While the U.S. is inching closer to pre-crisis unemployment and GDP growth figures, the picture across the pond is much, much darker. The Eurozone, once the darling of economists and businessmen everywhere, is unable to wiggle its way out of a quagmire of depressed investments, contracting exports, low employment and external shocks. The third-quarter growth figures, released on November 13, were underwhelming and fell beneath the expectations of analysts, further dispelling the hopeful notion that 2015 will be the year the Euro will boom. Instead of a predicted 0.4% growth, the 19 members of the currency bloc clocked in at 0.3% as Germany slowed, Portugal caved and Finland out-shrank even debt-laden Greece.
While a full, sector-by-sector breakdown of the economic contributions of every member state will be released in December, Barclays estimates that “domestic demand, and in particular private consumption, was once again the main contributor to GDP growth”. However, saying that consumption was responsible for keeping the Euro area in the green isn’t an epiphany—what is, however, is the extent to which exports slowed and imports rose. If historically net trade served as the engine of growth for the Euro economy as a whole (especially for export-dependent Germany), pundits, faced with a slump in emerging markets, anticipate consumption to become the dominant force in European growth. Indeed, consumption can be held responsible for the strong performance of the Euro area’s industrial production, which rose by 1.9% in the three months to September.
With unemployment refusing to budge downwards from its 11% summit, inflation barely registering at 0.1%, the onus is now on the ECB to accelerate its stimulus program ahead of a key meeting in December.
However, it’s not just global market trends that are responsible for the Eurozone’s flagging exports. In certain sectors, it is European policy itself that is to blame. Take the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) sector, seen as the backbone of the European economy. Unlike their American counterparts, EU SMEs are ill-fitted to secure financing, partly because the EU lacks a capital markets union, but also because EU funds are slowly trickling down and not across all sectors. For example, even if the European start-up economy benefits from a talented pool of STEM graduates that surpasses the U.S.’, the lack of collaboration between tech hubs and dependency on outside funding has meant that almost no innovative products have come from Europe. While the U.S. raised financing totaling some $39 billion in the first three quarters of 2015, the EU lagged far behind with $7.43 billion. Venture capital is so fragmented and caught up in red tape that European startups have to turn to the U.S. to secure funding, leading a CEO to exclaim: “How come we can’t get funding right in Europe?”
And it’s not just access to financing: sometimes competing European interests collide, dealing blows to European competitiveness and growth. Even if more than 600,000 EU SMEs are part of the export ecosystem, generating over a third of EU exports and employing more than six million people throughout the continent, their capacity to grow has in some respects been curtailed by poorly tailored policies. According to industry sources, adapting to regulations is a topic of growing concern, consistently ranking in the three most pressing problems faced by SMEs across the European Union.
A vivid example concerns the lowly aluminum foil sector, where an over-eager trade policy has led to significant job losses that eventually put at risk the viability of the entire sector. The European Commission placed anti-dumping tariffs upon aluminum foil imported from China, Brazil and Armenia back in 2009, ostensibly in a bid to protect businesses in the EU from the typically unfair trade practice of selling goods or commodities at a rate far below the ordinary market value. A similar action is now on the table for Russian exports. But with 80% of the production costs for the European SMEs rewinding foil into supermarket rolls, cutting off the source of raw materials can only bode ill on the industry as a whole. In safeguarding this principle, thousands of workers spread across several dozen EU SMEs involved in the chopping down of the so-called “jumbo rolls” into the household items used in kitchens everywhere are now at risk of losing their jobs, posing a threat to the European aluminum rewinder industry as a whole.
Therefore, the European economy is sputtering not just because the Chinese economy is in for a rough landing, nor because of growing political uncertainties attributable to rising Eurosceptic feelings—that would be an over simplistic analysis of the structural risks underpinning the much-expected and twice delayed European recovery. The truth is that the European economy is getting harder and harder to manage and understand by Brussels. The sad cliché that makes EU specialists chuckle is still relevant—there is no such thing as a silver bullet that can restart EU growth, what is needed is a coordinated institutional response.
The 20th anniversary of the Dayton Accords (November 21, 1995) is much in the news. A conference this week at the University of Dayton includes President Bill Clinton and several principles from the negotiations. HBO’s documentary, The Diplomat, explores Dayton’s chief negotiator, Richard Holbrooke. Continuing trouble in divided societies like Iraq, Syria, Ukraine and elsewhere illustrates how significant was the Dayton agreement that ended the war in Yugoslavia. But many questions remain.
A wide range of analysts are reassessing Dayton. The U.S. Institute of Peace was ahead of the curve, with a conference in 2014. More recently, Stratfor described the risk of declining EU influence in Bosnia, and the risk of renewed violence. The Weekly Standard offered a withering analysis of the agreement, cementing ethnic divisions as political divisions (three presidents, three police forces, etc.), discriminating against other minorities, and creating an EU colonial master—all of which resulted in a stagnant and unreformed economy. Two scholars in The Washington Post described Dayton as a terrible model for understanding Syria—misunderstanding (as they said Dayton did) the causes of the war and the solutions. An article in Foreign Policy asked straight out: Is war about to break out in the Balkans?
Based on my recent travels in Serbia and Bosnia, it seems clear that the relationships inside Bosnia and between Bosnia and Serbia remain strained, at best. Competing narratives over history, that now includes the 1990s and the subsequent peace, continue. And the role of Islam itself remains a seemingly minor, but not fully understood, factor.
Young Serbs feel judged, and misjudged, as the perpetrators of genocide rather than as one side of a complicated story, or even as victims. This summer’s commemorations of the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica were a continuation of a Western narrative, they say, that forgets or deliberately obscures atrocities on all sides, and that overstates an admittedly terrible war crime as genocide. They recognize that their path to Europe, that is, membership in the EU, has been delayed for a variety of reasons but not least of all because of these prejudices against them.
In Bosnia, meanwhile, the divided government contributes to an anemic economy, with an unemployment rate of 60% for young people. Bosnian Serbs have special access to Serbia, including Serbian passports, and therefore a possible future route into the EU economy. Bosnian Croats can get Croatian passports, making them essentially already members of the EU. Bosniaks, whom we called in the 1990s Bosnian Muslims, are being pulled in competing directions by Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The number of Bosniaks attracted to ISIS or other jihadi groups remains limited, but not zero.
A critical difference, however, seems to be the view of the future. The many young Serbs I met were embarrassed and frustrated by the indignities that their country still bears for its role in the war of the 1990s. And it has not forgotten the NATO bombing of their country in 1999—indeed, it leaves the partially-destroyed former Ministry of Defense building “as is” on a major thoroughfare. But the young Serbs were at least hopeful that membership in the EU, that golden ticket, was a possibility and indeed was nearing, however slowly.
The young people I met in Sarajevo—equally smart and ambitious and hardworking as their Belgrade peers—had no such hope. They knew that the political divisions within their country, many of which were driven by the same divisions that led to war in the 1990s and that were made permanent by the Dayton Accords, prevent any reasonable path to the EU, and even any reasonable working governance in their own country. Two young women I talked with said they wanted to rebuild a multi-ethnic country, but that the economy, health care, and corruption compelled many of their friends to emigrate. Bosnia’s most recent elections were decently run, but seemed to offer few solutions.
The danger for Bosnia, Europe, and all of us, is that this hopelessness will allow violence—ethnic or jihadi—to re-emerge. The task for the EU, for Bosnia’s benefit and for its own, is to help Bosnia find a new path forward.
À la suite des attentats du vendredi 13 novembre 2015, nous vous invitons à relire l’article de Myriam Benraad, « Défaire Daech : une guerre tant financière que militaire », publié dans le numéro d’été 2015 (2/2015) de Politique étrangère.
Organisation terroriste la plus médiatisée et la plus redoutée de la nébuleuse djihadiste mondiale, l’État islamique a largement bâti sa puissance militaire et politique sur le développement d’une véritable économie de guerre, à cheval entre l’Irak et la Syrie, passé graduellement d’activités de contrebande et d’extorsion diverses à un système dont chaque aspect a été méticuleusement pensé par ses concepteurs[1]. De par sa volonté de fonder un « État », qui confère tout son sens à son action au-delà des multiples débats sémantiques qui l’ont entouré, « Daech »[2] s’est doté de ressources qui, en 2015, en font toujours le groupe armé le plus fortuné au monde, avec près de deux milliards de dollars à son actif. Cette richesse se combine à un fonctionnement interne reposant sur une gestion millimétrée de revenus démultipliés à la faveur de l’absence de développement socioéconomique et de la déliquescence des institutions dans les territoires conquis ; revenus qui rendent compte de l’essor du djihad et de l’autonomisation de ses représentants par rapport à leurs promoteurs passés[3].
Cette sombre réalité et la résilience de l’État islamique en dépit des frappes aériennes de ces derniers mois rappellent, s’il en était besoin, l’urgence d’une compréhension plus aboutie de la machine de guerre qui sous-tend la survie même de l’organisation. Les djihadistes ont, en effet, su parfaire des méthodes de levée et de transfert de fonds extrêmement sophistiquées, qui fondent leur faculté à donner corps à l’État dont ils se prévalent. À ce titre, l’État islamique constitue une nouvelle forme de terrorisme pour laquelle conserver une activité financière pérenne est essentiel à la réalisation de ses ambitions. Or, si elles sont partiellement connues, les sources de financement de l’organisation appellent une documentation plus minutieuse, essentielle à l’adoption de mesures appropriées pour empêcher l’État islamique de faire usage de sa richesse, et pour tarir les ressources dont il pourrait s’emparer. Le caractère changeant des fonds en cause rend l’exercice périlleux, mais non moins décisif pour la réussite de la lutte anti-djihadiste.
On éclairera ici tout d’abord les rouages économiques et financiers de l’État islamique qui lui ont permis, dès son émergence sur la scène irakienne à l’automne 2006, de conquérir un vaste territoire à travers le Moyen-Orient, niant les frontières contemporaines de la région, et qui s’étend désormais à l’Égypte, à la Libye et, dans une moindre mesure, au Yémen. Quoiqu’une typologie exhaustive des sources de financement soit difficile à dresser, la richesse de l’État islamique provient principalement de ses extorsions et trafics divers – dont celui des populations fragilisées qui subissent son chantage –, de même que des ressources naturelles qu’il maîtrise et exploite au sein de son « califat » autoproclamé. Les revenus de Daech servent une stratégie qui vise par le biais de divers mécanismes de terrain et le recours aux technologies et aux derniers moyens de communication, à façonner un projet sociopolitique à double vocation régionale et globale[4].
On soulignera ensuite que les besoins financiers croissants de l’État islamique pour réaliser ses ambitions et consolider ses structures internes l’ont aussi très tôt placé dans une posture de vulnérabilité. Comme en témoigne son expansion hors d’Irak et de Syrie vers d’autres théâtres de conflit comme la Libye, l’organisation terroriste est contrainte de prendre de nouveaux territoires et de nouvelles ressources pour maintenir un flux constant de revenus et financer ses opérations. Depuis l’été 2014, la réponse militaire vise particulièrement l’économie de l’État islamique pour assécher ses revenus et le mettre en déroute au plan militaire. Le groupe djihadiste est aujourd’hui confronté à un défi : pérenniser sa richesse pour pouvoir subsister.
La communauté internationale continue quant à elle de se mobiliser, concentrant ses efforts pour entraver l’essor de la contrebande et des autres activités illicites aux mains des djihadistes. L’identification des acteurs, intermédiaires, transporteurs, acheteurs, reste toutefois ardue ; de même que le contrôle du secteur financier et des subventions extérieures. Quelles politiques peuvent être adoptées ou développées pour mettre fin au financement de l’État islamique ? Outre la poursuite des frappes sur ses infrastructures matérielles, une coopération internationale renforcée s’impose, de toute évidence. Mais selon quels dispositifs, eu égard à la capacité des djihadistes à déjouer les mesures traditionnellement prises contre les entreprises terroristes ? »
[…]
Et Myriam Benraad de conclure :
« Aucune victoire décisive contre l’État islamique ne pourra advenir sans une contre-offensive économique et financière qui requiert la mobilisation du plus grand nombre et la criminalisation de tout financement à destination du groupe et d’autres formations djihadistes actives. À l’heure actuelle, l’imposition de sanctions adéquates et la création de dispositifs judiciaires et institutionnels susceptibles de prévenir ces flux financiers butent sur des dissensions d’ordre géopolitique, notamment entre acteurs régionaux (Arabie Saoudite et Iran en tête) qui n’ont pas été directement frappés par l’onde de choc djihadiste, et restent par conséquent plus préoccupés par l’extension de leur influence. Vus du terrain, l’entremêlement sans fin des dynamiques conflictuelles et la primauté des réseaux économiques et circuits financiers informels n’est pas sans compliquer la donne. »
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[1]. On peut évoquer ici une économie politique. Voir à ce sujet : M. Batal Al-Shishani, « The Political Economy of the Islamic State », Terrorism Monitor, vol. 12, n° 24, The Jamestown Foundation, décembre 2014.
[2]. Ironiquement, l’usage du terme « Daech » ne retire rien à la prétention étatisante de ses membres. Il ne s’agit, en effet, que de l’acronyme arabe de Dawla islamiyya fi al-‘Iraq wa al-Cham, qui signifie « État islamique en Irak et au Levant ».
[3]. Sur le rôle joué par certains régimes sunnites du Golfe, au premier plan desquels l’Arabie Saoudite, dans l’essor continu du djihadisme et de l’État islamique en particulier, voir l’excellent essai de P. Cockburn, Le Retour des djihadistes. Aux racines de l’État islamique, Paris, Éditions des Équateurs, 2014.
[4]. Sur la stratégie de l’État islamique et ses multiples dimensions, voir l’essai remarquable de P.-J. Luizard, Le Piège Daech. L’État islamique ou le retour de l’Histoire, Paris, La Découverte, 2015.
Photo from the deleted Weibo posts, via Quartz
The coordinated series of bombings and shootings by the Islamic State (IS) on Friday the 13th which killed 129 people in Paris and 43 people in Beirut the day before, will have long-reaching repercussions on the domestic and foreign policies of many nations. Already, talk is growing of closing borders across Europe and 19 U.S. governors have indicated they will refuse any Syrians planning to seek refuge in their states. France reacted militarily by launching punitive airstrikes against IS in Syria on Sunday night, and the U.S. conducted airstrikes against IS and its oil smuggling network. Numerous raids on suspected Islamic terrorists were conducted across France and are also underway in Brussels.
Over in China’s far western autonomous province of Xinjiang, the attacks in Paris and Beirut will probably result in a green light from Beijing for local officials to step up their crackdown against the Islamic militant threat. Following the attacks, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly called for Xinjiang to become an “important part” of the world’s war on terror, calling for a “united front to combat terrorism.” Minister Wang was also reported saying, “China is also a victim of terrorism. The fight against the ‘East Turkestan Islamic Movement’… should become an important part of the international fight against terrorism.”
The momentum for increased counterinsurgency efforts in China is clearly building, and efforts to get the Chinese public on board, using propaganda, in the fight against terrorism will increase. On the day following the Paris attacks, the state-owned People’s Daily ran an article (since removed) covering a counterinsurgency effort to combat terrorist militants in Xinjiang. The article was accompanied by several pictures of armed police in mountainous areas, some preparing to raid a rural home (as shown above).
Xinjiang is the Chinese province which has witnessed the greatest number of terrorist actions, with hundreds killed, although recent attacks have spread across China to include Beijing, Kunming and Guangzhou. Beijing blames these attacks on Islamic terrorists, often pointing the finger at the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a group it claims has links with al Qaeda.
Beijing claims ETIM is fighting for an independent state called “East Turkestan,” or “Uyghuristan” modeled after neighboring Central Asian nations. Two “Eastern Turkestan Republics” survived between 1931-1934 and 1944-1949 before Mao Zedong took control and eventually conceded the title “Xinjiang Autonomous Region” in 1955, partly to win over Turkic speakers in the territory. Beijing also asserts some 300 of Xinjiang’s ethnic Uighur population have traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight alongside IS.
Despite ETIM having been placed by the U.N. and Washington on a list of terror organizations in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, many foreign experts doubt the portrayal by Beijing of ETIM as a formidable force. Rather, human rights organizations and the exile community argue the violence can be traced to the widespread resentment among Uighurs to strict controls on the practice of their religion and efforts to eradicate their culture.
These efforts have included the banning of veils for women, imposing restrictions on Uighur travel rights, banning students from fasting during Ramadan, restricting religious teaching for children, and putting limits on Uighur-language education. Analysts also point to widespread discrimination against Uighurs in hiring and other economic opportunities.
Back in September 2014, China’s highest court, highest prosecution office and the Ministry of Public Security jointly issued detailed instructions on dealing with terrorism and religious extremism. The instructions urged court officials, prosecutors and police to distinguish between the illegal acts of religious extremists and ordinary religious activities, urging officials to avoid discriminating against any religion or ethnic minority, and to avoid interfering with citizens’ freedom to practice their religion.
In the aftermath of the attacks in Paris, government officials in Xinjiang will be tempted to put aside these restraints on their policing, and any excessive actions against the Uighur population will likely be overlooked by Beijing. The rhetoric coming from China’s top police chief, Public Security Minister Guo Shengkun, “to smash violent terrorism before it occurs,” sets a dangerous precedent. Beijing is certainly justified in stepping up efforts to counter any real terrorist threats in the aftermath of the Paris and Beirut attacks, as many nations are doing. Yet greater efforts will need to be undertaken to promote smarter policing in Xinjiang, as also advocated by Guo, lest the rights of the innocent be further infringed upon in the name of expediency.