European Union

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Written by Anna Flynn.

The EU immediately strongly condemned Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and has done so repeatedly since. By 31 March 2026, the number of civilian casualties in Ukraine had reached 58 930, according to the United Nations. Since the beginning of the war , the EU has provided €200.6 billion in support for Ukraine, representing the Union’s largest civil protection operation to date.

The European Parliament labelled Russia’s war ‘the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945′. The EU’s response has been structured along three axes: political, economic and military support for Ukraine; isolation and containment of Russia; and enhancement of EU and EU neighbours’ resilience.

Parliament’s extraordinary meeting of 1 March 2022, during which it adopted a resolution unequivocally condemning Russia’s aggression and setting the direction for EU action, was one of the first international gatherings to which Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, spoke. Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, was the first EU leader to visit Kyiv after the Russian invasion, on 1 April 2022. In September 2025, Metsola officially opened a permanent European Parliament liaison office in Kyiv. 

Since the start of the war, Parliament has dealt with multiple legislative files of paramount importance for Ukraine, and adopted numerous non-legislative resolutions on aspects of EU support for the country; including several rounds of macro-financial assistance, the Act in support of ammunition production (ASAP); and the Ukraine Facility, which earmarks €50 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction from 2024 to 2027.

On 18 December 2025, the European Council agreed a €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027. Without this, Ukraine was expected to run out of funds in early 2026. Instead of using Russian assets, this loan is financed through EU borrowing secured on the ‘headroom’ in the EU’s budget and should cover two thirds of Ukraine’s financing needs for 2026 and 2027.

To implement the European Council’s decision, the Commission presented three legislative proposals on 14 January 2026:

• A regulation implementing the establishment of the Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027. This loan is based on enhanced cooperation, and therefore implies no financial obligations for Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia ;
• A regulation amending the Ukraine Facility in its current form so that it can be used for the Ukraine Support Loan;
• A regulation amending the EU’s 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) to allow this to guarantee the loan and finance the interest.

On 20 January 2026, Parliament agreed that these three proposals should be treated under the urgent procedure, meaning that it can vote on the regulations without a parliamentary report. A day later, Parliament gave its consent to use the enhanced cooperation procedure for the Ukraine Support Loan, and Parliament’s plenary adopted its position on the three proposals on 11 February 2026.

However, on 23 February 2026, Hungary blocked the third regulation (amending the MFF) in the Council of the EU, which required a unanimous vote amongst the 27 Member States. The other two proposals were signed by the Council and Parliament on 24 February 2026. On 6 May 2026, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) held a public hearing on financing Ukraine’s reconstruction through the MFF.

Moreover, Parliament has unwaveringly supported Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, advocating successfully in June 2022 for Ukraine to be granted candidate country status, and in December 2023 for Member States to start accession negotiations. Screening meetings concluded in September 2025, meaning that Ukraine is ready to start negotiations on all policy ‘clusters’. Related to these negotiations, Ukraine has a list of reform targets to meet in 2026. However, accession negotiations have not properly started due to lack of the required unanimity in the Council.

On 12 December 2025, the Council adopted a regulation indefinitely prohibiting the transfer back to Russia of Russian assets (of the Central Bank of Russia) immobilised in the EU. This money has been frozen since the war began. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for the assets (amounting to around €300 billion) to be used to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. However, it is a divisive issue due to potential economic, legal, and reputational consequences, and for the moment the European Council has not decided to do so.

Parliament also supports the EU’s sanctions against Russia. On 23 April 2026, the EU adopted its 20th package of sanctions against Russia, introducing 120 additional listings. In 2025, Russia represented 1.1 % of EU world trade in goods, shifting from the EU’s fourth largest trading partner in 2007 to 19th place in 2025.

Parliament continues to employ its budgetary, agenda-setting, external action and law-making powers to mobilise solid EU support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s aggression, and to ensure that the EU honours its pledges.

Links

• EU Support for Ukraine for 2026-2027
• Ten Issues to Watch in 2026
• Russia under Vladamir Putin
• State of play: EU support to Ukraine
• Financing Ukraine in 2026 and 2027
• Act in support of ammunition production

Other links

• EU solidarity with Ukraine
• Number of civilian casualties in Ukraine during Russia’s invasion verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to March 31, 2026
• EU adopts 20th package of sanctions against Russia
• European Parliament resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine 

Ukraine and its partners are holding their breath to see what’s next for Patriot air defense missile deliveries.

The West ignores the warning signs in the Sahel at its own peril.  

Length of video : 75'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

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Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

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