European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Rachele Rossi,

© F8 studio / Shutterstock

On 31 October 2019, the European Commission adopted a legislative package aimed at ensuring the continuation of the current common agricultural policy (CAP) until the legislation on the post‑2020 CAP is in force. The package includes a proposal for a CAP transitional regulation setting out a number of adjustments to current CAP regulations, concerning their applicability beyond 2020 with new financial allocations. This proposal introduces transitional provisions and amendments that are necessary to ensure the continuity of the CAP through a one‑year transitional period ending on 31 December 2021 and to smooth the passage to the new policy framework envisaged by the post‑2020 CAP proposals. It concerns all the basic acts which regulate how the CAP now works.

Versions

• April 2020:  ‘Transitional provisions for the CAP post 2020‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down certain transitional provisions for the support by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) in the year 2021 and amending Regulations (EU) No 228/2013, (EU) No 229/2013 and (EU) No 1308/2013 as regards resources and their distribution in respect of the year 2021 and amending Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013, (EU) No 1306/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013 as regards their resources and application in the year 2021 Committee responsible: Agriculture and Rural Development COM(2019) 581
31.10.2019 Rapporteurs: Elsi Katainen (Renew Europe, Finland) 2019/0254(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Álvaro Amaro (EPP, Portugal)
Clara Aguilera (S&D, Spain)
Bronis Ropė (Greens/EFA, Lithuania)
Ivan David (ID, Czechia)
Mazaly Aguilar (ECR, Spain)
Petros Kokkalis (GUE/NGL, Greece) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© pogonici / Adobe Stock

The von der Leyen Commission launched the European Green Deal as the new growth strategy of the European Union (EU), with a view to promoting the transition to a climate-neutral economy by 2050. Confirming the importance of financial resources for such a major objective, its investment pillar was the first initiative of the strategy to be presented.

The European Green Deal Investment Plan, also known as the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, aims to contribute to financing a sustainable transition, while supporting the regions and communities most exposed to its impact. By combining legislative and non-legislative initiatives, the plan addresses three aspects: 1) mobilising funding worth at least €1 trillion from the EU budget and other public and private sources over the next decade; 2) putting sustainability at the heart of investment decisions across all sectors; and 3) providing support to public administrations and project promoters to create a robust pipeline of sustainable projects.

The debate on the investment plan is interlinked with the ongoing negotiations on the EU’s 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which requires the European Parliament’s consent and unanimity in the Council. Parliament, which is traditionally a strong advocate of climate and environmental objectives, has called for an ambitious MFF, with resources commensurate with the goal of facilitating a just transition to a carbon-neutral economy.

Commentators have identified both positive elements and possible weaknesses in the Commission’s plan, arguing that it is a step in the right direction but would provide only part of the resources needed to meet the current climate targets for 2030. The impact of the pandemic has raised concerns that decarbonisation strategies could be derailed. However, analysts and stakeholders generally agree on their continued relevance, arguing that green investments from public and private sources must play a central role in any economic recovery plan.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Green Deal Investment Plan: Main elements and possible impact of the coronavirus pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen,

© kovop58 / Adobe Stock

The magnitude of the potential impact of the coronavirus pandemic is still unknown. But it is already clear that developed countries are being severely challenged by the crisis, and that many health-care systems around the world are under-resourced for dealing with a problem of this magnitude. The effects around the world in a wide range of linked areas – economy, political stability, security, human rights – are gradually surfacing as the pandemic spreads, and are likely to affect the global geopolitical balance. Against this backdrop, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell, have set out the EU’s global response to the pandemic. Council and Commission statements on the EU’s coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences are scheduled for the European Parliament’s plenary session on 16-17 April 2020.

Background

The scale of the impact of the evolving crises related to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is still not knowable, but it is already evident that this major shock to economies and societies across the world will have dire global consequences now and in the future. At the same time, the crises are accelerating underlying geopolitical rifts and weaknesses, and could potentially lead to a shift in the global balance of power. One symptom of the exacerbated global power struggle in the shadow of the health crisis is the combination of disinformation campaigns and heavily promoted health diplomacy, by Beijing in particular, capitalising on EU Member States’ preoccupation with the crisis in their own countries, as well as Washington’s disorganised response, which has diverted from the leading role it traditionally plays during international crises, such as the 2014 Ebola crisis. The influence campaigns have prompted the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) to caution against the ongoing ‘global battle of narratives‘.

The COVID-19 response package

Of the pledged package of €15.6 billion, €3.25 billion will go to Africa, including €2.06 billion for sub-Saharan Africa and €1.19 billion for the Northern African neighbourhood countries.

The EU is allocating in total €3.07 billion for the whole neighbourhood: €2.1 billion for the south, and €962 million for the Eastern Partnership countries. In addition, €800 million will go to the western Balkans and Turkey.

The overall package entails another €1.42 billion in guarantees for Africa and the neighbourhood from the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD).

The EU will support Asia and the Pacific with €1.22 billion. Another €291 million will go to the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific region, €918 million to support our partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, and €111 million to support Overseas Countries and Territories.

In terms of thematic division of the funds, €502 million go to supporting the short-term emergency responses; €2.9 billion to supporting research, health and water systems in partner countries and €12.3 billion to addressing the economic and social consequences.

Source: European Commission.

The EU boosts its global action

Against this backdrop, the EU is stepping up its global action in response to the evolving crises, focusing on the most vulnerable countries across the world. On 8 April 2020, the European Commission and the HR/VP presented plans for a strong and targeted EU response to help partner countries cope with the pandemic, as outlined in the joint communication on a global response to fight the pandemic. The collective ‘Team Europe’ package focuses on addressing the pressing health crisis and humanitarian needs, bolstering partner countries’ health, water and sanitation systems as well as their research and preparedness capacities to deal with the pandemic, and mitigating the wider impact on societies and economies. This will help reduce the risk of destabilisation.

As a global actor and the world’s leading international aid donor, the EU supports and promotes a coordinated multilateral response, together with the United Nations (UN), international financial institutions (IFIs), as well as the G7 and the G20. The EU’s global response to the COVID-19 pandemic integrates its strategic objectives vis-à-vis environment and climate, in line with the European Green Deal and the Digital Agenda.

The ‘Team Europe’-approach combines resources from the EU, its Member States and financial institutions, not least the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The Commission and the EIB have already pledged more than €15.6 billion from existing programmes. The package will help the most vulnerable countries in Africa, the EU’s neighbourhood, Asia, the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean. The first packages are already being implemented in the neighbourhood and in the western Balkans (see below). Consistent with the Union’s fundamental values, core interests and global strategy, the joint communication underlines the EU’s continued commitment to promoting and upholding good governance, human rights, the rule of law, gender equality and non-discrimination, decent work conditions, as well as fundamental values and humanitarian principles. The communication specifically reiterates that the ‘special and extraordinary measures required to contain the pandemic must not lead to backtracking on the fundamental values and principles of our open and democratic societies’, and that the EU’s action will be fact-based and fight any attempts of disinformation inside and outside the EU.

The four pillars of the ‘Team Europe’ approach

The strategy for Europe’s external response to the global coronavirus crisis rests on four pillars:

Team Europe priorities: (i) emergency response to the immediate health crisis and humanitarian needs; (ii) boosting health, water and sanitation systems, as well as the partner countries’ research capacities to address the pandemic; and (iii) tackle the immediate socio-economic impact.

Team Europe packages: coordination with implementing partners – such as the EIB, the EBRD and European development finance institutions, Member States’ development agencies and technical assistance providers, as well as IFIs – to create a coherent package for each country.

Team Europe for Global Preparedness: support for the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, which has set the global fundraising goal at €7.5 billion.

Team Europe for global coordination and multilateralism: as a major international aid donor, the EU will promote and lead a coordinated global response, together with the G7, the G20 and the UN. The EU and its Member States’ contribution will be presented at country, regional and global level, in particular the G7, G20 and the UN-led international response, to boost the visibility of EU support to partner countries.

Examples of the EU’s COVID-19-related support in partner countries

The EU provides over €100 million for immediate health needs, mostly through the World Health Organization (WHO) and UN agencies. This covers countries most in need in Africa, Latin America and Asia. It also includes €30 million for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine and €38 million for the western Balkans.

Examples include: Albania: 5 fully equipped ambulances, respirators, digital mobile x-rays and intensive care equipment; Bosnia and Herzegovina: 7 500 test kits and personal protective equipment (PPE); ­Kosovo: 30 respirators, 5 fully equipped ambulances and 400 hospital beds; ­Montenegro: 100 respirators, 10 mobile X‑ray devices and PPE.; North Macedonia: 20 respirators, 5 000 testing sets and PPE.­ The EU also funded 5 flights of cargo planes to transport 280 tonnes of emergency medical supplies procured by Serbia.

Under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, €90 million helps fund health infrastructure and equipment.

The EU has mobilised €10 million for Ethiopia’s Preparedness and Response Plan to the COVID-19 outbreak to increase the number of treatment centres, labs with COVID-19 diagnostic equipment and test kits. In Nigeria, the EU contributes €50 million for the implementation of the UN Response Plan to COVID-19. In Sudan, €10 million will increase access to clean water and hygiene and boost awareness about the virus.

In Venezuela and the region, the EU is providing €9 million to the Pan-American Health Organization and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent to help prepare the response to COVID-19.

In the Caribbean, the EU is contributing €8 million in regional support to the Caribbean Public Health Agency to cover the countries’ most urgent needs regarding outbreak control operations.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘The EU’s global response to coronavirus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© Stuart Miles / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) is having a major negative impact on employment. As part of the EU’s response to the crisis, the European Commission has proposed the creation of SURE, a temporary instrument to complement national efforts to protect employees and the self-employed from the risk of unemployment and loss of income. Under the scheme, the EU would be able to provide financial support worth up to €100 billion to ‘short-time work’ schemes and other national measures that have this objective. The Eurogroup has welcomed the proposal, which the Council should now fine-tune and adopt rapidly. While the instrument is linked to the EU budget through a guarantee scheme, Parliament is not involved in the legislative procedure due to the legal basis.

Background

The coronavirus pandemic is a public health crisis that, although at different paces, is having severe socio-economic repercussions across the world, including in the European Union (EU) and its Member States. The pandemic is predicted to have a far worse impact on employment than the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The United Nations International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that, in the second quarter of 2020, Europe will lose 7.8 % of its total working hours, equivalent to 12 million full-time workers (-6.7 % or ‑195 million full-time workers globally). Various analysts rapidly pointed to the need for coordinated and bold policy responses to mitigate the impact of the crisis on citizens, societies and economies. In its March 2020 communication on a coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the European Commission included a section on measures to alleviate the employment impact on workers and sectors, noting the effectiveness of ‘short-time work’ (STW) schemes in this respect and the EU’s readiness to support, where possible, Member States in meeting this objective. Under public STW schemes, found in different forms in many Member States, firms experiencing difficulties can temporarily reduce the number of hours worked by employees (either partially or to zero), but pay them for the hours not worked thanks to support from public sources. Such schemes, therefore, play a stabilisation function and provide support to both workers and firms, sustaining households’ incomes and avoiding large numbers of dismissals. As for the self-employed, similar measures may provide income replacement in an emergency.

European Commission proposal

On 2 April 2020, the European Commission put forward a proposal for the creation of a European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE).

Objective and scope

The SURE instrument aims to make available financial support, in the form of loans granted on favourable terms, to Member States that need to mobilise significant resources to alleviate the socio-economic impact of the pandemic through STW schemes or similar measures. Total loans could amount to up to €100 billion. The instrument, which would be temporary and tailored to the response to the pandemic, will be available to all EU Member States as a second line of defence to finance measures that help protect jobs. It would complement national measures as well as other support that the EU provides in this policy area through grants under the European Social Fund. The United Kingdom will not participate in SURE during the transition period, given the provisions of Article 143(1) of its withdrawal agreement from the EU.

Financing and prudential rules

SURE does not require any upfront cash contributions from Member States. To back the lending scheme, Member States would commit irrevocable and callable guarantees worth €25 billion to the EU budget, with each guarantee calculated on the basis of their respective share of EU gross national income (GNI). Such a system should ensure a high credit rating, enabling the European Commission to contract borrowings on the financial markets at favourable conditions, with the purpose of on-lending them to the Member State requesting financial assistance. Further to providing credit enhancement, the guarantees would protect the resources of the EU budget, for which they would constitute external assigned revenue according to Article 21(5) of the EU’s Financial Regulation. In addition, the proposal includes prudential rules to manage the risks related to the loan portfolio, such as the provision that, taken together, the three Member States receiving the largest loans cannot get financial assistance worth more than €60 billion.

Functioning

If a Member State experiences a sudden severe increase in actual and planned public expenditure for the preservation of employment because of its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, it can request financial assistance under the SURE instrument to cover part of this additional expenditure. Relevant expenditure concerns the extension or creation of STW schemes or similar measures designed to protect workers from the risk of unemployment and loss of income. Importantly, it includes relevant measures for self-employed people. After receiving the request, the European Commission consults the Member State to assess the increase in expenditure and define the terms of the loan. On this basis, the Commission submits a proposal for a decision to provide financial assistance, on which the Council decides by adopting an implementing act. A loan agreement between the beneficiary Member State and the Commission details the characteristics of the loan, including all the elements listed in Article 220(5) of the EU’s Financial Regulation. According to the CEPS think-tank, the SURE instrument has the potential to provide substantial relief to national systems, although a number of features (duration and cost of the loans as well as the overall size of the instrument) may partially reduce its impact.

Legal basis

The legal basis proposed by the Commission is Article 122(1) and (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Council may adopt, by qualified majority, measures to provide Union financial assistance to Member States faced with severe difficulties caused by exceptional occurrences beyond their control. The European Parliament is not involved in this legislative procedure. Article 122(2) TFEU underpins the lending component of SURE. In the past, it was used to establish the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary tool through which the EU provided Ireland and Portugal with financial assistance conditional on the implementation of reforms between 2011 and 2014 (and bridge-finance to Greece in 2015). Unlike the EFSM Regulation, the SURE proposal is also based on Article 122(1) TFEU (the Council ‘may decide, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, upon the measures appropriate to the economic situation…’) as far as the guarantee scheme is concerned. Once the requirements for the activation of SURE are met, the text limits the conditions linked to financial assistance to the provision that beneficiary Member States must use it in support of national STW schemes or similar measures.

Eurogroup and Council

On 9 April 2020, the Eurogroup welcomed the proposal for the SURE instrument as part of a package of three measures worth €540 billion to fight the consequences of the pandemic. Mário Centeno, President of the Eurogroup, stressed the magnitude of the response to the pandemic that monetary and fiscal authorities and regulators have put in place so far: ‘Nearly 3 % GDP of fiscal measures, enhanced flexibility, additional liquidity schemes of 16 % of GDP.’ Ministers agreed on the need to establish SURE as a temporary loan-based instrument for financial assistance, and committed to making it operational as soon as possible, noting that the legislative process should advance without delay. They confirmed the size of the instrument that could channel up to €100 billion, adding that it should build on the EU budget as much as possible, while ensuring sufficient capacity for Balance of Payments (BoP) assistance, and on Member States’ guarantees to the EU budget. The Council is now expected to fine-tune and adopt the legislative text.

SURE is a temporary instrument specifically designed for the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission stresses that this in no way precludes the establishment of a future permanent European unemployment reinsurance scheme under a different legal basis. Recently revived in Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s political guidelines, this long-debated idea could increase the resilience of economic and monetary Union (EMU) against economic shocks. Parliament has repeatedly insisted on strengthening the social dimension of EMU. Following the proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, the possible creation of a permanent unemployment reinsurance scheme could be a further step in that direction.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘Temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Magdalena Sapala,

© Duangjan / Adobe Stock

On 2 April 2020, as part of the EU response to the needs resulting from the coronavirus outbreak, the European Commission proposed to activate the Emergency Support Instrument and reinforce the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (rescEU). Provision of funding for these measures (€3 billion) requires mobilisation of flexibility and last resort mechanisms available under the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). In order to use the global margin for commitments for this purpose, the Commission proposes to amend the provisions of the MFF Regulation and lift the restrictions on the scope of application of this flexibility mechanism. Consent from the European Parliament for this urgent request is expected to be voted during the 16-17 April plenary session.

Proposal to activate €3 billion to support healthcare systems

In its Draft Amending Budget 2/2020 (DAB 2/2020) the Commission proposed to activate €3 billion in commitment appropriations and €1.53 billion in payment appropriations under heading 3, ‘Security and Citizenship’ of the 2014-2020 MFF (see EPRS ‘at a glance’ note on DAB 2/2020). The resources, channeled through the Emergency Support Instrument (€2.7 billion) and rescEU (€300 million), would support the healthcare systems in EU countries fighting the COVID-19 pandemic (see below). Since the resources under heading 3 have already been exhausted, and there are no available margins or scope for redeployment, the Commission proposes to mobilise amounts still available under three flexibility instruments provided for in the 2014-2020 MFF Regulation: the global margin for commitments (€2 042.4 million), the contingency margin (€714.6 million) and the flexibility instrument (€243.04 million).

Amendment of the 2014-2020 MFF Regulation

The global margin for commitments (GMC) allows the re-use of margins left below the MFF ceilings for commitment appropriations in previous years. According to Article 14 of the MFF Regulation, the scope of its application is restricted to the area of youth and employment, and since the mid-term revision of the MFF in 2017, to migration and security measures. The Commission proposes to remove this limitation and amend the wording of Articles 3(2) and 14 of the MFF Regulation. As a result, the GMC would become a flexibility tool of more general purpose, allowing its use for the financing of actions under the Emergency Support Instrument with amounts which otherwise would not have been available. The modification would not increase the financial obligations of the EU Member States.

Procedures in the European Parliament and the Council of the EU

For the amendment of the relevant provisions of the MFF Regulation, a special legislative procedure applies with the Council acting unanimously after receiving Parliament’s consent. The proposal has been treated urgently by Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (Rule 163 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament) and is expected to be voted, along with DAB 2/2020 and other acts, during the April 2020 plenary session. Adoption of the MFF amendment is a prerequisite for the adoption of DAB 2/2020. It is noteworthy, that while the budgetary implications of the activation of the instrument are subject to Parliament’s approval, the activation itself is carried out without any role for Parliament. The Council adopted the proposal for activation of the Emergency Support Instrument and DAB 2/2020 using a written procedure concluded on 14 April.

Activation of the Emergency Support Instrument

The Emergency Support Instrument is one of the main elements of the package of proposals put forward by the Commission on 2 April 2020 (others are the EU short-time employment scheme (SURE), and the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative plus). Created in 2016, at the peak of the refugee crisis, and then

equipped with a budget of €650 million for three years, the instrument has proved useful and relevant as a rapid and flexibile tool in emergency situations. As emphasised by the Commission, given the severe humanitarian consequences and the scope of the social, economic and financial impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic, it is also a suitable tool to apply in the current situation. Activation of this emergency assistance is based on the principle of solidarity enshrined in Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and requires the adoption of the Commission’s proposal for a Council regulation on the provision of emergency support within the Union (2016/369) with some provisions amended in respect of the COVID-19 outbreak. Despite the contribution to this instrument from the EU budget, the decision on its activation is taken by the Council alone, without Parliament’s involvement. The creation of such an ad hoc mechanism with strong links to the EU budget but without full observance of Parliament’s prerogatives as co-legislator was previously criticised when the Emergency Support Instrument was first used to address the refugee crisis.

The general objective of the instrument is to provide emergency support within the EU to address urgent humanitarian needs, assistance, relief and operations to preserve life. By taking coordinated action and providing financial means, the EU will assist the national administrations in managing the ongoing health emergency and its aftermath, including through:

• wider and faster stock-piling and coordination of essential resource distribution across Europe;
• import and transport of protective gear across the EU;
• cross-border transport of patients to hospitals;
• cross-border cooperation to alleviate the pressure on health systems in the most affected EU regions;
• central procurement and distribution of essential medical supplies to hospitals and emergency supply of protective gear for hospital staff, such as respirators, ventilators, personal protective equipment, reusable masks, medicines, therapeutics, and laboratory supplies and disinfectants;
• improvement of production capacities of EU enterprises to ensure rapid production and deployment of essential equipment, products, medicines and material needed to urgently address supply shortages;
• support for the construction of temporary field hospitals and converted facilities;
• increasing the production of testing kits and support for acquiring key basic substances;
• boosting the swift development of medication and testing methods;
• developing, purchasing and distributing testing supplies (testing kits, reagents, hardware).

These actions will be complemented by the reinforced Union Civil Protection Mechanism (rescEU). The Mechanism, for which the EU has allocated €80 million in March 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, will provide direct, 100 % financing for joint procurement and purchase of necessary equipment on behalf of the Member States. Managed at the EU level, the stock-pile of medical equipment will be hosted by one or more Member States and dispatched at short notice in case of insufficient national capacity.

The Commission proposed to introduce the Emergency Support Instrument for a period of two years as of 1 February 2020. This means that grants will be able to be awarded retroactively for actions started after that date. As explained by Gert-Jan Koopman, the European Commission’s Director-General for Budget, for the management of the assistance, the Commission has created a cross-department task force, which would cooperate with the national and regional authorities, NGOs and health organisations involved in the implementation of the instrument on the ground. Apart from the financing requested under DAB 2/2020, the resources dedicated to the instrument can be complemented by direct contributions from the national and regional authorities, foundations, individual donations and crowdfunding.

The instrument also applies to the United Kingdom, currently in the transition period under its EU withdrawal agreement, within the EU budget for 2020.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘Amendment of the 2014-2020 MFF regulation. Using the global margin for commitments to finance measures in the healthcare sector under the Emergency Support Instrument‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

Adstock/shutterstock

Pursuing its efforts to uphold vital democratic functions during this critical time, the European Parliament is again holding an extraordinary plenary session on 16 and 17 April 2020, using the temporary alternative voting procedure first used in March, and with a large amount of voting time on the agenda. Under Parliament’s rules, the urgent procedure (Rule 163) has been requested for a number of legislative and budgetary files concerning EU action in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Under the procedure, Members will first have to vote, on Thursday, to accept the use of urgent procedure, and would then go on to vote on the substance of the legislative and budgetary proposals, including on any amendments tabled, the following day.

Parliament will hear Council and Commission statements on EU coordinated action to combat the pandemic and its consequences on Thursday morning. This is likely to include news on progress towards SURE, the proposed temporary instrument to protect workers from unemployment and loss of income, complementing national efforts with up to €100 billion in support for ‘short-time work’ schemes and other measures. As Council may adopt measures to provide Union financial assistance to Member States who face severe difficulties outside their control, Parliament is not involved in this legislative procedure. However, should the Commission propose the creation of a permanent unemployment reinsurance scheme to strengthen the EU economy against such shocks in future, it is likely that Parliament will be fully involved.

Of course, the virus itself recognises no borders, and the EU’s international action will also be debated during the session. Even though international travel has been severely curtailed during the current lockdown, a global response is essential to prevent resurgence of the pandemic. The EU has already committed to a ‘Team Europe’ approach, using funding from the EU, Member States and financial institutions to prepare a €15.6 billion funding package to help EU neighbourhood countries and beyond tackle the health crisis and, further down the line, address health and preparedness capacity, aimed at reducing the risk of destabilisation in the face of worldwide crisis.

Members will undoubtedly focus on the measures to address the effects of coronavirus on which Parliament has to vote. Parliament’s Regional Development Committee has requested the urgent procedure for votes to take place on one of a second set of measures to tackle the crisis caused by the pandemic, the use of specific flexibility measures for European structural and investment (ESI) funds. Members are likely to vote on a proposal that would temporarily allow programmes dealing with the impact of the crisis to be financed up to 100 % from the EU budget between July 2020 and June 2021, as well as greater simplification and flexibility in the rules under which the resources are allocated.

Measures to prevent the spread of the virus, such as restaurant closures and travel bans, have hit the fisheries and aquaculture sector particularly hard. Parliament’s Fisheries Committee have requested that additional proposals to support the industry are considered under the urgent procedure. Should Members agree, they would vote on a package of measures to supplement those already agreed under the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative. These would include support for a temporary end to fishing activities, including for aquaculture farmers, for storage costs and for greater flexibility and simplified procedures in allocating the funding.

In addition to those specific legislative measures, Members are expected to vote on a series of budgetary measures, including changes to the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF) regulation and two amending budgets, to re-orientate current financing towards tackling the pandemic. The European Commission has proposed to amend this year’s EU budget to use three flexibility and last resort mechanisms (the Global Margin for commitments, the Flexibility Instrument and the Contingency Margin) to release €3 billion in emergency support for the healthcare sector. Complemented by €1.53 billion in payments for the reinforced Union Civil Protection Mechanism (rescEU), funding under the Emergency Support Instrument will be used for production, procurement, stockpiling and distribution of medical equipment, including testing kits, and construction of field medical facilities. However, lifting the existing restrictions on the scope of this flexibility first requires amendment to heading 3 ‘Security and citizenship’ of the 2014-2020 MFF regulation, for which European Parliament consent is required. This consent vote is thus expected to be held on Thursday, enabling the amending budget to be voted the following day. The move is not without precedent, as the ESI was extended to cover migration issues – however not without criticism of its ad hoc nature, as well as the lack of Parliamentary oversight of such measures that, conversely, a regulation would provide. A second proposal to amend the 2020 EU budget is also expected to be put to the vote, aimed at mobilising the Contingency Margin to alleviate the increased migratory pressure in Greece and earthquake recovery in Albania.

The procedure for voting during the session will follow that of the March II session, with Members voting by email.

Written by Naja Bentzen and Jakub Przetacznik,

© millaf / Adobe Stock

The true extent of the evolving coronavirus pandemic within the EU and across the world is still unclear, and the magnitude of the consequences is not known either. What is clear, however, is that the healthcare systems of many countries across the world are underfunded, and that even developed countries are severely challenged by the health crisis.

Moreover, the socio-economic impact of the crisis across the world will likely be grave, while the multiple crises related to the pandemic – including the global infodemic – may have lasting effects on the global geopolitical balance.

Against this backdrop, on 8 April 2020 the European Commission and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) presented a proposal for a strong and targeted EU response to help partner countries cope with the pandemic, as outlined in a joint communication. In its response, the EU is adopting a ‘Team Europe’ approach, combining resources from the EU, its Member States and financial institutions.

The collective package of €15.6 billion is to help here and now, but also has a longer-term perspective. It will focus on addressing the pressing health crisis and resulting humanitarian needs, bolstering partner countries’ health, water and sanitation systems and their research and preparedness capacities to deal with the pandemic, as well as mitigating the impact on societies and economies. This should also help to reduce the risk of destabilisation.

The EU’s financial support for the countries covered by European Neighbourhood Policy will amount to €3.07 billion: €2.1 billion for the southern neighbourhood, and €962 million for the eastern neighbourhood. Moreover, €800 million will support the six western Balkan countries and Turkey.

As a long-standing major international aid contributor, the EU will promote and lead a coordinated multilateral response, together with the United Nations (UN), international financial institutions, and the G7 and the G20.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU’s response to coronavirus in its neighbourhood and beyond’ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Funds for western Balkan countries announced on 30 March 2020

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© thodonal / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus crisis is beginning to show signs of abating in some countries, but not in others. Governments and local authorities have introduced, maintained, and in certain cases even strengthened, a range of tough measures designed to prevent, suppress or mitigate the advance of the virus. Many analysts and politicians are increasingly calling for stronger global-level action to combat the pandemic, while medical scientists still struggle to find an effective treatment and a vaccine for the disease.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the coronavirus and related issues. Earlier publications on the topic can be found in the previous edition item in this series, published by the EPRS on 3 April.

A European approach to fund the coronavirus cost is in the interest of all
Bruegel, April 2020

The G20 must step up to confront the global health crisis
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2020

The coronavirus: A political earthquake
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

A temporary, common fiscal stimulus to answer the mayhem of COVID-19
Bruegel, April 2020

Take me to your Leader! Or how the EU could emerge stronger from the corona crisis
Egmont, April 2020

How is the COVID-19 crisis serving the EU?
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Love thy neighbour?
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

How to pandemic-proof globalization
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Cities “on the front lines” of the coronavirus
Atlantic Council, April 2020

Europe should seize oil price windfall to fund its pandemic response
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2020

A joint effort to increase production of medical masks in Europe
Cligenael, April 2020

This time is different: The ‘COVID shock’ and future of the global oil market
Instituto Affari Internazionali, April 2020

Predictions and policymaking: Complex modelling beyond Covid-19
Chatham House, April, 2020

Europe’s economic emergency is also a geopolitical one
Atlantic Council, April 2020

Tackling Covid-19 calls for trust: Building confidence is part of containing a pandemic
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, April 2020

Beyond Corona: Getting EU economic security right
Egmont, April 2020

Does Covid-19 pose a threat to the EU’s climate neutrality efforts?
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Coronavirus: How are countries responding to the economic crisis?
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

The Covid-19 pandemic in Russia: No applause for Putin’s political play?
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, April 2020

The coronavirus in Eastern Europe: Avoiding another Chernobyl
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Emerging lessons from Covid-19
Chatham House, April, 2020

Supporting NHS cybersecurity during Covid-19 is vital
Chatham House, April, 2020

Trouble for the EU is brewing in coronavirus-hit Italy
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Come on Europe, we need you!
Friends of Europe, April 2020

Will the economic strategy work?
Bruegel, April 2020

What might have been: Globalization on the medal stand at the Tokyo Olympics
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2020

Digital technology and economic science can help during crises like Covid-19
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2020

Our finest hour
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

No more red lines left to cross: The Hungarian government’s emergency measures
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Can the coronavirus Reset the Abkhazia Conflict?
Carnegie Europe, April 2020

How local leaders can stave off a small business collapse from Covid-19
Brookings Institution, April 2020

How Jihadi groups in Africa will exploit Covid-19
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

The military, policing and Covid-19
Brookings Institution, April 2020

An emergency inside an emergency: How quarantine has changed life for women in Italy
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

We are already in a recession: Can we make it a short one?
Brookings Institution, April 2020

After the pandemic: Can the United States finally retool for the Twenty-First Century?
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

‘A Band-Aid on a gunshot wound’: How the restaurant industry is responding to Covid-19 relief
Brookings Institution, April 2020

Eight recommendations for universities and professors during the coronavirus pandemic
Brookings Institution, April 2020

Coronavirus deals a blow to Ethiopia’s elections
Atlantic Council, April 2020

Trade policy and COVID-19: Openness and cooperation in times of a pandemic
European Centre for International Political Economy, April 2020

Populists love the pandemic
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 2020

L’Italie, pays-cible de la propagande chinoise à l’heure du Covid-19
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, April 2020

L’Union européenne et le coronavirus
Fondation Robert Schuman, April 2020

Le Covid-19, nouveau venu dans le conflit en Libye
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, April 2020

Covid-19 et instruments numériques: La délicate gestion des données
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, April 2020

Coronavirus in Arab countries: Passing storm, opportunity for change or regional catastrophe?
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2020

La démocratie coréenne au temps du coronavirus
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2020

Coronavirus and the new oil prices: The case of Italy
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, April 2020

Why the EU will play a greater global role post-Corona
Friends of Europe, March 2020

Santé: Une plus-value européenne très perfectible
Institut Jacques Delors, March 2020

Will the Italians forgive the EU?
Friends of Europe, March 2020

Why are some stock markets in Asia less affected by coronavirus?
Bruegel, March 2020

The European Green Deal after corona
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2020

How the coronavirus threatens a geopolitical Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

How Covid-19 is laying bare inequality
Bruegel, March 2020

The fiscal consequences of the pandemic
Bruegel, March 2020

Is Covid-19 triggering a new emerging-market crisis
Bruegel, March 2020

After the pandemic: Why Europe must restore its economic and social safety margins
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

China’s exports of protective medical equipment fell less than its exports of all other products
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2020

EU solidarity in exceptional times
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2020

Orbán exploits Coronavirus pandemic to destroy Hungary’s democracy
Carnegie Europe, March 2020

How journalists can help stop the spread of the coronavirus outbreak
Reuters Institute, March 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Policy responses to the coronavirus crisis‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak

Written by Gregor Erbach,

© sergei_fish13 / Adobe Stock

Measures to contain the COVID-19 (novel coronavirus) pandemic have led to a dramatic reduction in travel and economic activity. In consequence, energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions have fallen sharply. This in turn had an impact on the prices of energy commodities and emissions allowances, which have also dropped rapidly. Thanks to lessons learned after the 2009 economic crisis, which caused a massive surplus of carbon emission allowances in the EU Emission Trading System, a market stability reserve was put in place in 2019 to automatically adjust the supply of allowances to actual demand and prevent a collapse of the carbon price.

The handling of the COVID-19 crisis had already led to an economic downturn, reduced tax receipts and increased government spending to support companies and citizens. Stimulus programmes are considered necessary to relaunch the economy after the crisis. While some governments consider that ambitious programmes like the European Green Deal will hinder economic recovery after the crisis, the European Commission and others maintain that the European Green Deal is the growth strategy that can help Europe’s economic recovery while at the same time addressing the global climate emergency.

The restrictions on travel and large-scale gatherings may also slow down legislative activity related to the European Green Deal, as EU institutions change their calendars, agendas and priorities. Decision-making under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization are also affected by the cancellation and postponement of important meetings and conferences.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Impact of the coronavirus crisis on climate action and the European Green Deal‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Development of COVID-19 cases and deaths, oil prices, carbon prices and the euro-area stock market index, January-March 2020.

Written by Niombo Lomba with Annika Stjernquist,

© Adobe Stock

Diseases do not recognise borders; vaccination is required to fight them effectively.

Collaboration and transparency is key in the fight against vaccine hesitancy and disinformation.

Both rapid action and lasting approaches are required when it comes to vaccines against diseases of pandemic potential.

EU actions to deal with new and ongoing challenges

Vaccines have revolutionised modern medicine and have helped to reduce the spread of – and in some cases even eradicate – deadly diseases. As the main tool for the primary prevention of communicable diseases, vaccines are amongst the most efficient and cost-effective measures in the fight against such illnesses.

New challenges are constantly arising in the field of vaccination, with the current COVID-19 pandemic – and the urgent need to produce a vaccine against the disease – exemplifying this. In addition to these new challenges, numerous challenges still remain with respect to existing vaccines. In recent years, several EU countries have faced unprecedented outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases. The European Parliament, Commission and other experts have highlighted a decline in public confidence on vaccination and insufficient vaccination coverage rates. While this briefing concentrates on vaccination, for more on broader EU action on coronavirus-related issues, see ‘COVID-19 – Novel coronavirus outbreak in Europe and the EU response’.)

Vaccination: facts and figures

Each year seasonal flu vaccination prevents around 2 million people in Europe from contracting the flu.

Member States have signed the joint procurement agreement.

The EU has some of the lowest levels of public confidence regarding the safety, effectiveness and importance of vaccination in the world (safety 82.1 %, effectiveness 86.5 %, importance 90 %)

In the cases of measles, diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis, a 95 % coverage rate is required to protect the whole community.

Vaccination programmes have led to the eradication of smallpox, the near eradication of polio, and an estimated 74 % reduction in measles deaths over the last 10 years.

For more, see: Lomba N., The benefit of EU action in health policy: The record to date, EPRS, European Parliament, March 2019.

Key EU contributions towards vaccine policy

Although public health, and thereby vaccination, is the responsibility of Member States, the cross-border threats posed by low vaccination levels have led to it appearing on the EU agenda. Considerable European added value has already been achieved thanks to cooperation between Member States and relevant stakeholders, as shown by the study ‘The benefit of EU action in health policy: The record to date’. Surveillance, coordination and networking, procurement and funding are helping to create economies of scale and address cross-border health threats. The European Commission supports EU Member States in coordinating policies and programmes, with vaccination falling under the objective to ‘Protect Union citizens from serious cross-border health threats’ of the Third EU Health Programme (2014-2020).

Member States have to implement EU legislation on communicable diseases, reinforce risk assessment and strengthen the capability of their healthcare systems to address health threats. The Commission also assists Member States in their efforts to offer, promote and warrant immunisation to all children and seasonal flu vaccination to at-risk groups, as well as to develop strategies against pandemic influenzas. These EU measures play an important role in ensuring access to vaccines, controlling vaccines in order to maintain vaccine safety and fostering research in the field. An important example is the European joint action on vaccination (EU-JAV) launched in September 2018.

Diseases and disinformation constitute cross-border threats

Figure 1: Vaccination coverage

All EU Member States have effective immunisation programmes. Nevertheless, in recent years, we have seen a decline in vaccination coverage in some parts of the EU. In 2018, the number of measles cases recorded by the WHO in the European region exceeded 80 000, bringing vaccination to the forefront of the EU health policy agenda. Meanwhile, the recent outbreak of the novel coronavirus has brought attention to those diseases that it is not yet possible to protect people from.

Two possible explanations for declining immunisation levels are vaccine hesitancy and the fading memory of severe health threats posed by vaccine preventable diseases. For example, protection against measles, made possible through vaccination, is now largely taken for granted, whilst the increased use of social media has fuelled a rise in the prominence of vaccine-related disinformation, leading to an increase in vaccine hesitancy. Diseases, vaccine hesitancy and disinformation do not stop at borders, and as people move freely, the threat posed by a potential disease outbreak is no longer a local problem, but a regional one.

European added value concerning vaccination

The Council, and a study by EPRS, clearly highlight the added value in strengthening cooperation amongst Member States in all relevant sectors at EU level. They identify numerous examples of European added value that have already been achieved, such as economies of scale due to joint actions, procurement and funding, the targeting of cross-border health threats through surveillance and coordination and networking effects.

Table1: Vaccination – Examples of European added value achieved

 

Period Official reason 1. Economies of scale • Saving resources with synchronised (vaccine) pharmacovigilance activities
• Joint funding for the validation and implementation of standards and guidance 2. Free movement of persons • EU-wide health insurance cards
• Coordination and review of immunisation programmes in Member States 3. Cross border threats • EU-wide coordination of the surveillance of human and veterinary diseases with pandemic potential
• Emergency protocols with a clear allocation of resources and synchronised responses 4. Promotion of best practices • Development, coordination and monitoring of the implementation of best vaccination practices and policies by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and European Medicines Agency (EMA).
• Collaboration with stakeholders to develop uniform criteria and methodologies for immunisation practice and policy 5. Networking • Expert panels convened by the Commission, DG SANTE, Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency (Chafea) and consortia to address specific challenges
• Connecting scientists in EU-wide research consortia on vaccines and immunisation 6. Benchmarking for decision making • Collation of data and know-how from EU Member States
• Evaluation of available evidence to harmonise vaccination schedules 7. Unlocking the potential of innovation • Funding programmes promoting collaborative research, supported by Chafea/DG SANTE, Horizon 2020/DG Research
• Special role played by EMA concerning new vaccines and new immunisation platforms and devices 8. Implementing EU legislation • The joint action on immunisation
• Joint procurement agreements

Source: Lomba N.,The benefit of EU action in health policy: The record to date, EPRS, European Parliament,March 2019.

Room for further joint action at EU level

In the EU, effective immunisation programmes are mostly already in place. Nevertheless, immunisation levels have recently begun to decline, mainly due to vaccine hesitancy. In some countries, lack of funding can also make it difficult to reach sufficient immunisation levels.

Another challenge is the existence of known pathogens that cause diseases for which no vaccine yet exists, such as HIV, Zika and the coronaviruses causing SARS and MERS. After the outbreak of SARS in 2003, researchers were close to finding a vaccine, however as the situation became less urgent, momentum was lost and funding for the development of a vaccine was reduced. Because of this, no coronavirus vaccine is currently available, despite the fact that coronaviruses have been causing severe diseases throughout the past 20 years.

This leads us to yet another challenge. We have known for a long time that pathogens (known or unknown) can suddenly soar and cause an epidemic outbreak, but what we do not know is which pathogen is going to cause this, as well as where and when this will happen, a problem that has been exemplified by the current COVID-19 outbreak.

Thanks to analyses conducted before the COVID-19 outbreak, we are able to identify both a set of needs and a subsequent set of actions that can help to target and address areas where the EU could do more regarding the subject of vaccination, both in general terms and in the current crisis.

Further EU action that could address the gaps and barriers identified

A forthcoming Cost of Non-Europe report identifies possible additional action at EU level, such as:

• Investment in research and infrastructure
  • Improving and developing vaccines against diseases of pandemic potential
  • Improving vaccinology training and education for healthcare workers
  • Investing in vaccine protection and preparedness infrastructure
  • Enforcing and leveraging the benefits of immunisation information systems
• Information and communication activities
  • Improving vaccine risk communication
  • Improving access to vaccine consultation
  • Enabling the general public to access key scientific information
• Increased understanding of the economic impact of not vaccinating
  • Studying the economic impact of vaccination in the EU
• Addressing inequalities
  • Addressing inequalities regarding access to public health information
  • Understanding the role that vaccines play in achieving greater equity in public health
  • Balancing vaccine access and policies amongst EU Member States

Main references

• European Commission Vaccination, as at March 2020.
• Lomba N., The benefit of EU action in health policy: The record to date, EPRS, European Parliament, 2019.
• Cost of Non-Europe report on vaccination, EPRS, European Parliament, (forthcoming).

Read this briefing on ‘Towards a joint European approach on vaccination‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Niestadt,

The coronavirus outbreak has paralysed the tourism industry, leaving travellers scrambling to return home and devastating economies that are largely dependent on tourism. The European Union (EU) has acted quickly to help the sector, for instance, by offering financial support to businesses, among them numerous small and medium-sized enterprises. At its 26 March extraordinary session, the European Parliament approved three initial measures in response to the crisis, which would, inter alia, benefit businesses and workers in tourism.

State of play

© thanakorn / Adobe Stock

The EU tourism industry, which employs around 13 million people, is estimated to be losing around €1 billion in revenue per month as a result of the outbreak of COVID-19. In many otherwise popular tourist destinations, hotels have been deserted and restaurants, bars, tourist attractions, theme parks and museums closed. Trade fairs, congresses and cultural events have been cancelled or postponed. Sporting events, such as the Euro 2020 football championship and the Olympic Games, have been postponed until 2021. Ski resorts have ended the winter season early. Major cruise companies have halted operations; cruise ships have been stranded at sea, as more and more ports have temporarily refused them entry. Many countries have reintroduced border controls or banned certain travellers from entering their territory, leaving them struggling to return home. The situation is particularly difficult in several EU countries that are key tourist destinations, such as Italy (see Figure 1), Spain and France. According to estimates by the Italian Tourism Federation, Assoturismo, Italy stands to lose around 60 % of its tourists this year.

Considering the evolving nature of the situation, it is too early to estimate the full impact of COVID-19 on global tourism. According to United Nations World Tourism Organization estimates, global international tourist arrivals could decline 20-30 % in 2020 as compared to 2019. This could translate into a loss of US$300-450 billion (€270-407 billion) in spending by international visitors (international tourism receipts). In comparison, the SARS outbreak of 2003 led to a decline of just 0.4 % that year. The Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development says the implied shock could bring a ’45-70 % decline in the international tourism economy in 2020′. The World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) predicts that in 2020, the travel and tourism market could lose 75 million jobs worldwide and 6.4 million jobs in the EU. The WTTC managing director believes that ‘once the outbreak is under control, it would take up to 10 months for the tourism sector to return to its normal levels’.

Figure 1 – Estimated impact of COVID-19 on tourism revenues in Italy for 2020 (€ billion)

Air travel has been hit particularly hard. Some airlines, such as low-cost Flybe, have ceased operations, while others have temporarily cancelled all flights. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) says global air travel could lose more than US$252 billion (€228 billion) in 2020. Two million passenger flights have been cancelled until 30 June. Airlines are going through a liquidity crisis: according to the IATA, the typical airline had no more than two months’ worth of cash at the beginning of 2020. Airports Council International says that European airports would lose 700 million passengers (-28 %) and €14 billion in revenue in 2020. Some airports – such as Brussels South Charleroi – have temporarily shut down.

Within the hospitality sector, which is also facing a severe crisis, small and medium-sized enterprises have been particularly badly hit. Many hotels have decided to close due to the drop in demand. In France, the hotel occupancy rate was as low as 3.3 % on 17 March (compared to 65.3 % on 26 February). By 30 March, restaurants and bars had closed in almost all EU Member States, with the exception of Sweden. Many hotels, restaurants and bars have laid off thousands of workers permanently or temporarily. However some hotels and Airbnb hosts have offered medical workers free accommodation to help them avoid infecting their families. Some hotels are also being turned into temporary hospitals.

Initial measures at EU level

The EU is working on many levels to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, the European Commission is helping to coordinate the Member States’ national responses, while also supporting national healthcare systems, the research and development of a vaccine, and treatment. Furthermore, the Commission is ensuring the uninterrupted cross-border flow of supplies. In addition, it is working on mobilising all available resources under the EU budget to support Member States in handling the outbreak. This includes advancing payments, redirecting funds and ensuring that Member States take advantage of the maximum flexibility that the EU fiscal rules afford. Yet again, the Commission has proposed earmarking €37 billion for addressing the crisis under its Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative aimed, among other things, at providing liquidity for businesses and support to people who have lost their jobs. Those in the tourism sector who have been laid off could also get support from sources such as the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund.

The EU Treaties give the EU limited competences with regard to the tourism sector; that is, the EU can only support, coordinate or supplement Member States’ actions in this area. Applying this in practice, the Commission has been in constant contact with ministries responsible for tourism, specialised international organisations and the EU tourism industry. The Commission has also provided legal analysis and is setting up a network of European tourism and travel industry associations.

As regards specific tourism-related sectors, the Commission has proposed to suspend the rules obliging airlines to use their allocated slots at EU airports. The Commission has also given guidelines on EU passenger rights and border checks. Those related to border checks include a recommendation to the Member States to impose a restriction on non-essential travel to the EU for 30 days. Furthermore, the Commission has helped to repatriate EU travellers.

The European Parliament debated the COVID-19 outbreak at its 10 and 26 March plenary sessions (the latter an extraordinary one). Among other issues, they stressed the need for establishing common rules on entering the Schengen area. At its plenary session of 26 March, the Parliament debated how to speed up the implementation of measures responding to the COVID-19 outbreak. It adopted, almost unanimously, its position on three legislative proposals: i) launching the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative; ii) extending the EU Solidarity Fund to cover public health emergencies; and iii) temporarily suspending airport slot rules. Subsequently, these measures were formally adopted and put into force. In a letter dated 24 March and addressed to several European Commissioners, Parliament’s Tourism Task Force called for ‘a tourism rescue action plan, with concrete short and medium term measures’.

Initial measures at Member State level

Most EU Member States have announced they are introducing economic assistance packages that would also cover tourism sectors. Measures include tax moratoriums, extended deadlines for payments of social charges, and wage subsidies, loans and guarantees for workers. Italy has implemented a tourism-specific support package. Some countries have re-nationalised coronavirus-hit companies. For instance, Italy has taken full ownership of Alitalia; the United Kingdom has partially nationalised its railways. France has modified the conditions for cancellations of travel bookings. Sweden has offered credit guarantees for airlines. Many of these measures are a form of State aid that usually requires the Commission’s approval. The Commission has stated that it ‘will make sure that State aid can flow to companies that need it’. As of 27 March, the Commission had approved 22 State aid plans.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘COVID-19 and the tourism sector‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The situation in Syria has been the subject of many debates and resolutions of the European Parliament.

© Zerophoto / Adobe Stock

In a resolution adopted on 15 March 2018, the European Parliament strongly condemned ‘… the widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed during the conflict, and in particular the acts perpetrated by forces of the Assad regime, including with the support of its allies Russia and Iran, as well as by the UN-listed terrorist organisations’. Furthermore, it deeply regretted ‘the failure of repeated regional and international attempts to end the war’, and urged ‘renewed and intensive global cooperation to achieve a peaceful and sustainable solution to the conflict’.

Turkish military operation

The Turkish military operation launched in north-east Syria on 9 October 2019 led to multiple reactions from the European Union (plenary debate in the European Parliament, declaration of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, adoption of conclusions by the Foreign Affairs Council and by the European Council).

Following a plenary debate on 23 October 2019, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, in which it strongly condemned the unilateral Turkish military intervention in north-east Syria. It also urged ‘Turkey to put an immediate and definitive end to its military operation in north-east Syria and withdraw all of its forces from Syrian territory’, and demanded ‘full respect for humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians, and for local and international humanitarian organisations to be permitted unhindered access’.

Although the European Parliament recognised ‘the fact that Turkey has legitimate security concerns’, it insisted ‘that they be addressed by political and diplomatic means, and not military action, in accordance with international law, including humanitarian law’.

It called on the Council ‘to introduce a series of targeted sanctions’, ‘to consider adopting appropriate and targeted economic measures against Turkey’, and ‘to consider, for the purposes of a deterrent to prevent a further escalation in north-eastern Syria, the suspension of the trade preferences under the agreement on agricultural products and, as a last resort, the suspension of the EU–Turkey customs union’.

Children’s rights

The European Parliament has always been a defender of children’s rights. In a resolution adopted on 26 November 2019, it expressed ‘its gravest concern regarding the humanitarian situation of children of foreign fighters held in north-east Syria’, and urged EU countries ‘to repatriate all European children, taking into account their specific family situations and the best interests of the child as a primary consideration, and to provide the necessary support for their rehabilitation and reintegration’.

Parliamentary delegations

The European Parliament has a delegation for the relations with the Mashreq countries, including Syria, as well as a delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean.

European Neighbourhood Policy

The European Neighbourhood Policy covers bilateral relations between the European Union and its neighbouring countries.

Through this policy, the European Union seeks to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security of its neighbours, based on a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, the rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). These values and the principle of good neighbourliness are established in the Treaty on European Union and are applied in the context of the external action of the European Union (Title V of the Treaty).

Syria is one of the 16 countries covered by the Neighbourhood Policy. The assistance provided in the context of that policy aims to directly support the Syrian population, both inside Syria and in its neighbouring countries.

Council’s response

The crisis in Syria led to a humanitarian response from the European Union in the form of financial aid agreed by leaders in the European Council, including through the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian crisis, also called the ‘Madad Fund’.

In parallel, the Council put in place restrictive measures against the Syrian regime and its supporters in 2013, most recently extended until 1 June 2020. Sanctions include investment and export restrictions, a freeze of assets and an oil embargo.

Further information

• European Parliament’s press release, 24 October 2019
• EU-Turkey relations in light of the Syrian conflict and refugee crisis, European Parliamentary Research Service, 9 March 2020
• Turkey’s military operation in Syria and its impact on relations with the EU, European Parliamentary Research Service, 11 November 2019
• Delegation of the European Union to Syria, European External Action Service
• Syria: Council response to the crisis, European Council

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us!

Written by Naja Bentzen,

© metamorworks / Shutterstock

The global health crisis sparked by the COVID-19 pandemic – which is currently hitting EU Member States, not least Italy and Spain, particularly hard – raises concern that a combination of disinformation and heavily promoted health diplomacy, echoed by local proxies in Europe, could potentially pave the way for wider influence in other sectors in the wake of the crisis.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initially concealed information about the spread of the virus. Research suggests that they thereby delayed measures to alleviate the spread of the disease. At the same time, the CCP launched far-reaching efforts to silence domestic criticism.

The CCP’s efforts to restore Beijing’s tainted image both at home and abroad include attempts to export the blame for the virus via a wave of conspiracy theories, in a move that seems to be inspired by the Kremlin’s well-known tactics. At the same time, Beijing has launched a highly visible global aid offensive, providing expertise, test kits and other essential medical equipment – not all of it for free, contrary to the CCP’s media offensive – to a number of countries, including in Europe.

EU Coronavirus Response

Both Moscow and Beijing seem to be driving parallel information campaigns, conveying the overall message that democratic state actors are failing and that European citizens cannot trust their health systems, whereas their authoritarian systems can save the world.

Meanwhile, the EU – which has taken significant steps to help citizens both in the EU and beyond – has acknowledged the geopolitical components in what has been dubbed the ‘politics of generosity’, and is preparing to protect Europe against the next stage in these influence operations.

Read the complete briefing on ‘COVID-19 foreign influence campaigns: Europe and the global battle of narratives‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Examples of false narratives trending on social media

Written by Issam Hallak,

© Rawf8 / Adobe Stock

The United Kingdom (UK) withdrew from the European Union (EU) on 1 February 2020, and moved into the agreed transition period, running until 31 December 2020. The EU and UK have launched negotiations towards a free trade agreement (FTA) that will shape their future trade relationship. Both parties expressed a preference for reducing ‘trade frictions’ to the extent possible, and rules of origin will play a role in that regard.

Rules of origin (RoO) are provisions in FTAs that govern the conditions under which an imported good is recognised to ‘originate’ from the FTA partner country and becomes eligible for preferential trade. These conditions are restrictive – implying trade ‘frictions’ – to various degrees and designed product-by-product, following operation- and/or value creation-based rules. Importantly, the EU’s RoO admit the ‘cumulation’ of preferential origin across other existing FTAs signed by both parties. As RoO thus create incentives for manufacturers to allocate production and sourcing across countries, they are an important trade instrument.

The European Commission and European Parliament favour RoO provisions in the EU-UK FTA that are consistent with the EU template and protect the EU’s interest; the UK government has declared that it is seeking ‘appropriate and modern’ RoO, providing for cumulation across common FTA partners. The EU and UK positions therefore converge in favour of unrestrictive RoO. Nevertheless, the geographical distance between the EU and UK is short and the resulting shipping costs low. In this context, should the UK unilaterally lower its production costs after the transition period – through, for instance, lower labour and environmental standards, and State aid – less restrictive RoO will provide manufacturers with incentives to increase the UK share in the production chain, penalising the EU. This explains the call in the Political Declaration for frictionless trade ‘and’ the alignment of standards. Indeed, protecting EU interests implies that RoO are likely to be restrictive, unless the UK commits to aligning standards.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Future EU-UK trade relationship: Rules of origin‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Klaus Müller,

© Adobe Stock

The coronavirus pandemic is affecting all 27 European Union (EU) Member States, but not all to the same extent, although the impact could spill over onto those Member States not (yet) badly hit.

A common European unemployment insurance scheme has been considered as one potential response to the lack of stabilisation instruments under economic and monetary union (EMU). Short-time work schemes could provide such a stabilisation instrument, as well as a starting point for the implementation of a Europea n unemployment insurance scheme.

During the financial crisis, ‘short-time work’ (STW) schemes in Member States allowed firms to temporaril y reduce working time and to receive support from government or public employment services (PES) for the hours not worked. This instrument stabilised employment levels, by avoiding dismissals (even in cases where working time was reduced to zero), sharing the burden and retaining the skilled workforce.

A common STW scheme for the EU-27 could reinforce existing national schemes, and support them in the countries most affected by the coronavirus pandemic. The proposal fully respects the principle of subsidiarity.

Short-time working schemes in Member States

A majority of EU Member States have STW schemes, which differ in the way they are implemented:

• Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal have relatively large (in Belgium, Germany and Italy) and well-established schemes.

• In Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain, support for employees on short-time work is provided through ‘partial unemployment benefits’.
• Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia and Sweden can also activate STW schemes (for Bulgaria, specific funding is needed).

Today, Member States without STW schemes in place, including Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Greece, the Netherlands and Slovenia, are taking measures to avoid dismissals, and granting support to workers and companies.

Existing STW schemes can be used if external events (bad weather conditions in the construction or agricultural sector and incidences of force majeure), affect economic activity. In response to the coronavirus pandemic, many Member States have now qualified the situation as a case of force majeure.

Short-time work schemes generally cover all employees, irrespective of their type of contract (full-time or part-time, temporary or permanent). Furthermore, in many Member States, apprentices and temporary agency workers are excluded. As a response to the current situation, Member States have extended the coverage of their STW schemes, e.g. to temporary agency workers in Germany. In Spain, employees can receive support regardless of the period for which they have contributed to unemployment insurance.

The use of short-time work is limited in time. The limits can vary, depending on whether work is fully suspended (i.e. 0 hours), or only partially reduced (e.g. from full-time to part-time). For a partial suspension of work, the maximum duration can range from three months (Belgium) to up to two years (Italy). In case of a full suspension of work, the maximum duration is generally shorter.

Evaluation

A Europe-wide evaluation of STW schemes 1 concluded that there are advantages in adopting such measures. However, only countries with pre-existing STW schemes would be ‘able to fully exploit the benefits of STW’, and ‘the effect of STW is strongest when GDP growth is deeply negative’. An STW scheme has to be boosted at the beginning of a recession and results indicate that STW is most effective when used as a fast-responding automatic stabiliser.

A short-time work scheme for the EU-27

A common STW scheme for the EU 27 could reinforce the existing national STW schemes. Such a scheme would limit severe economic crisis through its stabilising effect on disposable income and aggregate demand. It could ensure a stabilisation function, because the insurance scheme would intervene in areas where the economic impact is higher. It could also reduce the pressure on social policies and complement national schemes, when the level of current support is too low.

A growing number of workers are temporary agency workers, external collaborators, project-based workers, task-based workers, and workers identified as (but not actually) ‘self-employed’, for instance, platform-based workers. A European scheme could provide more universal cover than national schemes, and could also enhance protection for people facing a high risk of poverty, thereby strengthening the social dimension of the EU-27 and demonstrating European solidarity. Analysis estimates the costs of such a system (under four ‘shock scenarios’), to amount to between 0.6 and 0.8 % of the GDP of participating countries per year, with an estimated 20 % stabilisation effect.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament considers that ensuring compensation during a downturn has significant macro-economic stabilisation potential, as demonstrated by previous experience in the EU and the United States of America. A second important benefit is that this type of expenditure goes where it is most needed: to the countries most concerned and to support the capacity of households whose labour income is going to be reduced; it gives the economies affected greater space to invest where it is needed for long-term sustainable recovery.

In its resolution of February 2017 on the budgetary capacity of the euro area, the Parliament expressed the view that an EMU-wide basic unemployment benefit scheme would contribute directly to stabilising household income. Short-time working schemes could have more sustainable results, because they avoid dismissals. The workers would remain ’employed’.

Commission and Council responses to date

In May 2018, the Commission presented, within the proposals for the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), a regulation on the establishment of a European Investment Stabilis atio n Function (EISF). This regulation envisages support for Member States hit by an asymmetric shock and/or increase in the unemployment rate.4

In June 2018, France and Germany decided to examine the issue of a European Unemployment Stabilisation Fund, for the case of severe economic crises, without transfers. While the intention was to set up a working group with a view to making concrete proposals by the European Council meeting of December 2018, there has been no result to date.

On 1 April 2020, the Commission made a proposal for a Council regulation on the establishment of a European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE) following the coronavirus outbreak.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘EU-27 support for national short-time work schemes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© NicoElNino / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus pandemic continues to spread around the world. Governments have adopted preventive measures of varying degrees of severity. Analysts and commentators continue to call for a more coordinated response to the disease, notably at European Union level, without always agreeing on what the precise response should be. Meanwhile, some are beginning to try to envisage how the world will have changed once the virus is finally contained.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the coronavirus and related issues. Earlier publications on the topic can be found in the previous edition item in this series, published by EPRS on 26 March.

Monitoring Covid-19 contagion growth in Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2020

Pulling through the coronavirus together: European and international solutions to the pandemic
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

Europe needs a Covid-19 recovery programme
Bruegel, March 2020

International order and the European Project in times of COVID19
Instituto Affari Internazionali, March 2020

The multilateral system still cannot get its act together on COVID-19
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

China, Italy and COVID-19: Benevolent support or strategic surge?
Instituto Affari Internazionali, March 2020

What you need to know about the Coronavirus pandemic
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

Covid-19 and European solidarity: The fight for who we are
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

The COVID-19 pandemic: The EU must think and act globally
Centre for European Reform, March 2020

EU: Strongly united for health; Deeply divided on the economy
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

Is Coronavirus good for our sick planet?
Instituto Affari Internazionali, March 2020

Coronavirus and power: The impact on international politics
Egmont, March 2020

Why the EU will play a greater global role post-Corona
Friends of Europe, March 2020

Creating an EU ‘Corona Panel’
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2020

Coronavirus and transatlantic security: Implications for defense planning
Atlantic Council, March 2020

Route de la soie de la santé : Comment la Chine entend profiter de la pandémie pour promouvoir sa diplomatie sanitaire
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, March 2020

Extending the MFF: The need for an ‘emergency’ 2021 budget
European Policy Centre, March 2020

COVID-19 Fiscal response: What are the options for the EU Council?
Bruegel, March 2020

Yes, medical gear depends on global supply chains: Here’s how to keep them moving
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2020

This time is different
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2020

In a COVID-19 World, Russia sticks to international distancing
Chatham House, March 2020

The fiscal response to the economic fallout from the coronavirus
Bruegel, March 2020

Leadership in a time of contagion
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

Winning the peace against coronavirus
European Policy Centre, March 2020

After the pandemic: Why Europe must restore its economic and social safety margins
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

From G7 to G20: Passing three hot potatoes
Bruegel, March 2020

How leaders can stop Corona from undermining the EU
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, March 2020

How the coronavirus threatens a geopolitical Europe
zertyuiop
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

What the EU should do and not do on trade in medical equipment
Bruegel, March 2020

‘Whatever it takes’: Getting into the specifics of fiscal policy to fight COVID-19
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2020

The COVID-19 crisis and reflections on systems transformation
Brookings Institution, March 2020

Does COVID-19 pose a threat to the EU’s climate neutrality efforts?
European Policy Centre, March 2020

Coronavirus and the politics of a common fiscal instrument
Bruegel, March 2020

Polling shows Americans see COVID-19 as a crisis, don’t think US is overreacting
Brookings Institution, March 2020

The Coronavirus killed the revolution
Brookings Institution, March 2020

Let’s emerge from COVID-19 with stronger health systems
Chatham House, March 2020

Wrong tools, wrong time: Food export bans in the time of COVID-19
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2020

The covid-19 crisis: A crash test for EU energy and climate policies
Centre on Regulation in Europe

The G20’s pandemic moment
Chatham House, March 2020

Five steps to combat the infodemic
German Marshall Fund, March 2020

Cybersecurity in the time of COVID-19
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

Will European defence survive Coronavirus?
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2020

Campaign foreign policy roundup: Campaigning amid a pandemic
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

Unmasking differing U.S. and South Korean approaches to COVID-19
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

Viktor Orbán’s Hungary: A new risk to the EU from Coronavirus
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, March 2020

Transatlantic take 360: Too early to say nationalists are winners of the Coronavirus crisis
German Marshall Fund, March 2020

Coronavirus: The world’s first digital pandemic
Cingendael, March 2020

The EU needs a more comprehensive vision to tackle pandemic
Carnegie Europe, March 2020

The multilateral system still cannot get its act together on COVID-19
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

COVID 19’s next target: Fragile states and emerging markets
Atlantic Council, March 2020

Here’s how to fight Coronavirus misinformation
Atlantic Council, March 2020

Is China winning the coronavirus response narrative in the EU
Atlantic Council, March 2020

L’exode sanitaire: Nouvelle manifestation de la sécession des catégories supérieures
Fondation Jean Jaurès, March 2020

Five steps to combat the infodemic
German Marshall Fund, March 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: What should policy-makers do?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias and Carla Stamegna,

© Adobe Stock

The idea of issuing joint debt instruments, in particular between euro-area countries, is far from new. It has long been linked in various ways to the Union’s financial integration process and in particular to the implementation of economic and monetary union. In the first decade of the euro, the rationale for creating joint bonds was to reduce market fragmentation and thus obtain efficiency gains. Following the financial and sovereign debt crises, further reasons included managing the crises and preventing future sovereign debt crises, reinforcing financial stability in the euro area, facilitating transmission of monetary policy, breaking the sovereign-bank nexus and enhancing the international role of the euro.

While joint debt instruments present considerable potential advantages, they also present challenges. These include coordination issues and reduced flexibility for Member States in issuing debt, the potential to undermine fiscal discipline by removing incentives for sound budgetary policies, and the fact that adoption of joint debt instruments would eventually entail the difficult political choice of transferring sovereignty from the national to the EU level.

In the context of the current crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, joint debt instruments have once more come to the fore as a potential medium-term solution to help Member States rebuild their economies following the crisis. In Eurogroup and European Council meetings, the solution is not favoured by all Member States and alternative – possibly complementary – approaches have been proposed, such as a credit line through the European Stability Mechanism.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Joint debt instruments: A recurrent proposal to strengthen economic and monetary union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martina Prpic,

Graphics: Giulio Sabbati

© fizkes / Adobe Stock

According to official estimates, the COVID-19 crisis has left more than 200 000 EU citizens stranded outside the borders of the EU. EU Member States have been making great efforts to retrieve them, often with the help of the EU. The priority has been to return EU citizens by using commercial flights, but as the conditions continue to worsen, other resources have had to be utilised.

EU Member States can activate the EU Civil Protection Mechanism to facilitate the repatriation of their and other EU citizens, if the Emergency Crisis Response Centre assesses that there is no better way. So far, at least 15 countries are reported to have requested the help of the Civil Protection Mechanism, using it to organise flights co-funded with EU funds, and so far repatriating 4 382 EU citizens (and 550 others), first from China, and then from a wide range of countries, including Cape Verde, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Georgia, Japan, Morocco, the Philippines, Tunisia, the USA and Vietnam. More flights are scheduled to bring people back from other locations.

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism has been used more than 300 times to respond to disasters since its establishment in 2001. All the EU Member States, together with Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey, participate in the Mechanism, but it can also be activated by any country in the world and by certain international organisations. Once the Mechanism is activated, a number of steps follow. The Emergency Crisis Response Centre, as part of the Mechanism, decides on the best response and coordinates it. The EU funds up to 75 % of the costs of the deployment of resources. The 2019 upgrade of the Mechanism boosted the joint capacity for responding to disasters, including medical emergencies. It created rescEU, a reserve of capacities, which has now been augmented to include a stockpile of medical equipment for the COVID-19 response, 90 % of which is funded by the EU. On 27 March 2020, the Commission proposed to further boost the budget for repatriation and for the rescEU stockpile.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Repatriation of EU citizens during the COVID-19 crisis: The role of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU citizens repatriated under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, to 30 March 2020

Written by Elena Lazarou,

On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization declared the spread of COVID-19 to be a pandemic, confirming the global impact of the disease. Across the world, regional and global international organisations are stepping up coordination to confront the medical crisis and mitigate its effects on economies, societies and individuals.

Background

© cassis / Adobe Stock

Having characterised COVID-19 as a pandemic, the first ever to be caused by a coronavirus, the World Health Organization (WHO) urged countries to ‘detect, test, treat, isolate, trace and mobilise their people’ and to demonstrate international solidarity in the face of the global health crisis. In its most basic definition, a pandemic refers to the global spread of a new disease. According to epidemiology researchers at Harvard University, 20 to 60 % of the global population could eventually be infected. At the time of writing, according to data from Johns Hopkins University, there have been over 860 000 confirmed cases of COVID‑19 in the world and over 42 000 deaths, assuming that the data provided by governments around the world is accurate, a fact that has been questioned. Large-scale epidemics pose a severe threat to human lives and constitute an enormous challenge to economies and to public health systems, testing the limits of governments’ capacity and requiring a delicate balance between respect for international human rights norms and the need to implement restrictions.

Owing to the highly interconnected nature of the world, experts and international organisations, including the United Nations, the EU and the European Parliament, have called for coordinated responses at regional and global levels. The EU has, within the limits of its powers, responded to the virus by ensuring medical equipment is available, ramping up the search for a vaccine and helping Member States to withstand the social and economic impact. The G7 and G20 are continuing to coordinate their joint approach. While the extent to which regional organisations around the world are coordinating their responses to the pandemic varies, overall leaders have recognised the need to coordinate and cooperate in the face of the medical and public health emergency; to mitigate the effects of the pandemic on regional and global economies; to manage the movement of people for repatriation or epidemic containment reasons; to fight online disinformation regarding the virus; and to pool resources for the development of vaccines and treatments.

Global: G7/G20 action

On 16 March, the leaders of the G7 committed to work together in the face of the global health crisis, by: coordinating action on necessary public health measures to protect people at risk from COVID-19; restoring confidence and growth, and protecting jobs; supporting global trade and investment; and encouraging science, research, and technology cooperation. They also agreed to call on the G20 to ‘support and amplify’ these efforts. The statement meanwhile urged the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group and other international organisations to further support countries worldwide. G7 health ministers were asked to coordinate on a weekly basis.

On 26 March, the G20 heads of state or government met in a virtual summit dedicated to addressing the coronavirus pandemic. In their ensuing statement, the heads of the world’s twenty leading economies committed to working with all relevant international organisations, including the WHO and the IMF, to confront the humanitarian, economic and social challenges posed by the pandemic. Some of the key points of the statement refer to: sharing scientific, and research and development information; expanding manufacturing capacity for medical supplies and ensuring availability to those in need; closing the financing gap in the WHO Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan; facilitating trade and ensuring the flow of vital supplies and goods; and conducting ‘bold and large scale’ fiscal support. The leaders tasked the relevant officials with coordinating proportionate border-management measures in accordance with national regulations and providing assistance for repatriation. The statement echoed several of the main points put forward by the EU. Neither of the statements following the G7 and G20 summits addressed the issue of online disinformation regarding the virus however, in spite of senior officials having stated that the issue was discussed, at least within the G7. The EU’s Rapid Alert System has been used to share knowledge with G7 partners on disinformation. Jointly the G20 are injecting over US$5 trillion into the global economy as part of the measures to counteract the social, economic and financial impacts of the pandemic.

Regional organisations: Initial meetings and decisions Asia

On 10 March, the ASEAN finance ministers issued a statement on strengthening ASEAN’s economic resilience in response to the outbreak of the COVID-19 coronavirus. On 13 March, ASEAN senior health officials agreed to sustain and further enhance a strong collective regional response to the pandemic. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Disaster Management Center launched a website to provide information about COVID-19. On 15 March, leaders and representatives of member countries held a video-conference to discuss containment measures for the virus.

Middle East and north Africa

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) held meetings at the level of finance ministers (23 March) and undersecretaries of health ministries (21 March) to discuss the issues relevant to the respective ministries. The finance ministries agreed to exchange information via reports on a weekly basis. Apart from cancelling the March 2020 Arab summit, the Arab League does not appear to have taken any joint action at the time of writing. Experts attribute the League’s inability to address the coronavirus crisis to its design, which focuses on the preservation of sovereignty through unanimity.

Africa

In cooperation with the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), on 20 March the African Union (AU) issued the Africa continental strategy for the COVID-19 pandemic. It aims to prevent severe illness and death, and to minimise social and financial disruption, by coordinating the efforts of states, AU agencies, the WHO and other partners; and by promoting evidence-based public health practice for the surveillance, prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and control of COVID-19. The AU continent-wide approach was launched in coordination with other African regional economic communities. Health ministers from the ECOWAS countries agreed to harmonise regional preparedness strategies for prevention, early detection and control of the coronavirus outbreak in coordination with the West African Health Organization. In the south, health ministers of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) exchanged information on the spread of the virus and agreed to coordinate preparedness and response.

Latin America

On 19 March, the Presidents of the Mercosur countries decided to coordinate and facilitate the return of nationals of member states to their countries of origin; to ensure the circulation of goods and services across borders; to consider the specific needs of communities in border regions; to consider the possibility of reducing tariffs on essential products and equipment; to share information and best practices and to coordinate with regional credit institutions (such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the Latin American Development Bank) with regard to the economic challenges generated by the health crisis. The statement echoed the declaration of the newly founded Prosul. The Prosul declaration also made reference to adopting measures to fight disinformation and fake news, and coordination of the joint procurement of medical equipment, within the framework of the Pan-American Health Organization.

Eurasia

On 19 February, members of the Council of Heads of Authorized Bodies in the Field of Sanitary and Epidemiological Welfare of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) States’ Population agreed to exchange information on the spread of the pandemic. Following the expansion of the virus in the region, on 17 March the Council, as well as representatives from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, considered anti-epidemic measures, including strengthening sanitary and quarantine controls, restricting movement of people across the border, restricting air traffic and monitoring people arriving from countries with adverse coronavirus situations. The importance of the supply of Russian laboratory diagnostic tools was emphasised.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘Global and regional governance: Initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

When we hear the word ‘social’, we typically think of social security, social protection or employment policies. But the European Union goes much further in the ‘what’ and in the ‘how’.

The social dimension also covers education, health, and cohesion policies. In addition, even the environment, justice, agriculture, trade, and the economy.

The social dimension extends to the processes the European Union puts in place for people to come together, take part, express their demands and look for solutions together through projects and programmes. Through supporting transformation and innovation, the EU can trigger a change of systems.

Listen to Nora Milotay, an EPRS policy analyst, explaining the issues in 3 key questions on the potential of Social Europe.

Or read more in our publications:

• Social governance in the European Union: Governing complex systems
• Collective intelligence at EU level
• Measuring social impact in the EU