Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Latest News

• The changing role of think tanks vis-à-vis the G20
• Purpose and potential of the T20
• Developing the T20 further
• Outlook

The growing middle classes in middle-income countries may play a key role in current trends of democratic backsliding, online activism and lifestyle politics. This contribution uncovers which modes of political participation are prevalent among the middle classes in Peru and the Philippines, including new forms of online participation and lifestyle politics for sustainability. Drawing on household surveys conducted in 2018, we use latent class analysis and logit regressions to analyse, first, the characteristics of online vs offline participation, and second, the role of political consumption and online activism for political participation dynamics. The latter analysis contributes to the gateway/getaway debate of lifestyle politics. In both countries, we find four comparable classes: a substantial disengaged class that is not engaging in any political participation, an all-round activist class, an online activist class and a class that mostly engages in civil society activities. Further classes with specific participation patterns and socio-demographic characteristics could be identified for each country. Although the online activists in both countries are unlikely to engage in any other form of political participation, a clear empirical case for lifestyle politics as a separate mode of participation only exists among young Peruvians with a steady job. In the Philippines, political consumption as a form of lifestyle politics blends in with other types of political participation.

This policy brief addresses the tensions between international and domestic interests on issues relating to partnerships on migration governance. It specifically discusses the Senegal–EU partnership on migration, highlighting the unequal relationship between the two partners and the implications of this relationship for the outcomes of migration policy.
The authors highlight how the EU’s use of funding to shape migration governance in Senegal creates ownership and accountability challenges for policies that are formulated at the initiative of external actors without much, if any, input by the government of Senegal and its people. The Senegalese government’s quest to attract funding from the EU through the partnership on migration results in it being more accountable to its external partners, and less accountable to the Senegalese people and local civil society organisations. The latter argue that the government needs to formulate a policy that addresses migration in Senegal in a comprehensive manner. Senegal’s financially weaker position vis-á-vis the EU does not, however, constrain the Senegalese government from exercising agency in pursuit of its own interests within the EU agenda. It seeks to strike a balance between the interests of the EU and its domestic priorities on migration. It pursues this goal by conflating rent-seeking behaviour with domestic interests that are at variance with the EU agenda – a strategy facilitated by the government’s reluctance to adopt and commit to an official document providing the framework for migration governance. The partnership between Senegal and the EU has the hallmarks of an interface characterised more by mutual co-option than by meaningful co-operation on international migration governance norms. This state of affairs is detrimental to the formulation of a comprehensive migration policy addressing various aspects of Senegal’s complex migration matrix. In order for the Senegal–EU partnership to go beyond the pursuit of narrow interests and address migration governance issues in a comprehensive manner, several changes are required.

- Donor states, especially in the EU, need to acknowledge the variety of migration challenges Sene¬gal is facing, and not limit their action to their own border externalisation interests. Instead of only engaging with the government, and a few “token” civil society organisations, funders need to take on board the views of significant civil society and local government actors who are more in touch with local realities.
- A holistic migration policy is urgently needed, which goes beyond the current focus, required by external actors, on emigration from Senegal. Such a migration policy has become even more indispensable to Senegal because of the Senegalese diaspora’s economic and political role in the country, its contribution to Senegal’s development, and the need for the Senegalese government to provide adequate responses to the diaspora’s needs. Such a policy is also needed because of the position of Senegal as a destination country for migrants from the West African subregion.
- The EU needs to transform its current approach to “partnerships” on the governance of migration to a model that is mutually beneficial. The current partnership functions as a vehicle through which the EU and its Member States pursue their own agenda. A more feasible partnership would entail identification of the partners’ respective priorities and co-operation on areas of mutual

Mit diesem Policy Brief beleuchten wir den geopolitischen Einfluss auf die Entwicklungspolitik im indopazifischen Raum. Zunächst geht es um die Entstehung von Strategien zum Umgang mit dem Indopazifik und deren Überschneidungen mit geo- und entwicklungspolitischen Ansätzen traditioneller Entwicklungsakteure wie den Vereinigten Staaten und der Europäischen Union. Dann untersuchen wir, wie diese Narrative die entwicklungspolitischen Ansätze von China und Indien prägen. Im An-schluss erörtern wir, wie sich diese Dynamik in Schlüsselregionen des Indopazifiks, insbesondere in Südostasien, Südasien und auf den pazifischen Inseln, auswirkt. Wir erklären, warum der Wettbewerb zwar Chancen für diese Regionen bietet, positive Entwicklungsergebnisse sich aber nur dann erzielen lassen, wenn diese Chancen strategisch genutzt werden. Traditionell hat die Geopolitik immer Einfluss auf Entwicklungsdebatten und die Entwicklungspolitik gehabt, ein Fakt, der auch künftig Bestand haben dürfte (Power, 2019; Liao & Lee, 2022). Mit Chinas globalem Aufstieg im letzten Jahrzehnt hat sich der geopolitische Wettbewerb auf wirtschaftlicher, strategischer und geopolitischer Ebene verstärkt. China wird zunehmend als Konkurrent traditioneller globaler und regionaler Mächte – etwa der Vereinigten Staaten, der Europäischen Union, Japans oder Australiens – wahrgenommen. In Reaktion darauf entstanden neue Strategien, um diesen Aufstieg zu lenken, ihn zu neutralisieren oder ihm entgegenzuwirken. Eine der Folgen dieser Entwicklung ist, dass die entstehenden Rahmenbedingungen und Strategien rund um den Indopazifik mittlerweile den Diskurs über die globale Geopolitik, einschließlich der Entwicklungspolitik, stark beein-flussen oder sogar dominieren. Der starke geopolitische Wettbewerb hat dazu geführt, dass Entwicklungspolitik zu einem umkämpften Thema geworden ist. Die Triebkräfte dieser Dynamik sind der rasante Aufstieg Chinas sowie die darauffolgende Entwicklung von Strategien für den Indopazifik, die diesem Aufstieg entgegenwirken sollen. Während dieser Wettbewerb zwischen und innerhalb von Ländern und Regionen zu Spaltungen führen kann, kann er auch zu mehr Multipolarität, mehr Eigenverantwortung der Part-nerländer und zu einem positiven Wettbewerb um Ergebnisse im Entwicklungsbereich führen. Der Wettbewerb und die zahlreichen damit verbundenen neuen Strategien, Ressourcen und Initiativen können Partnerländern die Möglichkeit bieten, sich Res¬sourcen und Zusagen für ihre eigene Entwicklungsagenda zu sichern. Anstatt „gezwungen“ zu sein, sich für eine Seite zu entscheiden, können Länder und Regionen versuchen, den geostrategischen Wettbewerb zu ihrem Vorteil zu nutzen – und tun dies bereits. Der Wettbewerb bietet Optionen und die Chance, an Entscheidungen teilzuhaben. Die Übernahme von Verantwortung für diese Strategien und Ressourcen sowie deren Steuerung können für die Partnerländer und -regionen jedoch eine große Herausforderung darstellen. Eine mögliche Lösung sind Absicherungsstrategien (Hedging), die aber auch Risiken bergen, vor allem, wenn politische Entscheidungen plötzlich alles verändern und Entwicklungserfolge in der Folge gefährdet werden. Zwar gibt es eine Fülle von Strategien für den indopazifischen Raum, die Visionen und Wege aufzeigen, wie internationale und regionale Mächte die wirtschaftlichen, diplomatischen, sicherheits- und entwicklungspolitischen Beziehungen zu den Län-dern des indopazifischen Raums stärken sollten. Allerdings ist es an den indopazifischen Ländern selbst, eigene Strategien zu entwickeln, die Visionen und Ziele für die Zusammenarbeit mit Großmächten und anderen Akteuren enthalten, die sich um ihre Partnerschaft bemühen.

The Turkish president won a lot of electoral votes by demonizing the interest rate and lowering it in the context of flaming inflation, with the aim of achieving artificial growth and flirting with the emotions of his Islamic electoral base. Now, Muhammad Simsek has been appointed as Minister of Finance and Hafiza Arkan as Governor of the Central Bank, indicating a return to following a traditional economic policy that follows the traditional logic of economics. Interestingly, how will the interest rate be reconsidered in the Turkish government's discurse?

There is growing evidence that climate action necessitates a transition that addresses all dimensions of sustainability. Similarly, the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda cannot be successfully implemented without strong action on climate change. The NDC-SDG Connections tool, developed jointly by SEI and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), shows how activities in countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) connect to all 17 SDGs. NDC-SDG Connections allows users to explore how NDC activities (i.e. statements identifying a strand of future activity, conditional or unconditional on financial support) connect to the ambitions of the 17 SDGs and their 169 targets, both globally and for individual countries and country groupings. It reveals how NDCs directly contribute to the SDGs and that they are essentially both climate action plans and sustainable development strategies at the same time. This policy brief, which builds on updated data from NDC-SDG Connections, presents a comparative analysis of how NDCs have developed over time with regards to the 2030 Agenda. It concludes with policy recommendations.

In diesem Open-Access-Buch werden Prozesse und Dynamiken der Zusammenarbeit zwischen verschiedenen Akteur*innen in Projekten des zivilen Friedensdienstes in Kenia, Sierra Leone und Liberia betrachtet. Das durch lokale und internationale Akteur*innen gemeinsame Bearbeiten von Konflikten und Herausforderungen der Friedenskonsolidierung hat in der deutschen Friedensarbeit eine lange Tradition und wird in einer globalisierten Welt immer wichtiger. Deswegen geht das Buch der sowohl für die Wissenschaft als auch für die Friedenspraxis relevanten Frage nach, inwiefern im Kontext der Zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung eine gleichberechtige Partnerschaft vorliegen kann. Indem sich die Arbeit auf die Chancen und Herausforderungen der Zusammenarbeit konzentriert, gelingt es, den Blick auf die alltäglichen Aktivitäten zu legen, die eigentlichen Prozesse und Reibungspunkte der Friedensarbeit zu analysieren und einen wertvollen Beitrag zur kritischen Friedensforschung und der Diskussion um Hybridität und Friction zu leisten.

Bonn, 5 June 2023. For the last 50 years, World Environment Day has been celebrated under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as a reminder of the environment’s essential and irreplaceable role in human development. As the theme of the first World Environment Day in 1973 indicated, there is “Only One Earth”. Yet, protecting it has proven a paramount challenge for the United Nations and all of its member states.

While international environmental law has evolved dynamically, and a host of multilateral environmental agreements seek to govern international cooperation around a broad range of environmental challenges, humankind’s ecological footprint continued to increase and is far bigger than the “one earth” it treads on, using almost twice its biocapacity today. Accordingly, the global environment has continued to deteriorate as the impacts of socio-economic developments undercut improvements in environmental policy and implementation. Countless plant and animal species have been terminally lost already with many more threatened by extinction. In parallel, the average global temperature has increased by 1.1°C with major impacts around the world. Across all major assessment reports the science is crystal clear: achieving socio-economic goals within planetary boundaries will require urgent and transformative change.

Global environmental agreements have individually led to positive shifts towards such change, but lag far behind what is needed still. To boost their comparative strength and, indeed, coherent and effective implementation, stronger integration will be essential. First, socio-economic drivers are common across multiple environmental issues. Second, it is not only socio-economic development that can lead to environmental damage, but also environmental measures can, at times, adversely affect one another. For instance, extensive plantations of biofuels and non-native forest plantations to address climate change can lead to biodiversity loss, while ecosystems restoration through slow regrowth can limit the potential for more rapid carbon sequestration. Third, environmental change that remains unaddressed in one area may prompt domino effects for others. In that regard, global heating stands out as the biggest human-induced environmental threat: its ubiquitous impacts have far-reaching consequences for life on land and below water.

Reflecting the overarching risk of “dangerous climate change,” the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and has held numerous semi-annual negotiations since. Today, parties to the UNFCCC and its 2015 Paris Agreement are reconvening for two weeks of negotiations in Bonn for the latest session of its Subsidiary Bodies. These technical meetings serve to support the implementation of the decisions of the more political annual UN climate change conferences (better known as COPs). As such, “the SBs” are key to advancing the implementation of the Paris Agreement in particular.

At the heart of this year’s agenda is the “Global Stocktake” which aims to determine progress made towards the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Moreover, it considers the broader impacts of climate response measures and the losses and damages already incurred due to climate change. It is no surprise that the results are clear: climate action remains highly insufficient in terms of both reducing greenhouse gas emissions and in adapting to climate change impacts. In effect, this puts all of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at risk all the while our environment as we know it is being irretrievably changed by intensified forest fires, loss of terrestrial and marine biodiversity due to increased temperatures, water scarcity and desertification as a result of droughts, acidified oceans, salinised coastal areas, melting glaciers and permafrost, and even changing ocean currents.

Importantly, the impacts of response measures are now getting more attention under the Global Stocktake. Nevertheless, these discussions so far remain largely focused on the social dimension with the aim to enable just transitions, and environmental impacts receive limited attention. Yet, this would be crucial to shed light on the strong link between climate action and other environmental issues and to ensure that synergies can be maximised and trade-offs avoided or at least limited. To that end, a stronger and systematic exchange with the multitude of pertinent multilateral environmental agreements would be key. Enhancing policy integration across the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity is an obvious vantage point, given the relevance of “nature-based solutions” in both fields. Yet, it must not stop there. Indeed, synergies and trade-offs will also need to be identified and addressed across further conventions and MEAs ranging from the UN Convention to Combat Desertification to treaties addressing a broad range of hazardous wastes, pollutants and chemicals, like the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, or highly specialised concerns of species and ecosystems conservation, like the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands.

UNEP and its United Nations Environment Assembly would have a strong role to play in coordinating such efforts. Not only is it the organizational home of the majority of MEAs in question, but it would also reaffirm the original mandate UNEP was given by the UN General Assembly five decades ago, prompting inter alia the establishment of the World Environment Day. Having the current climate talks coincide with the 50th return of the World Environment Day should therefore serve as a stark reminder that climate and environmental action really are two sides of the same coin. The important links between climate change and the environment more broadly must be better appreciated and addressed. Ultimately, the transition to low-carbon and climate resilient societies is unfeasible without protecting the environmental fundament upon which these societies can develop and thrive. Economic concerns and development aspirations must no longer serve as a pretext for lukewarm climate action, but quite to the contrary ambitious climate action is an imperative for equitable and just sustainable development. To that end, climate action and environmental governance must work together.

After the successful adoption of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2014, investment facilitation is gaining importance as the next policy priority for a plurilateral agreement under the World Trade Organization (WTO). In fact, more than 110 WTO Members aim to conclude the negotiations on the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement by mid-2023 after only three years of formal negotiations. Investment facilitation refers to actions taken by governments designed to attract foreign investment and maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of its administration through all stages of the investment cycle. The IFD agreement focuses on allowing investment to flow efficiently for the greatest benefit, particularly to developing and least developed member countries, with the aim of fostering sustainable development. To provide policymakers with essential information for ongoing negotiations and to fill an existing research gap, we examine the economic impacts of a potential IFD agreement. Starting with a lower bound scenario, which incorporates investment facilitation commitments already present in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, we estimate that the IFD could improve global welfare by more than $250 billion. Pushing the boundaries of the policy scope by incorporating provisions from several proposals submitted at the beginning of the structured discussions, the ambitious IFD scenario suggests an increase of global welfare by almost $800 billion. Furthermore, extending the country coverage to India and the United States, currently disengaged from the negotiations, might boost global gains to as much as $1.1 trillion. Hereby, low and middle-income countries have the most to gain from a successful implementation of the IFD, given their low level of current practice in investment facilitation. Overall our analysis shows that the potential gains from an IFD agreement exceed those available from traditional trade liberalization. This provides a strong incentive for non-participating developing countries to join the IFD, reform their investment frameworks along the IFD agenda, and use the support structure contained in the section on special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed country members.

Behavioral economics has shown that changing small features in framing a context or action may drastically change behavior. A key factor characterizing most development interventions is the salience of either a local or an international implementer. Using the setup of an intervention conducted in Indonesia, we show that the study population in the Acehnese context exhibits higher levels of support for the project if the participation of international actors is highlighted. We find that previous experience with the respective actor is pivotal. Qualitative evidence suggests that internationals' perceived skills drive results, highlighting the importance of strengthened local capacities for positive experiences with local implementers. Overall, the study underlines the benefits of linking framing experiments to the actual experiences of respondents to generate insights into the real world.

Äthiopien hat eine lange Geschichte als Aufnahmeland von Geflüchteten aus seiner ostafrikanischen Nachbarschaft. Das mit etwa 114 Millionen Einwohner:innen zweitbevölkerungsreichste Land Afrikas war zugleich immer wieder auch Schauplatz erheblicher  Binnenvertreibungen aufgrund politischer Unruhen. Nachdem 2020 ein militärischer Konflikt im Bundesstaat Tigray im Norden des Landes ausbrach, der sich rasch zu einem Bürgerkrieg ausweitete, sind Millionen Menschen vertrieben worden. Zehntausende von ihnen  flohen in den benachbarten Sudan. Der vorliegende Beitrag behandelt beide Seiten der äthiopischen Fluchtverhältnisse: Er erörtert sowohl die durch den Tigray-Krieg ausgelöste Vertreibungskrise als auch die Situation Hunderttausender ausländischer Geflüchteter, die seit vielen Jahren, oft Jahrzehnten, im Land leben.

Am 8. Mai jährte sich die Verabschiedung der südafrikanischen Verfassung zum 27. Mal. Neben den ersten demokratischen Wahlen von 1994, aus denen Nelson Mandela als Präsident und die frühere Befreiungsbewegung African National Congress (ANC) als Regierungspartei hervorgingen, markiert sie für das Land das Ende des über vier Jahrzehnte herrschenden Apartheid: Denn bis dahin verfügten die Nachfahren der europäischen Kolonialmächte die Rassentrennung für alle Lebensbereiche und Wohngebiete in den Städten – und verwehrten der nicht-weißen Bevölkerungsmehrheit ihre Grundrechte. Wie steht es heute um die Demokratie Südafrikas? Inwiefern wird das Land dem in seiner international als vorbildlich angesehenen Verfassung niedergeschriebenen Anspruch gerecht, das soziale Unrecht seiner Vergangenheit anzuerkennen und die Rechte aller dort Lebenden zu schützen – „in unserer Verschiedenheit verbunden“ (united in our diversity)? Welchen Aufschluss gibt in diesem Zusammenhang der Umgang von Politik und Teilen der Gesellschaft mit den in Südafrika wohnenden Migrant*innen aus anderen Ländern Afrikas?

The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) Germany promotes sustainbale development in and  through Germany. It works in a cross-sectoral manner and acts as a platform bringing together perspectives by leading German scientific organisations, civil society and business. The members of SDSN Germany are also members of the global SDSN that was founded in 2012 unter the patronage of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Bonn, 30. Mai 2023. Wenn der Arktische Rat die durch Russlands Krieg verursachte politische Krise überleben soll, muss er lokale Stimmen stärker einbeziehen und über mögliche Perspektiven der Beziehungen zu Russland nach dem Krieg diskutieren.

Der Arktische Rat ist das wichtigste hochrangige zwischenstaatliche Forum für die Zusammenarbeit in der Arktis. Aufgrund der russischen Invasion der Ukraine beschlossen sieben der acht Arktisstaaten (alle außer Russland), ihre Kooperation im Arktischen Rat während Russlands Vorsitz vorläufig zu pausieren. In diesem Monat hat Norwegen den Vorsitz des Arktischen Rates von Russland übernommen. Der norwegische Vorsitz könnte der wichtigste in der Geschichte des Arktischen Rates werden, der in seiner jetzigen Form – ohne den größten arktischen Staat, Russland –, keine Zukunft haben wird. Und sollte Schweden NATO-Mitglied werden, wäre Russland das einzige Nicht-NATO-Mitglied im Arktischen Rat. Die Region erfährt bereits jetzt eine zunehmende Militarisierung.

Um das aktuelle Bild der Arktis als militärischen Hotspot zu verändern und zu vermeiden, dass es in der Arktispolitik in Zukunft hauptsächlich um sicherheitspolitische Prioritäten geht, sind ein Umdenken und ein stärkerer politischer Wille zur Integration lokaler Perspektiven erforderlich. „Die Menschen im Norden“, insbesondere die Jugend, ist eine der vier Prioritäten Norwegens für die Zeit seines Vorsitzes in den nächsten zwei Jahren. Lokale Stimmen aus dem Norden drängen zunehmend auf ein Verständnis der Arktispolitik, das sich nicht nur auf zwischenstaatliche Beziehungen konzentriert, sondern auch die Vielfalt der Lebensbedingungen und Lebensgrundlagen in der gesamten Arktis in den Blick nimmt. Das Netzwerk Universität der Arktis, das Arctic Mayors' Forum, der Arktische Wirtschaftsrat und die langjährige grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit zwischen indigenen Völkern und anderen Gruppen sind Beispiele für den klaren Willen und das starke Engagement, das die Menschen im Norden teilen, um mittels Interaktion und gegenseitiger Unterstützung Lösungen für gemeinsame Herausforderungen zu finden. Entscheidungen zur arktischen „Peripherie“ werden jedoch oft in den weit entfernten Hauptstädten der arktischen Staaten getroffen. Die aktuellen geopolitischen Turbulenzen führen allerdings dazu, dass das Thema Sicherheitspolitik die Agenda der arktischen Staaten dominiert und die Arbeit des Arktischen Rates lahmlegt.

Auf dem Weg zum Geist von Tromsö?

Jetzt, wo die „Hauptstadt der Arktis“ während des norwegischen Vorsitzes im norwegischen Tromsö liegt und es dort eine beträchtliche Anzahl von Veranstaltungen des Arktischen Rates geben wird, besteht ein großes Potenzial, über die langjährige Zentrum-Peripherie-Dichotomie und die klassischen geopolitischen Perspektiven hinauszublicken und neue Narrative zu entwickeln. Der Arktische Rat sollte einen ganzheitlicheren Ansatz verfolgen, der die Sorgen der Menschen und Gesellschaften im Norden berücksichtigt, etwa den demografischen Wandel, den Mangel an Infrastruktur und entsprechenden Dienstleistungen sowie die Anpassung der arktischen Lebensgrundlagen an den Klimawandel. Die internationale Hafenstadt mit Bürger*innen aus 139 Nationen, einer großen Gemeinde aus Russland und der Ukraine sowie norwegisch-russischen Familien beherbergt die Sekretariate des Arktischen Rates und des Arctic Mayors’ Forum, das Sekretariat für indigene Völker, den Arktischen Wirtschaftsrat, die Konferenz Arctic Frontiers und zahlreiche Forschungseinrichtungen, die sich mit dem Wissen um die Arktis beschäftigen. Nichtstaatliche Akteure auf beiden Seiten des Konflikts, die die Menschen und Gesellschaften in der Arktis repräsentieren, sollten ebenfalls einbezogen werden, wenn es um die verschiedenen möglichen Szenarien geht, wie die Zusammenarbeit mit Russland nach dem Ende des Krieges aussehen könnte. Da die globale Erwärmung in der Arktis fast viermal schneller ist als anderswo, ist die Begrenzung des Klimawandels nur eines von vielen Themen, die eine Zusammenarbeit erfordern, insbesondere in der Arktis.

Um das Vertrauen in die gegenwärtige arktische Zusammenarbeit unter der Schirmherrschaft des Arktischen Rates zu stärken, ist eine stärkere öffentliche Diskussion auf allen Governance-Ebenen in der Arktis von entscheidender Bedeutung. Der norwegische Vorsitz sollte Richtlinien, Strukturen und Plattformen einrichten, um einen Anreiz für einen fundierten langfristigen transnationalen Austausch zu schaffen. Dieser Austausch kann die Grundlagen für Politik und Entscheidungsfindung in den Mitgliedsstaaten des Arktischen Rates liefern und sollte die Perspektiven der Menschen im Norden zu kontroversen Themen im Arktischen Rat einbeziehen, einschließlich der künftigen Beziehungen zu Russland. Der Krieg in der Ukraine hat die geopolitischen Interessen in der Arktis deutlich in den Mittelpunkt gerückt, auch weil die Arktis zunehmend als neue Megaregion gilt, die die europäische Energiewende sichern soll. Bereits zuvor jedoch galten Investitionen in die Infrastruktur, insbesondere entlang des russischen Teils des Nördlichen Seewegs, als Teil von Chinas Bestrebungen, seine Rolle im Arktischen Rat zu stärken, die polare Seidenstraße auszubauen und sich als globale Supermacht zu behaupten.

Es war der Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit, der 1996 zur Gründung des Arktischen Rates führte und der dessen Rolle begründete, die Zusammenarbeit auf zirkumpolarer Ebene zu unterstützen. Ein neuer arktischer Geist von Tromsö, der verschiedene lokale Perspektiven in die Werteordnung der arktischen Zusammenarbeit integriert, würde den heutigen Bestrebungen einer grünen Kolonisierung und den Machtspielen der Großmächte besser Einhalt gebieten. Dies wäre ein notwendiger Schritt, um dem Arktischen Rat demokratische Legitimität und Relevanz zu verleihen und den Völkern und lokalen Regierungsstrukturen in der arktischen Region den ihnen gebührenden Respekt zu zollen.

Dieser Text entstand im Rahmen des Forschungsprojekts „Nachhaltige städtische Entwicklung in der Europäischen Arktis (SUDEA): Verbesserung von transnationaler Kooperation in abgeschiedenen Regionen“ (Projektnummer 426674468), das von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) und dem polnischen Wissenschaftszentrum (NCN) (UMO-Vereinbarung - 2018/31/G/HS5/02448) gefördert wird.

Kirsti Methi ist Projektmanagerin des Projekts „Artic Capital“ der Stadtverwaltung von Tromsö. Sie hat einen BA in Sozialwissenschaften und einen MBA in strategischer Führung und Wirtschaft.

Dorothea Wehrmann ist Soziologin und  Projektleiterin des Forschungsprojekts "Nachhaltige städtische Entwicklung in der Europäischen Arktis (SUDEA): Verbesserung von transnationaler Kooperation in abgeschiedenen Regionen" am German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)

This paper reviews the current state of literature on the impacts of urbanisation on rural development in the context of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with special emphasis to the pathways through which urbanisation affect rural economic development. Assessments of these effects diverge greatly. While some authors see urbanisation as strongly benefitting rural areas, for instance, through increased demand for agricultural goods and services, others highlight negative effects, for example, through the loss of livelihoods emanating from displacements and the conversion of agricultural land that may lead to urban sprawl. Given this complexity, a review that thoroughly analyses the causal relationships between urbanisation and rural development is warranted. To do this, the paper identifies seven pathways through which urbanisation affects rural development both positively and negatively: i) production and consumption linkages; ii) employment linkages; iii) financial linkages; iv) land market linkages; v) information and knowledge linkages; vi) social interactions linkages; and vii) environmental externalities linkages. The study suggests that recognising the importance of such linkages and incorporating them into the local and national economic policies is crucial for sustainable development. Overall, the review findings indicate that the impact of urbanisation on rural development in SSA is conditional and heterogeneous. It is conditional because countries need to be well-placed to reap the benefits of urbanisation, i.e., they need to have conducive infrastructure and institutional settings, as well as strong political commitment and leadership. When well-managed, however, urbanisation can play a pivotal role in reducing rural poverty, improving food security and creating opportunities for rural transformation. To this end, the review has identified research gaps that have important policy relevance in SSA. Addressing these gaps is imperative to harnessing the economic advantages of rapid urbanisation in a way that supports rural areas and promotes sustainable development.

The Board of Trustees of the Johannes-Rau-Forschungsgemeinschaft (JRF) has awarded the dissertation prizes for the years 2022 and 2023 for the second time. For the year 2022, Dr Gabriela Iacobuţă from the JRF member institute German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) was awarded.

Die G7-Staaten brauchen neue Verbündete. Der Think7-Beratungsprozess für die G7, ein Zusammenschluss führender Think Tanks und Forschungsinstitute, mahnt kürzlich in einem Communiqué: Die entschiedene Eindämmung der sich rasant ausbreitenden Schuldenkrise in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern sei von zentraler Bedeutung in der Ausgestaltung vertrauensvoller Allianzen innerhalb der G20 und darüber hinaus.

Utilizing an original data set, this paper demonstrates how protectionist industrial policy during the period of hybrid liberalisation has shaped the organizational structure of clothing firms in Egypt. It investigates determinants of vertical integration of clothing firms into fabric production. High-end market segments are a critical determinant of integration. Limited access to finance restricts the possibilities for many firms to undertake the investment required to integrate, whilst volatile and uncertain market conditions make firms more likely to rely on the market for their inputs. But there are nuances related to market segment. Producers of higher quality garments rely on imported textiles, so these producers do not integrate even if search and switch costs are high. But the opposite is true of producers relying on domestic suppliers. Foreign institutions are better able to ensure contract enforcement with respect to quality and timely delivery so that suppliers opportunistic behaviour is deterred, reducing the necessity of clothing firms to integrate. This may not be the case with respect to domestic suppliers, when domestic institutions do not guarantee the same level of enforcement. The adoption of the hybrid liberalisation model meant that the transition to a market economy was not preceded by the creation of the necessary regulatory framework. This model resulted in inefficient upstream production and in an institutional setting conducive to agency problems. It also meant that business suffers excessive and inefficient bureaucracy. It is thus not possible for firms to achieve the first best outcome of arm’s length relations based on frictionless market transactions. Given these structural constraints firms opt for the second best solution of make rather than buy, i.e. vertical integration. But only some firms are able to use the arbitrary and discretionary decision making system to their favour, negotiating government obstacles to successful business. Those linked to power, prospered, whilst the businesses of others foundered against the wall of patronage, bureaucracy and red tape.

Global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and the global debt crisis call for more cooperation among nations. Yet instead of well-coordinated, wise cooperation for the global common good, geopolitical tensions are rising and protectionism seems to have  become a “new normal”. As a consequence, the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 has been dramatically slow and the benefits of growth policies are imbalanced across high-, low-, and middle-income countries just as within them.

Socio-ecological transitions need to address the pressing challenges of our time, namely climate change mitigation and social development – including poverty and inequality reduction – in a complementary manner. The importance of achieving resilient and sustainable societies has been made more evident by recent shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. As a consequence, national and international development policies need to foster links between social and environmental goals and policies.
One way to achieve such synergies is through environmental fiscal reforms, defined as the combination of carbon-pricing mechanisms and consequent revenue spending for environmental and socio-economic goals. Even though carbon pricing is just one of the instruments needed to achieve climate goals, it provides the complementary benefit of expanding revenues while incentivising a reduction in emissions though market signals. This paper discusses environmental fiscal reforms from the perspective of low- and middle-income countries and development cooperation, with a focus on how to improve the social outcomes of such reforms. While revenues can be recycled for different purposes – including compensating industries with high adaptation costs, further investments in environmental projects and research, and use for the general budget – the paper focusses on social spending. The revenue can be used to decrease poverty and inequality levels and to compensate the poorest for increases in prices by utilising social protection mechanisms. This is particularly important to garner broad societal support and to make environmental fiscal reforms and carbon pricing more socially acceptable and implementable at sufficient levels in more countries. The paper first presents the key features of different carbon-pricing policies and the revenues they can generate, especially for low- and middle-income countries that have limited fiscal space. It then shows how the revenue can be used to fund social protection mechanisms that can compensate the poorest and address distributional concerns. It underlines the gaps and limitations of current social protection programmes, especially in terms of low coverage of vulnerable populations. This also constrained the response to the war in Ukraine, as lower-income countries had to use price stabilisation mechanisms – which ultimately generated negative fiscal and environmental effects – to avoid inflicting greater burdens on the poor instead of providing targeted programmes. The paper also offers some design principles to best address distributional concerns, including sequencing and sectoral coverage. It then discusses the role that development cooperation can have in implementing environmental fiscal reforms in low- and middle-income countries. Overall, the paper suggests that environmental fiscal reforms can be used to achieve resilient societies and accelerate the fight against climate change, with the goal of building a more inclusive and sustainable future. Such reforms should become a priority of German development cooperation and a key lever for its strategic goals, instead of occupying a peripheral role, as it currently does. Most importantly, the analysis strongly underlines the case for environmental fiscal reforms rather than the current use of subsidies and price controls; this is true when considering both climate goals (as keeping prices low does not incentivise shifts in production and consumption) as well as social goals (e.g. cash transfers result in significantly greater levels of poverty and inequality reduction when compared to untargeted subsidies). Therefore, social protection investments are urgently needed, also in lower-income countries. The current energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic has made this clearer.