Biztonságpolitika

Most major destination countries are shifting from a policy of expanding migrant labor to one of selectivity and restriction in order to manage immigration within their borders, especially unauthorized immigration. Credit: Shutterstock

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)

The delicate balance of international migration relies on the high demand for labor and the enforcement of stricter immigration controls. This equilibrium is especially crucial when considering the international migration of students and skilled workers.

International students and skilled migrant workers play essential roles in economic development and addressing labor shortages in many countries. However, these individuals are facing increasing obstacles in entering and integrating into destination countries.

Essentially, most major destination countries are shifting from a policy of expanding migrant labor to one of selectivity and restriction in order to manage immigration within their borders, especially unauthorized immigration.

A notable exception to this global trend is Spain, which is granting legal status to half a million undocumented migrants. This policy aims to reduce labor exploitation in Spain’s underground economy and meet the need for around 300,000 migrant workers annually to sustain its economy.

The stricter immigration controls in many destination countries are primarily driven by political shifts to the right, national security concerns, public pressure, unauthorized migration, unlawful border crossings, visa overstays, and anxieties about changing population composition and social integration. These controls are also limiting asylum seekers and low skilled migrants while favoring highly skilled migrants.

Major destination countries have also implemented stricter immigration controls in terms of international student migration.

These controls include stricter visa rules and entry requirements, fixed-term visas, limited years of study, work permit restrictions, higher financial costs, and restrictions on bringing dependents. These measures are driven by high net migration, efforts to curb visa misuse, university enrollment caps, housing pressures, higher financial requirements, and restrictions on bringing family dependents.

In 2024, there were approximately 304 million international migrants worldwide, representing about 3.7% of the world’s population of 8.2 billion. This figure is nearly double the number of international migrants in 1990, which was approximately 154 million, representing 2.9% of the world’s population of 5.3 billion at that time (Figure 1).

Source: United Nations.

The top five migration destination countries and their percentage of all migrants are the United States (17%), Germany (6%), Saudi Arabia (5%), the United Kingdom (4%), and France (3%) (Figure 2).

Source: United Nations.

In contrast, the top five emigration countries and their percentage of all emigrants are India (6%), China (4%), Mexico (4%), Ukraine (3%), and Russia (3%) (Figure 3).

Source United Nations.

As of 2024–2025, there were approximately 7 million internationally mobile students globally. The key destinations for these international students were the United States (17%), Canada (12%), the United Kingdom (11%), France (7%), and Australia (6%). Other major destination countries were Germany, Russia, South Korea, China, and Spain (Figure 4).

Source: United Nations.

In addition to internationally mobile students, there were approximately 168 million migrant workers in 2022, accounting for about 5 percent of the global labor force. About two-thirds of all migrants of working age are in the labor force, with 60% of them being men.

In many of the more developed countries, the percentage of migrant workers in the labor force is significantly higher. For example, in the United States, approximately 20% of the labor force, totaling over 30 million people, consists of immigrants and foreign-born workers who are concentrated in the construction, farming, and service sectors. Canada has an even higher proportion of 30%, with many migrant workers represented in the tech sector, manufacturing, and healthcare.

Migrant workers can be found across all skill levels. Despite many possessing higher qualifications, they are often concentrated in lower-skilled industries such as services, agriculture, construction, and tourism. However, sectors and occupations related to high-skilled information technology and professional work often rely on skilled migrant labor to address labor shortages.

Migrant workers can be found across all skill levels. Despite many possessing higher qualifications, they are often concentrated in lower-skilled industries such as services, agriculture, construction, and tourism. However, sectors and occupations related to high-skilled information technology and professional work often rely on skilled migrant labor to address labor shortages

The populations of most developed countries and many developing countries are experiencing declining, ageing, and diversifying trends in the 21st century. These three profound demographic changes present significant social, economic, political, and ethical challenges.

As populations rapidly evolve during the 21st century, changes in fertility, mortality, and migration are shaping the demographics of many regions. These changes are based on past trends, current data, and projected future patterns over the next eighty years.

Projections suggest that population decline will persist because of low fertility rates remaining below the replacement levels of about two births per woman. Many countries have experienced low fertility rates for an extended period. The population of the more developed countries is expected to decrease by 14 million by 2050, while the least developed countries are projected to grow by 733 million during the same period.

Regarding mortality rates, life expectancies are anticipated to continue rising throughout the century. For instance, the current life expectancy at birth of 80 years in more developed countries is projected to reach approximately 84 years by 2050 and 90 years by the end of the 21st century.

In addition to declining populations and increasing life expectancy, many countries have experienced a “historic reversal” in their age structures. By 2025, 55 countries and areas had experienced this reversal, with more countries expected to undergo the same soon.

This significant demographic milestone occurs when the percentage of individuals aged 65 and older exceeds the percentage of those aged 17 and younger. In simpler terms, it is when older adults outnumber children in a population.

Population ageing is expected to continue throughout the remainder of the 21st century. The median age for more developed countries currently at 42 years is projected to increase to 45 years by 2050 and 48 years by 2100.

Additionally, the proportion of elderly individuals is projected to continue rising. For example, Europe’s elderly population is expected to increase to approximately 30 percent by mid-century.

Major destination countries are also becoming more ethnically diverse due to increasing levels of international migration. For instance, the estimated number of foreign-born individuals in Europe, which was around 57 million at the beginning of the 21st century, has risen to approximately 87 million by 2020.

The population compositions of many countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, are becoming significantly more ethnically diverse. Population projections suggest that the US and the UK populations will become “minority white” around 2045 and 2065, respectively.

In addition to high levels of legal migration, increasing levels of unauthorized migration pose mounting challenges for many destination countries and for international students and skilled migrant labor.

Notable among these challenges are the negative attitudes and hostilities towards immigrants and their families, as well as the increasing political influence of far-right nationalist parties advocating anti-immigrant policies. These parties are concerned that the growing numbers of immigrants will have a negative impact on their traditional culture, shared values, and national identity. They believe that immigration, especially unauthorized migration, undermines their way of life, national security, ethnic heritage, and social cohesion.

A significant factor fueling the unprecedented high levels of unauthorized migration to many destination countries is the rapid demographic growth of sending countries. Many of these countries, which are struggling with poverty, political instability, civil strife, and climate change, are in the less developed regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The number of people desiring to emigrate permanently is approximately 1.3 billion. This number significantly exceeds the number of immigrants countries are willing to admit, leading many individuals to migrate without authorization.

Of particular note is Africa’s population, which currently includes 33 of the 46 least developed countries in the world. Africa’s population is expected to more than triple during the 21st century, increasing from approximately 800 million to nearly 4 billion.

In summary, the major demographic features of traditional destination countries for the 21st century are declining, ageing, and diversifying. In contrast, the populations of most sending countries are increasing and remain relatively young, with many of them wishing to emigrate to a developed country.

These potent, pervasive, and differing demographic trends are creating a delicate balance of high demand for labor and the implementation of stricter immigration controls. This balance is especially relevant for international students and skilled migrant labor as it impacts their entry and integration into destination countries.

Joseph Chamie is an independent consulting demographer and former director of the United Nations Population Division.

 

AMENDMENTS 149 - 156 - Draft opinion Interim report on the proposal for the multiannual financial framework for 2028-2034
Committee on Security and Defence
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

By Anwarul K. Chowdhury
NEW YORK, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)

In the month of February 2025, one year ago, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres commenced his briefing of the media by announcing that “I want to start by expressing my deep concern about information received in the last 48 hours by UN agencies — as well as many humanitarian and development NGOs — regarding severe cuts in funding by the United States.” He went on to warn that ““The consequences will be especially devastating for vulnerable people around the world.”

Anwarul K. Chowdhury

UN80 Initiative – Reform or Pressure?

That budgetary crisis was attempted to be put off by launching the anniversary-rationaled and liquidity-crunch-panic-driven, window-dressing reform agenda – the so-called UN80 Initiative. These long overdue structural and programmatic reforms of the UN system have been on the agenda of at least for the last four Secretaries-General but without having much significant impact, except acronym-changing, mandate-creeping and structure-tweaking, and now these days, staff-relocating.

An Alarm Bell for Financial Collapse

End of this January again the Secretary-General said in a letter to all UN Member States that cash for its regular operating budget could run out by July, which could dramatically affect its operations. He also called on the to fundamentally overhaul the UN’s financial rules to prevent an “imminent financial collapse”.

Why now ask the member states to do something concrete? Why not in February 2025 when he sounded the alarm himself?

It reminds me of the somewhat similar Aesop’s fable about boy who cried wolf.

Lamenting Limited Power – No Power, No Money

In the past, Secretary-General Guterres lamented to the media asserting that “… it is absolutely true that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has very limited power, and it’s also absolutely true that he has very little capacity to mobilize financial resources. So, no power and no money.”

That is the reality which every Secretary-General faces and has been aware of. That is also known generally to the people who follow the United Nations regularly and thoroughly understand the functional complexity of the world’s largest multilateral apparatus.

Why then does this reality surfaces and brought to public attention only when the UN leadership fails to carry out the mandated responsibilities?

I believe strongly that this “very limited power”, as worded by SG Guterres, should be highlighted as often as possible to avoid unnecessary and undue expectations of the global community about the UN and its top leadership. No Secretary-General has pointed out these limitations as he campaigned for the post and on assuming the office, as far as I know.

Current SG Guterres is no exception. He would have been realistic and factual if he had pointed out the limitations – better termed as obstacles – to his leadership as he took office in 2017, and not in 2026 after being in office for nearly nine years. This built-in operational weakness and inability of the world’s most important diplomat have always been there.

Controlling Or Quitting?

Some people speculate that the US is using its financial clout and pressure to threaten the collapse of the UN.

The US has always been using its huge power of veto and almost one-fourth of the budgetary contributions to the operations of the UN system. That is a reality which should be kept in mind by the leadership of the UN and its Member States, unless the Charter of the UN is changed to create a more democratic organization in the true sense.

For a long time, the US has used the part payment arrangements for its legally due contributions, with full understanding and acceptance of the Secretary-General, so that it can avoid losing its voting power and get its own pound of flesh each time such instalment payments are made.

I believe the US wants to use the world body in its own way by controlling, not quitting.

A Woman at the Helm for The UN

In this context, let me reiterate that after eight decades of its existence and choosing nine men successively to be the world’s topmost diplomat, it is incumbent on the United Nations to have the sanity and sagacity of electing a woman as the next Secretary-General in 2026 when the incumbent’s successor would be chosen.

There is a need for creative, non-bureaucratic and pro-active leadership initiative for a real change to ensure avoidance of “crying wolf” syndrome disrupting the work and activities of the most universal multilateral body with the mandate for working in the best interest of humanity.

Ambassador Anwarul K. Chowdhury is a former UN Under-Secretary-General, one-time Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations, Chairman of the UN General Assembly’s Administrative and Budgetary Committee (1997-1998), former Senior Special Adviser to UN General Assembly President (2011-2012) and President of the UN Security Council (2000 and 2001) and a two-term Vice Chairman of the all-powerful UN Committee on Programme and Coordination (1984-85).

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Game-changing international ocean treaty comes into force. Credit: NOAA
 
Deep-sea corals were among the treasures found during an expedition in the North Marianas Islands in the Pacific Ocean. Source: UN News

By Pietro Bertazzi and Oliver Tanqueray
AMSTERDAN / LONDON, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)

“The ocean’s health is humanity’s health”, said UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, in September 2025.

He was commenting after the High Seas Treaty (BBNJ) [1] finally achieved ratification, going on to call for “a swift, full implementation” from all partners. As of January 17, 2026, the treaty has come into force, meaning the time for implementation is now. What is the High Seas Treaty?

Only 1% of the high seas are currently protected. The new treaty will greatly increase safeguards, with significant implications for activities covering nearly 50% of the Earth’s surface.

The High Seas Treaty establishes, for the first time, a legal mechanism to govern activities affecting biodiversity in the areas of the ocean that lie outside the jurisdiction of any single country (ie their Exclusive Economic Zones, typically 200 miles from their coastline).

The agreement was achieved after nearly 20 years of dialogue, much of which was carried by Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Indigenous peoples and coastal communities. For them, the relationship with the ocean is most direct and the threats to it are most existential.

The entry into force of such a significant legal instrument sends a powerful message on the value of collaboration, and its importance in confronting the environmental risks facing the economy and humanity.

The agreement will change the ways that activities taking place in the High Seas – and those affecting them – will be planned, monitored, managed and reported on. This level of transparency will drive a cycle of accountability and improvement in the relationship between our economy and the natural world on which it depends.

What you need to know

The treaty’s role as an international legal mechanism will have significant effects on companies and financial institutions to respond to.

Key outcomes

1. Increased transparency on ocean-based activities

The agreement sets out monitoring and transparency requirements of countries – including Environment Impact Assessments (EIA) – alongside high seas genetic material, samples and digital sequence data, as well as a publicly accessible database to promote publicly available real economy data and data exchange.

This means that many aspects of companies’ high seas-related projects will be accessible to stakeholders.

Anticipating increased public information on environmental studies and mitigation plans, companies should prepare to report on high seas activities, such as fishing, shipping, energy infrastructure, mining and bioprospecting, as well as potential impacts of new activities such as carbon dioxide removal technologies.

Companies can also further identify opportunities through new publicly available data and recognize the halo benefits that increased coverage of marine-protected areas brings.

2. Increased expectations on corporate disclosure

New EIAs will amplify the need for standardized corporate data on marine impact – coupled with growing investor and policy focus on companies’ high seas activities, strategies and governance.

Financial institutions (FIs) and regulators will expect companies to report on how they comply with treaty obligations such as the number of high seas environmental assessments completed, presence in protected areas, and contributions to capacity building.

Asset owners will ask for metrics on exposure to high seas biodiversity risks. Governments may require reporting from firms to compile national reports and monitor compliance.

Companies should expect new jurisdictional regulations on ocean activities, as Member States take steps to implement the Agreement, via enhanced environmental rules and disclosure obligations.

For FIs, there is increased focus on integrating ocean health into Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) analysis, with risks and opportunities in blue finance and sustainable ocean industries only going to grow.

This creates a need to ensure that portfolio companies are equipped to comply with new regulations and secure relevant permissions to operate in international waters. Failure to do so creates risks to ongoing operations as well as litigation and reputational exposure.

3. Strengthened multilateral collaboration

The agreement creates legal mechanisms for area-based management tools, including Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). For disclosers and financial institutions, this means enhancing readiness to adapt to exclusions or operating conditions on shipping lanes, fishing grounds, mining sites, and cable routes. Industries will need to track MPA designations and adjust operations (for example by rerouting vessels or ceasing extraction) to remain compliant.

CDP stands ready to support the ocean

Working with companies and data users, CDP will integrate and standardize key metrics needed to implement the High Seas Treaty. This ensures that stakeholders have the reliable, comparable data needed to implement collective goals, and companies can demonstrate their leadership on ocean stewardship.

From 2026 onwards, CDP will be expanding its questionnaire to gather ocean-related data. In the first year of disclosure, we will generate insights on processes for identifying, assessing, and managing ocean-related dependencies, impacts, risks, and opportunities.

This work is being done in collaboration with our Capital Markets Signatories – many of which have already shown demand for ocean-related data – and disclosing companies, focusing on those with the most significant ocean impacts and dependencies.

High Seas, higher ambitions

There is still much to do to improve the protection of marine areas and restoration of ocean health. But the BBNJ is a significant step forward in this effort.

In a year where nature is placed on the main stage of the international agenda, companies, FIs and governments alike have an opportunity to embed ocean health into global financial systems.

Countries must also complement the agreement with a drive to protect coastal waters not part of their direct control. Many ocean-impacting activities will not be constrained by the BBNJ. Only 4.2% of fishery production, for example, takes place on the high seas[2]. This means there will be a continued role for Member States to conserve and sustainably use the biological diversity in areas within their jurisdiction.

We must build momentum behind the opportunities enabled by this historic deal – collaboration and transparency will play a vital part in turning this momentum into action.

Footnotes

1. The treaty is formally called the ‘Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’, or ‘BBNJ’.
2. By volume, the total catch from the high seas accounts for 4.2% of annual marine capture fisheries production. Schiller L, Bailey M, Jacquet J, Sala E. ‘High seas fisheries play a negligible role in addressing global food security.’

Pietro Bertazzi is Chief Policy and interim Growth Officer, CDP, and Oliver Tanqueray is Head of Ocean, CDP.

Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is a global non-profit that runs the world’s only independent environmental disclosure system for companies, capital markets, cities, states and regions to manage their environmental impacts.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Credit: UN/Monicah Aturinda Kyeyune

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)

A sharp cut in funding for “South-South Cooperation” (UNOSSC) has triggered a strong protest from the 134-member Group of 77 (G-77), described as the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries within the United Nations.

The protest has been reinforced by four UN ambassadors, two of them former chairs of the G77—Colombia (1993) and South Africa (2015), along with Brazil and India.

Traditionally, the G77 has been backed by China, the world’s second largest economy, and a veto wielding member of the Security Council

A letter of protest, addressed to Alexander De Croo, Administrator, UN Development Programme (UNDP), which funds and oversees the UNOSSC, says South-South cooperation remains a central pillar of the work of the United Nations and is of particular importance to the Group of 77 and China.

The UNOSSC, established by the UN General Assembly at the initiative of the G-77, “plays a critical role in supporting, coordinating and implementing South-South and triangular cooperation initiatives and projects across the United Nations development system, including in support of the UN development agenda”.

“Against this background, the G-77 and China wish to express its serious concern regarding the significant reduction in resources proposed to be allocated by UNDP to UNOSSC under the 2026–2029 Strategic Framework,” says Ambassador Laura Dupuy Lasserre, Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations and Chair of the Group of 77, in a letter to the UNDP Administrator.

The scale of the proposed reduction is described as “substantial and, if implemented, would severely constrain the Office’s ability to effectively deliver on its mandate.”

The reduction is estimated at 46% of funds allocated by UNDP to UNOSSC under the proposed 2026-2029 Strategic Framework. And in dollar terms, the proposed allocation amounts to USD 16.6 million, down from the USD 30.7 million under the 2022-2025 Strategic Framework. (the amount actually disbursed was approximately USD 22 million).

Of particular concern is the potential impact of these funding reductions on the management and operational capacity of Trust Funds administered by UNOSSC, including the Perez-Guerrero Trust Fund for South-South Cooperation (PGTF) and other financing mechanisms that provide critical support to developing countries.

The G77 Chair has received a démarche from the Chair of the Committee of Experts of the PGTF conveying the concerns that the ability of the PGTF to continue fulfilling its regular operations might be at stake.

“Reduced institutional capacity to manage these Trust Funds would undermine their effectiveness and would have adverse consequences for beneficiary countries that rely on these instruments to advance development priorities”, warns the letter.

The Group of 77 (and China) is of the view that consideration of the proposed Strategic Framework requires further clarification before approval and should therefore be postponed.

Furthermore, the Group underscores the importance of continued transparency and structured dialogue with Member States.

“Any proposals involving the restructuring or reconfiguration of UNOSSC should be submitted for review and approval, in line with the fact that the Office was established by a resolution of the General Assembly and therefore falls under the authority of Member States.”

“In light of the above, the Group of 77 and China respectfully requests that UNDP give due consideration to all available options to substantially increase the allocation of resources to UNOSSC.”

Such action, the letter said, would be essential to safeguard the effective implementation of the Office’s mandate, protect the integrity and functionality of Trust Fund operations, and avoid negative impacts on developing countries.

Meanwhile, the letter from the four ambassadors reads:

• 1.  “South-South cooperation remains a central pillar of the work of the United Nations and is of particular importance to developing countries. The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation plays a vital role in supporting, coordinating and implementing South-South cooperation initiatives across the United Nations development system, including in support of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

2. It is, therefore, with grave concern that we note the dramatic reduction (46%) of funds allocated by UNDP to UNOSSC under the proposed 2026-2029 Strategic Framework: only USD 16.6 million, down from the USD 30.7 million allocated under the 2022-2025 Strategic Framework, the amount actually disbursed having been approximately USD 22 million.

3. While we fully understand the current financial difficulties faced by the UN system as a whole, we believe that the allocation of funds proposed to South-South cooperation imposes losses that are considerably higher than the average reduction experienced by UNDP programs. In addition, given the said current difficulties, it is even more likely that, in 2026-2029, the actual disbursement could be significantly less than the original allocation.

4. In this case, UNOSSC would be left with very modest funding. It is beyond doubt that expected deep cuts in funding will negatively and profoundly impact the Office’s ability to continue providing its invaluable support to developing countries, including in trust fund management. In this particular regard, reduced capacity in UNOSSC to properly support trust funds would be detrimental to the best interests of dozens of developing countries.

5. In light of the foregoing, we kindly request that UNDP promptly consider all means at its disposal to substantially increase allocation to UNOSSC, thus allowing for the effective implementation of the Office’s mandate and avoiding damage to many developing countries.

6. A second concern relates to the proposed shift of the Office toward a more policy-oriented approach, which could aggravate the steep cut in funding mentioned above. While we fully recognize the importance of policy guidance, we strongly believe that an appropriate balance between policy and programming functions must be preserved in UNOSSC, thus ensuring that strategic orientation is underpinned by adequate programmatic capacity.

7. We trust that these considerations will be duly taken into account, acted upon and unambiguously reflected in the final version of the Strategic Framework for 2026-2029.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Evelis Cano, mother of political prisoner Jack Tantak Cano, pleads with the police for her son’s release outside a detention centre in Caracas, Venezuela, 20 January 2026. Credit: Gaby Oraa/Reuters via Gallo Images

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Feb 2 2026 (IPS)

When US special forces seized Nicolás Maduro and his wife from the presidential residence in Caracas on 3 January, killing at least 24 Venezuelan security officers and 32 Cuban intelligence operatives in the process, many in the Venezuelan opposition briefly dared hope.

They speculated that intervention might finally bring the democratic transition thwarted when Maduro entrenched himself in power after losing the July 2024 election. But within hours, those hopes were crushed. Trump announced the USA would now ‘run’ Venezuela and Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in to replace Maduro. Venezuela’s sovereignty had been violated twice: first by an authoritarian regime that usurped the popular will, and then by an external power that deliberately violated international law.

A cynical intervention

Under Trump, the USA has abandoned any pretence of promoting democracy. Trump wrapped the intervention in the rhetoric of anti-narcotics operations while openly salivating over Venezuela’s oil reserves, rare earth deposits and investment opportunities. He repeatedly made clear that US regional hegemony is the number one priority. His contempt for Venezuelans’ right to self-determination was explicit: when asked about opposition leader María Corina Machado, Trump dismissed her as lacking ‘respect’ and ‘capacity to lead’. The message to Venezuela’s democratic movement was clear: your struggle doesn’t matter, only our interests do.

Ironically, the US intervention achieved what years of Maduro’s propaganda failed to do, giving anti-imperialist rhetoric a shot in the arm. For decades, Latin American authoritarian regimes have justified repression by pointing to the threat of US intervention, even though this was a largely historical grievance. Not anymore: Trump has handed every Latin American dictator the perfect justification for continuing authoritarian rule.

The global response has been equally revealing. The loudest defenders of national sovereignty are authoritarian powers such as China, Iran and Russia: states that routinely violate their citizens’ rights expressed their ‘solidarity with the people of Venezuela’ and positioned themselves as champions of international law. By blatantly violating a foundational principle of the post-1945 international order, Trump made the leaders of some of the world’s most repressive regimes look like the adults in the room. And across Latin America, the political conversation has now shifted dramatically: the question is no longer how to restore democracy in Venezuela, but how to prevent the next US military adventure in Latin America.

Authoritarianism continues

Meanwhile, Venezuela’s authoritarian regime remains intact. Maduro may be in a New York courtroom, but the structures that kept him in power—the corrupt military, embedded Cuban intelligence, patronage networks and the repressive apparatus – continue unchanged. Rodríguez will likely try to run down the clock, claiming Maduro could return at any moment to avoid calling elections while quietly negotiating oil deals with US companies and reasserting authoritarian control. For both Rodríguez and Trump, democracy seems like an inconvenient obstacle to resource extraction.

For Venezuelan civil society, this creates real dilemmas. As she was sworn in, Rodríguez denounced the operation that put her in charge and vowed that Venezuela would ‘never again be a colony of any empire’. She has wrapped herself in the flag, framing regime continuity as a patriotic stand against western imperialism, and can now easily paint opposition activists who have long demanded international pressure for democracy as treasonous collaborators with foreign powers. This is despite being an insider of a regime that welcomed Cuban intelligence, Iranian oil traders and Russian military advisers, and is now negotiating oil deals with the USA and crossing its own red line by promising legal changes to enable private investment.

A Venezuelan solution for Venezuela

But there may be some cracks in the regime. With Maduro gone, frictions inside the ruling party have become apparent. For instance, there have been obvious disagreements on how to handle the pressure to free Venezuela’s over 800 political prisoners. These may yield opportunities the democracy movement can exploit.

This is the time for the democratic opposition to reclaim the narrative. In the immediate aftermath of the intervention, families of political prisoners mounted vigils outside detention centres, demanding releases the government has only partially delivered. Civil society must amplify these voices, making clear that any transitional arrangement requires the dismantling of the repressive apparatus, not merely a change of faces at the top.

A broad coalition of civil society organisations has issued 10 demands that chart a path to democratic transition. They call for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners, the dismantling of irregular armed groups, unfettered access for human rights monitors and humanitarian aid and, crucially, a free and fair presidential election with international observers. These demands deserve international backing, not as conditions for oil contracts, but as non-negotiable requirements for any government that can claim to represent Venezuela.

Venezuela’s democratic forces can either accept marginalisation as Trump and Rodríguez carve up their country’s resources, or use this chaotic moment to advance a genuinely Venezuelan democratic agenda. That means rejecting both Maduro’s authoritarianism and Trump’s intervention, and insisting that any legitimacy Rodríguez’s government claims must come from Venezuelan voters, not US armed forces or oil contracts. Any window of opportunity may however be closing fast. The question is whether Venezuela’s democratic movement can seize it to build the country they have strived for, or whether they will remain spectators while others decide their fate.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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La province du Nayala a apporté une contribution significative à la campagne nationale de solidarité DEMÈ SIRA, avec une mobilisation financière totale de 1 395 895 FCFA, récoltée au terme de la collecte menée du 15 au 30 janvier 2026. Cette initiative a été lancée au niveau provincial par le haut-commissaire du Nayala, Honoré Frédéric Paré, dans le cadre du renforcement de la solidarité nationale.

Afin de garantir une participation large et inclusive des populations, 21 urnes ont été installées dans les huit secteurs de la ville de Toma, ainsi que dans plusieurs services administratifs. Cette stratégie de proximité a permis de susciter un fort engouement des populations et des structures locales autour de l'élan de solidarité nationale.

Le dépouillement des urnes des secteurs de la ville de Toma a eu lieu dans la matinée du 30 janvier 2026, au domicile du chef de canton de Toma, Émile Paré, en présence d'un comité provincial de suivi et de collecte. D'autres contributions ont été reçues dans l'après-midi de la même journée.
Le comité était composé notamment du haut-commissaire de la province, du secrétaire général de la province, du directeur provincial en charge de la solidarité nationale, du directeur provincial de la police nationale, ainsi que d'un représentant de l'Agence d'information du Burkina (AIB).

Selon les résultats du dépouillement, les collectes effectuées au niveau des structures statiques ont permis de mobiliser plus de 350 000 FCFA, tandis que la mobilisation communautaire, avec l'implication active des autorités coutumières et des populations de Toma, a porté le montant global à 1 395 895 FCFA, en incluant les contributions enregistrées dans l'après-midi du 30 janvier.

Prenant la parole à l'issue du dépouillement, le haut-commissaire Honoré Frédéric Paré a rappelé que la campagne DEMÈ SIRA s'inscrit dans une dynamique nationale, marquée par une caravane symbolique ayant parcouru l'ensemble du Burkina Faso. Arrivé dans la région le 16 novembre 2025, le flambeau de la solidarité a ensuite été transmis à la région des Tannounya, avant le déploiement effectif de la campagne dans les régions des Bankuy et du Sourou, puis au niveau provincial.

Le haut-commissaire a exprimé, au nom du gouvernement, sa profonde reconnaissance aux populations du Nayala pour leur esprit d'entraide et de solidarité, saluant particulièrement l'engagement des responsables coutumiers, avec à leur tête le chef de canton de Toma. Il a souligné que la transparence a été au cœur du processus, avec un dépouillement effectué publiquement et l'ouverture d'un compte dédié au Trésor public du Nayala, les résultats devant être communiqués à la hiérarchie.

Au-delà des contributions financières, la campagne a également enregistré des dons en nature, comprenant notamment du savon, des moustiquaires, des vivres et des nattes, témoignant de la diversité et de la générosité des contributions.
De son côté, le chef de canton de Toma, Émile Paré, a adressé ses remerciements aux populations pour leurs efforts louables, estimant que cette mobilisation sera appréciée à sa juste valeur par les plus hautes autorités du pays.

Y. I K-Z
Lefaso.net

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Hunger shadowed Mercy Lung’aho’s childhood, fueling her campaign to promote nutrition as a foundation for Africa’s development. As lead for the Food Security, Nutrition and Health Program at the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA), this certified nutritionist and researcher, with more than 20 years of championing development, is advocating for an integrated approach combining […]

President Donald Trump Joins Faith Leaders in Prayer – Credit: The White House
 
According to the UN, Sunday marked the start of World Interfaith Harmony Week, a time to emphasize that mutual understanding and interreligious dialogue are essential to building a culture of peace. The week was established to promote harmony among all people, regardless of their faith.

By Azza Karam
NEW YORK, Feb 2 2026 (IPS)

Several events, meetings, consultations, initiatives, etc. taking place among faith-inspired, ‘faith-based’ and a variety of other similar efforts, over the past year, in the United States especially, concern me.

Coming from a background of human rights, international development, and humanitarian service, I have witnessed the arc of ‘none’ to increasing interest by Western governments in ‘religion’ – religious engagement, religion and development, religion and foreign policy, religious freedom, religious peacebuilding, or religion and peace, and more, including even religion and agriculture. Basically, religion and everything.

Non-Western governments within Africa and Asia, including areas overlapping with what we call (variably) “the Middle East”, have long been interested, and indeed actively engaging religious leaders and religious institutions.

As many scholars, observers, and foreign policy pundits have noted, the interest of such governments has often transcended any genuine fascination with faith, towards rather obvious instrumentalization of religious leaders, religious organisations and religious groups, in support of specific political agendas (e.g., making peace with Israel, legitimacy of corrupt – and violent – politically repressive leaders and regimes, etc.).

In fact, the marriage between select religious leaders/institutions/groups and some political actors goes back to the empires we have inherited pre-Westphalian states).

I recall some stories from my time serving as a staff member at the United Nations, and in other international fora. The first story revolves around one Arab and one Indian diplomat speaking with a European counterpart, during one of several UN Strategic Learning Exchanges on Religion, Development and Diplomacy, which I coordinated and facilitated, this one in 2014.

The discussion concerned how best to “benefit” from working with religious leaders to affirm a message of certain political parties, especially, albeit not only, around elections. The Arab patted the European on the back and said, with a smile and a wink: “you are finally catching up on how to use these religious leaders – congratulations my friend”. The Indian one, looking bemused, added “Yes. And be careful”.

Another story concerns another meeting I organised – in one of the basement meeting rooms of the UN – between UN officials and a diverse array of religious actors, around peace and mediation efforts, in select African and Asian conflict settings, early 2015.

A European Christian religious leader of a renowned multi-religious organisation made an intervention to address the concerns about “instrumentalization” of religious actors, which some faith-based NGO leaders were articulating.

While some faith representatives cautioned against religious actors being used to “rubber stamp decisions already made by governments and some intergovernmental organisations” (in the room were both UN and EU officials), this particular Western Christian religious leader spoke up and said, “I am not worried about that at all, in fact, I would like to say to my secular colleagues in this room, please use us… we can certainly benefit you… we are not common civil society actors, our mission makes us exceptional”.

My last story, is from my time serving as the secretary general of an international multireligious organisation which convenes religious leaders from diverse religious institutions around “deeply held and widely shared values”.

As soon as I became a member of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, I arranged a meeting between some of my multi-religious Board members (religious leaders), and some members of this high Level UN SG’s Advisory Board.

The idea was to nurture a quiet but candid dialogue between pollical and religious leaders, around why and how multilateralism can be significantly strengthened by multireligious engagement.

I hasten to note that multireligious engagement, if served well, can be – as I have written and persistently argued – resistant to instrumentalization of select religious actors to serve any one particular governmental agenda. The latter is a feature I warn against, and small wonder, given developments from India to the United States, from Russia to Israel, and beyond.

Once again, I heard a religious leader invite the members of the SG’s Board to “use” their (religious) wisdom because of their “exceptional” mission (presumably the godly one). This time, later reflection among members of the UN SG Board led to noting that such multireligious engagement would be inadvisable, due to a concern about “Muslims” involved in such multireligious spaces.

Fast forward to 2026, one year after an increasingly belligerent US Presidential Administration’s record, which includes relatively ‘minor’ policy decisions such as transforming the name of the Ministry of Defence to the “Ministry of War”. And not so minor human rights abuses of citizens and immigrants, and some pointing to manipulation and outright disregard of the rule of law, both at home and abroad (I hope this is polite enough wording). Of course one dares not mention support to certain genocidal regimes killing thousands in the name of self-protection.

In this environment, I listen to conversations among some of the United States’ most esteemed faith-based organisations, all with a remarkable track record of serving humanity in all corners of the world. Who, apparently, are seeking to engage this Administration “constructively”, with some praising the “unprecedented” outreach of members of this Administration in engaging, largely (some would say exclusively), with certain Christian NGOs, certain Christian religious leaders, and certain Christian faith protagonists – no doubt to further noble objectives. Apparently, this is a form of strategic engagement of/with religion.

Even though there were likely some who felt uncomfortable with aspects of this rhetoric, the studiously diplomatic silences – including my own – about challenging anything said, was noteworthy. The bottom line is, “we need access to the White House… we need more resources to do our (good) work”.

Why was I silent? Because I am the quintessential ‘other’ whose outspokenness has already earned me the loss of a sense of ‘home’ and security, many times over. This is neither excuse nor justification, rather, an acknowledgement of cowardice.

Into this Kafkaesque reality, let me ask a few questions I am battling with: what will it take to speak truth to power publicly – the way Minnesotans and Palestinians are having to do with their own regimes? Is it strategic to be silent, or such consummate diplomats, especially when we work in the name of the ‘godly’ – being such “exceptional” actors?

Conversely, is this Administration which we endeavour to be so tactful with, being silent about it’s “divine mission”? Is being “nice and essentially a kind person with their heart in the right place”, and doing godly work, a good reason to work with those who are serving regimes which ignore the rule of law in their own nation and abroad? Does faith-based diplomacy mean we either collude, remain silent, or take the struggle to the streets?

If so, what difference is faith-based diplomacy and engagement actually making to civic engagement, to honoring human rights and the rule of law, or to serving principled leadership? Or do these simply not matter since it is the self-interests of the ruling and rich few, are what matters to determine the integrity of life, planet and leadership?

Perhaps we should ponder the advice of the Indian Diplomat, given to his Western counterpart 22 years ago: how can we “be careful”?

Professor Azza Karam serves as President of Lead Integrity; and Director of the Kahane UN Program, for Occidental College’s Diplomacy and World Affairs.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Ministers are holding a series of meetings in parliamentary committees to present the priorities of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council.
Committee on Constitutional Affairs
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development
Committee on Culture and Education
Committee on Development
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on International Trade
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Legal Affairs
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
Committee on Fisheries
Committee on Security and Defence
Committee on Transport and Tourism

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

President Trump’s economic policy has disrupted global trade by imposing high tariffs and generating sustained uncertainty for partners. The European Union is among the most exposed actors. To assess its strategic options, this policy note interprets this trade policy as an interactive reform process rather than a coherent economic doctrine.

That tariff policy follows a non-linear pattern, characterised by abrupt shifts, shifting coalitions of domestic winners, and limited reliance on institutional expertise. Rather than reflecting a stable economic strategy, tariffs function as a tool of political realignment and bargaining leverage. This dynamic creates persistent analytical uncertainty, complicating the response of allies and markets.

By following a reform-process approach, the note identifies the political logic, distributional effects, and structural weaknesses of the tariff strategy. Understanding these features will help assess and inform the EU’s policymaking strategy and frame the broader policy discourse in an unstable trade order.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Angelos Karayannopoulos, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Emanating from this uncertain landscape, policies associated with “Trump Tariffs” have been challenging to analyse, as they represent a rather ongoing process.

The Trump Administration 2.0 trade policy has been defined by uncertainty. Uncertainty was first generated in the first months of the Administration by the unprecedented shift in the global economic order, adopting a protectionist-leaning trade policy that questioned the very foundations of the world trade system. Along the way, uncertainty was fuelled by repeated, often contradictory announcements, delays in implementing decisions, revisions, ongoing negotiations, and relapses in escalations of aggression vis-à-vis trade partners and competitors. Emanating from this uncertain landscape, policies associated with “Trump Tariffs” have been challenging to analyse, as they represent a rather ongoing process.

Several studies have tried to estimate the economic implications. According to modelling by Yale’s Budget Lab, the tariffs implemented through October 2025 are projected to result in a short-term increase in consumer prices of approximately 1.3%. Furthermore, it is anticipated that annual GDP growth will decrease by approximately 0.5% between 2025 and 2026. The impact of these tariffs varies across sectors, with prices for clothing, leather goods, and metals rising by 28% to 40%. In the long term, the economy is forecast to be approximately 0.4% smaller, equivalent to about $125 billion annually. By the end of 2025, unemployment is expected to increase by 0.3 percentage points, with a further 0.7 percentage point increase by 2026.

Figure 1: U.S Average Effective Tariff Rate Since January 1, 2025

Source: The Budget LabSource: The Budget Lab analysis. Created with Datawrapper

Although this process appears to have entered by October 2025 a more structured phase, where actors involved already expect at least minimum consequences from the new era of US-led trade protectionism, it is necessary to put this process into a frame in which we can better analyse the associated consequences and response strategies from actors directly affected. Regarding the EU, the European Commission had initially drafted a €26 billion counter-tariff package but froze it amid a temporary 90-day truce announced by Washington. The “Turnberry deal” that followed capped US tariffs on most European exports at 15 per cent, half of what had been threatened, but kept the 50 per cent duties on steel and aluminium firmly in place. Brussels framed the compromise as “the best possible under the circumstances”, though few viewed it as a victory. France’s then Prime Minister called it “a dark day for transatlantic trade”, while Germany and Italy quietly accepted it as damage control. The asymmetry of the arrangement, Europe cautious, Washington defiant, seems to reflect a broader strategy within Trump’s circle, which leverages uncertainty and unpredictability.

Equally salient is the tariff regime’s standing under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Several measures are plainly inconsistent with US obligations under WTO rules, and that institutional mismatch matters for two reasons. First, it signals to other actors that rules can be subordinated to unilateral leverage, thereby amplifying global uncertainty. Second, it also opens a parallel front of response, allowing partners to challenge the policy through WTO litigation, to coordinate pressure via new coalitions, or even to pursue alternative rule-making outside the traditional multilateral framework.

By breaking from previous tariff norms, the US signals both a shift in bargaining strategy and an intention to reshape the underlying logic of global trade engagement.

So while many viewed the Turnberry deal as a setback for Europe, its more profound significance is that it represents a fundamental rupture in the post-war global economic order, one whose elements remain blurry and purpose ambiguous. This rupture challenges the post-1945 framework of multilateral trade rules, embedded reciprocity, and predictable dispute-resolution mechanisms that have historically underpinned transatlantic commerce and investment flows. By breaking from previous tariff norms, the US signals both a shift in bargaining strategy and an intention to reshape the underlying logic of global trade engagement.

Understanding this rupture and its purpose, however, first requires taking a step back: how did this policy come about in the first place? Who supports this policy, whose interests are at stake? How, then, is this reform of the fundamental trade dogmas evolving, and what lessons can friends and foes acquire from this process? Answering these questions is critical because reforms of this magnitude cannot be assessed solely through economic metrics; they are embedded in complex political dynamics, institutional constraints, and the distributional consequences that define domestic and international legitimacy. It is not easy to assess both the US emerging context and the EU’s response strategy without first answering these fundamental questions. Failing to identify actors, coalitions, and underlying motivations risks misinterpreting both the policy’s logic and its potential outcomes.

It is thus crucial to frame the new tariff policy within a reform-process approach, assessing not only the policy instruments themselves but also how they were conceived, communicated, and implemented. Viewing the policy in this way allows for a nuanced understanding of how reforms evolve under uncertainty.

Reform Assessment 

Characteristics 

Like taxes, tariffs redistribute economic resources across sectors, firms, and households, creating both beneficiaries and those who bear direct or indirect costs. […] Its success thus depends not only on technical design but also on credible leadership and public trust.

Changes in tariffs resemble tax reforms, and tax reforms are “inherently difficult and a politically charged process”[1]. Like taxes, tariffs redistribute economic resources across sectors, firms, and households, creating both beneficiaries and those who bear direct or indirect costs. They are not neutral interventions; instead, they restructure incentives, alter market signals, and can produce knock-on effects across supply chains and consumer prices. This kind of reform encounters resistance from entrenched interests, including both domestic producers and import-dependent industries, which may lobby vigorously to protect their positions. Its success thus depends not only on technical design but also on credible leadership and public trust. In the US, where trust in public institutions stands at around 34% (OECD, 2024), this creates an additional obstacle: low confidence in governance amplifies scepticism, encourages political polarisation, and increases the likelihood of compliance gaps or public backlash. Consequently, any attempt to impose fundamental tariff reforms must begin with precise attention to both policy design and the clarity of its stated purpose. Clear objectives are essential to overcoming institutional friction and aligning stakeholders around a shared understanding of the reform’s objectives.

Donald Trump’s electoral victory in November 2024 reshaped the political landscape, creating the conditions for a new wave of policy experimentation. Among these, tariff reform emerged through a “window of opportunity”[2] in which public dissatisfaction with globalisation (problem), protectionist ideas (policy), and a nationalist political climate (politics) converged.

Donald Trump’s electoral victory in November 2024 reshaped the political landscape, creating the conditions for a new wave of policy experimentation. Among these, tariff reform emerged through a “window of opportunity”[2] in which public dissatisfaction with globalisation (problem), protectionist ideas (policy), and a nationalist political climate (politics) converged[3]. These “windows” are critical junctures in reform theory, representing periods when political, societal, and economic conditions align to allow for initiatives that entrenched interests might otherwise block. Trump, acting as a “policy entrepreneur”, seized this moment with a symbolic solution of high political appeal but low economic coherence, illustrating how political incentives often outweigh technocratic rationality in such contexts. Policy entrepreneurs are actors who mobilise attention and resources to attach specific policy ideas to these moments, shaping both the content and timing of reforms in ways that resonate with their political base. Such reforms rarely succeed. Trump Tariffs, too, seem unlikely to achieve the economic goals the Administration attaches to them in the short- to medium-term. Still, they serve as a strategic move to generate negotiation leverage. 

Figure 2: Trump’s Window of Opportunity

 

 Source: Author’s illustration, based on Kingdon (1984) and Aberbach & Christensen (2014).

 

The reform’s uncertainty stems from a lack of a coherent strategy understood by both experts and the actors involved. Uncertainty in this context arises from both the ambiguity of stated goals and the erratic sequencing of policy measures, leaving stakeholders unable to anticipate outcomes or plan accordingly. In his political economy framework, Rodrik (1993) emphasises that “identifying who benefits and who bears the costs is essential while assessing a reform”[4]. Without this mapping, policymaking risks misallocating support, generating opposition, and undermining credibility. For tariffs, this translates into narrow, fragmented domestic coalitions: producers of protected goods may celebrate immediate gains, while consumers, downstream industries, and exporters face hidden or delayed costs. When this distribution is unclear, reforms are often blocked, diluted, or derailed entirely, as competing interests contest both the measure’s legitimacy and its impact.

Trump’s policy design and objectives appear less economic than political, aimed at creating leverage in international trade negotiations and consolidating support from key domestic actors.

Furthermore, economists tend to attribute deviations from efficiency to vague “political motives”[5], thus overlooking the complex political dynamics that actually shape reform adoption and durability. In this case, however, Trump’s policy design and objectives appear less economic than political, aimed at creating leverage in international trade negotiations and consolidating support from key domestic actors. In other words, tariffs act less as calibrated economic instruments and more as signals to allies, competitors, and the domestic base, serving as a deliberate policy to structure perceptions and incentives rather than to correct market failures.

…“bring back manufacturing” can therefore gain traction not because it resolves a clearly defined economic problem, but because it fits a political narrative, is available at the right moment, and mobilises relevant constituencies.

These characteristics reflect what Aberbach and Christensen (2014) describe as a “high-ambiguity reform model”, often referred to in the academic literature as the “garbage-can” model of policymaking. The term is not normative but technical, denoting decision-making processes in which problems, solutions, and political attention move in parallel rather than sequentially. In such environments, solutions are often pre-packaged, and policy choices emerge when these elements temporarily coincide. A measure such as “bring back manufacturing” can therefore gain traction not because it resolves a clearly defined economic problem, but because it fits a political narrative, is available at the right moment, and mobilises relevant constituencies. This places the reform closer to a symbolic or narrative-driven act than a carefully calibrated economic intervention. Tariffs, in this sense, function performatively, shaping public discourse, signalling resolve internationally, and activating domestic coalitions even when their economic effects remain uncertain.

Altogether, the US Administration appears to clearly follow a highly “interactive model” of reform, in which policies evolve during implementation and are prone to being shaped by reactions from key stakeholders[6]. And this is a key understanding for friends and foes: in this interactive framework, policymaking is iterative rather than linear. This means that initial designs are adjusted in response to feedback from markets, industry lobbies, unions, or foreign governments. Here, the stated goals are vague but politically salient: restore domestic manufacturing, reduce trade deficits, decouple from China, and negotiate better deals with strategic partners. However, consistent with interactive models, implementation has been non-linear, marked by continuous redefinition, resistance, and episodes of market turbulence. Internationally, such unpredictability pressures partners to return to the negotiating table, potentially increasing the US’s bargaining power, as observed in engagements with the EU, among others. Domestically, however, outcomes are uneven. The interactive process produces winners and losers who may not align neatly along predictable lines, leaving policy outcomes contingent on power, influence, and negotiation skill. Who, then, are the key actors shaping this interactive process? Understanding their networks, incentives, and access to the administration is critical to forecasting the trajectory of Trump’s trade policy.

Actors and coalitions

Tariffs activated interest groups according to their economic and political leverage. Table 1 outlines the key leading actors and stakeholders in this process, illustrating their positions and the tensions that define the interactive model.

But who actually holds influence over the President? To understand the political motivations behind this reform, it is necessary to identify and monitor the coalition driving it.

Table 1: Key Actors and Coalitions Overview

Category Group/Actor Interest/Position Relevance Winners Certain US manufacturers (e.g., steel, aluminium) Support protectionist policies to reduce foreign competition Gain temporary market advantage; politically vocal Certain labour unions (e.g., UAW) Tentative support; hope to preserve jobs in targeted sectors Provide political legitimacy to tariffs Losers Consumers Face higher prices and a reduced variety of goods Broad-based economic impact, especially on low-income groups Retailers (e.g., Walmart, Amazon) Disrupted supply chains; higher costs Large employers and lobbyists are against tariffs Automotive industry (e.g., Ford, GM) Costlier production due to tariffs on parts Influence industrial policy and public debate Farmers Victims of retaliatory tariffs on exports Politically sensitive group Key Stakeholders Financial Sector (e.g., investment banks, Wall Street) Oppose trade instability; favour predictability and open markets Indirect but consequential influence through market reactions and lobbying E-commerce platforms (e.g., Shein, Temu) Affected by the de minimis rule changes Pushback through lobbying and legal channels US government/trade agencies Set and enforce tariff policy Shape the direction of the protectionist agenda

In theory, competing coalitions shape reform by leveraging resources and legitimacy to promote solutions and influence institutional arenas[7]. In this case, traditional pro-trade voices, such as consumer groups, major retailers, and the automotive industry, have been sidelined. Instead, a new “design coalition”[8] has emerged, uniting protectionist advisors, domestic steel and aluminium manufacturers, and labour unions like the United Auto Workers. This coalition strategically framed the tariffs as a patriotic move to revive American manufacturing, aligning with Trump’s agenda. Their ability to displace established advisory bodies and bypass expert consultation equally reflects the shift toward the interactive model, one that rewards salience, symbolism, and strategic positioning over traditional deliberation. Yet, it does not guarantee success.

At the centre of Trump’s new trade coalition stands Peter Navarro, reinstated as Senior Counsellor for Trade and Manufacturing. Navarro functions less as a bureaucrat than as a strategic ideologue. His framing of “reciprocal tariffs” as a question of fairness rather than efficiency has again struck a chord with the president. In practice, Navarro supplies both the conceptual blueprint and the political language of protectionism. His constant proximity to Trump, through Oval Office briefings and media coordination, gives him unparalleled access and agenda-setting power.

Around him operates a small circle of ideologues, including Miran, whose recent work provides the intellectual scaffolding for the new tariff rationale. In his paper “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System” in November 2024, Miran outlined a comprehensive plan to redesign global trade rules. His approach treats tariffs not as fiscal tools but as instruments of structural correction, meant to revive America’s industrial capacity, which he argues has been hollowed out by decades of asymmetric globalisation. At the core of his diagnosis lies a perceived distortion in the international monetary order: the US dollar’s reserve status, while conferring global privilege, simultaneously undermines US competitiveness by sustaining an overvalued currency. The outcome, in his view, is a chronic trade imbalance that erodes manufacturing and widens socio-economic divides in America’s industrial heartlands.

It is worth noting, however, that Miran’s blueprint ends with a sober caveat, stating that “[t]here is a path by which the Trump Administration can reconfigure the global trading and financial systems to America’s benefit, but it is narrow, and will require careful planning, precise execution, and attention to steps to minimise adverse consequences. This disclaimer matters because the administration’s rollout shows the opposite mix, and the mismatch between a disciplined intellectual roadmap and ad hoc managerial practice helps explain why a fragile path to systemic change has, so far, become a broad avenue of organisational failure.

Going back to the actors behind the new tariff regime, implementation largely falls to Howard Lutnick, the new Secretary of Commerce. A financier by background, Lutnick serves as the operational pillar of the administration’s trade structure. Once Navarro’s concepts gain presidential approval, they are translated into policy through the Commerce Department. Lutnick oversees the tariff schedule, exemption mechanisms, and enforcement procedures. He also maintains regular contact with industrial lobbies, particularly in autos, steel, and energy, to apply pressure and align protectionist measures with domestic business interests. Less ideological than Navarro but equally loyal to Trump, Lutnick’s strength lies in execution. His role ensures that ideology becomes administrative and that campaign slogans become regulatory instruments.

Bridging these two spheres is Jamieson Greer, the US Trade Representative (USTR). A veteran of the first Trump administration, Greer now serves as the system’s legal and diplomatic interface. His office formalises tariff actions in more proper language, manages negotiations, and integrates political objectives into trade agreements. In the July 2025 deal with the EU, Greer coordinated the partial rollback of auto tariffs in exchange for European concessions on LNG imports and investment flows.

Navarro dominates moments of escalation, crafting slogans and recasting Europe as an “unfair trader”. Greer intervenes during negotiations to codify those impulses into agreements. Lutnick, meanwhile, ensures continuity by translating presidential instinct into policy routines. Together they form a vertically integrated chain of influence: Navarro provides doctrine, Greer manages diplomacy, and Lutnick enforces implementation. 

Navarro dominates moments of escalation, crafting slogans and recasting Europe as an “unfair trader”. Greer intervenes during negotiations to codify those impulses into agreements. Lutnick, meanwhile, ensures continuity by translating presidential instinct into policy routines. Together they form a vertically integrated chain of influence: Navarro provides doctrine, Greer manages diplomacy, and Lutnick enforces implementation. This inner circle has marginalised moderating voices from the National Economic Council and the Treasury, both of which were diminished in Trump’s second term. The balance of power has thus shifted decisively toward the protectionist bloc. This configuration makes further tariff escalation with the EU not only plausible but structurally embedded in the administration’s policymaking logic. In this structure, however, it is worth remembering that Trump remains the final arbiter, shaping policy-making through personal, isolated decisions, often controversial and often isolated from expert advice.

In addition, by sidelining the dominant channels of economic expertise and despite a broad consensus on the tariffs’ economic harm, this coalition has already achieved a significant political and paradigmatic shift in the US economic policymaking. 

In addition, by sidelining the dominant channels of economic expertise and despite a broad consensus on the tariffs’ economic harm, this coalition has already achieved a significant political and paradigmatic shift in the US economic policymaking. This raises questions about the policy’s stability, as in democratic settings, experts serve dual roles: they inform decisions and foster clarity in public debate[9]. Both functions have been absent here. Beyond this coalition, key actors around economic and trade policy oppose the reform, and others, including  Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, have struggled to justify the policy or predict its distributional effects. This cleavage creates further confusion about the policy’s implications, raising questions about the polarised, highly top-down nature of the reform strategy. Moreover, reform political theory shows that this kind of exclusionary policymaking rarely delivers sustainable outcomes. In particular, citizen participation[10] and local knowledge[11] help legitimate such complex reforms, such as tariffs. In the US, due to low levels of trust, such inclusive mechanisms were more necessary but absent, with decisions driven by a closed executive circle. Taken together, the lack of deliberation, marginalisation of experts, and political opacity already undermine the reform’s legitimacy and long-term success as much as its questionable economic rationale.

Domestic and Ideological Ecosystem

Beyond the White House’s inner circle, Trump’s trade strategy rests on a broad and uneven domestic ecosystem, an assemblage of industrial lobbies, labour organisations, and ideological networks that together provide legitimacy, pressure, and political reinforcement. 

Beyond the White House’s inner circle, Trump’s trade strategy rests on a broad and uneven domestic ecosystem, an assemblage of industrial lobbies, labour organisations, and ideological networks that together provide legitimacy, pressure, and political reinforcement. This coalition functions less as a single bloc than as a layered structure in which manufacturing, energy, and conservative policy circles converge around a shared narrative.

At its foundation lie the manufacturing and energy sectors, the backbone of Trump’s tariff constituency. Groups such as the Coalition for a Prosperous America (Zach Mottl) and the Alliance for American Manufacturing (Scott Paul) have welcomed the 2025 measures as a long-overdue “reset” to restore industrial competitiveness. Steel producers were among the first to rally. The Steel Manufacturers Association (Philip Bell), the American Iron & Steel Institute (Kevin Dempsey), and major firms, including US Steel, Nucor, and Cleveland-Cliffs, all endorsed the revival of Section 232 tariffs, describing them as essential to counter global overcapacity. Their alignment with the administration has not been incidental: the sector’s strategic and symbolic role as “industrial America reborn” anchors Trump’s economic narrative. Support has also come from adjacent industries. The United Auto Workers union, representing roughly 400,000 workers, called tariffs “a victory” in the effort to reshore jobs. In contrast, construction, energy, and agricultural associations are more wary of this reform, with different interests taking different approaches towards the White House. Finally, the labour union federation AFL-CIO expressed caution, warning that “tariffs without a plan will lead to economic harm” and insisting on parallel industrial and labour-market policies.

Behind this patchwork of sectoral interests lies an organised intellectual infrastructure that sustains the administration’s economic nationalism. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 serves as its doctrinal anchor, describing the trade policy central to the renaissance of the American manufacturing and defence industrial base, and advocating a tariff regime built on “reciprocity”. Similar lines emerge from another key think-tank behind Trump’s agenda, the American Compass, led by economist Oren Cass, which hailed the tariff plan as proof that “the disastrous WTO era” has ended.

A combination of actors inside and outside the government has created the coalition driving this delicate reform, which aims at changing the very foundations of the post-war economic apparatus.

Hence, we can monitor how the driving coalition’s coordination across this ecosystem unfolds through both formal and informal channels. A combination of actors inside and outside the government has created the coalition driving this delicate reform, which aims at changing the very foundations of the post-war economic apparatus. Still, the coalition remains largely fragile. Market reactions to new tariffs have been volatile, and consumer groups, investors, and US allies continue to express unease. Even sympathetic voices warn that protectionism without parallel industrial policy risks hollowing out its own social base. The architecture of Trump’s trade coalition shows adequate coherence at the top but fragmentation below, confirming the hypothesis that the system is held together less by institutional design than by political momentum.

Collective assessment

Having mapped the key actors and interests driving the tariff agenda, the next step is to consolidate this information within an analytical framework that can capture both the politics and the process. The framework developed by Marsh and McConnell (2010)[12] offers precisely such a lens. Conceived to evaluate public policy success in multidimensional terms, it moves beyond the binary of “success or failure” to assess how political, programmatic, and process elements interact over time. Rather than treating outcomes as fixed, it sees them as fluid, being constantly shaped by institutions, coalitions, and shifting perceptions of legitimacy. This approach is beneficial for analysing reforms like Trump’s tariff programme, whose logic is as much political as it is economic.

In this model, political success reflects a policy’s ability to generate and sustain support among key constituencies. Tariff reform meets this criterion only partially. It resonates with Trump’s electoral base by framing trade as a question of sovereignty and fairness, yet polls show declining approval among moderates and business-oriented Republicans. Programmatic success, in turn, refers to the policy’s effectiveness in achieving its stated goals and addressing the problem it was designed to solve. Here, the record is weaker: the tariffs have increased costs and uncertainty, while their contribution to reshoring remains limited. Implementation thus becomes crucial, weighing as both a technical and a political variable in our assessment. In a context of multiple rates, country-specific carve-outs, and intricate rules of origin, customs administrations face heavy demands that strain their systems. Where capacity gaps exist, complexity invites uneven enforcement, discretionary arbitrage, and, in extreme cases, rent-seeking; incoherence thus mutates into additional risk. Finally, process success measures the quality of governance, such as the degree of consultation, coherence, and institutional learning involved. By this standard, the reform fares poorly. Decision-making has been top-down, consultation selective, and interagency coordination has often been bypassed.

It reminds policymakers that responding to the tariff agenda requires considering, or even engaging with, all three fronts: political, programmatic, and procedural. 

Understanding these three dimensions helps decode the apparent contradictions of the tariff regime. It reveals how a policy can be politically salient yet analytically fragile, adequate in narrative terms, but deficient in design and execution. For international observers and engaged partners, especially within the EU, this framework also has a strategic value. It reminds policymakers that responding to the tariff agenda requires considering, or even engaging with, all three fronts: political, programmatic, and procedural. In other words, in a comprehensive counter-strategy, purely economic arguments will remain inadequate. Recognising that Trump’s trade policy functions as an ongoing political process rather than a fixed economic doctrine will thus allow European actors to perceive it more accurately and, therefore, craft adaptive responses and measures that are less vulnerable to sudden shifts in US strategy. In this sense, the framework is not only diagnostic but also prescriptive, providing the conceptual discipline needed to command policy strategy in an inherently volatile policy environment.

Table 2: Assessment of Trump Tariffs’ Success

Dimension Assessment of Trump’s Tariffs Process Success Weak: Top-down, opaque, lacking consultation and public engagement Programmatic Weak: unclear goals, rising costs, retaliation risks Political Moderate: energises base, builds new coalition, frames foreign competition as a national threat

Based on: Marsh & McConnell (2010): “Towards a framework for establishing policy success”[13]

Conclusion

Internationally, tariffs function more as a negotiating instrument than a coherent trade policy; domestically, they operate as a narrative device, reinforcing Trump’s political messaging about restoring manufacturing and protecting American jobs.

The US tariff reform has been designed and implemented in ways that reform theory suggests are unlikely to succeed. Setting aside the risks it poses to the global economy, its economic rationale is weak, its objectives unclear, and its execution inconsistent. Yet these very weaknesses illustrate how power, ideology, and uncertainty now interact in the making of American trade policy, creating a coalition driving a highly disputed reform. Internationally, tariffs function more as a negotiating instrument than a coherent trade policy; domestically, they operate as a narrative device, reinforcing Trump’s political messaging about restoring manufacturing and protecting American jobs, thereby regaining economic sovereignty.

 

Recent judicial developments should also be taken into consideration when assessing the reform holistically. Lower federal courts have already found core elements of the tariff scheme unconstitutional, and the pending Supreme Court review could convert legal contestation into a decisive political variable. Judicial pushback does more than test legality; it can alter tactical choices within the administration (appeals, selective implementation, and legal workarounds), recalibrate bargaining leverage abroad, and create deadlines and windows for negotiation that political actors must account for.

The result is a system that is at once personalised and unpredictable, a policy arena that privileges immediacy over institutional coherence.

The reform process reflects elements of both the aforementioned high-ambiguity and interactive models of policymaking. As in the high-ambiguity reform model, solutions precede problems, so tariffs emerge as pre-packaged answers to diffuse labelled grievances such as economic decline, deindustrialisation and trade deficits. The interactive elements lie in how these policies mutate through feedback loops of crisis, shifted coalitions and opposition, and negotiation. Rather than linear policy design, we see a process of continuous adaptation, in which actors improvise around presidential impulses and external reactions, insulated primarily from expert advice. The result is a system that is at once personalised and unpredictable, a policy arena that privileges immediacy over institutional coherence. Or, in other words, a chaotic and conflict-prone policy environment, where outcomes are contingent on political manoeuvring rather than strategic design.

Framing this process through the proposed multidimensional framework clarifies why this reform endures politically despite its fragility. Politically, it speaks to the core constituencies and re-anchors Trump’s electoral narrative, even as broader public approval erodes. Programmatically, it remains weak, producing short-term symbolic victories but slight measurable improvement in economic performance. Process-wise, it shows minimal coordination and consultation, driven more by loyalty networks than by bureaucratic or expert procedure. Taken together, these dimensions depict a reform that succeeds in communication inside the party’s electoral base but fails as national policy.

For Europe, this analysis carries immediate strategic implications. To adapt to this new transatlantic relationship and respond effectively to future additional trade negotiations, EU policymakers must treat US actions not as static measures to be countered, but as interactive processes to be handled carefully. Tariff levels, exemptions, and bilateral deals will likely continue to fluctuate because the system that generates them is inherently unstable. Negotiators and analysts should therefore build strategies premised on volatility, crafting flexible instruments to manage recurrent shifts, such as rapid-response mechanisms, conditional retaliation frameworks, and coordinated communication channels[14]. The objective is not to mirror US escalation, but rather to remain salient within it, to anticipate rather than react.

Figure 3: Handling Unstable US Trade Policy

 

Source: Author’s illustration, synthesising insights from policy analysis and reform theory.

 

By reading US trade politics through the frameworks presented here, negotiators can better distinguish performative conflict from substantive negotiation, thereby reducing the risk of overreacting to symbolic measures.

Moreover, understanding the dynamics behind the tariff regime helps disentangle intent from outcome. Recognising that Trump’s trade policy operates simultaneously as an electoral project, an ideological statement, and a negotiating tactic could enable Europeans to prioritise engagement where material interests align and to contain disputes where they do not. By reading US trade politics through the frameworks presented here, negotiators can better distinguish performative conflict from substantive negotiation, thereby reducing the risk of overreacting to symbolic measures.

Capturing this concept is essential. Codifying the reform’s nature as a policy process reveals that it is interactive, unpredictable, and highly non-linear – qualities that ensure volatility will persist even after temporary deals, such as the July compromise. This unpredictability could also explain why criticism of the EU’s response often misses the bigger picture: the very object of that response is unstable, fragmented, and subject to sudden shifts.

Understanding trade reform in this way provides a firmer foundation for assessing policy choices in this new global economic landscape. The US is no longer operating within a stable, rules-based framework. This makes traditional forecasting inadequate. Instead, analytical capacity must now focus on process-tracking, which involves monitoring better networks of influence, institutional signals, and domestic political incentives. Policymakers should expect reversals, disputes, and evolving coalitions to shape their trajectory. Only by situating Europe’s options within this broader context of how the US trade policy is formulated can public debate and strategic planning become more coherent. In short, understanding the how of Trump’s tariff policy is now as important as understanding the what. Ultimately, this perspective not only helps interpret the current turbulence but also anticipates future disruptions in the global trade order.

[1]J. Martinez-Vazquez, Successful tax reforms in the recent international experience: Lessons in political economy and the nuts and bolts of increasing country tax revenue effort, ICEPP Working Papers, Paper 214, 2021.

[2] J. Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, Boston: Little, Brown, 1984.

[3] J.D. Aberbach & T. Christensen, Why reforms so often disappoint, The American Review of Public Administration, 44(1), 2014, pp. 3–16.

[4] D. Rodrik, The positive economics of policy reform, The American Economic Review, 83(2), 1993, pp. 356–361.

[5] Ibid.

[6] J. Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, Boston: Little, Brown, 1984. See also J.W. Thomas & M.S. Grindle, After the decision: Implementing policy reforms in developing countries, World Development, 18(8), 1990, pp. 1163–1181.

[7] K. Orach, M. Schlüter & H. Österblom, Tracing a pathway to success: How competing interest groups influenced the 2013 EU Common Fisheries Policy reform, Environmental Science & Policy, 76, 2017, pp. 90–102.

[8] L. Haelg, S. Sewerin & T.S. Schmidt, The role of actors in the policy design process: Introducing design coalitions to explain policy output, Policy Sciences, 53(2), 2020, pp. 309–347.

[9] M. Schudson, The trouble with experts – and why democracies need them, Theory and Society, 35, 2006, pp. 491–506.

[10] A. Michels & L. De Graaf, Examining citizen participation: Local participatory policy making and democracy, Local Government Studies, 36(4), 2010, pp. 477–491.

[11] F. Fischer, Citizen participation and the democratization of policy expertise: From theoretical inquiry to practical cases, Policy Sciences, 26(3), 1993, pp. 165–187.

[12] D. Marsh & A. McConnell, Towards a framework for establishing policy success, Public Administration, 88(2), 2010, pp. 564–583.

[13] D. Marsh & A. McConnell, Towards a framework for establishing policy success, Public Administration, 88(2), 2010, pp. 564–583.

[14] A more comprehensive strategy for the EU was initially proposed by T. Gehrke, in “Brussels hold’em: European cards against Trumpian coercion”, ECFR/576, 2025. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Brussels-holdem-European-cards-against-Trumpian-coercion.pdf

Following the conclusion of the World Economic Forum in Davos, ELIAMEP’s experts share their views on the strategic trends highlighted in global geopolitics and assess their implications for transatlantic cooperation.

The analysis is available in Greek.

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP