European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Union, EP

While Parliament and its Members were hopeful that the plenary session would return to Strasbourg this month, the significantly higher Covid‑19 health risks for the local population as well as Members and staff mean that the 14-17 September 2020 session will take place in Brussels. The agenda, however, remains the same, with Members set to debate and vote on a number of files.

The highlight of the session will undoubtedly be on Wednesday morning, when Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attends plenary to deliver the annual State of the Union address before Parliament. This is an important moment to take stock of the year’s achievements and present priorities for the next 12 months. While the coronavirus pandemic has put paid to the Commission’s ambition to move away from a crisis-management mode, the political priorities outlined in the original six priorities for its mandate have been recalibrated to deliver on promises while also adjusting to the crisis scenario. One of those priorities – upholding fundamental rights and the rule of law – is the subject of a joint debate on Monday evening on Poland and the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach.

However bad the crisis, the EU budget must not exceed its revenues – known as own resources. The magnitude of the funding needed for the coronavirus recovery will therefore require new revenue streams, particularly if, as Parliament insists, common debt issued is repaid fairly, without burdening future generations. The European Council reached political agreement on the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), next generation EU recovery fund (NGEU) and own resources in July 2020. Only consulted, Parliament has to adopt a legislative opinion on the EU own resources system agreement before Council can adopt that decision. Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) has fast-tracked the procedure accordingly, treating it separately from the MFF proposals, and Members will vote on its opinion on Tuesday. The Committee insists that new own resource streams are introduced (from carbon, emissions, plastics, and digital and financial services taxation) to finance at least the entire repayment costs of the recovery instrument, and Parliament has requested a legally binding calendar for their introduction.

At the same time, notwithstanding any move to tax the carbon emissions that contribute significantly to climate change, EU efforts to reduce them continue. On Tuesday evening, Members are expected to vote on Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations on the proposed establishment of a €17.5 billion Just Transition Fund to help regions that rely on fossil fuel and high-emission industries to invest in clean energy technologies, emissions reduction, site regeneration and reskilling of workers. On Monday, Members will consider an Environment, Public Health & Food Safety Committee (ENVI) report on reducing maritime transport CO2 emissions, where data gathering for monitoring is in need of reform. The committee report seeks to require shipping companies to reduce their annual average CO2 emissions by at least 40 % by 2030, with penalties for non-compliance. Again, the vote should establish the position for negotiations with the Council on the legislative proposal. Parliament will also vote on Monday on an ENVI own-initiative report on the EU’s role in protecting and restoring the world’s forests against deforestation caused by agriculture. Replacement of tropical forests worldwide with commercial crops such as palm oil, soy or beef continues at an alarming rate, threatening an irreplaceable resource crucial for fighting climate change, and EU action could reduce demand for such products.

The Council and Commission will make statements on Tuesday morning on the Covid‑19 situation, as regards EU coordination of health assessments and risk classification and the consequences on Schengen and the single market. Two files on the agenda pertain to the EU response to the coronavirus crisis, both tabled without report under the urgent procedure. On Monday evening, Members will consider Draft Amending Budget No 8/2020, which sets out the funding needed for the Emergency Support Instrument and the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative Plus to provide financing for deployment of a vaccine against the disease. It also covers reimbursement to Member States for actions to counter the public health crisis under the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative Plus (CRII+). The same evening, Members will also debate a proposal to support a sustainable rail market in view of the coronavirus pandemic. The proposal would allow, temporarily and at least to the end of the year, measures to assist the rail sector face the effects of Covid‑19, including lower, waived or deferred track access charges. It would also allow Member States to support rail infrastructure managers to cover any financial losses brought about by the new relief measures until the industry can get back to normal operations.

On Tuesday morning, Council and the Commission will make statements on the preparation of the Special European Council, scheduled for 24-25 September 2020, which will focus on the dangerous escalation and the role of Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean. Alarmingly, since the discovery of offshore natural gas reserves in the region, Turkey continues to challenge its neighbours on the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones. Turkey’s illegal drilling and military interventions, including military force, intimidation and violations of the territorial waters and airspace of its neighbours has destabilised the whole region. A joint debate and statements by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) will follow. The VP/HR will also make statements on the worrying developments in Belarus, where the democratic environment has deteriorated sharply since the elections in August. Statements are also expected on the situation in Lebanon, and in Russia, following the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. Parliament is expected to vote resolutions on these issues later in the day.

On Thursday, as is customary, the focus is on human rights issues. Before that, however, on Tuesday, Members will discuss a report on EU-African security cooperation in the Sahel region; a particular focus of EU efforts to build peace in a region destabilised by conflict in Mali, which has spilled over into neighbouring countries. The EU’s commitment to stabilisation in the Sahel is part of an overall focus on promoting peace and security in a deteriorating geopolitical environment worldwide.

Written by Etienne Bassot,

© European Union 2020 – Source : EP / Benoit BOURGEOIS

In her statements to the European Parliament in July and November 2019, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined the political priorities that would shape the Commission’s work programme for the years 2019 to 2024. The 2020 Commission work programme, adopted before the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in Europe, mirrored these priorities. Without changing the overall structure of the six priorities, the spread of the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) and its significant impact across Member States obliged the Commission, however, to focus on immediate crisis management. As a result, at the end of May, the Commission adjusted its work programme for 2020, prioritising initiatives that it considered to be essential or necessary for the EU’s post-crisis recovery, in line with the Recovery Plan for Europe. The State of the Union debate provides the opportunity to take stock of the progress made thus far and to look ahead.

Delivering on promises while adjusting to a crisis scenario Recalibrating political priorities

The von der Leyen Commission took office on 1 December 2019, a month later than expected and after a long investiture process, beginning in May 2019 with the European Parliament elections. The new Commission’s priorities were sketched out in von der Leyen’s political guidelines, presented prior to her election as President of the Commission in July 2019, and further developed in the Commission’s 2020 work programme (CWP 2020), adopted on 29 January 2020. Building on the European Parliament’s political priorities and the European Council’s new Strategic Agenda for the 2019-2024 period, the Commission sought to shift from the crisis management mode that had dominated the Juncker Commission’s activities in the previous term (i.e. the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis and Brexit) to focus on the long term. The new priorities aimed at leading the transition to ‘a fair, climate-neutral, digital Europe‘, building on six ‘headline ambitions’ or priorities: i) A European Green Deal; ii) A Europe fit for the digital age; iii) An economy that works for people; iv) ‘A stronger Europe in the world; v) Promoting our European way of life; and, vi) A new push for European democracy.

The Commission has delivered on some of its commitments for its first year in office. However, as the coronavirus spread among Member States and the public health crisis unfolded, the Commission focused on coordinating a common European response to the pandemic, through a wide range of actions aimed at supporting the Member States’ health systems and countering the socio-economic consequences of the pandemic. As a result of the adoption of all those non-planned measures, the CWP 2020 was adjusted on 27 May 2020. Presented on the same day as the Commission’s Recovery Plan for Europe, the adjustments to the CWP 2020 introduced changes affecting the scope and timing of some of the initiatives included in the original work programme. The adjusted work programme prioritises all the initiatives that, according to the Commission, are essential or support the immediate recovery of Europe, such as the strategy for smart sector integration (Priority 1), the renovation wave strategy (Priority 1), the strategy for sustainable and smart mobility (Priority 1), the digital services act (Priority 2), the reinforcement of the youth guarantee (Priority 3) and the white paper on an instrument on foreign subsidies (Priority 2). In relation to some other relevant initiatives, such as the new pact on migration and the updated skills agenda for Europe (both Priority 5), the Commission expressed its commitment to adopting them as swiftly as possible, whereas some other initiatives have been delayed until the end of the year or early 2021. In any case, timelines may again be changed to reflect the Commission’s 2021 work programme, expected to be adopted in October this year.

Adjusting EU finances

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has had significant consequences for EU finances too. Both the 2020 EU budget and the proposals for the next long-term budgetary plan, covering the 2021-2027 period (the multiannual financial framework − MFF) have had to be adjusted to the new circumstances and priorities. Already in the first weeks of the pandemic, as part of the immediate EU response to the crisis, the Commission proposed to reallocate part of the 2020 budget to support the policies most in need, such as healthcare systems, research into treatments and a vaccine, and protection of jobs and businesses. To finance these actions within the very limited resources of the 2020 budget, the Commission had to resort to the budgetary margins and flexibility instruments, while also proposing amendments to the provisions of the 2014-2020 MFF.

The pandemic has further complicated the lengthy negotiations on the 2021-2027 MFF. On 27 May 2020, together with its adjusted CWP 2020 and its Recovery Plan for Europe, the Commission presented a budgetary package for recovery and resilience. The Commission’s proposal linked the future 2021-2027 MFF with the €750 billion recovery instrument (‘Next Generation EU’). The latter would be financed through funds borrowed on the markets by the Commission on behalf of the EU, the first time such a method had been used on such a big scale. Political agreement on the proposals was reached by EU leaders at a special European Council meeting on 17-21 July 2020, opening the way for formal negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament, whose consent is required for the adoption of the MFF.

Adjusting the Commission’s structure and working methods

The pandemic has also had an impact on the von der Leyen Commission’s original structure and working methods. As all Commission staff in ‘non-critical functions’ moved to teleworking (as of 16 March) and all meetings of Commission decision-making groups, including the weekly meetings of the College of Commissioners (as of 18 March), switched to being held by video-conference or tele-conference, efforts were stepped up to facilitate the exchange of information, increase coordination and speed-up the decision-making process. The Commission introduced fast-track procedures to accelerate coordination at administrative level and the College privileged written procedure (as opposed to oral procedure) to expedite the adoption of decisions. Coordination was ensured by different means, including the creation of thematic clusters (global vaccine, macroeconomic aspects of the crisis, recovery phase), in which the members of the Commission took part on the basis of their areas of responsibility, and the creation of a coronavirus response group. Initially composed of five Commissioners (Janez Lenarčič, Stella Kyriakides, Ylva Johansson, Adina Vălean and Paolo Gentiloni) and headed by the Commission President, the group aimed to coordinate the EU’s efforts to handle the crisis, although its creation was seen by some commentators as a move towards further centralisation and presidentialisation of the Commission.

Finally, it is to be noted that the recent resignation of the Trade Commissioner (Phil Hogan) may also lead to changes in the Commission’s structure or working methods. On 26 August 2020, Hogan tendered his resignation to President von der Leyen after controversy over his attendance at an event with more than 80 people, despite the applicable Irish public health guidelines to contain the coronavirus pandemic restricting gatherings to a fraction of that number. Although von der Leyen did not formally request Hogan’s resignation under Article 17(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), she accepted it the following day, opening the way to the appointment of a new Irish Commissioner through the procedure provided for under Article 246 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). As requested by von der Leyen – who has been committed to ensuring parity within the Commission since the beginning of her mandate – the Irish government proposed both a female and a male candidate, the First Vice-President of the European Parliament, Mairead McGuinness, and a recent European Investment Bank Vice-President, Andrew McDowell. On 8 September, von der Leyen announced that she had chosen Mairead McGuinness, and that she would take over financial services, financial stability and the capital markets union from Valdis Dombrovskis. The latter would take the trade portfolio permanently (having already taken it in the meantime), while continuing in his role of Executive Vice-President. The Council has to appoint the new Commissioner, by common accord with the Commission President, after consulting the European Parliament. Parliament is expected to organise hearings of both McGuinness (on her qualifications to be a member of the College and for her portfolio) and Dombrovskis (as regards his new portfolio), as set out under Rule 125(9) of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure concerning candidates proposed to replace individual Commissioners or in the event of a substantial reshuffling of Commission portfolios.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities: State of play in autumn 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Sara Suna Lipp,

© Master1305 / Adobe Stock

Fashion is the second most polluting industry in the world, coming just after oil. Clothing manufacture and consumption have a huge negative impact on both the environment and people. Sustainability is not only about the environment, but is also an economic and social indicator, and the clothing industry is a good example illustrating their interconnections. Are technological innovations alone enough to ‘tailor’ a green and fair future for fashion?

The fashion industry is an important sector in Europe, constantly making and selling new clothes, shoes and accessories. Rapid changes in trends, continuous availability of new products and a huge drop in prices have created ‘fast fashion’ and a throwaway consumer culture. In its current state, the fashion industry (here, mainly focusing on clothes) has massive environmental and social costs in Europe and other parts of the world, which are incompatible with the Commission’s European Green Deal and circular economy objectives.

From the production of raw materials, manufacturing, transport and distribution, to consumer behaviour and care, the clothing lifecycle has a high environmental footprint, with massive usage of natural resources, water and land pollution, and high carbon emissions. Firstly, the fashion industry consumes 1.5 trillion litres of water annually. It causes 20 % of global clean water pollution, due to dyeing and treatment of fabrics with toxic chemicals, and pesticide usage to grow raw materials. Plastics, commonly utilised in synthetic fibres, end up in the oceans, contaminating the food chain as micro-plastics. Furthermore, 87 % of clothes end up as waste in landfill or are incinerated, whilst 30 % of garments are over-produced and disposed of without being worn even once. The fashion industry also accounts for 10 % of annual global carbon emissions and is a major player in deforestation and soil degradation.

Another challenge is societal, including tackling unethical working conditions and hazardous processes. Western fashion companies mostly outsource production to developing counties, not only to circumvent strict environmental regulations, but also to take advantage of cheap labour. Low salaries, long working hours and lack of safe working conditions are common.

Potential impacts and developments

While 11 % of Europeans and 25 % of the world population is affected by water scarcity, making a single cotton shirt requires 2 700 litres of fresh water. This amount equals a person’s drinking needs for 2.5 years. Could seawater replace fresh water in clothing manufacture? Research shows this is possible for certain steps in processing. A new fabric technology is also being developed that uses saltwater-grown plants. One-fifth of cotton’s global water footprint is related to pollution. Wastewater is often directly discarded into waterways, where it mixes with fresh water sources. While conventional wastewater treatments are energy-intensive, innovative technologies can allow more environmentally friendly separation of water and toxins. As water is key to sustainable development, more research on water filtering technologies for recycling and reusing is necessary.

To mitigate the environmental impact of manufacturing, industrial applications of biotechnology already offer innovative solutions for more sustainable materials and production processes. Genetically modified bacteria produce spider silk, which is strong, elastic and waterproof, while bio-leathers are produced by yeast making collagen, the major component of skin, or bacterial cellulose. Fungi are engineered to grow novel fibres, and to decontaminate textile waste. Pigments produced by algae replace toxic chemical dyes, and enzymes replace chemical treatment steps, reducing water consumption and providing non-toxic alternatives. Gene-editing techniques are advantageous for generating new plant varieties for raw materials. While food is an emotive topic, there might be fewer concerns over gene editing of non-food crops. New plant variants that are more resilient to climate change, such as droughts or floods are being generated. Manipulation of lifecycle characteristics could allow for cultivation outside of the normal seasonal range, and disease resistant plants could decrease the use of chemical pesticides. Such increased production efficiency can cut resource usage and minimise waste.

Products of fast fashion usually have a short lifetime. This is reflected in European consumer behaviour, where people purchased 40 % more clothing in 2012 compared to 1996, but wore it for a duration half as long. Better quality and sustainable material is part of the solution, but this is inseparable from consumer awareness. What if consumers were involved in the design process? Artificial intelligence applications have been exploited to predict trends and match supply with demand. Algorithms that can calculate all body measures and fabric types design custom-fit clothes. Furthermore, blockchain can help with supply chain transparency. These developments could reduce over-production, waste, and the online buy/return cycle. However, they do not eliminate the challenges of workforce ethics and excessive consumption. What if production was not outsourced? While people in developing countries depend on the industry for their living and these jobs help to bring poverty rates down, labour conditions should be fair. Would people be willing to pay more for higher quality, robust, adaptable and modifiable clothing? Surveys show people would pay more for sustainability. Legislative efforts to increase consumer awareness are undeniably part of a move towards a more planet-friendly fashion industry.

Anticipatory policy-making

EU legislation regulates textile production, labelling and marketing. The EU Textile Regulation sets labelling requirements for fibre composition; REACH provides protection regarding chemicals in production; and the Emissions Trading System controls emissions allowances. Furthermore, the updated waste management rules package imposes separated collection of textiles by 2025. A 2019 European Commission working document identifies textiles (i.e. clothing) as a ‘priority product category for the circular economy’. While current EU regulations focus on consumer health, safety and waste management aspects, equivalent standards and transparency for textile imports are still lacking. Policy-makers will need to pay particular attention to achieving the relevant Sustainable Development Goals, as well as compatibility with the Green Deal and circular economy goals.

Both the EU Ecolabel and Green Public Procurement are voluntary instruments encouraging sustainability, however, there is no minimum standard for textile sustainability and circularity in Europe. To promote the discovery of new materials and processes, such as biotechnology applications, research and development need more support. Rules for design and durability criteria could also improve clothing longevity and support slow, sustainable fashion. Instead of voluntary schemes, regulation on energy efficiency and resource management could address environmental issues. To tackle the water footprint in textile production, the industry can improve sustainable water use, and rules, taxation and financial sanctions could enforce them to do so. The use of certain chemicals in manufacturing could be banned and alternative methods used, to protect workers’ health, the environment and consumers. Furthermore, France is currently the only country with an extended producer responsibility (EPR) policy for clothing – a strategy to hold the producer accountable for waste management – contributing to recycling and reuse. Such EPR principles could be harmonised at European level. Policies can also support circular business models for safe and clean material cycles as well as sustainable production.

The fashion industry raises many ethical issues, but fair working conditions outside the EU, human rights and gender equality are key. Several measures have been proposed, including through European Parliament resolutions. After the Rana Plaza disaster, over 200 mostly European companies joined the Bangladesh Accord. However, a lot more still needs to be done to improve textile workers’ conditions. The EU supports internationally recognised guidelines from the OECD and ILO, but there is no legislation to ensure a socially sustainable supply chain. Furthermore, fair trade, an arrangement for international standards of ethical production, labour and environmental policies, should be endorsed on a wider scale. Lastly, consumer behaviour can significantly influence the fashion industry, and policies that encourage conscious consumer choices can ensure sustainability in the long-term.

Read the complete briefing on ‘What if fashion were good for the planet?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if fashion were good for the planet?’ on YouTube.

Written by Elena Lazarou,

© peshkov / Fotolia

The ‘Normandy Index’, now in its second year, aims to measure the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world. It was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2020 exercise and explains how the Index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country’s performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 40 individual country case studies, derived from the Index.

The paper forms part of the EPRS contribution to the Normandy World Peace Forum 2020. It is accompanied by two studies, one on the EU’s contribution to peace and security in 2020, the other on EU support for peace in the Sahel.

Read this study on ‘Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide: Normandy Index 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Normandy Index, 2020

Written by Martin Russell,

© Birute Vijeikiene / Adobe Stock

Following the post-Cold War reset of the 1990s, EU-Russia relations have become increasingly tense. Although initially seen as a pro-Western reformer, since the start of his first presidency in 2000 Vladimir Putin has shown increasingly authoritarian tendencies, and his efforts to assert Russian influence over post-Soviet neighbours threaten the sovereignty of those states.

Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia led to no more than a temporary cooling of relations with the European Union (EU). However, its 2014 annexation of Crimea caused a more permanent rupture. Responding to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the EU adopted hard-hitting sanctions.

In 2016, the EU decided to base its Russia policy on five principles, which remain as valid as ever in 2020. They are: insistence on full implementation of the Minsk Agreements on eastern Ukraine as a condition for lifting sanctions against Russia; efforts to strengthen relations with Russia’s former Soviet neighbours; greater EU resilience to Russian threats; selective engagement with Russia on certain issues such as counter-terrorism; and support for EU-Russia people-to-people contacts.

After six years of deadlock, French president Emmanuel Macron is among those calling for renewed EU-Russia dialogue. Improved relations between Ukraine and Russia following the election of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in spring 2019 raised hopes of a solution to the Donbass conflict, which is still the main obstacle to better relations between the two sides. However, there is still no sign of a breakthrough.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU and Russia: Locked into confrontation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘The EU and Russia: Locked into confrontation’ on YouTube.

Written by Tarja Laaninen,

© alexskopje / AdobeStock

The controversial issue of ‘front-of-pack nutrition labelling’ (FOP labelling) has been high on the agenda of those following European food labelling issues for many years. With half of adults in the European Union being overweight and with many health problems related to unhealthy diets, making the healthy choice the easy choice for consumers has been advocated as one of the means that could help to solve problems. Front-of-pack nutrition labelling is simplified nutrition information provided on the front of food packaging, aiming to help consumers with their food choices. Under the current EU rules, the indication of nutrition information on the front of packaging is not mandatory but could be provided on a voluntary basis.

Some Member States have already introduced voluntary schemes to help consumers to identify healthier products. The Commission announces in its new ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy, launched in May 2020, that it will propose a mandatory harmonised front-of‑pack nutrition labelling system by the end of 2022. Consumer and health associations broadly consider that FOP nutrition labelling plays a key role in helping consumers make more informed, healthier food choices. There is, however, also criticism of such schemes, arguing that they are over-simplified and can mislead consumers.

In its resolution on the European Green Deal, adopted in January 2020, the European Parliament welcomes the plan for a sustainable food system strategy, as well as the Commission’s intention to explore new ways to give consumers better information, and calls on the Commission to consider improved food labelling.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Nutrition labelling schemes used in Member States‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Nutrition labelling schemes used in Member States’ on YouTube.

Written by Elena Lazarou,

© fotomaster / Fotolia

This is the third Peace and Security Outlook produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). The series is designed to analyse and explain the contribution of the European Union to the promotion of peace and security internationally, through its various external policies.

The study provides an overview of the issues and current state of play. It looks first at the concept of peace and the changing nature of the geopolitical environment, in light of global shifts of power and of the impact of the coronavirus crisis. It then follows the logic of the annual series, by focusing on the promotion of peace and security in the EU’s external action. Linking the study to the Normandy Index, which measures threats to peace and democracy worldwide based on the EU Global Strategy, each chapter of the study analyses a specific threat to peace and presents an overview of EU action to counter the related risks. The areas discussed include violent conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, climate change, cyber-attacks, disinformation, and terrorism, among others. The EU’s pursuit of peace is understood as a goal embodied in several EU policies, including development, democracy support, humanitarian assistance, security, and defence. The study concludes with an outlook for the future.

A parallel study, published separately, focuses specifically on EU peace-building efforts in the Sahel. The studies have been drafted as a contribution to the Normandy World Peace Forum in October 2020.

Read this study on ‘Peace and Security in 2020: Overview of EU action and outlook for the future‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Threats to peace and security in the current global environment

 

Written by Micaela Del Monte and María Díaz Crego,

© European Union, 2019 – EC – Audiovisual Service

On 26 August 2020, Commissioner Phil Hogan tendered his resignation to the President of the European Commission following controversy over his participation in an Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) Golf Society dinner attended by more than 80 people, despite the applicable Irish public health guidelines adopted to contain the spread of Covid-19 limiting gatherings to a fraction of that number. In addition, questions were raised as to whether he had complied with applicable restrictions on movements after his arrival in Ireland. Although President Ursula von der Leyen had not formally requested his resignation, she accepted it and thanked Commissioner Hogan for ‘his tireless and successful work’ during the current mandate as Trade Commissioner and in his previous mandate as Agriculture and Rural Development Commissioner. Consequently, the procedure to replace him has started, with President von der Leyen requesting that the Irish government propose both a female and a male candidate. On 4 September, the Irish government proposed two candidates to replace Phil Hogan: Mairead McGuinness, current European Parliament First Vice-President, and Andrew McDowell, a recent European Investment Bank Vice-President. On 8 September, President von der Leyen announced she had chosen Mairead McGuinness, and that she would take over financial services, financial stability and the capital markets union from Valdis Dombrovskis. The latter would take the trade portfolio permanently (having already taken it temporarily in the meantime), while continuing in his role of Executive Vice-President. Parliament is now expected to organise hearings with both.

The ‘replacement’ procedure

The procedure for replacing individual Commissioners during their mandate is governed by the second paragraph of Article 246 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and differs from the regular Commission appointment procedure in several aspects (Article 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The latter applies only to the appointment of all members of the College as a whole, including its President, as most recently following the European elections of 2019.

Replacing individual members during the Commission’s term

The Article 246 TFEU procedure applies to individual vacancies caused by the resignation, compulsory retirement or death of a Commissioner during the Commission’s term. Resignation may by either voluntary or compulsory, if requested by the Commission President (Article 17(6) TEU). This latter possibility was included by the Treaty of Nice, as a result of the series of events that led to the collective resignation of the Santer Commission on 15 March 1999, following the refusal of two of its members to resign. The original provision required the Commission President to obtain the approval of the College to request the resignation of an individual Commissioner (Article 217(4) Treaty on the European Community, TEC), but the Treaty of Lisbon reinforced the power attributed to the President by deleting that requirement. Although there is no legal basis in the Treaties for the European Parliament to force individual Commissioners to resign, Point II.5 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission provides for the possibility of the European Parliament asking ‘the President of the Commission to withdraw confidence in an individual Member of the Commission’. Should this happen, the Commission President must consider whether to request that Member to resign, and if they decide not to must explain that decision to Parliament in the following part-session. Conversely, compulsory retirement may only be imposed by a decision of the European Court of Justice, on application by the Council (acting by a simple majority) or by the Commission, when a member of the Commission no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of their duties or is found guilty of serious misconduct (Articles 245 and 247 TFEU).

Completion of the term of office

It should be noted that replacement of individual members of the College applies for the remainder of the term of office. However, the Council may unanimously decide not to fill a vacancy in the College of Commissioners, further to a proposal from the Commission President, in particular if the remaining term of office of the member is short (Article 246 TFEU, third paragraph). This situation arose for instance in June 2019, when Vice-President Andrus Ansip (Estonia) and Commissioner Corina Creţu (Romania) resigned from the Commission to take up their seats in the European Parliament following the European elections. The then-Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker proposed not to fill these vacancies, as the remaining term in office was short (four months), the smooth functioning of the College could be ensured thanks to the practice of working in project teams, and to avoid unnecessary financial burden. The Council could not agree unanimously on his proposal, and the procedure to replace Commissioners Ansip and Creţu was launched, with the Estonian and the Romanian government proposing candidates. In the end, however, the Council did not appoint new commissioners. Five years earlier, following the resignations of Olli Rehn (Finland), Janusz Lewandowski (Poland), Antonio Tajani (Italy) and Viviane Reding (Luxembourg) to join the Parliament in July 2014, new Commissioners were appointed by the Council for the reminder of the Commission’s term of office – just three and a half months – (Jyrki Katainen (Finland), Jacek Dominik (Poland), Ferdinando Nelli Feroci (Italy) and Martine Reicherts (Luxembourg)). Conversely, in July 1999, the Council decided unanimously not to replace the resigning President, Jacques Santer, and Commissioners Martin Bangemann and Emma Bonino while the appointment of the new Commission, under Romano Prodi, was pending.

Parliament’s participation in the ‘replacement’ procedure

Unlike the regular appointment procedure for the Commission, the replacement procedure is a more expeditious process in which neither the Commission as a body nor the new individual candidate is subject to a vote of consent by Parliament before being formally appointed. Under Article 246 TFEU, the vacancy is to be filled by a new Commissioner of the same nationality. In this vein, after a suitable candidate has been put forward by the national government concerned (the Irish government in the present case), the new Commissioner is appointed by the Council, by common accord with the President of the Commission. The ‘replacement’ procedure only requires Parliament’s consultation. However, point II.6 of the Framework Agreement on relations between Parliament and Commission requires the Commission President to seriously consider the results of Parliament’s consultation before giving their accord to the Council decision on an individual replacement. It also requests the President to inform Parliament in due time of any re-shuffling of portfolios to allow ‘relevant parliamentary consultations’ (point II.7).

In this vein, Rule 125(9) of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (RoP) provides that the candidate proposed to replace an individual Commissioner, and those to take a substantially changed portfolio following a re‑shuffle, should be invited to participate in a public hearing with the appropriate parliamentary committee(s). These hearings are organised along the same lines as the ‘regular’ hearings prior to the Commission taking office, i.e. the declaration of financial interests presented by the Commissioner-designate is examined first, the candidate responds to the written questions submitted by the committee and, during the oral hearing, the candidate makes a statement followed by a question and answer session (Part I, Annex VII RoP). Once the hearing is closed and the candidate evaluated, Parliament then votes on the candidate in plenary session, approving or rejecting them by a majority of the votes cast by secret ballot (Article 10, Annex VII RoP).

Previous cases of replacement of individual Commissioners

There are a number of examples of Commissioners being replaced during their mandates, apart from the specific late-term cases mentioned above. In the Juncker Commission, Commissioner Jonathan Hill (United Kingdom) and Vice-President Kristalina Georgieva (Bulgaria) were replaced, by Julian King and Mariya Gabriel respectively. The former resigned in July 2016 due to the result of the referendum on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, while the second resigned in January 2017 to join the World Bank as Chief Executive Officer. The Barroso II Commission also faced a change because of the departure of the Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy, John Dalli (Malta), who was replaced by Tonio Borg. The resignation of Dalli followed a report by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) arguing that Dalli had met several times with representatives of the tobacco industry without involving the appropriate Commission services. A court case ensued, with Dalli arguing that President José Manuel Barroso had forced him to resign during a meeting in October 2012, whereas the Commission argued that Dalli had resigned voluntarily. The General Court dismissed the action brought by Dalli (T‑562/12) and the Court of Justice confirmed the ruling on appeal (C‑394/15 P). Apart from these recent cases, examples of replacements of individual Commissioners before the end of the Commission’s term were also seen in prior mandates, in most cases due to the voluntary resignation of members of the College.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Replacement of individual Commissioners‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Aleksandra Heflich, Cecilia Navarra and Tatjana Evas,

© Richard Carey / Adobe Stock

Deforestation caused by agricultural activity is continuing at an alarming rate, threatening irreplaceable tropical forests that, among other things, are crucial for fighting climate change. The EU bears its share of responsibility for this environmental loss, as it is one of the major importers of several forest-risk commodities.

To date, action has been taken at different levels to stop commodity-driven deforestation. Nevertheless, the impact on forest loss has been low as deforestation continues and new hot spots occur.

There has been a recent commitment at EU level to propose new measures to minimise the risk of deforestation and forest degradation associated with products placed on the EU market.

This European added value assessment (EAVA) accompanies the European Parliament’s own-initiative legislative report calling on the European Commission to take legislative action on the matter. The EAVA looks at why EU action is needed and analyses four potential demand-side regulatory policy options at EU level. A quantitative analysis reveals that to varying extents, all options have the potential to reduce EU-driven deforestation and associated carbon emissions, while having a relatively small impact on the EU economy.

Read this study on ‘An EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU-driven global deforestation: European added value assessment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© denisismagilov / Adobe Stock

The summer has initially brought some reprieve in the spread of coronavirus in Europe. However, a series of localised outbreaks gradually spread from one country to another and has transformed into a new upsurge affecting essentially younger age groups. As politicians have introduced various short-term measures to contain the rise in cases, scientists have pressed on in the race to develop a vaccine and analysts have continued to ponder the longer-term implications of the crisis. Although the number of hospitalisations and deaths in Europe has so far remained low following the resurgence in contaminations, governments have faced a dilemma in particular over whether to allow for the physical presence of pupils as the new school year begins in September.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on coronavirus and related issues. Earlier publications on the coronavirus can be found in the previous item in this series, published by EPRS on 17 July.

Algorithmic systems in the coronavirus pandemic
Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2020

Covid-19: À bas la mondialisation, vive l’Europe?
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2020

These are the EU’s ‘best of times and worst of times’
Friends of Europe, September 2020

Is the US or Europe more resilient to Covid-19?
Centre for European Reform, August 2020

Most approve of national response to Covid-19 in 14 advanced economies
Pew Research Center, August 2020

Lessons from Covid-19: A catalyst for improving sanctions?
Chatham House, August 2020

The fiscal response to the economic fallout from the coronavirus
Bruegel, August 2020

Covid-19 brings opportunity to reassess work policies
Rand Corporation, August 2020

Salvaging the Security Council’s coronavirus response
International Crisis Group, August 2020

It’s going to be the vaccination, stupid!
Rand Corporation, August 2020

Who will benefit from a successful Chinese Covid-19 vaccine?
Rand Corporation, August 2020

Emerging market central banks and quantitative easing: High-risk advice
Bruegel, August 2020

Consequences of Covid-19 in ASEAN states
Polish Institute of International Affairs, August 2020

Reopening the world
Brookings Institution, August 2020

Trump’s trade wars, and now Covid-19, are unravelling trade as we know it
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2020

Reopening America
Brookings Institution, August 2020

How are U.S. colleges dealing with coronavirus?
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2020

Covid-19’s impact on BME communities
Runnymede, August 2020

‘Back to work in the flames’: The hospitality sector in a pandemic
Brookings Institution, August 2020

What is the world doing to create a Covid-19 vaccine?
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2020

Covid-19 teaches resilience and the ‘vulnerability paradox’
Chatham House, August 2020

Emergency rulemaking in response to Covid-19
Brookings Institution, August 2020

Coronavirus recovery: Invest rainy day savings to boost Hong Kong’s economy
Bruegel, August 2020

How to fix the Covid stimulus payment problem: Accounts, information, and infrastructure
Brookings Institution, August 2020

Peace, conflict, and Covid-19
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2020

Want herd immunity? Pay people to take the vaccine
Brookings Institution, August 2020

Sustainable development finance proposals for the global Covid-19 response
Brookings Institution, August 2020

The Brexit parenthesis: Three ways the pandemic is changing UK politics
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2020

As Covid-19 spreads, Africa needs another ‘London moment’
Atlantic Council, August 2020

Coronavirus is setting back equality for women
Chatham House, August 2020

Romania: Living with coronavirus
Chatham House, August 2020

Attitudes on voting in 2020: Preparing for elections during a pandemic
Rand Corporation, August 2020

A stable blood supply is critical in the Covid-19 era
Rand Corporation, August 2020

Health insurance and the Covid-19 shock
Economic Policy Institute, August 2020

How the EU managed its coronavirus comeback
Carnegie Europe, July 2020

The challenges of the post-pandemic agenda
Bruegel, July 2020

Compulsory licensing and access to future Covid-19 vaccines
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2020`

Next generation EU standards will boost post-COVID-19 recovery
European Policy Centre, July 2020

How Covid-19 is worsening America’s racial economic divide
Atlantic Council, July 2020

Trump’s coronavirus swamp
Brookings Institution, July 2020

How is Covid-19 affecting America’s rich?
Brookings Institution, July 2020

A differentiated ‘dual track’ European Union as a remedy in times of crisis?
Instituto Affari Internazionali, July 2020

The coronavirus crisis exacerbated police abuses among French Muslims
German Marshall Fund, July 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Masked in the heat?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak

The European Union (EU) has legislation in place to protect our rights when travelling by plane. The European Parliament has advocated a higher level of protection for many years, and in the context of the Covid‑19 pandemic, the European Commission has taken steps to ensure air passengers’ rights remain protected.

EU legislation

© Adobe Stock

Should you be denied boarding, or your flight is cancelled or considerably delayed, common rules on compensation and assistance for passengers and minimum rights are established in the Flight Compensation Regulation.

As package travel may include air travel, air passenger rights are also covered by the Package Travel Directive, which aims at achieving a high and as uniform as possible level of consumer protection. Additionally, air carriers’ liability for transporting your luggage is specifically addressed in a Council Regulation on the carriage of passengers and their baggage by air.

European Parliament seeks better protection for air passengers

With the aim of improving information for passengers in the event of delays and clarifying the rules on compensation, as well as to give air carriers more certainty as to the law, the European Commission presented a proposal to review the rules on air passenger rights, in 2013.

However, the European Parliament, in a 2014 resolution on this proposal, asked for additional provisions. These include: ensuring that there is an airline contact person at the airport in the event of problems; further cabin luggage allowances; higher amounts for compensation in the event of delay; an exhaustive list of extraordinary circumstances in which compensation does not have to be paid; and guarantee mechanisms against air carrier bankruptcy. The Parliament reiterated its position in a 2019 resolution. The Council has not yet adopted a position on the proposal. After years of stalling, discussions reopened in 2019.

Coronavirus pandemic

The European Union has undertaken several steps to guarantee that passenger rights are applied coherently and to protect passengers across all EU countries during the Covid‑19 pandemic.

In March 2020, the European Commission adopted interpretative guidelines on passenger rights regulations and issued an information note on the Package Travel Directive. The Commission recalled that, under EU legislation, passengers have the right to choose between reimbursement (e.g. in money or in the form of a voucher) and re-routing, when transport tickets (plane, train, bus/coach and ferries) or package travel are cancelled. If the airline proposes a voucher, this offer cannot affect the passenger’s right to opt for reimbursement instead. The EU rules also set a deadline by when reimbursement is due: within seven days (following the passenger’s request) for air transport and within fourteen days after termination of a package travel contract.

The European Parliament called on the Commission to make sure these interpretative guidelines are properly implemented in the context of the developing Covid‑19 situation in a resolution of 17 April 2020.

The Commission subsequently reaffirmed passenger rights in a recommendation adopted on 13 May 2020, which aims to make travel vouchers an attractive alternative to reimbursement for cancelled trips. Vouchers should have a minimum validity period of one year and should be reimbursed at the latest fourteen days after the end of the validity period if the voucher has not been used.

Compensation in local currency

In September 2020, the European Court of Justice concluded that compensation awarded to air passengers under the Regulation may be paid in the national currency of the place of residence and not only in euros.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Further information

• Passenger rights, European Parliament fact sheet, February 2020
• Air passenger rights, Your Europe, European Union
• Flight Compensation Regulation (EC) 261/2004, European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2018
• Strengthening air passenger rights in the EU, European Parliamentary Research Service, May 2015
• EU rules on vouchers offered to passengers and travellers, European Parliamentary Research Service, June 2020

© Adobe Stock

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages condemning the conversion of the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul from a museum into a mosque. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in August 2020.

In their messages, citizens called for a halt to accession negotiations between the European Union and Turkey, or for sanctions against the country.

As early as 2019, the European Parliament opposed plans to convert Hagia Sophia into a mosque. Furthermore, the European Parliament has repeatedly called for accession negotiations with Turkey to be suspended as a result of other matters related in particular to the situation of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in German).

Main points made in the reply in English

At an early stage, the European Parliament opposed alterations to the physiognomy of the Hagia Sophia historical-religious monument and its conversion into a mosque in a resolution of March 2019 (point 14).

At a press conference on 13 July 2020 held after the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, EU Foreign Affairs Representative Josep Borrell said:

’There was broad support to call on the Turkish authorities to urgently reconsider and reverse this decision.’

In recent years, the European Parliament has repeatedly called on the European Commission and the EU Member States to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey, most recently in its Resolution of March 2019 (point 21).

Members of the European Parliament raised a number of parliamentary questions concerning the reactions of the European Commission to the transformation of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, particularly regarding relations with Turkey and the accession negotiation between the European Union and Turkey. These are registered under the following numbers: E‑004170/2020; P‑003705/2020; P‑004264/2020. Once received, the European Commission’s replies will be published in the same place.

Further background information can be found in the European Parliamentary Research Service analysis entitled Hagia Sophia: Turkey’s secularism under threat.

Extensive information on EU-Turkey relations and the state of play of the accession process can be found on the relevant websites of the European Commission and the European External Action Service.

Main points made in the reply in German

Das Europäische Parlament hat bereits frühzeitig in einer Entschließung vom März 2019 Veränderungen am äußeren Erscheinungsbild des historisch-religiösen Monuments Hagia Sophia und ihrer Umwandlung in eine Moschee widersprochen (Punkt 14 der Entschließung).

Der Außenbeauftragte der EU, Herr Josep Borrell, erklärte in einer Pressekonferenz am 13. Juli 2020 zu den entsprechenden Ergebnissen der Sitzung der EU-Außenminister u.a.:

„Es gab eine breite Unterstützung dafür, die türkischen Behörden aufzufordern, diese Entscheidung nochmals dringlich zu überdenken und rückgängig zu machen.“

Das Europäische Parlament hat die Europäische Kommission und die Mitgliedstaaten der EU in den letzten Jahren wiederholt aufgefordert, die Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei auszusetzen, zuletzt in seiner Entschließung vom März 2019 (Punkt 21).

Zu den Reaktionen der Europäischen Kommission auf die Umwandlung der Hagia Sophia in eine Moschee, insbesondere hinsichtlich der Beziehungen zur Türkei und den Beitrittsverhandlungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Türkei, wurden von Mitgliedern des Europäischen Parlaments eine Reihe von parlamentarischen Anfragen gestellt.

Diese sind z.B. unter folgenden Nummern registriert: E‑004170/2020; P‑003705/2020; P‑004264/2020. Die Antworten der Europäischen Kommission werden nach deren Eingang dort veröffentlicht.

Weitere Hintergrundinformationen sind (in englischer Sprache) in der Ausarbeitung des Wissenschaftlichen Dienstes des Europäischen Parlaments Hagia Sophia: Turkey’s secularism under threat erhältlich.

Umfangreiche Informationen über die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und der Türkei und zum Stand des Beitrittsprozesses können den einschlägigen Internetseiten der Europäischen Kommission und des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes entnommen werden.

Written by Katrien Luyten and Sofija Voronova,

© Dmitriy Sladkov / Adobe Stock

The EU has made substantial progress in terms of protecting its citizens since the early 1990s, often in response to dramatic incidents, such as mafia or other organised crime group murders, big money-laundering scandals, a steep increase in migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings following the 2015 migration crisis, or – more recently – a sharp rise in cybercrime, fraud and counterfeiting during the coronavirus pandemic.

Criminal organisations continue to pose big risks to the internal security of the EU. A rising number of organised crime groups are active in its territory, often with cross-border reach. Organised crime is furthermore an increasingly dynamic and complex phenomenon, with new criminal markets and modi operandi emerging under the influence of globalisation and – in particular – new technologies.

While the impact of serious and organised crime on the EU economy is considerable, there are also significant political and social costs, as well as negative effects on the wellbeing of EU citizens.

As organised crime has become more interconnected, international and digital, Member States – which remain responsible for operational activities in the area of police and judicial cooperation – increasingly rely on cross-border and EU-level cooperation to support their law enforcement authorities on the ground.

Recognising the severity of the problem and the need for coordinated action, the EU has initiated several measures to encourage closer cooperation between Member States and adopted common legal, judicial and investigative frameworks to address organised crime. Parliament has made fighting organised crime a political priority and has helped shape the relevant EU legislation. Future EU action will focus on implementing existing rules, improving operational cooperation – even beyond the EU’s boundaries – and information-sharing, as well as addressing some of the main criminal activities of organised crime groups. Furthermore, the EU aims to make sure that crime does not pay.

Read this briefing on ‘Understanding the EU response to organised crime‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen,

© Savvapanf Photo / Adobe Stock

As usual in Belarus, the 9 August presidential election was marred by fraud, repression and state violence against the opposition. As expected, the long-standing President, Aleksander Lukashenko, claimed a landslide victory. What was unusual this time, however, was the scale of Belarusians’ disappointment: peaceful protests and strikes spread throughout the entire country in response to the stolen election, despite brutal crackdowns. What started as a national crisis now represents a wider struggle between truth and lies, democracy and autocracy, raising the stakes for both Minsk and Moscow, whose nervousness has spilled over into mounting aggression.

Background: Just another rigged election?

Belarus is situated at the heart of Europe, but its election standards and poor human rights record have left the country as a ‘black hole’ on the European map. This has soured EU-Belarus relations, although ties have improved somewhat since the crisis in Ukraine and Minsk’s 2015 release of political prisoners, culminating in the entry into force of a visa facilitation and readmission agreement in July 2020. Given previous unfree and unfair elections in Belarus, it came as no surprise that the country’s president since 1994, Aleksander Lukashenko, declared his sixth consecutive overwhelming victory in the 9 August presidential election. Officially, he received 80 % of the vote, and his closest rival, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, 10 %. Lukashenko treated assertions of election fraud as business as usual, despite the punitive police violence towards opposition supporters, arrests of journalists and activists, internet shutdowns, ‘disappeared’ citizens and widespread accusations of torture. This time, however, his harsh response – adding to discontent over the economic crisis and his mishandling of the coronavirus crisis – fuelled the largest protests in the history of independent Belarus and mounting calls for him to resign. Tikhanovskaya, who rejected the official results and claims to have received 60-70 % of votes, called on authorities to ‘think about peaceful ways to hand over power’. As violence grew in intensity, she fled to Lithuania on 11 August.

Despite the brutal crackdowns – so far leaving at least four people dead, hundreds injured and over 6 700 arrested during protests – protests have escalated. Thousands of workers at state-run factories across the country have gone on strike. On 17 August, workers at the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant booed Lukashenko and chanted ‘leave’, to which he responded: ‘Until you kill me, there will be no other election’. On the same day, staff from the Belarusian State Television and Radio Company (BT) went on strike in protest against censorship and election fraud. Several TV anchors had already resigned, along with staff at other state-owned news companies. On 18 August, ‘specialists’ were flown in from Russia to get BT back up and running. On 18 August, workers at the Minsk Tractor Works – which employs over 16 000 people – limited a strike over fear they could be fined and dismissed. On the same day, Belarus’ ambassador to Slovakia resigned after having voiced solidarity with the protesters. On 23 August, more than 100 000 Belarussians marched peacefully through Minsk – the highest turnout thus far in these unprecedented protests – demanding Lukashenko’s resignation, despite a massive police presence and warnings from the military.

The National Coordination Council of Belarus

Ahead of the 19 August emergency European Council meeting, the Belarusian opposition leader and presidential candidate, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, in a video appeal to the European Council posted on YouTube, urged EU leaders to ‘support the awakening’ of the Belarusian people and not to recognise the ‘fraudulent elections’. She also announced the establishment of a new Coordination Council (CC) of Belarus to organise a peaceful transfer of power through dialogue, and to call for new fair and democratic presidential elections in the country. Lukashenko referred to this move as a ‘coup’. Moreover, the Belarusian Prosecutor General’s office opened a criminal inquiry against the members of the CC on the grounds of a violation of the constitution, arguing that ‘the creation and the activities of the CC are aimed at seizing power and inflicting damage to the national security’. On 24 August, two members of the CC were detained, accused of organising unauthorised mass events. A third CC member was summoned to the Belarusian Investigative Committee headquarters for questioning.

Putin’s perspective and preliminary response

The protesters in Belarus have no geopolitical motivation; they just want free elections. The Belarusian opposition is not aiming to sever ties with Russia; Tikhanovskaya’s associate, Maria Kolesnikova, has underlined that ‘all existing agreements must be respected’. Thus, the protests are not anti-Moscow. At the same time, however, a successful bottom-up regime change in Belarus could serve as encouragement for simmering protests in south-eastern Russia. Here, protesters have been using the same white-red-white flag of Belarus – banned under Lukashenko – that the Belarusian protesters have been using. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s response will impact on his future ties with Minsk, Brussels and the Russian people. Putin’s popularity has sunk to a record low amid the coronavirus pandemic and the evolving economic crisis. Recent constitutional changes, which could allow him to stay in power until 2036, have further challenged Russians’ patience. The suspected poisoning of Russian opposition leader, Alexei Navalny – who was hospitalised on 20 August and airlifted to Germany for treatment and protection on 21 August, following an emergency ruling by the European Court of Human Rights – further fuels criticism of Putin’s toxic toolbox.

A ‘frenemy’ in need: Shifting the blame from Russia to the EU

The Kremlin has key strategic and tactical interests in Belarus. Despite wobbly ties with Lukashenko (who used anti-Russian rhetoric for the first time in his 2020 campaign and arrested alleged Russian mercenaries in July, accusing them of ‘plotting terrorism’, which the Kremlin denied), the status quo in Minsk was seen as the lesser evil for Moscow, at least until Lukashenko lost all public support. A weak Lukashenko who has burnt all bridges to the EU would be even more dependent on Moscow. Putin has consistently pushed for a Union State with Belarus despite Lukashenko’s reluctance. Putin repeated his call in a telegram to Lukashenko on 10 August, as the Belarusian opposition’s calls for a power transfer grew. Days later, Lukashenko asked Putin to intervene, moved paratroopers from the Russian to the Polish border, and ordered the military to monitor NATO troops in Poland and Lithuania. He thus shifted the blame away from Moscow, framing the crisis as Western interference, perhaps to justify – or threaten – Russian intervention.

On 16 August, Putin confirmed Russia’s ‘readiness to provide necessary assistance in ironing out emerging problems’, ‘if necessary’ through the Collective Security Treaty Organization military alliance of six former Soviet states. There is reportedly increased military movement – with columns of unmarked trucks – on Russia’s side of the Belarusian border. Perhaps somewhat ironically, in separate conversations on 18 August with German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, French President, Emmanuel Macron, and European Council President, Charles Michel, Putin repeatedly underlined the ‘inadmissibility’ of foreign ‘interference’ in Belarus, warning it could lead to ‘further escalations’. On 20 August, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, alleged that the EU is on the verge of intervening in Belarus, claiming that ‘this is about geopolitics, the fight for the post-Soviet space’. Lukashenko interpreted the Minsk–Moscow line on 23 August as follows: ‘Putin and I agreed: Belarus is first, Russia is next in line‘, adding: ‘This is a springboard, and we must destroy it’.

Position of the European Union and the European Parliament

EU leaders, on the other hand, have explicitly focused on the wishes of the Belarusian people. At a 19 August emergency European Council meeting, EU leaders concluded that ‘the elections were neither free nor fair, therefore we do not recognise the results’, underlining that Belarusians ‘have a right to determine their future’. They called for a full investigation into all alleged abuses and announced sanctions against individuals responsible for violence, repression and election fraud. Charles Michel stated clearly that the ‘protests in Belarus are not about geopolitics’, adding that any resolution of the crisis ‘must be found in Belarus, not in Brussels or in Moscow’. The Commission will mobilise an additional €53 million in support of Belarusian civil society, media and the health sector. EU leaders support the idea of letting the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe mediate, and France and Germany have also offered that the EU play such a role. Lukashenko has so far not spoken to EU leaders about the crisis. In his opening speech to the European Council meeting, the European Parliament’s President, David Sassoli, said: ‘Our task is clear: support the calls made by the people of Belarus for new elections to be held as soon as possible’. On 17 August, Members from major political groups called for new and free elections in Belarus, and strongly condemned the violence and torture perpetrated against peaceful protesters. Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs will hold an extraordinary meeting on 25 August to discuss the situation in Belarus.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Belarus on the brink‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Drachenberg and Annastiina Papunen,

© tumsasedgars / Adobe Stock

The European Council video-conference meeting of 19 August 2020 was called by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, due to the increasingly worrying situation in Belarus after the recent national elections. As Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, summarised, the European Council decided to convey three clear messages from the meeting: i) the EU stands with the Belarussian people; ii) the EU will place sanctions on all those responsible for violence, repression and the falsification of election results; and iii) the EU is ready to accompany the peaceful democratic transition of power in Belarus.

While mainly focusing on Belarus, the Heads of State or Government also discussed two further issues during the video-conference meeting. First, as regards the tense situation in the eastern Mediterranean as a result of increasingly hostile Turkish activity, the European Council expressed its full solidarity with Greece and Cyprus, recalling and reaffirming its previous conclusions on the illegal drilling activities, and called for de-escalation. Second, on the situation in Mali, EU leaders expressed their deep concern over the events in the country, which have a destabilising impact on the entire region and on the fight against terrorism, and called for an immediate release of prisoners and restoration of the rule of law.

The situation in Belarus Background

Prior to the elections, the Belarusian opposition candidate, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, had managed to unite the opposition and to gather large crowds of supporters. After a strong performance on the campaign trail, she was expected to do well on election night (9 August). However, early results predicted a landslide victory for the incumbent President, Alexander Lukashenko, and the country’s election commission released results stating that Lukashenko had won 80 % of the vote, leaving Tikhanovskaya with only 10 %. The outcome, widely interpreted as falsified, sparked mass protests and demonstrations, which have now been going on for more than two weeks. President Lukashenko has tried to crack down on demonstrations by detaining protestors, with as many as 7 000 people reportedly arrested, and reports of widespread police and state authority brutality and abuse. Ahead of the European Council meeting, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya called on EU leaders not to recognise the fraudulent elections, and on all countries to respect the sovereignty of Belarus and the choice of the Belarussian people.

Earlier European reactions

On 13 August, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, expressed his deep concern regarding ‘the violence used by the state authorities against people peacefully demonstrating their desire for change’, and called on Lukashenko to stop the repression, refrain from further violence, and to immediately release those who have been detained. In his view, ‘the use of brutal force by the law enforcement services against its own people, resulting in death and injuries should have consequences according to international law, including targeted sanctions’.

On 14 August, EU foreign ministers debated the situation in Belarus following the presidential elections, and called on ‘the Belarusian authorities to stop the disproportionate and unacceptable violence against peaceful protesters and to release those detained’. They also sent a strong signal of the EU’s support to the Belarusian population in its desire for democratic change. Moreover, ministers reiterated that the elections had been neither free nor fair, and that, under those circumstances the EU did not recognise the election results. Ministers also agreed on the need to place sanctions on those responsible for violence, repression and the falsification of election results. The work on extending the list of targeted sanctions, notably against officials, beyond the already existing framework for Belarus will start immediately. This message was also stressed in a statement by the High Representative/Commission Vice-President, Josep Borrell.

As the situation in Belarus developed following the meeting of EU foreign ministers, the European Council President invited the Heads of State or Government for a video-conference meeting on 19 August, to discuss the EU’s response to the evolving situation in Belarus. Subsequently, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, and Charles Michel discussed the situation with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Following that discussion, Charles Michel expressed the view that ‘only peaceful and truly inclusive dialogue can resolve the crisis in Belarus’. President Putin also had talks with Alexander Lukashenko on the situation following the elections.

Ahead of the video-meeting of the European Council, the Visegrad countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) issued a joint statement, indicating their support for ‘the right of the people of Belarus to free, fair and democratic presidential elections’ and called ‘on any foreign actors to refrain from actions that would undermine Belarus‘s independence and sovereignty’.

European Council Presidency conclusions on Belarus

The Heads of State or Government reiterated the Foreign Ministers’ message that the 9 August elections in Belarus had been neither free nor fair, and that the EU therefore does not recognise the results. They expressed their clear solidarity with the people of Belarus in their desire to exercise their fundamental democratic rights. Furthermore, they condemned the disproportionate and unacceptable violence used by the state authorities against peaceful protesters. ‘Violence must be avoided and all those unlawfully detained must be immediately and unconditionally released. Civil society and opposition actors engaged in discussions of political transition must be protected from arbitrary arrests and violence. The EU expects a complete and transparent investigation into all alleged abuses’. The European Council unanimously confirmed that the EU would shortly impose additional targeted sanctions against a substantial number of individuals responsible for violence, repression and the falsification of election results. EU leaders called on the Belarusian authorities to find a way out of the crisis through an end to violence, de-escalation, and an inclusive national dialogue. Only a peaceful and democratic process, underpinned by independent and free media and a strong civil society, could provide sustainable solutions. All parties, including third countries, should support such a process. The European Council stressed that it would continue to follow the situation closely, and stood ready to contribute to efforts aimed at peacefully ending the crisis. The EU fully supports OSCE proposals for dialogue in Belarus, and is ready to provide assistance to further them.

Giving the opening speech at the video-conference meeting, David Sassoli relayed Parliament’s deep concern regarding the violations of human rights in Belarus, and underlined that ‘the only viable way ahead is that of dialogue involving all national and international stakeholders to secure a peaceful solution’. In his view, the European Union must have an active role in that dialogue, in the context of its Neighbourhood Policy. He indicated that the European Parliament was prepared to play its part in collaboration with the OSCE, drawing on its own structures and experience.

Situation in the eastern Mediterranean

The situation in the eastern Mediterranean is increasingly tense, with growing hostile Turkish activity. As a result, France sent two fighter jets and a naval frigate to monitor the situation in mid-August. The European Council expressed its full solidarity with Greece and Cyprus, and reaffirmed its previous conclusions on the illegal drilling activities (notably from October 2019, December 2019 and April 2020). As previously indicated by Charles Michel, the European Council will revert to this topic in detail during a special European Council meeting on 24-25 September 2020, ‘where all options will be on the table’.

Situation in Mali

EU leaders also addressed the situation in Mali, where a military coup forced President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta to resign. The Heads of State or Government expressed their deep concern, and considered that the events in the country had a destabilising impact on the entire region and on the fight against terrorism. They called for an immediate release of prisoners, and the restoration of the rule of law. The European Council supports efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to find a solution in line with the aspirations of the Malian people, and confirmed the EU’s full coordination with African and international partners.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the European Council video-conference of 19 August 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Etienne Bassot,

© jirsak / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus pandemic that hit the world from January 2020 onwards, with Europe at its epicentre for some weeks in the spring, has led to a major, multi-dimensional global crisis. Pressure on national health services, a major economic down-turn and new sources of tension on the world stage are just some of the most obvious negative consequences that spring to mind.

Since the beginning of the pandemic, analysts have produced an abundance of new forecasts, with many earlier ones made redundant by the new situation. The focus has mainly been on negative consequences and risks. As important as this approach is to underpin strategic planning and enable policy-makers to prepare for the worst, no analysis of a post-coronavirus world would be complete without a look at the other side of the coin − the opportunities that it may offer too.

Where there is crisis, there is also opportunity

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in medical Latin, the word crisis refers to ‘the turning point in a disease when an important change takes place, indicating either recovery, or death’. The root of the word is, however, the Ancient Greek verb κρίνειν − to decide −and a crisis can be defined as ‘a time, when a difficult or important decision must be made’. Like every other crisis, the coronavirus crisis is a crossroads at which important decisions have to be made, bringing both the necessity and the opportunity for change.

Taking the best from the crisis

The opportunities arising from a crisis are not immediately obvious and sometimes obscured by difficulties. The pandemic and the resulting confinement have had some immediate positive consequences − such as reduced CO2 emissions and the boost to e-commerce. Other potentially positive consequences are avenues to explore − such as bringing the Member States closer together on health or rejuvenating European industry.

Turning the immediate positive effects into lasting change and seizing the less obvious opportunities requires both reflection and action. Europe’s capacity to nurture the catalytic, but sometimes disruptive, positive effects of the crisis will be the measure of its resilience: the resilience of its liberal political systems, its economy, and its people − individually and as a society.

A critical moment for Europe

In the public discourse, the search for a ‘new normal’ is omnipresent. The Union will not re-create itself. Major shifts can, however, be triggered by particular opportunities, such as the debate on the future financing of the Union and the recovery plan, and the Conference on the Future of Europe. The European Parliament has made – in its resolution on the conclusions of the extraordinary European Council meeting, adopted on 23 July 2020 – a strong case for health, research, digital transformation and innovation. The Conference on the Future of Europe offers a valuable opportunity to engage in a more structured public debate, taking into account the challenges and opportunities brought by the pandemic. The debate should be aimed principally at improving the way the EU works, in terms not only of institutional dynamics, but also of policy design, in order to offer citizens a positive and constructive perspective.

Snapshot of ten opportunities

This paper replicates the formula of the ‘Ten issues to watch’ series produced by EPRS at the beginning of every year. Some of the opportunities described in the following chapters are very specific; others are more about the big picture. The aim is not to cover all possible issues but to highlight a few. The paper can be read in conjunction with a broader body of work, analysis and research being undertaken by EPRS on the longer-term implications of the coronavirus crisis, such as Towards a more resilient Europe post-coronavirus: An initial mapping of structural risks facing the EU, and a set of 20 ‘Ideas Papers’ on EU policy and resilience as the Union emerges from the crisis.

Read the complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Ten opportunities for Europe post-coronavirus: Exploring potential for progress in EU policy-making‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel Gavrilescu,

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On Monday 22 June 2020, the EU and China held their 22nd summit, which on this occasion was conducted by video-conference. Leaders of the EU and China covered a wide range of issues, some increasingly problematic. Aside from the response to the coronavirus outbreak, topics addressed included trade, climate change, international peace and security, Hong Kong and human rights. No joint statement was agreed, as further progress would require ‘reciprocity and trust’. For the EU, China is seen as both a partner committed to multilateralism, on which it nevertheless pursues its own distinctive path, and a competitor, assertively using different economic and trade tools, such as state subsidies and foreign direct investment, to increase its market share and international leverage.

Background

The EU-China summit, initially planned to take place in Beijing on 30-31 March 2020, but postponed due to the coronavirus outbreak, took place by video-conference on 22 June 2020. The Presidents of the European Council, Charles Michel, and of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, joined by the EU’s High Representative, Josep Borrell, represented the EU, whilst Prime Minister Li Keqiang represented China. As was the case at previous summits held in Beijing, an exchange of views with the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, took place after the summit’s main proceedings, also by video-conference. However, the notable difference with past meetings was that this summit ended without any joint statement. As stressed by President von der Leyen, the summit was ‘only a starting-point’, with further progress requiring greater ‘reciprocity’ and ‘trust’.

Main points discussed

The relationship with China is multifaceted, dependent on the policy area, with China being simultaneously a ‘cooperation partner’ (on climate change), ‘a negotiating partner’ (on trade), ‘a strategic competitor’ (on the economy) and a ‘systemic rival’ (with different values and political systems). All these dimensions were touched upon during the summit, which had a comprehensive agenda that included trade, climate change, international peace and security, the situation in Hong Kong, disinformation and the response to the coronavirus outbreak. President von der Leyen stressed that ‘China’s partnership is crucial, be it in terms of trade, climate, technology, and the defence of multilateralism’. However, President Michel also stressed that the EU and China ‘do not share the same values, political systems, or approach to multilateralism’.

International trade

Trade plays a central role in bilateral relations between the EU and China, with the EU being China’s largest single trading partner, and China being the EU’s second largest trading partner after the US. Given its scale, trade is a big factor in the turbulence currently affecting the bilateral relationship with China, although disinformation, the pandemic and human rights abuses also play an important role. Although an agreement on geographical indications (GIs) is reported to be on track, in the absence of political commitment on the Chinese side, there is no clear indication that negotiations on an investment agreement can be concluded by the end of 2020, as planned. EU relations with China are marked by an asymmetry in market access and the absence of an effective level playing-field able to ensure fair access to the Chinese market for EU companies. These two issues lead to an unbalanced trade relationship. They need to be addressed, including through China’s increased ambition and commitment to curb unfair trading practices by state-owned enterprises, and to act on transparency in subsidies and on forced technology transfers, prior to the conclusion of an investment agreement. Another item discussed as part of the trade debate was the future of the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose reform is one of the areas where the two parties converge on the need to pursue a multilateral approach, although they diverge on specific aspects, including on industrial subsidies.

Climate change

Climate change is an important area where the EU and China are partners and where their support to multilateralism is visible. They are both committed to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, although the EU would wish to see China commit to more ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and set a target date for achieving climate neutrality as soon as possible after 2050. President von der Leyen stressed that the EU looks ‘forward to seeing decarbonisation play a big a role in China’s next five-year plan, as the European Green Deal plays a big role in our strategic agenda as well.’

International and regional peace and security

Similar to their previous summit in 2019, a wide range of international and regional issues were discussed, including Afghanistan, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, relations with Iran and the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for Iran (JCPA). The latter is an item which the European Commission considered as having the potential to ‘deepen engagement with China on peace and security’ in its EU-China joint communication of March 2019. The summit also touched upon the situation in the South China Sea, as part of a debate on maritime transport safety.

Hong Kong and human rights

China has launched a new national security law which, if adopted, would endanger Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms, and would be in clear contradiction with its Basic Law, including its guiding principle of ‘one country, two systems’. President Michel stressed that the EU had expressed its ‘grave concerns about the proposed national security law for Hong Kong’, whilst President von der Leyen stressed that human rights in general are ‘non-negotiable’, although both statements are likely to have little impact in light of analysts’ perception that such declarations would need to be backed up by sanctions. In this regard, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the national security law for Hong Kong on 19 June, in which it called on the Council ‘to adopt targeted sanctions and assets freezes against Chinese officials responsible for devising and implementing policies that violate human rights’. More generally, the EU’s Human Rights Dialogue with China will be restarted once pandemic-related restrictions are lifted.

Disinformation and cybersecurity

President von der Leyen pointed to the spike in online disinformation activities and hospital-related cyber-attacks linked to the coronavirus outbreak originating from China. In June 2020, the European Commission published a joint communication on disinformation in which it clearly indicated that China is one of the actors promoting misleading narratives, for example, as regards the EU’s support to third countries.

Cooperation on coronavirus response

EU and Chinese leaders agreed to continue to support research efforts targeted at developing a treatment or producing a vaccine for Covid-19, and to participate in the international independent review on ‘lessons learned from the pandemic’.

The way forward

Due to the pandemic, the incoming German Presidency of the Council of the EU has adjourned to a later date the in-person meeting between the EU Heads of State or Government and the Chinese leadership, initially planned to take place in Leipzig in September 2020. This does not necessarily mean that bilateral EU-China relations in autumn 2020 will be less important, as an intense period of negotiation faces both parties on the investment agreement, which is due to be concluded by the end of 2020. Other issues of concern to the EU, such as the evolution of the situation in Hong Kong or disinformation activities, will most likely continue to attract the attention of both the media and national and European leaders. The coronavirus outbreak led the European Council to postpone its strategic discussion on relations with China, which it had initially planned for March 2020, but it is unlikely that such a discussion can be postponed much longer.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of EU-China video-summit of 22 June 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© elenabsl / Adobe Stock

After nearly five days of tough negotiations, the European Council agreed on the EU’s next seven-year budget, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), worth more than one trillion euros from 2021 to 2027, and crucially, on an additional 750-billion euro fund to help countries recover from the economic downturn caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

Many politicians and analysts have hailed the agreement on the recovery fund in particular as an ‘historic moment’. For the first time, some EU debt will be mutualised and the EU will tap financial markets on a significant scale to secure funds, which will be disbursed in the form of grants and loans. The European Parliament – which must approve these spending plans – welcomed the fund but criticised the lack of parliamentary scrutiny in its implementation as well as some of the cuts leaders made in spending on innovation and the climate as compared to the European Commission’s MFF proposals and the Parliament’s own demands, and regretted the weakened link between budget spending and the rule of law.

This note offers links to first reactions from international think tanks on the budget deal. Earlier publications on financing the EU can be found in a previous item in this series, published by EPRS on 8 June 2020.

The proof of the European Council pudding will be in the eating
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2020

Next Generation EU standards will boost post-Covid-19 recovery
European Policy Centre, July 2020

With its recovery deal, is the EU finally starting to act like a unifying force?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, July 2020

Having the cake, but slicing it differently: How is the grand EU recovery fund allocated?
Bruegel, July 2020

Un accord historique à améliorer et à réaliser
Jacques Delors Institute, July 2020

The MFF’s half-empty glass on supporting EU rights and values
German Marshall Fund, July 2020

Europe’s expensive coronavirus summit
Carnegie Europe, July 2020

Is the EU Council agreement aligned with the Green Deal ambitions?
Bruegel, July 2020

Experts react: European leaders reach decisive coronavirus recovery agreement
Atlantic Council, July 2020

Is the European Union finally moving to an economic – not just a monetary – Union?
Trans European Policy Studies Association, July 2020

EU budget battle could undermine its international ambitions
Chatham House, July 2020

Spanish vs Dutch views on the EU recovery fund
Clingendael, July 2020

It is time to reform critical social protection policies in the U.S. and the EU
German Marshall Fund, July 2020

Longue vie au un plan de relance européen
Institut de Recherche et de Communication sur l’Europe, July 2020

Gipfel der Ambivalenz: Historische Ergebnisse, Machtverschiebungen und verpasste Chancen
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, July 2020

The EU budget as an opportunity in the crisis
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2020

Recovery Fund, il freno di emergenza
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2020

European debt mutualisation
Jacques Delors Institute, July 2020

Read this briefing on ‘EU budget and recovery fund: Is it a done deal?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak

Written by Jaan Soone,

© snedorez / Adobe Stock

In the first weeks of the coronavirus crisis, the lockdown and border closures halted most passenger services in road and rail transport and left road hauliers to face uncertainty and very long waiting times at many border crossings.

With the pandemic easing, some passenger services resumed in certain EU countries from late April onward, and with the introduction of ‘green lanes’ the situation at border crossings stabilised allowing smoother passage for road hauliers. Nonetheless, the initial estimates of the costs to the transport sector are immense and the impact is expected to continue well beyond 2020.

The EU took a number of steps in the early stages of the crisis to alleviate the situation and to provide relief to the transport sector. As the situation progressed, the European Commission introduced further measures to help coordinate the exit from confinement and safely restart transport services. The Commission has also tabled a European recovery plan with a number of new instruments, which will allow the provision of assistance to key sectors, including the transport sector. The European Council reached a political agreement on the recovery fund on 21 July.

To support their economies, EU governments have introduced a number of economy-wide measures, but also sector-specific measures, including for transport and tourism, as well as support for individual transport companies. The Commission has further enabled governments to use State aid to help firms in difficulty by putting in place a temporary framework for State aid.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Road and rail transport and coronavirus: Mapping the way out of the crisis‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg,

© Adobe Stock

After almost five days of negotiations, the European Council finally reached a political agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021 to 2027 and a specific recovery instrument following the coronavirus crisis – Next Generation EU (NGEU) – together totalling €1 824.3 billion. Negotiations seem to have concentrated in particular on the balance between loans and grants for the provision of funding under the NGEU, with a final division of €360 and €390 billion respectively. Despite a significant reduction in the share of grants compared to the €500 billion proposed by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, in his July 2020 ‘negotiating box’, the mere fact of issuing common debt at EU level represents a substantial step in European integration, expressing EU solidarity in facing the coronavirus crisis. Other notable developments concern the link between EU funding and respect for the rule of law, on which the final wording is more vague than that of earlier proposals. On other controversial issues, notably the size of the MFF, rebates and own resources, the outcome remains close to the negotiating box. Overall, however, the deal remains significantly below Parliament’s expectations. With a lower overall commitments ceiling of €1 074.3 billion, the MFF falls below both the 2014-2020 MFF and the 2020 budget levels. Moreover, significant cuts were made to a series of key programmes, such as Erasmus+ and Digital Europe, areas which the European Council had itself identified as a strategic priority in its 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda. Finally, the increase – rather than the proposed abolition – of the rebates for four countries, together with only a vague commitment to ‘work towards the reform of the system of own resources’, seems unlikely to meet the conditions set by Parliament for giving its consent to the long-term budget. Indeed, the political agreement within the European Council on the MFF and the Recovery Fund is not yet the final deal, but only the starting point for negotiations between Parliament and Council. Before the MFF can enter into force, the Parliament must give its consent, which is also a pre-condition for the adoption, by co-decision, of legislation on the new policy programmes.

1. Reaching a deal at the special European Council meeting

In his invitation letter to the special European Council meeting focused on the EU’s long-term budget, Charles Michel announced that ‘finding agreement will require hard work and political will on the part of all’. It took almost five days and numerous group, bilateral and plenary sessions to reach the political agreement, making this meeting of the European Council the second longest to date.

Altogether, starting from the publication of the original MFF proposal, the discussions on the 2021-2027 MFF within the European Council have taken 26 months – or even 29 months since EU leaders discussed the post-2020 long-term EU budget for the first time at their informal meeting on 23 February 2018. By comparison, the negotiations in the European Council on the 2014-2020 MFF required only 20 months. The European Council thus took longer than all the scenarios outlined by its former President, Donald Tusk, for finding a political agreement on the long-term budget: (1) end of 2019/early 2020, 2) prior to May 2019, or 3) in the course of 2019.

Prior to the meeting, Charles Michel held video-conference discussions with every member of the European Council at least once or twice, to discuss their positions following his circulation of a revised negotiating box on 10 July. In parallel, EU leaders also held many bi- and multilateral discussions amongst themselves. Table 1 gives a non-exhaustive,[i] but telling overview of the interactions (both phone calls and face-to-face meetings) between EU Heads of State or Government. It shows which EU leaders were most active – namely Giuseppe Conte, Mark Rutte, Angela Merkel and Pedro Sanchez – and also highlights positions considered as important for reaching agreement.

Bilateral and group meetings among Member States’ leaders also continued during the European Council meeting itself, with for example a meeting of the Visegrad countries (Czechia, Hungary,Poland and Slovakia) to coordinate their position, and one of the ‘frugals’ (Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands) as well as a Baltic coordination meeting.

Table1: EU leaders’ interactions made public prior to the 17-21 July meeting

Member State Leader Contact with No of contacts Czechia Andrej Babis Giuseppe Conte, Igor Matovič, Mateusz Morawiecki and Viktor Orban 4 Denmark Mette Frederiksen Sebastian Kurz, Stefan Löfven, and Mark Rutte 3 Germany Angela Merkel Emmanuel Macron, Mark Rutte, Giuseppe Conte (twice), Pedro Sanchez, Sanna Marin, Mateusz Morawiecki 7 Estonia Juri Ratas Gitanas Nausėda 1 Ireland Micheál Martin Gitanas Nausėda, Mark Rutte 2 Greece Kyriakos Mitsotakis Nicos Anastasiades 1 Spain Pedro Sanchez Antonio Costa, Giuseppe Conte, Mark Rutte, Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Stefan Löfven, Gitanas Nausėda 7 France Emmanuel Macron Angela Merkel, Pedro Sanchez, Giuseppe Conte, Stefan Löfven 4 Croatia Andrej Plenković Gitanas Nausėda 1 Italy Giuseppe Conte Antonio Costa, Pedro Sanchez, Mark Rutte, Angela Merkel (twice), Emmanuel Macron, Sanna Marin, Sebastian Kurz, Viktor Orban and Andrej Babis 10 Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades Kyriakos Mitsotakis 1 Lithuania Gitanas Nausėda Andrej Plenkovic, Micheál Martin, Pedro Sanchez, Juri Ratas 4 Hungary Viktor Orban Mateusz Morawiecki (twice), Andrej Babis and Igor Matovič, Antonio Costa, Giuseppe Conte 6 The Netherlands Mark Rutte Angela Merkel, Giuseppe Conte, Pedro Sanchez, Antonio Costa, Micheál Martin, Sebastian Kurz, Stefan Löfven and Mette Frederiksen 9 Austria Sebastian Kurz Stefan Löfven, Mette Frederiksen and Mark Rutte, Igor Matovic, Giuseppe Conte 5 Poland Mateusz Morawiecki Angela Merkel, Viktor Orban (twice) Andrej Babis and Igor Matovič, 5 Portugal Antonio Costa Pedro Sanchez, Giuseppe Conte, Mark Rutte, Viktor Orban 4 Slovakia Igor Matovič Sebastian Kurz, Mateusz Morawiecki, Viktor Orban and Andrej Babis 4 Finland Sanna Marin Angela Merkel, Giuseppe Conte 2 Sweden Stefan Löfven Emmanuel Macron, Mette Frederiksen, Mark Rutte and Sebastian Kurz, Pedro Sanchez 5

Source: EPRS.

2. The political agreement

The political agreement set out over 68 pages of the European Council conclusions defines the MFF ceilings and the financial envelopes for all policy sectors for the seven-year MFF period. As was the case for the 2014-2020 MFF, when 48 pages of conclusions detailed the substance of the MFF headings, thus also including elements formally due to be agreed jointly between Parliament and Council (such as programme governance, objectives and sub-envelopes), the current conclusions testify once again to the European Council’s far-reaching involvement in areas of co-decision. Following the 2014-2020 MFF negotiations, the European Parliament identified the impact of the European Council’s involvement in the Parliament’s legislative prerogatives as a matter of particular concern.

Main elements

During previous European Council meetings in 2020 and during the final weeks of negotiations, the most controversial issues were: i) the size of the MFF, ii) the existence and size of rebates, iii) the size of the recovery fund, iv) the balance between grants and loans, v) the allocation criteria for funding, and vi) the governance of the recovery fund, and the role of the various institutions as well as national reforms. The political agreement reached the following compromises on these issues (see also the overview provided in table 3).

• The overall size of the MFF amounts to €1.074 trillion, which is below both the 2014-2020 MFF and the 2020 budget levels, thus following the position of the ‘frugals’.
• The existence and size of rebates: The political agreement not only maintains existing rebates or ‘budget correction mechanisms as lump sums’ for Austria, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, but in four cases, even increased their amount: Austria (€565 million), Denmark (€322 million), The Netherlands (€1 921 million) and Sweden (€1069 million). The German rebate remains at the same level (€3 671 million).
• The size of the recovery fund remained at a total of €750 billion as proposed by the European Commission.
• The balance between grants and loans has evolved towards an almost equal balance of €390 billion in grants and €360 billion in loans. This is the most apparent development compared to Charles Michel’s negotiating box (€500 billion in grants) and received the most attention during the European Council meeting. It should however be emphasised that, beyond difficult negotiations on the share of grants and a substantial reduction in their amount, the mere fact of issuing common debt at EU level is a historic step in European integration and a clear expression of solidarity following the coronavirus crisis.
• The allocation criteria for funding: As indicated in Charles Michel’s negotiating box, the political agreement envisages that 70 % of the grants of the RFF will be committed in 2021 and 2022, according to the Commission’s allocation criteria taking into account Member States’ respective living standards, size and unemployment levels. The remaining 30 % will be committed in 2023, where the current unemployment criterion will be replaced by one based on the drop in GDP in 2020 and 2021.
• Governance of the Recovery fund: Based on the Commission’s country-specific recommendations, Member States will be required to prepare national recovery and resilience plans for 2021-23, in line with the European Semester. The plans will be reviewed in 2022. The assessment of these plans will be approved by the Council by qualified majority vote (QMV), on a proposal by the Commission – and not by unanimity as was suggested in the course of the negotiations and heavily debated.

The disbursement of grants will take place only if the agreed milestones and targets set out in the recovery and resilience plans are fulfilled. If, exceptionally, one or more Member States consider that there are serious deviations from the satisfactory fulfillment of the targets, they may request that the matter be referred to the next European Council meeting.

Another change from Charles Michel’s negotiating box concerns rule of law conditionality. Albeit with a vaguer formulation than proposed, the principle of ‘rule of law’ conditionality has been accepted. The political agreement states that ‘a general regime of conditionality will be introduced to tackle manifest generalised deficiencies in the good governance of Member State authorities as regards respect for the rule of law when necessary to protect the sound implementation of the EU budget, including NGEU, and the financial interests of the Union’.

Incidently, the revised negotiating box also introduced a new €5 billion ‘Brexit reserve’, which will be established to support those Member States and economic sectors hardest hit by Brexit. This proposal was endorsed with the rest of the package.

Member States’ positions

While the agreement reached in the European Council is a compromise for which every Member State had to drop some of its ‘red lines’, for some Member States it is possible to identify the issues from their original strategy which prevailed in the course of the negotiations, and on which points those Member States had to give ground in order to get their way on their highest priority. An example among the ‘frugals’, for instance is the Netherlands, which managed to ensure itself a higher rebate, but had to give in on reverse QMV in the area of the rule of law and to accept the principle of grants.

Table 2: Main priorities of certain Member States, as indicated by EU leaders on 17 July

Member State Position going into the special European Council meeting Negotiation position achieved Austria Smaller MFF, and higher Austrian rebate, modern policies (green and digital), reforms, supports new own resources Smaller MFF, higher Austrian rebate Finland Prioritising strong rule of law conditionality, a lower overall level of funding and smaller amount of grants Smaller amount of grants Bulgaria Importance of traditional policies (CAP and cohesion policy) Cohesion policy remains an important element The Netherlands Maintaining and increasing rebates, ‘does not believe in grants’, southern Member States need to commit to reforms, rule of law needs reverse QMV Maintaining and increasing rebates Ireland Importance of CAP funding and Green Deal Belgium Very satisfied with Michel’s proposal Estonia CAP is important, direct payments Lithuania Cohesion and other traditional policies are important, recovery fund should not come at the cost of the MFF, direct payments Cohesion policy remains an important element Romania Romania will prioritise substantial funding for cohesion and agriculture policies, as well as a strong recovery package to support sustainable economic recovery Cohesion policy remains an important element

Strong recovery package

Source: EPRS.

Comparing the positions of the different EU institutions

When comparing the positions of the different EU institutions and the final agreement, it can be observed that the final agreement stayed closest to Charles Michel’s negotiating box of 20 July. The main differences relate to the balance between grants and loans within the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF), which shifted from a mix of €500 billion in grants and €250 billion in loans to €390 billion in grants and €360 billion in loans as a result of the position of the frugal four (see Table 3).

At the start of the European Council meeting, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, outlined once again the Parliament’s main priorities to EU Heads of State or Government. He underlined in particular that Parliament expected ‘the introduction of a package of own resources with a commitment that they enter into force as soon as possible, and by 2023 at the latest’. As stressed by the EP negotiators on the MFF package, in a joint position following the political agreement in the European Council, ‘new genuine own resources are the solution to repay the common debt, but the plastic-based contribution will not do the trick alone! We recall our strict demand to that respect: a binding commitment for the introduction of additional own resources as soon as 2021, and still in the course of the MFF 2021-2027’.

Parliament also believes that ‘the time has come to eliminate the rebates that some Member States receive, which are unfair and difficult to justify’. Yet, instead of being abolished, rebates will be kept, and even increased for four countries, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. The EP President also put strong emphasis on ‘adequate democratic control over allocation of resources and the approval of national recovery plans’. As also underlined by the EP negotiators, ‘democratic oversight must be substantially increased: Parliament, as one arm of the budgetary authority will fight to be fully involved in the establishment and implementation of the Recovery Instrument’.

Table 3: Positions and results on the main topics of the MFF and recovery fund negotiations

Main topics Commission 2020 proposal EP position[ii] Negotiating box
10 July 2020 Conclusions
18 July 2020 Position prevailing MFF €1.1 trillion €1.324 trillion €1.074 trillion €1.074 trillion Negotiating box NGEU €750 billion €2 trillion €750 billion €750 billion European Commission Rebates Phase out the current rebates over time Abolition of all rebates and corrections Continuation of the rebates Annual rebates for Austria (€565 million), Germany (€3 671 million), Denmark (€322 million), the Netherlands (€1 921 million) and Sweden (€1 069 million) Negotiating box and rebate beneficiaries Grants and loans €500 billion in grants; €250 billion in loans €500 billion in grants is the bare minimum €500 billion in grants

€250 billion in loans €390 billion in grants

€360 billion in loans Frugals Allocation criteria for funding for RFF Unemployment 2015-2019;

Inverse GDP per capita;

Population share N/A 70 % in 2021-2022 based on unemployment 2015-2019;

Inverse GDP per capita; Population share.

 

30 % in 2023 based on overall drop in GDP in 2020 and 2021, observed in 2022; Inverse GDP per capita; Population share. 70 % of RFF grants will be committed in 2021 and 2022, according to the Commission’s allocation criteria, taking into account Member States’ respective living standards, size and unemployment levels.

30 % will be committed in 2023, with the unemployment criterion be replaced by one based on the drop in GDP in 2020 and 2021 Negotiating box Recovery fund, governance Proposal for a regulation on the protection of the EU budget against generalised deficiencies in the rule of law Member States that do not respect EU values shall be subject to financial consequences Reform and Resilience National Plans adopted by the Council with QMV;

Rule of law conditionality adopted by the Council with QMV; earmark 30 % of funding for climate-related projects Negotiation box approach + in case of serious deviations, one or more Member States may request that the President of the European Council refers the matter to the next European Council Negotiating box and the Netherlands Own resources New own resources of some kind at a later stage (2021-27). Parliament would only give its consent to the next MFF if a basket of new own resources were to be introduced Four-phase approach 1. Plastic-waste based levy – 1 January 2021

2. Border carbon adjustment mechanism and digital levy – by 1 January 2023

3. Emission trading system (ETS) (possible extension to aviation and maritime)

4. Work on introducing other new own resources A new plastic levy in 2021. A carbon adjustment measure and a digital levy, both of which would be introduced by the end of 2022. Then the Commission will revise the proposal for the EU ETS. Other new resources might be a financial transaction tax. The gains from these new own resources will be used for early repayment of NGEU borrowing. Negotiating box with small changes

Source: EPRS.

Policy priorities and cuts to EU programmes

In its 2019-24 Strategic Agenda, the European Council set out the EU’s political priorities for the next five years, organised around four headings: protecting citizens and freedoms; developing a strong and vibrant economic base; building a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe; promoting European interests and values on the global stage. However, in the political agreement of the EU Heads of State or Government, some policy areas do not receive the attention and funding to match the degree of priority attached to them in their own long-term objectives. This is the case, for instance, with the Digital Europe programme, for which funding has been cut. Charles Michel explicitly rejected a reinstatement put forward by the Commission in its May 2020 revised MFF proposal; thus funding in this area may be insufficient to meet the EU’s stated ambition of achieving ‘digital sovereignty’. Concerning policy priorities, President Sassoli reiterated Parliament’s support for an MFF with a sufficient level of funding for convergence policies and the appropriate resources needed to meet the fundamental priorities: the Green Deal, digitalisation and resilience.

The political agreement envisages cuts, in comparison to Charles Michel’s first negotiating box, in the additional budgetary funding under NGEU for many long-term EU policy programmes. To name just a few examples, Horizon Europe’s allocation shrinks from €13.5 billion to €5 billion; that for the InvestEU programme is being reduced from €30.3 billion to €2.1 billion, the rural development programme will now receive an allocation of €7.5 billion compared to €15 billion; the Just Transition Fund €10 billion reduced from €30 billion to; and the NDICI just €3.5 billion instead of the initial €15.5 billion. Only the React-EU budget increase for cohesion policy remains substantial, at €47.5 billion, compared to €50 billion at the outset.

Likewise, a total envelop of €8.5 billion was agreed for defence related projects – the European Defence Fund (EDF) and military mobility, which represents 50 % less than the initial proposal made by the European Commission in 2018 (€17.22 billion). In a joint letter, the High Representative, Josep Borrell, and Commissioner Thierry Breton, warned that low funding for defence would jeopardise the EU’s capacity to meet its self-set level of ambition. The European Parliament in a January 2020 resolution supported the initial amount proposed by the European Commission in 2018.

For a detailed comparison of the proposals of the different EU actors (i.e. Parliament, Commission and the European Council President) by policy area (i.e. by heading and selected programmes) see EPRS briefing on Negotiations on the next MFF and the EU recovery instrument.

Next steps

The political agreement reached at the level of the European Council on 21 July does not however conclude the process for the adoption of the EU’s long-term budget for the years 2021 to 2027.[iii] It is only the starting point for negotiations between the two arms of the budgetary authority, Parliament and Council. Indeed, according to Article 312 TFEU, the regulation laying down the MFF is adopted by the Council acting by unanimity, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.[iv]

As outlined above, the political agreement falls short on many of Parliament’s main objectives (see table 2). Whilst EP President David Sassoli welcomed ‘the unprecedented agreement between governments to revive the European economy’, he also stressed that Parliament would now work to improve these instruments, in particular aiming at a more ambitious MFF and more clarity on new own resources. Striking the same note, the Parliament’s negotiating team on the MFF and Own Resources welcomed the creation of the NGEU, but indicated that ‘Parliament cannot accept the proposed record low ceilings as they mean renouncing the EU’s long-term objectives and strategic autonomy’. What is needed now is ‘more European solidarity, more European action in public health, in research and digitalisation, youth, and in the historical fight against climate change’.

Intense negotiations between Parliament and Council are therefore to be expected. While the total amount may not be the main issue of contention, Parliament will seek to gain concessions on issues such as the introduction of a mid term review of the MFF, an increase in funding for its priority policy areas, as had been the case during the 2014-2020 MFF negotiations (for example with Erasmus). Parliament’s negotiating team has already indicated that it ‘will strive to secure improvements, including higher amounts, on future-oriented MFF programmes like Horizon, InvestEU, LIFE, Erasmus+.’ Some political group leaders have also already stressed that they would seek ‘changes on MFF, rule of law and own resources’.

The Parliament will debate the results of the European Council in plenary on 23 July, preceded by a meeting of Parliament’s political group leaders on 22 July. President Sassoli has already emphasised that ‘Parliament will only give its consent to the MFF if it meets [Parliament’s] priorities’.

Other topics

Greece and Cyprus raised the question of Turkey’s drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean, stressing that the EU ‘should respond collectively and decisively in concrete terms’ and asked for ‘tough sanctions’. The Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, also raised the issue of the conversion of Istanbul’s Hagia Sophia into a mosque.

In a joint statement, France, Germany and Italy expressed concern at the escalating military situation in Libya, called for a cease-fire, and warned the different actors involved of possible sanctions.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 17-21 July 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.