European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Micaela Del Monte.

In December 2019, Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (hereafter ‘the directive’) entered into force. Member States had 2 years to transpose the directive into their domestic legal systems. Prior to the entry into force of the directive, the legal framework was fragmented at national level and limited in scope to specific sectors at EU level (i.e. financial services and transport safety). Transposition did not prove easy, and the European Commission was obliged to open infringement procedures against a number of Member States.

The directive came into force after major cases of whistle-blowing (Panama Papers, Dieselgate, Wikileaks, Luxleaks, Cambridge Analytica) drew strong public attention to the situation of those who reveal misconduct and malpractice in public and private entities. Those who ‘blow the whistle’, and also their colleagues and their relatives, can face retaliation and suffer both economic and reputational harm. Fear of retaliatory measures can foster a culture of silence, with a dissuasive effect on individuals who are willing to report unlawful practices (‘chilling effect’).

The EU legislator has recognised the positive impact of whistle-blowers who act as public watchdogs. They promote a culture where speaking out is not penalised and where disclosing information in the public interest increases transparency, improves integrity and ensures public accountability. Whistle-blowers help the public to access accurate information on matters of public concern.

Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that legislation alone is not enough, a cultural change in the workplace will also be necessary to ensure that those blowing the whistle are not stigmatised and do not suffer social, professional and personal repercussions. 

Read the complete briefing on ‘Protecting whistle-blowers in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the President to protest against the Willow oil-drilling project in Alaska. Citizens expressed concern that the project could be detrimental to the climate and to the rights of indigenous people in Alaska. They called on the European Parliament to adopt a resolution asking the United States Government to respect the rights of indigenous people.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the European Parliament and its President on this matter (in English and German).

Main points made in the reply in English European Parliament position

In a resolution on the Arctic of October 2021, the European Parliament stresses that Arctic exploration and exploitation of natural resources should adhere to international law and comply with stringent precautionary environmental standards. The protection of the environment should be a key objective. The European Parliament ‘discourages the exploitation of Arctic resources if it is scientifically proven to cause irreparable damage to the ecosystem of the Arctic and beyond’.

As regards the Paris Climate Agreement and human rights, the European Parliament’s October 2022 resolution emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems to achieve the Paris Agreement objectives. It also stresses the importance of safeguarding and strengthening human rights and the rights of indigenous peoples in this context.

EU Arctic policy

As part of its Arctic policy, the European Union (EU) intends to push for oil, coal and gas to remain in the ground, building on partial moratoriums on fossil fuel exploration in the Arctic. The EU also supports comprehensive, inclusive and sustainable development of the Arctic regions for the benefit of current inhabitants and future generations, with a particular emphasis on the needs of indigenous peoples, women and young people.

Further information is available in the European Commission’s press release and on the dedicated questions and answers webpage.

European Union Diplomatic Service and EU foreign policy

Regarding the United States’ plans to proceed with the Willow oil-drilling project in Alaska, diplomatic relations between the EU and non-EU countries are not directed by the European Parliament, but rather by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EU has a Delegation to the United States of America, which promotes EU policies in the United States. In foreign policy, the EU’s ultimate decision-making body is the European Council, comprised of EU countries’ heads of state or government.  

Main points made in the reply in German Standpunkt des Europäischen Parlaments

In einer Entschließung zur Arktis vom 21. Oktober 2021 betont das Europäische Parlament, dass bei der Exploration und Gewinnung natürlicher Ressourcen in der Arktis das Völkerrecht sowie strenge vorbeugende Umweltstandards eingehalten werden sollten. Der Umweltschutz sollte ein zentrales Ziel sein. Das Parlament „rät davon ab, die Ressourcen in der Arktis auszubeuten, wenn es wissenschaftlich erwiesen ist, dass dadurch für das Ökosystem in der Arktis und darüber hinaus ein nicht wiedergutzumachender Schaden entsteht’.

Was das Klimaschutzübereinkommen von Paris und die Menschenrechte betrifft, hat das Europäische Parlament in einer Entschließung vom Oktober 2022 unterstrichen, dass es wichtig ist, die Natur und die Ökosysteme zu schützen, zu erhalten und wiederherzustellen, um die Ziele des Übereinkommens von Paris zu verwirklichen. Das Parlament hob dabei auch hervor, dass dies mit dem Schutz und der Stärkung der Menschenrechte und der Rechte indigener Völker einhergehen muss.

Die Arktis-Politik der Europäischen Union (EU)

Im Rahmen ihrer Arktis-Politik setzt sich die EU dafür ein, dass Erdöl, Kohle und Erdgas auch in den arktischen Regionen im Boden bleiben, wobei sie sich auf die partiellen Moratorien für die Exploration von Kohlenwasserstoffen in der Arktis stützt. Die EU unterstützt außerdem eine inklusive und nachhaltige Entwicklung der arktischen Regionen zum Nutzen ihrer Bewohner und künftiger Generationen, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bedürfnisse der indigenen Bevölkerung, von Frauen und jungen Menschen.

Weitere Informationen finden Sie in der Pressemitteilung der Europäischen Kommission und in der Webseite mit Fragen und Antworten zum Thema.

Der Auswärtige Dienst der Europäischen Union und die EU-Außenpolitik

Im Zusammenhang mit den Plänen der Vereinigten Staaten, das Willow-Erdölförderprojekt in Alaska voranzutreiben, ist anzumerken, dass die diplomatischen Beziehungen der EU mit Drittstaaten nicht vom Europäischen Parlament, sondern vom Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst (EAD) geleitet werden. Die EU betreibt eine Delegation in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (in englischer Sprache), die die Politik der EU in den Vereinigten Staaten vorantreibt. In letzter Instanz werden Entscheidungen über die Außenpolitik der EU vom Europäischen Rat getroffen, der sich aus den Staats- und Regierungschefs der EU-Länder zusammensetzt.

Written by Karin Jacobs.

Did you know a total 37 000 navigable kilometres connect 13 European Union (EU) countries? These inland waterways play an important role in transporting goods in Europe. As part of the EU effort to reduce CO2 emissions from transport, the European Commission proposes to accelerate the shift of freight transport to less polluting and more energy efficient modes, such as the inland shipping sector, under the European Green Deal and the EU’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy. Unlike the European road network, there is also sufficient waterway capacity to cope with an increase in traffic.

However, to play its role to the full, the inland waterways transport sector needs to overcome certain challenges to becoming greener, digital and climate resilient. These include protecting waterways from the effects of flooding and drought, which have happened frequently in Europe in recent years. Inland waterway vessels therefore need to become ‘smart’, and infrastructure, including in ports, needs to be improved. Greater investment is also needed in digital technologies, as well as ensuring there is a sufficient and qualified workforce. The European NAIADES III programme (2021-2027) supports these objectives and reforms, aiming at better navigability and setting ports as multimodal hubs and providers of alternative fuels, as promoted under the EU’s Fit for 55 package, the building block for the Green Deal.

The European Parliament strongly supports the decarbonisation of transport through this modal shift. In its most recent resolution, Parliament demands the establishment of dedicated EU funding for the inland waterways transport sector, as well as the creation of a framework of rules to support inter-modality and improve connections between national waterways. Parliament’s focus on the shift from road to inland waterways and the development of a future-proof inland waterways transport system includes making ports energy hubs, ensuring better working conditions for personnel and stimulating urban transport. Parliament has insisted that funding match the EU’s ambitions for cleaner transport.

During its April 2023 plenary session, Parliament also took important decisions on the Fit for 55 package. These add to those taken earlier in 2023 on alternative fuels infrastructure (AFIR), including onshore power and electricity and alternative fuels for vessels at inland ports. Parliament has also given its approval for the revision of the Trans-European Network for Transport (TEN-T), focusing on ensuring a good navigation status for the core network and minimising waiting times at locks. Maritime ports connected to inland waterways will need to be equipped with dedicated handling capacity for inland waterway vessels. For both inland and maritime ports, connectivity requirements and obligations to provide alternative fuels have now been updated.

The EU funding for inland waterways transport reform is made available under several streams of the current European multi-annual financial framework. An important part of the funding is managed by the European Climate Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA). This is the case for among others the TEN-T Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). Funding is also provided under the financial instrument for the environment (LIFE programme) and the Horizon research programme for waterborne research and investment projects. Other funding is available under i.e. the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), Invest EU, and the Innovation Fund.

Under the Horizon programme, the Commission finances an important flagship project – Platina 3. This project serves as a platform of 14 key inland waterways transport partners and provides a €2 million budget for the implementation of the NAIADES III action programme. During the EU Inland Navigation Week, which took place at the end of March 2023, this particular platform attracted a great deal of attention. At its final event, looking back at its contribution to the EU objectives for inland waterways transport, Platina 3 focused on four different aspects: markets, the inland waterways transport fleet, jobs and skills, and infrastructure. The project has helped to increase innovation and research and development, digitalisation and automation, competitiveness and economic viability, as well as to create the necessary regulatory framework and coordinate EU countries’ interactions on all these four aspects. Platina 3 has produced several reports, studies and pilots addressing the challenges concerned and their possible solutions, taking different approaches. These include:

• creation of a European inland waterways transport policy (and funding) observatory;
• investment in sustainable alternative fuels (bio liquid natural gas, bio methanol, hydrogen, and biofuels), including certification and uptake;
• research and investment to create zero-emission solutions for (pilot) vessels (i.e. electrification);
• improved energy efficiency;
• better design and retrofitting, digitalisation/automated navigation;  
• climate resilient vessels and infrastructure, including ports;
• jobs and adapted skills for alternative energy carriers and automation.

The current focus for inland waterways transport is on the implementation of the current NAIADES III programme. Flagship projects, such as the Platina 3 platform make a significant contribution in this case. At the same time, the sector is in need of additional funding for the execution of the necessary reforms and measures, which, could come from national governments, stakeholders and from the EU. The European Commission is expected to present a review of the current Directive on River Information Services (RIS) later in 2023, which should further improve inland navigation.

‘This is Europe’ – an initiative proposed by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola – consists of a series of debates with EU leaders to discuss their visions for the future of the European Union. In his address to the European Parliament on 19 April 2023, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel, emphasised three topics: i) democracy and the rule of law, ii) strategic autonomy, and iii) migration. He called for greater protection of minorities and respect for the rule of law and fundamental values. Openness was also an important point for him, both regarding internal borders within the European Union and on cooperation and trade with the world. Given the challenges – financial, climate, security, industrial and social – that lie ahead in the coming years, he called for more solidarity and greater means on which to build the EU’s political action.

The fundamental rights of citizens must remain the backbone of this European Union. We cannot procrastinate on this point.

Xavier Bettel

Background Figure 1 – Time devoted by Xavier Bettel to various topics in his speech

Roberta Metsola launched the ‘This is Europe’ initiative soon after her election as president of the European Parliament in January 2022. Xavier Bettel is the eighth EU leader to have addressed the Parliament since its Conference of Presidents endorsed the initiative on 28 April 2022. These debates will continue during subsequent sessions. The next leader to have confirmed his participation is the Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, who will speak during the May 2023 plenary session.

A similar Parliament initiative, ahead of the 2019 European elections, saw a number of EU leaders speak in Parliament’s plenary sessions about their views on the future of Europe. Xavier Bettel, who is currently the third longest serving member of the European Council, also took part in that series. A 2019 EPRS analysis of the future of Europe debates pinpointed the similarities and differences in EU leaders’ views.

The ‘This is Europe’ initiative is particularly relevant in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), a bottom-up exercise that allowed EU citizens to express their opinions on the EU’s future policies and functioning. On 30 April 2022, the CoFoE plenary adopted 49 proposals (see EPRS overview), including more than 300 measures by which they might be achieved. As a follow-up, Parliament adopted a resolution, by a large majority, calling for a convention in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. This call was backed by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union speech on 14 September 2022.

At the June 2022 European Council meeting, the Heads of State or Government ‘took note’ of the CoFoE proposals. While calling for ‘an effective follow-up’, they did not provide specific guidelines in this respect. Instead, they merely stated that each EU institution should follow up on the proposals ‘within their own sphere of competences’, rather than acting jointly. EPRS research has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council, as expressed in the latter’s 2019‑2024 strategic agenda and its conclusions over the past 3 years.

Main focus of Xavier Bettel’s speech

Bettel addressed a wide range of topics in his speech to Parliament (see Figure 1). In terms of words, he devoted most attention to i) democracy and the rule of law, ii) strategic autonomy, and iii) migration.

Democracy and the rule of law

Respect for minorities was a central focus of Bettel’s address. He gave a personal insight based on his own experience, underlining that homosexual people wanted first and foremost ‘respect’. He welcomed the fact that 15 Member States had supported the European Commission’s referral of Hungary’s ‘anti-LGBT propaganda’ law to the Court of Justice of the European Union. He called for Members to continue the fight for democratic rights, for the rule of law and for human rights.

Strategic autonomy

Bettel expressed his support for the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’, stressing that it meant ‘neither protectionism nor renunciation of friends and close partners, nor equidistance between allies and the rest of the world’. He argued that none of his colleagues in the European Council understood it in such a narrow way. In his view, openness was an essential part of strategic autonomy.

Migration

Bettel called for improved surveillance at the EU’s external borders and for greater engagement with international partners on issues such as returns, the management of migratory flows, ways of addressing the root causes of irregular migration and of setting up possibilities for regular migration. He expressed hope that the Parliament and Council would reach agreement before the end of this legislative term.

Specific proposals and positions

The Luxembourgish Prime Minister used the opportunity to present his views on how the European Union should advance in specific policy areas. He also made some new proposals, summarised below.

Policy issuePriority action and proposals (quotes)Democracy‘We need to complete our toolkit on human rights and minority rights’.Russia’s war on Ukraine‘Sanction the aggressor, continue to financially support Ukraine, and deliver weapons to them’.Internal market‘It brings us prosperity, but is also at the origin of our common rules and standards in social, environmental, consumer protection and food safety’.Migration‘A common European migration policy needs to be fair, resilient, rules-based and characterised by the right balance between solidarity and responsibility’.Energy and climate‘In the face of the dual climate and energy crisis – too often we tend to forget – we have also succeeded in significantly reducing our consumption while accelerating the transition to an energy system based mainly on renewable energy’.Table – Specific proposals made by Xavier Bettel, by policy area Contrast with Bettel’s speech during Parliament’s 2019 Future of Europe debates

The magnitude of the change in the political context since Xavier Bettel spoke before the Parliament 4 years ago, on 30 May 2018 as part of the Future of Europe debates, is apparent when comparing the two speeches. Back then he talked a lot about i) tax harmonisation, and called for ii)  further deepening of economic and monetary union, and iii) efforts to move towards a European social model. Then, he was also the EU leader who addressed the highest number of policy areas.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘‘This is Europe’ debate in the European Parliament: Speech by Xavier Bettel, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, 19 April 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nera Kuljanic with Clemens Weichert.

The interested shopper can find a multitude of product labels and claims on their food, clothes and household items. They provide the buyer with information on a range of topics, such as animal welfare, CO2 emissions, organic, and fair trade aspects, and more. But this variety can be daunting and confusing. What if there were a European climate label to help consumers make better choices – those that cause the least amount of global warming?

This was the premise of a workshop organised by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) on 20 March 2023. Initiated by STOA Panel member Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark), the workshop’s aim was to discuss the potential and challenges of introducing an EU climate labelling framework. Two core themes emerged from the speakers’ contributions: the advantages of having a harmonised system of climate labelling for products on the EU market, and the crucial role of data in the process of designing such a system.

On the potential advantages of such a framework, Bo Weidema from the Danish Centre for Environmental Assessment started by pointing out some of the issues with the interpretation of the current labelling standards (notably at the ISO level), such as giving irrelevant, non-comparable, and non-transparent results. On the other hand, he noted the EU Product Environmental Footprint (PEF) method includes some unnecessary, complicated or unclear requirements. It therefore fails in several borderline cases, such as a producer declaring that a certain by-product has no climate impact whatsoever. According to Mr Weidema, a clear and simple PEF standard is possible by improving the methodology, rethinking the role of product categories, removing unnecessary and complicated requirements, and adding rules on dealing with uncertainty in the data. In this way, the standard could become more comprehensive, easier to apply for producers, and easier to understand for consumers.

Moving to the practical implementation of a single climate labelling framework, Emilia Moreno Ruiz, chief technical officer at ecoinvent Association, a Swiss non-profit organisation that manages a life cycle inventory database supporting environmental assessments of products and processes worldwide, explained what the supporting data infrastructure should look like. Ms Moreno Ruiz highlighted three key points that make databases fit-for-purpose. These were: (1) the enormous amount of data needed to evaluate the products has to be centrally managed according to a transparent and uniformly enforced methodology; (2) the databases have to be properly maintained and regularly updated; and (3) a modular design makes the data accessible, interoperable and reusable, for example to easily connect to other databases.

Moving from the technical ‘back end’ to the consumer-facing ‘front end’, John Thøgersen of Aarhus University, Denmark shared the latest insights from his field of economic psychology. To help consumers make better choices, he explained, labelling has to be actively used by consumers who regard it as trustworthy, must relate to a topic they care about, and should be easily understandable. In this respect, research shows that some designs are more effective than others. For example, simply declaring the amount of CO2 emitted to produce a given product is less effective than relative labelling, such as the traffic light system. Some of the issues highlighted by Mr Thøgersen are related to product categories: deciding on a reference product, establishing categories that are meaningful to the average consumer (since comparisons between very different products – such as carrots and beef – are unlikely to provide new, useful information for consumers), and labelling a large share of products in a category. Finally, Blanca Morales addressed potential advantages from the civil society perspective, speaking on behalf of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and the consumer organisation BEUC, where she serves as the EU Ecolabel coordinator. She pointed out that there are no carbon neutral products – despite the carbon offsetting efforts undertaken by some companies. Moreover, she explained, the information a label provides to consumers and the background data is just as important to producers in identifying hotspots where they can make climate-friendly improvements. Lastly, besides climate change, the EU climate label should consider other concerns, such as biodiversity loss and pesticide use. On this last point, Mr Weidema pointed out that including different types of impacts to be expressed in a single number with one label would require weighting them against each other.

Towards a European climate label?

The workshop will inform a forthcoming STOA study on the topic, carried out by Bo Weidema. As the workshop demonstrated, more research is needed about the best design and methodology for a climate labelling framework.

A webstream of the event is available on our website.

Your opinion counts for us! To let us know what you think, get in touch via and follow us on Twitter at @EP_ScienceTech.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson with Rebecca Fredrick.

Highlights of the April plenary session included debates on the need for an EU strategy on relations with China and on children forcibly deported from Ukraine. Other debates addressed: energy storage; labour mobility and the social rights of striking non-EU lorry drivers; adoption of the cyber-package proposals; a digital euro; and Dieselgate (use of defeat devices in cars to disarm pollution control systems). Members also held debates on: a possible EU global health strategy; universal decriminalisation of homosexuality, in light of recent developments in Uganda; the IPCC report on climate change; and the EU action plan against trafficking in cultural goods. 

Following a statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, Members discussed the situation in Peru. Commissioner Johannes Hahn made statements on the need for European solidarity in saving lives in the Mediterranean, particularly in Italy, as well as on EU relations with Iraq. 

The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, made a statement on the 80th anniversary of the Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto. Xavier Bettel, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, was also present, participating in the latest ‘This is Europe’ debate.

Fit for 55 package

In a joint debate on the EU’s ‘Fit for 55’ package, Members considered and adopted provisional agreements reached in trilogue with the Council on a set of linked proposals.

Revising the emissions trading system (ETS)

Covering 40 % of EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the EU has not revised its emissions trading system (ETS) since 2018. An update is needed to align the ETS with the European Climate Law target of a 55 % reduction in EU net GHG emissions by 2030, compared with 1990 levels. The agreement on the proposed revision of the ETS will increase overall emissions reductions and include municipal waste incineration from 2028. It covers a wider range of fuels, and phases out free allowances from 2026 to 2034. From 2024, the ETS will also cover maritime transport emissions.

ETS for aviation

The agreement on aviation emissions reflects Parliament’s demands for transparency measures and to encourage uptake of sustainable aviation fuels. Locations such as small islands and outermost regions will be able to cover the price difference between sustainable fuels and kerosene, while monitoring of non-CO2 aviation emissions will begin in 2025.

Carbon border adjustment mechanism

The EU aims to phase out the free allocation of carbon emission allowances to European industry. To prevent non-EU manufacturers from taking unfair advantage, a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) should provide a level playing field for EU and non-EU producers. The agreed text greatly amends the proposal, extending the CBAM to a wider range of products and emissions, and scheduling the transitional period to phase in the CBAM to 31 December 2025.

Social climate fund

A further, separate, ETS for road transport and buildings (ETS II) should begin in 2025 (although if energy prices remain exceptionally high, this could be delayed). The proposed €72 billion social climate fund aims at supporting the most vulnerable citizens and companies to counter the costs of this extension. The agreement will see the fund in place from 2026. Funding will largely come from ETS credits, but national governments should co-finance 25 % of the total estimated cost of their plans under the social climate fund.

Deforestation-free products

The EU is keen to contribute to the global fight against deforestation by halting EU consumption of commodities and products contributing to deforestation and forest degradation. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on a proposal to ensure only deforestation-free products reach the EU market. The new law would impose due diligence obligations on importers, and set penalties for non-compliance. During negotiations, Parliament succeeded in extending the scope to include additional products; a wider definition of ‘forest degradation’; and ensured consultation with indigenous peoples.

Markets in crypto-assets (MiCa)

Digital or virtual ‘crypto’ assets are a relatively new phenomenon. Mindful of both the opportunities they present and the potential risks, the EU seeks to legislate to protect investors and maintain financial stability, whilst also encouraging industry innovation. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on markets in crypto-assets negotiated by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), which would cover crypto‑assets not regulated under existing legislation. Key amongst these are ‘stablecoins’, digital assets whose value is stabilised against major currencies, and whose popularity has surged in recent years. The regulation will reinforce safety measures for crypto‑assets, requiring issuers to have plans in place to tackle turbulence and ensure reserves.

Information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets

Members also debated and adopted a provisional agreement based on a joint report by ECON and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on revising existing law on fund transfers, to include transfers of crypto-assets. Due to their low traceability, speed and global reach, there is a risk of criminals using crypto-assets, including to finance terrorist activity. The EU therefore proposes to extend the ‘travel rule’ (payment service providers must include payer and payee information with each transfer), to cover crypto-assets. During interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal, Parliament succeeded in imposing additional rules for transactions between crypto‑asset service providers and self‑hosted addresses (‘wallets’, for crypto‑assets that are otherwise almost impossible to monitor for money-laundering activity).

2024 EU budget

Parliament did not adopt guidelines for the 2024 EU budget, as the plenary rejected the report tabled by the Committee on Budgets. This rejection followed disagreement between the political groups over amendments tabled in plenary. The Commission’s presentation of the draft 2024 EU budget will be the next milestone in the 2024 budgetary procedure, and is scheduled for the end of May/beginning of June.

Question time – Legacy of the European Year of Youth

Members posed questions to Commissioner Mariya Gabriel on the legacy of the European Year of Youth, (EYY22), which encompassed a series of events and initiatives in 2022. The Commission is expected to provide Parliament with a report evaluating EYY22 by the end of 2023. In the meantime, the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) has suggested that the EYY22 legacy and that of the 2023 European Year of Skills could be linked in 2024, with funding for follow-up activities in subsequent years.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

By vote, Members confirmed five mandates for negotiation from the LIBE committee on proposals on: the screening regulation; a centralised system for the identification of Member States holding conviction information on third-country nationals and stateless persons (ECRIS-TCN); on asylum and migration management; the crisis and force majeure regulation; and on the long-term residents’ directive. Members also confirmed, without a vote, several further mandates to enter into interinstitutional negotiations: from the LIBE committee on reports on the single permit directive; and from the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) on the directive on a trans-European transport network; from the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) on financial services contracts concluded at a distance; as well as three mandates from the ECON and LIBE committees on: prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing; on measures in this context to be put in place by Member States; and on the Anti-Money-Laundering Authority (AMLA).

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – April 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García with Clemens Weichert.

To explore the future of Europe’s open strategic autonomy, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) organised a workshop on 7 March 2023. Four panellists working on the topic and a full room of policy-makers, analysts, students and others made for a lively discussion. Most agreed on the need for more European autonomy, while nuanced opinions on where to focus provided some contrast.

STOA Panel Member Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain) opened the discussion by introducing the concept of open strategic autonomy. While strategic autonomy refers to the reduction of dependencies in raw materials and other critical parts for the industrial value chains, the qualifier ‘open’ implies a continued engagement with third parties.

Keynote speaker Diego Rubio, director of the Spanish Prime Minister’s Office for Foresight and Strategy then took the floor. He explained that the last two years have taught us three lessons: first, that history has not ended; second, that the European Union is particularly threatened by geopolitical change, because Europeans benefited greatly from the previous world order; and third, that the EU is very much able to handle the different crises it faces. However, he argued that we need new visions for the future. Fighting crises purely reactively is not enough in the long-term. Instead, it is essential to formulate a vision for how our energy systems or primary sector industries are supposed to work 30 years from now. EU countries and institutions are currently establishing foresight units to strengthen this preparedness capacity. Global competitors such as China and the USA are already far ahead in their foresight capabilities today.

Diego Rubio went on to formulate three theses, which led to an animated discussion. His first thesis is that Europe has to react swiftly, as long as it is still a major powerhouse in many areas. Marek Havrda (Czech Deputy Minister for European Affairs) subsequently underlined this urgency by noting that the centre of gravity in several research fields, such as artificial intelligence (AI), is moving from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. Alice Pannier, who heads the Geopolitics of Technology programme at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), and EPRS Policy Analyst Mario Damen, then took the floor to stress the roles of both the private sector and EU institutions in AI research.

The keynote speech’s second thesis was the importance of not over-reacting: a second Cold War has not yet occurred, and interdependence with other regions should not be a problem in itself. Returning to this subject, Mario Damen added that, to the contrary, in terms of military and economic autonomy, some degree of interdependence is necessary. Mikel Landabaso, panellist and Director of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Seville, pointed out that all foresight analysis needs to be firmly anchored in science. Consequently, the JRC operationalises what strategic autonomy means and expresses it in numbers. The JRC did this most recently in a report on the future of EU-China relations.

Diego Rubio’s third and most discussed thesis was that the EU should change the way it operates. This means searching for ways to decrease overall dependencies, instead of changing which countries it relies upon. While, during subsequent discussion, the general idea found agreement in the room, a wide range of opinions was expressed on what changes should be made. Mikel Landabaso and Alice Pannier underlined the importance of the dual transitions to green and digital technologies. Marcin Batory, of the Polish Office for the Registration of Medical Products (URPL) remarked on the role of technical expertise and education. The availability of experts is a major bottleneck in some sectors, for example in the production of advanced medical devices, where the EU has few competencies today. The stance towards third countries became a major point of debate. Marek Havrda noted many countries in the Global South have taken neutral or Russia-friendly positions regarding the war in Ukraine, which poses a difficulty for Europe. Alice Pannier responded that, while those concerns are justified, European values of multilateralism and human rights remain very attractive. In this sense, Europe’s values are an asset in diplomacy, just as US military power and Chinese manufacturing capabilities are for their respective circles of influence.

Diego Rubio made clear that the priority for the forthcoming Spanish Council Presidency would be to work with other EU governments in preparation of a European Council meeting on open strategic autonomy in October 2023. He took an optimistic tone, noting that Europe had mastered many crisis before and would do so again.

To conclude, Lina Gálvez Muñoz summarised the need for strategic foresight and open strategic autonomy in her key message: ‘We cannot make the same mistakes as in the past, we cannot go from one dependency to another’.

If you missed the conference, the full recording is available here.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Mario Damen.

That the EU imports almost 60 % of its energy shows that real EU strategic autonomy in energy is far from achieved. The current energy crisis poses a risk to all four EU energy policy objectives. Crisis in the energy market is causing public and private debt and inflation, which risks destabilising the European energy market. While diversifying gas imports away from Russia reduces dependency on one big supplier, reliance on several other third countries implies new supply risks. Although high fossil fuel prices may accelerate the transition towards renewable energy, short-term investment in alternative fossil fuels and energy price caps risk diluting incentives for the green transition. Finally, improved cross-border energy network connectivity is susceptible to the yet untested risk of a lack of solidarity between Member States in the event of a structural supply crisis. Now that energy policy is increasingly determined by geopolitics, mitigating these risks is essential.

So far, the EU has managed these four challenges quite well, although concerns remain. Diversification of supply, filling gas storage and a relatively mild winter have limited the impact of the energy crisis. Initially, most responses to the crisis came from national governments, safeguarding their national strategic autonomy in energy matters. Member States took the lead with short-term measures to diversify supply and mitigate the effect of rising prices, mostly according to national energy priorities. The EU has also reacted swiftly, with a range of strategies and practical measures designed to increase coherence and EU strategic autonomy. The measures focus both on the internal autonomy of a functioning and well connected internal market and on the external autonomy of supply security in a global market. One of the biggest challenges will be to enhance strategic autonomy for renewable energy, for instance by producing renewables in the EU, while managing dependence on imports of the necessary raw materials.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU strategic autonomy: Four energy crisis challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein group) of 54 countries supporting Kyiv in its struggle against Russia’s military aggression meets on 21 April to discuss sending more military equipment to Ukraine.

As President Vladimir Putin visited his commanders in regions of Ukraine under Moscow’s military occupation, Russian forces stepped up heavy artillery bombardments and air strikes on the devastated, symbolically important Ukrainian city of Bakhmut.

Poland, Ukraine’s neighbour and staunch ally, has banned imports of Ukrainian grain in defiance of EU trade policies, saying local prices of wheat had plummeted, causing protests from Polish farmers. Transport shipments would be restored after a deal to ensure that Poland would be only a transit country for the commodity. Meanwhile, Russia has cast doubt over whether it will agree to extend the agreement not to block Ukrainian shipments of grain via the Black Sea.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Poland and Ukraine: The emerging alliance that could reshape Europe
Atlantic Council, April 2023

Arming Ukraine without crossing Russia’s red lines
Brookings Institution, April 2023

How Russia’s invasion of Ukraine tested the international legal order
Brookings Institution, April 2023

No gains for Europe from latest pilgrimage to Beijing
Bruegel, April 2023

Ukraine’s total democratic resilience in the shadow of Russia’s war
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

Russian army in search of human reserves: Day 414 of the war
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2023

The EU’s strategic energy partnership with the US after a year of war
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2023

Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, April 2023

EU-Ukraine strategy should include the Eurasian spine
Egmont, April 2023

Steppe change: How Russia’s war on Ukraine is reshaping Kazakhstan
European Council on Foreign Relations, April

The Zelensky-Lukashenka-Tsikhanouskaya triangle: Understanding Ukraine’s relationship with the Belarusian opposition
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

The art of vassalisation: How Russia’s war on Ukraine has transformed transatlantic relations
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

Advancing military mobility in Europe: An uphill battle
European Policy Centre, April 2023

Buying weapons together (or not)
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2022

Ukraine’s Integration with the EU in the context of the war
EUROPEUM, April 2023

Russian blackmail and the Black Sea Grain Initiative: The (limited) impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, April 2023

Judging Putin
Fondation Robert Schuman, April 2023

Humanitarian responses to the war in Ukraine: Stories from the grassroots
Foreign Policy Centre, April 2023

Sanctions against Russia: Are they working?
Friends of Europe, April 2023

TB2 Bayraktar : Grande stratégie d’un petit drone
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023

Tackling the constraints on EU foreign policy towards Ukraine: From strategic denial to geopolitical awakening
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2023

Reframing Russian colonialism: Ukraine refuses to be the subaltern
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, April 2023

War in Ukraine, where quantity as well as quality matters
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2023

Ukraine’s strategy of attrition
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2023

Ukraine: The shock of recognition
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2023

Economic sanctions against Russia: How effective? How durable?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2023

Stick with Europe
Rand Corporation, April 2023

Stalled in Ukraine, Kremlin increasingly turns to political theater
Rand Corporation, April 2023

Why blockading rather than retaking Crimea might be Kyiv’s best option
Rand Corporation, April 2023

Cyber operations in Russia’s war against Ukraine
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2023

Ukraine’s reconstruction: Questions and common grounds
Vox Ukraine, April 2023

Ukraine, the defeat of Putin
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, March 2023

War, peace, and the international system after Ukraine
Brookings Institution, March 2023

What to do about the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant
Brookings Institution, March 2023

Reforming the Ukrainian economy and state: The unfinished business
Bruegel, March 2023

Much of the Global South is on Ukraine’s side
Bruegel, March 2023

Is the EU doing enough for Eastern Europe?
Carnegie Europe, March 2023

The EU accession prospects of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023

One year of war in Ukraine
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023

After a year of arms deliveries to Ukraine, the EU needs to step up and speed up
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023

Eurovision, war and the geopolitics of pop
Chatham House, March 2023

Russian nuclear intimidation
Chatham House, March 2023

Chinese supply chains could tip the balance in Ukraine
Chatham House, March 2023

How the Ukraine grain deal went from boon to burden for the Kremlin
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, March 2023

Population-centric: Lessons from Russia’s hybrid war in Moldova
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

Ukraine’s accession talks need bold action in Kyiv and Brussels
European Policy Centre, March 2023

Where to now? Ukraine’s war is eclipsing the EU’s internal woes
Friends of Europe, March 2023

Global politics in the shadow of Ukraine
International Crisis Group, March 2023

The EU after one year of war: Widening, deepening, rebalancing
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2023

Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institution for International Economics, March 2023

Ukraine’s reconstruction already on the agenda
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

One year after the invasion: Most Russians still back war in Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

EU plans for increased ammunition production
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

Reviewing the Russian economy a year after the invasion of Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

Refugees from Ukraine adapting to the European labour market
Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023

America’s dangerous short war fixation
Rand Corporation, March 2023

Framing sanctions: The role of governmental narrative-building
RUSI Europe, March 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Antonio Albaladejo Román.

What happened?

On 15 April 2023, the Polish government announced a ban on the import and transit of Ukrainian agricultural products until June 2023. The governments of Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria mirrored Poland’s decision, although Slovakia and Bulgaria’s ban  do not prohibit the transit of agricultural products. Czechia has publicly ruled out similar measures. After reaching a deal with Ukrainian authorities on 18 April 2023, Poland agreed to lift the transit ban, but the import restriction remains. At the time of writing, no other EU Member States bordering Ukraine have adopted or announced a ban on Ukrainian agricultural products.

Why was Ukraine exporting grain through its neighbours?

Since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia has deliberately targeted Ukraine’s agricultural production, and occupied or blockaded its Black Sea ports, through which most of its agricultural commodities were exported. Moscow’s objectives are twofold. By destroying Ukraine’s agricultural industry – an important share of its GDP – Russia aims to cripple the Ukrainian economy, and thus Kyiv’s will and ability to resist the Russian aggression. Additionally, by depriving international markets of Ukraine’s substantial agricultural exports, Russia seeks to provoke a global food crisis, putting pressure on the international community to concede to Moscow’s demands. 

The EU and its international partners are responding to Russia’s strategy by helping Ukraine’s farmers maintain production levels, and by facilitating the export of Ukrainian grain and other agricultural commodities critical to global food security.

On 12 May 2022, the European Commission and EU Member States bordering Ukraine launched the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, allowing for the export of blockaded Ukrainian goods through EU road, railway and river networks. Additionally, the EU agreed on temporary trade liberalisation to facilitate exports to the EU single market and support Ukraine’s battered economy.

What was the effect of these measures?

EU solidarity lanes allow safe transport of much-needed Ukrainian grain and other agricultural commodities to international markets. Some 56 million tonnes of goods, including 29 million tonnes of agricultural products have been exported from Ukraine, thanks to the EU solidarity lanes. In combination with the United Nations-Türkiye sponsored Black Sea Grain Initiative, the EU solidarity lanes contributed to the stabilisation of international markets, and the steady decline in world food prices, following the initial disruptions caused by Russia’s invasion and averting a greater humanitarian crisis.  

However, the influx of Ukrainian agricultural products into the EU also impacts regional markets in neighbouring Member States. In its recent agriculture short-term outlook report, the European Commission acknowledges that ‘the sharply increasing imports from Ukraine created oversupply, downward pressure on prices and saturated logistical chains in some EU regions’ (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania). Competition from Ukrainian producers, and the downward pressures on agricultural prices led farmers in these countries to call for the reintroduction of import restrictions.

How did the EU respond to these concerns?

The EU has devoted substantial support to European producers affected by rising energy, feed and fertiliser prices, including a €500 million package adopted in March 2022, and by approving national State aid measures which, in the case of Poland, reached €836 million.

Additionally, after the Member States affected raised concern regarding the consequences of the solidarity lanes for their markets, the European Commission mobilised €29.5 million in funding to support Polish farmers (€16.7 million for Bulgaria and €10 million for Romania), which could be complemented using national funds to reach 100 %.

What could be the consequences of the ban?    

Trade policy is an exclusive competence attributed to the EU by Member States. Any restriction on agricultural imports from Ukraine therefore requires adoption at EU level.

The most recent Eurostat data shows persistently high food inflation in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria – well above the EU average. As the European Commission points out, Ukraine grain imports brought agricultural prices down and compensated for production shortages in the EU after a hot and dry summer. Should the bans remain – particularly for transit – and given the uncertainty regarding Russia’s commitment to the Black Sea Grain Initiative, global food prices could rise sharply once more, affecting European consumers everywhere, especially if extreme weather continues during 2023.

What is the position of the European Parliament?

During the March II 2022 plenary session in Brussels, the European Parliament called for the establishment of safe transport and food corridors to and from Ukraine, as well as support for EU farmers affected by the war in Ukraine. On 24 April 2023, the European Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) is expected to hold an exchange of views with Markian Dmytrasevych, Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Rebecca Frederick.

Members of the European Parliament meet in Strasbourg from 17 April, with a number of high-profile issues to discuss, not least the current geopolitical situation and the continuing fight against climate change. A key debate following Council and European Commission statements on the need for a coherent strategy for EU-China relations is scheduled for Tuesday morning. In a second key debate on Wednesday morning, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the situation of children forcibly deported from Ukraine and the International Criminal Court arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. The Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel, is due to attend the plenary to take part in the latest ‘This is Europe’ debate, on Wednesday. In the foreign affairs field, a statement is expected on the deep political crisis in Peru. The Question Time session scheduled for Tuesday afternoon provides an opportunity for the Commission to respond to Members’ questions on the legacy of the European Year of Youth, which encompassed a series of events and initiatives in 2022.

Launched in 2005 and covering 40 % of EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the EU has not revised its emissions trading system (ETS) since 2018. An update is therefore necessary to align the ETS with the European Climate Law target of a 55 % reduction in EU net GHG emissions by 2030, compared with 1990 levels. In a joint debate on the EU’s ‘Fit for 55’ ambitions on Monday evening, Members are due to consider provisional agreements on a number of proposals. The first is the agreement reached on the proposed revision of the ETS. The agreed text increases overall emissions reductions and envisages the inclusion of municipal waste incineration from 2028. It covers a wider range of fuels and phases out free allowances from 2026 to 2034. From 2024, the ETS will also cover maritime transport emissions under a linked proposal.

A separate proposal covers trading in aviation emissions, which are set to rise. Here, Members are due to consider a provisional agreement that reflects Parliament’s demands for transparency measures and to set aside allowances to encourage uptake of sustainable aviation fuels. Locations such as small islands and outermost regions will be able to cover the price difference between sustainable fuels and kerosene, while monitoring of non-CO2 aviation emissions will begin in 2025.

As part of the transition to a cleaner economy, the EU aims to phase out the free allocation of carbon emission allowances to European industry. To prevent non-EU manufacturers from taking unfair advantage of the new rules, however, a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) should provide a level playing field between EU and non-EU producers. Members are set to consider a provisional agreement that greatly amends the original proposal, extending the CBAM to a wider range of products and emissions and scheduling the transitional period to phase-in the CBAM to 31 December 2025.

A further, separate, ETS for road transport and buildings (ETS II) should begin in 2025 (although if energy prices remain exceptionally high, this could be delayed). This part of the necessary transition to a greener economy will have a direct impact on the whole of society. The proposed €72 billion social climate fund therefore aims at supporting the most vulnerable citizens and companies to counter the costs of extending the ETS to these sectors. Members are expected to consider the provisional agreement reached between the co-legislators on creating the fund from 2026. While funding is largely expected to come from ETS credits, national governments should co-finance 25 % of the total estimated cost of their plans under the social climate fund.

Deforestation contributes to global warming, so the EU is keen to contribute to the global fight against deforestation by halting EU consumption of commodities and products that contribute to deforestation and forest degradation. On Monday evening, Members are due to debate the provisional agreement on a proposal to ensure only deforestation-free products reach the EU market. If adopted, the new law would impose due diligence obligations on importers and set penalties for non-compliance. During negotiations on the file, Parliament succeeded in extending the scope to include additional products; a wider definition of ‘forest degradation’; and to ensure consultation with indigenous peoples.

Digital or virtual ‘crypto’ assets are a relatively new phenomenon. Mindful of both the opportunities they present and the potential risks, the EU seeks to legislate to protect investors and maintain financial stability, whilst also encouraging industry innovation. A joint debate on two provisional agreements concerning crypto‑assets is therefore set to take place on Wednesday afternoon. The first is the subject of a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report on markets in crypto-assets, which would cover crypto‑assets not covered by existing legislation. Key amongst these are ‘stablecoins’, digital assets whose value is stabilised against major currencies, and whose popularity has surged in recent years. The provisional agreement reinforces safety measures for crypto‑assets, requiring issuers to have plans in place to tackle turbulence and ensure reserves to back up their currency.

Due to their low traceability, speed and global reach, there is a risk of criminals using crypto-assets, including to finance terrorist activity. The EU therefore proposes to extend the ‘travel rule’ (payment service providers must include payer and payee information with each transfer), to cover crypto-assets. During interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal, Parliament succeeded in imposing additional rules for transactions between crypto‑asset service providers and self‑hosted addresses (‘wallets’, for crypto‑assets that are otherwise almost impossible to monitor for money-laundering activity). Members are therefore also due to debate a joint report by ECON and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on revising existing law on fund transfers to include such transfers of crypto-assets.

On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament is expected to debate a motion for a resolution, tabled by the Committee on Budgets (BUDG), on Parliament’s ‘guidelines’ for the 2024 EU budget. The guidelines set Parliament’s goals for the Union’s budget before negotiations begin with the other EU institutions, and ahead of the Commission formally presenting the draft budget. The BUDG committee urges the Commission to revise the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework in light of the significant challenges (Russia’s war of aggression, high levels of inflation) that have arisen since its adoption and which hamper achievement of the EU’s political goals. The committee calls upon the Commission to present a second basket of new own resources, highlighting the importance of repaying debt incurred under the EU recovery instrument. It reiterates the importance of the 2024 EU budget in delivering across a variety of policy areas, including the green and digital transitions, and ensuring energy security and independence. The committee stresses that EU funding should not be used for the construction of walls or fences at the EU’s external borders.

Further reading

• Agenda – European Parliament Plenary Session April 2023
• EU-China relations
• Russia’s war on Ukraine : Forcibly displaced Ukrainian children
• Political turmoil in Peru
• Legacy of the European Year of Youth 2022
• Revision of the EU emissions trading system: Fit for 55
• Regulation on deforestation-free products
• Revision of the EU emissions trading system: Aviation
• EU carbon border adjustment mechanism
• Social climate fund
• Markets in crypto-assets (MiCA)
• Recasting the Transfer of Funds Regulation
• Parliament’s guidelines for the 2024 EU budget: Section III – European Commission

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) causes 33 000 deaths in Europe annually. The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) held a workshop to discuss scientific and policy breakthroughs to counter AMR on 29 March 2023. The lessons learned will serve Members of the European Parliament in the forthcoming discussions on the revised pharmaceuticals package.

The Chair, STOA panel member, Lina Galvez Munoz (S&D, Spain), appealed to the Commission and Member States to take action on this public health issue, which and may increase 10‑fold by 2050, surpassing cancer as the second biggest cause of death worldwide.

The first session of the event focused on new insights from science, in particular from monitoring, new antimicrobial strategies and prevention, including vaccines.

"Surveillance is the basis of everything and without it we are flying blind. Data sharing is essential"- @FrankAarestrup at #STOAevent on #AntimicrobialResistance pic.twitter.com/RN49xZfuPe

— STOA Panel (@EP_ScienceTech) March 29, 2023

Frank Aarestrup, Professor of Microbiology at Technical University of Denmark, introduced novel technologies such as metagenomics and wastewater sequencing for monitoring and surveillance of antimicrobial resistance genes. These technologies are applicable to any living being and habitat, making them an essential tool in modern global AMR surveillance. Data sharing and open science are important to accomplish this.

Francesco Imperi, Professor of Microbiology at University Roma Tre in Italy, presented possible alternatives to antibiotics. These include resistance breakers, antibiotic adjuvants, antivirulence drugs and phage therapy. Professor Imperi stressed the need to preserve existing antibiotics (stewardship) and to develop rapid diagnostic tools. It is still possible to identify novel antibiotics, by investigating yet-unexplored microbial bacterial diversity, which accounts for 99 % of existing microbes.

Pedro Madureira, co-founder and CSO at Immunethep in Portugal, presented a new immunotherapeutic strategy that can be used to help our immune system fight infections. This vaccine strategy neutralises a common bacterial molecule, GAPHD, that is present in the five bacterial groups that cause more than 80 % of global infections (Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), Streptococcus pneumoniae and Streptococcus agalactiae).

Session two focused on a discussion of policy strategies. Malin Grape, Swedish ambassador on AMR, presented the different EU and global level policy measures in place to counteract AMR. AMR will be a focal point of the upcoming revision of the pharmaceutical package, as well as of the Council’s recommendations on the implementation of the EU One Health action plan. It is essential to translate scientific evidence into implementable policy. The solution will be to ensure equitable access to a diversified pool of both new and old antimicrobials, which requires a discussion on models of financing.

Ellen 'T Hoen @ellenthoen
: "Companies are making huge profits from infectious diseases….Antibiotics are a particular category of pharmaceuticals that do not fit the standard business model of the pharmaceutical industry " #STOAevent on tackling #AntimicrobialResistance

— STOA Panel (@EP_ScienceTech) March 29, 2023

Clare Chandler, medical anthropologist at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine in the United Kingdom, stressed that the development of new antibiotics is but a partial, temporary fix to a public health problem. A more sustainable solution is to reduce society’s infrastructural reliance on antibiotics and address systemic problems at the basis of AMR, such as healthcare, hygiene, productivity and inequality, by reinvesting in physical and economic structures, including good quality public healthcare, good working conditions, good nutrition, patient follow-up, and vaccination. More emphasis should go on policy research, which only accounts for 1 % of the total AMR funding.

A question and answer session followed, where speakers discussed topics including new approaches in artificial intelligence as opportunities for vaccine development, the importance of data sharing, the link between AMR and the environment, and the nature of incentives for the development of new antimicrobials.

The Chair concluded with a reflexion on how we do not need to socialise the cost and privatise the profits, but rather discuss money and benefit allocation, using a global approach focused on international collaboration and interdisciplinary science, for equitable, reliable access. The solution to AMR cannot be incentives for private industry alone – we should move towards a public ownership of research and development.

In conclusion, the workshop discussed the urgent need for a new EU pharmaceutical strategy to address AMR. The workshop provided insights into new scientific and policy breakthroughs, including alternatives to antibiotics, monitoring, surveillance, and policy strategies for equitable access to old and new antimicrobials.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Agnieszka Widuto (1st edition).

On 14 March 2023, the European Commission proposed a reform of the EU electricity market, with the aim of reducing price volatility for consumers and creating favourable conditions for investors in low-carbon energy. The reform includes two legislative proposals – one on electricity market design (EMD) and the other on protection against wholesale energy market manipulation. These two proposals revise five pieces of EU legislation.

The electricity market reform seeks to make the energy bills of consumers and businesses less dependent on short-term price fluctuations, which are often driven by fossil fuel prices. It also improves consumer protection by offering more fixed-priced contracts and enhancing supplier obligations, and incentivises solutions such as energy communities, self-consumption and renewable energy sharing.

The reform supports the use of more long-term instruments such as power purchase agreements and contracts for difference, and improves integration and liquidity in forward markets. It also enhances flexibility solutions such as demand response and storage. Furthermore, it aims to improve market monitoring and transparency, and protection against manipulation.

Both legislative proposals will now be negotiated by the European Parliament and the Council.

Versions

• April 2023: Improving the design of the EU electricity market (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2019/942 as well as Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 to improve the Union’s electricity market design Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2023) 148
14.3.2023Rapporteur:Nicolàs Gonzales Casares (S&D, Spain)2023/0077(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Maria da Graça Carvalho (EPP, Portugal); Morten Petersen (Renew, Denmark); Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany); Paolo Borchia (ID, Italy); Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR, Poland); Marina Mesure (GUE/NGL, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Mar Negreiro.

Protecting children online is becoming increasingly vital. For over two decades, there has been a limited range of online age verification methods available to protect children from accessing online content unsuitable for their age. A number of countries are introducing legislation and/or codes of practice to address this situation. At EU level too, there are increasing efforts in this regard, with a code of practice in the pipeline. Challenges abound, however, in the areas of privacy, monitoring and the need to improve parents’ and children’s digital skills.

State of play

Children are very avid internet users; the coronavirus pandemic only amplified this trend, as children became used to spending more time online during the lockdowns. Global estimates reveal that one in three children is an internet user, and that one in three internet users is under 18. In the EU, most children use their smartphones daily, and almost twice as much as compared to 10 years ago. They also use them from a much younger age. More often than not, though, the online environments they access were not originally designed for them. Moreover, younger children have no problem bypassing the EU age requirements put in place by services such as social media, which require a minimum age of 13 for their users. One study found that digital services do not use adequate age verification or parental consent methods. This failing recently resulted in a record fine.

Main types of online age verification method

Online age verification methods are increasingly diverse. Below is a list of the most common ones.

• Self-declaration: this most common of all methods has been shown to be easily bypassed by children. Examples include self-declaring one’s date of birth.
• Credit card: here, users are required to verify the validity of their cards, for instance, by making a bank or card payment of €0.01. This method is mostly used by e-commerce sites and apps selling adult products such as alcohol or adult content. Beyond the inherent risk of phishing, it is not possible to ascertain that the person using the card is the legitimate owner; moreover, the age for owning a credit card varies across countries.
• Biometrics: this method relies on artificial intelligence (AI), which powers the use of biometric technologies, including facial recognition applications. These may be used to analyse facial features with a selfie to ascertain that the individual requesting access is over 18. Establishing a person’s age with accuracy is prone to errors; furthermore, underage individuals may use the face of someone older to gain unjustified access. What is more, authentication methods that use biometrics raise privacy issues because they may use special categories of personal data. Using applications to estimate a child’s age can also lead to excessive data processing and to profiling.
• Analysing online usage patterns: this involves using age verification systems by inference, such as importing the individual’s internet browsing history or analysing their ‘maturity’ by means of a questionnaire or their online user-generated content or purchases.
• Offline verification: this is done using scratch cards or offline in-situ age checks by means of documents.
• Parental consent: some apps and services require parental consent to register a child for a digital service. Yet, parental authority is rarely fully verified. Proving parental authority/guardianship might involve checking traditional identity (ID) documents and family registers.
• Vouching: this involves asking users other than the parents to vouch online as confirmation that a child seeking online access is of the right age.
• Digital ID: this method relies on tools offered by the state to verify individuals’ identity and age before granting them access to digital services. For instance, China, Canada and Australia have introduced a digital ID for citizens. Some EU countries have also adopted this solution, and there is a proposal to create a European digital identity wallet.
• Age verification by a specific app: such apps are applied for a specific purpose. In France, for instance, users will soon have to install a government-licensed digital certification app to access online pornography content.

Only recently have social platforms started applying measures to verify age.

• In 2022, Instagram started testing a vouching tool to ensure users are as old as they say they are; it has also started using biometric technology for facial analysis in some cases.
• YouTube has launched a dedicated children’s app and introduced new data practices.
• Meta has created Messenger Kids in Facebook that allows children to connect with parent-approved contacts only.
• Tiktok does not have an age-verification method but might ban accounts after sign-up.
• Twitter verifies parental consent requiring documentation (ID/birth certificate, etc.). Twitter says that the documents are treated confidentially and deleted after verification.
• e-Commerce sites selling adult products and services such as gambling, alcohol or pornography have a wide range of age verification methods such as credit and scratch cards and biometrics.

Main challenges and opportunities

A number of key challenges remain, of which the following three are particularly serious.

• Privacy/cybersecurity concerns: despite the widespread use of age verification methods in some sectors, there are still fears that they pose privacy and cybersecurity risks. Given the sensitivity of the data collected by some age verification systems, some suggest creating a specific trusted certification for third-party players. To date, there is no common EU guidance on methods for determining age verification; children easily bypass most solutions.
• Content not attractive enough for children: since children’s apps and digital services tend to provide a limited set of functionalities, many children prefer to lie about their age to use the ones designed for adults. This makes children more vulnerable not only to privacy risks but also to safety threats, such as online grooming, or to exposure to content that is inappropriate for their age. There is a need to consider usability for young users during the software design phase.
• Improved digital skills: parents, children and guardians need better digital skills and a greater awareness of the risks involved. Some have also suggested that age verification should be an ongoing process that continues after sign-up.

What the EU is doing

Prior to the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into effect in 2018, there were no specific restrictions on the online processing of children’s data in Europe. The GDPR requires the use of verification with regard to age and parental consent. Likewise, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) requires the adoption of appropriate measures to protect children from online harmful content, including through age verification. In addition, the new European strategy for a better internet for children envisages a comprehensive EU code of conduct on age-appropriate design for 2024, building on the new rules in the Digital Services Act (DSA) and in line with the AVMSD and the GDPR. Such a code already exists in other parts of the world, such as the United Kingdom and California.

Moreover, in the context of the EU eID proposal, the Commission intends to strengthen age verification methods by means of a robust framework of certification and interoperability. In addition, the proposal for a regulation to combat child sexual abuse online envisages improved online age verification. There is also the EU co-funded euCONSENT project, which is building a browser-based interoperable age verification method. The European Parliament has called for better age verification methods to protect children online on several occasions, including in its own-initiative report on consumer protection in online video games adopted in January 2023 and its March 2021 resolution on children’s rights in the light of the EU strategy on the rights of the child. Likewise, better age verification methods to protect children online are part of the European Commission’s proposed European declaration on digital rights and principles for the digital decade and the OECD’s Declaration on a Trusted, Sustainable and Inclusive Digital Future.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Online age verification methods for children‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

One of the flagship proposals of the Strategic Compass adopted in March 2022 is the creation of a new rapid reaction force for responses to crises outside the EU. This rapid deployment capacity (RDC) will be a modular force of 5 000 personnel that should be fully operational by 2025. To establish the RDC, important issues, particularly on cost-sharing, decision-making, size, readiness and enablers need to be resolved.

Rapid deployment capacity

In May 2021, 14 EU Ministers of Defence called on the HR/VP to develop a proposal for a new EU rapid reaction force to respond to international crises outside the EU. This call to action took shape in the March 2022 Strategic Compass, with its commitment to establish an RDC by 2025. The RDC will be a modular force of up to 5 000 personnel, consisting of modified EU battlegroups and additional forces combining Member States’ forces and capabilities. Rather than a single force, the RDC will combine different components (air, land, maritime) and should include strategic enablers – such as air transport capabilities – depending on the operational scenario. The RDC’s purpose will be to respond rapidly to imminent crises, and to be able to be used in different operational scenarios, including ‘initial entry, reinforcement, or as a reserve force to secure an exit’. The first live exercises will be held in autumn 2023 in the south of Spain (Gulf of Cadiz). The RDC should reach full operational force by 2025.In a first sign of progress, EU ministers of defence endorsed two possible scenarios for the RDC on 15 November 2022: (1) initial phase of stabilisation and (2) rescue and evacuation. According to the first annual progress report on the implementation of the Compass, the RDC’s conceptual development has progressed and ‘work continues on the substantially modified EU Battlegroups … pre-identifying Member States’ military forces and capabilities… [and] on the remaining operational scenarios’.

Decision-making and cost sharing

The battlegroups have never been deployed, mostly owing to the lack of political will and the necessity for a unanimous Council decision for their activation. As a potential way to overcome these hindrances, EU leaders have committed to developing modalities for more flexible decision-making, in particular by exploring the potential of Article 44 TEU, which allows ‘coalitions of the willing’ to conduct missions and operations on behalf of the EU. Although Article 44 still requires a unanimous Council decision and political oversight by the Council, according to an October 2022 study requested by the European Parliament Sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), it does ‘potentially create an avenue for more flexibility and speed in decision making’. The authors of the study suggest increasing the incentives by allowing greater funding from the common budget and giving more freedom to coalitions of the willing, e.g. by letting them establish the plan for the operation (OPLAN), especially where speed is of the essence. They also call for the simulation of different scenarios to clarify the modalities for the invocation of Article 44.

The principle that ‘costs lie where they fall’ means troop-contributing nations have to date found reasons to veto battlegroup deployment to avoid being stuck with the costs. The European External Action Service (EEAS) and European Council recognised this as the ‘most significant obstacle’. The Strategic Compass specifically states that the RDC will profit from common funding and enhanced solidarity. However, owing to lack of agreement, the precise modalities have not yet been defined, with experts suggesting using the European Peace Facility should compensate troop contributors based on a common cost calculation, taking the gross national product key into account and covering extra costs associated with deployment. The authors of the SEDE study note that, at the very least, incremental costs (additional costs for deployment, transport, use of ammunition and fuel, etc.) should be covered by the European Peace Facility.

EU battlegroups vs rapid deployment capacity

EU battlegroups are multinational, military units of up to 1 500 personnel each, meant to respond rapidly to emerging crises around the world. While they have been operational since 2007, they have never been deployed, mostly because of a lack of political will and financial solidarity. The former is especially problematic because deployment requires a unanimous Council decision. A number of questions have been raised regarding the differences between EU battlegroups and the RDC. The precise parameters for the EU rapid deployment capacity have yet to be defined; however, according to Clingendael, several differences between the RDC and battlegroups can already be highlighted:

• Size: while the RDC is meant to consist of 5 000 personnel, battlegroups comprise up to 1 500 troops (3 000 if two are always supposed to be on stand-by at the same time).
• Composition: the RDC is modular and comprises different components (land, air, maritime) according to operational needs, while battlegroups include land-based capabilities alone, based on fixed national contributions.
• Strategic enablers: the RDC incorporates strategic enablers, while this is not the case for battlegroups.
• Scenarios: two concrete operational scenarios have already been adopted for the RDC, while this has never been the case for the battlegroups.
• Standby-period: while battlegroups are on stand-by for 6 months, the RDC will be on standby for 12 months.

Clingendael consider these differences will make it challenging to incorporate ‘substantially modified’ EU battlegroups in the EU RDC (as suggested by the Compass). It also remains unclear what ‘substantially modified’ means. One expert notes that a bottom-up approach should be used: the EU should start by expanding the membership of each battlegroup and prolong their standby duration. The same report argues that an incentive-based ‘spillover’ could help an actual deployment of rapid reaction forces: gradually integrating capability projects into the European defence union through permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) could encourage EU Member States to then deploy such capabilities within the framework of the RDC in crises, when the time comes.

Size and enablers

The Strategic Compass suggests a modular force of 5 000 troops. However, for the five scenarios already mentioned in the Strategic Compass, it is thought this number will not be enough. The authors of the SEDE study suggest that, to cover all currently envisaged scenarios, the RDC would need different force packages for different scenarios and regions, and a very varied number of required land, air, special forces and maritime enablers. They therefore suggest 7 000-10 000 troops as a rough indication of the required forces, including enablers. For the RDC to materialise, one analyst suggests the EU will need a pool of at least five or six brigades (5 000 troops). In terms of readiness, the SEDE study suggests a system similar to the French Guépard system, which would mean that the majority of RDC modules would stay at a relatively low readiness, except those for ‘high urgency tasks’ (e.g. rescue and evacuation operations). Clingendael suggests a model of ‘dual hatted readiness forces’, where forces at various levels of readiness would be available for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the RDC. An objective that will be particularly difficult to fulfil by 2025 will be the necessary enablers, such as intelligence and strategic reconnaissance (ISR), strategic transport and air-to-air refuelling. Experts doubt that these shortfalls will be made up by 2025, especially for ISR and precision weapons. Experts note that, while PESCO and the European Defence Fund are already dealing with some shortfalls, those remaining should be remedied as a matter of priority. This will require sustained high defence investments and political will, which experts agree is the most crucial component of the RDC.

European Parliament position

In its CSDP implementation report of 18 January 2023, Parliament calls for the RDC to be ‘implemented as soon as possible and by 2025 at the latest’ and underlines the need to close the gaps on strategic enablers by 2025. A Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) draft report on the EU rapid deployment capacity, adopted on 9 March 2023, underlines that the RDC’s tasks should include rescue and evacuation, initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations. Temporary reinforcement of other missions should be used as a reserve force to secure an exit. The committee notes that the RDC target number should be at least 5 000 troops, plus the strategic enablers required to conduct its operation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Network cost contribution debate‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

The European Peace Facility (EPF), a financial instrument outside the EU budget that has been operational since July 2021, finances activities with military implications. It funds equipment and training for EU partner countries’ armies, as well as the common costs of EU military missions and operations abroad. It also funds the military component of EU civilian missions or exercises abroad, or of EU support to missions led by other international organisations. One year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, its initial ceiling has been increased to allow the EU to continue its military support to Ukraine at a critical stage of the conflict, while simultaneously maintaining and even increasing its military engagement in other regions of its neighbourhood, in the Western Balkans and in Africa.  

Since the start of Russia’s war of aggression on 28 February 2022, the EU has mobilised seven successive tranches, of €500 million each, from the EPF. In February 2023, EU military assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces reached a total of €3.6 billion. This assistance, for the first time in EU history, has a strong lethal component (weapons and equipment, including, most recently, tanks) alongside a smaller, although significant, non-lethal component (including protective equipment, other non-lethal supplies, and training). The delivery of military assistance is carried out by the EU Member States; through the EPF, the EU can reimburse Member States for a part of their military deliveries.

The EPF-funded military assistance to Ukraine has absorbed, in the first 12 months of the war, 60 % of the initially planned financial ceiling of the EPF of €5 billion for 2021-2027. Therefore, the Council decided on 13 March to increase that ceiling by €2 billion (in 2018 prices) for 2023, and possibly by an additional €3.5 billion (in 2018 prices) up to 2027, an increase that would more than double the total initial ceiling. On 20 March, in response to Ukraine’s urgent needs and requests, the Council decided to earmark €1 billion from the EPF to partially reimburse Member States for deliveries of ammunition (and missiles if requested) to Ukraine from their stocks, and another €1 billion for the joint procurement of ammunition (and missiles if requested) from the EU and Norwegian defence industries.

The European Parliament consistently and firmly supports the use of the EPF in Ukraine and beyond, and the increase of its ceiling.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Peace Facility: State of play as of 31 March 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EPF-funded military assistance to Ukraine, March 2022 to March 2023

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

Air pollution is the single largest environmental health risk in the EU and causes significant damage to ecosystems. As part of the European Green Deal’s zero pollution ambition, on 26 October 2022 the Commission tabled a proposal for a revision of the Ambient Air Quality Directives. The proposed directive would set air quality standards for 2030 that are more closely aligned with the Word Health Organization’s recommendations, as updated in 2021. It would also include a mechanism for the standards’ regular review based on the latest scientific information. To achieve them on time, the Member States would have to establish air quality plans ahead of 2030. Provisions on air quality monitoring and assessment would be updated, including through new requirements for monitoring pollutants of emerging concern, such as ultrafine particles.

Stakeholders have had mixed reactions to the proposal. NGOs call for full alignment with the WHO guidelines by 2030 at the latest, and for penalties in case the 2030 deadline is missed. Industry representatives insist on the need to meet current standards first, before aiming for higher ones.

In Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), responsible for the file, aims to adopt its legislative report before the end of June 2023.

Versions

• April 2023: Revision of EU air quality legislation: Setting a zero pollution objective for air (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (recast) Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 542
26.10.2022Rapporteur:Javi López (S&D, Spain)2022/0347(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Norbert Lins (EPP, Germany)
Karin Karlsbro (Renew, Sweden)
Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Gianna Gancia (ID, Italy)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Petros Kokkalis (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Gregor Erbach with Sarah Svensson.

Renewable hydrogen has the potential to play a significant role in the energy system as a versatile energy carrier and feedstock that can help decarbonise a variety of applications in areas such as heavy industry, chemicals manufacturing, transportation, and electricity generation and storage. Hydrogen can be produced through the electrolysis of water with renewable electricity, using different setups that vary in terms of cost, impact on the electricity system and carbon emissions.

Today, renewable hydrogen makes up a small fraction of total hydrogen production. Most hydrogen is produced from fossil fuels and, although cheaper, it causes carbon emissions. Demand for renewable hydrogen is expected to grow quickly as the need for climate-friendly solutions increases. While the falling cost of renewable electricity certainly plays a role in boosting this demand, sustaining it still requires support measures aimed at growing the market and bringing down the cost of electrolysers. To avoid a situation where renewable electricity used for hydrogen production is diverted away from other uses, it is important to ensure additionality, i.e. additional renewable electricity capacity for renewable hydrogen production.

On 10 February 2023, in line with the requirements of the Renewable Energy Directive, the Commission adopted two delegated regulations: one defining rules on renewable hydrogen production and clarifying the additionality criteria for renewable electricity, and another setting out a methodology to calculate lifecycle GHG emissions. The European Parliament and the Council of the EU have four months to approve or reject the rules, but they cannot amend them. On 28 March 2023, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) decided not to raise an objection to the delegated regulation on additionality. Having in place definitive criteria for renewable hydrogen is key to making investment decisions and to launching EU and Member State initiatives that can support the growth of the European hydrogen industry.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU rules for renewable hydrogen: Delegated regulations on a methodology for renewable fuels of non-biological origin‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gabija Leclerc and Rosamund Shreeves.

Since the Taliban regime overtook the country in mid-August 2021, Afghanistan’s record on women’s rights has been manifestly one of, if not the worst, worldwide. Despite promises to ‘uphold women’s rights in line with Sharia law’, from the very first weeks of its rule, the Taliban started suppressing the rights of their citizens, with women the main target of restrictions. As well as prohibiting women and girls from traveling without a male relative, the Taliban have also denied them post-primary education, banned them from numerous public places and restricted their employment to health care and primary education. In December 2022, women were also banned from working for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in most sectors.

This crackdown on women’s rights has attracted considerable international condemnation, including from Muslim states. In response to the regressive policies, many international donors have reduced or threatened to halt their humanitarian assistance, upon which the country is strongly reliant. It is feared that women could, unintentionally, be those most impacted by this reduction or suspension of humanitarian aid. The Taliban nevertheless appears inflexible, leaving international actors with a dilemma as to how to proceed.

The European Union (EU) has been engaged in Afghanistan since the mid-1980s and has prioritised advancing Afghan women’s rights. While changing its terms of engagement, it has continued to provide humanitarian aid and to support civil society. The European Parliament has followed the situation closely and recommended further action to support Afghan women and girls.

This briefing analyses the current situation of women’s rights in Afghanistan, taking a long view. Women’s rights have been an intense battleground between different actors for over a century, with periods of promising reforms followed by resistance and often reversals of progress. This helps to explain how a country, where women won voting rights in 1919 – earlier than in most of the Western world – has ended up by treating its female population in a manner possibly amounting to a crime against humanity.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women’s rights in Afghanistan: An ongoing battle‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timeline of main restrictions on women’s rights under the Taliban (2021-2022)

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the Parliament to vote against the European Commission’s new legislative proposal to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. Citizens expressed their concerns that this new legislation would breach data protection and privacy rights. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in February 2023. In its proposal, the Commission wants to make it mandatory for online service providers to detect, report and remove child sexual abuse material on their services. According to the Commission, investigation of suspicious content will follow strict rules and conditions; it will not entail general monitoring of individuals’ communications. The European Parliament has recently started working on the legislative proposal.  

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English and German).

Main points made in the reply in English

Protecting EU values in the digital field

While the European Parliament has long advocated for a safer internet for children, it also defends privacy and data protection on the internet.

In a joint declaration, the three EU institutions agreed to promote a digital transformation based on EU values and principles. This includes, for example, the principle of privacy and individual control over data. On this occasion, President Metsola stressed: “We want to make Europe fit for the digital age. This declaration […] makes sure that our values also apply in the digital sphere.”

New legislative proposal by the European Commission

As part of a new EU strategy to combat child sexual abuse online more effectively, the Commission announced a legislative proposal in May 2022. This law would oblige online service providers to identify, report and remove child sexual abuse content. They would have to assess the risk of misuse of their services and take measures to minimise them. The proposal also suggests creating a decentralised EU agency to combat child sexual abuse.

According to the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson, who is responsible for the proposal, it does not allow for generalised or indiscriminate scanning of content of all kinds of electronic communication. The scope for investigating suspicious content is very limited and the procedure is subject to strict conditions and guarantees. The proposal also requires providers to deploy technologies that are the least privacy-intrusive possible.

Further information on how the European Commission intends to protect privacy is available on its website.

Next steps in the legislative process

As a next step, the European Parliament and the Council have to vote on the proposal. In Parliament, the file was assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), which recently started working on the draft report.

It should be noted that, in accordance with Article 2 of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament, Members of the European Parliament are free and independent. Neither Parliament nor its President are authorised to impose instructions on Members on how to vote or how to carry out their political activities.

Main points made in the reply in German

Schutz der gemeinsamen europäischen Werte im digitalen Bereich

Während sich das Europäische Parlament seit langem für ein sichereres Internet für Kinder einsetzt, verteidigt es ebenfalls die Privatsphäre und den Datenschutz im Internet.

In einer gemeinsamen Erklärung vereinbarten die drei EU-Institutionen, dass sie einen digitalen Wandel auf Grundlage der europäischen Werte und Grundsätze fördern möchten. Dazu gehört beispielsweise der Grundsatz des Schutzes der Privatsphäre und der individuellen Kontrolle über Daten. Zu diesem Anlass hob Präsidentin Metsola hervor: „Wir wollen Europa fit für das digitale Zeitalter machen. Diese Erklärung […] stellt sicher, dass unsere Werte auch im digitalen Bereich gelten.“ (Übersetzung aus dem Englischen)

Neuer Gesetzesvorschlag der Europäischen Kommission

Im Rahmen einer neuen EU-Strategie zu einer wirksameren Bekämpfung des sexuellen Missbrauchs von Kindern im Internet veröffentlichte die Kommission im Mai 2022 einen Gesetzesvorschlag. Dieses Gesetz würde Onlinedienstanbieter verpflichten, Inhalte über sexuellen Missbrauch von Kindern zu identifizieren, zu melden und zu entfernen. Sie müssten das Risiko des Missbrauchs ihrer Dienste einschätzen und Maßnahmen ergreifen, um es zu minimieren. Der Vorschlag sieht auch die Einrichtung einer dezentralen EU-Agentur zur Bekämpfung des sexuellen Missbrauchs von Kindern vor.

Laut der zuständigen EU-Kommissarin für Inneres Ylva Johansson erlaubt der Gesetzesvorschlag kein allgemeines und wahlloses Scannen von Inhalten aller Arten elektronischer Kommunikation. Der Freiraum bei Ermittlungen zu verdächtigen Inhalten sei sehr begrenzt, und das Verfahren unterliege strengen Bedingungen und Garantien. Der Vorschlag sieht außerdem vor, dass die Anbieter Technologien einsetzen, die am wenigsten in die Privatsphäre eingreifen.

Weitere Informationen darüber, wie die Europäische Kommission beabsichtigt, die Privatsphäre zu schützen, sind auf der Webseite verfügbar.

Nächste Schritte im Gesetzgebungsverfahren

Im nächsten Schritt müssen das Europäische Parlament und der Rat über den Vorschlag abstimmen. Im Parlament wurde das Dossier dem Ausschuss für bürgerliche Freiheiten, Justiz und Inneres (LIBE) zugewiesen, der erst kürzlich mit der Arbeit des Berichtsentwurfs begonnen hat.

Hierbei möchten wir anmerken, dass gemäß Artikel 2 des Abgeordnetenstatuts des Europäischen Parlaments Europaabgeordnete ihr Mandat frei und unabhängig ausüben. Weder das Parlament noch seine Präsidentin sind befugt den Abgeordneten vorzuschreiben, wie sie abstimmen noch wie sie ihre politischen Tätigkeiten ausüben sollen.