Diplomacy & Crisis News

Sur les huit conflits les plus meurtriers et dévastateurs du moment, sept se déroulent en Afrique, où la désintégration de la Libye alimente en armes les groupes djihadistes. Une première force d'urgence continentale pourrait voir le jour cette année… / Afrique, États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires (...) / Afrique, États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), France, Libye, Nigeria, Sénégal, Conflit, Islam, Terrorisme, Mali, Géographie, Sahel, Frontières - 2015/02

Les régimes du Proche-Orient imaginent se protéger de la contagion du « printemps arabe ». La logique : exacerber les tensions avec leurs voisins pour préserver le statu quo intérieur. Leur stratégie débouche sur une impasse lourde de menaces nouvelles. / Arabie saoudite, Égypte, États-Unis, États-Unis (...) / Arabie saoudite, Égypte, États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Golfe, Irak, Iran, Liban, Proche-Orient, Syrie, Monde arabe, Géopolitique, Guérilla, Idéologie, Islam, Mouvement de contestation, Religion, Terrorisme, Fondamentalisme, Yémen, Dictature, Répression, Autoritarisme, Réveil arabe 2011- - 2015/02

Lutter contre les idéologies religieuses sectaires requiert une vaste politique de contre-radicalisation s'appuyant sur la mobilisation des élites et des institutions musulmanes de France. / Éducation, Islam, Justice, Prison, Religion, Secte, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme, Associations, (...) / Éducation, Islam, Justice, Prison, Religion, Secte, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme, Associations, Société civile - 2015/02

/ Géopolitique, Islam, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme - Relations internationales / Géopolitique, Islam, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme - Relations internationales

Photo: Arc2020

As the 21st Conference of Parties begins this week in Paris, for the first time in years, the prospect for serious, substantive international progress on climate issues is not bleak.

China and the U.S., the world’s two biggest carbon emitters, are more or less on the same page, looking to reduce emissions, if for very divergent reasons.

In my latest video, I take a look at what’s going on at COP21.

 

La question des déficits publics, qui anime le débat occidental depuis les années 1980, a conduit les Etats à expérimenter des solutions pour alléger le « fardeau » de l'aide sociale sans dégâts catastrophiques sur les populations. / Canada, France, Royaume-Uni, Capitalisme, Dette, Économie, État, (...) / Canada, France, Royaume-Uni, Capitalisme, Dette, Économie, État, Finance, Fiscalité, Inégalités, Libéralisme, Protection sociale, Solidarité, Associations - 2014/12

Depuis trente ans, les gouvernements occidentaux usent de multiples artifices pour réduire leurs dépenses. L'un d'eux consiste à sous-traiter les services sociaux à des bénévoles et à des associations, tout en encourageant la charité privée. Si le Canada, la France et le Royaume-Uni, par exemple, (...) / États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Christianisme, Économie, Entreprise, État, Finance, Fiscalité, Idéologie, Inégalités, Parti politique, Pauvreté, Personnalités, Protection sociale, Religion, Solidarité, Associations, Université - 2014/12

When Putin started to increase Russian military presence in Syria, I was reading Kissinger’s Diplomacy and coincidently its chapter on the Suez Canal Crisis. I couldn’t resist comparing Putin’s move to that of Khrushchev’s, when he provided support and aid to Nasser’s Egypt. 1950s Soviet Union and today’s Russia suffer from the effects of containment imposed by the West. Containment brought on themselves through acts the West views as blatant aggression. The difference between the two contexts is that  Russia is no longer communist and the primary adversary of the West. Yet, in both circumstances the same underlying motivations and logic seem to have convinced Russia to play the Middle East card.

When Khrushchev came to power following Stalin’s death in 1953, the transition was not smooth. It took him until 1957 to cement his strangle hold on the Kremlin. This insecurity in Moscow led him to take a few cocky decisions, even when the West took him to be the best chance for peace. One of these decisions was to throw his support behind the Nasser regime in Egypt and its Pan-Arabic aspirations. The West was stunned by this Soviet diplomatic victory. Containment was intended to keep the Russian maneuvers within its communist sphere. The traditional sphere of influence of the diminishing British and French powers in Middle East now involved a new player. U.S. diplomatic bargaining with Nasser had gone no where. The end result was British and French humiliation and withdrawal from the region after the 1956 Suez Crisis, the creation of the short lived United Arab Republic involving Egypt, Syria and North Yemen and the 1967 Six-Day war.

The important point to note here is that Khrushchev did not squeeze into the Middle East power struggle at a moment of strength for the Soviet Union. It was at a point of great weakness; Stalin’s death led to power struggles and purges, the Korean war had been a stalemate and the U.S. still maintained an edge in the nuclear race. The incursion into Egypt was meant to showcase to his opponents and critics that he was a capable leader, who could take the ailing Soviet Union to heights even Stalin could not.

Putin, in contrast, definitely does not have the issue of being overshadowed by the legacy of his predecessor. He has been in power since 2000. Instead of proving to be an adversary to the West, Putin started as a surprising collaborator, supporting Bush’s War on Terror (obviously to garner support for his own war on terror in Chechnya). Over the last 15 years, he has slowly positioned himself as an adversary. The 2008 war with Georgia was the turning point. The annexation of Crimea and the insurgency in eastern Ukraine has cemented that view. He  supported the Assad regime in rhetoric, vetoes and limited material support, but providing Assad with a Russian air force seemed a bit far off.

Since Soviet times, the naval base at Tartus was Russia’s only permanent naval installation in the Mediterranean Sea. It has managed to hold on to this one last bastion, even when Hafez Assad decided to bomb a Soviet vessel at the base. Thus, it is doubtful that any Russian leader would want to lose the naval base, especially one with an ailing economy and a nationalistic fervor keeping him in power.

Putin had promised much to the Russian people during the commodity boom.  The military modernization project was planned on a $100 oil barrel. But that all went south when the prices plummeted in 2014. The Ukrainian crisis only made things worse as the U.S. and EU slapped on sanctions. Trade with China seems to be the lifeline of the economy. Yet the military continues to be modernized, while  Soviet strategic bombers are seen from the English Channel to Guam. Putin has used displays of military prowess as a means of sustaining the nationalistic fervor at home and distracting the people from the economic woes.

Assad has been losing ground since July and many expected him to start withdrawing to his Alawite homeland in the coastal region. That was until Putin emulated Khrushchev. He announced that Russian fighter jets, stationed in Latakia would be bombing ISIS targets in support of Assad’s troops. NATO forces until then dominating the region’s air space had to suddenly share it . There was suddenly a chance of U.S. and Russian planes facing each other off over enemy territory. The only previous event of similar magnitude was when in 1970. 15,000 Soviet troops were stationed in Egypt to man a comprehensive air defense system against Israeli incursions.

The question is can Russia afford this new active role in the region, something it has not performed since the 1970s ? Khrushchev did not enter Middle Eastern affairs with a clear cut strategic end game in mind. He didn’t achieve anything of much significance other than to commit Soviet resources, when its own people and satellites in Eastern Europe needed them the most. In 1972, Egypt’s Sadat simply evicted the Soviet personnel and its Syrian foothold was what was left.

Today in trying to protect the last Russian chip left in the region, Putin might be pitting the very survival of the Russian Federation. Russia is overextended today, as it once was under the Soviet Union. The A321 flight crash over Sinai and Turkey shooting down the Su-24 jet continuously put Russia on the headlines. Initially, Russia refused to accept the Sinai crash was a terror attack, but as soon as the French attacks occurred and it was obvious that fighting ISIS would allow an “alliance’ with France, Putin declared the truth of the matter. The Turkish action has been labelled a “stab in the back” by Putin. His reaction has been sanctions against Turkey, but obviously the economic impact won’t be merely one way.

The Russian Orthodox church’s declaration that it is a holy war to defend christianity might buoy the impact of those killed to protect the Assad regime. But just like Americans, Russians would also start decrying war when the body bags count begins to increase. It helps that Russian media is under strict state control. RT and massive military parades against Fascism can only sway public opinion for so long. In 1991, Russia survived by shedding away its Soviet empire. If Russia collapses again, the Federation is what is at stake. A nuclear power in chaos is a bad proposition for world peace. So all one can hope is that unlike Khrushchev, Putin has a clear end game in sight and knows when to pull back before over extension passes the point of no return.

Dans le cadre de la conférence de Paris sur le climat, l'Union européenne réfléchira-t-elle à son modèle agricole, qui accompagne plus que jamais la mondialisation libérale ? En développant l'agroécologie, une idée neuve, la France pourrait réduire considérablement son empreinte carbone tout en produisant (...) / Europe, France, Agriculture, Agroalimentaire, Alimentation, Animal, Commerce international, Écologie, Énergie, Mer, Forêt, Climat, Environnement, Néolibéralisme, Pollution - 2015/12

Crisis Group mourns the passing today of Sandy Berger, a tremendous friend and colleague who worked tirelessly to promote greater peace and security in a troubled world. He died of cancer at the age of 70.

Protesters displaying placards during a rally in front of the Chinese consulate in Manila on Aug 31, 2015.  PHOTO: AFP

The unanimous ruling on October 29 by an international arbitral tribunal over its jurisdiction to arbitrate territorial claims claimed by the Philippines in the South China Sea comes as a slap in the face to Beijing, and may lead to further filings by Southeast Asian nations.  Under its notorious nine-dash line, or “cow’s tongue”, Chinese leaders claim over 90 percent of the South China Sea and have argued against any international jurisdiction over sovereignty issues.

The current ruling, the first of its kind, concerns a case filed by the Philippine government at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague in 2013, under the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to the ruling, the case will now be handled by the Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS, and is expected to determine maritime zone entitlements of ten reefs and shoal in the South China Sea: Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and McKennan Reef.  Some of these reefs are currently being converted into islands.

Beijing bases its claims on the disputed waters and features as “traditional fishing grounds,” despite the presence of fisherman from around the region for centuries. For example, the Scarborough Shoal was referenced in a May 2012 article in the PLA Daily, claiming a Chinese astronomer, Guo Shoujing, first visited the shoal in 1279 as part of a survey of the Chinese empire. China’s formal claim to the shoal was made in 1935, while Manila says its initial claim was in 1937-1938, although it was unable to publicize its claim due to Japanese incursions and invasion. The shoal did not feature on Philippine maps until 1997, when Manila began to press its claim by taking ownership of the shoal as terra nullius, or “no man’s land.”

Beijing has reiterated it will not accept the Tribunal’s resolution, arguing that the only way forward is through bilateral negotiations.  China had previously argued in a position paper that the “2002 China–ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea constitutes an agreement to resolve disputes relating to the South China Sea exclusively through negotiation.”

International leaders, however, welcomed the decision over the Court’s jurisdiction.  German chancellor Angela Merkel recently addressed the issue while on a visit to Beijing, “The territorial dispute in the South China Sea is a serious conflict. I am always a bit surprised why in this case multinational courts should not be an option for a solution.”

Merkel’s statement clearly reflects Beijing’s two faces over the rule of law, for despite China ratifying UNCLOS in 1996, Beijing now says it will not accept procedures referring to “binding decisions” and compulsory processes under the law.  While Beijing considers certain UNCLOS rules to be inconsistent with its national policy, it has similarly chosen to invoke UNCLOS law to seek a binding decision for its claim against Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. China is also party to the Declaration on the Conduct for Parties in the South China Sea, which it signed in 2002. Through its dredging efforts to create artificial islands, Beijing has blatantly ignored Article 5 of the DOC, which calls for “self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes in uninhabited islands and reefs.”

So while it is high time for an international referee like the Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS to step in, separate the fighters, and issue a ruling concerning the sovereignty of the disputed waters, it is highly unlikely the Court will be able to enforce a ruling against China, which Beijing is likely to ignore.  Any court rulings issued by the tribunal are binding on its member countries, including China, but the tribunal has no powers of enforcement, so some of its rulings have been ignored before.  

The Tribunal’s eventual ruling, expected in 2016, will also be limited in scope to asserting whether or not specific features (rocks and low-tide elevations) can claim EEZs. Some of the reefs being converted into islands by China will fail to be recognized as islands–thereby losing any expanded territorial claims. Under UNCLOS, artificial islands are entitled to the rights enjoyed by the original feature–a 12 nautical mile territorial sea for rocks above water at low tide, and a 500-meter safety zone for elevations below water at low tide.  

Should Beijing refuse to honor a potential ruling against their claims of sovereignty, we can expect China to again attempt to assert its economic muscle to persuade other regional nations to settle the disputes bilaterally.  China’s Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin announced earlier this month Beijing’s offer to Southeast Asian countries of around US$10 billion in infrastructure loans.    

Yet China’s weakening muscularity and an economic pivot by Washington could lead other Southeast Asian nations toward pursuing similar rulings.  This month, some voters in Vietnam put forth a proposal to their National Assembly, calling for the initiation of legal proceedings against China at an international tribunal over its violation of the Southeast Asian country’s sovereignty in the East Vietnam Sea (South China Sea).  How far this request will go is disputed–Hanoi will need to balance the concerns of its nationalistic citizenry while maintaining close ties to its communist brother.  Indonesia has also hinted it may also go to court to assert its sovereignty over disputed territory.

Beijing can still effectively lobby its other neighbors–as it did when it scuttled efforts by Association of Southeast Asian Nations defense ministers to mention the South China Sea in a joint declaration after meetings in Malaysia earlier this month. On the international stage, a negative outcome for Beijing will surely lead to a loss of face for Chinese leaders, and they will face increasing isolation for failing to respect international law–a precondition for their regaining great nation status.

En perpétrant des attentats aveugles dans les rues de Paris, Tunis ou Beyrouth, les djihadistes veulent semer la terreur. Ils espèrent ainsi se singulariser face à un monde qu'ils exècrent, en suscitant des réactions guidées par la peur. Chercher à comprendre impose de revenir sur les convulsions qui (...) / Arabie saoudite, France, Proche-Orient, Armée, Conflit, Histoire, Terrorisme, Violence, Fondamentalisme - 2015/12

Joseph Staline était méchant. Cette affirmation intrépide, que nul ou presque n'a osé formuler ces quarante dernières années, est au cœur du documentaire Apocalypse : Staline, réalisé par Isabelle Clarke et Daniel Costelle (France 2, 3 novembre 2015). Les images colorisées s'accompagnent d'un (...) / URSS, Audiovisuel, Automobile, Économie, Histoire, Groupe de pression - 2015/12

A Russian S-400 air defense missile system makes its way through Red Square during a military parade in Moscow. File photo AP.

The Turkish F-16 that shot down a Russian SU-24 attack plane last week near the Turkish-Syrian border has created an international incident that rivals with the first few chapters of any Tom Clancy novel. Air operations against ISIS and Syrian rebels in Syria has created a situation where Turkey, other NATO countries and Russia are all operating aircrafts in close proximity.

The greatest fear of NATO commanders was realized when Turkish authorities gave the green light for the F-16 to shoot down the SU-24, resulting in one pilot killed and other Russian soldiers possibly killed or injured while rescuing the second member of the two-man crew. Turkey, a NATO member state, would have the right to claim that an attack by Russia on Turkey is an attack on all NATO members, but considering the order to shoot down the SU-24 was ill conceived and the SU-24 was not a real threat to Turkey, NATO members would do well to tamp down the rhetoric against the grieved party who has lost a pilot and soldiers and never threatened Turkish security to any great measure.

The predictable response to the incident by Russian President Putin was to shun Turkish officials in international forums and openly claim that Turkey took aggressive actions against its aircraft in order to protect oil flows from ISIS-controlled territory into Turkey itself. Russia has recently been targeting ISIS oil resources in order to financially starve the terrorist organization that uses this resource to supply its military and resulting in human rights abuses and genocide against minority groups in the region. The lack of attention given to ISIS oil resources by NATO has given way to assumptions by Russia that Turkey took aggressive actions against Russia to protect the oil reserves.

Another theory is that Russia wants to take the lead in the region by targeting resources that keep ISIS afloat. Russia’s aggressive strikes appeal to those communities that want to stop mass murder of ethnic minorities in the region, disregarding the notion that attacking energy resources in Syria and Iraq may cause significant environmental damage. Whatever the reason, the actions by the Turkish F-16 against the Russian aircraft were not morally legitimate, even if legally it can be argued that Turkey may have had the right to take an aggressive stand against a Russian aircraft flying over its territory.

Years of discussions and sanctions blocking the sale of the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system to Iran ended a few months ago when Russia decided to finally sell the advanced missile system to Iran. Despite U.S. officials believing that the nuclear deal would block the sale for many years, Russian officials moved ahead swiftly after the agreement was signed to fulfill the S-300s order. In the aftermath of the incident with Turkey, the next generation of Russian surface-to-air missile that concerned U.S. officials for so many years is now being deployed in Syria. The effectiveness, range and crew of the newer S-400 “Triumph” missile will operate as a Russian air defense network in northern Syria, covering much of Syria and reaching into Turkey, Israel and even as far as Cyprus.

While NATO officials do not believe Russia will target NATO aircrafts, a recent decline in NATO sorties has taken place upon the announcement of the S-400 deployment. Anti-aircraft missile systems have become a major strategic asset ever since the Vietnam War, and allow the party that has control of the system to pick and choose how an air strategy can be applied, or halted in a given territory. With the S-400 radars able to view all air activity in Syria and Turkey, missiles could target and hit Turkish and NATO planes in Turkey itself.

Putin has decided to create an Iron Dome of his own, enveloping Turkish air squadrons and bases within the range of the S-400. Retaliation against Turkey and NATO has not taken place, but with the S-400 Triumph as part of the increased air defense over Russian and Syria aircrafts in the region, NATO will be motivated to ease tensions and perhaps re-consider NATO’s future obligations towards Turkey itself.

L’impact psychologique de l’attentat suicide en Tunisie le 25 novembre qui a coûté la vie à douze membres de la garde présidentielle est peut-être plus important que celui des attaques contre les touristes étrangers en mars et juin 2015 au Bardo et à Sousse. La garde présidentielle est un corps d’élite assurant la protection du président, du Parlement, et de la présidence du gouvernement. Le symbole est extrêmement fort. L’objectif des commanditaires a été, sans nul doute, d’approfondir les divisions au sein de la société et de la classe politique en mettant en lumière un Etat incapable d’assurer sa propre sécurité, y compris dans la capitale.

Le nouveau numéro de Politique étrangère (4-2015) vient de paraître ! Il consacre un dossier à la justice pénale internationale, ainsi que de nombreux articles liés à l’actualité comme les fluctuations du cours du pétrole, les primaires américaines ou encore les modèles de prévention de la radicalisation en Europe.

Née des deux conflits mondiaux, l’idée de justice pénale internationale a mis un demi-siècle à se concrétiser dans des institutions pérennes, et des concepts juridiques indépendants des conjonctures de crises. Le tribunal pour l’ex-Yougoslavie, le tribunal d’Arusha, la création de la Cour pénale internationale témoignent, entre autres, des réelles avancées des années 1990. Le dossier que présente Politique étrangère éclaire ces avancées et leurs limites.

La Cour pénale internationale n’est pas universellement reconnue ; elle ne couvre pas tous les problèmes juridiques que posent crimes de guerre et génocides ; et elle n’est pas non plus la seule forme de justice imaginable face à ces événements. L’idée même de justice pénale internationale est aujourd’hui à la fois de plus en plus sollicitée et de plus en plus contestée : deux bonnes raisons d’évaluer ses résultats, rares acquis d’un temps où l’on croyait le monde saisi d’un irrépressible besoin d’unité.

Ce numéro de Politique étrangère s’attache à d’autres dimensions essentielles du jeu international : la redéfinition des rapports de puissance, à tous niveaux (Chine, Éthiopie…), ou les incertitudes des marchés énergétiques (à travers les énigmatiques variations des cours du pétrole)…

Après les attentats du 13 novembre, on s’attachera particulièrement à l’article qui étudie les modèles de prévention de la radicalisation et de déradicalisation mis en œuvre dans trois pays européens.

Découvrez le sommaire complet ici.

Téléchargez le dossier de presse ici.

Téléchargez gratuitement l’article de Marie-Claire Aoun, « Une ère nouvelle d’abondance pétrolière ? », ici.

Achetez le numéro 4-2015 de Politique étrangère ici.

Abonnez-vous à Politique étrangère pour les 4 numéros de l’année 2016  ici ou à cette adresse : revues@armand-colin.com.

 

The Great Wall of China. Source: Severin, stalder via Wikipedia.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has led one revolution away from capitalism and back again in its sixty-six year rule. Now it might be about to lead another. With the planned Paris conference on climate change due to start on November 30 Beijing has been releasing some significant-sounding statements on moving China’s huge economy towards a greener phase. Xi Jinping has shown himself to be China’s most powerful and energetic leader since Deng Xiaoping, who first brought market reforms to the giant and impoverished communist nation. The move to a green-based economy would require massive restructuring and the tackling of vested interests that profit from the current set up. But it is no more radical than the break-neck development China pursued over the last two decades.

Critics of the CCP have noted that it continues to play statistical games with inconvenient facts, most recently admitting that it has under-reported its coal consumption for many years. The new figures suggest that Chinese emissions have been a significantly larger driver of global warming than previously admitted. This feeds into perceptions of China’s government as an entity that talks the talk but struggles to walk the walk when it comes to facing up to the issues of climate change and public health disasters caused by its environmental policies.

Nonetheless regular public scandals over pollution and the mass protests they spawn show that there is public demand at home for China’s one-party system to take some responsibility in setting and enforcing standards to tackle the issue. The protests unite China’s growing middle classes with its poor migrant laborers, and its more privileged city dwellers with the hard-scrabble rural peasants out in the countryside. Despite China’s extensive censorship and pervasive security forces, protests about social conditions break out across the country with monotonous regularity. The government’s response is often to clamp down on the organizers but also to offer local concessions to appease the demonstrators.

China’s huge internal security budget reveals that the Party is uneasy about the ferment of social changes it has unleashed with its modernization of the country. Protests in China are no longer illegal so long as they do not call for the downfall of the CCP but attending them can be risky. Despite this tens of thousands of single issue protests break out across the country every year according to human rights groups, the vast majority concerned with corruption, development concerns or environmental problems. For all China is a one-party state, the regime of Xi Jinping is keen to stay ahead of the issues that matter to the Chinese public, as shown by his draconian anti-corruption campaign since coming to power. The idea of a nation-wide green movement taking off in the country that could not be assuaged by closing an unpopular chemical plant or sacking a hated local government official is anathema to Beijing.

President Xi Jinping has therefore shown himself to be more inclined to take green issues into account than his predecessors, who focused more closely on economic development. He has committed to capping carbon emissions by 2030 and turning to renewable sources for 20 percent of the country’s energy. By 2013 China had even become the world’s largest producer of wind and solar power. Increasingly the CCP must balancing its mission to lift the many more millions of Chinese who remain in grinding poverty against the costs of climate change and pollution that creating this wealth often entails. With a growing middle class increasingly outspoken about living in smog-ridden cities reminiscent of the early industrial revolution, Beijing is looking at radical changes in how its economy operates.

Some observers think that China has realized it must go green for its own survival, but just as likely is that the CCP has calculated that, as with corruption, the limits of public tolerance for pollution, public health scandals and massive industrial accidents has been tested to dangerous limits. Since 1989 Chinese politics has worked on the operating principle that popular discontent must never be allowed to build up unchecked. The Arab Spring protests of 2010-11 which swept away a clutch of fossilized and underperforming authoritarian regimes in the Middle East with a wave of street protests were seen as a warning in Beijing. As a result it stepped up repression of civil society activists including environmental activists, anticorruption campaigners or defense lawyers, but scrutinized many of their concerns more intently.

Beijing’s monopoly on political power still rests on showing that it can deliver economic growth and rising living standards. But the costs of a rapid industrial development, and the attendant explosion of consumerism among 1.5 billion people have taken their toll. Under Xi Jinping it has become a mature middle-sized economy that is now pondering what kind of society it would like to be by 2050. Affluence is creating more interest in social issues. People power movements are already a well-established phenomenon in local politics in China going back many years, but there has been no national movement since the suppression of pro-democracy protestors in 1989. The CCP fears that allowing any widespread organization on social issues will quickly turn political and lead to the overthrow of the communist system. It cites examples such as the Polish Solidarity trade union movement which led to the eventual democratization of Poland over of the course of the 1980s or the more recent Color Revolutions.

Unlike various secular Arab regimes however, the CCP has long proved adept at anticipating and diffusing popular concerns before they become a mortal threat to the Party’s political survival. The suppression of pro-democracy protests stalled but did not stop a pre-existing economic program to develop the Chinese economy. Once rising living standards had been achieved and official corruption was becoming a pressing issue the Party moved to clean up these Augean stables itself, without subjecting CCP cadres to an independent judiciary. It had already begun to soften its rhetoric on global warming under the previous leadership team around Hu Jintao. There is no reason to suppose that as green issues becomes more important globally and locally that the leadership of the CCP will not move to co-opt and ingratiate itself with the movements that emerge to tackle it. Whether this will help or harm the cause of green politics in China itself will be determined by the CCP’s ability to deliver on its promises. If Beijing cannot, it may find itself facing the very public protests it is currently trying to head off.

November saw further military escalation and setbacks in Syria, particularly after Turkey shot down a Russian warplane it claimed had violated its airspace. Meanwhile, several countries faced extremist attacks claimed by the Islamic State (IS), including in Lebanon, France and Bangladesh. Violence also rose in Turkey between the state and Kurdish insurgents. In Venezuela, political tensions and violence increased ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for 6 December and could worsen, while both Nepal and Kosovo faced deepening political crises. In a positive step forward, Burkina Faso and Myanmar experienced peaceful and openly-contested elections last month.

/ Europe, Démocratie, Démographie, Parti politique, Politique - Politique / Europe, Démocratie, Démographie, Parti politique, Politique - Politique

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