, and others, but how agile.

Photo 1:  WhiteHouse.gov, https://www.flickr.com/photos/whitehouse/17384259745/

Photo 2: Voice of America, http://gdb.voanews.com/80D2A2EC-6AE0-47ED-ADC4-381FC85F54D2_mw1024_s_n.jpg

Road to South Ossetia’s capital, Tskhinvali, courtesy Nir Nussbaum/Flickr

Just over two months ago, newspapers and other media outlets provided substantial coverage of Russia’s activities in Crimea, more specifically the “celebration” marking one year since Russia’s annexation of the region. Someone in the Kremlin perhaps saw an opportunity to take advantage of the media hubbub: That same day, March 18, Russia also effectively grew by about 50,000 people and 3,900 sq. km.

This sudden growth spurt comes as a result of a Treaty on Alliance and Integration signed by Russia and South Ossetia. “A joint defense and security zone will be created between our two countries, our customs agencies will be integrated, and border crossings for our citizens will become open,” Vladimir Putin said.

The EU, unsurprisingly, did not see it that way. A statement issued by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, noted:

Like previous agreements signed between the Russian Federation and the two Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, this “treaty” – which includes references to a transfer of powers in some areas – clearly violates Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, principles of international law and the international commitments taken by the Russian Federation, including the 12 August 2008 Agreement and its Implementing Measures of 8 September 2008 and has no legal standing.

One commentator wondered whether the agreement was political homework for South Ossetia’s politicians, set by the Kremlin. There was disagreement among those in parliament; RFE/RL reported on dissent in the ranks over the degree of cooperation expected by Russia, just one week before the treaty was signed. But whoever gained top marks from the Kremlin would likely succeed in future political endeavors, a tempting carrot to dangle.

Was this treaty entered into willingly? There’s a short summary of the history of South Ossetia over at FPRI. Given many South Ossetian’s misgivings about Georgia, the biggest benefit in choosing Russia as a protector is clearly security: The 2008 conflict demonstrated Russia’s might in the region. However, as Larisa Sotieva noted, “Albeit rarely, some have even been heard to question what difference it would make – to lose ones’ identity as a nation to Georgia or to the vastness of Russia?” When you believe yourself to be between a rock and a hard place, which do you choose?

Georgia too is feeling the repercussions, and in such a way that should concern Western leaders. Although it issued a nicely-worded statement on South Ossetia, the EU has not delivered tangible benefits (such as visa-free travel to EU states) for Georgians. Ghia Nodia, a political scientist at a Georgian University warns that “Putin looks like a strong guy who’s getting his way, so people think, what exactly are the benefits from Europe? Maybe it’s silly to resist Russia so much.”

While the events of March 2015 may not have registered on the global radar, it seems that calling them a “blip,” an anomaly, is misguided. But getting drawn into another conflict over a territory that seems to have sealed its own fate with open eyes is also not a path many wish to go down.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The media has been understandably preoccupied with how various Republican candidates for president have sought to explain their positions on Iraq circa 2002. That is a legitimate subject for attention, and it is not unreasonable to expect candidates for the role of commander-in-chief to be able to speak with nuance about the myriad different topics ...

Osama Bin Laden spent the latter years of his life portraying himself as an authority on Islamic law who was qualified to order Muslims around the world to strike Western targets — and then capable of giving them the purported scriptural justifications for their actions.

Az Ukrán Ortodox Egyház Moszkvai Patriarchátushoz tartozó több tíz lelkész -a megtorlástól való félelem miatt - Ukrajna elhagyását tervezi – írja a Rusvesna. Erről Dmitrij Szafonov a régió kapcsolatokért felelős lelkésze nyilatkozott az EBESZ konferencián Bécsben.

Vegyesvállalatot alapított Oroszországban a Hortobágyi Lúdtenyésztő Zrt. A magyar cég és a kazanyi székhelyű Ekoferma Zvenyigovo vezetői kedden írták alá a megállapodást a moszkvai magyar nagykövetségen a magyar és az orosz agrártárca képviselői jelenlétében. Varga Ferenc, a társaság tulajdonos-vezérigazgatója az MTI-nek elmondta, hogy tavaly december elején vették fel vele a kapcsolatot az Ekoferma alapítói, akik víziszárnyasok tenyésztéséhez kerestek partnert.

Megjelent a "Mikro-, kis- és középvállalkozások piaci megjelenésének támogatása" című pályázat

A pályázat célja:
A vállalkozások külföldi piacokra kijutását elősegítő Felhívás célja mikro-, kis- és középvállalkozások támogatása külföldi kiállításokon és vásárokon való megjelenésben, árubemutatók és üzletember találkozók megszervezésében. Mindezen célok eredményeként megvalósulhat a mikro-, kis- és középvállalkozások exportképességének és versenyképességének növekedése, a helyi, nemzeti és nemzetközi hálózatokba történő bekapcsolódása, a szomszédos országokkal való együttműködések fejlődése, valamint a régióval folytatott külkereskedelmi tevékenységek fejlődése is. A projektek által teremtett új munkahelyek révén nőhet a foglalkoztatás is. A projektet 24 hónap alatt kell megvalósítani!

Benyújtási határidő:
2015. június 22-től 2017. június 22-ig
Támogatás összege:
1.500.000.- forinttól 20.000.000.- forintig, DE az igényelhető támogatási összeg nem haladhatja meg a támogatási kérelem beadását megelőző teljes lezárt üzleti év éves átlagos statisztikai állományi létszámának 1 000 000 Ft-tal
szorzott összegét.

Támogatás mértéke:
Az összes elszámolható költség 50%-a. Budapesten és Pest megyében nem vehető igénybe a támogatás!

Támogatható tevékenységek:
a) Külföldi kiállításon vagy vásáron való részvétel – önállóan támogatható
tevékenység
b) Külföldi árubemutató szervezése – önállóan támogatható tevékenység
Önállóan nem támogatható, kapcsolódó tevékenységek:
c) Piacra jutás támogatása - önállóan nem támogatható
d) Információs technológia-fejlesztés – önállóan nem támogatható
e) Tanácsadás igénybevétele – önállóan nem támogatható
f) Piackutatás elkészítésének költsége – önállóan nem támogatható
g) Szabadalmak és egyéb immateriális javak megszerzésének, érvényesítésének és védelmének költsége – önállóan nem támogatható
h) Innovációs tanácsadás és innovációs támogató szolgáltatás költsége – önállóan nem támogatható

Kötelező vállalások:
a) Létszámtartás
b) Külkereskedelmi felelős kijelölése
c) Piackutatás elkészítése
d) Idegen nyelvű honlap kialakítása legalább 2 idegen nyelven

Támogatást igénylők köre:
1. mikro-, kis- és középvállalkozások
a) melyek éves átlagos statisztikai állományi létszáma a támogatási kérelem benyújtását megelőző legutolsó lezárt, teljes üzleti évben minimum 2 fő volt,
b) melyek magas szinten feldolgozott terméket előállító iparágak
vállalkozásai, amelyek hozzáadott érték-növekedési potenciállal vagy
exportnövekedési potenciállal bírnak, és a fejlesztés eredményeként helyi, nemzeti, de főleg nemzetközi hálózatokba kapcsolódnak be vagy részvételük intenzitása ilyen tekintetben növekszik.
c) melyek fejlesztése az 1. számú szakmai mellékletben („Ágazati fókusz”) foglalt tevékenységek valamelyikéhez kapcsolódik, illetve amennyiben fejlesztésük a 74.10 Divat-, formatervezés tevékenységhez kapcsolódik, akkor a piacra vitt termék gyártására vonatkozóan együttműködési megállapodással rendelkeznek az „Ágazati fókusz” című mellékletben foglalt tevékenységet végző hazai vállalkozással.
 2. jogi forma szerint:
a) kettős könyvvitelt vezető jogi személyiségű gazdasági társaságok,
b) egyéni vállalkozók, egyéni cégek,
c) szövetkezet

Forrás: Széchenyi 2020

Amennyiben pályázni szeretne, kérem töltse ki az alábbi kérdőívet és mielőbb felveszem Önnel a kapcsolatot.

Üdvözlettel:
Baksa Eszter, az Ön pályázatírója
Betöltés...