Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Latest News

Der russische Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine zeigt, dass das multilaterale System zu schwach ist, um Frieden sicherzustellen. In diesem Interview beurteilt Anna-Katharina Hornidge die Lage. Sie ist die Direktorin des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklung und Nachhaltigkeit (IDOS – German Institute of Development and Sustainability), das bis Ende Juni Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik hieß. Aus ihrer Sicht stehen wir in einem globalen Konflikt, bei dem irrationale Ansprüche rationale Entscheidungsprozesse behindern. Anna-Katharina Hornidge im Interview mit Hans Dembowski.

Action-oriented summits like the 2018 Global Climate Action Summit and 2019 UN Climate Action Summit, have become a major feature of global climate governance. Their emphasis on cooperative initiatives by a host of non-state and local actors creates high expectations, especially when, according to the IPCC, governments’ policies still set the world on course for a disastrous 2.7 °C warming. While earlier studies have cautioned against undue optimism, empirical evidence on summits and their ability to leverage transnational capacities has been scarce. Here using a dataset of 276 climate initiatives we show important differences in output performance, with no improvement among initiatives associated with more recent summits. A summit’s focus on certain themes and an emphasis on minimal requirements for institutional robustness, however, can positively influence the effectiveness of transnational engagement. These results make an empirical contribution towards understanding the increasingly transnational nature of climate governance.

Nur wenige internationale Übereinkünfte, die von den jeweiligen Zeitgenossen als historisch wahrgenommen werden, sind dies auch in den Augen späterer Generationen. Sie sind stets Produkt und Ausdruck ihrer Zeit, können aber auch über diese hinausweisen, indem sie erwartete und angestrebte Zukünfte verhandeln. Wenn nur wenige Jahre später die Welt schon wieder anders erscheint, versuchen sich dann neu zusammengesetzte Kohorten internationaler Diplomatie am nächsten »historischen« Wurf. Dabei geht allzu leicht das Gefühl für die miteinander verknüpften institutionellen und programmatischen Pfadabhängigkeiten verloren. Ohne das Wissen um bereits früher erzielte Verständigungen und Fortschritte kann aber auch das Bewusstsein für die notwendigen nächsten Schritte schwer gedeihen.

Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine proves that the multilateral system is too weak to safeguard peace. Anna-Katharina Hornidge, the director of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) – assessed matters in an interview with  D+C/E+Z. According to her, we are witnessing a global conflict in which irrational aspirations are pitted against reasoned deliberation. (Anna-Katharina Hornidge interviewed by Hans Dembowski)

Prof. Dr. Anna-Katharina Hornidge hatte von 2015 bis 2020 eine Kooperationsprofessur zwischen der Universität Bremen und dem Leibniz-Zentrum für Marine Tropenforschung (ZMT) mit dem Schwerpunkt Entwicklungs- und Wissenssoziologie inne. Seit 2020 ist sie Direktorin des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn und Professorin an der Universität Bonn.

In this policy brief, we analyse the direct effects and implications of the war in Ukraine on energy security, industrial supply chains, food security and environmental protection in the EU and in developing countries. Section 2.4 also considers the ramifications of the war on Ukraine’s own environment. We also explore several integrative policy approaches to mitigate these implications, namely policy coherence, social protections measures and international cooperation.
Throughout our analyses, we consider existing and potential policy measures, and in doing so refer to the EGD’s many dimensions. We argue that the EGD is instrumental in setting the EU and its partners on a sustainable path, and key to addressing multiple crises in the short and long term. Moreover, successful implementation of the EGD can help the EU weather the shock of the war, while facilitating sustainable development that leaves no one, and no country, behind.
Key messages:
• The European Green Deal (EGD) is instrumental in addressing some of the implications of the war in Ukraine. It can facilitate an integrated response that considers the global concerns raised by the concurrent geopolitical, health and socio-environmental crises, in both the short term and the long term. The war’s effects on food security, energy security, industrial supply chains and environmental protection should be addressed with due attention to immediate threats, and with a view to speeding up the nascent sustainability transformation in order to avoid exacerbating future disruptions. To achieve this, three approaches are essential: enabling policy coherence between sectors and institutions, designing adequate social protection measures, and advancing international cooperation.
• To simultaneously address energy security and the climate crisis, the energy transition should be accelerated worldwide. Domestically, the EU can ratchet up production of renewable energies, phase-out fossil fuels (including liquefied natural gas (LNG)), and make energy efficiency improvements across all sectors and industries. The EU should avoid response measures that create lock-ins to pathways that are incompatible with the green transition. In parallel, the EU has the capacity to build strong international partnerships to assist other interested countries in their own energy transitions and support them to become key trading partners of renewable energy sources.
• Global supply chains, particularly industrial supply chains, have been disrupted by the war and related sanctions. Ukraine, Russia and Belarus supply much of the world’s key raw materials, such as neon, nickel, aluminium and palladium, and crucial goods, such as iron-derived products and fertilisers. The energy price spike and inaccessible transportation routes have further exacerbated the disruptions. As companies relocate their production and seek new suppliers, the EU should aim to incentivise low-carbon options, boost innovation and material efficiency, and support developing countries in building their own green industries.
• Food security has also been adversely affected by disrupted supply chains. In particular, developing countries reliant on food imports face serious challenges due to record high prices. The EU has already put measures in place to support short-term food security, both domestically and beyond. To mitigate future crises, it should develop long-term measures to transition the EU food system towards sustainability and support the development of resilient food systems in developing countries.
• The war in Ukraine poses a serious threat to global environmental governance, particularly with regard to environmental protection and biodiversity conservation. The war will likely influence supply chain-driven deforestation and ecosystem degradation, in part due to increasing food insecurity. The EU can support effective and smart agriculture to minimise or avoid land conversion for food or energy production, both domestically and in developing countries. In addition, the EU can play an active role in assisting Ukraine in its ever-more precarious environmental situation, and to support neighbouring countries like Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary that may suffer from trans-boundary pollution.
• The war in Ukraine has exposed the urgent need for effective coordination and coherence between EU policy frameworks. To implement the EGD, internal and external trade-offs between core issue areas, such as food and environmental protection or energy and industrial supply chains, and between short-term and long-term effects, need to be minimised. Simultaneously, synergies need to be enhanced. Currently, however, the content and implementation of the EGD still follows a sectoral and siloed approach that contradicts the EU’s policy coherence ambitions. More than ever, the realisation of the EGD’s objectives requires an integrated approach to facilitate efficient alignment with long-term global agendas, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.
• In the short term, social protection can help vulnerable households cope with increases in food and energy prices, through mechanisms like cash transfers, in-kind transfers and subsidies. To promote longer-term resilience, social protection can support the just transition and independence of energy and food systems by way of facilitating structural changes, for example, in terms of employment. This will require increased spending on social protection systems anchored in equity concerns.
• With regards to its international cooperation, the EU still needs to define the goals it seeks to attain under the external dimension of the EGD. These will need to be translated into concrete actions in close dialogue with the EU’s partner countries. Moreover, international cooperation must be aligned to support long-term strategies to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement in a synergistic fashion. This requires a policy space for accountability and learning, through continuous monitoring and evaluation of pertinent international cooperation activities and partnerships. The EU also has the important role of building trust between partner countries and demonstrating international leadership in the face of Russia’s geo-political belligerence.

In this policy brief, we analyse the direct effects and implications of the war in Ukraine on energy security, industrial supply chains, food security and environmental protection in the EU and in developing countries. Section 2.4 also considers the ramifications of the war on Ukraine’s own environment. We also explore several integrative policy approaches to mitigate these implications, namely policy coherence, social protections measures and international cooperation.
Throughout our analyses, we consider existing and potential policy measures, and in doing so refer to the EGD’s many dimensions. We argue that the EGD is instrumental in setting the EU and its partners on a sustainable path, and key to addressing multiple crises in the short and long term. Moreover, successful implementation of the EGD can help the EU weather the shock of the war, while facilitating sustainable development that leaves no one, and no country, behind.
Key messages:
• The European Green Deal (EGD) is instrumental in addressing some of the implications of the war in Ukraine. It can facilitate an integrated response that considers the global concerns raised by the concurrent geopolitical, health and socio-environmental crises, in both the short term and the long term. The war’s effects on food security, energy security, industrial supply chains and environmental protection should be addressed with due attention to immediate threats, and with a view to speeding up the nascent sustainability transformation in order to avoid exacerbating future disruptions. To achieve this, three approaches are essential: enabling policy coherence between sectors and institutions, designing adequate social protection measures, and advancing international cooperation.
• To simultaneously address energy security and the climate crisis, the energy transition should be accelerated worldwide. Domestically, the EU can ratchet up production of renewable energies, phase-out fossil fuels (including liquefied natural gas (LNG)), and make energy efficiency improvements across all sectors and industries. The EU should avoid response measures that create lock-ins to pathways that are incompatible with the green transition. In parallel, the EU has the capacity to build strong international partnerships to assist other interested countries in their own energy transitions and support them to become key trading partners of renewable energy sources.
• Global supply chains, particularly industrial supply chains, have been disrupted by the war and related sanctions. Ukraine, Russia and Belarus supply much of the world’s key raw materials, such as neon, nickel, aluminium and palladium, and crucial goods, such as iron-derived products and fertilisers. The energy price spike and inaccessible transportation routes have further exacerbated the disruptions. As companies relocate their production and seek new suppliers, the EU should aim to incentivise low-carbon options, boost innovation and material efficiency, and support developing countries in building their own green industries.
• Food security has also been adversely affected by disrupted supply chains. In particular, developing countries reliant on food imports face serious challenges due to record high prices. The EU has already put measures in place to support short-term food security, both domestically and beyond. To mitigate future crises, it should develop long-term measures to transition the EU food system towards sustainability and support the development of resilient food systems in developing countries.
• The war in Ukraine poses a serious threat to global environmental governance, particularly with regard to environmental protection and biodiversity conservation. The war will likely influence supply chain-driven deforestation and ecosystem degradation, in part due to increasing food insecurity. The EU can support effective and smart agriculture to minimise or avoid land conversion for food or energy production, both domestically and in developing countries. In addition, the EU can play an active role in assisting Ukraine in its ever-more precarious environmental situation, and to support neighbouring countries like Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary that may suffer from trans-boundary pollution.
• The war in Ukraine has exposed the urgent need for effective coordination and coherence between EU policy frameworks. To implement the EGD, internal and external trade-offs between core issue areas, such as food and environmental protection or energy and industrial supply chains, and between short-term and long-term effects, need to be minimised. Simultaneously, synergies need to be enhanced. Currently, however, the content and implementation of the EGD still follows a sectoral and siloed approach that contradicts the EU’s policy coherence ambitions. More than ever, the realisation of the EGD’s objectives requires an integrated approach to facilitate efficient alignment with long-term global agendas, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.
• In the short term, social protection can help vulnerable households cope with increases in food and energy prices, through mechanisms like cash transfers, in-kind transfers and subsidies. To promote longer-term resilience, social protection can support the just transition and independence of energy and food systems by way of facilitating structural changes, for example, in terms of employment. This will require increased spending on social protection systems anchored in equity concerns.
• With regards to its international cooperation, the EU still needs to define the goals it seeks to attain under the external dimension of the EGD. These will need to be translated into concrete actions in close dialogue with the EU’s partner countries. Moreover, international cooperation must be aligned to support long-term strategies to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement in a synergistic fashion. This requires a policy space for accountability and learning, through continuous monitoring and evaluation of pertinent international cooperation activities and partnerships. The EU also has the important role of building trust between partner countries and demonstrating international leadership in the face of Russia’s geo-political belligerence.

The governance of ocean and polar regions is among the most relevant challenges in the combat against global environmental degradation and global inequalities. Ocean and polar regions are climate regulators and very much affected by climate change. They are an important source of nutrition for life in and above the sea. At the same time, they are subject to an increasing number of geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. Due to the lasting virulence of many security issues, economic conflicts, legal disputes, new technological developments and environmental crises in global marine areas as well as the intricate overlap of sovereign, semi-sovereign and global commons territories, the relevance of ocean and polar governance is bound to rise: as frontiers both in global competitive strategies as well as most fragile eco-systems whose collapse would have catastrophic consequences. This thematic issue sketches important trends in research on ocean and polar governance, and identifies avenues for future research. In this editiorial, we first provide an overview of governance challenges for ocean and polar regions and their relevance for geopolitical and geo-economic conflicts. In a second step, we present the eight contributions that make up the thematic issue by clustering them around three themes: the impact of (re-)territorialisation on governance and the construction of authority, the effectiveness of regimes of ocean and polar governance, and, challenges to norm-creation in ocean governance.

The advancement of governance architecture in the Arctic region and dealing with the “Arctic development paradox” have been among the most significant challenges of the circumpolar North for decades. The common denominator of both issues is the growing necessity to frame solutions that credibly and effectively support the Arctic’s social and environmental systems in the face of climate change and globalisation. The current status quo seems deficient, which is why understanding the main impediments is subject to public and academic discussion. This article contributes to these debates by referring to the concept of governability to demonstrate how transregional activities advance the development of more coherent governance in the Arctic. The article explores approaches applied by transregional organisations and cooperation programmes that constitute the governance system in the European Arctic. Specifically, it scrutinises governing interactions developed by the Barents Regional Council and the Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme to overcome the normative trap of the Arctic development paradox. This research follows a semi‐structured, exploratory approach, which facilitates identifying key elements of a structurally and conceptually led response that resounds in each case. Combined with a synoptic literature review, this article answers two questions: First, how do the transregional actors approach the Arctic development paradox in their cooperation strategies and programmes, and to what extent do these approaches differ? Second, what kind of recommendations do they provide to overcome the Arctic development paradox?

Bus rapid transit (BRT), an innovative transit solution from the Global South, represents a more affordable and easier to implement mass transit mode in comparison to railway systems. Despite these advantages, many cities struggle to implement BRT due to different challenges from the need of an institutional framework and financing to the managing of competing transport modes and public opposition from car users and informal bus operators, as well as the design of BRT components (e.g. the quality of the infrastructure, vehicles and service). When these challenges are not solved, already implemented BRT systems struggle to successfully perform and expand their network to increase the service coverage. This paper studies the case of Jakarta’s BRT, which has become the largest BRT network in the world and reaches 82% of the city’s population. This study shows how Transjakarta has been able to face the different challenges for the phasing-in, good performance and expansion of its network, and presents lessons for the future of BRT within an integrated transit network that includes other mass transit modes, as well as formerly informal feeder services.

The socio-economic well-being of urban areas depends on a well-functioning transportation system that makes it easier for people to access goods and services. Most urban areas in emerging economies are expanding in size and human population, resulting in increased demand for transportation and mobility. But these urban areas are characterised by high motorisation and inadequate public transportation resulting in traffic congestion, accidents and increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Urban rail (metro, tram, suburban) can be the solution because trains can move a large number of people at high speed at short intervals, provide reliable services because of its spatial isolation, contribute minimal GHGs when the source of energy is renewable, and has a low accident rate. However, urban rail is expensive and require many technical and technological capabilities often unavailable in emerging economies because they are technological latecomers. This paper examines how two emerging economies, China and India, have been developing local capabilities through an industrial policy to ensure increased urban rail development.

Railway systems are essential in high-density urban areas in emerging economies, but cities and their transit agencies struggle to finance them due to the high upfront-investment costs, continuous maintenance, and network expansion costs. However, when transit planning is integrated with land-use planning in favour of transit-oriented development (TOD) strategies, land value capture (LVC) can be generated to cover part of the costs to finance transit infrastructure. In Hong Kong, the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) has successfully implemented its metro system through its Rail+Property (R+P) model, a public-private cooperation with a government-led approach. This development-based LVC mechanism provides development rights from the government to the MTRC for master planning, property development and management. This has enabled the expansion of the MTRC portfolio beyond transport operations, such as residential and commercial development, property leasing and management, consultancy services, etc. This study not only presents the policies that have allowed the success of the R+P model, but also raises the question about its replicability in other contexts without the same particular conditions of Hong Kong. This contributes to draw policy lessons for the integration of transit and land-use planning and the use of LVC mechanisms for the financing of railway systems.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the climate crises are both revealing resilience and inequalities in the Arctic region.
These inequalities are manifold, and many relate to infrastructure – either lack of or unequal, not cultural-appropriate access to them in a remote context.
Infrastructure can provide an overarching framework for policymaking in the Arctic, also for the EU.
The EU should consider the relevance of the local level more strategically and link this relevance to infrastructure issues

This study analyses a complex social-ecological system (SES), the case of competition for groundwater in Azraq, in the light of the 2030 Agenda. Building on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) and the concept of Networks of Adjacent Action Situations (NAAS) it assess the complex governance system in a consistent and systematic manner. It includes aspects of power through the political economy concept of the social contract. It furthermore assesses the performance of the investigated SES against the 2030 Agenda’s core principles ‘leaving no one behind’, ‘interconnectedness and indivisibility’, ‘multi-stakeholder partnerships’, and ‘inclusiveness’.
The study finds that in Azraq, agricultural, domestic and environmental water users compete for shrinking groundwater resources. The core of the conflict lies between a heterogeneous group of farmers, who use groundwater for irrigation agriculture supported by a strong political lobby, and the water authorities, which rely on the aquifer for domestic water supply at national level. Water, agricultural, environmental, energy, and land governance, but also high-level decision-making and the monarchy’s underlying social contract and the informal concept of wasta influence the outcomes on the ground. As a result, groundwater governance in Jordan hardly does justice to the 2030 Agenda’s core principles. The study shows that no panacea exists, but that systems thinking may help identify a range of intervention points, some more sensitive than others, that could support a social-ecological transformation towards sustainability.

In Elmau werden viele verschiedene Krisen verhandelt. Was bedeutet das fürs Regierungshandeln? Anna-Katharina Hornidge ist Co-Leiterin von Think7 – dem Zusammenschluss von führenden Denkfabriken. Sie sieht im Gipfel auch die Chance für einen großen Wurf. Ein Interview von Journalist Jan Rübel.

The City of Bonn has experienced flooding on several occasions in the past. However, in the last two decades, it has seen increased precipitation leading to floods. The City had initiated several flood management measures in response. Those measures played a significant role in minimizing the impact of the heavy rainfall seen in July 2021. With this report, the Bonn Water Network (BWN) documents the successful efforts of the City of Bonn administration and the catchment authorities in responding to the floods. The report is also part of BWN’s effort to strengthen cross-learning, co-produce knowledge and build a true partnership with the City of Bonn. The report documents the authorities’ adaptive response and the challenges encountered by both civil society and the respective authorities in taking resilient action. It draws on secondary documents and online resources, which are supplemented with interviews with city authorities and experts. The report was presented to the city authorities with a request for their feedback, which subsequently flowed into its finalisation.
The report highlights the steps taken by the authorities towards flood mitigation, flood preparedness and flood response. Those measures are described at three levels – catchment, streams and sewers – as looked at from a social, technical and legislative perspective. To gain an insight into how these initiatives converge, the report uses the example of flood risk management at the level of local streams. Given the various institutions involved in the City’s flood management activities, it identifies the challenges faced by three key actors in implementing flood management measures. The report concludes with an outlook that shows a way forward by highlighting the need to strengthen the hybrid infrastructure approach in order to secure a sustainable strategy. It identifies opportunities for use in strengthening risk management and mitigation in respect of pluvial flooding, promoting hybrid governance and utilizing both science-policy dialogue and digitalization in strengthening flood risk management in Bonn.

Climate change, natural resource degradation and lack of inclusiveness challenge existing social contracts in the Middle East and North Africa. This think piece looks at how environmental factors influence governments’ scope of action to deliver on their duties of protection, provision and participation within current social contracts and proposes an alternative solution that can work for both people and planet.

Climate change, natural resource degradation and lack of inclusiveness challenge existing social contracts in the Middle East and North Africa. This think piece looks at how environmental factors influence governments’ scope of action to deliver on their duties of protection, provision and participation within current social contracts and proposes an alternative solution that can work for both people and planet.

Whereas South American countries are experiencing increased population movements in the context of climate change, the international climate governance agenda calls for the adoption of specialised legislation and for enhanced cooperation among different policy frameworks. The revision and update of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) provide a window of opportunity to mainstream human mobility discussions in climate policy frameworks and, thus, support the uptake of effective measures to address the topic.
This briefing paper provides an overview of how the climate change–human mobility nexus has been addressed in the NDCs submitted thus far by South American countries and identifies pathways towards improved management of population movements in revised NDCs. To date, a partial integration of the human mobility perspective prevails: References to the topic indicate a slow – but progressive – acknowledgment of the impacts of a changing climate in vulnerable communities, which may include human displacement. Given the urgent need to move forward from the recognition of the topic to the establishment of effective measures to tackle forced population movements associated with the impacts of climate change, the updating of NDCs – currently under way in the region – entails an opportunity to incorporate strategies aimed at enhancing the management of human mobility. Ongoing discussions linked to the inclusion of the human mobility dimension should happen in a holistic manner, taking socio-environmental approaches into consideration. Human displacement and adaptation to climate change are akin processes that need to be aligned with mitigation and related measures. An improved adaptation component of NDCs depends on the participation of distinct actors (such as national departments and agencies, as well as non-governmental and civil society organisations focussed on climate adaptation) at the national level, and not only those dealing with mitigation strategies. Likewise, it should take the incorporation of practical and evidence-based measures into account. These include, for instance, methods to promote the consultation and effective participation of affected communities and strategies to strengthen their resilience. Furthermore, revised NDCs should call for governance and legal frameworks that include a clear definition of roles and the establishment of effective measures, rooted in the commitment to protect the human rights of affected and vulnerable populations. Revised NDCs should set up policy options to prepare for and respond to human displacement, aiming to reduce communities’ vulnerability and exposure. The recognition of human mobility in the context of climate change as a common challenge faced by South American countries entails a window of opportunity to enhance the development of effective measures to address the topic, as well as to foster the implementation of coherent long-term strategies that go beyond short-term political priorities.

Whereas South American countries are experiencing increased population movements in the context of climate change, the international climate governance agenda calls for the adoption of specialised legislation and for enhanced cooperation among different policy frameworks. The revision and update of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) provide a window of opportunity to mainstream human mobility discussions in climate policy frameworks and, thus, support the uptake of effective measures to address the topic.
This briefing paper provides an overview of how the climate change–human mobility nexus has been addressed in the NDCs submitted thus far by South American countries and identifies pathways towards improved management of population movements in revised NDCs. To date, a partial integration of the human mobility perspective prevails: References to the topic indicate a slow – but progressive – acknowledgment of the impacts of a changing climate in vulnerable communities, which may include human displacement. Given the urgent need to move forward from the recognition of the topic to the establishment of effective measures to tackle forced population movements associated with the impacts of climate change, the updating of NDCs – currently under way in the region – entails an opportunity to incorporate strategies aimed at enhancing the management of human mobility. Ongoing discussions linked to the inclusion of the human mobility dimension should happen in a holistic manner, taking socio-environmental approaches into consideration. Human displacement and adaptation to climate change are akin processes that need to be aligned with mitigation and related measures. An improved adaptation component of NDCs depends on the participation of distinct actors (such as national departments and agencies, as well as non-governmental and civil society organisations focussed on climate adaptation) at the national level, and not only those dealing with mitigation strategies. Likewise, it should take the incorporation of practical and evidence-based measures into account. These include, for instance, methods to promote the consultation and effective participation of affected communities and strategies to strengthen their resilience. Furthermore, revised NDCs should call for governance and legal frameworks that include a clear definition of roles and the establishment of effective measures, rooted in the commitment to protect the human rights of affected and vulnerable populations. Revised NDCs should set up policy options to prepare for and respond to human displacement, aiming to reduce communities’ vulnerability and exposure. The recognition of human mobility in the context of climate change as a common challenge faced by South American countries entails a window of opportunity to enhance the development of effective measures to address the topic, as well as to foster the implementation of coherent long-term strategies that go beyond short-term political priorities.