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Nachdem am Sonntagabend ein Vermittlunsgversuch des EU-Kommissionspräsidenten Jean-Claude Junckers scheiterte, wächst die Furcht vor einer…

La Banque centrale européenne fait son maximum pour parvenir à un résultat positif dans les négociations en cours avec la Grèce, a affirmé son Président, Mario Draghi, en commission des affaires économiques ce lundi. M. Draghi a cependant expliqué clairement qu'au final, le versement de toute nouvelle aide financière à la Grèce était "une décision politique qui devra être prise par les responsables politiques et non les représentants des banques centrales".
Commission des affaires économiques et monétaires

Source : © Union européenne, 2015 - PE

The European Central Bank is doing all it can to facilitate a successful outcome of the ongoing talks with Greece, ECB President Mario Draghi assured Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee MEPs on Monday. But he also made it crystal clear that ultimately, disbursing any further financial assistance to Greece is "a political decision that will have to be taken by elected policymakers, not by central bankers".
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The European Central Bank is doing all it can to facilitate a successful outcome of the ongoing talks with Greece, ECB President Mario Draghi assured Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee MEPs on Monday. But he also made it crystal clear that ultimately, disbursing any further financial assistance to Greece is "a political decision that will have to be taken by elected policymakers, not by central bankers".
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The European Central Bank is doing all it can to facilitate a successful outcome of the ongoing talks with Greece, ECB President Mario Draghi assured Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee MEPs on Monday. But he also made it crystal clear that ultimately, disbursing any further financial assistance to Greece is "a political decision that will have to be taken by elected policymakers, not by central bankers".
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The European Central Bank is doing all it can to facilitate a successful outcome of the ongoing talks with Greece, ECB President Mario Draghi assured Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee MEPs on Monday. But he also made it crystal clear that ultimately, disbursing any further financial assistance to Greece is "a political decision that will have to be taken by elected policymakers, not by central bankers".
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

This report is provided for the media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by third parties and security considerations*. The SMM observed numerous ceasefire violations at and around Donetsk airport. The SMM visited weapons holding areas and observed that some weapons previously documented were no longer present, both at government-controlled and “DPR”-controlled sites.

During the weekend, fighting intensified in Donetsk, with substantially more shelling observed. The level of violence in areas around “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk airport remains high.

Over a period of two days, the SMM at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation point at Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 8km north-west of Donetsk city centre) observed a total of at least 594 explosions caused by incoming and outgoing artillery and mortar fire, as well as small arms and light weapons (SALW), including heavy machine-gun fire. The SMM concluded that the explosions occurred at locations to the north, north-west, north-east, west, and south-west and at distances ranging between 2 and 10km from its position.

At the JCCC headquarters in government-controlled Soledar (77km north-north-east of Donetsk) the SMM was presented with separate ceasefire log files covering 11 June by representatives of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and representatives of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Ukrainian Armed Forces had logged 99 violations and reported six Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers killed and eleven wounded in action, and the Russian Federation Armed Forces had logged 103 violations. While the majority of violations in the Ukrainian Armed Forces log targeted Ukrainian positions in and around Donetsk airport, violations were also recorded in Horlivka (“DPR”-controlled, 37km north-east of Donetsk) and in the Luhansk region. 

From observation points located 1.5 and 3.5km west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), over two days the SMM observed a total of 180 explosions caused by 82mm and 120mm mortars, automatic grenade launchers and artillery, as well as small arms, including heavy machine-gun fire. An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted six mortar positions in Shyrokyne on 13 June.

On 13 June, the SMM observed a military parade held in Mariupol (government-controlled, 103km south of Donetsk). The parade was organized by the Azov volunteer battalion within the Ministry of Internal Affairs to mark the first anniversary of what the Ukrainian authorities refer to as the liberation of the city of Mariupol from “DPR” forces, and was attended by the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine as well as other high-ranking government officials. There were some 100 regular Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and Azov battalion members present. The parade consisted of three trucks pulling artillery pieces (one 100mm 2A29 “Rapira” and two 122mm D30 howitzers), present in violation of Minsk withdrawal lines; one armoured personnel vehicle (BTR); one “Spartan” armoured vehicle; and twelve pick-ups with “Azov” insignia. Four vehicles were pulling mortars (2B11 “Sani”, 122mm). The military parade was followed by a concert attended by up to 1,000 people.

During the weekend, the overall situation in Luhansk remained calm. On 14 June, while stationary in government-controlled Toshkivka (60km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard a series of 10 to 12 incoming and outgoing explosions from a south-easterly direction 10km from its position.

On 14 June, five kilometres north of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed four impact craters, each with a diameter of 3-5m and a depth of 1 to 1.5m. The SMM observed the remains of a rocket and identified it as having been fired from a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 “Grad”, 120mm). The positioning indicated that the rocket was likely fired from an east-north-easterly direction.

On 14 June, in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM was told by residents about early morning grenade and Grad rocket explosions. The SMM observed a hole in the roof of an abandoned building. On the ground near the building the SMM observed metal pieces from the rockets. Five metres south of the village’s main road, the SMM located a crater with a Grad rocket casing. Another crater was observed approximately 30m from the road in the area of the local tuberculosis hospital. The SMM observed several metal pieces around the crater. Based on analysis at the scene, the fire had been incoming from the south-west. No casualties were reported.

On 13 June, the SMM visited the Luhansk water supply company customer service department to gather updates on the current water supply situation. Two administrative staff told the SMM that the water supply had been restored in all districts in Luhansk city in the past week. This was due, they said, to the partial re-opening of government-controlled supply systems, and Luhansk city households are now provided with water for four hours every evening. The current water supply is limited to 30% of the usual supply capacity. The deputy head of the Luhansk regional state administration said the supply of water from government-controlled areas to “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled areas had been limited due to technical reasons.

During a two-day period, the SMM revisited seven “DPR” weapons holding areas, whose locations comply with the respective withdrawal lines. At five of them, all weapons previously observed were in situ. Two of them, each of which had previously stored six 122mm howitzers, were abandoned. At one of the sites, only one SMM patrol member was permitted to enter the venue.

On 14 June, the SMM was not granted access to a Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area as the commander was not present nor reachable via phone despite several attempts.  The SMM revisited three Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas in the vicinity of Soledar, whose locations comply with the respective withdrawal lines. At the first site the SMM was initially denied entry. Following intercession by the JCCC, the SMM was granted access and observed only two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 “Gvozdika”, 122mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 “Akatsiya”, 152mm) at the site, where nine 2S1 and eight 2S3 systems were previously recorded. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel stated that the missing weapons were used for training in the area. The SMM also noted that two anti-aircraft missile systems (9K35 “Strela-10”) previously present at the position were now absent. The SMM visited another Ukrainian Armed Forces holding area where twelve anti-tank guns (MT-12, 100mm) had previously been present. This site was found to be unoccupied. At a third holding area, the SMM confirmed that five MT-12 guns remained in place in accordance with SMM records.

Despite claims that the withdrawal of heavy weapons was complete, the SMM observed weapons in areas that are in violation of Minsk withdrawal lines. On 13 June, the SMM observed two MBTs (one T-64, the other unidentified) being transported southward from Luhansk city on trailers. On 13 June, on the outskirts of Amrosiivka (“DPR”-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed six self-propelled howitzers (122mm, 2S1) heading south. In Ternove (60km south-east of Donetsk, “DPR” controlled), the SMM observed a shooting range used by the “DPR” on both 13 and 14 June and on both occasions saw 18 stationary main battle tanks (MBT) (T-64s and T-72s), and other military vehicles.

On 14 June, the SMM observed ten self-propelled howitzers (2S3 “Akatsiya”, 152mm) moving away from the line of contact along the road from Soledar to Sloviansk (government-controlled, 95km north of Donetsk). On 14 June, an SMM UAV observed a concentration of 53 MBTs (unknown type), six towed howitzers (D30, 122mm) and ten military trucks in Torez (“DPR”-controlled, 60km east of Donetsk); seven MBTs (unknown type), 23 armoured personnel carriers (APC) and at least nine trucks and other vehicles in Komsomolske (“DPR”-controlled, 43km south of Donetsk); four self-propelled howitzers in Vasylivka (“DPR”-controlled, 50km south-east of Donetsk); one MBT (unknown type), 14 APCs, and six military trucks in Bezimenne (“DPR”-controlled, 28km east of Mariupol). In addition, an SMM UAV observed six covered artillery pieces in Paraskoviivka (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk) and additional surface-to-air missile systems in the region.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kyiv, Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Chernivtsi.

 

 

* Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement:

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by third parties and security considerations including the presence of mines, the lack of information on whereabouts of landmines, as well as damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government.

Delays:

• On 13 June, the SMM was held at the checkpoint south of Artemivsk (government-controlled, 67km north of Donetsk) for approximately 50 minutes, ostensibly due to the disposal of an unexploded 82mm mortar round. However, the SMM did not hear any explosions that would have indicated ordnance disposal.
• On 14 June, at a Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area, the SMM was initially denied entry. Following intercession by the JCCC, the SMM was granted access to the site.

Prevented access:

• On 13 June, the SMM observed a possible “LPR” heavy weapons holding area. The SMM conducted an unannounced visit to the site. At the gate, the SMM spoke with two armed personnel, one of whom identified himself as the Cossack commander of the site. The interlocutor denied the SMM access, saying the facility was a “military installation” and only the “director” based in Luhansk could grant approval. The interlocutor refused to give a name or contact details of his superior. The SMM then left the area after approximately five minutes at the site.
• On 13 June, while visiting a “DPR”-controlled heavy weapons holding area, only one SMM patrol member was permitted to enter the site.
• On 14 June, at a checkpoint located immediately outside “LPR”-controlled Brianka (49km west of Luhansk), the checkpoint commander did not allow the SMM to proceed to Pervomaisk (“LPR”-controlled, 70km west of Luhansk), citing ongoing shelling in the area.
• On 14 June, the SMM was not granted access to a Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area, as the commander was not present or reachable via phone despite several attempts. 
  
  For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

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Az újvidéki rendőrség letartóztatott egy helyi fiatalkorú személyt, mert a gyanú szerint gyilkossági kísérletet követett el.

Le 15 juin 2015, les médecins de la force Barkhane stationnée à N’Djamena ont appuyé les secours tchadiens en prenant en charge sept victimes civiles des attentats qui ont touché la capitale dans la matinée.

Un décryptage en vidéo pour l'Opinion

General : "There can be no cultural relativism where human rights are concerned," said Louis Michel (ALDE, BE) on Monday, at the start of the 29th meeting of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, in Suva, Fiji. He said human rights could not be breached in the name of cultural diversity, adding that this issue was at the heart of discussions in Europe, as well as in the ACP states.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

General : "There can be no cultural relativism where human rights are concerned," said Louis Michel (ALDE, BE) on Monday, at the start of the 29th meeting of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, in Suva, Fiji. He said human rights could not be breached in the name of cultural diversity, adding that this issue was at the heart of discussions in Europe, as well as in the ACP states.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Elhagyta Dél-Afrikát és útban van Szudánba Omar el-Besir szudáni államfő - közölték szudáni hivatalos források hétfőn.

General : "There can be no cultural relativism where human rights are concerned," said Louis Michel (ALDE, BE) on Monday, at the start of the 29th meeting of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, in Suva, Fiji. He said human rights could not be breached in the name of cultural diversity, adding that this issue was at the heart of discussions in Europe, as well as in the ACP states.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Général : "Il ne peut y avoir de relativisme culturel en matière de droits humains", a déclaré Louis Michel (ADLE, BE) ce lundi à l'ouverture de la 29e session de l'Assemblée parlementaire paritaire ACP-UE, à Suva (Fidji). Il a affirmé que la diversité culturelle ne devrait pas pouvoir être invoquée en cas de violation des droits de l'homme, ajoutant que cette question était au cœur des discussions tant en Europe que dans les pays ACP.

Source : © Union européenne, 2015 - PE

Ismerős a helyzet, amikor külföldi nyaraláson az interneten megnézné kedvenc filmjét, de nem megy a hazai streaming szolgáltatás? Ennek oka lehet a szerzői jogvédelem, amit a szolgáltatók úgy biztosítanak, hogy bizonyos tartalmakat külföldről elérhetetlenné tesznek. A jogi szakbizottság kedden szavaz arról a jelentésről, amely a 2001-es, információs társadalomról szóló irányelv átültetését és az európai szerzői jogi szabályok harmonizációját értékeli.
Jogi Bizottság

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2015 - EP

Photo Credit: Presidential Press and Information Office

The Chinese are notorious for copying Western products and adapting them to serve the Chinese market.  Look at Alibaba, often described as China’s answer to eBay, or Weibo, a hybrid of Twitter and Facebook. Plus, thanks to weak intellectual property protection laws in China, these companies often get away with it.

Yet there is nothing inherently immoral or illegal about governments copying geopolitical strategies from other governments, and China’s northern comrade, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, may be setting a dangerous precedent. The apparent success of Putin’s misadventures in Ukraine could serve as an attractive geopolitical militaristic strategy for other nations with territorial disputes, such as China. But if Putin’s strategy in Ukraine is so dangerous and widely condemned, why would Chinese President Xi Jinping bother copying Putin?

Some political analysts argue that when a nation’s leaders face economic difficulties, the public’s preoccupation with day-to-day problems can be alleviated by focusing on broader concerns like nationalism and the protection of the state’s interests. Economic growth in China is a serious concern, as overcapacity in real estate and heavy industry took gross domestic product (GDP) from the nine percent average from 1989 to 2015 to an expected seven percent first-quarter year-over-year growth rate this last quarter.

Russia is also facing an economic slowdown. Its GDP is expected to shrink by three percent in 2015 as $50 a barrel oil and capital outflows of $115 billion harm growth prospects. Despite an economic crisis in Russia, Putin’s popularity has soared, largely the result of increased nationalism. In May 2013, a little less than a year before Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Putin’s approval ratings stood at 64 percent. Following further intervention by Russia, which stands accused of providing arms and forces in the east of Ukraine, Putin’s latest approval rating rocketed to 86 percent. Some have questioned the legitimacy of the poll numbers, but many do concede a marked increase in Putin’s popularity among ordinary Russians.

Why would the approval ratings soar after military intervention in another country? One often-cited reason could be the public’s positive perception to any government willing to stand up and defy outside criticism. Other leaders have seen their approval ratings soar when nationalism is fired up — indeed, following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks former President George W. Bush enjoyed the highest approval rating of any president (90 percent). His father, George H.W. Bush, received an 88 percent approval rating in 1991 in the midst of the first Gulf War.

Joseph Nye,  a professor at Harvard University and the Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Clinton administration from 1994–95, hints this same strategy may be happening in China under Xi Jinping.  In a recent interview with The Diplomat, he warns of growing nationalism under Xi:

Xi Jinping needs a legitimizing force for his power and for the power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Economic growth has historically been the primary legitimizer of its authority, especially since communist ideology has declined greatly in importance. As China has an economic slowdown, nationalism will increase further, and I think we are undergoing a period of heightened attention to nationalism. I think nationalism has made it more difficult for China to resolve conflicts with its neighbors in the South China Sea. So far there is no clear indication that increased Chinese nationalism will result in military aggression. The high level meeting between Xi Jinping and Abe at the APEC summit was a positive step, as China had been resistant to these meetings in the past. But the potential for nationalism to boil over, it is something we need to watch closely.

I think the most probable scenario would be if Chinese planes and ships got involved in incidents with the Japanese in the Senkaku Islands, and lost. The Japanese might have superior capabilities in the event of conflict, and a defeat there would be a direct threat to Xi Jinping’s power.

Nye’s scenario is not so far-fetched. On Saturday, Japanese media reported on Chinese plans to build a large naval base in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province for its coast guard vessels. Wenzhou is not far from the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu to the Chinese), it and would allow the Chinese to closely monitor naval activities around the disputed eight uninhabited islands and rocks in the East China Sea controlled by Japan.

The potential for skirmishes in the airspace above the Senkaku is also real. In November 2013, China announced the creation of its air-defense identification zone in the East China Sea, which requires all aircraft to comply with Beijing’s rules.

China also claims up to 90 percent of the South China Sea, and draws a ten-dash U-shaped line (or “cow’s tongue”) around the sea on its maps, which overlaps territorial claims by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.  Originally an eleven-dash line formulated in 1936, two dashes were removed near the Gulf of Tonkin to appease its Communist brother Vietnam. Last year, one dash was added by Beijing emphasize its sovereignty over Taiwan. In recent months, Beijing has come under have international criticism for land reclamation on islands it occupies, and for attempting to impose its control over the fishing rights in, and airspace above, the South China Sea.

Should Xi copy Putin in building nationalistic fervor in order to distract the populace from domestic problems, the strategy could well backfire. Many of the student protests in Chinese history originally began as nationalistic protests against foreign countries and morphed into protests against government leadership. The strategy could also lead to strong reactions from both regional governments and the naval superpower in the region, the United States.

Such reactions have already affected Russia. In response to Putin’s latest misadventures in Ukraine, the U.S. announced plans this past weekend to store heavy military equipment in the Baltics and Eastern European nations. The U.S. may seek a similar strategy in the East and South China Sea, and position more and more of its naval military there to reassure its allies and other nations with territorial claims and deter any further aggression from Beijing. Vietnam and the Philippines are already requesting further support from Washington, and Japan is reconsidering its constitution to allow for greater military efforts.

Besides leading to a potential dangerous and costly war, what both Xi and Putin should not forget is that while military nationalism may provide a temporary boost to popularity, it may prove short-lived, inflict further damage on the economy, and result in a failure to achieve its military objectives.

Le 2e régiment d’infanterie de marine (2e RIMa) du Mans a organisé un exercice tactique de préparation opérationnelle dans son département du 8 au 10 juin 2015. Pendant ces 72h, trois compagnies du régiment ont été évaluées.

Avez-vous déjà essayé de visionner des vidéos en ligne pendant vos vacances à l'étranger ? Plus de la moitié des personnes qui tentent d'accéder à l'étranger à des services de streaming de leur pays se voient refuser l'accès au site pour des raisons liées à la protection des droits d'auteur. La députée Julia Reda a examiné la mise en œuvre de la directive « InfoSoc » visant à harmoniser les règles en matière de droits d'auteur. Le rapport sera voté à la commission des affaires juridiques mardi.
Commission des affaires juridiques

Source : © Union européenne, 2015 - PE