Defence`s Feeds

Afghanistan’s new electoral law has come into force, which means that the requirement of electoral reform ahead of the next elections has – at least nominally – been met. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili and Martine van Bijlert discuss the main features of the new law and note that the most controversial and complicated changes have been passed on to the Independent Election Commission to decide on. These include, most prominently, an instruction to decrease the size of the electoral constituencies for the parliamentary and provincial council elections, which could usher in an overhaul of the electoral system. This will be a politically fraught exercise, which will pave the way for a new round of bickering and delay. It also threatens to drag the newly established commission into political controversy.

In September 2016, the government finally managed to agree on a new electoral law, and, in November 2016, the president appointed and inaugurated a new Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). The law was passed by presidential decree, based on a ruling by the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution (ICOIC), which ruled that, in this case, the president did not need to go through parliament. The ICOIC based its ruling on a different interpretation than the parliament had previously arrived at of an article in the constitution which prohibits the parliament from discussing the electoral law in the last year of its session (for details see previous AAN reporting here).  The new law combines the two main laws that previously governed the electoral process and bodies: the Electoral Law and the Law on the Structures, Authorities and Duties of the Electoral Bodies (or Structure Law, for short). (1) The new law – simply titled ‘Election Law’ – replaces earlier legislative decrees that were issued by President Ashraf Ghani (but not enforced, as they had not been passed by parliament), as well as the two electoral laws that were signed by former president Karzai in 2013, ahead of the 2014 presidential election. The most important changes are discussed below (the full text of the new electoral law, in Dari, can be found here).

Changing the electoral constituencies

Potentially, the most important change in the new law is found in article 35. This article instructs the newly appointed Independent Election Commission (IEC) to “determine the Wolesi Jirga and provincial council electoral constituencies and to divide them into smaller constituencies.” It does not stipulate whether the constituencies should be multi-member or single-member. The decree that endorsed the law further instructs the IEC to conduct a technical study within three months of its establishment on the “better implementation” of article 35 (the study must therefore be finalised by late February, as the new IEC and ECC were sworn in on 22 November 2016). It is unclear what happens after that. The decree states that the cabinet will “assess the report and take a decision accordingly,” but does not specify whether it can modify the IEC’s proposal on the redrawing of the electoral constituencies, a move which, in any case, would reopen the discussions that had bogged down the finalisation of the law from the beginning.

Article 35 is a watered-down version of the ongoing attempts to replace the current electoral system (SNTV, or single non-transferable vote) with a first-past-the-post, single-member constituency system. Such a change would simplify the vote and make the outcome easier to understand for voters, but would also introduce a ‘winner takes all’ system in each constituency.

The Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC), the commission that was tasked in 2015 by the government to come up with proposals for electoral reform, had been unanimous in their desire to change the SNTV system, but had had trouble agreeing on what should replace it. After considering several possible alternatives, the SERC developed a Multi-Dimensional Representation (MDR) system with multi-member constituencies, which it presented to the government in late 2015. (2) Two dissenting boycotting SERC members presented their own favoured system to the government, which was the first-past-the-post system that the cabinet tried to include in the current law (but failed to reach a consensus on). Opponents of the single-member constituencies fear that the system could fatally split their voter base and/or allow representatives in certain areas to be elected with very small numbers of votes (which is currently already the case in some insecure provinces). They worry that the IEC may be pressured to not only decrease the size of the electoral constituencies, but to also make them single-member.

Apart from raising the stakes of the competition in every single constituency (given that only one person can win), a change to single-member constituencies will also complicate the issue of the women’s quota. As reiterated in article 35 of the new electoral law, the IEC needs to observe article 83 of the constitution (paragraphs 4 and 6), which states that the Wolesi Jirga, apart from not exceeding 250 individuals, should be proportionate to the population of each constituency, and should include, on average, two women from each province. In a single-member constituency system, this would involve different constituencies for the male and female seats (as there are less seats for the women to compete over). This could possibly result in separate elections with separate ballots for male and female candidates, which would be a significant setback for women, particularly for the female politicians who aim to get elected on their own merit, by receiving enough votes vis-à-vis their male counterparts to win regardless of a quota.

The issue of the electoral system risks becoming polarised. Proponents of the different options keep a close eye on how they believe the changes might impact the relative balance of power in parliament. Particular concerns include the parliament’s ethnic make-up, its factional and geographical representation, whether the changes strengthen political parties or not, and what they mean for the women’s quota. In this climate of heightened suspicions, it will be difficult for the IEC to come up with a proposal that can unite the different sides, address the various concerns and not complicate election procedures further.

If the IEC and/or the cabinet fail to come to an agreement on a new electoral system, they may choose to retain the existing STNV system. Despite its drawbacks – large numbers of candidates, narrow margins between winners and losers, high percentages of ‘wasted votes’, and a fragmented parliament – SNTV is a known quantity. As we have seen so far, any change to the system is likely to affect the equation regarding who might benefit, and will draw opposition from those who believe they might lose out.

Linking voters to polling centres

Articles 6 and 8 of the new law describe a system of registration and voting that includes the development of voters’ lists and a database in which voters are, for the first time, linked to specific polling centres:

Article 6.1-6: The person eligible to vote has to personally appear at the polling centre, and register his/her name in the voter’s list based on the citizenship Tazkera (National ID) or [other] document specified by the [Independent Election] Commission for the verification of his/her identity. No person can register his/her name more than once in the voter’s list. The voter is obliged to vote at the polling centre where his/her name has already been registered in the voters’ list of that polling centre. To get a ballot paper, a voter is obliged to present the citizenship Tazkera or [other] document specified by the Commission for the verification of his/her identity. Every voter has the right to one vote and can use it directly in favour of his/her favourite candidate. In case a voter may need guidance to find his/her candidate of choice, he/she can seek the help of a person he/she trusts.

Article 8: The Commission is obliged to prepare the voters’ list by polling centre and shall link it to the Commission’s national database.

At the moment Afghanistan has no voter list system. Although there are databases with information gathered during several rounds of ‘voter registration’ ahead of previous elections, they are not in any usable way linked to the voter cards that have been distributed, nor do they link voters to polling centres. During the ‘registration,’ the emphasis has been on the distribution of voter cards, rather than on the establishment of any kind of voter database. This has resulted in massive over-registration: a total of 21 million voter cards have been distributed throughout the various registration and top-up exercises, for an estimated maximum total voting population of 15 million people (for more details, see here). Many cards were given without ID documents being shown – to accommodate voters who did not have documents – or without the voters present (many people, for instance, took advantage of the leniency shown to female voters by collecting large numbers of cards “for the women of the family,” simply by showing up with long lists of female names).

The technicalities of the new regulation have been left to the IEC. The new law does not specify whether the existing voter cards will be invalidated or whether new voter cards will be issued. However, the wording of the law strongly suggests that there will need to be some form of renewed registration to accommodate the linking of voters to polling centres. Neither does the law specify whether registration will take place prior to the elections or concurrently, which leaves open the possibility of same-day or even simultaneous registration and voting.

The IEC will also need to determine which documents can be used for identification during registration and voting. The Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) previously noted that many Afghans have multiple documents, often with different names and birth dates, which might confuse the system (Afghanistan does not have a singular system for last names, or a central birth registry; many Afghans use a takhalus, which is more like a nickname that they can change any time). It also noted that Afghans who do not have valid identification risk being disenfranchised, and recommended that an exception to the identification requirement be made for those without a valid ID. This could open the door to abuse again.

In the past, plans for an improved system of voter registration have often been based on the idea that an accelerated rollout of the e-Tazkera, or electronic ID card, would introduce a secure form of identification that could be used as voter ID as well. The introduction of the e-Tazkera, however, has technical and political difficulties of its own. It is unlikely that it will be implemented any time soon.

Introducing electoral crimes and penalties

Where previous electoral laws only specified electoral violations (distinguishing between negligence and fraud), the new law now lists twenty acts that are considered electoral crimes and carry stricter penalties (art 99). For instance, the act of “preventing the participation of agents, observers and media during the polling and counting process for the purpose of concealing the truth” is now considered a crime that carries a penalty of up to three years imprisonment. (In the 2013 electoral law, the electoral violation of “preventing the national and international monitors and observers from monitoring the electoral process” was punishable by a fine of 100,000-500,000 Afghani, or about 2-10,000 US dollars.)

The list of electoral crimes in the new law reads as a catalogue of the ways that candidates, supporters, electoral staff and others have, in the past, tried to influence the outcome of elections (for more details on these efforts, see here and here). The penalties are generally high (imprisonment). A full list of the crimes can be found in footnote (3).

The criminalisation of electoral violations has been touted by the government as an important measure to mitigate fraud (see the president’s comments during a consultative meeting with political leaders here). However, as always, a law is only as good as its implementation. The law, moreover, is not fully clear about the different lines of authority. According to article 97, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is obligated to investigate and identify electoral crimes and refer the perpetrators to the relevant authorities. According to article 99, however, “penalties will be declared by the [Independent Election] Commission and implemented by the law enforcement authorities.”

Given the heated atmosphere that usually surrounds elections, including sustained allegations of partisanship and manipulation against both electoral bodies, it is potentially problematic to give the authority to prosecute and punish violations to the main implementing bodies. (The IEC conducts the elections and the ECC, although it does not implement the elections per se, has in practice become the final body to rule on which votes get counted and which do not, thus affecting the final outcome of the elections.)

Employing civil servants as temporary electoral staff

The electoral law defines two categories of staff for the IEC and the ECC: permanent staff at headquarters and provincial offices, and temporary staff. In the 2013 law, both permanent and temporary employees were hired through a process of staggered recruitment (many candidates would try to get their supporters recruited as IEC staff). According to the new law (art 23) “temporary electoral workers at the polling centres and stations shall be assigned from amongst school teachers, lecturers of government institutions for higher education and government administrative personnel, in accordance with procedures adopted by the Commission.” The measure to enlist government workers as temporary staff is intended to decrease the costs of temporary recruitment and to simplify the recruitment process. It could, however, also become controversial. Campaign managers and other candidate supporters have, in the past, tried to mobilise all kinds of networks in support of their candidates, including teachers and civil servants. The impartiality of temporary IEC staff will therefore still not be guaranteed.

Structural changes to the committee that selects the electoral commissioners

The Selection Committee for the electoral commissioners (IEC and ECC) was first introduced in 2013, ahead of the 2014 presidential elections, as a way to limit the influence of the president on the appointment of the commissioners. The Selection Committee calls for applications, vets and selects qualified candidates based on criteria specified in the law, and presents the shortlist to the president for his final selection. The new law has brought three changes to this committee: it reduced the number of committee members from six to five, changed the composition of the committee and pre-appointed the elected member of the High Council of the Supreme Court as the chair (previously, the chair was elected from among the members).

The composition of the Selection Committee has changed with every iteration of the law, as the different actors negotiating the law kept a close eye on who would sit on the committee, as a result of the changes, and how this would affect the factional balance. In the previous 2013 law, the committee was made up of six members: the speakers of the Wolesi Jirga and the Meshrano Jirga, the Chief Justice, the chairperson of the Independent Commission for Oversight of the Implementation of the Constitution (ICOIC), the chair of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and an elected representative from among civil society organisations working on elections. (In previous versions of the current law, which were not passed by parliament, the Selection Committee also included an elected representative of the media).

The new law has removed the speakers of the two houses of parliament (a move that was made possible by the decision not to present the decree to parliament for approval – for more details see here) and replaced them with a civil society member from among the organisations defending women’s rights. The SERC recommended the removal of both speakers, arguing in its report to parliament that “a balance should be struck between government and non-government members.” It argued further that “many advisers” had suggested that the National Assembly should not be represented in the committee, since it was “a beneficiary in the election.”

The new law further substituted the Chief Justice with a member of the high council of the Supreme Court and replaced the chairpersons of the ICOIC and AIHRC with members from these organisations. It retained the member elected from among civil society organisations working on elections.

Structural changes to the IEC and its secretariat

The new law adjusts the structure and operations of the IEC (articles 11, 12 and 22). It decreases the number of commissioners in the IEC from nine to seven, reduces their term from six to five years and introduces staggered appointments so that not all commissioners are replaced at the same time (as a result, the recent new appointments were for two different terms: four members for a period of five years and three members for a period of three years.) This was recommended by the SERC to safeguard both institutional memory and continuity of experience in the future. The terms of the chair, deputies and secretary have also been decreased (two and a half years for the chair and one year for the other positions, instead of three-year terms for all posts). The requirements for the IEC commissioners have been increased: the minimum age went up (from 30 to 35), as did the number of years of required work experience (now ten years for a Bachelor degree, seven years for a Masters and five years for a PhD). The new law also specifies required fields of studies (law, sharia, political sciences, management, sociology, economy or other related fields).

The new law further makes the IEC secretariat subservient and accountable to the commission (art 22.4: “The Secretariat shall carry out its duties in accordance to the provisions of the law and the procedures adopted by the Commission, and shall report to the Commission”), which is new. The 2013 law did not require the secretariat to report to the commission. On the other hand, the IEC now has to propose three candidates for the position of Chief Electoral Officer to the president (instead of just one). Article 27 further gives more detailed instructions on how the IEC should establish a media committee, comprised of three members.

Structural changes to the ECC and its secretariat

Unlike the IEC, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is not enshrined in the constitution, but was established based on the earlier Electoral Law. There were, as a result, extensive discussions within the SERC about the constitutionality of the ECC and whether a complaints mechanism could be introduced under the authorities of the IEC instead. In the new law, however, a separate ECC has been retained “to address objections and complaints arising from electoral negligence and violations, and to identify crimes related to the elections” (art 28:1).

Like the previous 2013 law, the law distinguishes between the Central Electoral Complaints Commission (CECC) and the Provincial Electoral Complaints Commissions (PECC). The CECC, which is based in Kabul, has five members. The new law does not reduce or increase the number, but it does include a provision that the government, in consultation with the United Nations, can appoint two international election experts as non-voting members “to ensure transparency and address challenges” (art 29.6). The ECC has had international members in the past, which was welcomed by some and met with suspicion by others. The SERC had included this in its recommendations, arguing that this was “done in other countries as well,” probably in an attempt to dispel sensitivities towards the involvement of foreigners in the electoral process.

Article 28 of the new law raises the requirements for ECC membership, raising the age from 30 to 35, and stipulating that the candidates should have higher education in the fields of law or Islamic jurisprudence. Article 34 retains the provision that the CECC is independent in its budget spending, after having prepared the budget in consultation with the government, but requires the commission to present its report according to the provisions of the law (it does not specify to whom).

The provincial complaints commissions (PECCs), which are established one month before candidate registration, will have three members each – two of them (one man and one woman) introduced by the CECC and a third introduced by the AIHRC – which have to be approved by the president (art 31.2). In the 2013 law, all three members were introduced by the CECC and approved by the president.

As with the IEC secretariat, the new law makes the ECC secretariat accountable to the CECC, and as with the IEC secretariat, the ECC should propose three candidates to the president for the position of head of the secretariat, instead of just one (article 32).

Changes that affect the composition of the elected bodies: reserved seats for women and Hindus/Sikhs

The constitution stipulates that, on average, at least two women from each province are to be elected to the Wolesi Jirga; that is, at least 64 out 249 seats, which is a little over 25 per cent (art 83.6). Subsequent electoral laws also allocated seats for women in the provincial councils: in the 2013 electoral law this was “at least 20 per cent.” The new law increases the provincial council allocation to “at least 25 per cent” (art 58.2), as it had been in an earlier version of the law, and now also gives the same allocation to the district councils (art 61.2) and village councils (art 64.2). The law does not include a quota for women in the municipal councils, which, to date, have not been formed.

Article 48 increases the number of Wolesi Jirga seats from 249 to 250, maintaining the ten reserved seats for Kuchis and allocating the extra seat to a joint representative of the Hindu and Sikh communities (Article 83.4 of the Constitution sets the maximum number of Wolesi Jirga members at 250). This lumps the two tiny, only non-Muslim communities together (details about them in this AAN dispatch) and separates them, together with the Kuchis, from the rest of the population. The reserved seat for the Hindu and Sikh community had been included in earlier drafts of the electoral law, but removed by the Wolesi Jirga, which argued that the community was not large enough to warrant a separate seat and that the Hindu and Sikhs should be treated equally with other citizens of the country. (4)

The new law also reduces the number of members of the provincial councils, district councils and village councils proportionate to the population. For the provincial councils (art 58), for example, this has now become:

• Population up to 500,000 – 9 seats
• Up to 1,000,000 – 11 seats (down from 15)
• Up to 2,000,000 – 15 seats (down from 19)
• Up to 3,000,000 – 17 seats (down from 23)
• Up to 4,000,000 – 19 seats (down from 29)
• Over 4,000,000 – 21 seats (down from 33)

The largest district council has gone from 15 to 11 members (art 61) and the largest village council from 11 to 7 (art 64).

Article 59 adds the proviso that if a member of the provincial council is unable to fill his/her seat (due to death, resignation, sickness or disability), and more than one year of their term of service remains, the seat will be given to “the next candidate of the same sex (male or female) with the most votes, based on the list prepared by the Commission.” The same proviso was added for members of the district and village councils, and retained for the Wolesi Jirga.

Changes in the articles on campaigning

Article 76 of the new law reduces the campaign period for most races: 20 days for the Wolesi Jirga and provincial council elections (down from 30), 15 days for district council elections (down from 20), and 7 days for village council elections (down from 10). It retains 60 days for the presidential election and 20 days for the municipal council and mayoral elections.

Whereas the 2013 electoral law imposed caps on spending in the various election campaigns, article 77 of the new law leaves it to the IEC to enact a procedure based on the following three criteria: 1) number of eligible voters 2) area and 3) geographical location of the electoral constituency. During SERC discussions, it was argued that setting the same caps for candidates in all provinces might not do justice to the varying challenges they would face. The law now explicitly obliges candidates to report on their campaign spending to the IEC.

Where the previous electoral law prohibited candidates from accepting or receiving either financial or technical assistance from foreign entities during the campaign, the new law (art 77) only bans foreign financial assistance. The argument in the SERC was to not deprive the country of the democratic experiences of other countries.

The presidential election’s second round

Due to the ethnic and factional nature of alignments, Afghanistan’s presidential elections tend to go to a second round, to ensure that the president is voted in with “more than 50 per cent of votes cast by voters through free, general, secret and direct voting” (art 61 of the Constitution). A paragraph in the new law makes explicit what happens when one of the two runner-up presidential candidates decides not to participate in the run-off election (as happened in 2009): “In case one of the candidates does not participate in the elections in the second round, the other candidate is recognised as the winner” (art 45.5). The 2013 electoral law made no reference to such a scenario, even though the IEC, in 2009, had already set the precedent by declaring Hamid Karzai the elected president after the runner-up and current chief executive, Abdullah Abdullah, withdrew. (5) This explicit addition may invite forced withdrawals and opens the way for a president to be elected with less than 50 per cent of the vote, as the votes in the first round are still divided among many candidates. According to the new provision in the electoral law, if – hypothetically speaking – Karzai had withdrawn in 2009, Abdullah would have been allowed to be president with, according to the IEC results, a little over 30 per cent of votes.

Article 46 of the new law retains the constitutional clause which stipulates that if one of the presidential candidates dies during the first or second round of voting, or before the announcement of the results, new elections will be held among the remaining presidential candidates (this is sometimes referred to as the “assassination clause”). It has, however, done away with the impractical stipulation of a 30-day timeframe during which the new elections had to be held, which was included in the 2013 law.

Reintroducing the exclusion clause for links to illegal armed groups

Article 44 reintroduces the ban on commanders or members of illegal armed groups from running in the elections; the clause existed in earlier versions of the electoral law but was removed in 2013. The article states that:

Commanders or members of illegal armed groups may not stand as candidates in elections. The commandership or membership of illegal armed groups is vetted and necessary decisions made by a separate commission comprising representatives of the Ministries of National Defence and Interior Affairs, the General Directorate of National Security and the Directorate of Local Governance, chaired by the Chairperson of the Complaints Commission. Complaints will be adjudicated by the Complaints Commission, the decisions of which are final.

The vetting of candidates with links to illegal armed groups has been a complicated affair in the past, as these links were often difficult to persuasively prove (at least, this could be argued). As a result, the most powerful commanders were usually unaffected by the process. In the 2005 parliamentary election, for example, out of 208 candidates put forward by election stakeholders for disqualification for having links to illegal armed groups, only 34 were finally barred from running (see this report). Moreover, many commanders have some form of legal cover for at least a proportion of their fighters. As AAN reported in 2013:

The removal of this clause, and of the related vetting procedure (see here) for what this looked like during past elections), means a significant simplification of the process, but it is also a stark admission of defeat: of the failure of disarmament, the proliferation of militias and the inability to separate armed commanders from politics.

It remains to be seen how the reintroduction of vetting for links to illegal armed groups, and the politicking and complaints surrounding the process, will affect the line-up of candidates in future elections. It also remains to be seen whether mechanisms can be introduced to improve the implementation of this legal provision.

Looking ahead

The signing of the new electoral law and the appointment of a new IEC and ECC means that – at least nominally – the requirement of electoral reform, as stipulated in the 2014 National Unity Government agreement and demanded by the chief executive’s camp, has been met. The most controversial and complicated changes, however, have not been finalised and have instead been passed on to the Independent Election Commission. The IEC will now have to grapple with the redrawing of electoral constituencies, a reopened discussion over the electoral system and the introduction of a voter registration system that links voters to polling centres. Each of these issues will require a large amount of technical and political finesse and will most likely result in new rounds of bickering and delay.

The IEC said it intends to announce the date for the upcoming parliamentary elections, as well as its plan for either the cancellation or the re-accreditation the voter cards, at the latest, in the next month. But whatever date gets announced, it is unlikely that elections will still take place in 2017. Practically speaking, once the parameters are clear, the IEC will need around a year to prepare and organise. This means that even in the best-case scenario – that is, if the IEC’s proposal on electoral constituencies is indeed ready by late February and is immediately accepted, and if no other major controversies come up – this will, at the very least, bring us into the spring of 2018.

 

 

(1) The two laws – the Electoral Law and the Law on the Structures, Authorities and Duties of the Electoral Bodies (or Structure Law, for short) – were combined in order to simplify the procedure and to solve the ongoing debate as to whether at least one of the laws still needed to be passed by parliament. For background on the politicking that preceded the current law, see earlier AAN reporting here, here and here.

(2) Initial alternatives to the SNTV system included a first-past-the-post, single-member constituency (FPTP) system, which is discussed above; a list-based Proportional Representation (PR) system (options with open and closed lists were both discussed); and a parallel system, which would combine the current SNTV with a partial PR system.

In a later round of discussions – after the SERC had suggested the parallel system and had lost two dissenting members to a boycott – the SERC (with outside help) developed the Multi-Dimensional Representation (MDR) system. MDR is based on multi-member constituencies, and includes a proposal to possibly decrease the size of the largest constituencies.

The MDR system, which was especially tailored to address the demands and concerns that had come up in the SERC’s discussions, allows individuals to run either as independents or as part of a list (whether a party list, a coalition of parties, or an ad hoc gathering of individuals). Voters would still vote for individuals, but the determination of the winners would be done in two steps – first counting how many seats the best-performing lists have earned and then awarding seats to the individuals on these lists with the most votes. This would not change much for the voter, but the outcomes of the count can be easily misunderstood, as individuals with far fewer votes than others could still win a seat if their list did better than others.

(3) The listed electoral crimes and their penalties, include: misuse of military resources and signs for the purpose of frightening or influencing a person in favour of or against a candidate (imprisonment of up to three months); receiving or offering bribes for the purpose of exerting influence in the electoral processes (five years imprisonment); threat, intimidation, irreverence and exertion of pressure (five years imprisonment); hiding results forms and ballot papers for the purpose of concealing the truth (two years imprisonment); displacing, transferring or taking into possession electoral documents without a lawful permit (up to three years imprisonment); receiving funding from illegal sources (up to three years imprisonment); receiving or accepting material assistance in cash or kind from foreign sources (up to three years imprisonment); bringing changes in the result forms that do not correspond to the votes in the ballot box (up to three years imprisonment); tampering with the software and hardware systems of the results tallying centres without legal authorization (imprisonment of no less than one month and no more than one year); exerting violence or pressure or disrupting the security situation that leads to an interruption of the electoral process (imprisonment of two to five years); stealing or destroying electoral documents, ballot papers or sensitive electoral materials (five years imprisonment); registration of a candidate using fake documents (deprivation of the right to register and short-term imprisonment); voting using fake documents (deprivation of the right to vote and short-term imprisonment); using the vote of a person in his/her absence (deprivation of the right to vote and short-term imprisonment); buying and selling of votes (deprivation of the right to vote and short-term imprisonment); changing or replacing electoral documents, including the registration book, results sheets and ballot papers, in favour of or against a candidate (imprisonment up to three years); increasing or decreasing votes in favour of or against a candidate during elections (imprisonment of more than three years); hiding, or not processing in a timely manner, filed complaints and objections to conceal the truth (imprisonment of more than three years); concealment or failure by staff to report violations witnessed at the polling station (short term imprisonment, no less than three months); preventing the participation of monitors, observers and media during the polling and counting process for the purpose of concealing the truth (imprisonment up to three years). If the crimes were committed as a result of provocation, intimidation or encouragement by someone else, this person shall face the same penalties as the actual perpetrator of the crime.

The law also lists 35 electoral violations that are punishable by fines (art 98). These include violations such as registering more than once as a voter, displaying candidates’ symbols in polling centres, destroying campaign materials, preventing monitors and observers from monitoring the process (apparently without the intent of concealing the truth), etc.

(4) The reserved seat for Hindus and Sikhs was included in the initial draft of the 2013 electoral law, but was rejected by parliament in July of that year. It was re-included in the new electoral law that was introduced by presidential decree on 3 September 2013, but was removed again by the Wolesi Jirga. This is the third time the government has introduced the separate seat for Hindus and Sikhs. This time it is likely to remain as the Wolesi Jirga, according to the ICOIC, is not allowed to discuss or vote on the law. For more background on the back and forth, see AAN’s previous reporting here.

(5) The IEC justified its decision by arguing that Karzai had received the most votes in the first round and, after the withdrawal of Abdullah, had no contender in the second. Abdullah’s supporters, who had contested the outcome of the first round, argued that the IEC’s decision had no basis in the law and warned that this would not solve Afghanistan’s problems (see previous AAN reporting here).

Japanese Prototype 8x8 Armored Personnel Carrier

The European Defence Agency has launched a new, specialised Defence Energy Managers’ Course (DEMC), which aims to enhance MoD capabilities through the integration of Energy Management Systems within their organisations.  The participants of the DEMC will reinforce their understanding of the complexities of managing energy within a defence organisation or sub-organisation and will acquire the capacity to structure, implement and improve effective Energy Management Systems (EnMS).

Through the attendance of the course, MoD/Armed Forces personnel will be trained to the required technical standard to deliver practical, cost-effective solutions and, uniquely, will benefit from case-specific mentoring support to their first project delivered within the context of their normal work activities. After the course, the trainees will have sufficient knowledge to continue to develop their skills in a continuous cycle of self-improvement through on-going mentoring, alumni relations and as members of the European Defence Energy Network (EDEN) with permanent access to its established on-line resources. 

Following relevant support from EDA’s EnE WG  participating Member States as well as the pertinent requirements of EU legal framework on Energy Efficiency regarding Energy Management Systems (EnMS), the Agency has  proceeded to contract a developmental educational service from a consortium of professional education service providers. 

Based on the ISO 50001 International Energy Standard, the course is tailored to the specificities of the Defence sector and it is divided into the following phases:

• One DEMC – Pilot Course, which will provide the initial EnMS approach in the Defence sector and synchronise the various relevant national requirements. The Pilot Course is scheduled to last 14 months, comprising of classroom sessions and alternating with relevant mentoring and in situ on–the-job training (OJT) for developing and implementing an EnMS at home for MoD organisations. 

• A maximum of 6 DEMC – Steady State are scheduled for the 3 years to follow a successful completion of the Pilot Course. These courses will comprise the DEMC - Pilot structure, in addition to incorporating the previously gained experience as well as any recommendations and feedback from participating Member States. 

The consortium consists of:

• ENMS Ltd (Ireland);
• Centre for Renewable Energy Sources and Saving (CRES) (Greece) and 
• GEN Europe Soluciones Energéticas SL (Spain).

The EDA project team of DEMC is composed of Tom BENNINGTON and Nektarios ALEXANDRIS.

This workshop will provide a brief overview of aspects related to civilian and military personnel serving in CSDP missions and operations, in terms of challenging issues related to force generation, in mission treatment, training, follow up to crimes and offences perpetrated during deployment. For instance, despite progress in force generation and preparation, procedures for personnel recruitment and deployment remain cumbersome and slow. Possible solutions will also be discussed by the experts.
Further information
Workshop programme
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Savox Communications will be attending and exhibiting at the International Defence Exhibition and Conference (IDEX) 2017 between 19-23 February.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© kemaltaner / Fotolia

A long-running discussion on reforming the European Union’s budget gained momentum when the High-Level Group on Own Resources, led by former Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti, presented its report in January 2017. The report proposes simpler methods for funding the EU, to make it less reliant on direct contributions from Member States, and recommends that spending be focused on areas where the highest European added value can be achieved, now, for example migration and security emergencies.

The report, entitled ‘Future financing of the EU‘, lists and examines several options for new own resources, such as a reformed VAT-linked resource, an EU corporate tax, a financial transaction tax or taxes linked to efforts to fight climate change. It also proposes to explore other revenue sources stemming directly from the EU policies and programmes. The report will be taken into consideration by the European Commission and EU Member States when they work on the EU’s next long-term budget after 2020.

This note offers links to reports and commentaries from some major international think tanks and research institutes on the EU budget. Some papers also discuss whether the euro area should have its own, dedicated budget.

Brexit et budget de L’UE: Menace ou opportunité
Jacques Delors Institute, Bertelsmann Stiftung, January 2017

The future of the EU budget: Between dream and reality
Clingendael, December 2016

Reforming the EU’s Budget Revenue: The case for a visible VAT-based resource
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2016

The multiannual financial framework post-2020: Balancing political ambition and realism
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2016

The EU Budget’s mid-term review with its promising reform proposals the Commission lays the groundwork for the next, post-2020 budget
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2016

A sustainable finance plan for the EU
E3G, October 2016

What are the prerequisites for a euro-area fiscal capacity?
Bruegel, September 2016

Can the EU spend more green? The CAP and the environment in future EU budgets
Policy Network, September 2016

The Impact of Brexit on the EU budget: A non-catastrophic event
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2016

Is Horizon 2020 really more SME-friendly? A look at the figures
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2016

Keeping Europeans together: Assessing the state of EU cohesion
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2016

The potential and limitations of reforming the financing of the EU budget
Centre for European Policy Studies, CATT/UPPA, University of London July 2016

Brexiting yourself in the foot: Why Britain’s eurosceptic regions have most to lose from EU withdrawal
Centre for European Reform, June 2016

EU budgetary responses to the ‘Refugee Crisis’ reconfiguring the funding landscape
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2016

The budget of the European Union: A guide
Institute for Fiscal Studies, April 2016

The economic strategy of stateless nations in the framework of the European cohesion
Centre Maurits Coppieters, March 2016

Which fiscal union for the euro area?
Bruegel, February 2016

Federalising the Eurozone: Towards a true European budget
Institute Affaire Insternazionali, December 2015

Flexibility in the EU Budget: Are there limits?
Clingendael, December 2015

The political economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy: An imperfect storm
Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2015

Reforming the financing of the European Union: A proposal
Centre for European Economic Research, May 2015

Filed under: EU Financing / Budgetary Affairs, PUBLICATIONS Tagged: At a glance, EU budget, financing, Marcin Grajewski, what think tanks are thinking

Written by Monika Kiss,

© kantver / Fotolia

Information and communications technologies (ICT) play an increasingly important role in our professional and private lives, and digital competence is of growing importance for every individual. In the future, nearly all jobs will require digital skills.

However, European Commission figures show that two fifths of the EU workforce have little or no digital skills. In addition, despite continued high levels of unemployment, there could be 756 000 unfilled jobs in the European ICT sector by 2020.

This situation is even more challenging in certain geographical areas (such as south-eastern Europe), among socially vulnerable groups (in particular, the unemployed and the disabled) and the elderly. Despite favourable developments in the digital literacy of citizens, the digital gap needs to be narrowed further.

Digitalisation has several impacts on the labour market. On the one hand, new business models, products and machines create new jobs, while on the other hand, automation contributes to the elimination of jobs or their relocation to countries with lower labour costs. To remedy this situation, developing the digital skills of the EU workforce is essential.

Reducing the mismatch between the skills available and those demanded for the digital transformation of the economy has been a key EU-level priority over the past decade. For instance, a 2008 communication entitled ‘New skills for new jobs’ emphasised the increasing need for digital skills in the shift to a low-carbon economy. Furthermore, the 2010 Digital Agenda recognised the need for indicators to measure the extent of digital competence in the EU. This was implemented through the development of the Digital Competence Framework (‘Dig Comp’), enabling citizens to evaluate their digital skills, and the Digital Economy and Society Index (‘DESI’), summarising relevant indicators on Europe’s digital performance and tracking the evolution of EU Member States in the area of digital competitiveness.

The Grand Coalition for Digital Jobs, a multi-stakeholder partnership created in 2013, aims to facilitate collaboration between business and education providers, and between public and private actors, and has already created 60 functional pledges in 13 countries.

The 2016 New Skills Agenda aims to improve the quality of skills training and to make the skills acquired more visible and comparable from one country to another. Data on ICT skills should also be improved in order to better anticipate developments and help people make better career choices. Skills acquired in non-formal ways should also be assessed and validated.

Possible solutions developed in the EU Member States include encouraging and enabling people to acquire the skills needed, enhancing the labour mobility of digitally skilled people and promoting cross-border skills policies. Improving skills supply can be done by encouraging people to offer their skills on the labour market and by retaining skilled people in the labour market. Putting skills to effective use by creating better matches between skills offered and demanded, and by increasing the demand for high-level skills can also contribute to improving the situation.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Digital skills in the EU labour market‘.

Filed under: Economic and Social Policies, PUBLICATIONS Tagged: digital skills, employment and work, In-depth analysis, Information Technology, labour market, Monika Kiss

Assessment of the frequencies and polarisations behaviour of the Radar Cross Section (RCS) of moveable targets with an unpredictable trajectory and / or targets with unrepeatable behaviour is difficult using single frequency / polarisation measuremen…

On 25 January, the SEDE committee invites Brigadier General Daniel Grammatico, Director Operations at the EU Military Staff and Niklas Novaky, visiting researcher at VUB Brussels, to discuss the future of EU battlegroups. In the light of the recent push for more cooperation in the field of European security and defence, these experts will exchange views with the members of the committee on what can be done to make the battlegroups more operational and their actual use more likely.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 25 January, the AFCO Committee and the SEDE Subcommittee will hold a joint meeting to discuss the amendments tabled to the own-initiative report 'Constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common security and defence policy: possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty'. The report examines the legal possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty as well as the necessary institutional set-up to make CSDP more operational.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Written by Krisztina Binder (3rd edition),

© boldg / Fotolia`

Since 2011, Jordan’s economy has suffered from the negative spill-overs of the on-going regional conflicts and the Syrian refugee crisis, weakening the country’s fiscal and external financing position. In line with the EU’s objective to support the stability and development of Jordan’s economy, the European Commission has presented a proposal to grant the country a second package of macro-financial assistance (MFA). Amounting to a maximum of €200 million, the assistance would help the country cover a part of its external financing needs. The first MFA package, worth €180 million, was approved in 2013 and fully disbursed in 2015. In addition to the significant resources mobilised by the multilateral and bilateral donors, this second MFA, adopted in December 2016, will, by strengthening the economy, contribute to Jordan’s overall stability, which is a high priority for the EU. The Commission will, if appropriate, put forward a new proposal in 2017 to extend and increase this MFA to Jordan. EU aid will complement the International Monetary Fund’s new programme of about US$723 million, focusing on the country’s economic and financial reform programme.

See also our at a glance note
‘Parliamentary elections in Jordan‘

Versions

• January 2017: ‘EU pledges further aid to Jordan‘ (3rd edition)
• November 2016: ‘EU pledges further aid to Jordan‘ (2nd edition)
• September 2016: ‘EU pledges further aid to Jordan‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council providing further macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Committee responsible:

Rapporteur:

Shadow rapporteurs:

 

 

 

 

  International Trade (INTA)

Emmanuel Maurel (S&D, France)

Salvatore Cicu (EPP, Italy)

Sander Loones (ECR, Belgium)
Marielle de Sarnez (ALDE, France)

Lola Sánchez Caldentey (GUE/NGL, Spain)

Klaus Buchner (Greens/EFA, Germany)

David Borrelli (EFDD, Italy) COM(2016)431 of 29.6.2016, 2016/0197(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Procedure completed Decision (EU) No 2016/2371

OJ L 352, 23.12.2016, p. 18

Filed under: International Relations, PUBLICATIONS Tagged: briefings, EU Legislation in Progress, European neighbourhood policy, Jordan, Krisztina Binder, Mediterranean and Middle East

US-based Kaman Aerosystems has successfully supplied its first airframe from the re-opened K-MAX production line in Jacksonville, Florida, to its facility in Bloomfield, Connecticut.

South Australia's Flinders University has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with a consortium of France's major graduate engineering schools to foster Australia's $50bn future submarine programme.

Car Nicobar Class fast attack craft (FAC) of the Indian Navy were built by Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) in Kolkata, India, between 2007 and 2011.

Eurotorp EEIG has received a contract to provide operational maintenance support for the French Navy’s MU90 lightweight torpedo system.

Americas

• Investors and traders looking to avoid/gain from the stock market turmoil caused by US President Donald Trump have a new best friend: an app that will generate trading alerts for shares based on comments made by the man on social media. Tweets sent by Trump in December, criticizing big ticket defense programs such the F-35 and the new Air Force One, sent stock prices of Lockheed Martin and Boeing tumbling, and the CEOs of the US’ biggest defense companies scrambling to find ways to trim the fat on program costs. Behind the creation, London-based FinTech firm Trading.co.uk said the Trump signal generator used artificial intelligence technology to differentiate between tweets or other messages that, for example, just mention Boeing and those liable to move markets. Happy Inauguration Day!

• Speaking of costs, the price of the F-35 looks set to take a tumble, as the US DoD and Lockheed Martin come close to an agreement on a new contract for the Joint Strike Fighter. While talks on the warplane’s tenth batch are still ongoing, sources close to discussions say the fighter will drop below its current $100 million per-plane price tag for the first time. Believed to be in the range of $9 billion, an official announcement on the 90-plane deal is expected to come at the end of the month.

Middle East North Africa

• The Israeli Air Force has received delivery of their first Arrow-3 missile defense battery. A joint-development effort by Boeing and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the Arrow-3 interceptor will form the upper-tier layer of Israel’s multi-tiered Arrow Weapons System (AWS), and is designed to fly nearly twice as high at half the weight of the Arrow-2 interceptor, which covers the lower-tier segment of the network. Arrow-3 missiles will allow the IAF to shoot twice against a single ballistic target, assess for battle damage and, if needed, divert to other approaching threats, with the Arrow-2 operating as a back-up.

• Warplanes from Turkey and Russia have conducted their first joint air-strike. In what is a strange development for a NATO member to coordinate so closely with Russia, the raid comes just fourteen months after Ankara downed a Russian Su-24 for allegedly crossing into Turkish airspace. Focusing on the town of al-Bab in Aleppo province, the strike included four Russian Su-24s, four Su-25s and an Su-34, joined by four F-4s and four F-16s from Turkey. Al-Bab, located just 12 miles from the Turkish border, has been the focus of a five-month Turkish-backed Syrian rebel campaign aimed at pushing back both IS and Kurdish forces.

Europe

• Polish Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz has said that his government is considering a 2017 splurge on new military hardware. Macierewicz name-dropped Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky subsidiary, Leonardo, and somewhat surprisingly Airbus, as potential suppliers of 14 helicopters to the Polish army. While both Sikorsky and Leonardo have plants located in Poland, relations between Airbus and the ruling Law & Justice Party soured last year following the cancellation of a $3.2 billion deal to provide 50 H225M Caracals. The ministry has also proposed a plan to buy between 50-100 F-16s as well as three new submarines with contracts to be signed by either the end of the year or in early 2018.

• Thales will update the master radars for the Swiss Air Force in a deal worth $78.90 million. The five-year upgrade is part of a life extension project to keep the former’s FLORAKO system running until the 2030s. Thales said the project will involve development of a new radar signal and upgrading the radar’s data processing and antenna system.

Asia Pacific

• Indonesia’s government has approved a $2 billion plan to purchase five A400M transport aircraft from Airbus. News of the deal marks a significant leap in the country’s modernization plans and provisions included in the deal will allow Indonesian engineers to study and observe the assembly of various major aircraft components, including wings and fuselage shells, for the first two airframes in Seville, Spain. State-owned firm PT Dirgantara will then conduct the final fit-out of the last three airframes at its plant in Bandung.

• A Royal Thai Air Force plan to purchase Mil Mi-17V-5 helicopters has paved the way for the potential setting up a production and maintenance facility in the kingdom. The facility will help support the new helicopters as well as five models previously purchased by Bangkok; once established, the facility would look to provide maintenance support to other Mi-17V-5 operators in Southeast Asia. Once a strong US ally, relations between the two have gone south in recent years following a 2014 coup, resulting in a reorientation toward Russia for defense and industrial ties.

Today’s Video

Unveiling of the Arrow-3 to the IAF:

ThalesRaytheonSystems (TRS) received $120 million in contracts from the Swiss defense procurement agency, ARMASUISSE, to provide the Swiss Air Force with advanced Link-16 connectivity for their fighter aircraft.

The funding represents a continuation of work by TRS on the FLORAKO command and control program. Phase VII will add voice and data transmission over an encrypted link, nation-wide Link-16 coverage, allow aircraft to acquire Link-16 information before take-off, and incorporate multifunctional information distribution system (MIDS) technology. DID has covered the significance of MIDS and Link 16 technology before; in Switzerland, MIDS technology will be especially useful for overcoming the challenges of maintaining full situational awareness at all times, even when flying aircraft within the mountainous Swiss terrain. With respect to the FLORAKO program generally…

Link 16 Display

TRS’ fully distributed FLORAKO comprises master surveillance radars, a data and communication system, a new airspace management system and new air command and control centers.

FLORAKO went into operation on Feb. 2, 2004, after successfully completing final tests and operating in parallel with the previous Swiss air defense system. It’s replacing Switzerland’s older Hughes FLORIDA with a system whose main functions include:

• Joint civil-military airspace management
  
• Air surveillance with multi-sensor tracking (military and civil radars)
  
• Identification
  
• Sensor management
  
• Threat assessment
  
• Air mission Command and Control

Phase VII is slated for completion in late 2008. Work will be performed by ThalesRaytheonSystems employees in Fullerton and Massy, France. Swiss industry will also participate in the system’s deployment. Read corporate release.

Future upgrades to FLORAKO will integrate more real time data and to interface with more sensors and reconnaissance assets.

ThalesRaytheonSystems is an equally owned transatlantic joint venture between Raytheon Company and Thales Group, with offices in Massy Cedex, France and Fullerton, California, USA.

Update

January 20/17: Thales will update the master radars for the Swiss Air Force in a deal worth $78.90 million. The five-year upgrade is part of a life extension project to keep the former’s FLORAKO system running until the 2030s. Thales said the project will involve development of a new radar signal and upgrading the radar’s data processing and antenna system.

Arrow test concept
(click to view full)

In a dawning age of rogue states, ballistic missile defenses are steadily become a widely accepted necessity. Iran is widely believed to be developing nuclear capabilities, and Israeli concerns were heightened after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad urged that Israel be “wiped off the map” (the fact that America was also placed in that category went largely uncovered).

Because missile defenses are so important, states like India and Israel have taken steps to ensure that they have the ability to build many of the key pieces. The Arrow project is a collaboration between Boeing and IAI to produce the missile interceptors that accompany the required radars, satellites, command and control systems.

NOTE: Article capped and coverage suspended in 2011.

The Arrow System

Arrow launch
(click to view full)

In general, the Israeli Arrow is a more advanced weapon than the Patriot and possesses far more range, undertaking high altitude interceptions and covering a wide area (est. 90km/ 54 mile range, maximum altitude 30 miles/ 50 km for Arrow 2) as a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. Unlike the USA’s THAAD, PAC-3, or SM-3 which all use “hit to kill” technology, Israel’s Arrow relies on a directed fragmentation warhead to destroy enemy missiles. It can work in conjunction with a number of systems, but its main Israeli partner is the Green Pine long-range, ground-based fire control radar. The system and its engagements are controlled by the mobile Citron Tree battle management center. Since the launchers are also mobile, and the radars are semi-mobile, the system is resistant to pre-emptive strikes if good discipline is maintained.

The exoatmospheric, 2-stage Arrow-3 will use pivoting optical sensors and its own upper-stage kick motor, instead of separate control rockets for final steering. The goal is a highly maneuverable missile that can reach more than double the height of existing Arrow-2 interceptors, using a lower-weight missile. This will also have the effect of extending the missile’s range.

In contrast, Israel’s Patriot PAC-2s are more of a local point defense system with a range of about 40km/ 24 miles. They were all Israel had during the 1991 Gulf War, but these days, Israel’s Patriot PAC-2 GEM+ missiles will only be launched if the Arrow missile fails, or the target is outside the Arrow’s protective umbrella. In that respect, the Arrow/Homa system will play a role similar to the longer-range naval SM-3 Standard missile that forms the high end of Japan’s planned ABM shield (and seems destined for Europe and other states in a land-based role), or the US Army’s THAAD.

Overall responsibility for Arrow lies with the U.S. Missile Defense Organization (MDA) in Washington, DC, and the Israel Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv, Israel. The program is executed by the Israel Missile Defense Organization in Tel Aviv, and the US Army Program Executive Office for Air and Missile Defense’s Arrow Product Office in Huntsville, AL. Key contractors include:

• Israel Aircraft Industries (prime contractor, Arrow missile, Green Pine fire control radar)
  
• Tadiran Electronics in Holon, Israel (Citron Tree battle management center)
  
• Boeing (about 35% of the Arrow missile, manages many US subcontractors)
  
• Lockheed Martin Missiles & Fire Control in Orlando, FL (radar seeker)
  
• Raytheon in Santa Barbara, CA (Infrared seeker)
  
• Other American subcontractors include ATK in Iuka, MS and Clearfield, UT; Manes Machine, in Fort Collins, CO; Ceradyne Thermo-Materials, Inc., in Scottsdale, GA; and Sanmina SCI, in Huntsville, AL.
  
• Rafael Armament Development Authority, Haifa, Israel (Black Sparrow air-launched target; joint U.S./Israel effort).

EL/M-2080 “Green Pine”
(click to view larger)

Israel deployed the first battery of Arrow-1 missiles on March 14/2000, and has continued to upgrade the system. The summer of 2005 marked delivery of the first co-produced Boeing/IAI missiles. Israeli and US troops engaged in pre-training for the biennial Juniper Cobra exercise in 2007, and part of that process includes working out interoperability issues between the Patriot PAC-3 system (ad PAC-2 GEM+ that Israel deploys) and Arrow.

On July 29/04 Israel and the USA carried out joint experiment in the USA, in which the Arrow was launched against a real Scud missile. The experiment was a success, as the Arrow destroyed the Scud with a direct hit. In December 2005 the system was successfully deployed in a test against a replicated Shahab-3 missile. This feat was repeated on February 11/07.

Despite some international interest in the Arrow, the USA has blocked export initiatives so far. Although India purchased an Arrow-capable “Green Pine” radar from Elta in 2001, and has expressed interest in deploying its own battery of Arrow interceptor missiles, U.S. concerns regarding compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR, an international agreement limiting the proliferation of ballistic missile technology) have effectively halted such plans for the time being. This did not stop India from using the Green Pine technology in its own November 2006 anti-missile test, using a modified Prithvi short-range ballistic missile with an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle and a hit to kill warhead.

Contracts & Key Events, 2004-Present

Arrow-3 development
click to play video

The section is still being updated.

January 20/17: The Israeli Air Force has received delivery of their first Arrow-3 missile defense battery. A joint-development effort by Boeing and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the Arrow-3 interceptor will form the upper-tier layer of Israel’s multi-tiered Arrow Weapons System (AWS), and is designed to fly nearly twice as high at half the weight of the Arrow-2 interceptor, which covers the lower-tier segment of the network. Arrow-3 missiles will allow the IAF to shoot twice against a single ballistic target, assess for battle damage and, if needed, divert to other approaching threats, with the Arrow-2 operating as a back-up.

June 16/15: Joint US-Israel missile programs may benefit from additional funding under a Defense Appropriations Bill, following a vote in the House. The programs covered by the increase in funds include the Iron Dome, Arrow, Arrow 3 and David’s Sling systems. The last of these will receive the most significant boost, with an additional $286.5 million allocation.

Feb 22/11: An Arrow System successfully intercepts a ballistic target missile during a flight test conducted at Pt. Mugu Sea Range, CA. This test is part of the Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP) and was conducted jointly by the Israel Missile Defense Organization and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.

The test represented a realistic scenario, and all the elements (Arrow, Green Pine radar, Citron Tree BMC) performed in their operational configurations, using new Block 4 software designed to improve their ability to discriminate targets. US MDA release | video || Defense News.

July 27/10: The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense votes to fund Israel’s missile defense programs at $422.7 million for 2011, nearly $96 million above the original White House funding request. This represents a doubling of aid for missile defense from 2010, in the wake of an emerging consensus that the CIA’s 2007 estimate of Iran’s nuclear weapons program was wrong, and underestimated Iranian progress.

On the other hand, the structure of that funding is less good for the Arrow program. While the HASD added $58 million to the administration’s original FY 2011 Arrow-3 request, that provisional $108.8 million is actually less than FY 2010 funding of $157.4 million ($60M request + $97.4M Congress added). Likewise, the complementary medium range RAFAEL/Raytheon David’s Sling/Magic Wand dropped from $134.7 million in FY 2010 to $84.7 million requested in 2011. The net increase comes from a one-time, $205 million grant for the procurement of 10 RAFAEL Iron Dome batteries for defense against short-range missiles. HASD Chair statement [ PDF] | HASD Table [PDF] | AllGov | Jerusalem Post | Israel’s Globes business news.

July 26/10: Israel and the United States sign a deal to develop and field the Arrow 3 system. It will be capable of tracking and shooting down ballistic missiles at a higher altitudes, including fully exoatmospheric threats. US MDA | China’s Xinhua.

March 22/10: Defense News reports that U.S. and Israeli government and industrial partners will press ahead with Arrow 3 work through good faith understandings, until formalized government-to-government accords catch up. The goal is to deploy the new missile by 2014.

Production of the Arrow-2 is winding down, and final deliveries are planned by the end of 2010. Government and industrial partners have apparently been working together on Arrow-3 for nearly 2 years, moving the program through at least 4 of the US Missile Defense Agency’s required technology “knowledge points, and validate critical subsystems. A first fly-out is planned for 2011.

Manufacturing
(click to view full)

April 7/09: The Israeli Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency conduct a successful test of the Arrow ballistic missile defense system. The operationally realistic test was conducted in Israel, using an ASIP interceptor co-produced by Boeing and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). The event marked the co-produced Arrow II’s 2nd intercept in 2 attempts, as well as its 3rd successful flight test. Boeing.

Jan 4/09: Israel’s Arutz Sheva news service reports that the Arrow missile defense system has been deployed near Ashkelon, in part because IAI has worked with American firms and developed an updated radar system named MC4. The new radar can also deal with smaller missiles, such as the Hamas government’s Kassam or Grad rockets being launched from Gaza. Using GPS and camera sensors, the MC4 system tracks the flight path, and within a minute of launch, it can determine both the launch site and projected landing site of the missile.

At the same time, pressure is building to add Northrop Grumman’s SkyGuard laser system to Israel’s defenses, a system whose technology is based on joint US-Israeli research:

“Supporters claim that the Skyguard laser based system is more suited to Israel’s needs than the rocket-based Rafael solution. Firstly, the laser can intercept short range missiles such as the Kassam rocket which hit their targets in less than 10 seconds. The rocket-based Rafael system can only hit medium-range rockets which reach their targets in more than 20 seconds. In addition, each laser round fired costs approximately $3,000. In contrast, defensive rockets for the Iron Dome system are estimated to cost over $100,000. Supporters also claim that the Skyguard system could be deployed in a short amount of time, whereas the completion of the Iron Dome rocket system is not foreseen in the near future.”

Sept 29/08: The USA has deployed an unspecified X-band radar system in Israel, manned by around 120 American personnel. Reports hint that the system may be similar to the radars deployed to Japan, or the AN/TPY-2 used as part of the THAAD system. The Guardian:

“One key feature of the system is that information from early-warning satellites – which greatly increases the radar’s ability to pinpoint launches – would remain in US hands. The satellite ground station would be in Europe and transmit data to Israel.

…The high-powered X-Band system, manufactured by Raytheon Company, would allow Israel’s Arrow II ballistic shield to engage an Iranian Shehab-3 missile about halfway through its 11-minute flight to Israel, six times sooner than Israel’s existing Green Pine radar can. The X-Band can track an object the size of a baseball from 2,900 miles away.”

Feb 14/08: IAI announces that The Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) / Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) has awarded a follow-on production contract to Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI)’s MLM Division for an undisclosed number of additional Arrow 2 Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM) system interceptors. The interceptors will be assembled in Israel at IAI’s MLM Division, the Arrow prime contractor, with major portions coming from Boeing IDS, the U.S. prime contractor in Huntsville, AL., ATK in Luka, MS., and various other subcontractors across the U.S.

Aug 23/07: The Jerusalem Post publishes “IDF modifying Arrow deployment in the North.” Key quote:

“Following this past summer’s war and the recognition that the next war will involve Syrian and Iranian missile barrages, the Air Defense Forces decided to adopt a “wide deployment” for its Arrow missile batteries.”

Aug 6/07: Jane’s Defence Weekly: “Israel is leaning towards upgrading its own anti-ballistic missile Arrow Weapon System (AWS) rather than acquiring the US Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system. While no formal decision has yet been taken, Jane’s has learned that officials from the Israel Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO) have informed the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) about potential complications with integrating THAAD into the country’s missile-defence alignment.”

March 26/07: An improved Arrow II missile, with modifications to its hardware and electronics under the Arrow System Improvement Program, is successfully test-fired this afternoon at Palmahim Air Force Base. The interceptor performed successfully according to design specifications, meeting all expectations and objectives. This is the 1st successful test of the improved configuration, and the 2nd test overall of a co-produced interceptor. Testing is managed by the Israeli Missile Defense Organization, in close cooperation with the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.

Test objectives were to collect flight engineering data for future test events, and to test the capabilities of the improved Arrow interceptor. This test marks the U.S./Israeli Arrow II program’s 14th success in 16 attempts. US MDA [PDF].

Feb 12/07: A successful ballistic missile intercept test by the Arrow missile defense system, conducted at night over the Mediterranean Sea. It’s the 1st test of a co-produced Arrow intercept missile fired from an improved launcher, using 2 Arrow batteries separated from each other. The target, called “Black Sparrow,” was launched from an F-15 fighter aircraft at which point the Fire Control Radar acquired the target and notified the Battle Management Center. A defense plan was issued and a mission command was sent to the Launch Control Center to fire the interceptor missile. This test marks the U.S./Israeli Arrow II program’s 13th success in 15 attempts. US MDA [PDF].

Spring 2005: The 1st co-produced Arrow 2 interceptor is delivered by IAI to the MoD. Source [PDF].

Feb 2/05: Israel Defense Forces carry out a successful test of the IAI/Boeing Arrow anti-missile system at a secret location in the center of the country. The Jerusalem Post reports that “an F-15 fighter jet flying over the Mediterranean dropped a Black Sparrow test missile specially designed to simulate an incoming Iranian Shihab 3 missile headed toward the Israeli shore.” The successful interception occurred at a higher altitude than previous efforts, and tested recent improvements made to the Arrow 2 system.

Israeli Air Force Patriot missile batteries also participated passively in the test, following the incoming missile with their radars. The Times of India notes that this was the 14th test of the system, which has included joint tests in the USA and advanced tests simulating advanced separating warheads. As evidenced by the Patriot batteries’ participation in this latest test, Israel is working to integrate all of its key assets and connections to US data into one national system, rather than relying on fragmented local control. Jerusalem Post | copy at United Jerusalem.

Pt. Mugu launch
(click to view full)

Aug 26/04: US Missile Defense Agency [PDF]:

“The Arrow anti-ballistic missile system was used today in a joint Israel/United States test exercise as part of the ongoing Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP). The test was the second in a series conducted at the Point Mugu Sea Range in California. It was the thirteenth Arrow intercept test and the eighth test of the complete weapon system. The Arrow interceptor was launched toward the target but no intercept was achieved. Many of the test objectives were successfully completed, and the test data is being analyzed by test engineers to determine why an intercept did not occur.”

July 29/04: A modified Arrow System Improvement Program anti-ballistic missile successfully intercepts and destroys a ballistic missile target today, west of San Nicolas Island on the Pt. Mugu Sea Range in California. Point Mugu was used, in order to offer a realistic scenario that could not have been tested in Israel due to test-field safety restrictions.

The objective of the test was to demonstrate the Arrow system’s improved performance against a target that represents a threat to Israel. This was the 12th Arrow intercept test, and the 7th test of the complete Arrow system. US MDA [PDF]

April 1/04: Boeing announces a $78 million contract from Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) to produce Arrow II interceptor components. The contract, effective immediately, runs through 2006 with options for additional production until Q2 2008. The total contract value could exceed $225 million if all options are exercised.

Boeing and IAI signed a teaming agreement in 2002 to co-produce the interceptor for the Arrow weapon system. The firm is responsible for production of the electronics section, the radome, motorcases for the booster and sustainer, and the canister that holds the interceptor in the missile launcher. Boeing production and program management will be conducted in Huntsville, AL. IAI, the prime contractor of the Arrow system, is responsible for system integration and final interceptor assembly in Israel.

Boeing will manage several major subcontracts to support the Arrow interceptor production including Alliant-Techsystems in Iuka, MS and Clearfield, UT; Manes Machine, in Fort Collins, CO; Ceradyne Thermo-Materials, Inc., in Scottsdale, GA; and Sanmina SCI, in Huntsville, AL.

Sept 14/2000: The Israel Ministry of Defense, in cooperation with the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the U.S. Army, conduct the 2nd successful intercept of a target ballistic missile by the Arrow Weapon System (AWS) in Israel. This was the 8th overall Arrow-2 flight test, but the 1st intercept for the against a new air-launched, in-bound target called the Black Sparrow.

The Arrow interceptor took off and flew in a nominal trajectory, acquired the Black Sparrow target, then locked on and homed on the designated threat. The warhead was fused at the proper range and the Arrow interceptor destroyed the target. The Green Pine fire control radar and Citron Tree battle management center participated fully in the test, performing battle planning, launch operations, and up link/down link message applications, as well as post intercept verifications. Both assets worked according to plan and fulfilled all test objectives. Analysis of all data is underway to evaluate and confirm results. US MDA [PDF]

Additional Readings & Sources

• Israeli MoD – Arrow Weapon System site.

• US MDA – Arrow gallery. Covers joint tests to 2004.

• Boeing – Arrow Interceptor

• Israeli-Weapons.com – Arrow. Profiles the entire Homa system, including Green Pine and Lemon Tree.

• Claremont Institute MissileThreat.com – Arrow Missile

• Claremont Institute MissileThreat.com – Shabab-3

• Wikipedia – Arrow Missile

• yNet News – Iran: We will build 20 new nuclear plants. also discusses the Arrow system test, and the larger efforts underway on the international front.

• BBC News (Feb 11/07) – Israeli missile test ‘successful’

• Jerusalem Post (Dec 2/05) – ‘Arrow’ Scud buster test a success

• India Times (Dec 2/04) – Israel successfully tests Arrow missile system

• Claremont Institute MissileThreat.com (Nov 17/04) – Aegis Test Successful: Marks First Attempt Against More Advanced Separating Target. This had been a key concern re: the system.

• Globes Online (Nov 7/05) – Jane’s: First IAI-Boeing “Arrow 2” missile delivered to IAF

• US Army News Service (Nov 2/05) – Air defenders train with Israeli counterparts

• A Daily Briefing on Iran (Oct 29/04) – Why Haven’t We Seen This? Sometimes a picture really is worth 1,000 words, and it’s worth looking at this one from Ahmadinejad’s infamous speech… but the thousand words in documents like Hassan Abbassi’s “War Preparation Plan” can be at least as chilling.

• MEMRI Translation Special Dispatch Series (Oct 28/05) – Translated excerpts from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech

• UPI (Aug 27/04) – Arrow anti-ballistic missile test fails. It was tested against a separating warhead. The articles gives details re: what happened – but the most fascinating part to me was the difference between American and Israeli weapons testing philosophies.

• JINSA (Aug 4/04) – First U.S. Test of Arrow Missile Defense System Goes ‘Beautifully’. Adds useful background re: the overall US-Israeli program.

• Israeli IDF (Aug 2/04) – The ‘Arrow’ System Test- A Strategic Accomplishment

French ACMAT VLTP-NP Light Utility Vehicle

Written by Mihalis Kritikos and Nera Kuljanic,

Sergey Nivens / Fotolia

Scientists have new technological answers to the twin challenges of limiting emissions and feeding a growing population which is simultaneously shrinking the space left for cultivation. However, these answers in turn pose their own ethical and risk management questions. Societal actors and a wide range of stakeholders have long sought to broaden the scope of authorisation and regulation of agricultural biotechnologies to take into account the relevant socio-economic impacts. Assessing the socio-economic sustainability, societal benefits and ethical acceptability of agricultural biotechnologies in the frame of the established risk assessment procedures has, for a long time, been debated at both EU and international levels. However, the increasingly rapid developments in the field of genetic engineering and synthetic biology trigger a need to re-examine the traditional risk assessment model and explore the deployment of methodologies that may further reinforce the responsiveness and inclusiveness of the current framework.

On 25 January 2017, STOA is organising a workshop to discuss these issues, continuing STOA’s practice of discussing the socio-ethical dimensions of techno-scientific developments. The workshop will be chaired by Marijana Petir, MEP and STOA Panel member. Former President (2010-2016) of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), Julian Kinderlerer, will give the opening presentation on innovation and bioethics, and will moderate the event.

What to expect from the event?

The workshop will provide space for a debate on this challenging aspect of public policy and will offer the opportunity to analyse the feasibility and necessity for inclusion of socio-economic considerations into the current framework.

The various methodological options for assessment, the role of participatory involvement in risk governance and the practical steps and indicators that could be introduced in risk assessment and decision-making related to synthetic biology and genetic modification in agriculture will be discussed by Helge Torgersen, of the Institute of Technology Assessment, Austrian Academy of Sciences, and Anne Ingeborg Myhr, of the Genøk-Centre for Biosafety, Tromsø, Norway. For example, in Norway, sustainability, benefit to society and ethics are important criteria in GMO assessment prior to cultivation, import, and use as food or feed. The workshop will look at how this has evolved.

Put simply, if a measure, an action or a policy could harm the public or the environment, and there is no scientific consensus that it is not harmful, then one willing to act must prove the absence of danger. This is known as the precautionary principle, which belongs to the domain of risk management. However, there are differences in the way this is defined and applied across the world. Amir Muzur, from the School of Medicine, University of Rijeka, Croatia, will speak on the comparison between application in the EU and the USA.

How could policy-makers in the EU deal with socio-ethical considerations, as well as the regulatory challenges raised by scientific uncertainty, the speed of technological advance, technological complexity and issues related to public perception? How is this shaping decision-making in the field of agricultural biotechnologies? Register for the workshop before 20 January 2017 and take part in the discussion.

Filed under: BLOG, Events Tagged: agriculture, events, Mihalis Kritikos, Nera Kuljanic, STOA