Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Analysen

Deutschland ist ein wichtiger Player in der globalen Entwicklungspolitik. Doch es mangelt an proaktivem Handeln und strategischer Steuerung.

A series of high-profile events has added up to making 2021 a crucial year to tackle the global sustainable development agenda and present a unique opportunity to drive a virtuous circle of political commitment, regulation, and financial flows towards sustainable recovery in developing countries, which is a key issue of this year’s G20 cycle. Bringing the voice of developing countries in the global multilateral agenda is not easy to tackle due to different and often competing political priorities. This blog draws lessons from the Italian G20 Presidency to inform the development policy considerations and efforts of the upcoming Indonesian, Indian and Brazilian G20 Presidencies. These Presidencies have a great potential to prioritize sustainable recovery in the Global South in their own, as well as in cooperation with the G7 and EU Presidencies when appropriate.

This chapter identifies and examines fundamental changes observed in the development policy system over recent years across three dimensions –narratives (why?), strategies (how?) and operational approaches (what?). The changes are diverse, ranging from new narratives applied to the development policy context (such as the migration narrative, climate change consequences and the COVID-19 pandemic), to new strategic considerations (such as developing countries’ graduation issues), new instruments (in theform of development finance at the interface with the private sector), and new concepts for project implementation (application of frontier technologies). We discuss the implications and effects of these trends in terms of holistic changes to the wider development policy system. Do these changes go hand in hand and ultimately build on each other? Or are we observing a disconnect between the narratives that frame the engagement of actors in development policy, their strategies for delivery and their operational approaches in partner countries? Based on a literature review and information gathered in expert interviews and brainstorming sessions, this chapter sheds light on these questions by exploring current trends and presenting ongoing disconnects between the why, what and how in the development policy system. Further, we argue that the importance of such disconnects is increasing. In particular, continuing or even amplifying disconnections in the development policy system become more problematic given the availability of a universal 2030Agenda for Sustainable Development and the need for a wider system of global cooperation to scale up delivery to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).

In the last few decades, the democratic credentials of global governance institutions have been extensively debated in the fields of international relations and political philosophy. However, despite their prominent role in the architecture of global governance, club governance institutions like the Group of Seven (G7) or the Group of Twenty (G20) have rarely been considered from the perspective of democratic theory. Focussing on the G20, this paper analyses its functions in international political practice and discusses whether, in exercising these functions, the G20 exhibits a democratic deficit. As a standard of democracy, the analysis uses the all-affected principle, according to which all those who are affected by a policy decision should be given the opportunity to participate in decision-making. This paper identifies several democratic shortcomings of the G20, for instance related to the exclusion of citizens of non-member states and a lack of parliamentary and public control. By describing realisable reforms that could to some degree alleviate these shortcomings, it is shown that more democratic institutional alternatives are feasible. Thus, the ascription of a democratic deficit to the G20 is warranted.

During the first ‘Finance in Common Summit’, in November 2020, public development banks (PDBs) from around the world committed to align their activities with the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While there is increasing interest in mainstreaming the SDGs, we still lack an open and deeper discussion of what that means. As a consequence, there is as yet no broad-based ambitious operational approach. The present study is the product of a European Think Tanks Group (ETTG) collaboration aiming both to propose a definition of SDG alignment and to provide concrete principles to further operationalise and promote such alignment in practice. To align with the multidimensional scope of the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, PDBs must incorporate the imperative of the transition to low-carbon, climate-resilient and equitable socio-economic models in all their financing decisions and project cycles. Up to now, many SDG alignment discussions have been limited to mapping exercises. Some actors perceive “SDG investments” as equivalent to infrastructure investments, without questioning whether infrastructures are designed sustainably. The present study applies a much deeper comprehension of the 2030 Agenda, arguing that alignment with the Paris Agreement and SDGs must go hand in hand. Implementing the 2030 Agenda requires PDBs to ensure coherence and spur a profound change on the scale of the entire PDB organisation and across its full range of operations. As such, SDG alignment demands high-level commitment, together with deep governance and, probably, business model restructuring. However, moving from a clear understanding of the 2030 Agenda to a truly operational approach is no easy task. Hence, this study develops four operationalisation principles, along with practical steps to implement them. Together, these provide a guiding checklist for PDBs’ efforts to align their activities with the 2030 Agenda and SDGs.

The conventional economics literature equates welfare with consumption-based utility, neglecting the psychological effects of uncertainty and fear of the future on well-being. In this study, we examine how food insecurity relates to changes in subjective well-being within a comparative analysis across different country groups between 2005 and 2018 and find that food insecurity matters to well-being. We also examine the relationship between experienced food insecurity and well-being, taking into account any potential endogeneity. In low-income, food-deficient, food-importing and drought-affected countries, changes in the prevalence of undernourishment explain a great deal of the variation in subjective well-being over time.

The Technical Expert Group on Comprehensive Risk Management (TEG-CRM) – established in 2019 under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM) – developed its Plan of Action (PoA) as an essential element of a five-year rolling workplan of the Executive Committee of the WIM. The PoA supports the implementation of activities under strategic workstream (c) on enhanced cooperation and facilitation in relation to comprehensive risk management approaches. Both workplans acknowledge social protection as a distinct risk management instrument. This briefing paper supports the implementation of the TEG-CRM PoA and the workplan of the Executive Committee of the WIM. Its objectives are to highlight policy gaps on using social protection to support loss and damage action (at the national level), and to define key capacity-building needs in developing countries. The brief further seeks to: i) recommend priorities for strengthening national social protection systems with the view to minimizing, averting and addressing residual loss and damage associated with climate extremes and slow onset changes; and ii) inform the future work on social protection by the TEG-CRM and, more broadly, that of the thematic expert groups established under the WIM.

This paper assesses the preferences of EU institutions and member states for the Union’s development policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Addressing both the effects of climate change and biodiversity loss and the exacerbating socio-economic inequalities requires a response that links the short-term recovery of the pandemic with longer-term socio-ecological transformations. Our findings show that the EU and its member states have mainly responded to that challenge through Team Europe and Team Europe Initiatives. While these have contributed to defining a joint European response to the pandemic, the strong focus on climate and green transitions and the lack of connections to the broader SDG agenda as well as social and human development have created tensions between some member states and the EU. A key challenge ahead in further defining the European response to the pandemic is finding new strategic directions and operational means for bridging these differing priorities.

Deutschland soll sich für die Finanzierung von Wissenschaft in Partnerschaft mit wissenschaftlichen Institutionen und Partnern in Afrika aussprechen, sagt Anna-Katharina Hornidge im Interview mit Klaus Bernhard Hofmann. Sie betont auch, dass ein Erfolg der Energiewende nur möglich ist, wenn ein Teil der erneuerbaren Energien importiert werde. (Grüner Wasserstoff könne eine wichtige Rolle spielen.)

Vom 11. bis 15. Oktober 2021 und vom 25. April bis 8. Mai 2022 findet in Kunming, China, die 15. Konferenz der Vertragsparteien des Übereinkommens über die biologische Vielfalt (Convention on Biological Diversity, CBD) statt. Auf der Konferenz werden Länder aus aller Welt zusammenkommen, um sich auf eine Reihe neuer Biodiversitätsziele für das kommende Jahrzehnt (Global Biodiversity Framework, GBF) zu einigen. Diese Ziele werden die Meilensteine für das Erreichen von Ergebnissen bis zum Jahr 2050 sein. Die einundzwanzig Ziele für 2030 sehen unter anderem vor, weltweit 30 % der Land- und Meeresflächen als Schutzgebiete auszuweisen. Sie beabsichtigen, invasive gebietsfremde Arten zu bekämpfen, die Verschmutzung durch Nährstoffe, Pestizide und Kunststoffe erheblich zu reduzieren und naturbasierte Lösungen für den Klimaschutz und die Anpassung an den Klimawandel umzusetzen. Darüber hinaus schlagen sie vor, Anreize, die der biologischen Vielfalt schaden, zu verringern und die internationalen Finanzströme für biodiversitätsfreundliche Aktivitäten im globalen Süden (200 Milliarden Dollar jährlich) zu erhöhen.

Im Vorfeld dieses entscheidenden Treffens wird der erste Entwurf des GBF den indigenen Völkern und lokalen Gemeinschaften (IPLCs) jedoch nicht gerecht, da es kein entsprechendes Ziel gibt, das die Bedeutung der rechtlichen Anerkennung der Rechte von IPLCs auf Land und andere Ressourcen für den Naturschutz festhält.

In diesem ersten Entwurf der GBF zielt Ziel 3 darauf ab, bis 2030 mindestens 30 % der weltweiten Landflächen und Ozeane durch die Ausweisung von Schutzgebieten zu schützen (auch als 30*30-Ziel bekannt). Allerdings gibt es weder auf globaler noch auf lokaler Ebene Garantien dafür, dass die Rechte indigener Völker und lokaler Gemeinschaften in vollem Umfang respektiert und gefördert werden. Heute werden 52 % der weltweiten Schutzgebiete unter der strikten Prämisse verwaltet, dass der Mensch von der Natur ausgeschlossen werden muss, damit sie gedeihen kann. Diese Prämisse hat ihren Ursprung im Kolonialismus, in dem die Kolonialmächte unter dem Vorwand einer höherrangigen Religion, Rasse oder besseren Wissens angestammte Gebiete der indigenen Bevölkerung exklusiv kontrollierten. Heute wie damals hat der ausschließende Naturschutz (oder „Festungsschutz“) für die IPLCs schlimme Folgen: Sie werden aus ihren Häusern und von ihrem angestammten Land vertrieben, ihre traditionellen Lebensgrundlagen werden kriminalisiert und ihre Menschenrechte auf Leben, Gesundheit, Wasser, Nahrung, einen angemessenen Lebensstandard und kulturelle Rechte werden verletzt. Mit anderen Worten: Indigene Völker werden nicht nur den Preis zahlen für ein ökologisches Problem, welches sie nicht verursacht haben. Auch ihr Beitrag zur biologischen Vielfalt wird übersehen.

Weltweit leben 1,87 Milliarden indigene Völker und lokale Gemeinschaften in den wichtigsten Hotspots der biologischen Vielfalt, die 47 % der Erdoberfläche ausmachen; 363 Millionen von ihnen leben in bestehenden Schutzgebieten. Dennoch ist die rechtliche Anerkennung des Eigentums von IPLCs auf nur etwa 10 % dieser Gebiete beschränkt. IPLCs haben bewiesen, dass sie Wälder, Ökosysteme und die biologische Vielfalt durch kollektives Eigentum, Governance-Mechanismen und traditionelles ökologisches Wissen effektiv erhalten. Die Ernährungs- und Landwirtschaftsorganisation der Vereinten Nationen (FAO) zeigt, dass von IPLCs geführte Gebiete mit formal anerkannten kollektiven Landrechten wesentlich besser zum Erhalt von Umwelt und Ressourcen beitragen als benachbarte privat oder staatlich verwaltete Schutzgebiete, etwa bei der Eindämmung der Entwaldung – und dies selbst bei zunehmender gewaltsamer Bedrohung der IPLCs.

Aus diesen Gründen müssen sich die weltweiten Naturschutzbemühungen vom „Festungsschutz“ weg und hin zu einem auf Rechten basierenden Schutz bewegen. Rechtebasierter Naturschutz stellt sicher, dass die Rechte von IPLCs auf Land, Binnengewässer und Ressourcen anerkannt, formalisiert und gesichert werden. Sie erhalten angemessene Unterstützung und Schutz, einschließlich finanzieller Mittel, um ihren wichtigsten Beitrag zum Naturschutz zu erhalten. Würden die globalen Biodiversitätsziele rechtebasierte Ansätze im Naturschutz verankern, wäre dies ein wichtiger Beitrag dazu, den Naturschutz zu entkolonialisieren. Auf diese Weise könnten lokale Gemeinschaften ihre Gebiete besser verteidigen, etwa gegen die Agrarindustrie, legale und illegale Rohstoffgewinnung, korrupte Politiker, Landspekulanten und Ressourcenraub.

In diesem Zusammenhang sollte die GBF der Stärkung der Rechte indigener Völker und lokaler Gemeinschaften, der substanziellen Beteiligung auf lokaler Ebene und darüber hinaus sowie der rechtlichen Anerkennung ihrer Menschen-, Land- und Eigentumsrechte Vorrang einräumen. Schließlich muss die Bedeutung von Fortschritten bei der rechtlichen Anerkennung der Rechte von IPLCs auf Land und andere Ressourcen für den Schutz der Natur in den globalen gebietsbezogenen Zielen für die Zeit nach 2020 kodifiziert und mit einem eigenen Ziel versehen werden. Der Hohe Kommissar für Menschenrechte der Vereinten Nationen schlägt die Aufnahme des folgenden Ziels vor (als neues Ziel 3 oder als Zusatz zu Ziel 21), das starke Unterstützung finden sollte: „Bis 2030 die rechtliche Anerkennung und Sicherung der Eigentumsrechte von IPLCs an allen Ländereien, Gewässern und anderen natürlichen Ressourcen, die sie gewohnheitsmäßig oder anderweitig besitzen, bewirtschaften oder nutzen, sicherstellen, mit besonderem Augenmerk auf kommunale Rechte und die Eigentumsrechte von Frauen und Jugendlichen innerhalb dieser Gruppen“.

To facilitate FDI in developing countries, understanding technical and financial needs to transition from idea to adoption is vital.

This paper empirically examines the link between the cost of sovereign borrowing and climate risk for 40 advanced and emerging economies. We find that vulnerability to the direct effects of climate change matters substantially more for sovereign borrowing costs than climate risk resilience. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect on bond yields is progressively higher for countries deemed highly vulnerable to climate change. Finally, a set of panel structural VAR models indicate that the reaction of bond yields to climate risk shocks become permanent after around 18 quarters, with high risk economies experiencing the largest permanent effects on yields.

The 2030 Agenda with its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on climate change were adopted in 2015. Although independently defined, the two agreements are strongly interlinked. We developed a framework that scores the impacts of climate-change actions on all SDG targets based on directionality (i.e., trade-offs or co-benefits) and likelihood of occurrence (i.e., ubiquitous or context-dependent), and categorizes them by dependence on four key context dimensions—geographical, governance, time horizon and limited natural resources. Through an extensive literature review, we found that climate-change mitigation measures directly affect most SDGs and their targets, mostly through co-benefits. Improving energy efficiency, reducing energy-services demand and switching to renewables provide the most co-benefits. In contrast, carbon capture and storage and nuclear energy likely lead to multiple trade-offs. We show how understanding the relevant context dimensions facilitates policy design and policy mixes that enhance co-benefits and minimize trade-offs. Finally, by assessing the prevalence of climate-change mitigation measures in G20 countries, we found that measures with more co-benefits are more frequently adopted. Our study advances the knowledge of climate–SDG interactions, contributing to climate and sustainable development governance research, and facilitating policy design for a joint implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda.

This paper empirically examines the reaction of global financial markets across 38 economies to the COVID-19 outbreak, with special focus on the dynamics of capital flows across 14 emerging market economies. The effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy responses to COVID-19 is also tested. Using daily data over the period January 4, 2010 to August 31, 2020, and controlling for a host of domestic and global macroeconomic and financial factors, we use a fixed effects panel approach and a structural VAR framework to show that emerging markets have been more heavily affected than advanced economies. In particular, emerging economies in Asia and Europe have experienced the sharpest impacts on stock, bond and exchange rates due to COVID-19, as well as abrupt and substantial capital outflows. Quantitative easing and fiscal stimulus packages mainly helped to boost stock prices, notably for advanced and emerging economies in Asia. Our findings also highlight the role that global factors and developments in the world's leading financial centers have on financial conditions in EMEs. Importantly, the impact of COVID-19 related quantitative easing measures by central banks in advanced countries extended to EMEs, with significant positive spillovers to EME stock markets in Asia, Europe and Latin America. Going forward, while the ultimate resolution of COVID-19 may be expected to lead to a market correction as uncertainty declines, our impulse response analysis suggests that there may be persistent effects on bond markets in emerging Europe and on EME capital flows.

Failure at multiple levels of governance rather than the resource base itself is at the origin of the water crisis. Despite increasing scholarly research on water governance and efforts towards policy reform the overall situation has not substantially improved and major transformations in water governance are yet to be implemented. The chapter summarises and addresses multi-level and multi-sectoral challenges for water governance by reviewing and discussing several key concepts in science and policy. An analysis of basin scale approaches and their effectiveness and a discussion of the importance of scale and of multi-level governance approaches shows that crossing boundaries is essential to tackle complexities of sustainable water governance and management. The concept of the WEF nexus is introduced and critically analysed concerning its potential to overcome sectoral fragmentation and sectoral power imbalances. Crossing boundaries also implies governance across national borders. The sub-chapters on transboundary water management and on global water governance address these international and global dimensions. Overall, the chapter highlights from different perspectives the importance of linking and of governing across scales from the local to the international and global.

Since the pandemic began, the debt situation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been further exacerbated as the pandemic has constrained the ability of many countries to mobilise revenues; it has also raised public  sector financing requirements. To close the financial gap, countries in SSA need short-term and long-term liquidity from a wide range of financiers. The G20 assumes a crucial role in resolving debt problems in SSA as the only forum that encompasses the governments of Africa’s most important creditors among industrialised countries and emerging markets. The G20 can help by: (a) operationalising, in the shortterm, the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and linking it to sustainable development; (b) supporting robust replenishments of the concessional windows of the International Development Association (IDA) and the African Development Fund (ADF) and a new allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for low-income countries (LICs); (c) enhancing capacity building for domestic resource mobilisation in LICs through the development of financial sectors and public financial management; and (d) developing a set of critical indicators for CRAs that can easily be compared across countries and can stand the test of time and changing risk profiles.

Has the Covid-19 outbreak been a blessing in disguise for the social contract for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Kuwait? This column argues that the double crisis of the pandemic and low oil prices provides an opportunity to adopt the reforms that are necessary to make the country’s economy more dynamic, in particular encouraging innovation and job creation in the small business sector.

Once the dust of the COVID-19 crisis settles, it will be time to build a new foundation for Europe-Africa relations. As the EU searches for allies in a post-COVID world, a group of seven European think tank leaders looks at how to build a stronger Europe-Africa axis in the multilateral system.