Written by Anna Flynn.
The European Parliament is fully committed to ensuring an ambitious European Union budget that meets the Union’s many challenges in the years to come. The European Commission presented its proposals for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF) on 16 July 2025. The Commission proposes a budget amounting to a total of almost €1.8 trillion in commitments over seven years (in constant 2025 prices). The MFF constitutes the EU’s long-term budgetary plan, setting a maximum level of spending (‘ceilings’) for each major category of expenditure (‘heading’) in accordance with Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
The proposed 2028-2034 budget corresponds to 1.26 % of the EU’s GNI. This includes 0.11 % of EU gross national income (GNI) for the repayment of the debt created by Next Generation EU (NGEU) grants. Excluding the NGEU repayment, the proposed post-2027 MFF reflects, in nominal terms, an increase of €367.2 billion (+29 %). However, in real terms, the increase is only 0.02 percentage points of GNI.
The national and regional partnership plans (NRPPs) proposed by the European Commission have proven particularly controversial throughout the European Parliament. They are seen as a risk of ‘renationalising’ the EU budget, as each Member State would agree their own plan with the Commission, within the constraints of allocated funding that is conditional on meeting EU priorities This raises questions about Parliament’s capacity for oversight and scrutiny. Moreover, the NRPPs merge many funds that were previously separate, such as the common agricultural policy, cohesion policy, and the common fisheries policy. Parliament’s four pro-European groups (S&D, Greens/EFA, Renew Europe, and the EPP) threatened to reject the Commission’s draft regulation on the NRPPs if it does not substantially amend its proposal.
On 9 November 2025, the Commission proposed some possible reforms to the NRPPs, such as the introduction of a 10 % spending target for agriculture, and a strengthened role for regional authorities in decision-making. However, these revisions do not address all of Parliament’s concerns. Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) continues its work on the interim report on the MFF proposals, with opinions awaited from many of the standing committees before the BUDG report goes to plenary in May 2026.
An overview of the main components of the proposed 2028-2034 MFF and an initial comparison with the 2021-2027 budget framework illustrates the Commission’s proposed division of €1.763 trillion in commitments, which Parliament’s BUDG committee finds lacks ambition.
Academia, think tanks, other EU institutions and bodies, and a variety of stakeholders are publishing a wealth of analysis and commentary on the proposed 2028-2034 MFF as it proceeds through negotiations (see our monthly digest).
Links to EPRS publications: Other linksWritten by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer.
Introduction to Cyprus’s parliamentary systemCyprus is a presidential democracy with a President directly elected by universal suffrage in a secret ballot. The President is both Head of State and Head of Government as he or she appoints the ministers and exercises executive power together with them. The President is formally invested by the Parliament, but the executive, legislative, and judicial powers are strictly separated.
The President and ministers are scrutinised by the Parliament, but they are not accountable to it. Reciprocally, the executive cannot dissolve the Parliament; only an absolute majority of the Parliament can decide to do so (Article 67 of the Constitution). The President and ministers cannot be members of the Parliament.
Legislative power is exercised by the House of Representatives, the unicameral parliament of the Republic of Cyprus. It is elected by universal and secret suffrage every five years through a system of simple proportional representation in six electoral districts. Both the President and the members of parliament are elected for five-year terms but in different years. The President does not necessarily have the support of a parliamentary majority and can govern without it.
The Constitution sets the number of members of the House of Representatives at 50 (two thirds Greek Cypriots, and one third Turkish Cypriots), but this number may be altered by the House of Representatives. Since 1985, the number of seats has been set at 80, keeping the same proportions between the two communities (Law 124/85): 56 Members come from the Greek Cypriot community, and 24 seats are reserved for Members coming from the Turkish Cypriot community – currently vacant due to the de facto division of the island. In addition, the minority religious groups of Armenians, Maronites and Latins each elect a representative who can express views but not vote.
The main role of the House of Representatives is to examine and adopt legislation, including on the state’s budget. Both the executive and the Parliament can make legislative proposals, but in practice, most are proposed by the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, this right is constrained for the Parliament, as bills it proposes should not result in any increase in budgetary expenditure.
The House of Representatives has the right to amend the Constitution, with the exception of the articles determining its form of government, the separation of powers and the bicommunal character of the state.
Read the complete briefing on ‘The Parliament of Cyprus and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Anna Flynn.
The EU and China account for nearly 30 % of global trade. The EU has defined China as a ‘partner, competitor, and systemic rival.’
One of the key, current challenges is that, following the announcement of United States’ tariffs, China announced new export controls on their rare earth elements in April and October 2025. A second package was suspended until November 2026.
At the 25th EU-China Summit in Beijing, marking 50 years of diplomatic relations, the partners discussed trade, climate change, and Russia, against an ongoing backdrop of huge geopolitical shifts.
During the July 2025 summit, the EU urged China to lift its restrictions. China’s rare earth elements are difficult to source elsewhere, and simultaneously play an imperative role in the EU’s digital, defence, and green industries. According to the European Central Bank, 80 % of European firms are three intermediaries away from rare earth element producers; highlighting the value of these materials to the EU economy.
The EU’s plan to address this vulnerable, yet vital supply, is the Critical Raw Materials Act. The aim of this regulation (among other things) is to diversify the EU’s imports, support strategic projects, and strengthen EU monitoring of supply risks.
In July 2025, Parliament adopted a resolution urging the Commission to speed up the process of implementing the Critical Raw Materials Act, condemning China’s actions as unjustified and coercive.
Moreover, The EU’s trade deficit with China (€308.4 billion in 2024), is expected to rise.
Meanwhile, China’s relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is growing, in direct competition with the EU’s objective to diversify critical raw material sources. Latin America produces large amounts of lithium and copper. By 2030, the EU’s demand for lithium is expected to increase 12-fold. Chinese companies have purchased half of the world’s largest lithium mines, and China is Latin America’s second largest trading partner today.
Nevertheless, in a joint statement following the EU-China summit, both parties reiterated that major economies should bolster climate efforts. They agreed to cooperate and lead a green transition.
A couple of months afterwards, ahead of COP30, China submitted its nationally determined contribution (NDC), or climate targets, for 2035. China’s share of global emissions increased from 9 % in 1990 to 17 % in 2024, and this is the first time that it has agreed to an absolute greenhouse gas emissions reduction.
An additional source of contention is China’s involvement with Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. At the summit, the EU stressed China’s responsibility to uphold world order and to refrain from supporting Russia’s military agenda. At the end of October 2025, the EU’s 19th package of sanctions was adopted against Russia, including sanctions on 12 entities located in China that are supporting Russia’s military and industrial complex.
This bilateral relationship will continue to carry far-reaching importance.
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