Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

In order to effectively assist countries in “building back better” following the COVID-19 pandemic and returning to a path towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the United Nations (UN) and its development entities, organised within the United Nations Development System (UNDS), will need to adjust their approach. They need to respond not just through selected interventions of limited scope, which aim to achieve quick and tangible results, but by providing more and higher quality policy advice to governments for dealing with the deep inequalities laid bare by the pandemic worldwide.
The argument for a stronger focus on policy advice directed at high-level decision-makers and delivered through both dialogue and advocacy, is not to deny the importance of service delivery, capacity-building and systems strengthening – other key UN delivery modalities that currently account for the majority of the UN’s development activities. Through them, the UN saves lives and helps developing countries reduce their reliance on external support. However, such work often fails to achieve the kind of broader, sustainable impact so urgently needed for ensuring a more equitable and sustainable recovery.
The UN has long recognised the importance of policy advice, and UN entities have a unique role to play in helping to implement universal norms and values that have been agreed by UN member states and which should inform any recovery. The recent strengthening of the UN resident coordinator system (2019), which ensures that the on average 18 UN entities per programme country deliver more “as one”, has put the UN in a better position to provide integrated policy advice. Building on these reforms, UN Secretary-General António Guterres recently encouraged a greater role for the UN in the provision of “integrated policy advice”, citing “persistent challenges in forging integrated policies” (UN, 2020).
These “persistent challenges” to policy advice (or “upstream work” in UN parlance) also come from structural factors that push UN entities towards implementation or “downstream” work directed at interventions on the ground. Also, member states have been increasingly reluctant – despite often lofty commitments at the global level – to support policy advice through robust mandates, their own strategic engagement and suitable funding at the level of UN entities.
The following actions are recommended to correct disincentives to policy advice:
• The UN should define policy advice more clearly as a distinct mode of UN engagement and track good practice from UN country teams to further develop this mode of engagement.
• Member states should strengthen their endorsement of UN entities’ provision of quality policy advice and request them to undertake concrete steps to expand this mode of engagement.
• Resident coordinators need to fully exercise the new roles envisioned by the UNDS reform and lead on policy dialogue in collaboration with the UN entities concerned.
• Donors should engage strategically with UN entities through core contributions and non-core partnerships to incentivise, rather than discourage, the provision of increased policy advice.

In order to effectively assist countries in “building back better” following the COVID-19 pandemic and returning to a path towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the United Nations (UN) and its development entities, organised within the United Nations Development System (UNDS), will need to adjust their approach. They need to respond not just through selected interventions of limited scope, which aim to achieve quick and tangible results, but by providing more and higher quality policy advice to governments for dealing with the deep inequalities laid bare by the pandemic worldwide.
The argument for a stronger focus on policy advice directed at high-level decision-makers and delivered through both dialogue and advocacy, is not to deny the importance of service delivery, capacity-building and systems strengthening – other key UN delivery modalities that currently account for the majority of the UN’s development activities. Through them, the UN saves lives and helps developing countries reduce their reliance on external support. However, such work often fails to achieve the kind of broader, sustainable impact so urgently needed for ensuring a more equitable and sustainable recovery.
The UN has long recognised the importance of policy advice, and UN entities have a unique role to play in helping to implement universal norms and values that have been agreed by UN member states and which should inform any recovery. The recent strengthening of the UN resident coordinator system (2019), which ensures that the on average 18 UN entities per programme country deliver more “as one”, has put the UN in a better position to provide integrated policy advice. Building on these reforms, UN Secretary-General António Guterres recently encouraged a greater role for the UN in the provision of “integrated policy advice”, citing “persistent challenges in forging integrated policies” (UN, 2020).
These “persistent challenges” to policy advice (or “upstream work” in UN parlance) also come from structural factors that push UN entities towards implementation or “downstream” work directed at interventions on the ground. Also, member states have been increasingly reluctant – despite often lofty commitments at the global level – to support policy advice through robust mandates, their own strategic engagement and suitable funding at the level of UN entities.
The following actions are recommended to correct disincentives to policy advice:
• The UN should define policy advice more clearly as a distinct mode of UN engagement and track good practice from UN country teams to further develop this mode of engagement.
• Member states should strengthen their endorsement of UN entities’ provision of quality policy advice and request them to undertake concrete steps to expand this mode of engagement.
• Resident coordinators need to fully exercise the new roles envisioned by the UNDS reform and lead on policy dialogue in collaboration with the UN entities concerned.
• Donors should engage strategically with UN entities through core contributions and non-core partnerships to incentivise, rather than discourage, the provision of increased policy advice.

Die Große Koalition hat sich in einer Arbeitsgruppe des Koalitionsausschusses grundsätzlich auf eine verbindliche Geschlechterquote für Vorstände geeinigt. Dazu ein Statement von Katharina Wrohlich, Leiterin der Forschungsgruppe Gender Economics am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die Einigung der Großen Koalition auf eine verbindliche Geschlechterquote für Vorstände mit mehr als drei Mitgliedern ist ein starkes gleichstellungspolitisches Signal und hat das Potential, den Anteil von Frauen in diesen Gremien nachhaltig zu erhöhen. Die Entwicklung der vergangenen Jahre hat gezeigt, dass freiwillige Selbstverpflichtungen kaum Effekte haben, während verbindliche gesetzliche Vorgaben, wie es sie für Aufsichtsräte schon seit 2016 gibt, Wirkung zeigen. Ein höherer Anteil von Frauen in hohen Führungspositionen kann gleichstellungspolitische Impulse in die gesamte Gesellschaft geben, insbesondere durch das Aufbrechen geschlechterstereotyper Zuschreibungen.

Die Abteilung Konjunkturpolitik des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung sucht zum 15. Januar 2021

 

 eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div)

für 10 Wochenstunden.

Emilio Lamo de Espinosa. DT 22/2020 - 20/11/2020

Este documento de trabajo trata de abordar un análisis transversal de los efectos de la pandemia, antes de intentar territorializar esos efectos en un análisis geopolítico, todo ello desde la perspectiva de las consecuencias y enseñanzas de la pandemia.

Die Islamische Republik Iran hat unter dem Sanktionsdruck der Trump-Administration den »Osten« zur außenpolitischen Priorität erklärt. Im Rahmen einer neuen »Blick-nach-Osten«-Politik sollten die Beziehungen zu asiatischen und eurasischen Großmächten wie Russland, China oder Indien vertieft werden.

An seiner Ostorientierung wird Iran auch unter dem US-Präsidenten Joe Biden festhalten, denn die außenpolitische Schwerpunktverlagerung reicht über kurzfristige Wirtschaftsinteressen hinaus. Teheran sieht in östlichen Partnern das größte Potential, um vom Westen unabhängige Ordnungs­strukturen zu schaffen.

Mittelfristig setzt die Islamische Republik auf eine multipolare Ordnung, in der Regionalmächten eine höhere politische Bedeutung zukommt. Langfristig schwebt Teheran die Vision einer einheitlichen islamischen Gemeinschaft und einer Sphäre islamischer Souveränität vor.

Vor diesem Hintergrund begrüßt die Islamische Republik bedeutende geopolitische Großprojekte in Eurasien, in denen Iran eine zentrale Rolle einnimmt.

Teherans »Blick nach Osten«-Politik geht aber auch mit Kosten einher und stößt vor allem sicherheitspolitisch an enge Grenzen. Noch zeichnen sich keine strategischen Partnerschaften ab, die sich in einer belastbaren Bündnispolitik widerspiegeln würden.

Dennoch müssen sich Deutschland und die EU darauf einstellen, dass der Einfluss eurasischer und asiatischer Akteure, insbesondere Pekings, in Iran steigen wird. Dabei stehen Teherans Beziehungen zu diesen Staaten nicht unter dem Vorbehalt, Menschenrechtsfragen oder die iranische Regionalpolitik zu diskutieren.

Irans Orientierung nach Osten stellt aber noch keine Abkehr vom »Westen« dar. Mit der Umsetzung der »Blick nach Osten«-Politik könnte die Bedeutung Deutschlands und Europas sogar noch zunehmen.

 

La situation économique délétère en Turquie a conduit le Président Erdogan à licencier le gouverneur de la banque centrale tandis que le ministre des Finances a démissionné. Dans le même temps, le Président turc poursuit ses interventions dans la région, en affirmant sa souveraineté en Méditerranée orientale ou en soutenant l’Azerbaïdjan dans le conflit qui l’oppose à l’Arménie dans le Haut-Karabakh. Ariane Bonzon, journaliste spécialiste de la Turquie et…

Épidémie, chômage, terrorisme, climat… De nombreux jeunes éprouvent un «sentiment de désolation», voire d’«abandon». Leur créativité et leur engagement les aident à tenir bon. Ils ont 20 ans, l’âge de tous les possibles, et vivent une période d’interdits qui contrarie tous leurs élans. Être assigné à résidence à l’âge des fêtes jusqu’au bout de la […]

The post 2020, l’année du désarroi pour la « génération Covid » appeared first on Fondapol.

Organisation d’un Islam de France, intégration des jeunes issus de l’immigration, apprentissage de la langue arabe, séparatisme religieux, etc. L’actualité ne manque pas autour de ces sujets cruciaux pour la cohésion sociale de notre pays. Nous nous sommes entretenus avec Bassma Kodmani, chercheuse franco-syrienne, spécialiste du monde arabe.

En quoi l'apprentissage de la langue arabe à l'école est…

Event Video: 
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On November 19th, IPI together with the French Ministry of the Armed Forces cohosted the launch of IPI’s policy paper entitled “UN Reform and Mission Planning: Too Great Expectations?” authored by Marc Jacquand.

Since 2017, the UN system has undergone a historic process of reform at several levels and across many entities. Several of these reforms have either directly aimed at improving the planning of UN peace operations or included elements that have a significant bearing on mission planning.

The reorganization of the peace and security pillar has created shared regional divisions between the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), streamlining communication and providing field operations a single point of entry. The reform has also brought greater attention to peacebuilding during planning processes. The management reform has made missions more flexible and efficient by delegating greater authority to mission leaders, and has centralized operational planning capacity. Likewise, the development system reform has enhanced country teams’ analysis and planning processes, supporting longer-term peacebuilding. Other initiatives—from the secretary-general’s use of independent strategic reviews of peace operations to increased attention to data-based performance monitoring of peacekeeping—have also impacted how missions are designed.

As the focus shifts from designing to implementing these reforms, this public virtual panel discussion will take stock of the various strands of UN reform and explore their impact on the planning of UN missions, drawing on the recent establishment of UN political missions in Colombia, Haiti, Hodeidah, Yemen, and Sudan—whether alongside or to succeed preexisting political missions, or in parallel with the drawdown of long-standing peacekeeping operations.

Opening remarks:
Brig. Gen. Roland Margueritte, Head of the Defense Mission, Permanent Mission of France to the UN

Panelists:
Mr. Marc Jacquand, Independent Consultant and Author of the IPI paper, “UN Reform and Mission Planning: Too Great Expectations?”
Ms. Laura Flores, Director, Americas Division, UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs/Department of Peace Operations
Mr. Steven Siqueira, Chief of Staff, a.i., UN Integrated Transition Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)
Mr. David Haeri, Director, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, UN Department of Peace Operations
Mr. Ian Martin, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and member of the HIPPO panel

Moderator:
Mr. Jake Sherman, IPI Senior Director of Programs

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Mario Esteban. ARI 131/2020 - 19/11/2020

Este análisis estudia las implicaciones de la esperable llegada de Biden a la Casa Blanca sobre la política de EEUU hacia China y las repercusiones sobre sus aliados europeos.

In a world struggling to manage both the pandemic and its spillover effects–– with a population of around 51 million people and only about 320 dead eight months after the pandemic started––the Republic of Korea stands out in the global landscape of pandemic management and SDG16+ leadership. The country is, of course, not immune from COVID-19 waves and containment risks. However, its fundamental approach seems to be quite effective from a global perspective. Indeed, state capacity, trust, and leadership seem to be more powerful crisis management tools than specific governance models that went hand in hand with stockpiles of equipment. Interestingly, ROK’s COVID-19 management capacity is also contributing significantly to the country’s soft power.

In a world struggling to manage both the pandemic and its spillover effects–– with a population of around 51 million people and only about 320 dead eight months after the pandemic started––the Republic of Korea stands out in the global landscape of pandemic management and SDG16+ leadership. The country is, of course, not immune from COVID-19 waves and containment risks. However, its fundamental approach seems to be quite effective from a global perspective. Indeed, state capacity, trust, and leadership seem to be more powerful crisis management tools than specific governance models that went hand in hand with stockpiles of equipment. Interestingly, ROK’s COVID-19 management capacity is also contributing significantly to the country’s soft power.

In a world struggling to manage both the pandemic and its spillover effects–– with a population of around 51 million people and only about 320 dead eight months after the pandemic started––the Republic of Korea stands out in the global landscape of pandemic management and SDG16+ leadership. The country is, of course, not immune from COVID-19 waves and containment risks. However, its fundamental approach seems to be quite effective from a global perspective. Indeed, state capacity, trust, and leadership seem to be more powerful crisis management tools than specific governance models that went hand in hand with stockpiles of equipment. Interestingly, ROK’s COVID-19 management capacity is also contributing significantly to the country’s soft power.

This paper aims at estimating the economic vulnerability of developing countries to disruptions in global value chains (GVCs) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It uses data on trade in value-added for a sample of 12 developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America to assess their dependence on demand and supply from the three main hubs China, Europe, and North America. Using first estimates on COVID-19-induced changes in production and sectoral final demand, we obtain an early projection of the GDP effect during the lockdowns that runs through trade in GVCs. Our estimates reveal that adverse demand-side effects reduce GDP by up to 5.4 per cent, and that collapsing foreign supply is responsible for a drop in GDP of a similar magnitude. Overall, we confirm conjecture that the countries most affected are those highly integrated into GVCs (Southeast Asian countries). We argue, however, that these countries also benefit from a well-diversified portfolio of foreign suppliers, leading to a cushioning of economic downswing from adverse supply-side spillovers, because COVID-19 stroke major hubs at different times during the first wave in early 2020. Moreover, despite expected hazardous home market effects, sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP appears to be comparatively less affected though GVCs due to a lack of intensive supply- and demand-side dependencies.

This paper aims at estimating the economic vulnerability of developing countries to disruptions in global value chains (GVCs) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It uses data on trade in value-added for a sample of 12 developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America to assess their dependence on demand and supply from the three main hubs China, Europe, and North America. Using first estimates on COVID-19-induced changes in production and sectoral final demand, we obtain an early projection of the GDP effect during the lockdowns that runs through trade in GVCs. Our estimates reveal that adverse demand-side effects reduce GDP by up to 5.4 per cent, and that collapsing foreign supply is responsible for a drop in GDP of a similar magnitude. Overall, we confirm conjecture that the countries most affected are those highly integrated into GVCs (Southeast Asian countries). We argue, however, that these countries also benefit from a well-diversified portfolio of foreign suppliers, leading to a cushioning of economic downswing from adverse supply-side spillovers, because COVID-19 stroke major hubs at different times during the first wave in early 2020. Moreover, despite expected hazardous home market effects, sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP appears to be comparatively less affected though GVCs due to a lack of intensive supply- and demand-side dependencies.

This paper aims at estimating the economic vulnerability of developing countries to disruptions in global value chains (GVCs) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It uses data on trade in value-added for a sample of 12 developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America to assess their dependence on demand and supply from the three main hubs China, Europe, and North America. Using first estimates on COVID-19-induced changes in production and sectoral final demand, we obtain an early projection of the GDP effect during the lockdowns that runs through trade in GVCs. Our estimates reveal that adverse demand-side effects reduce GDP by up to 5.4 per cent, and that collapsing foreign supply is responsible for a drop in GDP of a similar magnitude. Overall, we confirm conjecture that the countries most affected are those highly integrated into GVCs (Southeast Asian countries). We argue, however, that these countries also benefit from a well-diversified portfolio of foreign suppliers, leading to a cushioning of economic downswing from adverse supply-side spillovers, because COVID-19 stroke major hubs at different times during the first wave in early 2020. Moreover, despite expected hazardous home market effects, sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP appears to be comparatively less affected though GVCs due to a lack of intensive supply- and demand-side dependencies.

On November 16, 17, and 18, IPI and the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) jointly hosted a series of consultations to
explore if and how a focus on masculinities can allow for a more comprehensive approach to integrating gender considerations in counter-terrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE). The series aimed to identify specific policy implications of such an approach, as well as potential challenges and pitfalls.

At the Open Briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on “integrating
gender into CT and CVE,” held on November 1, 2019, several Member States acknowledged the need to consider masculinities and requested CTED to give due regard to this issue.

The CTED-IPI consultations were held as four thematic sessions structured around a set of specific questions for each theme. Participants included academics, civil society experts and practitioners from different regions of the world, along with relevant United Nations partner entities.

Discussions centered on the following questions:

• What does the concept of “masculinity” mean in the context of CT/CVE?
• Why does it matter to consider masculinities in CT/CVE? What is the objective in doing so?
• What are the practical implications for policy?
• What are some of the challenges and potential adverse effects?

There is growing awareness that integrating gender in CT and CVE must include a focus on masculinities. This is reflected in a growing body of research into the relevance of masculinity for various aspects of terrorism and counter-terrorism, as well as the importance of avoiding a one-dimensional conception of gender. However, the bridge from that research to policy, as well as the bridge from policy to practical implementation, remains weak.

An issue brief on this topic is forthcoming.

Download consultations agenda>>

The Covid-19 pandemic has moved relations with Sub-Saharan Africa further up the Maghreb countries’ agenda and consolidated existing trends. Morocco is the Maghreb state with the most sophisticated Sub-Sahara policy. Its motivations include attractive growth markets in Africa, frustration over restricted access to Europe, stalemated in­tegration in the Maghreb and the wish to see the Western Sahara recognised as Moroc­can. Morocco’s Sub-Sahara policy has heightened tensions with Algeria and awakened ambitions in Tunisia. Algiers, as a significant funder and security actor in the African Union (AU) and “protector” of the Western Sahara independence movement, is seek­ing to thwart Rabat’s advances. Tunis for its part is trying to follow in Rabat’s foot­steps, hoping that closer relations with Africa will boost economic growth. The Euro­pean Union should treat these trends as an opportunity for African integration and triangular EU/Maghreb/Sub-Sahara cooperation. This could counteract Algeria’s feel­ing of growing irrelevance, strengthen Tunisia’s economy, put Morocco’s hegemonic ambitions in perspective, and thus mitigate the negative dynamics of the rivalry.

By siding with Azerbaijan in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey is primarily pursuing the goal of undermining the current status quo of the region. Ankara aims above all to secure a place at the table where a solution to the conflict between Arme­nia and Azerbaijan will be negotiated in the future. The Syrian scenario should serve as an example. Turkey thus wants to negotiate with Russia in the South Caucasus, preferably without Western actors. Ankara’s plans are not uninteresting for Moscow. However, because of the complexity of Turkish-Armenian relations, there is a risk that Armenia and Turkey might become the eventual opponents in this conflict, rather than Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU’s engagement should not be determined by its tense relationship with Turkey, but rather by the UN Security Council resolu­tions on Nagorno-Karabakh.