European Union

The Commission chief's proposal to trigger "the escape clause" in the bloc's fiscal rules has created confusion – given the rules include two different such clauses.

In a letter seen by Euractiv, Spain says they want to ease burdens for business, but that the most important thing is to "unlock capital flows forward the green transition."

1) Scholarly Interest in Russian Emigrees 

The immigration politics across Europe receive a greater actuality in the context of Russia’s full-fledged invasion in Ukraine.  The war prompted mass forced emigration not only from Ukraine, where the mass destruction takes place, but also from Russia, where repressions take various forms, as I demonstrated in my recently published books, first, “Diversity of Migrant Entrepreneurship in Varieties of European Capitalism. Post-Soviet Entrepreneurship in Austria, Spain, and Hungary” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), and second, “Global Crises, Resilience, and Future Challenges. Experiences of Post-Yugoslav and Post-Soviet Migrants” (Ibidem Press, 2024). Simultaneously, many of the European Union’s (EU) immediate responses to Russia’s full-fledged invasion in Ukraine were increasing restrictions in issuing visas for Russian citizens across Europe and increased controls at the EU – Russia borders. One of the questions that I address in my research is, how do immigration regimes shape Russians’ immigration in Europe? This question is conceptually situated in the scholarly discussions concerning the EU immigration and integration policies.

2) Recent Immigration of Russians in Serbia 

Building upon these findings, I embarked on an exploration of immigration politics towards Russian anti-war emigrees in the European Union (EU) candidate countries of the Western Balkans. Through my initial research in Serbia, I found that this country, which counts about 6 million population, received between 100000 and 400000 Russian immigrants since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Thanks to UACES’ Microgrant, in January 2025, I made a short field trip to Serbia, where I met and conducted interviews Russian anti-war emigrees, and by using their services and by attending some of their events, I analyzed their motives to immigrate in Serbia and economic activities. Russians’ in-mass exodus to Serbia provides a certain political paradox: while majority of the Russians currently residing in Serbia represent young anti-war emigrants and Putin’s regime opponents, close ties between Russian and Serbian authoritarian political leaders provided them with visa-free access to Serbia.  

3) Are Russian Immigrants in Serbia Short-Term Phenomenon? 

As I noted in “Global Crises, Resilience, and Future Challenges”, “it is essential to distinguish between people and states, especially in non-democratic regimes, as they are very different units and actors.” My initial findings from Serbia confirm this statement: my interlocutors revealed that many of them – relokanty (migrants) as they refer to themselves – in the beginning of the war first moved to visa-free countries territorially closer to Russia, such as Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Turkey. However, for a variety of reasons, they decided to move forward to the EU. Coming to Serbia, many of them found it both culturally close and convenient for living. Most of them are under forty years old, and they initially were employed by Russian companies, which relocated their offices to Serbia, such as the Russian tech giant, Yandex. However, after spending sometime in Serbia, most of Russian immigrants quit their jobs in large Russian companies and founded their small businesses. Most of my interlocutors expressed intension to stay in Serbia for a long-term. Similarly, most of them expressed deep sympathy with the current Serbian students’ mass anti-corruption protests.   

4) Russian Immigrants’ Current Impact on Serbia  

Seemingly endless number of restaurants, cafes, and small shops with Russian titles, and Russian language heard on every corner of Belgrade, making the portrayal of the city vibrant as never before. Relying on the theory built in “Diversity of Migrant Entrepreneurship in Varieties of European Capitalism”, I also found that Serbia resembles dependent market economy of Visegrad Four group of post-socialist countries in the early 2000s, before they joined the EU. Some Serbia’s official sources demonstrated that Serbia’s remarkable economic growth in 2023-2024 is owing to the large number of Russian immigrants in Serbia. At the same time, Serbia’s immigration policy, which particularly resembles the process of Hungary’s immigration regime at the time of its’ emergence in 2010-2012, has not moved further from visa-free regime for these Russian citizens, with largely liberal political views. It remains a question, whether and to what extent will they be enabled to contribute to further economic growth and democratic reforms in Serbia, and the country’s EU integration. 

The post UACES Blog Post: Is Russian Anti-War Emigrees in Serbia A Short-Term Mass Phenomenon? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Abstract 

This article revisits the productivity paradox in the context of the European Union’s (EU) digital transformation, exploring the intersection of responsible innovation (RI) and productivity growth. The analysis is guided by two pivotal questions: how regulatory frameworks promoting RI influence productivity in the digital economy, and whether traditional productivity metrics effectively capture RI’s broader impacts. By introducing key debates surrounding EU regulations, such as the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA), the article highlights that while these frameworks may initially constrain conventional productivity measures, they also catalyse new forms of innovation and value creation. The exposition highlights the limitations of traditional productivity metrics in capturing RI’s societal benefits, calling for alternative frameworks aligned with the EU’s vision of sustainable, inclusive growth. 

 

Productivity and RI: Friends or Foes? 

In 1987, Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow famously observed, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics,” coining what became known as the productivity paradox. This paradox emerged during a time of rapid technological advancement, where innovations like personal computers and mainframes were transforming workplaces, yet productivity growth remained stagnant. Brynjolfsson and Hitt’s seminal 1998 research revealed that this apparent paradox stemmed from several factors: measurement challenges, implementation lags, redistribution of benefits, and mismanagement of technology. These insights prove remarkably relevant to today’s digital transformation challenges. Contemporary scholars continue to grapple with the innovation-productivity paradox, particularly in the context of the EU’s digital transformation (Fragkandreas, 2021). 

At the same time, as society faces the complexities of rapidly advancing technologies, the need for a responsible approach to innovation has also become increasingly significant. Awareness of environmental challenges, climate change, social inequality, and the broader impacts of technological advancements has shifted societal expectations of business activities. RI has emerged as an important framework for navigating the complexities of technological advancement, offering a structured approach to ensure that innovation aligns with societal values and sustainable development goals. 

RI, as defined by von Schomberg (2013), represents “a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process.” This definition, however, is just one perspective in a rich academic discourse. Building on this foundational definition, Owen et al. (2013) position RI as a powerful policy discourse that enables innovation processes to address societal challenges while acknowledging inherent uncertainties and ambiguities. Their work emphasizes that innovation must be guided not only by technological capabilities but also by ethical and societal implications, providing a flexible approach for responsible development. 

Expanding this theoretical framework further, Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten (2013) developed four dimensions of RI: anticipation, reflexivity, inclusion, and responsiveness. Anticipation involves systematic thinking about potential impacts, both positive and negative. Reflexivity requires innovators to scrutinize their own assumptions and commitments. Inclusion demands meaningful engagement with stakeholders throughout the innovation process. Responsiveness ensures that innovation systems can adapt to changing societal needs and values. These dimensions of RI, while of great importance for ethical innovation, introduce new complexities into traditional productivity calculations. They require businesses to invest resources in stakeholder engagement, impact assessment, and adaptive management practices that may not yield immediate measurable returns. 

The EU’s regulatory approach to digital transformation exemplifies the complexities of embedding RI principles into governance frameworks, ensuring that technological advancements align with ethical and societal values. Yet, this framework also challenges traditional conceptions of productivity and innovation. This raises two critical questions: First, how do EU digital regulations that promote RI influence productivity growth? Second, can conventional productivity metrics effectively capture the broader value of RI? The next section addresses the first question by discussing the impact of these regulations on productivity, while the following section examines the adequacy of conventional metrics in reflecting the societal contributions of RI. 

 

EU Digital Regulations: Balancing RI and Productivity Growth  

The EU has established a framework of major regulatory initiatives in digital governance through four cornerstone regulations: the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act for comprehensive AI oversight, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) for data privacy standards, and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA) for platform governance and market competition. Recent academic literature highlights critical concerns about how these regulations, while aiming to institutionalize RI principles, affect productivity growth, market dynamics, and business performance, particularly for smaller firms navigating compliance requirements. 

The AI Act stands as the world’s first comprehensive AI regulation, employing a risk-based model to categorize AI systems by their potential societal impact. However, Meyers (2024) brings attention to the tension between implementing robust safeguards, such as transparency, robustness, and human oversight, and maintaining the flexibility businesses need to advance cutting-edge AI technologies. Meyers (2024) also highlights the Act’s singular rulebook approach, designed to ensure regulatory coherence across the EU, which could paradoxically lead to institutional complexity and fragmentation, complicating its implementation. This critique underscores the broader tension between establishing robust safeguards, such as transparency, robustness, and human oversight, and maintaining the flexibility businesses need to promote advancements in AI technologies.  

The GDPR provides a revealing case study of RI’s practical implementation challenges. Research by Chen et al. (2022) demonstrates significant disparities in the regulation’s impact across different business segments. Their findings reveal that enhanced data protection requirements led to measurable reductions in financial performance for companies targeting European consumers, with small technology companies experiencing nearly twice the negative impact on profits compared to industry averages. Also, Chen et al. (2022) point out that larger technology firms remained relatively unaffected, highlighting the regulation’s uneven economic impact. At the same time, despite these challenges, Bachlechner and van Lieshout (2020) note that the GDPR has catalysed innovation in privacy-preserving technologies, spurring the growth of new market segments in data security and encryption, user consent management, and more, thereby advancing the EU’s vision of a digital economy founded on accountability and trust.  

The varying impacts of GDPR implementation across different business segments illustrate a key challenge in measuring the productivity effects of RI-focused regulations. While traditional metrics might show decreased financial performance, especially for smaller firms, these measurements fail to capture the long-term value created through enhanced trust, improved data security, and the emergence of new privacy-preserving technologies 

The DMA and DSA further expand EU’s regulatory framework by addressing digital platform market power and content governance. While these regulations aim to foster a more competitive and ethical digital economy, scholarly analysis reveals potential limitations. Teese and Kahwaty (2021) critique the DMA’s Impact Assessment for applying outdated industrial-era tools to dynamic digital markets. Furthermore, Erixon et. al. (2022) present a nuanced perspective, acknowledging potential benefits from reduced network effects and increased trust in AI-based services while warning about indirect economic consequences. The scholars emphasize that even without direct compliance burdens, these regulations may introduce new costs and affect resource allocation throughout the economy, potentially reinforcing advantages for larger firms and economies. 

The EU’s regulatory approach to digital transformation illustrates both the potential and limitations of implementing RI at scale. While the regulatory frameworks establish important safeguards and foster trust in digital markets, they simultaneously reveal the inherent complexities of balancing innovation, competition, and broader societal benefits. The empirical evidence suggests varying impacts across different market segments, particularly for smaller enterprises, raising fundamental questions about the way in which productivity is measured and evaluated in the context of RI. This measurement challenge requires a deeper examination of traditional productivity metrics and their adequacy in capturing the full spectrum of value created through RI practices. 

 

Measuring Productivity in the Age of RI 

Traditional productivity metrics, focused primarily on labour and capital inputs versus economic outputs, increasingly fall short in capturing the multifaceted impact of RI. This limitation stems in part from significant measurement challenges, as many RI initiatives generate long-term societal benefits that extend well beyond the timeframe of conventional productivity statistics (Cunha, 2018). Moreover, “the variety of the social impact … is substantial and it is difficult to capture all kinds of impacts fairly or objectively,” admits the EU (2014). RI initiatives also create positive externalities that benefit the broader ecosystem rather than individual firms, making their value challenging to quantify through traditional firm-level measurements (Nieminen and Ikonen, 2021). The transformation of business models and organizational processes through RI also generates value that transcends traditional product and service measurements (Yaghmaei and van de Poel, 2021). 

In response to these limitations, new frameworks are emerging that strive to rflect the fuller scope of innovation’s impact. Porter and Kramer’s (2011) Creating Shared Value (CSV) theory offers a particularly compelling approach, demonstrating how businesses can transcend traditional socioeconomic trade-offs. The CVS framework shows how redefining productivity in the value chain through social and environmental innovations can simultaneously improve operations, reduce costs, and contribute to societal well-being without sacrificing corporate competitiveness (Dembek et al., 2016). This methodological innovation emphasizes the importance of considering both direct and indirect value creation, including improvements in supplier capabilities, local cluster development, and workforce development. 

The EU has embraced this broader perspective in its policy evaluation approach, developing impact assessments that integrate social, environmental, and ethical dimensions alongside traditional economic metrics. Such a shift is further exemplified by the growing adoption of Social Impact Measurement and Management (SIMM), which systematically evaluates an organization’s broader societal effects. SIMM enables a more nuanced understanding of long-term impacts and community well-being, fostering greater accountability and transparency while supporting more informed decision-making. 

The integration of CSV and SIMM approaches with traditional productivity metrics presents practical challenges, particularly in standardization and comparability across different contexts. However, these frameworks offer important insights into how regulatory compliance costs might be balanced against broader value creation, especially in the context of RI initiatives. 

Recent scholarly work has also highlighted the importance of considering network effects and innovation ecosystem impacts in productivity measurement. Digital platforms and RI initiatives often create value through network externalities, knowledge spillovers, and ecosystem development that traditional productivity metrics fail to capture. Additionally, the role of intangible assets, such as data, algorithms, and organizational capital, has become increasingly significant in the digital economy, requiring new approaches to value measurement. 

New measurement frameworks must move beyond financial returns to address environmental sustainability, social equity, and long-term resilience. Incorporating more comprehensive assessment dimensions aligns with the EU’s vision of a digital economy that integrates societal well-being with economic competitiveness. This is particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which often lack the resources to implement sophisticated measurement systems yet play a vital role in the digital economy’s transformation. The challenge ahead lies in developing governance frameworks that can effectively balance traditional productivity metrics with these broader value dimensions, while remaining accessible and practical for enterprises of all sizes. 

 

Conclusions  

In the EU’s pursuit of digital transformation, a complex interplay emerges between RI and productivity growth, challenging established paradigms of economic measurement. The implementation of RI frameworks introduces asymmetric productivity constraints across the business landscape, with SMEs bearing a disproportionate burden of compliance costs and operational adjustments. Nevertheless, these regulatory frameworks also catalyse innovation in unexpected ways, fostering new market opportunities and technological solutions. 

The EU’s comprehensive regulatory approach, exemplified by the AI Act, GDPR, DMA, and DSA, illustrates the intricate balance required between advancing RI and maintaining economic dynamism. This balance holds heightened significance for SMEs, which often lack the resources to effectively navigate complex regulatory requirements while maintaining competitive productivity levels. 

This discussion reveals a fundamental need to reconceptualise productivity measurement in ways that acknowledge both immediate economic impacts and broader societal benefits. While conventional metrics inadequately capture the positive externalities generated by RI, emerging frameworks like SIMM and CSV offer promising pathways forward. The challenge lies in developing measurement approaches that are both comprehensive enough to capture the full spectrum of value creation and sufficiently practical for implementation across enterprises of all sizes, ensuring that the transition to responsible digital innovation supports rather than impedes the competitiveness of Europe’s diverse business ecosystem. 

The post The New Solow Paradox? Responsible Innovation and Productivity in the EU Digital Age appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The annual European Parliamentary Week will take place on Monday and Tuesday, bringing MEPs together with MPs from member states and EU candidate countries.
Committee on Budgets
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The annual European Parliamentary Week will take place on Monday and Tuesday, bringing MEPs together with MPs from member states and EU candidate countries.
Committee on Budgets
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

An EP survey of EU citizens aged 16-30 shows social media is their main information source, and that the majority are also aware of the risks of online disinformation.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

An EP survey of EU citizens aged 16-30 shows social media is their main information source, and that the majority are also aware of the risks of online disinformation.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Those paying attention have seen this coming for years.

Britain does not have enough skilled workers to meet Labour’s ambitious target of building 1.5 million homes over the next five years.

This stark reality was highlighted on the front page of The Independent on 17 February 2025, yet Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner insists it’s no excuse. But excuses are irrelevant – facts remain facts.

Post-Brexit and post-Covid, Britain is suffering a chronic shortage of both skills and workers.

The construction sector is no exception.

Without a sufficient workforce, housing plans remain just that – plans. This is precisely why Britain now relies on millions of migrant workers to fill gaps in industries ranging from healthcare to agriculture and, crucially, construction.

The truth is, this crisis was avoidable.

When Britain was part of the EU, workers from our own continent could travel freely to meet labour demand. This fluid workforce ensured industries had the people they needed, when they needed them. But Brexit shattered that dynamic.

Now, in a desperate scramble to plug the gaps, the government – whether Tory or Labour – is handing out work visas to hundreds of thousands of people from countries thousands of miles away, including India, the Philippines, and Nigeria.

Yet, even with these efforts, it’s still not enough.

The result? A nation unable to house its people, spiralling construction costs, and projects stalled due to workforce shortages. This is the tangible cost of Brexit.

Had we remained in the EU, Britain wouldn’t be in this predicament.

European builders, engineers, and tradespeople who once came and went with ease are now entangled in red tape – or simply staying away. And with them, the possibility of meeting Britain’s housing targets disappears.

This isn’t an abstract issue.

The housing shortage is worsening the cost-of-living crisis, pushing homeownership further out of reach for millions, and deepening social inequality.

1.5 million homes aren’t just a political talking point – they are a necessity for a functioning, fair society.

There is a solution, but neither major party has the courage to embrace it.

Eventually, a government with foresight will emerge – one that understands the need to reverse the damage and bring Britain back to economic and social sanity.

That means rejoining the EU.

Britain doesn’t have to suffer needlessly when the remedy is clear. It’s only a matter of time before the electorate demands it.

• Join the discussion about this post on Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, BlueSky
• Related video: Why Britain needs migrants

• Migrants are a boon, not a burden: BBC report from 2021 on post-Brexit shortage of construction workers



• • • Post Brexit blues: Video report from 2021 on the shortage of construction workers



The post Britain’s housing crisis: Another Brexit disaster appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A vote for Brexit was a vote for Putin.

Since the 2016 EU referendum, evidence has mounted that Russian interference helped secure the narrow ‘Leave’ victory.

By weakening the EU and sowing division, Brexit played into Vladimir Putin’s hands while delivering no tangible benefits to Britain.

Putin has long viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as a “major geopolitical disaster” and has consistently sought to weaken the EU while restoring Russian influence over former Soviet states.

Brexit was a significant strategic win for Moscow.

 RUSSIA’S COVERT INFLUENCE

Reports from multiple sources, including The Guardian, The Times, and the UK Parliament, revealed that Russian-backed social media accounts posted tens of thousands of messages in the days leading up to the Brexit vote, overwhelmingly promoting Leave.

Research by Swansea University and the University of California, Berkeley, found that over 150,000 Russian-linked accounts suddenly pivoted to Brexit-related content, influencing millions of voters.

The UK Parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee confirmed that these efforts aimed to increase tensions and undermine Britain’s democratic process. Committee chair Damian Collins MP warned this was likely “just the tip of the iceberg.”

Despite these findings, the British government repeatedly refused to launch a full-scale investigation.

Even after the Russia Report was published in 2020 by Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee, confirming systemic Russian interference in UK politics, no meaningful action was taken.

 THE UK’S COMPLICITY

Successive UK governments have ignored the growing threat of Russian influence.

Oligarchs with Kremlin ties poured millions into British politics, particularly the Conservative Party, turning London into a hub for Russian money laundering – earning the nickname ‘Londongrad.’

Cross-party MPs, including Labour’s Chris Bryant and Green Party’s Caroline Lucas, repeatedly warned of the dangers, but their concerns were dismissed.

Even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the UK was slow to freeze Russian assets and sanction oligarchs.

A new Labour government took power in 2024, raising hopes for a fresh approach.

However, despite mounting evidence that Russia played a key role in fueling and funding Brexit, Labour has not committed to investigating alleged interference in the EU referendum or other democratic processes in the UK.

 A WIDER RUSSIAN PLAYBOOK

Russia’s tactics in Britain were not isolated.

While many former Soviet bloc countries remain staunchly pro-EU and wary of Russian influence, some, notably Hungary and Slovakia, have taken a different path.

Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary has repeatedly blocked EU sanctions against Russia, maintained close economic ties with Moscow, and adopted a pro-Kremlin stance on key issues, including energy dependence.

Slovakia, following the election of Robert Fico as Prime Minister, has also signaled a more Russia-friendly position, reducing support for Ukraine and opposing further European intervention.

These shifts pose a challenge for EU unity, as Putin seeks to exploit internal divisions, weakening the bloc’s collective response to Russian aggression.

Moscow has also engaged in cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns, and financial backing for far-right and nationalist parties across Europe to weaken EU cohesion.

By 2017, Russia had amassed 2,500 troops near Latvia and Estonia, heightening fears of aggression.

These concerns escalated further in 2022 when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, despite having repeatedly denied any such plans.

 THE TRUMP FACTOR AND NEED FOR STRONGER EU TIES

The situation has become even more precarious with the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency in 2025.

Trump has made statements appearing to favour Putin over Europe, openly criticised NATO, and questioned US commitment to European security.

His wavering stance on supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression has emboldened Moscow and left Europe more vulnerable.

With the US no longer a reliable ally, the UK’s alliance with the EU is more crucial than ever.

The EU remains the strongest force resisting Putin’s expansionism, coordinating sanctions, military aid, and humanitarian support for Ukraine.

Britain must recognise that its interests align with Europe – not with an increasingly isolationist and unpredictable US administration.

 LEGAL CHALLENGES AND POLITICAL INACTION

Frustrated by the government’s failure to act, in March 2022 cross-party MPs Ben Bradshaw (Labour), Caroline Lucas (Green), and Alyn Smith (SNP) took the case to the  European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

They argued that the UK’s refusal to investigate Russian interference violated democratic rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.

The UK government was given until April 2023 to respond. Predictably, it downplayed the allegations and offered no substantive counter-investigation.

The refusal to engage reflects a deeper unwillingness to acknowledge that Brexit – hailed as a victory for sovereignty – was, in part, manipulated by a hostile foreign power.

The ECHR ruling has yet to be delivered, and there is no indication of when it will be.

However, when it does, it is expected to be major news. The case remains a key moment in determining accountability for foreign interference in UK democracy.

 THE PATH FORWARD

Brexit was a strategic success for Putin but a devastating blow to Britain.

The economic, political, and social consequences are increasingly clear. The UK’s international standing has diminished, businesses have struggled, and trade with Europe has suffered.

But there is a way forward. The UK must:

• Acknowledge and investigate Russian interference in Brexit and UK politics.
• Strengthen ties with the EU, recognising the benefits of European collaboration in trade, security, and global influence – in other words, being back IN the the EU.
• Expose and counter Russian influence, ensuring that UK democracy is not for sale to the highest bidder.

The ultimate repudiation of Putin’s interference would be a national commitment to rebuilding Britain’s European partnerships – including rejoining the EU, at least in the longer term.

The damage caused by Brexit is not irreversible, but time is running out.

The UK must choose: stand with its European allies or remain a pawn in Putin’s geopolitical ambitions.

The clock is ticking.

• Join the discussion about this post on Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, BlueSky 
• Earlier versions of this post were published in February 2024, February 2023, March 2022, February 2022, and November 2017.
• Related article from 2013: Latvia: From Soviet Union to European Union

• Related video – Putin’s interference in UK democracy, as explained by British MPs (will be updated later in 2025)



• Related video: Boris Johnson and the Russian connection



• Related video: Message for Russian people



• Related video: Stanley Johnson (Boris Johnson’s father) and the Russian Connection

The post How Brexit played into Putin’s hands appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Committee meetings

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

During her official visit to Israel and the occupied Palestinian Territories, EP President Metsola was the first European leader to enter Gaza in more than a decade.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

During her official visit to Israel and the occupied Palestinian Territories, EP President Metsola was the first European leader to enter Gaza in more than a decade.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Check out our timeline for an overview of how the EU and the European Parliament continue to support Ukraine in 2025.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

What will happen if the US imposes extra tariffs on EU products? Find out the facts about EU-US trade and what the EU could do in case of a trade war.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Brexiters claim the EU is run by unelected bureaucrats. It’s untrue.

The EU is a democracy, run by elected politicians.

By comparison, the UK seems more like a quasi-democracy, with unelected decision-makers and undemocratic practises that would be considered despotic by EU standards.

The UK Parliament consists of 1,481 members across the Commons and Lords. However, while all 650 MPs in the House of Commons are elected, the remaining 831 members of the House of Lords were appointed and not elected.

Our Parliament has more unelected members than elected.

The number of members of the Lords often fluctuates due to new appointments, leave of absence, and disqualification. Voters have no say in this process.

The House of Lords is the upper chamber of the UK Parliament. It plays a key role in the legislative process, scrutinising government actions, and providing expertise on policy and law.

Although it has limited power compared to the elected House of Commons, for a Bill to become law it must be approved by both the Commons and the Lords except in certain circumstances. Ultimately, however, the elected Commons has the final say over legislation.

The House of Lords is the only upper house of any two-chamber parliament in the world to be larger than its lower house.*

[*Source: Alan Siaroff, Comparing Political Regimes]

By stark contrast, the European Parliament has 720 members, all elected.

Just look at other aspects of so-called British ‘democracy’ that would be considered alien in the EU:

 We have a legislative system whereby most laws are made by Statutory Instruments, drafted by the Civil Service, which cannot be amended by Parliament and most of which become law automatically, without a Parliamentary vote.

We have governments that can bypass Parliament with the use – and abuse – of arcane and ancient Royal Prerogatives and Henry VIII clauses.

We have an old-fashioned voting system of first-past-the-post resulting in governments that most people didn’t vote for. (In European Parliament elections, voting is by proportional representation).

We had a Prime Minister who could (until it was ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court) close down Parliament for an extended period at his will and without Parliamentary approval.

We had a Prime Minister who attempted to initiate Brexit without Parliamentary authority and spent considerable sums of public money in litigation defending her “right” to do so.

We had a government that gave lucrative contracts to their friends, bypassing usual procurement procedures and public accountability.

We had a referendum in which two out of the four nations of the United Kingdom, along with Gibraltar, voted strongly against Brexit, but the UK government went ahead with it anyway.

We have an unelected head of state (although the King has no real power to intervene on important issues).

None of these undemocratic situations would be acceptable in the EU.

But how many people in Britain truly know that the EU is a democracy?

For years, Brexit politicians and papers have been selling us the blatant lie that the EU is undemocratic, even a “dictatorship” and run by unelected bureaucrats.

Let me take this opportunity to explain why that is not the case.

EU MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS

In the EU, democratic governance is the number one requirement of European Union membership.

In 1962, the year after Britain first applied to join the EEC, Spain also applied.

The country was then governed by authoritarian dictator, Francisco Franco. Spain’s membership application was flatly and unanimously rejected by all members of the European Community.

The reason? Because Spain wasn’t a democracy.

Indeed, if the UK was applying to join the EU now, recent events could present questions over the validity of our application and whether our democratic governance is currently robust enough.

Remember, recent Tory governments wanted to scrap our Human Rights Act and also opposed the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Conservative leaders have  also threatened to leave the European Convention on Human Rights. The current Tory leader, Kemi Badenoch, has said she was willing to consider leaving the Convention if she became Prime Minister.

Such a move would bar us from joining the EU, where a commitment to human rights is a strict membership requirement.

Before becoming a member of the EU, an applicant country must demonstrate that it has a stable government guaranteeing:

• Democracy
• The rule of law
• Human rights
• Respect for and protection of minorities
• The existence of a functioning market economy
• The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union

Most countries that applied to join the EU did not meet these strict membership requirements and so they needed many years to prepare for the process before their application could be accepted.

NOTE: The UK’s unelected House of Lords may be a barrier to the UK being accepted as an EU member if we apply to re-join. We may have got away with having an unelected second chamber when we first joined in 1973, but there is a question mark over whether our application would be successful again without deep constitutional reforms in the UK. 

 EU MEMBERS

Contrary to what many people in Britain understand, the EU is a democracy, democratically run by its members.

These comprise the democratically elected governments and Parliaments of EU member states, alongside the directly elected European Parliament.

All the treaties of the EU, upon which all EU laws must be compatible, and any new countries applying to join the EU, must be unanimously and democratically agreed by all the national parliaments of every EU member state, however large or small.

In some EU countries, according to their national constitutions, agreement must also be obtained by regional parliaments and national referendums.

All the EEC/EU treaties since Britain joined the European Community in 1973 were fully debated and democratically passed by our Parliament in Westminster.

Not once were any changes to our EU membership imposed upon us, and neither could they be, as the EU is a democracy.

In addition, every EU country has a veto on any treaty changes or any new country joining.

(Compare that to our referendum of 2016, when a majority of citizens in Scotland and Northern Ireland voted against Brexit, but it made no difference.)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The European Parliament is the EU’s law-making body, alongside the EU Council, also called the Council of Ministers, which comprises the departmental ministers of democratically elected governments of every EU country.

The Parliament is directly elected every five years by citizens in all EU countries. The latest European elections were held in June 2024.

There are 720 MEPs (we used to have 73 MEPs from the UK representing us in Europe; alas, no more).

Each European country is proportionally represented in the Parliament according to their size of population.

EU laws can only be passed by the European Parliament in concert with the Council of Ministers.

The Council shares law making and budgetary powers with the European Parliament. When voting on proposed EU laws, its meetings must be public.

Alongside the Council, the European Parliament has the democratic power to accept, amend or reject proposed laws and regulations.

According to extensive research at the time by VoteWatch Europe, over 97% of adopted EU laws in the 12 years to 2016 were supported by the UK.

There are proposals to give the European Parliament new powers to directly initiate legislation.

 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The European Commission is the servant of the EU, and not its master. Ultimately, the Commission is beholden to the European Parliament, and not the other way around.

The candidates for Commission President are proposed by a qualified majority of the European Council, which comprises the Prime Ministers or Heads of States of EU countries, taking account of the latest European elections.

Similarly, the Commission is composed of one member from each member state “suggested” by the national governments of each member state, but elected by a qualified majority of the European Council.

The Commission President must then be elected by an absolute majority of all MEPs (i.e. over 50% of them).

Indeed, Ursula von der Leyen could only become Commission President – for a second term – with the democratic backing of over half of ALL MEPs.

Each proposed Commissioner must also be democratically approved by the European Parliament in a strict vetting process. The Parliament has the democratic power to reject candidate Commissioners – as two were in in 2019.

After the 2024 European Parliament elections, European Parliament’s hearings, held in November 2024, involved rigorous evaluations of the Commissioners-designate. While no nominees were outright rejected, several faced intense scrutiny and challenges during their hearings.

The Parliament also has the democratic power to sack the entire Commission at any time during its five-year tenure.

The Commission is responsible for implementing the democratic decisions of the EU, upholding and enforcing democratically passed EU laws and treaties, and managing the day-to-day business of the EU.

The Commission also proposes new laws, but they only do this in close collaboration with the European Parliament and Council of Ministers, as only the Parliament and Council can pass laws.

The Commission has zero power to pass any laws.

Before the Commission proposes new laws, it prepares ‘Impact Assessments’ which set out the advantages and disadvantages of possible policy options.

The Commission then consults interested parties such as non-governmental organisations, local authorities and representatives of industry and civil society. Groups of experts also give advice on technical issues.

In this way, the Commission ensures that legislative proposals correspond to the needs of those most concerned and avoids unnecessary red tape.

Citizens, businesses and organisations also participate in the consultation procedure. National parliaments can also formally express their reservations if they feel that it would be better to deal with an issue at national rather than EU level.

 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

The European Council consists of the democratically elected leaders of each EU country – their Prime Ministers and Presidents. It is the EU’s supreme political authority.

The Council does not negotiate or adopt EU laws, but it does democratically set the political goals and priorities of the European Union, including the policy agenda of the Commission.

The Council also democratically chooses candidates for the post of Commission President, which the European Parliament must then elect with an absolute majority of MEPs.

The Council President reports to the European Parliament.

UK MEMBERSHIP OF THE EU

During our membership, Britain democratically helped to run and rule the EU, and not the other way around. Whatever the EU is and has become, Britain helped to create it.

Indeed, the EU can become whatever all its members unanimously agree it can become. But of course, that only applies to EU members, and not to ex-members.

Outside of the EU, Britain can only watch as democratic decisions about our continent are decided without us, even though those decisions affect us just as much, whether we are a member or not.

Leaving the EU has meant a loss of sovereignty. We no longer have a say, votes, and vetoes on the running and future direction of Europe.

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• Related video: The BBC got it wrong, so this video explains how the EU functions as a democracy



• Related video: Why the UK joined the EU – and why we might join again for the same reasons

• Related video: Why Brexit is a colossal mistake, by former Prime Minister Sir John Major



The post The EU is more democratic than the UK appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

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Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

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Subcommittee on Human Rights

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

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Subcommittee on Human Rights

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP