Africa - INTER PRESS SERVICE

Tehran, Iran before the conflict began. Credit: Unsplash/Mohammad Takhsh

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 1 2026 (IPS)

The on-again, off-again US-Iran peace negotiations, which have been disparaged by Israeli leaders, have resulted in a rare rift between the US and Israel, a Middle East ally which has had America’s unwavering “iron clad” support since its creation in 1948.

The cracks were visible – all the way from Tel Aviv to Washington DC. But is this for real or just a passing family squabble?

US Vice President J.D. Vance, who has been leading the negotiations in Geneva, lambasted the Israelis last week for their very personal attack on President Donald Trump.

“Donald Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time, and he happens to be the head of state of the world’s superpower,” he said, speaking to reporters at the White House.

Vance said ” two thirds of the weapons that protected Israel were American-made and paid for by US tax dollars.”

“If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that i have anywhere left in the entire world,” he warned.

Dr Ramzy Baroud, Palestinian author and editor of the Palestine Chronicle, told Inter Press Service “while Vice President J.D. Vance’s comments may suggest that there is some divergence between the United States and Israel, we should be cautious not to read too much into them or assume that they signal a fundamental shift in US policy”.

First, this is not the first time that criticism of Israel has emerged from a US administration, even from officials widely regarded as strong supporters of Israel, he pointed out. Similar disagreements have surfaced before without leading to any meaningful change in American policy.

Second, there have been credible reports indicating that, during the Biden administration, the appearance of tension between President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu was often overstated and did not reflect the reality of continued US support for the genocide in Gaza.

Despite public disagreements, American military, financial, and diplomatic backing remained largely unchanged, he said.

Similarly, recent attempts to portray a rift between President Trump and Netanyahu—whether genuine or exaggerated—have so far had little impact on US support for Israel.

In fact, only days after Vice President Vance’s remarks, the United States carried out another strike against Iran, in line with objectives long advocated by the Netanyahu government, said Dr Baroud.

At the same time, Washington is actively advancing a broader scheme in Lebanon aimed at achieving politically what Israel failed to achieve militarily: weakening the Resistance, restructuring Lebanon’s political and security landscape in Israel’s favor, all while continuing to ignore the ongoing genocide in Gaza, declared Dr Baroud..

Meanwhile, according to a Fact Sheet from the US State Department “steadfast support for Israel’s security has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy for every U.S. Administration since the presidency of Harry S. Truman”.

“Since Israel’s founding in 1948, the United States has provided Israel with over $130 billion in bilateral assistance focused on addressing new and complex security threats, bridging Israel’s capability gaps through security assistance and cooperation, increasing interoperability through joint exercises, and helping Israel maintain its Qualitative Military Edge (QME).”

This assistance has helped transform the Israel Defense Forces into one of the world’s most capable, effective militaries and turned the Israeli military industry and technology sector into one of the largest exporters of military capabilities worldwide.

Since 1983, the United States and Israel have met regularly via the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) to promote shared policies, address common threats and concerns, and identify new areas for security cooperation.

The 48th JPMG, held in October 2022 reaffirmed the ironclad strategic partnership between the United States and Israel, underscoring a mutual commitment to advance collaboration in support of regional security and reinforce the historic achievements of recent normalization under the Abraham Accords.

Israel is the leading global recipient of Title 22 U.S. security assistance under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. This has been formalized by a 10-year (2019-2028) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Consistent with the MOU, the United States annually provides $3.3 billion in FMF and $500 million for cooperative programs for missile defense.

Since Elaborating further, FY 2009, the United States has provided Israel with $3.4 billion in funding for missile defense, including $1.3 billion for Iron Dome support starting in FY 2011. Through FMF, the United States provides Israel with access to some of the most advanced military equipment in the world, including the F-35 Lightning.

Israel is also eligible for Cash Flow Financing and is authorized to use its annual FMF allocation to procure defense articles, services, and training through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, Direct Commercial Contract agreements – which are FMF-funded Direct Commercial Sales procurements – and through Off Shore Procurement (OSP). Via OSP the current MOU allows Israel to spend a portion of its FMF on Israeli-origin rather than U.S.-origin defense articles. This was 25 percent in FY 2019 but is set to phase-out and decrease to zero in FY 2028.

Elaborating further, Dr Baroud said It is important to note any signs of disagreement between Washington and Tel Aviv. However, political rhetoric is ultimately meaningless unless it is accompanied by tangible changes on the ground.

Israel remains the largest recipient of US military and financial assistance anywhere in the world, even as it carries out the genocide in Gaza.

As long as this fundamental equation remains unchanged, any supposed disagreements or personal feuds between the two governments amount to little more than empty words, he declared.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Delegates gather for the opening plenary of the June UN Climate Meetings in Bonn. Credit: Kiara Worth / IISD/ENB

By Felix Dodds and Chris Spence
APEX, North Carolina / SAN FRANCISCO, California, Jun 30 2026 (IPS)

With progress stalled on many issues, this year’s June talks in Bonn—which are supposed to smooth the way towards COP 31 in Antalya at year’s end—were widely judged a failure. What happened? And what does it mean for Antalya?

“Deliberately delaying us.”

“Spreading misinformation.”

“Denying the science.”

“Lacking integrity.”

“Blocking progress.”

“Costing countless lives.”

These were just some of the charges delegates leveled at each other during the UN Climate Meetings held in Bonn this June. As delegates took up multiple issues in small “contact groups” and “informal consultations”, negotiations quickly became tetchy and irritable before descending into levels of rancor and even rudeness rarely seen before. And it was not just one issue where tempers frayed.

What went wrong? One problem is the sheer number of topics on the Bonn agenda. Over the thirty-plus years since the UN climate talks began, countries have been keen to add issues they particularly care about to the agenda

From talks on climate change research and science to topics like mitigation and funding for adaptation, the mood was often combative and confrontational. By the meeting’s end, differences were so great that in many cases delegates could not even agree to continue working on the draft outcome documents from Bonn when they arrive at COP 31 in Antalya later this year.

This means they will need to start discussions from scratch. In other cases, they failed to finish their work, but at least managed to forward the current working texts. This is hardly a great outcome, however.

In fact, Bonn may have witnessed more arguments over “mandates” (whether a particular group should be discussing certain topics) and “points of order” (whether delegates were playing within the rules) than ever before in the climate change process.

Searching for positives, some participants pointed to one success. Delegates did choose the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) to host the Climate Technology Centre (CTC).

The CTC provides technological support to developing countries. It means the Centre’s work will continue beyond 2027 and possibly all the way through to 2041. But even the glow of this minor “win” dims when one recalls that UNEP was already the host.

This agreement simply means it can carry on its work. It doesn’t create something new. When continuing to do something that’s already happening counts as a victory, you know things haven’t gone well.

 

Too Many Topics

What went wrong? One problem is the sheer number of topics on the Bonn agenda. Over the thirty-plus years since the UN climate talks began, countries have been keen to add issues they particularly care about to the agenda.

For instance, vulnerable small island nations are eager to talk about keeping global warming under 1.5oC, the threshold at which scientists fear serious “tipping points” will be reached. They also want to talk about phasing out fossil fuels—the major cause of climate change—and about wealthy countries helping them to adapt.

Meanwhile, fossil fuel exporters like Saudi Arabia are keen to talk about what wealthy western nations’ actions, including carbon taxes or a shift to renewables, are doing to their oil-based economies. They believe these “response measures” could harm them—or already are. That said, these same oil and gas-rich nations certainly do not want to talk about getting rid of fossil fuels.

A third example are the western nations, particularly those in Europe, who are making efforts to shake off their dependence on oil and gas.

They are happy to talk about renewable energy and science, but are keen to shut down talk about funding or compensating countries affected by what the Europeans consider to be their virtuous efforts to change. Bailing out oil producers for any “harm” done to their export trade is the last thing on their minds.

As the various groups have added their topics to the negotiations over the years, these divergent views have collided with ever greater force. Although there are frequent calls to simplify the process, no country is going to give up their “pet” topic, especially since that would mean more time to talk about someone else’s favorite issue. Could everyone agree to simplify and give up their preferred agenda item? Maybe. But so far, no one has blinked.

 

The Rule Is, There Are No Rules!

Making things more difficult still are the UN climate treaty’s “rules of procedure.” These were developed in the 1990s when countries first penned the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change—the bedrock agreement on which the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement were also built.

The rules of procedure offer a way out of difficult issues by allowing for countries to vote. In some cases, a two-thirds majority is required to “win” on an issue. Sometimes, the bar is even higher and a three-quarters majority is needed.

The trouble is, these rules were never formally adopted. Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries refused to agree to them. What this means is that consensus is required for everything. So, what happens when a treaty has 198 parties, all with differing views and priorities on what is possibly the most complex issue of our times? One could argue it’s a miracle anything has been agreed at all.

 

The COP 31 Pileup

What does this mess mean for COP 31, which is taking place in Antalya, Türkiye, in November? First, it means an agenda pileup. The annual June climate meeting in Bonn is supposed to help pave the way to the end-of-year COP. Bonn’s job is to resolve much of the low-hanging fruit—agenda items that require some sort of agreement or outcome document, but which can be taken care of relatively quickly. This then leaves the COP to finish up work on the big, meaty, difficult issues.

The problem is, Bonn resolved almost nothing. Even the low-hanging fruit seems to have soured. With so many documents unresolved and “rolled over” (or, in the jargon of the process, ‘Rule 16ed’), COP 31 will have a massive workload. It’s a logjam that seems unlikely to be cleared in Antalya.

Does this mean COP 31 will fail? Not necessarily. One silver lining that could be observed in Bonn was how well the two countries presiding over COP 31 seemed to be working together. In an unusual arrangement, the government of Türkiye is physically hosting and organizing the COP, while the government of Australia is joining as co-president tasked with handling the diplomatic negotiations.

Their collaborative spirit and air of quiet competence provided a ray of hope in Bonn. Also, there are two pre-COP events in October—one taking place in Fiji, the other in Tuvalu—that might help.

Still, the signs are not good overall.

 

Fixing the Process

Bonn did not occur in a vacuum. By common consent, the UN climate process has been getting steadily more complicated by the year, especially since the Paris Agreement was inked back in 2015. Bonn was just the latest example—and one of the more extreme—in how confusing and difficult it has become from an agenda perspective.

There is also a growing interest in these negotiations to reckon with. Some of the early COPs attracted only a few thousand participants, while today the numbers regularly top 50,000 and more.

The most extreme, COP 28, topped 83,000! Some argue this is making it more difficult, while others see this as a positive development, since it demonstrates to politicians that climate change remains a critical issue. Either way, this evolution adds to the organizational complexity of the process.

These recent travails and complications have led to a steady stream of think pieces, reports, and meetings aimed at streamlining, simplifying and improving the system. They contain many good ideas for shedding agenda items and other alterations.

Perhaps one day frustration will mount to a point where some of these good ideas actually happen. But with countries so divided on the substance of the talks, it is hard to imagine them agreeing on their organization, at least in the short term.

 

Does It Really Matter?

In spite of the mess the process is in right now, we can see four reasons to remain positive and not to give up hope.

First, COP 31 is not a “make or break” COP. Sure, it needs to keep the momentum going. But there are no major outcomes needed in Antalya.

Instead, delegates and observers are looking more to COP 32 in 2027—which will review countries’ success in implementing their pledges under the Paris Agreement—and COP 33, which is tasked with completing a second “global stocktake” of progress. COP 33, in particular, will need to end with something noteworthy. Interestingly, COP 33 is also likely to take place hard-on-the-heels of the U.S. Presidential elections.

Looking further out, COP 35 in 2030 should mark another important moment in the process, with countries scheduled to submit their next set of pledges or “Nationally Determined Contributions”.

A second reason to stay positive—and no disrespect to the climate negotiations—is that we already have in place the major agreements we need to make progress.

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement are the launch pads we need. A lot of the negotiations occurring these days in Bonn and at the COPs are relatively minor and procedural. Now, our work can and should be more about implementing what we’ve agreed.

To be clear: the COPs have an important role to play in reviewing progress and encouraging countries to do more. But the foundations are already in place, the promises made. Now, it is about doing what we have said we would.

Thirdly, the creation of “Coalitions of the Willing” in recent years show there is an appetite for promoting implementation even on issues where there is not yet consensus among all 198 member states.

Alliances designed to advance progress on critical matters such as energy, agriculture, water, oceans, and health can only help us move forward. While some, such as the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ), have failed in their original goals, the potential is certainly there.

The recent alliance to transition away from fossil fuels, and another initiative on financing known as the “Vulnerability to Viability Compact”, are positive developments that could and should help us on the path to implementation.

Are we doing what is needed? Not yet. At least, not fast enough. But—and this is our fourth and final note of positivity—there is hope here. It’s worth noting that, since the Paris Agreement in 2015, the trajectory of global warming has changed. Back in 2015, the world was staring down the barrel of 4-6oC in warming by the end of this century. These numbers should cause any sensible person to quail. They are extinction-level predictions; apocalyptic in their scope, horrifying in their impact.

Today, the numbers have fallen to between about 2.1oC and 2.8oC, depending on your assumptions. These numbers are still very, very bad. They threaten breaching all sorts limits, passing many points of no return.

Even at 1.5oC warming, we are seeing unprecedented weather such as the heatwaves felt recently in Europe. Still, we have started to bend the curve. As a result of government policies, scientific breakthroughs, private sector initiatives and action from many, many stakeholders, things are slowly beginning to change.

Our friend Christiana Figueres, who played a major role in the Paris Agreement, talks often about “stubborn optimism”. We agree. This is the time to double down on climate action. With renewed energy and dogged persistence, we can keep bending the curve and change humanity’s future.

This, surely, is something participants at future COPs should be striving towards.

 

Prof. Felix Dodds and Chris Spence have participated in United Nations talks on climate change and other environmental negotiations since the 1990s. They co-edited Heroes of Environmental Diplomacy: Profiles in Courage (Routledge, 2022) and wrote Environmental Lobbying at the United Nations: A Guide to Protecting Our Planet (Routledge, 2025). Their next book, Political Heroes of the Environment: Profiles in Courage, is due for release in 2027.

Smart farming enables farmers to produce more with fewer resources, make better decisions under uncertainty, and reduce agriculture's environmental footprint. Credit: FAO

By Beth Bechdol
ROME, Jun 30 2026 (IPS)

Farmers today are producing food under pressures that would have been unimaginable to previous generations. Input costs are rising and supply chains are unreliable. Water is scarcer. Weather is less predictable. And for a growing number of farmers — in Sudan, in Ukraine, in Myanmar, in Gaza — the challenge is producing food at all, in the middle of active conflict. These are not marginal conditions. They describe the reality facing hundreds of millions of people who grow the food the world depends on.

Smart farming — using data, digital tools, and precision technologies to make better decisions, use fewer inputs, and get more from every hectare — is not a luxury response to these pressures. It is increasingly a practical and necessary one. It helps farmers know when to plant, where fertilizer will generate the greatest return, how much water a crop actually needs, where pests are likely to emerge, and which risks are developing before they become crises.

Three agricultural revolutions got us here. The first gave humanity settled agriculture. The second transformed land use and productivity through new methods and early machinery. The third — the Green Revolution — combined improved seeds, fertilizers, and modern practice to feed a rapidly growing world. Each solved the defining challenge of its era … producing enough.

Smart farming — using data, digital tools, and precision technologies to make better decisions, use fewer inputs, and get more from every hectare — is not a luxury response to these pressures. It is increasingly a practical and necessary one

The fourth revolution faces a fundamentally different challenge. It is no longer simply about producing more food. It is about producing more with fewer and less reliable inputs, under greater uncertainty, on land under increasing stress, and while reducing agriculture’s environmental footprint.

The tools that drove the Green Revolution were extraordinary, but they are not infinitely scalable. Synthetic fertilizers depend on energy-intensive production and supply chains that have proven fragile. Aquifers in key agricultural regions are being drawn down faster than they recharge. The yield gains from conventional intensification are flattening. There is no endless supply of cheap water, cheap fertilizer, or cheap fuel to sustain food production the way we have for the past half-century.

Smart farming is how we meet this new challenge. It enables farmers to produce more with fewer resources, make better decisions under uncertainty, and reduce agriculture’s environmental footprint. It is not a vision for the future. It is already happening.

FAO’s own operational programmes demonstrate what is already possible. Our Desert Locust early warning system uses satellite imagery, weather data, and field intelligence to forecast outbreaks before they reach crops, giving governments time to act rather than simply respond. The SoilFER programme is turning faster, more affordable soil mapping into actionable fertilizer recommendations for farmers in Central America and sub-Saharan Africa. The Hand-in-Hand Initiative combines geospatial, market, and socioeconomic data so governments and investors can direct agricultural investment where it will have the greatest return. These are not pilots. They are operational programmes with measurable outcomes — and they include AI-driven tools that forecast pest and disease pressure, analyze crop stress, and help governments make better decisions faster than was previously possible.

My own family’s seven-generation grain farm in rural Indiana today uses GPS-guided equipment, variable-rate fertilizer applications based on soil sampling, yield mapping, and real-time weather tools to make planting and harvesting decisions. The technology works. The question is who has access to it.

That is the central challenge. The benefits of smart farming currently concentrate among producers who already have the resources, connectivity, and institutional support to adopt new tools. Smallholder farmers — who produce a third of the world’s food — are too often last in line. Women farmers and young producers face additional barriers to technology and financing, which means the whole system underperforms when they are excluded.

At FAO’s Global Conference on Smart Farming in Rome from 1 to 3 July, the commitments required are specific and clear. Governments need to modernize regulatory environments and invest in the digital infrastructure agriculture depends on. Development banks should finance data systems and precision agriculture as essential infrastructure rather than optional innovation. Private companies need business models that reach smallholders, not only large commercial farms. And organizations like FAO must ensure that technical knowledge becomes practical solutions farmers can actually us e.

The fourth agricultural revolution is already underway. What remains to be decided is whether its benefits reach the farmers who need them most — or whether the gap between what is possible and what is accessible becomes permanent.

Beth Bechdol is Deputy Director-General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Usually, the fiesta to celebrate St Antony at the church with the same name in Crown Mines, Johannesburg, is a lively affair. The church is usually packed with congregants from the Portuguese community, including recent migrants from Mozambique and Angola. On Sunday, the mass was half empty, with mostly white congregants filling the few seats […]

A UN Peacebuilding Week Event held in Egypt’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York. Credit: Maximilian Malawista

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 30 2026 (IPS)

As the United Nations held its first-ever Peacebuilding Week (June 22-26), UN officials and developmental partners gathered at Egypt’s Permanent Mission on June 23 to hold a dialogue on the main question that emerged from the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR): “How can global commitments to peacebuilding translate into tangible results on the ground?”

This event, hosted by Egypt at the sidelines of Peacebuilding Week, titled “Strengthening National Peace Infrastructures in Africa: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward,” brought together representatives from African governments and regional organizations, as well as members of the UN system, to discuss how nationally-owned institutions can mitigate and prevent conflict, manage effects and sustain peace long after such situations have ended.

To open the event, Egypt’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ihab Moustafa Awad Moustafa, emphasized that the 2025 PBAR negotiations repeatedly asserted a fundamental concern: ensuring that policy discussions in New York produce measurable impact on the ground, whether in Africa or in any other peacekeeping sites.

“One of the clearest answers that emerged during those discussions was the need to strengthen national capacities and institutions,” Moustafa said. “We are serious about peacebuilding, sustaining peace, and primarily prevention. We must invest in national peace infrastructure.”

The PBAR, which was adopted in November of 2025, reaffirmed that nationally led and nationally owned endeavors remain at the core of sustainable peace. The PBAR actively calls on Member States, regional organizations, development partners, international financial institutions, and the UN system to strengthen the institutions capable of preventing conflict, fostering social cohesion, and managing risk.

Throughout the discussion, speakers agreed that contemporary conflicts are rooted in security threats but also pointed to institutional fragility, governance deficits, and declining trust of public institutions between citizens as an additional threat.

Brian James Williams, Chief of the Peacebuilding Fund at the Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office (PBPSO), explained that the review provides a clear mandate for the international community to follow nationally identified priorities.

“Prevention and sustaining peace need stronger national capacities, stronger institutions and better alignment of international support behind those national priorities,” Williams said.

Williams detailed the UN Peacebuilding Fund’s increasingly important role in helping governments operationalize existing national mechanisms, rather than creating new parallel structures. Williams cited examples such as support for peace and reconciliation committees in Chad and local peacebuilding mechanisms in the Central African Republic.

“These committees bring together administrative authorities, traditional and religious leaders, women, young, and marginalized groups,” Williams said, relaying the efforts to connect national peace architectures with local institutions and provincial actors.

Participants of the dialogue repeatedly emphasized that national ownership must extend beyond central governments. Effective peace infrastructures require civil society organizations; participation of local authorities, women, youth, religious leaders, and representatives of the community; and capability of identifying tensions or risks before they can escalate into violence.

Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, Ibrahim F. Jimoh, highlighted his country’s model to strengthen peacebuilding through institutions such as the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution and through reintegration, demobilization, disarmament, and reconciliation programs tailored to specific local conditions.

“Such infrastructures provide the framework through which countries can anticipate risks, address grievances, and support recovery,” Jimoh said. “Their effectiveness depends on inclusive participation, institutional resilience, and strong national ownership.”

Sierra Leone, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and The Gambia also shared examples where local mediation structures, national peace councils, reconciliation commissions, and traditional institutions of justice have contributed to conflict prevention and social cohesion.

Jacqueline Seck, Chief of Staff, Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), pointed to Ghana’s Peace Council as an example of nationally owned institutions providing trusted platforms to have dialogue, mediation, and electoral conflict prevention. Similarly, in The Gambia and Sierra Leone, the role of dedicated peace institutions in helping support post-conflict reconciliation and manage political tensions was discussed.

Among the major challenges, financing emerged as a recurring topic throughout the duration of the dialogue. While the catalytic role of the Peacebuilding Fund was praised by the speakers, many emphasized that sustained peace ultimately requires a long-term political commitment to peace as well as continuous domestic investment.

Williams warned that developing institutions often takes a lot of time and is a gradual process.

“Institutions take time to develop,” he said. “Results often require support at a certain scale, across the country, and across different parts of an institution to make meaningful impact.”

Throughout the discussion, participants pointed to a broader shift in peacebuilding strategy, from responding to crises after violence has already erupted to investing in preventative institutions designed to address risks before conflict happens.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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By James Alix Michel
VICTORIA, Seychelles, Jun 29 2026 (IPS)

On the night of 29 June 1976, just before midnight, I stood among my fellow Seychellois at the heart of a moment that would change our history forever.

James Alix Michel

We were waiting for the British flag to come down and for our own flag to rise for the first time over an independent Seychelles.

The air was heavy with expectation, pride, and a certain quiet anxiety: we were stepping into the unknown.

That night was emotional for me in a very personal way. After the new president had delivered his address, the president of my party – who would become Prime Minister at Independence – took the podium. At the end of his speech, he recited a poem I had written for our newspaper, entitled “Il est Minuit” – “It is midnight”. Hearing my own words spoken at that exact moment, when one era was ending and another beginning, was unforgettable. It felt as if the poem had become part of the birth certificate of our nation.

Fifty years later, as Seychelles celebrates its golden jubilee of Independence, I look back not only as a witness of that first midnight, but as someone who has walked alongside the country through many of its trials and transformations: from minister, to vice president, to president, and now as an advocate for the Blue Economy and for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) on the global stage.

From struggle to nationhood:

The struggle for Independence was our first great challenge. As a small colony in the Indian Ocean, it could have been easy to remain permanently on the periphery of history. Instead, the Seychellois chose to take responsibility for their own destiny. The transition from colonial rule to self government forged a strong sense of identity and duty. It taught us that freedom is not a one time event, but a continuous effort.

In the years after Independence, Seychelles experimented with different political paths, including one party rule and later a return to multi party democracy. These choices were often contentious, but they were part of our process of political maturation. As institutions evolved and multi party politics took root, we learned the value of dialogue, compromise and the rule of law. A young state was becoming a more confident republic.

2008: A turning point born of crisis:

One of the most defining moments in my own journey came in 2008. By then I was president, and Seychelles was facing a deep economic crisis. The global financial turmoil, combined with soaring oil and food prices, had almost exhausted our foreign reserves. The rupee was heavily overvalued, deficits were spiralling, and eventually the country missed a payment on its external debt.

In such moments, leadership is tested in very practical ways. On 31 October 2008, I took the decision to launch a comprehensive macroeconomic reform programme, supported by the International Monetary Fund. We floated the rupee, restructured the national debt, and imposed strict fiscal discipline. These were not popular measures; they required real sacrifice from the Seychellois people.

Yet that programme became a turning point. It stabilised our economy, restored credibility, and moved Seychelles towards a more modern, private sector led market system.

Looking back, I consider those reforms one of the most important achievements of my leadership. Without that foundation, many of the subsequent steps we took – in education, innovation and environmental policy – would have been far more difficult, if not impossible.

Pirates at sea, pressure on land:

Just as those economic reforms were taking root, a new and very different threat emerged. Somali pirates, heavily armed, began operating deep inside our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), hijacking local vessels, taking Seychellois fishermen hostage and frightening away cruise ships and fishing fleets. Our two main economic pillars – tourism and tuna fishing – were suddenly at risk.

For a small island state with 1.3 million square kilometres of ocean, this was an existential security challenge. We knew we could not police such a vast space alone. We therefore mounted an intense diplomatic effort to convince regional and global partners that securing the Western Indian Ocean was in everyone’s interest. Seychelles became a hub for anti piracy operations; our Coast Guard cooperated closely with foreign navies; and we adapted our domestic laws to prosecute and imprison pirates.

These were difficult years, but they showed that a small nation, if it acts with courage and clarity, can punch above its weight. We helped to restore security to our waters and protect the livelihoods of our people.

Meanwhile, a quieter but more permanent threat was taking shape: climate change. Coral bleaching, coastal erosion and rising sea levels were affecting our islands directly. Seychelles was facing an environmental crisis it had done little to create, while international climate finance for SIDS was still limited and slow.

From vulnerability to vision: the Blue Economy:

It was in this context that the idea of the Blue Economy began to crystallise. For years, I had been convinced that our future would be decided not only on land, but in the ocean that surrounds us. Seychelles has a small landmass but a vast maritime zone. If we could rethink the ocean as a space for sustainable development – not just for exploitation – we could turn vulnerability into opportunity.

When I began advocating publicly for the Blue Economy, there was scepticism at home and abroad. Some considered it too abstract, others thought it was merely a new label for old ideas. But we persisted in giving the concept substance: through marine spatial planning, through the designation of large marine protected areas, and through innovative mechanisms such as the debt for nature swap we concluded in 2014 with the Paris Club and The Nature Conservancy.

That agreement restructured part of our national debt in exchange for robust commitments to ocean conservation. It helped to fund protection for 30% of our waters and became a model for other countries. Seychelles, once seen only as a vulnerable small island state, was now recognised as a pioneer of the Blue Economy and of nature based solutions.

Investing in people

Economic and environmental reforms are only part of the story. I have always believed that the most important investment a country can make is in its people. That is why I supported the creation of the University of Seychelles, at a time when some argued that our nation was too small to have its own university. The aim was simple: to give Seychellois youth the chance to pursue tertiary education at home and build their future on their own soil.

We complemented this with initiatives like the Young Leaders Programme, designed to prepare promising young Seychellois for positions of responsibility, including through postgraduate studies.

For me, these efforts are as central to our Independence story as any economic reform or diplomatic achievement. Independence is not only about sovereignty; it is about giving every generation the tools to shape its own destiny.

Looking ahead: Seychelles in 2076:

Today, as Seychelles celebrates 50 years of Independence, I am often asked what I see when I look ahead to the next half century. My vision is of a nation that has completed the journey from perceived vulnerability to respected ocean leadership: a country that manages its maritime space wisely, that uses its natural resources sustainably, and that shares its experience with other island and coastal states.

But my greatest pride is not in the policies we have already put in place. It lies in the potential I see in our people, especially our young people. They are better educated, more connected and more globally aware than my generation was in 1976. If they remain united, keep faith with our values and dare to innovate, I believe the Seychelles of tomorrow can be even more remarkable than the Seychelles of today.

At midnight on that first Independence Day, the poem “Il est Minuit” captured a sense of ending and beginning. Fifty years on, I feel we are once again at such a threshold. The first chapter of an independent Seychelles has been written. The next will be authored by a new generation.

My hope is that they will write it with courage, imagination and love for these islands and the ocean that surrounds them.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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A team of universities, led by Addis Ababa University, has joined forces to implement a four-year Intra-Africa academic mobility project aimed at strengthening agroforestry research and education for climate change mitigation. The project, dubbed Strengthening Agroforestry Research and Education for Climate Change Mitigation in Africa (SERA), brings together JKUAT (Kenya) and Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia) […]

By CIVICUS
Jun 29 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses Ghana’s anti-LGBTQI+ law with Leila Lariba, Executive Director of One Love Sisters Ghana, a community-driven organisation that advances human rights, social inclusion and wellbeing for Muslim LGBTQI+ people in Ghana.

On 29 May, Ghana’s parliament approved the Human Sexual Rights and Family Values Bill, which imposes prison terms of up to three years for people who identify as LGBTQI+ and three to five years for anyone deemed to promote, sponsor or support LGBTQI+ activities. With it, Ghana joins a growing group of West African states, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal, that have recently passed anti-LGBTQI+ laws.

What does the new bill do, and how different is it from the version parliament approved in 2024?

Parliament approved the new anti-LGBTQI+ bill on 29 May and it now awaits President John Dramani Mahama’s signature. The bill criminalises LGBTQI+ people and anyone perceived to support, advocate for or provide services to them. It reaches far beyond identity and relationships into the freedoms of association, education, expression, healthcare and human rights advocacy. I have worked directly with LGBTQI+ communities across Ghana for years and I see this not as a legal document but as a tool that legitimises discrimination.

The version parliament approved in 2024, which former president Nana Akufo-Addo left office without signing, was already one of the continent’s most restrictive. The new text keeps most of its harmful provisions. It comes at a moment when LGBTQI+ people already face heightened fear, insecurity and stigma, and it makes simply existing, seeking support or speaking about human rights a potential crime.

Why is the bill being pushed now, and who’s behind it?

The bill is being pushed by anti-rights groups that have increasingly turned LGBTQI+ people into a political target. As many Ghanaians struggle with economic hardship, unemployment and governance concerns, public attention is being redirected towards a small and already excluded community.

Behind it stands a coalition of political figures, conservative religious groups and traditional leaders who frame LGBTQI+ rights as a threat to culture and family values. This narrative ignores Ghana’s long history of diversity and the fact that LGBTQI+ people belong to every family, community and faith group in the country and the world.

Do you expect President Dramani to sign the bill, and what would the consequences be?

It’s uncertain whether President Dramani will sign. But the damage is already done. The prolonged public debate has fuelled fear, encouraged discrimination and left many people feeling less safe. Even before it becomes law, the bill has emboldened hostility.

At One Love Sisters Ghana, we have documented rising reports of blackmail, evictions, family rejection, mental health crises, online harassment and workplace discrimination. People are now afraid to seek healthcare, legal help and psychosocial support in case they are exposed or targeted. When fear becomes institutionalised, people stop seeking help precisely when they need it most.

The law would threaten fundamental rights and deepen the stigma, isolation and vulnerability of people who already face daily barriers. As a queer Muslim activist, I know what it means to navigate many layers of exclusion. Many LGBTQI+ people are balancing identity, faith, family and safety. This law would make that even harder.

The impact would reach beyond individual people. Community organisations, healthcare providers, human rights defenders and support networks would also face risk, making it harder for vulnerable people to reach essential services and protection.

How are LGBTQI+ groups, including your organisation, responding?

Ghana’s LGBTQI+ communities are remarkably resilient. Across the country, people are supporting one another, sharing information, strengthening their safety and keeping community ties alive.

At One Love Sisters Ghana, we focus on community care, protection and wellbeing. We have tightened safety and security measures, expanded psychosocial support, documented rights violations and kept referring people in crisis to the help they need.

We work closely with activists, community leaders, health professionals, lawyers and regional partners to track developments and keep people informed and supported. Through our national support systems, we keep hearing from people worried about their safety, livelihoods and future.

We also hold on to hope. Our communities have survived hard times before, and we keep building solidarity, caring for one another and advocating for dignity and human rights.

What further restrictions could follow, and what support do you need to prevent them?

Our greatest fear is that this law lays the groundwork for broader restrictions on civil society, free expression and human rights work. Organisations could face tighter scrutiny, activists greater risk and excluded groups even harder access to services.

To prevent further harm, we need sustained support from national, regional and international allies for community safety initiatives, emergency response, legal assistance, mental health services and the protection of human rights defenders.

International solidarity should be led by local communities and grounded in human rights. Allies should amplify local voices, back grassroots organisations and keep advocating for fundamental freedoms.

This is bigger than LGBTQI+ rights. It’s about the kind of society we want to be. Respect for human rights can’t be selective. When the rights of one group are restricted, it creates a precedent that can affect everyone.

As a queer Muslim feminist and human rights defender, I believe that dignity, freedom and safety belong to all people. The conversations happening today will shape the future of our democracy. I hope Ghana chooses compassion over fear, inclusion over exclusion and human dignity over discrimination.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Gender rights: rollback and resistance CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
Senegal: ‘The new law criminalises not only LGBTQI+ people but also anyone offering support’ CIVICUS Lens | Anonymous interview 21.May.2026
Ghana: ‘The anti-LGBTQI+ law enshrines prejudice and discrimination and perpetuates inequalities’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Solomon Atsuvia | 01.May.2024

Picture alliance / Anadolu | Magdalena Chodownik Source: International Politics and Society, Berlin

By Sandra Weiss
MEXICO CITY, Jun 29 2026 (IPS)

Ever since the Berlin Wall fell 37 years ago and the communist Eastern Bloc collapsed, Cuba has been debating economic reforms to its socialist system. Essentially, the discussion always revolves around the same issues: less state planning, more personal responsibility. In other words, a strong dose of capitalism as an antidote to inefficient and corrupt state bureaucracy.

Little has happened since then. Phases of liberalisation and opening up have been followed by phases of tightening and control. Time and again, hardliners within the party, the military and the bureaucracy have put the brakes on. The reason — the reforms fuelled inequality and resentment towards the newly wealthy privileged class. Underlying this was, above all, the fear of losing power and control, and of infiltration by the class enemy, or, in the Cuban interpretation, US imperialism.

Throwing money down a bottomless pit

Suddenly, things moved very quickly. Last week, the parliament – which had been convened in haste and with a rather incomplete quorum, as many MPs were unable to travel to Havana due to the petrol shortage – passed a 176-point reform programme which observers have described as ‘historic’ given its far-reaching implications. In the process, some of the ‘sacred cows’ of the socialist state economy are being brought down. For instance, there will be no more blanket subsidies in the future, instead, support will be targeted solely at the socially disadvantaged. This spells the end of the ‘Libreta’, the state food ration card that has granted the population access to virtually free food and hygiene products for over half a century, even though, in the face of the economic crisis, it had recently become little more than a piece of waste paper.

The second taboo to be broken is decentralisation. From now on, state-owned enterprises and provinces are to be less dependent on the central government in Havana and will be allowed to make their own decisions on staffing and wages. The absurd extremes to which this centralisation had led were captured by directors Juan Carlos Tabio and Tomás Gutiérrez Alea in their 1995 classic Guantanamera, in which a corpse had to be transported from Santiago de Cuba to Havana for burial – that is, all the way across the island, in a battle against bureaucracy.

Cuban exiles are permitted to invest directly on the island.

Private companies are finally to be permitted to operate in the agricultural sector; until now, only cooperatives had been authorised. Agriculture on the Caribbean island, once renowned for its sugar production, is now almost completely in ruins: millions of hectares of arable land lie fallow due to a lack of machinery, fertilisers, technology and labour. Cuba imports the majority of its food. Much of this comes from China, Turkey or Arab countries, but also from the neighbouring US – despite the embargoes. Private investment is now also permitted in the energy sector. The reforms will also allow individuals to own more than one private company in the future.

However, the liberalisation also targets trade, foreign investment and integration into the global economy. For example, private banks and financial institutions are to be authorised to operate in the microcredit sector. Numerous restrictions on foreign exchange transactions are being lifted. Consequently, businesses and private individuals may now open and operate foreign exchange accounts without prior authorisation. Foreign firms are permitted to select their own staff and are no longer required to go through state employment agencies. Furthermore, they are no longer obliged to enter into joint venture agreements with the state. Cuban exiles are permitted to invest directly on the island. This is intended to attract foreign investors and fresh capital.

Months ago, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had already stated that political reforms and a change in the leadership were needed – but Havana categorically rejects this.

Almost all of these reforms have been under discussion for years. Even Vietnam and China have repeatedly urged the Cuban leadership to move in this direction, because, despite their historical ties, geopolitical interests and ideological affinities, they were tired of throwing money down a bottomless pit. Fifteen years ago, whilst the island was still receiving oil in abundance from its brother nation Venezuela and the then US President Barack Obama was reaching out to the island, the circumstances would have been ideal for such a transformation.

Now, beneath the sword of Damocles of the oil embargo and the threat of US intervention, it is actually already too late: the coffers are empty, legitimacy among the population has been squandered, and the reforms can only take effect if the US plays its part, lifts its sanctions against Cuba and supports the country’s integration into the global economy. However, that is out of the question at present. The US government holds the upper hand geopolitically and wants more. Months ago, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had already stated that political reforms and a change in the leadership were needed – but Havana categorically rejects this.

The potential of democratization

The Speaker of the Cuban Parliament, José Luis Toledo, made it clear when the package was passed that ‘the reforms do not mean abandoning the state’s social role’. Washington’s reaction was correspondingly cool: the US State Department described the economic reforms as modest, too late and ‘superficial smoke signals’. This is a typical strategy to create the illusion of change, only to quickly reverse the reforms as soon as the regime’s control is threatened.

The strategies of either side are clear. Cuba is playing for time and hoping that Trump will lose the mid-term elections in the autumn, thereby losing his interest in Cuba and the backing for his stranglehold tactics. Washington will probably let Havana continue to squirm for the time being and wait to see whether words are followed by deeds – and how quickly. Meanwhile, political pressure is likely to continue to mount during the secret talks. Military intervention is not yet off the table either. This game of poker is ultimately about one thing: who dictates the terms for Cuba’s transformation.

The EU has, in fact, sidelined itself when it comes to Cuba.

So far, the Cuban people have had little say in the matter. Although protests against power cuts, water shortages and food shortages are a daily occurrence, they are swiftly and brutally suppressed. Unlike in Venezuela, there is no organised opposition on the island with charismatic leaders, a clearly defined political programme and broad support. This currently plays into the hands of the ruling elite. But this need not remain the case in the long term, especially if the reforms take hold and more and more people become independent of the state.

Transition processes in Eastern Europe have shown that civil society actors (and, unfortunately, organised crime too) know how to capitalise on the turmoil of such periods of upheaval. However, this could lead to all sorts of outcomes: permanent instability, a mafia-style oligarchic regime, or democratic structures. For the latter to emerge, however, the process – and above all the regime in Havana – would require discreet international support; at present, this seems conceivable only through countries such as Mexico and Brazil, with the backing of the UN or the Vatican.

Neither Latin America as a whole nor the EU currently has any relevant supranational structures with appropriate leaders. Quite the contrary. The EU has, in fact, sidelined itself when it comes to Cuba. Firstly, Trump’s sanctions forced most European companies to abandon their investments in and business dealings with Cuba, without Brussels doing anything to oppose this. And a few days ago, the European Parliament – with a majority of right-wing and conservative MEPs – called for sanctions against Cuba’s President Miguel Díaz-Canel and for an end to cooperation with Cuba – in other words, entirely in line with Trump’s thinking and spirit, without so much as a hint of independent ideas to defend European interests. Another small step towards geopolitical and geo-economic irrelevance.

Sandra Weiss is a political scientist and a former diplomat. A freelance journalist, Sandra writes articles about Latin America for several German newspapers, among others Die Zeit and Die Welt.

Source: International Politics and Society, published by the Global and European Policy Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin.

Excerpt:

This game of poker is ultimately about one thing — who dictates the terms for the country’s transformation.

With elections likely to be held in August, the young people in Haiti are moving ahead, creating opportunities in music and digitalization and agricultural cooperatives, which are reinventing food self-sufficiency. Credit: Shutterstock

By Xavier Michon
PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti, Jun 29 2026 (IPS)

There is a question that is never asked plainly enough in reports on Haiti: why, despite decades of analysis, billions in international aid, and an abundance of national strategies, does the potential of Haitian youth remain so consistently underutilized? This report, The Silent Transformation, is an attempt at an honest answer.

And that answer begins with an admission: for too long, we have viewed this generation as a problem to manage rather than a solution to mobilize.

Haiti is one of the youngest countries in the Western Hemisphere. More than one in two Haitians is under the age of 25. This reality should be at the heart of every policy decision, every investment strategy, every dialogue with international partners. It is not yet. And it is precisely to change this that this report exists.

We are at a turning point unlike any in the country’s recent history. For the first time since 2016, general elections are on the horizon. What may appear as an institutional milestone is, in fact, a deeply human one: an entire generation is preparing to vote for the first time. Citizens who were between 8 and 17 years old during the last general election. Since then, they have built businesses, lived through an earthquake, a pandemic, a presidential assassination and an unprecedented security crisis—and at no point during all of this were they consulted about the future of their own country.

Ten years without elections. Ten years of shaping their own lives without their institutions recognizing them as full actors. This paradox lies at the heart of this report.

Because this generation has not waited for permission to begin its transformation. It has done so on its own, in adversity, with whatever tools were within reach. And this is where the central thesis of this document lies: Haitian youth are not waiting for development. They are already producing it.

Mannitòks are inventing fintech without waiting for banks to modernize. Agricultural cooperatives are reinventing food self-sufficiency in secure areas. Coding clubs in Cap-Haïtien and Carrefour are training the next generation of developers without formal computer science schools. Designers in Pétion-Ville, musicians exporting kompa and Kreyòl rap to global platforms, DJs connecting Port-au-Prince to the diaspora, and artisans in Noailles are sustaining a cultural economy still absent from official economic radars.

These are not isolated success stories. They are signs of a structural transformation unfolding before our eyes—quietly, because we have not yet learned how to see it with the right tools.

This report is an attempt to develop those tools. It documents, analyzes, and recommends. But it also does something rarer in development literature: it shifts the perspective. It starts from the creative genius of Haitian youth and works upward toward public policy, rather than moving from policy down to beneficiaries.

This inversion is not rhetorical—it is methodological. And it changes what we see.

What it reveals is demanding for all of us. It shows that the main barrier to youth development in Haiti is not a lack of potential, but a lack of recognition of that potential. It shows that the most effective policies will not be those designed for young people, but those designed with them. And it shows, finally, that the international community—including UNDP—must embrace a new kind of humility: sometimes, to support means to step back, to remove obstacles rather than impose solutions.

UNDP supports these dynamics: we promote digital skills, access to finance and innovation ecosystems. Our initiatives—from supporting Fab Labs to advancing regulatory reforms—aim to create an environment in which youth-led enterprises can thrive. But we also know that our most valuable role is the one we build on the ground, alongside those who are already taking action. This report calls on us to listen as much as we act.

I warmly thank Group Croissance and CEDEL Haiti, whose field expertise and unwavering commitment have shaped every page of this document. Above all, I thank the young Haitians who shared their experiences, their vision and their clarity—because this is their report before it is ours.

To them, I want to say this: your determination is not only your strength—it is, objectively, the most valuable resource Haiti possesses. The upcoming election will be your first meeting with the ballot box. It will not be your last. And if this report helps ensure that this moment lives up to what you have already built without itin adversity, without permission, with unwavering ambition, then it will have achieved its essential purpose.

None of this happens in isolation. Canada has been a trusted partner in Haiti’s development journey, and its continued support for initiatives that invest in people, ideas and long-term possibilities reflects exactly the kind of partnership Haiti needs. To the Government of Canada and Global Affairs Canada: thank you. Your commitment to a Haiti defined by its potential—not only its challenges—helps make initiatives like this one possible.

The path ahead requires courage, collaboration and clear-eyed reflection on what has not worked—but above all, renewed faith in what is possible. Because while the past teaches us caution, it is the future this generation is already shaping that must guide our choices.

Let us take this path together—by letting you show the way.

XAVIER MICHON IS Resident Representative, UNDP Haiti

Source: UNDP

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Excerpt:

Haitian youth are quietly reinventing their country’s future.

Cattle Empire LLC, Satanta, Kansas, USA. Credit: Guilhem Alandry / HealthforAnimals

By Armin Wiesler
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Jun 27 2026 (IPS)

Animal disease is no longer a distant concern for farmers and veterinarians alone. It is increasingly visible in household budgets: global egg prices surged more than 60% during recent bird flu outbreaks. In South Africa, foot-and-mouth disease pushed beef prices up by 34%. These are not isolated fluctuations in price. They are reminders that when prevention falls short, families, farmers and food systems all pay the price.

Exactly 15 years ago today, the world proved there is another way. On June 28, 2011, the United Nations (UN) declared rinderpest, or “cattle plague,” eradicated. It remains the only animal disease ever wiped from the planet. For centuries, the virus had killed millions of livestock animals, devastated herds and triggered famines across continents.

The eradication campaign succeeded because science, logistics and political commitment all came together. A global prevention effort was supported by surveillance, international coordination, and an effective, heat-stable vaccine that could reach remote, tropical areas without the need for refrigeration. This turned an ancient threat into a preventable one – and then into a disease of the past.

The lesson was not only scientific. It was economic. According to estimates by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, rinderpest control cost around $610 million while the annual benefits for Africa alone amounted to $1 billion. In other words, prevention did not just save animals. It protected livelihoods, strengthened food security and paid for itself many times over.

Yet, in the past 15 years, the world has not applied that lesson more broadly or consistently enough. When outbreaks occur, the response still too often defaults to emergency measures such as culling, movement restrictions and trade disruption. Rather than rapid deployment of preventive tools like surveillance, biosecurity measures, vaccination and close international cooperation.

Lumpy skin disease is a current case in point: diagnostics, biosecurity practices and effective vaccines exist, yet many countries struggle to use them quickly enough to stop spread and limit damage. The barriers are structural. International trade rules with potential economic risk impact decision-making, even when it is a necessity. Countries may face an impossible choice: protect their animals and farmers or protect access to export markets. The result is a system that remains perpetually reactive.

Meanwhile, these diseases continue to spread. Lumpy skin disease and peste des petits ruminants (PPR) reached new regions for the first time last year, disrupting trade, harming rural communities and undermining food security. For the more than one billion people who rely on livestock for food, income and livelihoods, these are not abstract events. They have a real economic and social impact.

That is why the rinderpest eradication anniversary should be more than a moment of reflection. It should be a reminder that prevention only works when it is planned before the next emergency, not improvised during it. National preparedness remains essential, but diseases respect no borders. No country can fully control animal health threats alone.

Global collaboration is needed to improve surveillance, align incentives for vaccination, and remove the trade and policy barriers that discourage prevention. This is the role initiatives such as the World Organisation for Animal Health’s PREVENT Forum can play: bringing governments, international organizations and the private sector together to help remove the barriers that individual countries cannot on their own.

But collaboration must move beyond discussion. It should lead to practical changes: stronger investment in surveillance and diagnostics, clearer pathways for the use and recognition of vaccination, and faster access to these tools during outbreaks. The goal should not be to respond better to every crisis. It should be to prevent more crises from happening.

The past three years alone have brought outbreaks of avian influenza, bluetongue virus, foot-and-mouth disease and Newcastle disease across continents. We do not yet know which animal disease will cause the next major shock, or where it will emerge.

But rinderpest proved that the world knows how to act when science, political will and global coordination are aligned. The question is not whether prevention is possible. The question is whether we will choose to make it a priority before the next crisis strikes.

Dr Armin Wiesler is President of HealthforAnimals

IPS UN Bureau

 

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AI job exposure and risk of human jobs lost to AI. Image generated by IA

By Isabel Ortiz and Bill Shoulder
NEW YORK, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)

Artificial intelligence (AI) promises remarkable gains in productivity, science, medicine and education. But it is also poised to wipe out millions of jobs, hollow out the middle class, and drain the tax revenues that pay for hospitals, schools and pensions. The process has already begun, and the time to act is running out.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that AI will affect almost 40% of jobs worldwide. In advanced economies, around 60% of jobs are exposed and as many as one in three (33%) human jobs are at high risk of being replaced by AI. In emerging markets, about 40% are exposed, with roughly one in four (24%) at high displacement risk; and in low-income countries, an estimated 26%, with close to one in five (18%) human jobs lost to AI.

Isabel Ortiz

Job losses shrink the middle class
The most exposed jobs include many occupations long seen as the backbone of middle-class stability: clerical work, customer service, translation, journalism, legal support, financial analysis, marketing content, and even parts of software and data work. These jobs support middle-class incomes, consumer demand and, ultimately, tax-paying households, yet many are among those the IMF finds most exposed to AI.

New jobs will appear but, according to the IMF, far more are likely to vanish. The effects spread beyond the workers who lose their jobs. Wages fall, insecure work multiplies, and bargaining power collapses once employers can credibly threaten to swap workers for AI. More income flows to those who own the technology and to a handful of dominant firms, while the share reaching ordinary employees and workers shrinks.

Middle-class households are the economy’s main consumers. If their incomes fall, shops and small businesses sell less, investment slows, and closures rise. The economy can then slip into a low-growth trap of weak demand, low wages and chronic underemployment.

Falling tax revenues weaken the welfare state
The pressure then moves to public finances. Much of governments’ funding depends on the middle class: income taxes, consumption taxes and social security contributions. If wage income falls and stable employment shrinks, public revenues shrink with it. At the same time, more people need unemployment support, retraining, healthcare and income assistance. Governments then face the fiscal vise of lower revenue and higher need, a risk highlighted in the IMF’s 2026 analysis of AI, labor markets and public policy.

Bill Shoulder

Public pension systems rely on pay-as-you-go financing, where current workers fund retirees. In health, healthy people finance those who are sick. If the pool of contributors shrinks, sustainability collapses; then governments tend to cut benefits, raise charges or shift more costs onto households, as explained in the UNRISD article AI and the Future of the Social Contract.

Public services and democracy come under strain
History suggests what often comes next: austerity policies. Governments under pressure raise consumption taxes, increase user fees, tighten eligibility rules and cut public spending. When revenues weaken, education, health, care services and social protection are often treated as budget lines to be “rationalized,” even though they are human rights and indispensable public services that hold societies together. The result is a two-tier world: quality private services for the wealthy few and failing public provision for everyone else.

Economic insecurity erodes democratic trust. If people feel that work no longer provides stability, that public institutions no longer protect them, and that the gains from technology flow upward to a small elite, resentment grows. Polarization intensifies. Scapegoating becomes easier, as does the appeal of surveillance, manipulation and more authoritarian forms of control, especially when AI itself can be used to shape information and public debate.

The future is ours to shape
None of this is inevitable. As Nobel laureates Acemoglu and Johnson argue, the impact of AI depends far less on the technology than on the political and economic choices we make about how to use it. Governments can tax the windfall profits and concentrated power AI creates. With these funds, they can protect demand and guarantee income security through the transition. Governments can and should expand public services and social security as fundamental human rights. States should also give workers and citizens a real say in how AI is deployed, and regulate AI to strengthen democracy, prevent disinformation and surveillance from eroding civic trust before it is damaged beyond repair.

AI is already transforming society. The decisive question is whether democracies can ensure that its enormous gains are shared widely enough to foster prosperity for all, preserving the social contract on which stable, dignified societies depend. That choice is still ours, but not for much longer.

Isabel Ortiz, Director, Global Social Justice, was Director at the International Labor Organization (ILO) and UNICEF, and a senior official at the UN and the Asian Development Bank.

Bill Shoulder is an AI software engineer and a researcher, with a background in artificial intelligence and international project management.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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(L-R) Horacio (Luis) Carvalho, CEO of Climate Change Ventures, and Faraz Khan, MBE, at London Climate Action Week. Carvalho's firm advises on carbon mitigation and green investment projects. They signed an MOU to develop markets with Brazilian CPR Verde (green rural product certificate), a Brazilian financial credit instrument used to fund environmental preservation, forestry conservation, and carbon sequestration. The markets they are eyeing will be Saudi Arabia, Africa and Pakistan. Credit: Faraz Khan

By Zofeen Ebrahim
LONDON & KARACHI, Pakistan, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)

The 30 COP gatherings may not have done what three months of US-Israeli war against Iran did: expose the world’s vulnerability to fossil fuels.

As the world faced its biggest energy shock in a decade, the case for investing in clean energy suddenly became far more compelling.

As an intense heatwave grips Europe, with London’s Met Office issuing a “risk to life” warning and the closure of shops, offices and schools alongside disruptions to transport during the London Climate Action Week (LCAW), calls for this shift are gaining even greater momentum.

New Sense of Urgency

“The sentiment is palpable among policymakers, investors and business leaders,” conceded Faraz Khan, MBE.

A Pakistani entrepreneur and co-founder and partner of Pakistan-based Sustainadility, a technology, data and advisory firm, with over 25 years of experience in multi-stakeholder investments and in drafting environmental, sustainability and governance frameworks, is among those gathered to discuss the future of climate finance and the energy transition.

Speaking to IPS by phone on the sidelines of LCAW which closes on June 28, Khan stressed the urgency of transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy, saying the shift would not be possible without investors and businesses.

Khan described the mood at LCAW, as “optimistic” tempered by caution. He also welcomed the attention Pakistan was getting. “Our country was lauded for its efforts in brokering the peace deal,” referring to the Islamabad Memorandum between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

From Rule-Making to Seeking Investment

Comparing the two events, he said the annual Bonn climate talks, held from June 8 to 18, focused on diplomatic negotiations and climate rule-making, while LCAW, also an annual event held since 2019, centres on mobilising private investment in sustainability and ESG and scaling these initiatives commercially.

“LCAW is more business- and private sector-orientated,” said Khan, who is also the founder and director of  SeedVentures, a Pakistan-based social impact organisation and impact investor.

Still, he said: “There are two sides to the coin. On the one hand, the US-Iran peace deal and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz have shown the world that oil remains crucial for the world to exist; but, on the other, many countries recognise that dependence on fossil fuels is not in their national interest and even poses a national security risk.”

Geopolitical conflicts have exposed the vulnerabilities associated with oil production, trade and transportation, which is why investment in alternative energy is expected to accelerate.

At a COP31 presidential meeting with the private sector at LCAW, which Khan attended, the conversation revolved around the circular economy, electrification and climate finance with some of the biggest names in the global climate community, including BlackRock, the World Bank, UNIDO, the IFC and several trade organisations.

“It was a gathering of the who’s who of the climate world,” Khan said with a laugh. “Even we made the cut.”

What was missing, however, Khan said, were women in decision-making roles. He was, however, impressed by those in the Turkish COP team, praising their intellectual rigour and commanding presence in the room, which he found to be “truly impressive”.

Beyond the composition of the meetings, Khan said the discussions themselves reflected a growing determination to move beyond rhetoric.

There was a strong sense in the room that a new precedent was about to be set by shifting the focus from negotiations to implementation, investment and action.

“Governments can create an enabling environment and UN frameworks can provide the rules, but ultimately it is investors, bankable projects and big businesses that will drive change,” he said.

While the Bonn climate talks focused on regulatory frameworks, LCAW’s focus is on climate finance and transactions, he noted. “And at Antalya, where the COP31 will be held this November, it will be about putting money where our mouths are—deploying capital into bankable projects and creating collaborative investment vehicles to scale climate action,” said Khan.

Private Sector Takes Centre Stage

He also observed that China was frequently cited as a global leader in clean energy investment.

“Across the various meetings, I sensed a strong and growing appetite for investment in renewable energy, and I believe this momentum will only accelerate,” he said.

Large businesses and institutions, he added, would be critical to delivering a just transition because their extensive operations and community links give them the reach needed to drive meaningful change.

The emphasis on electrification and reducing dependence on fossil fuels was echoed by Türkiye’s COP31 leadership.

Earlier this month, speaking to The Guardian on the sidelines of the climate talks in Bonn, Murat Kurum, Türkiye’s environment minister, said the 35% target would be “one of the defining priorities” of the COP31 presidency.

“By electrifying daily life, from transport to buildings and industry, we can protect families and businesses from volatile energy markets,” he told the media outlet.

Khan believed Pakistan has an opportunity to position itself at the forefront of this transition.

While Pakistan is frequently showcased as a victim of climate disasters, despite contributing less than 1% of global greenhouse gas emissions, Khan said the global focus on solar should also shine a light on the country’s “silent solar revolution”, which has transformed its investment landscape.

“Pakistan has become a global example of how solar adoption can evolve rapidly, opening up substantial investment opportunities in solar manufacturing and battery production,” he said, adding that modernising the grid and scaling up utility-scale energy storage have become increasingly urgent.

Investing in Nature

Beyond renewable energy, Khan saw significant opportunities in nature-based investments.

Khan said Pakistan’s rich biodiversity—from mangroves and forests to wetlands, rangelands and mountain ecosystems—offers enormous investment potential, with private capital capable of both restoring and protecting these natural assets.

Agriculture accounts for a large share of Pakistan’s economy and is a major driver of biodiversity loss. He said private businesses could invest in regenerative agriculture, agroforestry and sustainable rice and cotton production, either to meet sustainability goals or as part of emerging biodiversity credit markets.

“Just as there are carbon credits, there are biodiversity credits, and these are directly linked to food security and agriculture,” Khan said. Given agriculture’s central role in Pakistan’s economy, he argued that the country holds enormous potential for biodiversity credits. “I think this is going to be truly phenomenal because it presents enormous investment opportunities,” he said.

But realising this potential will depend on Pakistan’s ability to attract sustained private investment.

Investment Challenges

Sadly, there are few takers.

Khan said Pakistan’s high sovereign risk remains the biggest obstacle to attracting international climate investment at scale, although recent policy reforms, including the Pakistan Green Taxonomy, green banking guidelines and ESG standards, have improved investor confidence.

He also pointed to a shortage of bankable projects, with many failing to attract global investors despite their strong fundamentals. Still, he said, the investment potential remains enormous.

Yet time may be of the essence.

If the recent turmoil in the Middle East exposed the world’s vulnerability to fossil fuels, Khan believes it also underscored the urgency of accelerating the clean energy transition. For Pakistan, he said, the opportunity is immense—but only if the country can create the conditions needed to attract the investment required to realise it.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Credit: Jaime Saldarriaga/AFP

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)

On 21 June Colombians made their choice. By the narrowest of margins, Abelardo de la Espriella, a far-right criminal lawyer who’s never held elected office, became president-elect. Climate activists, human rights defenders, Indigenous communities and peace advocates have the most to lose from the incoming government’s agenda.

The election results follow the logic of a decade of deepening polarisation. Since the 2016 Peace Accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia began a contested and incomplete transition away from armed conflict, Colombian society has divided into two mutually hostile blocs. The election further revealed that no middle ground remains between them. The mainstream right is gone, its candidate receiving a humiliating 6.3 per cent of the first-round vote, and a new right, harsher and less constrained by institutional norms, has taken its place.

Peace agreement in trouble

Nothing divided the two runoff candidates more starkly than the 2016 Peace Accord. Iván Cepeda, the candidate backed by outgoing leftist President Gustavo Petro, is a long-time human rights advocate and senator, and chairs the Senate’s Peace and Post-Conflict Commission. He ran on a ‘comprehensive peace’ platform focused on addressing the structural roots of violence, including land access, inequality and the absence of state services in rural areas.

In contrast, De la Espriella said there would be no peace process under his watch, proposing instead to resume aerial bombardment of armed groups and reinstate herbicide fumigation of coca crops, a practice with well-documented environmental and public health consequences.

According to figures from Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office, the six-decade conflict caused over 1.1 million killings and more than 200,000 enforced disappearances, while over nine million were forcibly displaced. That record, and the significant progress made since 2016, will now be judged expendable by a government that regards the accords as illegitimate.

For the communities living in territories where armed groups overlap with extractive industries, this is no abstract policy debate. Human rights organisations have warned that a return to a full military offensive will be devastating for civilian populations, particularly the environmental defenders and Indigenous communities who already face lethal threats. Colombia is the world’s deadliest country for environmental and land rights defenders. It’s likely about to get worse.

Cutting the human rights lifeline

De la Espriella also proposes to part ways with the international human rights architecture that has provided Colombia’s victims with a path to justice. On the campaign trail, he announced his intention to withdraw from ‘useless’ international organisations including the UN and the Organization of American States, and denounced the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as ‘a farce’ that has served only to ‘support the left and persecute our security forces’.

In Colombia’s conflict-ridden territories where Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities continue to experience massacres and displacement, international monitoring bodies are often the only source of independent verification that violence is happening. The American Convention on Human Rights, which Colombia ratified in 1973, is embedded in the country’s constitutional framework, shaping the interpretation of fundamental rights across the legal system.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has hundreds of cases involving Colombia. In December 2024, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found the state responsible for the 1995 enforced disappearance of two human rights defenders. Their families waited almost three decades for closure, and only got it because they turned to the regional system when domestic institutions failed them. Now that route could be closed.

What the results mean

Colombia’s change of direction could have global repercussions. Just weeks before the election, Colombia hosted the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, bringing together 57 states alongside civil society and scientists frustrated by the repeated failure of UN climate summits to deliver binding commitments on fossil fuel phase-out. Under Petro, renewable energy grew from two per cent to around 16 per cent of the energy mix, and Colombia issued no new contracts for fossil fuel exploration.

That era ends when de la Espriella takes office on 7 August. He frames fossil fuel expansion as a fiscal imperative and calls for the immediate legalisation of fracking, currently banned by judicial moratorium. Since the country includes significant parts of the Amazon rainforest, the climate impacts won’t be limited to Colombia.

Ultimately, De la Espriella did not win for his positions on peace, climate or human rights. He won on security and the promise of order. Calling himself ‘The Tiger’, he modelled his campaign on the populist template of Argentina’s President Javier Milei and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, vowing to shrink the state, build megaprisons and combat corruption with tools normally reserved for organised crime. The movement he founded, Defenders of the Homeland, carried Donald Trump’s public backing. The combination proved effective in a country exhausted by decades of violence where many are deeply sceptical of the left’s ability to deliver safety.

The far-right candidate converted legitimate grievances about insecurity into a mandate to dismantle the peace process, reverse climate commitments and withdraw from the international human rights architecture. The consequences will be felt most acutely by those his campaign never meant to speak to.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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Credit: Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/IMF Photo

By Chie Aoyagi, Maurizio Leonardi, Athene Laws and Hamza Mighri
WASHINGTON DC, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)

For decades, official development assistance has been a central pillar of financing in sub-Saharan Africa. That pillar is now weakening—quickly and broadly.

In 2025, bilateral aid to the region fell sharply, with early estimates pointing to cuts of about 26 percent in a single year. Multilateral support is also under pressure, with major institutions projecting sizeable budget reductions. More cuts may follow as donors reset priorities in a shifting geopolitical environment.

As we explain in chapter 2 of the IMF’s recent Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, this is not a routine fluctuation. It is hitting countries that have limited room to adjust and few alternative sources of financing.

Why aid matters

Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest aid dependency globally in 2024. On average, aid accounted for 3 percent of GDP at the regional level. But that average hid sharp differences. In low-income countries and fragile states, aid often reached the equivalent of 6 percent of GDP or more, and in some cases far higher.

Over half of that aid was used to finance essential services such as health, education, and humanitarian assistance. And because development partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often deliver services directly to people in need, aid cuts can also curtail the very systems that people rely on. Effective responses to crises such as the Ebola emergency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the high and rising needs of people forcibly displaced by conflict, and the ongoing drought in the Horn of Africa rely heavily on the health and humanitarian infrastructure that aid has consistently helped to build.

A different reality

Aid flows have always fluctuated. But this episode stands apart.

The recent cuts are large and broadly simultaneous across countries. They are driven by donor decisions rather than changes in recipient economies. And they come at a time when traditional buffers are weaker: multilateral institutions and NGOs, which have often cushioned past declines, are themselves facing funding constraints. While non-traditional donors, such as China and the Gulf States, have grown their aid presence in the region, the magnitudes are not able to cover the reduction in traditional donors.

The cuts are also difficult to manage because they follow six years of successive shocks—including the pandemic, tighter global financial conditions, and food and energy crises—that have already eroded fiscal space.

Tough trade-offs

Governments now face difficult choices. Many have limited fiscal space, rising debt, and low reserves.

IMF-administered surveys covering 28 African countries suggest four broad policy responses:

o Some governments are not replacing lost aid, allowing programs to lapse. This limits immediate fiscal strain but carries high social costs.
o Many are reprioritizing spending, often cutting public investment—easier politically, but damaging to future growth.
o Others are borrowing more, including domestically, increasing debt risks.
o Some are stepping up revenue mobilization, though results take time.

Each option comes with trade-offs. Replacing lost aid can protect services and growth, but at the cost of wider deficits and external imbalances. Not replacing it stabilizes budgets and protects debt sustainability, but risks lasting damage to human capital and development.

There are no easy choices.

How to respond

The policy challenge is to manage the adjustment while preserving core development gains. Three priorities stand out.

First, protect and target high-impact aid.
With resources scarce, allocation matters more. Aid should be directed toward the countries and sectors where it has the greatest effect—especially low-income countries and fragile states, and essential humanitarian needs. Stronger coordination can reduce fragmentation and avoid duplication.

Second, broaden the financing toolkit.
Grant financing will remain essential, particularly in humanitarian contexts. But other instruments can play a larger role. Blended finance—using public funds to mobilize private investment—can help expand financing for infrastructure, energy, and agriculture. It is not a substitute for aid: it is harder to scale, more complex, and can add to debt if poorly designed. Managing these trade-offs will be critical.

Third, strengthen domestic capacity.
With aid less predictable, resilience increasingly depends on domestic institutions. This means mobilizing more revenue, improving spending efficiency, and strengthening policy design and service delivery. Aid has often provided both funding and implementation; replacing that capacity will take time and sustained investment.

A turning point

The shift that began in 2025 is unlikely to be temporary. It reflects a broader reconfiguration of development finance, shaped by tighter donor budgets and changing priorities.

The implications will vary by country, depending on exposure, initial buffers, and policy choices. But the direction is clear: reliance on external aid will become more uncertain, and domestic policy will matter more.

The immediate task is to manage the decline in aid without backsliding on the significant human development achievements of the past decades. The longer-term challenge is to adapt to a world where aid is less abundant and less predictable. How countries navigate both will shape growth and development outcomes for years to come.

Chie Aoyagi, Maurizio Leonardi, and Athene Laws are economists in the IMF’s African Department, where Hamza Mighri is a research analyst.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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As the afternoon sun casts a golden glow over Mukwiro village on Wasini Island on Kenya’s Indian Ocean South Coast, Mwanasiti Mwalola, 26 and Mzungu Mohammed Dhossa, 45, stand at the community fish landing site, carefully receiving baskets of freshly caught fish from returning fishers. A weighing scale hangs before them, with a pen and […]

By Appolinaire Djikeng
NAIROBI, Kenya, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)

Smallholder farmers in Africa and Asia are likely to still be reeling from the fuel and fertilizer crisis caused by conflict in the Middle East when what forecasters expect to be a “super” El Niño arrives later this year.

Appolinaire Djikeng

When climate extremes and conflict converge to cause crop harvests to fail, livestock will once again offer a resilient source of nutrition, organic fertilizer and incomes. But the confluence of shocks will nevertheless reverberate worldwide in everything from global food supply chains to increased migration and social tensions.

Consensus is increasingly clear that tackling climate change to avert such crises is a legal duty under international law. Bringing down emissions requires both short-term and long-term action. And yet one of the most effective levers available — sustainable livestock farming — receives just 1 to 2 per cent of climate finance dedicated to agriculture. That is a vanishingly small share for a sector that, in many low- and middle-income countries, accounts for as much as 80 per cent of agricultural GDP.

This funding gap matters because livestock offer something relatively rare in climate policy: the chance to cut emissions fast while also building resilience. Methane is a more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide over the short term, which means reducing it delivers quicker climate benefits.

Cattle and other livestock are among the primary sources of methane emissions. But crucially, both direct and indirect methane emissions from livestock production are often higher than necessary because of the same factors that hold back productivity. Poor animal health, low quality feed and nutrition, and climate stress all undermine production and increase both direct emissions and emission intensity. Tackling these fundamental factors solves both challenges.

In Ethiopia, for example, poor animal health has been found to increase livestock emissions by 50 per cent while also resulting in lower meat, milk and egg yields. Parasites and other vector-borne diseases increase the methane produced in animals’ guts while stunting growth and development.

Simply by applying existing tools to improve animal health, such as vaccines, drugs that kill parasites and good nutrition, research suggests that emissions could be conservatively reduced by at least 15 per cent per unit of output. The same interventions also increase productivity and improve livelihoods.

New research is also uncovering new opportunities to reduce methane from livestock while also boosting productivity and resilience.

Scientists from CGIAR research centres and partners have analysed nearly 300 forage samples and found that varieties of African clover, cowpea and lablab could reduce methane emissions by up to 90 per cent. These plants contain compounds that alter the microbes in cows’ stomachs and block the process that generates methane.

Testing is now under way to identify varieties that could be grown as low-methane feed, which not only helps reduce emissions but also supports local seed systems.

Restoring rangelands adds another layer: it helps improve forage availability to support better animal nutrition, lower methane emissions and build stronger ecosystems. Last year, for example, participatory rangeland management (PRM) was strengthened across 340,000 hectares in Ethiopia and 50,000 hectares in Tanzania, improving rangeland health and supporting livestock production.

Many more solutions exist to improve livestock sustainability for short-term and long-term gains, including those developed by the Livestock and Climate Solutions Hub. But despite growing evidence of impact from livestock interventions, climate finance continues to flow elsewhere, away from the agricultural systems that hundreds of millions of people depend on most directly.

In a post-aid world, directing more climate finance towards sustainable livestock farming in low- and middle-income countries is an investment in global stability.

Investing in more sustainable livestock production has a ripple effect that improves food security, livelihoods, and economic growth and contributes to greater stability and resilience in the face of shocks like the “super” El Niño.

Climate vulnerability is costly. Building resilience through the primary sectors of low- and middle-income countries is an insurance against future crises.

Prof. Appolinaire Djikeng is Director General of the International Livestock Research Institute

IPS UN Bureau

 

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By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Nurina Malek
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Jun 26 2026 (IPS)

Leadership of the Global South has gradually declined since the 1980s. Many hope BRICS+ will fill the vacuum, but its purpose and membership suggest such hopes may be misplaced. A repurposed Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) offers the best way forward.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Golden Age
The post-World War Two (WW2) Keynesian ‘Golden Age’ saw significant postwar reconstruction and post-colonial development, especially in South Asia.

In 1964, developing countries formed the G77 caucus and created the UN Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) within the UN system.

In 1974, the UN General Assembly called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) after President Nixon ended the 1944 Bretton Woods international monetary system in 1971.

In 1979, the US Fed responded to Western stagflation by sharply raising interest rates. This triggered fiscal and sovereign debt crises in Latin America and Africa, forcing many to seek IMF emergency funds to cope.

Meanwhile, the Thatcher-Reagan-inspired counter-revolution against Keynesian and development economics led to ‘neoliberal’ Washington Consensus policy reforms, deepening economic contraction.

At New York’s Plaza Hotel, the US got its G7 caucus of the world’s 7 largest allied economies to address its overvalued dollar by requiring the currencies of Japan and Germany to appreciate sharply.

Nurina Malek

G7-encouraged financial liberalisation, especially the IMF-promoted opening of national capital accounts in the 1990s, increased the frequency and impact of crises.

With its legitimacy at stake following the East Asian, Russian, and other financial crises of 1997-99, G7 finance ministers agreed in 1999 to create a more inclusive G20 grouping of finance ministers of the world’s 20 largest economies.

Soon after the 2008 global (actually Western) financial crisis began, the first G20 leaders’ summit convened in the White House in November 2008.

Making BRICS
‘BRICs’ was coined in late 2001 by then-Goldman Sachs Global Economic Research head Jim O’Neill, referring to Brazil, Russia, India, and China.

Ostensibly to include Africa, the BRICs invited South Africa to join, creating BRICS as a coalition of the five more independent large ‘emerging market’ economies.

Also serving as a caucus within the G20, BRICS has tried to improve international monetary and financial relations. It has since admitted more nations into an expanded BRICS+ with two tiers of affiliation.

To be sure, neither BRICS nor BRICS+ was ever intended to represent the even more diverse interests of the entire Global South. Understandably, it serves its ‘financially significant’ developing economy members.

BRICS and the South
The BRICS promise a world less dominated by the rich and powerful nations of the Global North, mainly in the West.

The world has been dominated by the US since the end of WW2, and especially after the first Cold War. Despite occasional dissent, the US’s European NATO allies seem happy playing second fiddle.

Many developing countries have long felt that existing arrangements do not serve their best interests. The BRICS seem to offer some ‘voice’ and alternative bases for international economic cooperation.

BRICS has undoubtedly strengthened the Global South’s voice and developed new arrangements to support developing country interests, especially to finance development.

The BRICS have also advocated on specific international issues for the Global South. All five BRICS countries have also led developing-country groupings on specific issues with varying degrees of success.

Unsurprisingly, many developing countries appreciate the BRICS role in such matters, with some choosing to publicly align with and even affiliate with it.

However, the BRICS expansion into BRICS+ is unlikely to resolve many problems faced by developing nations due to international power asymmetries and imbalances.

Potential and problems
The diversity of the Global South complicates any grouping’s claim to represent it.

BRICS+ brings together countries with very different political and economic systems, priorities and aspirations, including development goals and interests.

This diversity enhances BRICS’ broad appeal but also makes it difficult to ensure it becomes an effective platform consistently advocating all developing nations’ interests.

This challenge becomes more apparent when the interests and ambitions of weaker developing countries are compared with those of the major BRICS+ powers.

Many vulnerable nations are preoccupied with food security, structural change, deindustrialisation, environmental sustainability, planetary heating, and financialization.

Meanwhile, BRICS members seek to pursue their own strategic interests, garner finance and investments, boost their exports and increase their influence internationally.

Such objectives are not inherently contradictory, but rarely fully aligned. This makes it more difficult to pursue shared interests, advocate collectively, and sustain cooperation.

BRICS+ membership by invitation also limits its effective accountability to the Global South. It is unrealistic to expect BRICS+ to consistently advocate for the full range of concerns of all developing countries, especially the poorest and least influential.

The Global South should undoubtedly try to benefit from the economic weight and voice of BRICS+. But it can best advance its shared interests with its own voice and organised strength via a revived NAM, repurposed for peace, development and justice.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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As of now, geopolitics overtook trade policy uncertainty as the primary concern for countries. Credit: Unsplash / Sajimon Sahadevan

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 25 2026 (IPS)

Amidst increased geopolitical tensions, the risk of volatile energy markets, trade corridors, and regional stability in the Middle East has garnered more attention than trade policy in terms of its power to alter the global economy, according to new findings from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

In their report on trade and development, “Global Economy Faces a Geopolitical Challenge”, UNCTAD says that a protracted escalation “raises the likelihood of deeper disruptions in global trade and finance, potentially, foreshadowing a cascading crisis”.

Credit: UN Conference on Trade and Development (Trade and Development Foresights 2026)

Daily crude oil prices in the Middle East since the beginning of the conflict have risen from around USD 60-70, to a fluctuating rate between a high of over USD 110-. With oil prices surging more than 60 percent, and gas doubling in price, many markets have been left in an inflating scenario as higher energy prices increase macroeconomic pressure and overall slow and contract the economy.

The increase per barrel is largely due to a constriction of supply, where most Gulf economies can barely output oil due to a lack of transport ability through the strait of Hormuz. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) records a spike in the price of Brent crude rising over USD 100 per barrel and remaining at elevated levels, with European gas also jumping roughly “60 percent amid disruptions to LNG exports”.

The numbers are impacted by an estimated loss of capacity of 10 million barrels per day of oil and “about 500 million cubic meters per day of natural gas”. This is roughly 10 percent of global oil production, and roughly 5 percent of global natural gas production for every single day.

The IMF records the following:

Daily Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz (in number of vessels) between 26 February and 6 April 2026. Credit: IMF

Oil being an inelastic good means that consumers won’t be able to curb their spending. Rather, they have to pay more for as long as the conflict lasts as fuels are needed for many essential routine tasks, from driving your car, to taking your vitamins, to growing your food, and having your Amazon packages shipped.

In their April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook Update for the Middle East and Central Asia, the IMF details that a continued conflict will likely for every 10 percent rise in the average oil price lead to a loss of about 0.5 percent of GDP and an inflation increase of around 1 percent in Gulf economies, ultimately affecting global markets heavily.

As the report notes, “Longer trade disruptions or greater damage to oil production capacity raises the possibility of higher and more sustained oil prices and a larger risk premium than is currently embedded in oil futures prices”.

However, for developing countries higher energy prices hit a lot harder to consumers in developing countries, which in this case don’t have the same money to spare. The IMF warns that “Low-income countries and other fragile and conflict-affected states in the MENAP region are especially vulnerable to higher energy, fertilizer, and food prices”.

Due to the conflict, estimates stand that vulnerable economies, mostly least developed countries (16.1 billion) and small island developing states (4.3 billion), could incur a USD 20 billion a year increase in spending, representing a huge composition of their GDP expenditure.

Among least-developed nations, Mauritania is recorded to have their bill increase by 7.3 percent, The Gambia 6.3 percent, Burkina Faso 5.0 percent, Liberia and Zambia 4.3 percent, with 17 other least developed countries also estimating to increase their spending by at least 0.5 percent in terms of GDP points.

Similarly for small-island developing states, Vanuatu is recorded to have an increase of 5.8 percent, Maldives 5.2 percent, Tonga 4.4 percent, Mauritius 4.2 percent, and Fiji 3.2 percent, with 18 other small developing states recording an increase of at least 0.6%.

UNCTAD also expects this conflict to take away capital investment into developing nations, as these assets are perceived as riskier. The UNCTAD report states that “the start of the Middle East conflict triggered a sell-off of developing countries’ assets, with equity markets of emerging markets sliding by more than 12 per cent between 28 February and 29 March.” Likely such effects will trigger a compacting of issues, contributing to an economic downturn that could take years to recover from depending on the length of the conflict.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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When agricultural crops are lost to flooding, food costs rise, food systems are weakened, and our ability to meet our food security needs is threatened. Credit: Shutterstock

By Esther Ngumbi and Christy Gibson
URBANA, Illinois, US, Jun 25 2026 (IPS)

Across the United States, record breaking extreme weather events have already occurred, including severe storms and Tornadoes in the State of Illinois to flooding in Texas, southern Wisconsin and the South. Throughout the summer, and the remainder of the growing season, additional severe weather events will come through including several hurricanes and tropical storms beginning with Tropical Storm Arthur.

While the impacts of severe weather on people, communities, and infrastructure dominate headlines, the damage flooding inflicts on agricultural systems, crop productivity, and food security often goes unnoticed and underestimated.

Equally concerning is the noticeable lack of focused dialogue among researchers, policymakers, and other key stakeholders in agricultural crop production and food systems, including farmers, about whether current best management practices and innovations are keeping pace with efforts to mitigate the negative impacts of severe weather and flooding on agriculture.

The impacts of flooding on crops and soils, as well as the beneficial web of microbes, can persist long after floodwaters have receded. Research shows that even after floodwaters have receded, plants continue to grow slowly and remain highly vulnerable to pests and diseases, further exacerbating crop damage and yield losses

Flooding can affect agricultural crops, including corn and vegetables like tomatoes, in many ways. These effects range from altered growth patterns and the wiping out of millions of acres of crops to tons of unsellable vegetables due to potential contamination from floodwaters.

I have seen this firsthand in my research at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. In just a few days, due to a lack of oxygen, crops like tomatoes and corn visibly stop growing, and when flooding is severe, they suffocate to death.

Belowground, flooding is also harmful to beneficial soil microbes that provide many benefits to plants, including improving nutrient availability and uptake, fixing nitrogen, promoting growth, boosting resilience to biotic and abiotic threats, and improving soil health and fertility.

By harming beneficial microbes and other organisms, including earthworms, flooding can disrupt the belowground ecosystem that sustains healthy soils, crop growth, resilient agricultural production systems, and food security.

Disturbingly, the impacts of flooding on crops and soils, as well as the beneficial web of microbes, can persist long after floodwaters have receded. Research shows that even after floodwaters have receded, plants continue to grow slowly and remain highly vulnerable to pests and diseases, further exacerbating crop damage and yield losses.

Alarmingly, current studies show that agricultural losses from flooding do parallel those caused by drought, and future projections indicate that the intensity, frequency, and severity of flooding events will continue to increase.

Ultimately, flooding causes systemic issues and disruptions across food systems, affecting all stakeholders connected to agriculture, a trillion-dollar industry.  These impacts that come along with flooding can increase food costs, trigger higher insurance claims, and place additional mental burden on farmers and agricultural workers.

The question then becomes: What can be done to prepare for this future? What best practices and innovations can be implemented? What can farmers, researchers, policymakers, and all stakeholders in agriculture do to ensure that the crops we depend on to meet food security, along with the practices and flooding mitigating innovations in place, can withstand flooding?

First, there is a need for more investment in flooding research in the United States and globally. Compared with drought, we know far less about the full extent of flood impacts on agricultural crops, from the onset of flooding through the post-flood recovery phase.

Additionally, we do not know whether the current best management practices and innovations that farmers are deploying to cope with flooding are effective.

Investing in research will enable researchers to build a comprehensive understanding of flood impacts on plants, soils, and microbiomes in current and projected future climates, while uncovering the many strategies plants use to resist, adapt, and thrive.

Notably, our understanding of flooding impacts to crops, microbes, agroecosystems, and agricultural productivity remains siloed and fragmented across disciplines. Yet flooding impacts span multiple disciplines, including plant biology, entomology, agronomy, microbial and soil ecology, predictive modelling, and climate systems biology and engineering.

Arguably, there is a need to collaborate across disciplines to develop a more integrated and holistic understanding of how flooding affects crops and agroecosystems. In doing so, we will advance scientific knowledge and lay the groundwork for developing solutions to address and conquer flooding and its negative impacts on agriculture.

Necessarily so, there is an urgent need to conduct field-based research across a spectrum of climates, soils, and management practices. Although researchers have made great strides in building foundational knowledge about flooding impacts on crops, most of this research has been conducted in controlled settings, primarily in greenhouses.

To capture the complexity and inherent variability of agricultural systems, soils, and environments, field experiments are necessary. These experiments can offer insights and help determine the factors that determine crop resilience.

A metric of success for researchers is collaborating with farmers and using farms as living laboratories to understand flooding and co-build flooding solutions. These collaborations offer many benefits, as farmers are the ones who suffer most, but also have on the ground intelligence that research may not have.

When researchers and farmers co-build solutions, the resulting insights, solutions, and innovations become more practical, trusted, and embraced by farmers and in turn, these can be quickly integrated and translated into the suite of strategies and solutions farmers are deploying to mitigate flooding.

Research alone would still not go very far. Policymakers, governments, philanthropists, the private sector, and the media are equally needed if we are to make strides in addressing flooding and its negative impacts.

Media outlets such as NBC, CNN, local TV news channels, and major outlets, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today, and The News-Gazette, can expand public understanding of flooding by discussing and sharing the rarely highlighted consequences of flooding for agricultural production. Greater visibility can raise awareness and highlight the need to invest in flooding research.

In the end, we cannot solve a problem we do not fully understand. Only by acknowledging and demonstrating the impacts of flooding through research and having the media and other stakeholders share widely about the consequenses of severe weather including flooding on agriculture can we begin to identify the sustainable short- and long-term solutions needed to protect our agricultural systems.

When agricultural crops are lost to flooding, food costs rise, food systems are weakened, and our ability to meet our food security needs is threatened. It’s time to paint a realistic picture of flooding and acknowledge its full impact. In doing so, we can begin to develop solutions that help us withstand flooding and the extreme weather-related challenges ahead. Time is of the essence.

Esther Ngumbi, PhD is Assistant Professor, Department of Entomology, African American Studies Department, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Christy Gibson is an Illinois Distinguished Postdoctoral Scholar in the Department of Crop Sciences at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, where she studies how floods and droughts reshape farming systems and the ecosystems that sustain them.