European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Vasilis Margaras with Albin Boström,

The pandemic has led to a situation where the healthcare systems of European regions have been heavily over‑burdened, with more patients to treat than they have capacity for. Several healthcare projects between cross-border regions, funded by Interreg programmes, have contributed to the fight against the virus, in particular in regions of Germany, France, Italy and Spain, some of the worst affected EU Member States.

Contribution of Interreg to health care

© jpgon / Adobe Stock

As part of EU cohesion policy for 30 years, European Territorial Cooperation (ETC), better known as Interreg, has played a significant role in facilitating cooperation between European regions through project funding. It provides a framework for the implementation of joint actions and policy exchanges between national, regional and local actors from different Member States. More concretely, the Interreg programme aims to enhance regions’ capacity to find shared solutions to common challenges in a wide-range of fields, such as health, environment, transport, research and sustainable energy.

In the current programming period (2014-2020 – fifth period of Interreg), Interreg V has 79 cooperation programmes, mainly targeting cross-border cooperation (Interreg A), but also transnational (Interreg B) and inter-regional cooperation (Interreg C). One aim of the programme addresses cross-border cooperation in the field of health aiming, amongst other things, to facilitate the cross-border mobility of patients and health professionals, and to develop access to high quality healthcare through the use of common equipment, shared services and joint facilities in cross-border areas. The Interreg programme is funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and has a budget of €10.1 billion invested in a range of cooperation programmes for the 2014-2020 programming period.

Legal basis for cross-border cooperation on public health

Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that, in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. The article also stipulates that particular attention shall be paid to rural areas affected by industrial transition, and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as cross-border regions. Article 168 TFEU stipulates that EU action, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards improving public health and combat serious cross-border threats to health. The article also stipulates that the EU shall encourage cooperation between Member States regarding public health, and in particular between the Member States to improve the complementarity of their health services in cross-border areas.

Interreg cross-border healthcare responses to combat coronavirus

The Covid-19 pandemic has led to a situation where the healthcare systems of the Member States and their regions have been heavily burdened, with more patients to treat than they have capacity for. In particular, some border regions in northern Italy, south-western Germany and north-western France were significantly affected by the pandemic. The European Commission highlighted that many border regions already have both a history of, and the structures for, cooperation in health, which they should fully exploit in the spirit of European solidarity. On 3 April 2020, it recommended that Member States, regional and local authorities should use the full capacity of the flexibility offered to the Interreg programmes to address the pandemic. Several Interreg V projects have contributed to cross-border regions’ fight against the Covid-19 pandemic all over Europe, for example through mobility of intensive care patients and healthcare professionals, and the development of medical equipment.

Examples of Interreg-funded cross-border healthcare projects contributing to combatting Covid-19

• The Cerdanya Hospital in Spain, located close to the French border, cooperates with French hospitals regarding intensive care capacity and personnel. They also have an agreement with the border police, which ensures that patients and health professionals can cross the border rapidly and without any obstacles.
• The SHG-Kliniken Voelkingen hospital, located in the German part of the Greater Luxembourg Region, next to the French border but also close to Luxembourg and Belgium, has admitted French patients in need of hospitalisation. The hospital benefits from several Interreg cross-border cooperation projects, such as COSAN.
• The Zimnicea City Hospital in Romania and the hospital in Svishtov, Bulgaria, have received support to modernise and to develop cross-border cooperation in the area through the Interreg project Your Health Matters!.
• The MEDIWARN project has created biosensors, allowing medical and nursing staff to monitor, for instance, a patient’s heartbeat, respiratory rate and body temperature at a distance. A total amount of 12 biosensors are being used at the San Marco hospital in the Sicilian city of Catania, and ten more have been purchased by the Mater Dei hospital in Malta.
• Within the framework of ongoing Interreg programmes various Covid-19 projects with non-EU neighbouring countries have also been developed such as the FILA project activities (Interreg IPA CBC Italia-Albania-Montenegro).

Many Interreg projects in the field of health can be found in the keep.eu database.

European Parliament’s position

As part of the cohesion policy legislative package for 2014-2020, Parliament adopted its position on specific provisions for support from the ERDF to the European territorial cooperation goal on 14 March 2012. Regarding cross-border cooperation, Parliament amended the European Commission’s proposal aiming to tackle common challenges identified jointly in the border regions, in particular in relation to information and communication technology (ICT) connectivity and transport infrastructure, declining industries. It also promoted the idea of exploiting the untapped growth potential in border areas, such as development of cross-border research and innovation facilities and clusters, cooperation among education providers, including universities, and between health centres.

Outlook

Regarding the proposed 2021-2027 Common Provision Rules, the European Parliament adopted a first-reading position in March 2019, stating that the resources for cross-border projects under Interreg (European Regional Development Fund) should amount to €11.3 billion in 2018 prices, or 3 % of the total cohesion resources (instead of the 2.5 % proposed by the Commission). Parliament also adopted a first-reading position on the proposal for a regulation on specific provisions for Interreg, supported by the ERDF and external financing instruments, on 26 March 2019. It called for some amendments regarding cross-border cooperation, in particular regarding people-to-people and small-scale projects, which are important for, among other things, eliminating border and cross-border obstacles. It also called for the ERDF, and where applicable, the external financing instruments of the EU to contribute to a more social Europe (policy objective 4 of the ERDF) by delivering on the principles of European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), which includes European citizens’ rights to timely access to affordable, preventive and curative healthcare of good quality.

During the pandemic, a number of EU initiatives and policies have been adopted in order to suit the needs of Member States and their regions. The regulations of already existing funds have been amended in order to help the Member States which faced numerous challenging situations in the field of health.

See also our EPRS briefing, ‘Exceptional coronavirus support measures of benefit to EU regions’, of May 2020.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Cross-border regional healthcare cooperation to combat the coronavirus pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig, Katrien Luyten, Micaela del Monte, Sofija Voronova,

© alexlmx / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus crisis has put huge pressure on European prisons, already often affected by chronic overcrowding and poor healthcare services. Ensuring strict sanitary conditions, adequate health monitoring and the necessary distancing to prevent an outbreak in these closed environments − particularly vulnerable to contagion − has been a considerable challenge for most, if not all EU Member States.

Starting from March 2020, as lockdowns and states of emergency gradually came into force across Europe, EU Member States have taken a number of containment measures to protect prisoners’ health. These measures have consisted mostly of suspending all visits and regular activities in order to limit contacts among detainees and also between detainees and the outside world. Transfers of prisoners between EU countries have been put on hold as well.

Improved sanitary measures have been taken in detention centres, in terms of both personal hygiene and cleanliness of premises. At the same time, several Member States have sought to reduce overcrowding, by limiting entries and increasing exits, for instance by postponing the execution of sentences or using alternatives to detention. However, according to the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, at least half the Member States did not seek alternatives to detention.

This briefing looks into the various measures adopted by Member States between early March and the end of May 2020 in response to the challenges posed to the Union’s prisons by the coronavirus crisis. While, at the time of writing, containment measures in many Member States are gradually being eased, the long-term impact of the pandemic on prison conditions and populations remains to be seen.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Coronavirus and prisons in the EU: Member-State measures to reduce spread of the virus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Izabela Bacian,

© Adobe Stock

At their video-conference meeting on Friday 19 June, EU Heads of State or Government focussed essentially on the revised proposal for the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), together with the coronavirus Recovery Plan for the European economy. As announced, this exchange of views was effectively a ‘stepping-stone’ in an on-going discussion, and as expected, no final agreement was reached during this video-conference. Nevertheless, EU leaders used this first opportunity to jointly discuss and clarify their positions on the European Commission’s new proposals. While consensus is emerging on certain issues, differences in views remain substantial, notably on the overall size of the EU budget, the use of rebates, the balance between loans and grants, and the allocation criteria for funding. Aware of the need to provide funding to a severely affected European economy as soon as possible, the European Council will convene again around the middle of July – this time for an in-person meeting – to attempt to reach a political agreement. Those discussions will be based on concrete proposals which the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, will submit ahead of that meeting.

In addition to this central topic, EU Heads of State or Government were briefed on the state of play in the negotiations on the future EU-UK partnership, on the EU’s economic situation and on the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

1. European Council meeting

This video-conference of the Members of the European Council on 19 June was the fifth virtual meeting since the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis and lasted around four hours. In accordance with Article 235(2) TFEU, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, addressed the European Council at the start of its proceedings. The Prime Minister of Croatia, Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, President-in-Office of the Council of the EU, provided an overview of the results achieved during the Croatian Presidency of the Council.

2. Multiannual Financial Framework and the Recovery Plan

The video-conference on 19 June was the first opportunity for EU leaders to jointly discuss the European Commission’s revised proposal for the 2021-27 MFF, together with its proposal for an EU recovery fund, entitled ‘Next Generation EU’, which the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, had presented to EU Heads of State or Government. Prior to the meeting, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, had already indicated that no agreement was to be expected at this stage, as ‘there is still quite some way to go towards an agreement, so we will need to work hard in the coming days and weeks’.

In his invitation letter, Charles Michel outlined the points on which he felt a consensus was emerging, and those where views still needed to converge. In his view, the areas of growing convergence among leaders included the propositions that: (i) the EU needs to give exceptional response to the current unprecedented crisis; (ii) the means of financing the response should emerge from borrowing by the Commission on the financial markets, a process which would also require an increase in the own resources ceiling; (iii) the response should support the most affected sectors and geographical areas of Europe; (iv) there is a ‘package’ character to the next MFF and the Recovery Plan; (v) beyond the immediate crisis, funding from the recovery fund should help to embrace a green and digital future. Following the video-conference, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, confirmed this assessment and added that many EU leaders were aligned in the belief that the political agreement should be reached before the summer.

However, as outlined in the EPRS’s Outlook for this meeting, published in advance of the event, substantial divergences still remain regarding: (i) the size of the budget; (ii) the existence and size of rebates; (iii) the balance between policy areas; (iv) the balance between loans and grants; (v) the allocation criteria for funding; and (vi) the length and modalities of repayment.

The video-conference meeting on 19 June seems to have brought some progress, and the first possible trade-offs between sensitive issues, notably between rebates and the size of the recovery fund, were mentioned.

Main messages from the European Parliament President

When addressing the European Council, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, relayed the Parliament’s views on the MFF and on the recovery fund, as reiterated during its plenary debate on 17 June on the preparation of the European Council meeting. Following that plenary discussion, five of the seven political groups sent a joint letter to the European Council, calling on EU Heads of State or Government to match political statements with sufficient budgetary means, and to agree on the very idea of introducing new own resources. The joint letter warned that the Parliament would only give its consent to the next MFF if a basket of new own resources were to be introduced.

President Sassoli stressed that the Parliament considered the Commission’s ambitious proposal as a starting-point and ‘will accept no retreat from this initial position’, but rather seek to improve it. He also underlined that ‘any common debt issued must be repaid fairly, without burdening future generations’. President Sassoli recalled that political agreement in the European Council, once reached, does not end the negotiations, which can only be concluded with an agreement between the Parliament and the Council. He also announced that the Parliament was aiming to increase the financial allocations for the Erasmus+ programme (i.e. the EU’s programme to support education, training, youth and sport in Europe) during the negotiations.

Next steps

Charles Michel announced that EU leaders were now entering a new phase, the negotiation phase, which he was intending to start immediately. In an attempt to conclude the negotiations, EU Heads of State or Government would meet in person around the middle of July. Ahead of that meeting, President Michel will present concrete proposals, drawing up a new ‘negotiating box’ (i.e. a document aimed at facilitating the gradual completion of negotiations to prepare the final deliberation in the European Council) which would replace the one he had presented on 14 February 2020, which found no consensus.

3. Economic situation

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has had a dramatic impact, both on the world economy and more specifically on the EU and euro-area economies. The IMF predicts that the world economy could contract by 3 % in 2020, whilst, according to the latest Commission forecast, GDP in the EU and in the euro-area economies could decrease by 7.5 % and 7.75 % respectively. The President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Christine Lagarde, was invited to brief the EU Heads of State or Government on the economic situation at their meeting on 19 June. According to an ECB analysis for the euro area, GDP fell by 3.8 % in the first quarter of 2020, and a further drop by 13 % is expected for the second quarter, despite the loosening of the lockdown rules in many countries. The ECB predicts an even worse contraction of GDP in the euro area, which could amount to 8.7 % in 2020. For 2021 and 2022 however, many actors (ECB, Commission, IMF) forecast at least a partial recovery. During her intervention, President Lagarde reiterated that the recovery plan should be agreed and finalised as quickly as possible to promote recovery and minimise market turbulence.

4. EU-UK future partnership

Presidents Michel and von der Leyen briefed EU leaders on the outcome of the high-level conference held between the EU and the UK on 15 June 2020, as provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement. Talks will intensify throughout July, with the aim of reaching ‘an early understanding on the principles underlying any agreement’. After four rounds of negotiations this year, divergences of views between the EU and the UK have remained substantial in a number of areas, in particular regarding level playing-field provisions (state aid, environmental and social standards, taxation, sustainable development), police and judicial cooperation, and fisheries, as well as on the governance framework. Presidents Michel and von der Leyen emphasised that progress was still needed in these areas, as well as on the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement, and in particular of the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland. At the 12 June EU-UK Joint Committee, the UK had also confirmed that it would not request an extension of the transition period before 30 June 2020, the date which, under the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement, would have been the last opportunity to do so.

Main messages from the European Parliament President

President Sassoli underlined that ‘an ambitious, overarching and comprehensive agreement’, in line with the October 2019 political declaration, ‘is the best possible outcome for both sides and, despite the limited time available, with goodwill and determination, it is still possible’.

5. Other issues Implementation of the Minsk agreements

Following a briefing by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, the European Council approved the renewal of the economic sanctions imposed on Russia and linked to the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Pending agenda points Climate change

Climate change, a topic which EU leaders had, prior to the pandemic, committed to discuss at their June 2020 meeting, was absent from the agenda. This postpones to an unspecified point in time the debate on the end of the temporary exemption granted to Poland in December 2019, when the country announced that it could not commit to ‘the objective of achieving a climate neutral economy by 2050’. President von der Leyen stressed that, as part of the MFF debate, EU leaders have expressed support for the green dimension. Securing the green envelope in the form proposed by the European Commission in May 2020 might enable Poland to commit to the 2050 climate objective, since the country would be among the top three beneficiaries of the Just Transition Fund.

Strategic guidelines for the area of freedom, security and justice

As flagged up in the recent EPRS study, Key issues in the European Council, Member States have been expected since February to agree on new ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning’ within the area of freedom, security and justice, which would then be adopted by the European Council. However, so far, the European Council has not delivered on its Treaty-based role ‘to define the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning Article 68 TFEU.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council video-conference of 19 June 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Russell,

© Werakit / stock.adobe.com

Coronavirus has affected the 10 south-east Asian countries in very different ways. Thanks to quick and decisive action, Vietnam came through relatively unscathed; Singapore also seemed to have the virus under control, before a second wave of infections among migrant labourers took off. Malaysia and Thailand initially struggled, but now seem to have turned the situation around. In Indonesia and the Philippines, the disease continues to spread rapidly. Although weak healthcare systems make Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, the three poorest countries of the region, highly vulnerable, they have not reported many infections so far.

Despite such differences, some of the issues raised by the coronavirus pandemic are common to all countries of the region. For example, pre-existing inequalities have widened, particularly affecting low-paid workers in informal employment, migrants, and refugees. Meanwhile, governments are clamping down on free speech and adopting emergency powers, raising concerns over authoritarian tendencies. Although the countries of the region are cooperating with each other and neighbours such as China, tensions (for example, in the South China Sea) have become more apparent.

All south-east Asian economies have been affected, but the impact varies considerably. Vietnam is expected to do relatively well, and several other countries will also see modest growth. Due to a global downturn in trade and tourism, Singapore and Thailand are suffering most. Overall, the region is forecast to see less of an economic impact than Europe or North America, and growth is expected to rebound in 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Coronavirus in south-east Asia: Health, political and economic impact‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alec Vuijlsteke with Lisa Pschorn.

If you hold a university degree you can still apply for a Robert Schuman traineeship in the European Parliament. The deadline is 30 June for a traineeship to start on 1 October. A paid traineeships will enhance your education and your vocational training. It will provide you with an insight into the work of the EU institutions and the European Parliament.

DG EPRS

Candidates without distinction as to gender, sexual orientation, cultural, ethnic backgrounds or disability are encouraged to apply, with reasonable accommodation available for successful candidates with disabilities who may need them.

Several traineeships are possible in the European Parliament’s Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, usually known as the European Parliamentary Research Service. The EPRS is the in-house research centre and think tank of the EP. It provides information, analysis and research, on an independent basis, to Members of the European Parliament and parliamentary committees on all EU policies, legislation and issues.

We comprise four directorates – for the Members’ Research Service, Impact Assessment and European Added Value, Library and Knowledge Services, and Resources. In addition, there are two horizontal units within the Directorate-General’s central services: the Strategy and Innovation Unit and the Linking the Levels Unit. The Directorate-General comprises a total of 21 units and just over 300 staff.

‘Empowering through knowledge’ is the guiding principle of EPRS, underpinning the mission of the entire DG.

In concrete terms, between 2014 and 2019, EPRS:

• Answered over 16,000 requests for substantive research and analysis from over 90 per cent of individual Members;
• Replied to over 2,000 such requests from other parliamentary clients;
• Undertook targeted research work for 20 parliamentary committees;
• Treated over 110,000 reference requests from within the Parliament and over 330,000 citizens’ enquiries;
• Produced over 5,000 publications, most recently at a rate of around 700 physical publications and 250 digital-only texts annually.

Take a look at the video about the EPRS:

Or a video specifically on EPRS publications:

You can apply for some 24 traineeship positions in the EPRS.

Some testimonials by trainees in the EPRS

Lisa, Germany:

“As a trainee working in the Strategy and Innovation Unit, my tasks were very diverse. I was in regular contact with many Members’ offices and provided them with pertinent EPRS research tailored to their needs. What’s more, I created videos for social media on the basis of EPRS publications, for example on health inequalities in the EU.”

 

Lenka, Czechia:

I assisted with the design of LibGuides, compiled a number of selected reading guides on various topics, including law, artificial intelligence, the impact of Brexit or state aid. I was involved in the selection of books as well as their acquisition and catalogue-related tasks. I was also given the opportunity to attend plenary sessions and meet with some Czech MEPs as well as with the Vice-President of the European Commission.

 

Ilaria, Italy:

I applied for a traineeship with the Ex-Post Evaluation Unit to benefit from the opportunity to explore a wide range of policy areas, and that’s exactly what I was lucky enough to do. For example, within the same week I would work on three different studies on defence, digital finance and unemployment. My learning curve has been extremely steep and very rewarding.

 

Jiline, Luxembourg:

During my traineeship, I contributed to researching and drafting model answers, a service that provides material for Members to use in their correspondence with the general public. This allowed me to delve into a wide variety of topical subjects, ranging from investment protection agreements to the illegal trade in pets and from the Conference on the Future of Europe to hazardous chemicals in recycled materials.

 

Suna, Germany:

“My traineeship in the Scientific Foresight Unit, which provides advice to Members on scientific and policy options, allowed me to learn about the foresight approach and apply it to exploring impacts and policy considerations, in particular regarding artificial intelligence.”

 

Tom, UK:

“During my traineeship, I contributed to the drafting of publications relating to the issue of mis- and disinformation, with a particular focus on how the issue has been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic. I was also tasked with editing publications on a wide variety of interesting topics, as well as with updating the EPRS blog.”

 

Elise, Belgium:

“I participated in the elaboration of a pilot project regarding a pre-legislative analysis of five topics in the Commission Work Programme during my traineeship with the Linking the Levels unit. The work consisted of researching the different levels of government (national, regional local), and contacting partners in the different organisations to get their input on our research. I also helped with the unit newsletters and with work on a new IT tool in collaboration with the IT Unit.”

 

Agerti, Albania:

“My traineeship included contributing to several briefings or papers through researching and editing information for the Budgetary Policies Unit in the Members’ Research Service. For example, I rendered numeric information from the plenary session, which was then published in a briefing on establishing a contingency plan for the European Union multiannual financial framework.”

 

Sam, UK:

“Working in the Scientific Foresight Unit and the European Science Media Hub during the coronavirus pandemic has been a really stimulating experience – I had a fantastic opportunity to interview leading researchers for articles exploring the crisis on the European Science Media Hub (ESMH) website, for example on lockdown easing and the United Kingdom perspective.”

 

Emily, Italy:

“I contributed to drafting publications related to the activities of the European Council during my traineeship, including the EU27 leaders’ video-conference on 26 March 2002 to address the socio-economic impact of Covid-19. Moreover, I was involved in analysing the discourse of European Council members on EU policy areas via social media and creating extensive data set with key facts and figures on the European Council.”

 

Rafael, Portugal:

“As a trainee in the Financial Management Unit, I updated the DG EPRS Manual of Financial Procedures, which I also presented in an online meeting with all financial initiators. Currently, I’m analysing the Public Procurement procedures to assess to compliance with good practices.”

 

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig,

© Ben Gingell / Adobe Stock

On 1 February 2020, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) became effective. With the UK’s exit from the EU, UK nationals lose the rights deriving from EU citizenship, unless they also have the nationality of an EU Member State. This means, first and foremost, that they lose freedom of movement rights across the EU, but also political rights such as the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European and municipal elections, the right to petition the European Parliament and to lodge complaints before the European Ombudsman, among others. In addition, EU citizens resident in the UK find themselves in a third country which will no longer be bound by common EU rules regarding their treatment.

Nevertheless, the UK left the EU on the basis of a negotiated withdrawal agreement. Part Four of the withdrawal agreement institutes a transition period until 31 December 2020, during which time the UK is treated as a Member State and EU law continues to apply in and to the UK – with certain exceptions provided for in the agreement. Therefore, until 31 December 2020, UK nationals in the EU will continue to benefit from most EU citizenship rights, most importantly freedom of movement rights. Notable exceptions are the right to participate in a European Citizens’ Initiative and the right to vote and stand as candidate in European Parliament elections and in municipal elections in the Member State of residence (although national measures may allow for the continuation of the exercise of franchise rights). EU citizens also benefit from the freedom to move to the UK during the transition period, based on the applicable EU law.

Beyond the transition period, Part Two of the withdrawal agreement preserves most of the rights of EU and UK citizens who have made use of their freedom of movement rights in accordance with EU law before the end of the transition period. In particular, the provisions of the withdrawal agreement regarding citizens’ rights cover entry/exit and residence rights, workers’ rights and social security coordination rules. This will allow EU and UK citizens who previously exercised their rights to live, work and study in the UK and the EU respectively, under EU law, to maintain these rights for their entire lifetime, as long as they continue to meet the conditions set in the agreement. The rights of reunification with certain (third-country) family members are also protected.

On the other hand, EU citizens arriving in the UK, and UK citizens arriving in the EU, after the end of the transition period will not benefit from the protection of the withdrawal agreement. Both UK and EU nationals will have to comply with the national immigration rules applying to third-country nationals, unless the EU and UK agree on specific mobility arrangements, either as part of the future relationship agreement currently being negotiated or in a subsequent agreement.

This paper analyses the consequences of the UK withdrawal from the EU for citizens’ rights, both during and after the transition period. It provides an overview of the rights guaranteed by the withdrawal agreement and takes stock of the measures taken or envisaged by the UK and the EU Member States to implement the citizens’ rights provisions of the agreement.

Read this complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘EU and UK citizens’ rights after Brexit: An overview‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepanski,

© agrarmotive / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus crisis caused an asymmetric shock to both supply and demand in the EU, inflicting unprecedented economic harm: the deep recession in 2020 is likely to be followed by a fragile recovery in 2021. The downside risks are high and there is a strong possibility of further deterioration. European economies are highly integrated: about two-thirds of the EU’s total trade in goods takes place on the single market, through its tightly knit network of supply chains, financial connections and trade relationships. However, the pandemic has severely impacted the free movement of persons, goods and services in the EU, on which the market is based. While the depth of the economic downturn and the strength of recovery vary across EU Member States, many of those that were hardest hit by the pandemic happen to have the least policy space to respond to it. Left unaddressed, an uneven recovery across the EU risks creating divergences, fragmentation and permanent damage to the single market, which will have a negative impact on the EU’s recovery as a whole.

The EU has acted on many fronts since the onset of the crisis. Initially, it provided first-response measures – such as the suspension of State aid rules and a roadmap for lifting containment measures – designed to address multiple emergencies in the single market and the EU economy. It has also developed a comprehensive longer-term response to enable economic recovery and repair the damage inflicted by the crisis, while at the same time protecting and deepening the single market and rendering it more autonomous. The EU will offer large-scale asymmetric support and financial support, that will be distributed through existing and novel instruments. Some experts warn that the proposed recovery plan, while a step in the right direction, may be financially insufficient and too slow to disburse. The European Parliament has asked for a major recovery package worth €2 trillion.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Single market and the pandemic: Impacts, EU action and recovery‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nicole Scholz,

© Anton / Adobe Stock

The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) is a decentralised European Union (EU) agency based in Stockholm, Sweden. It began operating in 2005. Its mission is to identify, assess and communicate current and emerging threats to human health posed by infectious diseases.

The ECDC is governed by a management board. Its director, Andrea Ammon, is guided by an advisory forum composed of the Member States’ competent bodies, which also serves as an information exchange platform. The ECDC also works with partnerships and networks.

For the 2020 financial year, the ECDC’s budget is €60.4 million. Its 2020 establishment plan provides for a total of 286 staff. The ECDC’s main activities include: surveillance, epidemic intelligence and response; scientific advice; microbiology; preparedness; public health training; and country support. Its disease-specific activities are organised within horizontal disease programmes. Its organisational chart was restructured in January 2020.

The ECDC is playing an important part in the EU’s response to the unfolding coronavirus pandemic. Among other things, it provides systematically updated risk assessments, guidance and advice on public health response activities to EU Member States and the European Commission. Stakeholders have nevertheless criticised the ECDC’s handling of the pandemic, while remarking on the ECDC’s lack of authority and executive power.

In a recent resolution, the European Parliament called the ECDC’s competences, budget and staff to be strengthened. A similar call was made in a joint Franco-German initiative, and will reportedly be a topic for the upcoming trio of EU Council presidencies. A strong role for the ECDC is also among the initiatives announced by the Commission under its recovery plan for Europe.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control: During the pandemic and beyond‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen, Albin Boström, Micaela Del Monte, Ingeborg Odink, Martina Prpic, Mari Tuominen,

© Ivelin Radkov / Adobe Stock

The spread of the coronavirus pandemic has prompted countries to take extensive and far-reaching measures to tackle the consequences of the outbreak. Apart from curbing the spread of the disease, these measures have also posed legal and economic challenges, significantly affecting people’s lives. Due to the nature of the virus, citizens’ rights and freedoms have been curtailed, inter alia affecting their freedom of movement and assembly, as well as the right to conduct economic activities. Whilst the measures are currently being relaxed, there is debate in some Member States over whether the measures were justified and proportionate. Some Member States resorted to declaring a ‘state of emergency’, whilst others did not, either because they have no such mechanism in their constitutional framework or because they chose a different path, giving special powers to certain institutions or using and modifying existing legislation. In either case, democratic scrutiny over the situation has been highly important, making parliamentary oversight crucial to ensure the rule of law and respect for fundamental democratic principles. This briefing covers the following countries: Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. It focuses on three key aspects: i) the constitutional framework of the state of emergency or legitimation of the emergency legislation; ii) the specific measures adopted; and iii) the extent of parliamentary oversight exercised on the adopted measures.

This briefing is the third in a series aimed at providing a comparative overview of Member States’ institutional responses to the coronavirus crisis. The first in the series gives an overview of the responses in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Spain, while the second covers Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Slovenia.

Read the complete briefing on ‘States of emergency in response to the coronavirus crisis: Situation in certain Member States III‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel, Izabela Bacian, Ralf Drachenberg, Annastiina Papunen,

© Adobe Stock

Established as an informal summit meeting in 1975, the European Council became a formal European Union institution, with a full-time President, in 2009, on the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission (Article 15(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)). The latter two individuals have no voting rights. Meetings of the European Council are normally also attended by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The President of the European Parliament is ‘invited to speak’ as the first item on the European Council’s agenda, followed by an exchange of views (Article 235(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)). At its formal meetings, normally four per year, the European Council adopts ‘conclusions’ that are aimed at identifying policy priorities and action to be taken by the Union as a whole.

The European Council’s role is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define the general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15(1) TEU). It cannot exercise legislative functions. At the beginning of the 2014-2019 and the 2019-2024 institutional cycles, the European Council also adopted an agenda of strategic priorities, designed to guide the work of the European Union over the five-year period.

With the EU only just coming out of a period of economic and financial crisis and unemployment still at a high level, the 2014-2019 strategic agenda made economic issues the top priority. Subsequently, unprecedented domestic and global challenges, and notably the prospect of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (combined with a rise of populism and anti-EU sentiment), have triggered a debate on the future of Europe. As a result, previous objectives have been somewhat re-shaped in order to respond more effectively to public expectations and concerns, as well as to bind the EU-27 closer together. EU leaders thus used the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties in March 2017 to issue a finely-tuned set of policy orientations for the Union for the next 10 years. The Rome Agenda encompasses four broad chapters − a safe and secure Europe, a prosperous and sustainable Europe, a social Europe and a stronger Europe on the global scene − which should shape the action of the Union over a decade.

Reflecting the orientations set in the Rome Declaration, the new 2019-2024 strategic agenda, adopted by the Heads of State or Government at their meeting in June 2019, defines migration and the protection of citizens as the top priorities for action in the upcoming five years. Then, comes the development of a stronger economic base, including the fight against unemployment, followed by climate change and social issues. Finally, it looks to increase the EU’s influence and defend its interest in the world. The four core priorities set out in the 2019-2024 strategic agenda broadly correspond to the concerns of EU citizens, as indicated by the most recent standard Eurobarometer.

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020 and the prospect of a protracted economic recession of an unknown length and severity has, however, prompted EU Heads of State or Government to review the above priorities in order to provide for a coordinated approach and joint action to tackle the crisis. At their first video-conference dedicated to the management of the health crisis, on 10 March 2020, the 27 EU Heads of State or Government, alongside the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Central Bank and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agreed to work together along four main axes, with a view to: 1) limiting the spread of the virus; 2) providing medical equipment; 3) promoting research, for instance on development of a vaccine; and 4) tackling the socio-economic consequences of the crisis. The EU leaders underscored the need for a joint European approach and close coordination with the European Commission in combating the pandemic.

While the European Council endorsed the proposals made by the Commission to tackle the immediate social and economic consequences of the health crisis, at their meeting on 23 April 2020, EU leaders were not able to agree on a common vision for a recovery fund to address the long-term consequences of the crisis. The Commission was therefore tasked with preparing a revised Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), to establish a link to the recovery fund. The European Council President, Charles Michel, underlined that EU leaders remained ‘committed to giving the necessary impetus to work on the recovery fund as well as the MFF, so that a balanced agreement on both can be found as soon as possible’.

Given the serious human consequences of the health crisis, the lack of overall preparedness in combatting the epidemic across the EU and the lack of coordination among Member States at the start of the virus outbreak have been criticised. And indeed, EU leaders have acknowledged that the EU needed to become better at ‘developing its executive capacity and at managing crises in a coordinated fashion’.

In addition to its horizontal priority-setting role, as defined in Article 15(1) TEU, the European Council is also tasked with identifying the Union’s strategic interests, determining the objectives of, and defining general guidelines for common foreign and security policy (Article 26 TEU). Following a request by EU leaders, the then High Representative, Federica Mogherini, presented an EU global strategy, which the European Council welcomed in June 2016. The strategy sets five broad priorities for the EU external action in coming years: the security of the Union, state and societal resilience to the East and South, an integrated approach to conflict and crisis, cooperative regional orders, and global governance for the 21st century.

The European Council furthermore defines the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 68 TFEU). For the period until 2019, the priorities for the European Union in the area of freedom, security and justice, were to ‘better manage migration in all aspects; prevent and combat crime and terrorism; [and] improve judicial cooperation among EU countries’. Following the outbreak of the migration crisis, and a series of terrorist attacks on European soil, key strategic documents, notably the European agenda on security and the European agenda on migration, were adopted in 2015, either at the request or with the endorsement of the European Council. A new set of ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning’ were expected to be adopted by the European Council at its meeting of 26‑27 March 2020. Since the meeting had to be postponed following the coronavirus outbreak, the adoption of these guidelines will probably occur later in the course of the year.

The European Council has also to ‘consider each year the employment situation in the Union and adopt conclusions thereon, on the basis of a joint annual report by the Council and the Commission’ (Article 148 TFEU).

Its decisions are taken mainly by consensus, but in certain cases, the European Council can also decide by qualified majority. For example, the President of the European Council is elected by qualified majority vote for a once-renewable term of two and a half years. The President’s role is ‘to ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission’, chair its meetings, ‘facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council’, and to ensure ‘the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (Article 15(5) TEU). The first two full-time Presidents of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy and Donald Tusk, served five years each between 2009 and 2019. The third permanent President of the European Council, Charles Michel, began his mandate at the beginning of December 2019.

While not directly accountable to the European Parliament, the President of the European Council presents a report to the Parliament after each meeting of the Heads of State or Government (Article 15(6)(d) TEU). Usually this takes the form of a declaration in person, followed by a plenary debate.

As a result of both the UK’s decision to leave the Union and the Leaders’ Agenda proposed by European Council President Donald Tusk in 2017, aimed at ‘reinvigorating and enriching’ the institution’s work ‘by engaging directly on politically sensitive issues’, the working method and formations of the European Council have evolved substantially. In recent years members of the European Council have met in five different formats:

• the EU-27, previously EU-28, Heads of State or Government meet quarterly in the regular European Council meetings;
• from 2016 to 2019, the EU-27 (leaders of all the 28 EU Member States except the UK) met, first informally and then, from April 2017, in the European Council (Article 50) format, to discuss Brexit;
• the EU-27 or EU-28 have in recent years held informal summits at least twice a year;
• the EU-27 or EU-28 for two years from October 2017 participated in Leaders’ Meetings;
• the EU-27 (leaders of all the 28 EU Member States except the UK) have met in several inclusive Euro Summits. Participation in Euro Summits is usually restricted to the leaders of euro-area countries, but the President of the Euro Summit (currently also President of the European Council) can invite other leaders as well.

‘Leaders’ meetings’, which are designed to enable a leaders’ discussion to take place on a specific topic, are a key feature of the ‘Leaders’ Agenda’. Unlike regular European Council meetings, such discussions are based, not on draft conclusions, but on short notes prepared by the President. The idea is to have an open, relatively unstructured debate on controversial but highly consequential issues, with a view to facilitating agreement at a follow-up European Council.

The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was prepared in very much the same way, by using the working method developed under the Leaders’ Agenda. Just ahead of the 2019 European elections, the EU‑27 met on 9 May 2019 in the Romanian city of Sibiu to assess the implementation of previous policy objectives and to reflect informally on future EU action over the coming five years. The EU leaders’ discussion was informed by President Tusk’s Leaders’ Agenda note, ‘Strategic agenda 2019-2024 – Outline’, which provided a first overview of the topics for future action. The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was then adopted at the June 2019 formal European Council.

At the first European Council that he chaired in December 2019, Charles Michel explained how he envisaged the future work of the European Council would be carried out, and presented his colleagues with an ‘indicative agenda’ for its work over coming years. Moreover, in his remarks following the European Council meeting in December 2019, President Michel also stressed that a concerted agenda, coordinated between the institutions (Council, Commission, Parliament), would be a key element in advancing the European project.

The EU Heads of State or Government see the strategic agenda as ‘the first step in a process that will be taken forward by the Institutions and the Member States’. The European Council announced that it ‘will follow the implementation of these priorities closely and will define further general political directions and priorities as necessary’.

Following the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and its severe economic, as well as social, impact, the most pressing issue for Heads of State or Governments will be to achieve a ‘political agreement’ on a revised long-term budget for the 2021-2027 period able to provide the necessary support for the revival of the European economy. Given the failure of the special European Council meeting of 20-21 February 2020 to reach such an agreement and in view of diverging views among Member States on the approach to funding through the Recovery Fund, finding consensus on the revised MFF could indeed prove challenging. When, and under what conditions, the European Council will reconvene to attempt to find an agreement has still to be decided.

Read the complete study on ‘Key issues in the European Council: State of play in June 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi,

Launched on 20 May 2020, the ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy put forward the EU’s ambition for making its food system a model of sustainability at all stages of the food value chain. Ahead of the desired engagement of institutions, stakeholders and citizens in a broad debate, the strategy is already high on the agri-food community’s agenda.

Background

© Pixelbliss / Adobe Stock

On 11 December 2019, the European Commission presented ‘The European Green Deal‘, a roadmap for sustainability that envisaged a ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy on sustainable food, to address priorities and challenges related to every step in the food chain. Many citizens and stakeholders contributed to the Commission’s consultation on a sustainable food strategy in February/March 2020. Initially planned for the end of March, the launch of the strategy was delayed due to the outbreak of the coronavirus. This change of plans raised lively debate among stakeholders and policy-makers on whether the strategy should be further delayed or not. In the end, the idea prevailed that the current environmental and climate emergencies, and a need for a resilient food system evoked by the crisis, do not permit additional delays.

A long-awaited and highly anticipated strategy finally unveiled

On 20 May 2020, the Commission adopted its communication on ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally friendly food system‘, accompanied by an action plan that put forward 27 legislative and non-legislative measures over a timespan running from 2020 to 2024 (with a review by mid-2023).

The strategy includes elements that have been on the agri-food policy agenda for a while, from the use of pesticides to food labelling, as well as aspects stirred up by the weaknesses of the EU’s food chain revealed by the coronavirus crisis. Food security (largely taken for granted in the EU in recent times, except for the most deprived) becomes one of the strategy’s dimensions, along with the environmental impact of food production and supply, and food affordability in a fair economic environment. The strategy envisages a proposal for a legislative framework on a sustainable food system and, in light of the lessons learned during the coronavirus crisis, the set-up of a contingency plan for ensuring food supply and food security in times of crisis. A revamped agricultural crisis reserve (never used so far in its current format) would also help to mitigate future agricultural market crises.

The strategy covers all steps taken by the food from production to consumption. Given the role of agricultural policy in achieving both environmental and climate goals, a host of actions (summed up in the box to the right) aim at making EU agriculture (and fisheries) more sustainable, while supporting farmers (and fishermen). Actions include quantifiable targets for 2030, roadmaps for action and policy tuning (this latter, through identified steps for aligning the common agricultural policy (CAP) reform proposals with the Green Deal’s ambitions).

‘Farm to Fork’ moves for healthy and sustainable food production Targets for 2030

• 50 % cut in the use and risk of chemical pesticides and in the use of more hazardous pesticides.
• 20 % at least reduced use of fertilisers.
• 50 % cut of EU sales of antimicrobials for farmed animals and in aquaculture.
• 25 % at least of organically farmed area and a significant increase in organic aquaculture.

Other areas of action

• Rewarded CO2 sequestration on farms.
• Bioeconomy and energy efficiency.
• Animal welfare and plant health.
• Sustainable production in the farm animal and fish and seafood sectors.
• Integration of the nine objectives of the common agricultural policy (CAP) in the Member States’ CAP strategic plans.
• Competition rules and unfair trading practices (UTPs).

Moving forward in the food value chain, the strategy calls on all actors (processors, service operators, retailers, and consumers) to take action, and outlines a number of initiatives (see box to the right) for a sustainable food system. As no food strategy can make it without lining up people’s attitude towards food ethics with their consumption habits, key actions aim at facilitating consumers in making informed food choices for healthy and sustainable diets.

For enabling the sustainability transition, the strategy relies on research and innovation (on natural resources, bioeconomy, etc.), targeted investments (such as on broadband for mainstreaming the use of technology), and better data use (statistics on farm sustainability, monitoring data, SMEs’ skills). Finally, as European food is already a global standard for food, it should also promote the global transition to sustainable food supply, through international cooperation and trade.

‘Farm to Fork’ moves for healthy and sustainable food supply and consumption Actions in the food chain

• EU code of conduct for responsible business and marketing practice.
• Sustainable corporate governance and circular business models.
• Food nutrient profile, packaging and marketing standards.
• Combating food fraud.

Actions on food consumption

• Information to consumers (harmonised front-of-pack labelling: nutritional, ‘green’ and social claims; origin mark).
• Sustainable food promotion and procurement, and tax incentives.
• Targets to reduce food loss and waste, and revision of date marking (‘use by’ and ‘best before’ dates).

Stakeholders’ diverging reactions

The Commission aims to involve stakeholders and citizens in a broad debate on the strategy, the launch of which has already prompted much debate in the agri-food community. Reactions range from emphasising its positive aspects, at times despite negative expectations, to raising doubts or criticism. In general, ecologist NGOs welcomed the strategy as a timely potential game-changer to save the planet from destructive practices, and as a shift towards sustainable future policies, though commitments are still just aspirational. Others see it as a first real attempt at an EU food policy that favours biodiversity and health over agribusiness profits, aims at empowering consumers to make informed healthy food choices, and can offer opportunities to food and drink sector SMEs hit by the crisis. This entails changes in production and consumption patterns, including alternative proteins for food and feed. Critics emphasise the lack of a scientific approach, such as in the case of the farming sector’s claims that certain proposals lacking an impact assessment would endanger EU agriculture and mislead consumers. Sector stakeholders question targets on pesticides as unrealistic and those on fertilisers as too ambitious, whereas targets on organic farming would be achievable by rewarding organic conversion. Others regret the absence of issues such as access to land, or consider new farm policy proposals are needed. In certain views, meat production and consumption are not adequately addressed by the strategy, despite being a main societal challenge. On the other hand, the meat sector warns about simplistic measures putting off meat consumption and recalls meat’s important place in the EU’s rural economy and eating habits, and as a key component of circular food systems. Think-tanks generally welcome a strategy that identifies the conditions for reaching sustainable food systems, but warn that broad support for its realisation is essential, in particular for overcoming its intrinsic limitations.

The starting point of EU interinstitutional talks

Putting forward a framework for legislative and non-legislative initiatives that the European Parliament and Council will contribute to shaping, the European Commission invited the co-legislators to endorse the ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy and contribute to implementing it. In Parliament, first reactions have mirrored Members’ different policy angles and political ideas, though the need for rethinking the EU’s food system is a common view. Commissioners in charge of steering the strategy regularly participate in meetings with Parliament’s committees dealing with environment, public health and food security, and agriculture. In Council, early discussions have highlighted the main challenges and opportunities for EU Member States in achieving the strategy’s targets, such as the budgetary aspects and the differences in the initial positions at country level.

On 15 January 2020, Parliament adopted a resolution on the Green Deal. Noting that food production is still the biggest driver of biodiversity loss, and that providing safe, healthy and good quality food for all should be a top priority, Parliament welcomed the Commission presenting a ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy to tackle such issues.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘‘Farm to Fork’ strategy: Striving for healthy and sustainable food‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anja Radjenovic and Rafał Mańko with Gianna Eckert,

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With the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, many countries around the world that were or are due to organise elections or referendums, have had to decide whether to hold them as originally planned, introducing mitigating measures, put them on hold or postpone them to a later date.

When deciding whether to continue with elections or not, decision-makers have needed to take into account a variety of legal, technical and sanitary parameters and implications, as well as constitutional arrangements, to ensure that democratic institutions function as they would in normal circumstances and to ensure people’s fundamental rights and freedoms are upheld.

While postponing an election may be the most feasible and responsible option from the public health perspective, the decision may open the door to other risks, including undermining people’s trust in democracy and casting doubt on the regular nature of elections. However, as experts suggest, democracy can also be undermined by holding elections during the pandemic, as their free and fair nature might be questioned.

In order to protect election staff and voters, health and safety procedures can be built into election-related procedures, and special voting arrangements can be introduced, such as postal or e-voting, that allow citizens to cast their votes remotely. These entail other technological, security and social challenges, however, that need to be taken into account.

This briefing provides example of how selected EU Member States have dealt with elections and referendums that were due to take place during the coronavirus pandemic.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Coronavirus and elections in selected Member States‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou,

As Covid-19 adds increased pressure on international security, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations have been adapted and contributed to the mitigation of the effects of the pandemic in host countries.

Peace, conflict and peacekeeping in the wake of coronavirus

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Increasingly, research on the implications of Covid-19 on international security indicates that the pandemic will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable populations and countries in the world, leading to an increase in the likelihood of conflict and exacerbating the implications of ongoing conflict. Based on current trends, root causes of conflict, such as resource scarcity, inequality and food insecurity, are expected to grow. At the same time, the impact of the pandemic on the global economy, including on the most developed countries, is likely to suppress budgets for peace operations further, compounding a trend that has seen peacekeeping budgets and personnel decline in recent years. This has also given rise to a growing gap between authorised and deployed personnel. As noted by the 2019 report on the Global Peace Index, this comes at a time when the number of countries facing internal conflicts had already increased. Some experts argue that the pandemic offers an opportunity to reverse these trends in peacekeeping. As, across the world, military and peacekeeping operations have had to adapt to the spread of the pandemic, opportunities for more strategic and flexible planning, and more effective use of capabilities are being explored. This approach is reflected by the European External Action Service (EEAS). Among other things, the EEAS has recently highlighted the importance of the integrated approach in the face of the crisis; solidarity of missions and operations with host nations; the importance of quick responsiveness of CSDP missions and operations, and the adaptability of the planning and conduct of missions and operations within the agreed mandates.

CSDP missions and operations in the face of Covid-19

Through the CSDP, the EU has developed a broad crisis management agenda, which includes conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation, in accordance with United Nations (UN) principles. The UN recognises the EU as one of its most important regional partners in peacekeeping. Currently, there are 17 CSDP missions and military operations, with a range of mandates such as military training, capacity-building, counter-piracy, security sector reform, border assistance and counter-terrorism. They deploy over 5 000 personnel. EU civilian missions carry out tasks consistent with the EU Global Strategy’s commitment to strengthening the resilience and stabilisation of countries recovering from – or threatened by – conflict and instability. CSDP missions and operations are present in some of the countries ranking lowest on the Normandy Index, which measures threats identified by the Global Strategy (e.g. Somalia, Central African Republic). In the face of the coronavirus pandemic, the CSDP missions and operations continue to deliver on their security mandate; they are additionally exploring ways to support their host countries. While ongoing missions and operations do not have a humanitarian aid mandate, within their existing mandates, means and capabilities, civilian missions are providing specific advice and sharing information with international and national partners helping to address the pandemic (see Figure 1). Several missions are also donating medical and protective equipment. The actions of the CSDP missions are in full coherence with the wider actions undertaken by the ‘Team Europe‘ global response to the coronavirus, addressing the humanitarian, health, social and economic consequences of the crisis. Within the limits of their resources and mandate, military missions are also offering support. For example, the EU military Training Mission in Somalia is providing advice to the medical team of the Somali army on how to deal with Covid-19 emergencies.

The European Parliament is a long-standing advocate of a more effective CSDP. In January 2020, it called for a forward-looking approach to capability planning, as well as early anticipation of needs for crisis response; it expressed concern about limited force generation, and emphasised that Parliament should be consulted about strategic planning for missions. In 2017, it urged the Council to move towards the harmonisation and standardisation of European armed forces.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘CSDP missions and coronavirus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CSDP missions and operations Force generation and contribution against Covid-19

Written by Philip Boucher

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In the digital age, citizens need to manage a range of online identities that are linked to their offline identity. In managing these identities and entering into agreements, citizens navigate a complex legal and technical infrastructure. As digital identities become increasingly important, it is worth considering how this infrastructure can be made more trustworthy, empowering users while increasing the availability of data and ensuring citizens’ safety and privacy.

In this context, the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) hosted a roundtable discussion to examine how citizens can manage their identities online while maintaining privacy, safety and security. The event was organised in cooperation with ELONTech and the IOT Council in the context of the work of next generation internet, a European Commission initiative to reimagine and re-engineer the internet for the third millennium and beyond.

In her introduction, STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) highlighted the importance of managing digital identities safely and securely in the digital age, paying particular attention to who owns and controls the identity management tools. She then welcomed the speakers, all experts on digital sovereign identity and coming from industry, academia and policy-making, including Remy Knecht, COO of ITSME.be; Daniel Du Seuil, Convenor European Self Sovereign Identity Framework, part of the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI); Loretta Anania, Scientific Officer at DG Connect, European Commission; Thibaut Verbiest, Head of Regulatory Affairs Europe & Africa at Diginex and Petros Kavassalis, Associate Professor at the University of the Aegean.

Itsme.be is an identity management service that is widely used for securely signing digital transactions. While they are well known for their banking services, their COO, Remy Knecht, explained that they are also active in many other domains, including utilities, human recourses and mobility. These services are useful for many citizens, but only when they are trustworthy, that is, when they respect privacy and protect users when something goes wrong. Remy concluded his talk by identifying gaps in regulations and standards to providing a reliable link between decentralised IDs (known as DIDs) and more traditional centralised IDs, such as government-issued documents.

Daniel Du Seuil from the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI) spoke about how DIDs empower citizens by giving them control of their own data and identities. Citing several problematic experiences of identity management around the world, he emphasised the importance of empowering citizens while ensuring adequate protection of security and privacy. He argued that good partnerships between the public and private sector are key to achieving this.

The European Commission has been active in promoting the development and application of DIDs, for example through the next generation internet initiative. Loretta Anania – a Scientific Officer at the Commission – emphasised that privacy is not just a value, but a hard-won right enshrined in the EU Treaties that needs to be respected. However, while the treaties themselves do not provide guidance on how to respect these rights in the digital age, she argued that legislation such as the GDPR and eIDAS could form a solid basis for positioning Europe as a centre for safeguarding digital identities.

With their decentralised structure, blockchain technologies can form a key part of decentralised identity solutions. Thibaut Verbiest from Diginex – a digital financial services company focusing on blockchain technology – said that users already have to deal with dozens of digital IDs, passwords and accounts, and the number is growing. He emphasised the need for user-friendly systems. However, reliable decentralised systems for ID management can be expensive, and firms also need to consider regulatory elements as they are compelled to use the most GDPR-compliant technologies available to them. He highlighted that decentralised and centralised ID services could enter a virtuous circle whereby centralised IDs provide the basic credentials to enable users and service providers to engage in decentralised systems confidently, while decentralised systems provide a layer of transparency for centralised systems of the state by acting as a witness or notary.

Providing the final talk of the event, Petros Kavassalis recalled that the internet has always had to compromise between centralised and decentralised systems. Both have their role, and neither one alone can provide all of the privacy and security that users need. For that, it is key to develop a ‘trust layer’, and to complement technology with appropriate regulation.

During the subsequent discussion, inclusion emerged as a key issue. The primary device used for managing digital IDs are smartphones, but not all citizens have one. Indeed, many citizens prefer or require traditional physical interactions, and they should not be excluded from key services such as banking. Technology could provide some alternative solutions but, in the meantime, it remains important to maintain an ecosystem of identity management services that can cater to all citizens’ needs.

In his concluding remarks, STOA second Vice-Chair Ivars Ijabs (Renew Europe, Latvia), underlined the importance of DIDs, highlighting the competition to provide ID services from a wide range of platforms, including for example Facebook, which is also used as an ID service to access to many other online services. In closing, he stressed the important role of STOA, working at the interface of science and policy-making, to address these issues.

The full recording of the meeting is available here.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP / DAINA LE LARDIC

It is (almost) back to ‘business as usual’ as Parliament meets again in plenary from Wednesday 17 to Friday 19 June 2020. Members will deal with a full agenda, including up to three voting sessions each day, using the alternative electronic voting procedure introduced since the coronavirus outbreak, which has now proven to run smoothly.

On Wednesday afternoon, the session begins with Council and European Commission statements on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 19 June, at which the European Union budget and the proposed coronavirus recovery plan will be the focus of the agenda. Already under somewhat strained discussion, the coronavirus epidemic has further delayed the process of agreeing the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021‑2027. Parliament has already called on the Commission to propose a contingency plan for 2021, should the MFF, as seems increasingly likely, not be agreed in time. Nevertheless, Members will vote on Thursday afternoon on amendments to a Budget Committee report on guidelines for the 2021 Budget – Section III, the first under the yet to be agreed new MFF. Parliament’s guidelines on Section III are intended to assist the Commission by indicating political priorities for the deployment of next year’s EU budget; the recovery from the coronavirus crisis the most urgent, whilst Parliament will also seek to reinforce focus on the European Green Deal and digital transformation. Members will also vote on Wednesday night on two further draft amending budgets for the current year. Draft amending budget No 3/2020 concerns the over €3.2 billion surplus (mostly higher than expected revenues, and underspent expenditure) from 2019, which was carried over to 2020. While this surplus will reduce Member States’ gross national income contributions in 2020, Parliament is keen to see Member States devote the equivalent amount to support regions and businesses affected by the coronavirus crisis. To tackle the likely effects of the coronavirus crisis on the labour market, Members will also consider a proposal from the Commission to mobilise €345 000 to provide technical assistance that will strengthen the functioning of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund on Wednesday night. The fund provides vital support for workers who lose their jobs due to structural changes in global markets. Members will also vote on Wednesday night on draft amending budget No 4/2020, to make €279 million available in the 2020 budget to assist regions in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Austria affected by natural disasters caused by extreme weather events in 2019.

Thursday morning’s session begins with debates on a statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the foreign policy consequences of the Covid‑19 crisis. The virus has greatly exacerbated already deteriorating international relations on the one hand, and strengthened resolve on the other to support vulnerable regions in facing the threat to public health globally. In response, Parliament has already called for more strategic action, including updating the Global Strategy and supporting the Western Balkan countries, Africa and Latin America. At a time when the danger is real, access to reliable information is vital, yet the coronavirus epidemic has seen a corresponding worldwide outbreak of hoaxes, conspiracy theories, mis- and disinformation. In some countries, this has provided a pretext for restricting freedom of expression. Members will hear statements from the Council and the Commission on Thursday morning on tackling disinformation regarding Covid‑19, and the virus’s impact on freedom of expression. Parliament has already underlined that the issue presents a major public health problem, as well as the importance to democracy of a free and independent media. In advance of a Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs report on media freedom, Members will vote later on Thursday on a proposal to set up a special committee on foreign interference in EU democratic processes. Members will also vote on setting up further special committees on the fight against cancer and on artificial intelligence.

Looking beyond the coronavirus pandemic, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on tourism and transport in 2020 and beyond on Wednesday evening and vote on a motion for resolution the following day. Here, the Commission has acted quickly to avoid the confusion seen at the beginning of lockdown measures, issuing guidelines to help Member States safely lift travel restrictions and support the badly affected tourism and transport sector. Members are likely to insist that the EU take more action and provide greater financial support for the sector.

Planned to provide a comprehensive reflection on the direction and organisation of the EU, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the Conference on the Future of Europe on Wednesday evening. The Conference participants were to include citizens as well as representatives of Member State governments and Parliament and civil society. However, the Covid‑19 epidemic brought a halt to discussions between the EU institutions on the composition and structure of the Conference – and will inevitably have an effect on the proposed ‘Agora’ format. Nevertheless, keen to revive the discussions, Members will vote on a motion for resolution, which is expected to call for the Conference to be launched as soon as possible during the second half of 2020.

Returning to non-coronavirus related business on Wednesday evening, Members will debate a joint report from the Foreign Affairs and International Trade committees on recommendations on the negotiations for a new partnership with the United Kingdom following the 2016 ‘Brexit’ vote to leave the EU. The fourth round of EU-UK negotiations ended on 5 June 2020, with limited progress and critical divergence between the parties has emerged on level playing field commitments, fisheries, cooperation on criminal matters and the overarching institutional framework to govern future relations. The UK confirmed during the second EU-UK Joint Committee meeting on 12 June that it will not request an extension to the transition period, which will thus end on 31 December 2020. Parliament fully supports the Commission negotiating position, and the debate will be followed by a series of votes to agree Parliament’s position, with a final vote scheduled for Thursday.

Members will also vote on a motion for resolution on Thursday, following a statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the PRC national security law for Hong Kong and EU defence of a high degree of autonomy for the people of Hong Kong. Parliament has already strongly condemned China’s increasing interference in Hong Kong, as well as its apparent willingness to abandon its commitments to uphold rights and freedoms under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984.

Finally, Parliament is asked to consent to three reports on fisheries agreements, scheduled for votes on Wednesday evening. These include the conclusion of the Protocol on the implementation of the 2019‑2024 Fisheries Partnership Agreement with the Republic of Cape Verde, the 2019‑2024 Protocol on the implementation of the EU-Guinea-Bissau Fisheries Partnership Agreement and the Protocol on the implementation of the EU-São Tomé and Príncipe Partnership Agreement. All three agreements concern access rights for the EU fleet to fish in the respective regions and promote sustainable fisheries and the blue economy in those waters.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Annastiina Papunen,

© Shutterstock

The European Council meeting on 19 June, to be held by video-conference, will be almost exclusively dedicated to the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the proposed new EU recovery fund, dubbed ‘Next Generation EU’. The two European Commission proposals are now to be considered as one package for the purpose of negotiation, since the recovery fund is in effect embedded within the revamped EU long-term budget. This has increased the pressure on Member States to reach a political agreement on the MFF, but also multiplied the issues of disagreement among the EU leaders. In addition to the MFF-specific issues, on which divergences could not be overcome at the special European Council meeting in February 2020 – namely the overall size of the EU budget, the use of rebates and the funding allocation per policy area – the proposal for the recovery fund raises sensitive new questions, notably on the balance between loans and grants, the allocation criteria for funding and the modalities for repayment.

EU leaders are not expected to reach agreement at this stage, but rather to have a first exchange of views on the new proposals from the Commission. The outcome of this discussion will provide pointers for the European Council President, Charles Michel, on further steps and the possible timing for an in-person meeting of leaders in the course of July, with a view to reaching an agreement on the EU budget package. To this end, the video-conference meeting of 19 June could produce a statement in which EU Heads of State or Government express their commitment to finding a political agreement before the summer break. In addition, this statement might also address foreign policy issues, such as Turkey’s drilling activities in the Mediterranean or sanctions on Russia.

1. The next Multiannual Financial Framework and the EU recovery fund

The European Council’s video-conference on 19 June 2020 will be its fifth virtual meeting since the start of the coronavirus crisis, but the first devoted mainly to the next MFF. EU leaders have discussed the 2021-27 long-term budget on numerous previous occasions (see EPRS’s The European Council and the 2021-27 Multiannual Financial Framework). Yet, at the special European Council meeting of 20-21 February 2020, no political agreement could be found between the Heads of State or Government on the negotiating box presented by Charles Michel. The video-conference of 19 June will be the first opportunity for EU leaders to discuss together the European Commission’s revised proposal for the 2021-27 MFF, including its proposal for an EU recovery fund, called ‘Next Generation EU’, which Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented in the European Parliament’s plenary session on 27 May 2020.

‘Next Generation EU’

The proposed recovery fund amounts to €750 billion, of which €500 billion would be in grants and €250 billion in loans. According to the proposal, the money for the recovery plan would come from the financial markets. The Commission would issue bonds with a maturity of up to 30 years to raise funds, and the money would be paid back over time through future EU budgets and possible new own resources, such as a digital tax. One of the corner-stones of the plan is the Commission’s current strong credit rating, which might however, according to some experts, be at risk in the future.

The money would be invested through three pillars: (i) supporting the Member States to recover; (ii) kick-starting the EU economy and helping private investment; and (iii) learning the lessons from the crisis. The key element of the proposal is the new €560 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility, which aims to help Member States tackle the challenges identified in the European Semester process.

Initial reaction to the European Commission’s proposals

While most Member States have reacted positively to the Commission’s proposals, some national governments have expressed criticism. These latter voices include Finland and the ‘frugal four’ group (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) of net contributors to the EU budget (that is, countries contributing more to the EU budget than the amount of EU funding they receive), which insist on budgetary discipline and on maintaining a relatively small EU budget. They have called for changes to the Commission’s proposals, notably as to the size of the EU budget, the balance between grants and loans, and the length of time for paying back the loans.

During the debate in the Parliament’s plenary session, most MEPs welcomed the Commission’s new proposal. The President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, was pleased that ‘the European Commission’s plan takes on board [the Parliament’s] proposals’. He will address the European Council at its meeting on 19 June, and relay the Parliament’s views on the EU budget.

2. Main discussion points at the European Council video-conference

Since the MFF and the recovery fund proposals will be considered as one package, EU leaders will need to address simultaneously two sets of sensitive issues, on which diverging views persist. Regarding the MFF, the traditional dividing lines concern mainly (i) the size of the budget, (ii) the rebates, and (iii) the balance between policy areas. Other delicate issues include the question of conditionality and the introduction of new own resources. The recovery package adds additional sensitive points to the discussion, notably (iv) the balance between loans and grants, (v) the allocation criteria for the funding, and (vi) the length and modalities of repayment.

Total amount

The new MFF proposal envisages a total of €1.1 trillion (in 2018 prices) in commitments, which represents a reduction compared to the €1.279 trillion in the 2018 Commission proposal, but a small increase compared to the €1.095 trillion in Charles Michel’s negotiating box discussed at the special European Council meeting of 20-21 February 2020. Together with the €750 billion envisaged under the new temporary recovery instrument, Next Generation EU, this would present an overall budget of €1.85 trillion. Some Member States, such as Denmark, have indicated their preference for a ‘slim and modern budget’ and have argued that the current proposal is too high.

Rebates

Certain Member States (Austria, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) benefit from rebates or ‘budget correction mechanisms’ to compensate for what is, in their view, ‘a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to [their] relative prosperity’. The Commission argued in its 2018 MFF proposal that the elimination of all rebates would increase the fairness of the MFF, and proposed to phase out the current rebates over time. In its new proposal, the Commission has softened its previous stance and argues that the current rebates could be phased out over a much longer period than previously proposed. As all ‘frugal four’ Member States would benefit from this solution, this could be a crucial argument to convince them to agree on the new MFF. Charles Michel’s proposal in February already included the idea of retaining a lump-sum correction mechanism.

Balance between policy areas

Another highly debated issue is the balance between the funding of ‘traditional’ and of ‘modern’ EU policies. Traditionally, the biggest share of MFF expenditure has been ear-marked for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and cohesion policies, representing respectively 38 and 34 per cent of the overall 2014-20 MFF. The ‘friends of cohesion’, a group (currently encompassing Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain) which defends a strong level of cohesion funding and opposes cuts in this area in the 2021-27 MFF, has reiterated its opposition to a reduction in the appropriations devoted to these policy areas.

Conditionality

Conditionality can be defined as the requirement that all EU spending should comply with a set of Union policy standards, with funding withdrawn in the event of lack of compliance. The European Commission has already been using conditionality requirements for many years, in particular in the field of cohesion policy. In its 2021-27 legislative proposals, the Commission has reinforced existing requirements such as ‘macro-economic conditionality’ and ‘infringement conditionality’. It has also introduced new ones, such as ‘rule-of-law conditionality’, which would seek to protect the Union’s budget in cases of generalised deficiencies as regards respect of the rule of law in a Member State. The measures to be applied to the failing Member State would have to be approved by the Council by ‘reverse qualified majority’ (that is, a qualified majority to block the proposal rather than to approve it). This approach is supported by some Member States (notably Belgium, Germany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands), while others (such as Bulgaria and Romania) are more critical.

New own resources

The European Parliament has repeatedly, most recently on 15 May 2020, called on EU leaders and the Commission ‘to take bold decisions regarding the reform of the EU own resources system, including the introduction of a basket of new own resources’. These could include ‘a common consolidated corporate tax base, digital services taxation, a financial transaction tax, income from the emissions trading scheme, a plastics contribution and a carbon border adjustment mechanism.

On 27 May, the Commission indicated that it would propose additional new own resources at a later stage in the 2021-27 financial period. Options include a new own resource based on non-recycled plastics packaging waste; an emissions trading system-based own resource extended to the maritime and aviation sectors; a carbon border adjustment mechanism of some kind; an own resource based on the operations of companies drawing huge benefit from the EU single market, and a digital tax on companies with a global annual turnover of above €750 million.

Balance between loans and grants

Initial discussions among EU leaders on a long-term response to the socio-economic consequences of the Covid-19 crisis concentrated on two issues: (i) on whether or not to issue joint debt instruments, or ‘coronabonds‘. These would keep borrowing costs down, but spark fears in some Member States of ‘opening the door to mutualisation of members’ debt under the banner of the EU’; (ii) on the delivery method for recovery support, i.e. in the form of grants or loans. Grants would not need to be paid back, whereas loans would. Some countries have strongly advocated a grants-based solution as opposed to loans, which would only lead to an increase in the debt burden. Others, especially the ‘frugal four’, consider grants to be an inefficient use of money, which could leave the EU budget in a situation of permanent deficit; thus, they have strongly backed a loan-based recovery approach, with clear conditions and criteria attached.

The Commission proposal, which includes both loans and grants, attempts to find a compromise between Member States calling for a grant-based recovery fund, such as Germany and France, and those preferring a recovery fund based on loans, such as the ‘frugal four’. Nevertheless, as indicated by the Chancellor of Austria, Sebastian Kurz, this point is expected to be a crucial issue for discussion and trade-off in the negotiations. Even if only used as ‘an exceptional and temporary emergency mechanism’, as stated by the European Commission, policy analysts and financial experts argue that the introduction of a possibility to borrow on capital markets would be ‘a radical change for the EU’.

Allocation criteria for the recovery funding

Criticism has been expressed about the targeting of the recovery fund support, with some experts and Member States suggesting that the proposed support allocation criteria are outdated and not fit for purpose. In the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the Commission plans to take into account Member States’ population, GDP per capita and unemployment figures from 2015 to 2019. The Commission insists, contrary to views of critics, that this allocation key ‘will be particularly beneficial to the countries most affected by the crisis, notably those with low per capita income and high unemployment’. The biggest potential recipients would be Italy, Spain, and Poland.

Length and modalities of repayment

The Commission proposes that ‘the funds raised will be repaid after 2027 and by 2058 at the latest’. However, some Member States, such as Finland, argue that ‘the repayment period in the recovery instrument should be shorter than the proposed 30 years, and the financing facility must comply with the principle of a balanced budget, laid down in the Treaty’.

3. Steps towards reaching agreement

Following the presentation of the updated MFF proposal, President Charles Michel urged ‘all Member States to examine the Commission’s proposal swiftly and work constructively towards a compromise in the best interests of the Union’. In his opinion, ‘everything should be done to reach an agreement before the summer break’. The European Commission invited ‘the European Council and the co-legislators to examine these proposals rapidly with a view to reaching a political agreement at the level of the European Council by July’. In order to see if there is enough room for an agreement, Charles Michel has held numerous bilateral or group meetings with Member States to discuss their assessment of the Commission’s proposals. In order to involve all relevant actors in the MFF negotiations, Charles Michel attended the meeting of the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents on 11 June, to discuss with EP group leaders the state of play of the negotiations.

Based on his consultations and the results of the video-conference, if Charles Michel sees the potential for reaching the ‘landing zone’ of the negotiations, he is expected to call for an extraordinary European Council meeting in early July in Brussels, with the aim of reaching a ‘global compromise’ (i.e. MFF and recovery fund). Observers and practitioners agree that, in order to reach an agreement, a physical meeting is required, as video-conferences are less effective due to the limited possibility for side-discussions, the lack of interpretation, and the reduced confidentiality resulting from the increased number of people ‘in the room’.

4. Other items

In the statement expected following the video-conference, the European Council could possibly also touch upon foreign policy issues. In light of recent developments regarding Turkey’s drilling activities in the Mediterranean, EU leaders might once again express their solidarity with Cyprus and Greece. Imposing new sanctions on Russia, as well as renewing the existing economic ones which will expire in July 2020, would also require the green light of the European Council.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council video-conference of 18-19 June 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© BillionPhotos.com / Adobe Stock

Policy analysts and politicians alike acknowledge the ‘game-changing’ impact or potential of the coronavirus pandemic for the world economy and geo-political order, as well as on regional disputes and domestic politics in many countries. For the European Union, the crisis highlights the need for closer and more effective cooperation and action at European level, not least because a number of major players around the world are attempting to use the crisis to increase their international influence, often at the EU’s expense.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on coronavirus and related issues. Earlier publications on the topic can be found in the previous item in this series, published by EPRS on 8 June.

From bad to worse? The impact(s) of Covid-19 on conflict dynamics
European Union Institute for Security Studies, June 2020

Is the Covid-19 crisis an opportunity to boost the euro as a global currency?
Bruegel, June 2020

Europe after coronavirus: The EU and a new political economy
Chatham House, June 2020

Global currencies during a crisis: Swap line use reveals the crucial ones
Central for European Policy Studies, June 2020

A new policy toolkit is needed as countries exit Covid-19 lockdowns
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2020

The impact of Covid-19 on cyber-crime and state-sponsored cyber activities
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, June 2020

Covid-19: Choc sanitaire et géopolitique
Institut français des relations internationales, June 2020

Will Covid-19 change the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2020

Next generation EU bonds might face a credit-rating challenge
Central for European Policy Studies, June 2020

Coronavirus and Europe’s new political fissures
Carnegie Europe, June 2020

Economic recovery will be the battered EU’s ‘Phoenix moment’
Friends of Europe, June 2020

Covid-19 and emerging economies: What to expect in the short- and medium-term
Bruegel, June 2020

How Europe should prepare for the post-coronavirus world
Carnegie Europe, June 2020

Cities on the frontline: Managing the coronavirus crisis
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, June 2020

In navigating the economic recovery, one size does not fit all
Chatham House, June 2020

European coronavirus lockdown status
German Marshall Fund, June 2020

After Covid: Resetting Europe-Africa relations for mutual benefit
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2020

Europe needs mobility and cooperation to fight the coronavirus
Carnegie Europe, June 2020

Trade in time of corona: What’s next for the EU?
European Centre for International Political Economy, June 2020

The US and Europe have addressed Covid unemployment in divergent ways: The differences are revealing
Atlantic Council, June 2020

Protecting biodiversity could spare us future pandemics
Friends of Europe, June 2020

Covid-19 pandemic threatens US elections: The pandemic adds significantly to the risk of a contested result and a constitutional crisis
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2020

Critical supply chains: Do we need to bring them back home?
Friends of Europe, June 2020

European society and economy after Covid-19
European Centre for International Political Economy, June 2020

How the constitution’s federalist framework is being tested by Covid-19
Brookings Institution, June 2020

Youth or consequences: Put youth at the center of Covid-19 recovery
Brookings Institution, June 2020

Britain: Living with coronavirus
Chatham House, June 2020

How (and why) Turkey strengthened its grip on Libya despite Covid-19
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, June 2020

Emerging from the pandemic, Turkey rolls out a more assertive foreign policy
Carnegie Europe, June 2020

Covid-19: Voices from Asia
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2020

India: Covid-19 could be Modi’s reform moment
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, June 2020

Turkey’s ‘coronavirus diplomacy” and its impact on relations with the EU
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, June 2020

Multiplying crises: The coronavirus in Sudan
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2020

Hurricane season, Covid-19 pose twin threats to vulnerable
Atlantic Council, June 2020

Living with Covid-19: The thinking behind Spain’s lockdown exit plan
Real Instituto Elcano, June 2020

La vie des cultes en temps de Covid-19 : Épilogue
Fondation Jean Jaurès, June 2020

Where the pandemic hits the hardest: Fragility, conflict and Covid-19 in Asia
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, May 2020

Trump’s Covid-19 response is deepening the transatlantic rift
Centre for European Reform, May 2020

The recovery fund faces a tricky passage
Centre for European Reform, May 2020

Securing Europe’s medical supply chains against future shocks
Centre for European Reform, May 2020

L’énergie solaire en Afrique subsaharienne après le Covid-19: Guérir un secteur malade
Institut français des relations internationales, May 2020

Covid-19: Cartographie des émotions en France
Fondation pour l’innovation politique, May 2020

Reopening America and the world
Brookings Institution, May 2020

The role of greater cohesion funding for solidarity and sustainability post-COVID-19
Institute for European Environmental Policy, May 2020

Global sustainable development in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic
Institute for European Environmental Policy, May 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus and international power‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak

Written by James McEldowney,

In December 2019, the European Parliament declared a climate and environmental emergency in Europe and across the globe – a recognition of the challenges that the EU faces in this area. The agricultural sector is not only affected by climate change but also contributes significantly to it, according to some assessments. Evidence from a range of reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre points to the impacts that climate change will have on yields, length of growing season, water availability, biodiversity, and habitats. The pattern of climate change will have a differential impact in terms of the regions affected. A clear north–south divide emerges, with countries of southern Europe likely to face declining yields due to increased temperatures and reduced precipitation. In the legislative proposals for the common agricultural policy (CAP) for the post-2020 period, the European Commission has set a high level of ambition in both environmental and climate change objectives, taking into account the fact that agriculture is responsible for around 10 % of the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The European Green Deal outlined in the Commission’s political guidelines aims to make Europe the world’s first climate-neutral continent by 2050. A range of mitigation and adaptation responses are available, designed to curb GHG emissions and reduce vulnerability to climate change.

The EU can use the CAP as a tool to influence policy-making in the area of climate change. In fact, data on the operation and impact of the CAP on climate change and GHG emissions have been examined using a range of sources, including a study undertaken for the Commission. One of its conclusions is that there are a range of CAP measures that are only partially relevant to climate needs, as the CAP is constrained by the lack of compulsory implementation. Additionally, a series of inconsistencies and ‘missed opportunities’ were identified in the study. It remains to be seen how such findings will influence the content and design of the new CAP strategic plans, given that the Commission’s future proposals for them include giving greater discretion to Member States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU agricultural policy and climate change‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘EU agricultural policy and climate change’ on YouTube.

Written by Sofija Voronova with Anna Nichols,

The near-ubiquity of data in the lives of ordinary people, along with its exponential growth in generation rate and potential misuse, has made the protection of personal information an increasingly important social, legal and political matter for the EU. In recent years, both awareness of data rights and expectations for EU action in this area have grown considerably.

The right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data are both enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the EU Treaties. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 gave the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties and abolished the pillar structure, providing a stronger basis for a more effective and comprehensive data protection regime in the EU.

In 2012, the European Commission launched an ambitious reform to modernise the EU data protection framework. It resulted in the adoption in 2016 of the main EU data protection legislative instrument – the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – and the Law Enforcement Directive. The framework overhaul also included adopting an updated Regulation on Data Processing in the EU Institutions and reforming the ePrivacy Directive, pending in the Council since September 2017.

The European Parliament has played a major role in passing these reforms, both as co-legislator and author of own-initiative reports and resolutions seeking to guarantee a high level of data protection to EU citizens. Last but not least, the European Court of Justice has also played an important part in building the EU data protection framework, with several landmark judgments delivered in recent years.

In the coming years, potential challenges to the data protection framework include the question of how to adapt the GDPR to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, facial recognition technology and the Internet of Things. Potential fragmentation issues include differing Member State interpretations of consent for data processing, while compliance burdens for SMEs and insufficient resources for data protection authorities may present challenges for enforcement. The European Commission is expected to address these issues in its upcoming evaluation of the GDPR.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU data protection policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Understanding EU data protection policy’ on YouTube.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Sara Suna Lipp,

Dementia is a growing public health concern, with no reliable prognosis or effective treatment methods. In the age of big data and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, the goal of more precise, early diagnosis and prediction of the progression of dementia may not be very far away. However, solving a huge biomedical problem via AI could have a profound impact on human privacy, rights and dignity.

Dementia is an increasingly common condition in various brain diseases described by symptoms such as a diminished ability to think, reason and remember. Dementia not only impacts the patient’s daily life but also poses a huge burden on families, caregivers and on national economies. Currently, about 50 million people worldwide, including 10 million in European Union (EU) Member States, are affected, and the numbers are expected to triple by 2050. Strikingly, 5 % of these cases correspond to early-onset dementia, where the disease develops before the age of 60. Current costs of dementia in the EU are estimated at €200 billion. Contrary to cancer, heart disease and HIV, there is still no reliable method for early diagnosis, or treatment to prevent or reverse dementia.

Recent health innovations and dementia research are gaining momentum using AI algorithms. Referring to systems that respond autonomously to their environment, AI and machine learning (a subset of AI denoting the ability of computers to ‘learn’ without explicit programming) could identify ‘biomarkers’, common patterns, measurable biological molecules or functions, which are indicative of pre-onset dementia. Early diagnosis may set the first stage in combating dementia, but AI could present additional possibilities.

Potential impacts and developments

AI technologies have been employed to assist dementia patients in their daily lives and to monitor and integrate information to detect unexpected behavioural changes. Smart systems remind patients to eat or take their medication. Moreover, machine-learning applications collect and analyse speech or walking patterns over time to survey disease progression.

AI as a diagnostic tool

Up to now, dementia drug development has focused on treatments targeting later stages, with no success. Remarkably, research shows that biomarkers as well as genetic testing can be indicative up to 20 years prior to onset of the disease. Several EU-funded initiatives such as European Prevention of Alzheimer’s Disease and the PREVENT research programme aim at generating extended datasets to understand the origin and development of dementia. Academic and private-sector interest in early detection has facilitated promising progress. AI is used to mine complex ‘big data’ obtained from brain scans, blood and spinal fluid samples, to identify factors as well as metabolic alterations that are predictive of dementia. Non-invasive methods such as blood-based testing could provide a particularly affordable route to tracking dementia progression. Early diagnosis is crucial to manage dementia and improve patients’ quality of life.

AI as a treatment tool

As AI technologies progress, interdisciplinary efforts by neuroscientists and AI experts create maps of nerve cell connections in the brain. What if, in the future, we could have access to human brains (neural networks) like Google maps? What if one day we could create a backup and restore our minds when necessary, such as in the case of getting dementia? Substantial amounts are being invested in several large-scale research projects such as the EU’s Human Brain Project (HBP), the United States’ Brain Research Initiative and Japan’s Brain Project, which are working towards an understanding of how, on the structural and functional level, millions of neurons come together to make the brain work, generate and store information. Furthermore, there are several companies researching links between the human brain and computers, ‘brain-machine interfaces‘, to preserve and enhance brain function, with additional potential to treat brain disorders causing dementia. Neuralink, founded by Elon Musk, intends ‘to implant computer chips into human brains and to develop brain-machine interfaces connecting the mind to external processing power’. Similarly, Kernel, founded by Bryan Johnson, states its objective as ‘to read and write the underlying functions of the brain‘. Although mapping the complete human brain is far from a reality, rapidly evolving science and technology may bring developments that until recently sounded like science fiction.

Despite its promise, using AI to fight dementia raises ethical and societal concerns. All these developments depend on the collection of very sensitive data – comparable to genetic data – operating in close proximity to the human body. Privacy, data governance and informed consent will therefore be important issues to address. Results obtained by AI algorithms for early diagnosis may be difficult to comprehend and explain, even by experienced physicians – raising issues of trust. Do people trust more in decisions made by machines or by humans? And what happens in the case of erroneous diagnosis? Who would be accountable for incorrect treatments and how would damage be compensated? In addition, inequity in accessibility to the technology may lead to a growing social gap.

More complex scenarios emerge when considering whether AI-powered brain-interface technologies could be utilised as a dementia treatment to restore brain information. Could a person’s personality be changed? What happens to autonomy and free will? How easy would it be to manipulate or change people’s thoughts? How would human relationships be affected, knowing that a person is partially governed by a programmed machine? Non-therapeutic human enhancement, such as creating ‘super-smart’ people, could lead to very controversial dual-use of this technology. Lastly, technological foreign invasion of the brain could cause major cybersecurity issues, such as hackers being able to target brains instead of computers to extract information (i.e. financial, political), or to manipulate people’s ideas. The possibilities for misuse of AI technologies therefore pose fundamental challenges to basic human rights, dignity and even personhood.

Anticipatory policy-making

AI research and development in dementia diagnosis and treatment require close attention to several legal and ethical issues: privacy, autonomy, data protection, cybersecurity, surveillance, dual-use, transparency, accountability and non-discrimination. Due to the strategic importance of AI and its future use, the European Commission published a White Paper and European strategy for data in February 2020, setting out policy options and measures for a European approach to AI and big data. The OECD Recommendation on Responsible Innovation in Neurotechnology, released in December 2019, is the first international standard aiming to guide governments and innovators to plan for and address challenges in the field of brain research. The OECD Recommendation’s principles can assist the EU to build on existing rules.

Medical/brain data are highly sensitive. Therefore, policy-makers must ensure that data storage and transmission methods are vigorous and secure. Potential use of the technology ‘to read and write’ the brain may threaten privacy and autonomy, and cybersecurity requires rigorous implementation of safety and security standards. Today’s legal framework may be unable to react to these serious concerns. Societal deliberation, increased oversight and advisory-body capacity are essential at the early research and development stage.

AI-powered brain interfaces necessitate a code of conduct and surveillance mechanisms. Due to the potential dual-use/misuse, legal guidance criteria to define legitimate and ethically permissible use of brain data are required, and risk assessment within a common EU framework is crucial. Currently, a Commission draft proposal for a risk-based approach is open for consultation, and a legislative proposal is expected in late 2020. Furthermore, transparency and informed consent procedures require re-evaluation to provide legal protection for long-term safety and against risks. Legal responsibility needs attention as erroneous diagnosis/actions impact issues from safety to privacy. Finally, future laws should ensure non-discrimination and fairness through equal distribution and accessibility to these technologies to avert social inequalities.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘What if AI could advance the science surrounding dementia?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to Science and Technology podcast ‘What if AI could advance the science surrounding dementia?’ on YouTube.