Diplomacy & Crisis News

Malware not seen since the 2014 attack on Sony has returned, raising the possibility of future destructive attacks.

Rather than speaking out against Putin, the U.S. president is playing into Moscow’s hands.

Depuis 2006, Twitter propose aux internautes de propager des messages courts à travers Internet et vers les téléphones mobiles. Très simple et gratuit, ce service deviendra-t-il bientôt le « pouls informationnel de la planète » ? / Communication, Entreprise, Information, Internet, Médias, Presse, (...) / Communication, Entreprise, Information, Internet, Médias, Presse, Technologies de l'information - 2011/10

Le « printemps arabe » est venu heureusement rappeler que notre histoire est façonnée par les révolutions. Sans trancher la question, très débattue, de la définition de ce concept, cette carte recense les grands mouvements révolutionnaires, qu'il s'agisse de prises du pouvoir violentes, d'élections (...) / États-Unis, URSS, Colonialisme, Communisme, Conflit, Élections, État, Extrême droite, Histoire, Idéologie, Impérialisme, Mouvement de contestation, Nationalisme, Parti politique, Politique, Violence, Socialisme, Marxisme, Extrême gauche, Coup d'État, Maoïsme, Mouvement de libération, Révolution russe 1917, Indépendance, Réveil arabe 2011- - Politique

US and South Korean army soldiers pose on a floating bridge on the Hantan River during a joint military exercise in Yeoncheon, South Korea, in December 2015. (Photo by AP)

This year’s U.S.-ROK annual joint military drills kicked off on 1 April after a delay of two months caused by the astonishingly fast-forwarded bilateral thaws between the Koreas, U.S. and China. The first part of the drills, Foal Eagle, will involve a field training exercise of 11,500 U.S. and 290,000 ROK troops and the remaining part, Key Resolve, will involve a computer-based-simulation exercise of 12,200 U.S. and 10,000 ROK troops. Although both U.S. and ROK military press releases announced that the intensity of the drills will be similar to that of last year, the drills are expected to be low-key, cautiously reflecting the thaws. The duration of Foal Eagle has been shortened from two months to one, and Key Resolve from one month to two weeks. Plans for U.S. strategic asset deployment have also been altered as the deployment of large-scale nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines has been cancelled. Allegedly, however, such cancellation is offset by the deployment of other assets, including those crucial to the operation of ‘Decapitation Strike’, such as MC-130, as well as those that support marine landing in case of full-scale war, such as the amphibious assault ship group USS Wasp.

Contrary to last year, when he vociferously starred as President Trump’s evil counterpart, Kim Jong-un has remained silent since he expressed that he ‘understands South Korea’s stance’ on the drills during his meeting with President Moon’s convoys on 5 March. Once called ‘Crazy Fat Kid’, Kim Jong-un now appears on TV like any other ordinary global leader with complete disregard for the public’s willingness to accept such anomaly. The bizarre images of him awkwardly shaking hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping and IOC President Thomas Bach credit this fashion terrorist with the egregious hairstyle with rational characteristics and the capacity to run a ‘normal state’. Kim Jong-un’s gawky debut in the global diplomacy theater prior to the end of April meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, followed by the May meeting with President Trump, are, nonetheless, carefully planned attempts to play soft-powered preliminary warm-up.

Many experts agree that Kim Jong-un’s recent pro-diplomacy moves reveal his disguised intent to strengthen negotiation leverage for the May meeting. It is predicted that Kim Jong-un will ultimately demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces and strategic assets from the Korean peninsula through the orderly steps of earning recognition as a normal state, signing the peace treaty with the U.S., restoring diplomatic relations with the U.S., and damaging the U.S.-ROK alliance throughout the process. Backward induction of these future strategic aims, in conjunction with Kim Jong-un’s common ground interests with China and Russia’s emphasis on ‘double-freeze’, also explains the reclusive leader’s real intent, well-observable in his first foreign trip to China. China, vexed with its dwindling influence on the Korean peninsula since the startling U.S.-DPRK thaw, warmheartedly welcomed Kim Jong-un’s visit, which restored China’s seven-year decoupled diplomatic relations with North Korea. In response, Kim Jong-un shared with President Xi his refusal to accept the Libyan denuclearization model and alternatively proposed a procedural, step-by-step model to maximize his stakes. Kim Jong-un’s seemingly desperate yet innately strategic outreach now engages China in potentially alleviating sanctions and enlarging the pie on the negotiation table of the soon-to-be held six-party talks. Such guileful outreach will extend to other stakeholders as well. A number of experts anticipate that Kim Jong-un will soon meet with Russian President Putin to discuss the May meeting.

Can South Korea Save Itself?

The South Korean Moon administration’s subtle predilection for temporary peace over Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID) calls into question whether recent temporary thaws can truly evolve into perpetual peace, given the fact that South Korea cannot defend itself (but such a leftist position is sympathetically understandable considering the doomsday nature of the war with Kim Jong-un). For some Korean conservatives, the emotional aspect of the currently deepening inter-Korean rapprochement seems to blind the Korean people into realizing the realpolitik beneath the thaws, a situation reminiscent of the geopolitical conditions that led to Nixon’s pursuit of Vietnamization during the U.S.-China détente era. Unless South Korea in the divided Korean peninsula has credible capacity to defend itself, the risks involving the incremental approach toward reunification should always be managed with a keen, vigilant reciprocity-oriented mentality.

The Kim dynasty has always taken advantage of the uncertainties arising from frequent regime changes in competitive democracy between the U.S. and South Korea, while the U.S.-ROK alliance has ironically suffered from the certainty shown in the Kim dynasty’s consistent policy pursuit of WMD development. Rewarding the Kim dynasty for its temporary for-aid deception under such uncertainties has always generated more next-level costs than benefits, while the Kim dynasty has repeatedly breached the Agreed Framework by non-compliance. Thus, the Kim dynasty’s abominable past records of repeatedly withdrawing from the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) and KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization)’s failures to certify the Kim dynasty’s commitment to ‘freeze’ plutonium production and programs all lead to one very clear conclusion. Even if the Moon administration’s goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is a procedurally long-term one and the leftist regime does not seek a regime change in North Korea, such aims must reciprocally maximize its negotiation leverage by strategically devising a step-by-step blueprint for consistently punishing and sanctioning Kim Jong-un whenever he displays detracting behaviors.

The post U.S.-ROK Annual Military Drills Again Signal Kim Jong-un Punishments for Deception appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

La gauche française, quand elle n'occupe ni Matignon ni l'Elysée, analyse plus volontiers son exercice du pouvoir. La sempiternelle question de ses revirements, celle aussi de sa droitisation liée aux « contraintes européennes », au bouleversement de sa sociologie électorale, sont indissociables (...) / France, Politique - 2007/04

White House officials want Brian Hook to stay in his current role in Foggy Bottom, but a demoralized diplomatic corps would like to see him go.

The United States should be condemning Ilham Aliyev's corrupt regime rather than condoning it.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Delphine Alles propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Yandry Kurniawan, The Politics of Securitization in Democratic Indonesia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 240 pages).

Cet ouvrage aborde la construction du rapport de l’État indonésien à la sécurité nationale, avant de décrire les acteurs et débats impliqués dans les processus de sécuritisation (désignation d’une menace existentielle justifiant la mise en œuvre de mesures d’exception) et désécuritisation (retrait de certaines thématiques de l’agenda sécuritaire) de deux conflits internes. Yandry Kurniawan analyse l’évolution de la perception des menaces puis l’implication militaire face à la rébellion acehnaise (jusqu’à l’accord de 2005) et aux violences interconfessionnelles aux Moluques (1999-2005).

Un retour historique souligne combien la désignation de menaces existentielles fait figure de norme en Indonésie, dès l’époque coloniale. Une forme de loi martiale est institutionnalisée sous Sukarno puis consolidée par Suharto, avec développement d’une structure militaire territoriale parallèle à la bureaucratie civile. Le principal apport théorique de l’ouvrage apparaît dans les chapitres consacrés à la transition post-Suharto, de sa destitution (1998) au milieu du second mandat de Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (2009). La période est marquée par l’embrasement de plusieurs conflits internes et la diffusion d’une violence de basse intensité (attentats, piraterie, criminalité). Dans ce contexte, les autorités cherchent à consolider simultanément la transition démocratique et l’appareil sécuritaire, débarrassant l’establishment militaire de ses habitudes répressives tout en recourant abondamment à une loi martiale désormais inscrite dans le droit. Les trois premiers présidents de la transition démocratique ont ainsi invoqué la loi martiale (Habibie au Timor oriental ; Wahid aux Moluques puis dans le contexte précédant sa destitution ; Megawati à Aceh). Les mandats de SBY n’ont pas non plus été exempts de mesures exceptionnelles, notamment en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme.

Les cas d’étude soulignent l’absence de linéarité de la transition entre sécuritisation et désécuritisation, alternativement mises en œuvre par les mêmes acteurs selon leur perception des menaces et du contexte, notamment de l’opinion. Ils soulignent aussi la complexité du rôle des militaires, susceptibles de devenir des partenaires nécessaires voire des amplificateurs de désécuritisation, loin de la représentation dominante qui les cantonne au rôle d’agents de sécuritisation.

Tourné vers l’étude d’acteurs nationaux et locaux, l’ouvrage aurait pu davantage souligner l’importance d’un contexte mondial susceptible d’enrayer ou de favoriser les processus de sécuritisation. C’est notamment le cas, pour des conflits à dimension religieuse, après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 (le gouvernement de Megawati assimilant alors les rebelles d’Aceh au terrorisme global). Dans la même ligne, l’intentionnalité des parties prenantes est parfois surestimée – choix assumé dont témoigne l’évocation de « politiques de sécuritisation » –, là où les autorités procèdent souvent à une sécuritisation ad hoc face à des situations semblant mettre en jeu leur crédibilité en l’absence de réponse vigoureuse. Enfin, les particularités inhérentes à la conception même de la sécurité en Asie du Sud-Est, au-delà de l’expérience coloniale, auraient mérité d’être soulignées : la sécuritisation prend une dimension différente dans un contexte où la sécurité nationale est d’emblée conçue de manière extensive et tournée vers l’intérieur, alors que l’appareil militaire se perçoit comme un vecteur de stabilité politique.

Delphine Allès

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

Buckle up — the technology won’t be ready for another decade.

It's hard to be powerful when nobody believes a word you say.

Merkel now talks of protecting Ukraine’s interests as Russia’s $12 billion gas pipeline seeks to bypass Kiev.

Not everyone fighting “fake news” is doing it for the right reasons.

A 2-ship of Israeli Air Force F-16s from Ramon Air Base, Israel head out to the Nevada Test and Training Range, July 17, 2009 during Red Flag 09-4. Red Flag is a realistic combat training exercise involving the air forces of the United States and its allies. The exercise is conducted on the 15,000-square-mile Nevada Test and Training Range, north of Las Vegas. Red Flag is one of a series of advanced training programs administered by the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center and Nellis, through the 414th Combat Training Squadron. Flying for Red Flag 09-4 begins July 13 and ends July 24. U.S. aircraft will come from Nellis and Creech in Nevada, South Carolina, Idaho, the United Kingdom, Washington, Oklahoma and Ohio. Aircraft types will include F-15s, F-16s, E-3s and KC-135s. In addition to U.S. aircraft, the Israeli Air Force will be flying F-16C Falcons.
(U.S. Air Force photo/ Master Sgt. Kevin J. Gruenwald) released

Iran has been ratcheting up the rhetoric while Haaretz warns of the consequences of Iran’s ambitions in Syria. It all started back in February, when an Iranian drone and an Israeli F-16 were shot down at the Syria-Israel border. More incidents and additional quarrels over the Iran Nuclear Deal could lead to more grievous confrontations between the parties involved.

The drone and the F-16: the incident

On 10 February, the Israeli Air Force (IAF – Heyl Ha’Avir) intercepted and shot down an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was flying within its borders. Soon after, the IAFdispatched its F-16I jetfighters in order to destroy the UAV control vehicle in Syrian territory. However, as the F-16Is engaged their targets, an intense barrage of anti-aircraft firewelcomed them. One F-16I was eventually shot down, while the two pilots managed to eject and landed on Israeli territory. In retaliation, Israel conducted surgical strikes against at least twelve Iranian targets within Syria.

A series of new developments

The events of 10 February represented a number of unprecedented developments. First, this was the first time that an Iranian drone penetrated Israeli airspace. Previously, Iran’s proxies – such as e.g. Hezbollah – usually carried out these tasks. This marks an upgrade in Tehran’s presence and involvement in operations against Israel. Also, the retaliation unleashed by the downing of the F-16 represented the first Israeli strike against manned Iranian bases. Hence, similarly to the Iranian counterpart, Israeli forces are not steering clear of a direct confrontation with their regional competitor.

Moreover, the IAF losing an aircraft is news in itself. Indeed, Israel had not lost a single jetfighter in a combat operation since the time of the Lebanon War at the beginning of the ‘80s. It is not clear what anti-aircraft weapon system brought the jetfighter down. IAF F-16Is are equipped with electronic countermeasures that give them an advantage against many anti-aircraft systems. There are, however, sophisticated systems in Syria – such as the Russian-made Buk-M1-2 or S-400 – that could successfully engage advanced jetfighters like the IAF F-16Is.

The loss of the jetfighter is noteworthy in another regard as well, as it could change Israel’s course of action. Indeed, Israel has been ceaselessly conducting airstrike in Syria throughout the Civil War, targeting Hezbollah’s supply chain as well as Syrian and Iranian strategic military facilities and bases. This line of conduct might be subject to change in light of these recent events; as an Iranian official commented, “the era of hit and run is over” and his words might ring partially or entirely true.

Leaders send warning from Munich

Displaying a piece of the UAV downed over the skies of Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Iran from the stage of the Munich Security Conference to not “test Israel’s resolve”. Netanyahu asserted that Israel would not let Tehran proceed with their plans against Tel Aviv, stating that his country is ready to wage war against Iran or its proxies to defend itself.

While Iran rejected all accusations brought forth by Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister might find additional reasons to reinforce his anti-Iranian foreign policies in recent domestic developments. The Israeli police recently claimed to have enough evidence to charge Netanyahu with corruption. Faced with this accusation, the Prime Minister might be strongly motivated to show resolve against Israel’s arch-enemy in order to deflect attention from himself – more so as if he can count on the Trump administration’s unconditional support and even on the assistance of countries equally worried about Iran’s rise, like Saudi Arabia.

Also in Munich, Lebanon’s Defense Minister Yaacoub Sarraf reacted to Netanyahu’s words. Commenting on the Israeli Prime Minister’s promise to go after Iran’s proxies, Sarraf asserted that the government in Beirut is ready and willing to defend its territory against external aggression. Any Israeli operations taking place on Lebanese soil would, therefore, prompt an armed reaction against it. Sarraf’s pledge may well prove empty, as it is hard to imagine Beirut conducting military operations against Tel Aviv. Nevertheless, Israel will feel forced to gauge potential reactions from other neighbouring countries besides Syria. Meanwhile, there have been further revelations about Iran allegedly having up to 10 military bases in Syria, two of them near Israel’s border.

The Nuclear Deal as the final straw?

The year 2018 will see an increase in tension between Iran and Israel. This could potentially lead to a limited, regional conflict between Tel Aviv and Tehran’s proxies. Yet, while the anti-Iranian front tightens, a more direct confrontation might arise from the Nuclear Deal. Indeed, the dissatisfaction of Israel and the USA grows, since they believe the Deal is incapable of preventing Iran from getting nuclear capabilities.

At the same time, Iran’s resentment towards the US is increasing. In particular, Iran accusesthe Trump administration of meddling in its business with other countries in order to counter the positive effects that the lifting of the sanctions ensued. Under such circumstances, the Nuclear Deal does not pay off and Iran would benefit from withdrawing. In this regard, Tehran warned its competitors that the world “would face another nuclear crisis, which would be very difficult to be resolved”, if the Nuclear Deal was to be scrapped.

If this is going to be the case, Iran will surely re-embark on its nuclear endeavour with renewed vigour. Simultaneously, Israel, the US, and the rest of the regional powers worried about Iran’s rise, might push for more aggressive solutions in order to deal with the prospects of a nuclear Iran once and for all. If diplomacy loses this round, the probability of a direct confrontation between these parties will increase dramatically.

 

This article was first published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Mauro Lubrano.

The post Israel and Iran on the path to escalation appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Canada’s left is trying to tarnish Doug Ford’s image by branding him a racist. They’d be better off asking why so many minorities support him.

Blaming the Russians, or political opponents, only goes so far.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Alexander Thurston , Boko Haram: the History of an African Jihadist Movement (Princeton University Press, 2017, 352 pages).

Voici enfin une histoire de Boko Haram qui permet de comprendre en finesse une des insurrections djihadistes les plus énigmatiques d’Afrique. L’approche chronologique, en particulier, s’avère fort utile pour décrypter la complexité d’un mouvement qui, à partir de 2003, a connu plusieurs phases de profondes transformations, de la secte jusqu’au groupe terroriste, avec une faction affiliée à l’organisation État islamique depuis 2015. Arabophone, l’auteur a prêté beaucoup d’attention aux vidéos de propagande des insurgés, et il argue que l’on ne peut analyser Boko Haram en faisant abstraction de sa dimension religieuse, quoi qu’il en soit par ailleurs des facteurs politiques, sociaux et économiques pouvant, aussi, expliquer sa résilience face à une coalition antiterroriste qui réunit les quatre pays du pourtour du lac Tchad.

Une telle lecture permet de déconstruire les poncifs habituels à ce propos, ­notamment les représentations qui opposent un islam soufi, africain et tolérant face et un islam arabe, salafiste, « radical » et séditieux. Contrairement à la vision qu’en ont certains spécialistes du terrorisme, Thurston montre ainsi que Boko Haram n’est pas une importation saoudienne. Au contraire, le mouvement s’est développé en rupture avec les groupes wahhabites du Nigeria. Au début des années 2000, son fondateur Mohammed Youssouf a d’abord réussi à s’imposer comme le prêcheur le plus virulent de la région, en profitant de l’absence des principaux prédicateurs salafistes de la ville de Maiduguri, partis en Arabie Saoudite poursuivre leur cursus religieux à l’université islamique de Médine. Les relations entre les deux mouvances se sont ensuite dégradées très vite. À mesure que les groupes salafistes dénonçaient la déviance doctrinale de Mohammed Youssouf, celui-ci s’est radicalisé et a musclé son discours contre l’État nigérian. En 2009, il devait finalement appeler au djihad pour venger des membres de la secte abattus sans sommation par la police. L’exécution extrajudiciaire de Mohammed Youssouf précipita alors Boko Haram dans une autre dimension, celle de la clandestinité, du terrorisme et, bientôt, du massacre et de la guerre civile dans les régions riveraines du lac Tchad.

Pour autant, le mouvement a continué à revendiquer des positions religieuses. Rejeté en 2016 par l’organisation État islamique, le successeur de Mohammed Youssouf, Aboubakar Shekau, a par exemple accusé la faction de son rival d’avoir basculé dans le murjisme (murji’ah). Cette école théologique, qui date du Moyen Âge, considérait que seul Dieu pouvait juger des péchés des croyants. Elle est aujourd’hui déclarée impie, car elle va à l’encontre de la position des clercs qui attribuent aux imams et aux juges de la charia le soin de prononcer des anathèmes et, pour les salafistes les plus radicaux, d’excommunier (takfir) les déviants. Le débat n’est pas clos, mais il revêt toute son importance quand on sait que Boko Haram tue essentiellement des musulmans et non des chrétiens, minoritaires dans la région. À sa manière, le livre de Thurston nous renvoie ainsi à la question fondamentale des relations entre la religion et des États défaillants qui n’ont pas réussi à gérer leur héritage islamique et les demandes de justice sociale à travers la charia.

Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

With or without the United States.

With little to show for last year’s missile attack, the Trump administration is contemplating a larger campaign against the Assad government.

Everything Trump does in Syria revolves around what’s good for Trump. And that’s bad for America.