European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Clément Evroux (1st edition).

On 27 February 2023, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation to allow voluntary digital labelling of EU fertilising products. This initiative follows similar EU legislative initiatives establishing the digital labelling of goods in other economic sectors, such as batteries. The rationale for digital labelling is provided by: on the one hand, the deployment of digital solutions such as QR codes, which can lower the cost of labelling while facilitating the updating of content; and on the other, the complexification of physical labelling, whose readability can prove difficult.

Against this backdrop, the proposal introduces a set of voluntary digital labelling schemes for EU fertilising products, whose requirements depend on the packaging arrangements and the users of the products (economic operators or end-users). The proposal also introduces a single set of technological requirements for all established labels, to ensure that labels are accessible free of charge, including for vulnerable groups.

In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection.

Versions

• May 2023: Digital labelling of EU fertilising products (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1009 as regards the digital labelling of EU fertilising products Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2023) 98
27.02.2023Rapporteur:2023/0049(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’)

Next steps expected: Appointment of the rapporteur

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

The required deployment of clean energy technologies to support the achievement of Europe’s 2030 and 2050 climate targets is considerable. Europe already largely imports these technologies, and many third countries have stepped up their efforts to expand their clean energy manufacturing capacity. On 16 March 2023, the Commission put forward a proposal for a ‘net-zero industry act’ that aims to expand the manufacturing capacity of net-zero technologies in the EU and enhance the resilience of its energy system.

The proposed regulation would set up enabling conditions for the manufacturing of 10 net-zero technologies (through streamlined administrative processes and access to regulatory sandboxes and European net-zero industry academies). Eight ‘strategic’ net-zero technologies would gain additional benefits (even shorter administrative processes, facilitated access to markets, and administrative support to access finance). The proposed regulation would aim to ensure that, by 2030, the manufacturing capacity in the EU for these strategic net-zero technologies reaches an overall benchmark of at least 40 % of the EU’s annual deployment needs. It would also set an EU‑level target for annual CO2 injection capacity by 2030 (50 million tonnes).

The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is responsible for the file.

Versions

• May 2023: Net-zero industry act (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem (Net Zero Industry Act) Committee responsible:Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2023)161
16.3.2023Rapporteur:Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany)2023/0081(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Tsvetelina Penkova (S&D, Bulgaria)
Christophe Grudler (Renew, France)
Damien Carême (Greens/EFA, France)
Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, Czechia)
Paolo Borchia (ID, Italy)
Marc Botenga (The Left, Belgium)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’)

Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Between 2018 and 2020, over 18 000 migrant and refugee children were reported as missing in Europe. It is feared that many may have been exploited and abused for sexual or labour purposes. The European Parliament has repeatedly stressed the need to address the disappearance of migrant children in the EU. The conflict in Ukraine and the subsequent mass displacement of people have only made the situation worse, creating fertile ground for criminal networks to take advantage of vulnerable people, especially children.

Background

The number of migrant children has been growing, both globally and in the European Union (EU). According to 2020 estimates, 35.5 million children worldwide (1.5 million more than in 2000), were living outside their country of birth. In 2021, Lost in Europe, a journalism project investigating the disappearance of migrant children, reported that more than 18 000 migrant children had gone missing in Europe between 2018 and 2020. According to Missing Children Europe, migrant children are considered missing ‘when they are registered with state authorities and go missing from the reception/accommodation centres provided for them’. While most missing migrant children are understood to be unaccompanied minors (UAMs), they also include separated children and children that were travelling with family. According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), UAMs missing from first reception facilities are a major concern in many EU Member States. However, incomplete and inconsistent reporting makes it difficult to fully grasp the picture. The importance of data collection and sharing has been confirmed by several studies on missing migrants; a single contact point would arguably make it much easier to search for and find information about such people. In fact, registration is particularly relevant in the case of children, as it lessens the risk of them going missing while also helping families reunite. In addition, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there have been reports of children disappearing after having arrived in EU countries from Ukraine. Overall, the reasons for children’s disappearance include: poor reception conditions; a lack of child-friendly information; inefficient family reunification and guardian-appointment procedures; fear of detention or deportation; the desire to join family or friends in another country; and violence and abuse, including illegal adoption and trafficking.

EU action to protect children in migration

In recent years, the EU has adopted a series of policies relevant to children in migration. In February 2007, the European Commission adopted a decision requiring EU countries to reserve the telephone number 116000 as a hotline for reporting missing children, including UAMs of third-country origin. The hotline has been implemented gradually at national level and is now active in 32 countries.

In a communication from 2017, the European Commission laid out a list of priority actions aimed at contributing to the protection of children in migration. Moreover, in its 2020 communication on a new Pact on Migration and Asylum, the Commission stressed that ‘the reform of EU rules on asylum and return is an opportunity to strengthen safeguards and protection standards under EU law for migrant children’. It furthermore identified children’s rights as a priority to be taken into consideration as part of a broader range of initiatives, such as those set out in the 2020 action plan on integration and inclusion 2021-2027 and the 2021 EU strategy on voluntary return and reintegration. In 2020, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) called on EU Member States to do ‘whatever is necessary and required in the best interests of the child’ to avoid the disappearance of thousands of child refugees and migrants globally.

More recently, the 2021 EU strategy on the rights of the child stressed the vulnerability of migrant children, who are often deeply traumatised by what they have had to endure in their country of origin or on a migratory route. The strategy notes that migrant children are more likely to be victims of abuse and violence, and that the risk of going missing increases ‘when children travel unaccompanied or are obliged to share overcrowded facilities with adult strangers’. Additionally, several directives look at the specific situation of migrant children, with a view to preventing them from going missing and falling victim to criminal networks. For instance, Article 24 of the Reception Conditions Directive and Article 25 of the Asylum Procedures Directive envisage the appointment of guardians for UAMs, while Article 14 of the Anti-Trafficking Directive requires Member States to provide specific assistance and support to child victims. Moreover, AMBER Alert Europe aims to achieve zero missing children in Europe by increasing the technological and human resources that are mobilised in searches for missing children.

In focus: The situation of missing Ukrainian children
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Magnolia has recorded more than 2 100 children as kidnapped, abducted, forcibly disappeared or simply missing inside Ukraine. Similarly, NGOs and public authorities have been warning about the risk of violence and trafficking facing children outside Ukraine too, stressing the importance of proper registration. The Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) has likewise warned of the danger faced by people fleeing Ukraine of falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, the Office of the European Parliament Vice-President, and EP Coordinator on Children’s Rights, Ewa Kopacz, cooperates with a number of stakeholders on the issue of missing Ukrainian children, while continuing to keep awareness of Ukrainian children high on the Parliament‘s agenda. In March 2022, the Commission presented a 10-point plan for stronger EU coordination on welcoming people fleeing the war against Ukraine. The plan envisages strengthening children’s protection by developing ‘standard operating procedures and uniform guidance for the reception and support of children, as well as specific procedures for the transfer of UAMs‘ and measures on recording and exchange of information. The plan also underpins the development of an anti-trafficking plan, while also supporting the ‘Safe Homes’ initiative. Finally, during the first joint mission of the Parliament, Commission and Council to Kyiv focusing on the protection of Ukrainian children under institutional care, Parliament’s Coordinator on Children’s Rights, Ewa Kopacz, met with First Lady Olena Zelenska and the Presidential Commissioner for Children, Daria Herasymczuk, to discuss the concerns for children illegally deported or retained in Russia and the Russian-occupied territories. European Parliament position

The need to tackle the disappearance of migrant children has featured in several Parliament resolutions in recent years. In a November 2014 resolution, Parliament stressed that many UAMs had disappeared or absconded after their arrival in the EU, and insisted that more should be done to ensure that the rights of migrant children were fully respected across the EU. In a December 2016 resolution, Parliament called on the Commission to ensure that UAMs do not disappear and to design a strategy for that purpose and for the purpose of identifying the whereabouts of missing children. In another December 2016 resolution, Parliament recommended reinforcing the existing tools for finding missing children and noted that children’s rights and the best interest of the child needed to be taken into account and assessed in all EU policies and actions, including migration and asylum.

In May 2018, Parliament called on the Member States to place all children and families with children in non-custodial, community-based accommodation while their immigration status is being processed. Parliament also stressed the need to host UAMs in separate facilities from adults to avoid any risk of violence and sexual abuse. In November 2019, Parliament called on the Member States to improve the situation of children in migration and stressed the importance of child protection as a fundamental principle for the EU. In March 2021, Parliament stressed that the EU strategy on the rights of the child needed to include measures to improve the situation of children in migration and protect their interests at every stage of asylum procedures. In April 2022, Parliament adopted a resolution on the protection of children and young people fleeing the war in Ukraine, which stressed the need to identify vulnerable groups and to move swiftly to appoint guardians for UAMs. Most recently, Parliament also highlighted the risk of children falling victim to human trafficking in relation to the situation of Ukrainian migrant- and displaced children.

This updates an ‘at a glance’ note by Micaela Del Monte and Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou published in September 2022.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Disappearance of migrant children in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

The EU’s ambition to become a climate-neutral economy by 2050, and its ability to sustain the green and digital transition and achieve strategic autonomy, all rely heavily on reliable, secure and resilient access to critical raw materials (CRMs).

On 16 March 2023, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on CRMs. It introduces the concept of strategic raw materials (SRMs), which are key for some strategic technologies and vulnerable to shortages. The general objective of the proposed regulation is to improve the functioning of the single market by establishing a framework to ensure the EU’s access to a secure and sustainable supply of CRMs. To achieve this, the regulation would pursue four specific objectives: strengthening the whole SRM value chain; diversifying the EU’s imports of SRMs (so that by 2030, no third country would provide more than 65 % of the EU’s annual consumption of each SRM); improving the EU’s ability to monitor and mitigate the CRM supply risk; ensuring the free movement of CRMs and products containing CRMs placed on the EU market; and ensuring a high level of environmental protection, by improving their circularity and sustainability.

The proposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is responsible for the file.

Versions

• May 2023: Critical raw materials act (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 Committee responsible:Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2023)160
16.3.2023Rapporteur:Nicola Beer (Renew, Germany)2023/0079(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Hildegard Bentele (EPP, Germany)
Mohammed Chahim (S&D, the Netherlands)
Henrike Hahn (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Izabela-Helena Kloc (ECR, Poland)
Marie Dauchy (ID, France)
Cornelia Ernst (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Discussion of draft report in committee

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Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The United States, China and the European Union are making more and more funds available for the green economic transition and efforts to fight climate change. Increased government spending on green technologies also serves the goal of establishing or expanding industries that have emerged as strategic at a time of global warming, as well as providing quality jobs. This subsidy race is strongly affected by the technological rivalry between China and the US.

However, the race in governments’ support to develop or strengthen sectors such as batteries, electronic vehicles, solar panels, wind turbines and many others, may not be the best solution for decarbonising the economy, some think-tank analysts say. It risks a downward race among governments, and suboptimal allocation of resources.

This note offers links to recent reports and commentaries from some major international think tanks and research institutes on the green transition. Analyses on EU clean tech and industrial policies can be found a previous edition of What think tanks are thinking.

Green hydrogen: Loaded up and (long-haul) trucking
Atlantic Council, May 2023

Europe’s policies for a green transition: The European Commission’s geopolitical turn and its pitfalls
Finnish Institute for International Relations, May 2023

Industrial policy for electric vehicle supply chains and the US-EU fight over the Inflation Reduction Act
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2023

The US and the EU want to create a hydrogen economy: They need the BIS in BRICS
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2023

“Carbon management”: Opportunities and risks for ambitious climate policy
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2023

Building a prosperous world with fewer emissions
Brookings Institution, April 2023

Green transition: Create a European energy agency
Bruegel, April 2023

North Sea Summit: Blowing in the wind?
Bruegel, April 2023

Mobilising transition finance will require credible corporate climate plans
Bruegel, April 2023

Why Europe’s critical raw materials strategy has to be international
Bruegel, April 2023

Rising to the challenge: EU actorness in climate policy and its global impact
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023

Europe’s pursuit of securing critical raw materials for the green transition
Chatham House, April 2023

The Critical Raw Materials Act: Digging in the dirt for a sustainable future
Climate Foresight, April 2023

Pour fabriquer une électricité non polluante, avoir un horizon de long terme
Fondation Jean Jaurès, April 2023

Greenhouse gas emissions in the EU
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, April 2023

Rise in coal use and decline in hydropower cancelled out EU gains in renewables this year
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2023

“Made in America” puts the brakes on electric vehicles Biden hopes to push
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2023

Can China’s green energy acceleration put at risk the West’s hydrogen plans?
Rand Corporation, April 2023

The green, digital and social transitions: Towards a new Eco-social pact
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, March 2023

Energy and climate challenges will continue in 2023
Brookings Institution, March 2023

Developing countries are key to climate action
Brookings Institution, March 2023

The ‘Green Golden Rule’ for the green transition
Bruegel, March 2023

The potential of sovereign sustainability-linked bonds in the drive for net-zero
Bruegel, March 2023

The Net-Zero Industry Act puts EU credibility at risk
Bruegel, March 2023

Climate adaptation: The race to cool down Europe’s cities
European Policy Centre, March 2023

Energy prices, not us subsidies, are Europe’s biggest headache
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023

What the IPCC report means for global action on 1.5°C
Chatham House, March 2023

Climate action in China
Chatham House, March 2023

Europe’s green industrial policy and the United States’ IRA: Reducing dependence on China
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, March 2023

Certification of carbon dioxide removals evaluation of the Commission proposal
Ecologic Institute, March 2023

Blowing in the balance: Europe’s wind industry
Friends of Europe, March 2023

Que faut-il retenir du European Critical Raw Materials Act
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, March 2023

Building climate resilience in urban informal settlements through data co-production
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2023

Four lessons on the interaction between climate change mitigation policies and social behaviour
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2023

A permanent EU Investment Fund for tackling the climate and energy crisis
Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, March 2023

The role of the ocean in climate policy
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2023

Power play: How the US benefits if China greens the Global South
Brookings Institution, February 2023

Climate versus trade? Reconciling international subsidy rules with industrial decarbonisation
Bruegel, February 2023

Climate action, social justice, and democracy: Europe’s new trilemma
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

Plugging green power into the EU-ASEAN partnership
Clingendael, Feruary 2023

For a green European industrial policy
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, February 2023

A European green deal diplomacy toolbox
E3G, February 2023

Strategy and risk: How to make the Green Deal Industrial Plan a geoeconomic success
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

The power of pragmatism: Nuclear energy, technological innovation, and the green transition
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

Decarbonise and democratise: How the European Green Deal could transform high-carbon economies
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

EU poised to copy US subsidies for green technology: New evidence from China shows how it could backfire
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, February 2023

The US-EU race for green subsidies can help fight climate change
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2023

Where is the carbon premium? Global performance of green and brown stocks
Brookings Institution, January 2023

Carbon farming co-benefits: Approaches to enhance and safeguard biodiversity
Ecologic, Institute for European Environmental Studies, January 2023

More than just a petrol station: Norway’s contribution to European Union’s green strategic autonomy
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, January 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Green transition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

‘This is Europe’ – an initiative proposed by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola – consists of a series of debates with EU leaders to discuss their visions for the future of the European Union. In his address to the European Parliament on Europe Day, 9 May 2023, a geopolitical EU was a central theme for the Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz. He stressed that, in a multipolar world, the EU needed ‘a genuine partnership with the countries of Asia, Africa and South America, without Eurocentrism’. He called for an enlarged EU with an honest enlargement policy, also in the context of a geopolitical Europe. He supported Parliament’s calls for EU reforms, notably the use of qualified majority voting in the Council on foreign policy and taxes, and promised to promote such changes within the European Council.

We need a geopolitical European Union, an enlarged and reformed European Union and, last but not least, a European Union that is open to the future.

Olaf Scholz

Background

Roberta Metsola launched the ‘This is Europe’ initiative shortly after her election as president of the European Parliament in January 2022. Olaf Scholz is the ninth EU leader to have addressed the Parliament since its Conference of Presidents endorsed the initiative on 28 April 2022. These debates will continue during subsequent sessions.

A similar Parliament initiative, ahead of the 2019 European elections, saw a number of EU leaders speak in Parliament’s plenary sessions about their views on the future of Europe. A 2019 EPRS analysis of those future of Europe debates pinpointed similarities and differences in EU leaders’ views.

Figure 1 – Time devoted by Olaf Scholz to various topics in his speech

The ‘This is Europe’ initiative is particularly relevant in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), a bottom-up exercise that allowed EU citizens to express their opinions on the EU’s future policies and functioning. On 30 April 2022, the CoFoE plenary adopted 49 proposals (see EPRS overview), including more than 300 measures by which they might be achieved. As a follow-up, Parliament adopted a resolution, by a large majority, calling for a convention in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. This call was backed by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union speech on 14 September 2022.

At the June 2022 European Council meeting, the Heads of State or Government ‘took note’ of the CoFoE proposals. While calling for ‘an effective follow-up’, they did not provide specific guidelines in this respect. Instead, they merely stated that each EU institution should follow up on the proposals ‘within their own sphere of competences’, rather than acting jointly. EPRS research has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council, as expressed in the latter’s 2019‑2024 strategic agenda and its conclusions over the past 3 years.

Main focus of Olaf Scholz’s speech

Scholz addressed a wide range of topics in his speech to Parliament (see Figure 1). In terms of words, he devoted most attention to i) a geopolitical Europe, ii) migration, and iii) the war in Ukraine.

Geopolitical Europe

Without using the expression, his vision of a geopolitical EU resembles the concept of strategic autonomy. He stressed that Europe needed to ‘invest more in our security and defence – in civil resilience, technological sovereignty, reliable supply chains, our independence in critical raw materials’. For Scholz, a geopolitical EU is one which knows its place in the world, and is aware of its global responsibility. Cooperation with other countries, including trade agreements, is crucial for the future, both for them and for Europe. For him, an honest enlargement policy and keeping the EU’s promises is also part of the concept.

Migration

Chancellor Scholz stressed that EU Member States were ‘united by the goal of better managing and ordering irregular migration without betraying our values’. The solution must be based on European solidarity; however, in his view, one cannot wait for this solidarity to materialise out of thin air. Therefore, he called for the work to be finalised in the Council before the next EP elections. Given the demand for workers in many parts of Europe, linking regular migration opportunities with the call for countries of origin and transit to take back those who do not have the right to stay in the EU would increase the acceptance in the EU population for regular migration.

War in Ukraine

The Chancellor underlined that the Union had seldom been more united than after this ‘despicable breach of the European and international peace order’. He called for the EU to remain steadfast in its support of Ukraine – as long as necessary. He indicated that the reconstruction of Ukraine would require political and financial capital for a long time, but stressed that a democratic Ukraine, a European Ukraine, was the ‘clearest rejection of Putin’s imperial, revisionist, illegal policy on our continent’.

Specific proposals and positions

The German Chancellor used the opportunity to present his views on how the European Union should advance in specific policy areas. He reiterated earlier proposals, and made new ones, summarised below.

Policy issuePriority action and proposals (quotes)Rule of law / EU reforms‘To strengthen the European Commission’s ability to launch infringement procedures when our fundamental values are violated: freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’.EU reforms‘A reformed Europe should take decisions on foreign policy and taxes by qualified majority. It is not unanimity that creates the greatest possible legitimacy, but the democratic competition for majorities, and compromises that also do justice to the interests of the minority’.Trade‘It is more than reasonable to quickly conclude new and fair free trade agreements – with Mercosur, with Mexico, with India, Indonesia, Australia, Kenya and, in the future, with many other countries’.Security and defence‘The EU needs a closer integration of our defence efforts, and to build an integrated European defence industry’.Energy and climate‘Probably the greatest task is the departure of our countries, our economies and societies into a climate-neutral future’.Table – Specific proposals made by Olaf Scholz, by policy area

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘‘This is Europe’ debate in the European Parliament: Speech by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of Germany, 9 May 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Höflmayr (1st edition).

The overwhelming majority of businesses in the European Union (EU) are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). They employ almost two thirds of the workforce, create 85 % of all new jobs and generate about three fifths of EU value added. In the period from 2010 to 2020, only a small proportion of EU SMEs said that they raised external financing through capital markets (4 %), while a quarter used bank loans, and a fifth used business-to-business trade credits or internal funds.

To make capital markets more attractive to EU SMEs and diversify their sources of external financing, the European Commission tabled three interconnected proposals in December 2022. They seek to streamline the listing process, balancing the regulatory and compliance costs to companies seeking to list, or already listed, and ensuring proper investor protection and market integrity.

The key amendments seek to cut red tape in the listing process: at the pre-IPO stage by facilitating the development and provision of investment research while avoiding conflicts of interest inherent in such research; at the IPO stage by making it easier and cheaper for issuers to draw up a prospectus; and at the post-IPO stage by providing more clarity on what constitutes inside information. A new directive on multiple-vote share structures would harmonise national laws and allow listed companies’ owners to raise more funds at a given voting share.

Versions

• May 2023: Listing act (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation amending Regulations (EU) 2017/1129, (EU) No 596/2014 and (EU) No 600/2014 to make public capital markets in the Union more attractive for companies and to facilitate access to capital for small and medium-sized enterprises; Proposal for a directive amending Directive 2014/65/EU to make public capital markets in the Union more attractive for companies and to facilitate access to capital for small and medium-sized enterprises and repealing Directive 2001/34/EC; Proposal for a directive on multiple-vote share structures in companies that seek the admission to trading of their shares on an SME growth market Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2022) 762;
COM(2022) 761;
COM(2022) 760
7.12.2022Rapporteur:Alfred Sant (S&D, Malta)2022/0411(COD);
2022/0405(COD);
2022/0406(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Inese Vaidere (EPP, Latvia),
Eva Maria Poptcheva (Renew, Spain), Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA, France), Valentino Grant (ID, Italy),
Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Ionel Zamfir (1st edition).

EU equality directives have laid down an obligation for Member States to establish equality bodies, mandated to assist victims of discrimination, and to prevent and fight discrimination on the grounds listed under the directives. The legal provisions are, however, general in nature and do little to define precisely these bodies’ mandate and way of working. This has led in practice to a great divergence among Member States. In some EU countries, lack of resources, insufficient independence or a limited focus on discrimination grounds have been serious obstacles to the functioning of these bodies. Other EU countries have taken a more ambitious approach.

After adopting a recommendation in 2018 on standards for equality bodies and assessing its implementation, the European Commission moved to binding legislation. The proposal, published in December 2022 together with another one as part of the equality package, aims to reinforce the equality bodies’ independence, resources and mandate.

While general welcoming the proposal, stakeholders have suggested specific legal changes to it.

In the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality. A rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs have not yet been appointed.

Versions

• May 2023: Standards for equality bodies: Equal treatment between women and men in employment (ordinary legislative procedure) (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, and deleting Article 20 of Directive 2006/54/EC and Article 11 of Directive 2010/41/EU Committee responsible:Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM)COM(2022) 688
7.12.2022Rapporteur:2022/0400(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Appointment of rapporteurs, draft report

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

Among the highlights of the May I plenary session were debates on the EU budget and own resources, as well as on 55 reports on the discharge for the 2021 budget. Members addressed a variety of issues, including the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact, and the role of farmers as enablers of the green transition and a resilient agricultural sector. Further debates concerned Ukrainian cereals on the European market, the act in support of ammunition production (on which Parliament voted to fast-track the legislative proposal, with a vote during the May II session), updating the anti-corruption legislative framework, the roadmap on a Social Europe, fighting cyberbullying of young people across the EU, and the adequacy of the protection afforded by the EU-US Data Privacy Framework. Members also considered Commission statements on oceans, biodiversity and fisheries. A debate was held on the European Citizens’ Initiative, ‘Stop Finning – Stop the trade’.

Finally, Members heard and then debated a ‘This is Europe’ address by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of Germany, and heard an address by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, President of Portugal, in a formal sitting.

2024 EU budget – Borrowing costs of the EU recovery instrument

The biggest issue on Parliament’s agenda this plenary session was the EU budget. Members held a joint debate on the current multiannual EU budget and own resources. Parliament adopted a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) initiative report addressing the undermining of the EU’s capacity to finance its priorities as a result of rising borrowing costs for the EU recovery instrument. Members also debated a BUDG report urging a revision of the EU’s long-term budget by 2024. To avoid having to cancel existing programmes due to lack of funds, the committee calls on the Council to act urgently to adopt the stalled Own Resources Decision.  

Discharge for 2021

To ensure the transparent and democratic scrutiny of how public funds are spent, Parliament’s elected Members decide whether the EU institutions have disbursed their budget in accordance with the rules. Members debated and voted 55 reports on the discharge procedure for the EU’s 2021 budget. The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommended granting discharge to all 33 EU decentralised agencies and 9 joint undertakings. However, the committee also drew attention to the European Court of Auditors’ recommendations, including the need for all joint undertakings to adopt common guidelines. In the light of the continued institutional differences between Parliament and the European Council and Council, the committee once again proposed to postpone the decision on discharge of their 2021 budget. In the interests of transparency, Parliament has refused to grant discharge to the Council each financial year since 2009. By contrast, the CONT committee proposed to grant discharge to all other EU institutions and bodies, although it again made observations on opportunities to improve budgetary management. For the first time, the discharge procedure for the European Commission also applied to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Here, the Commission appears to have taken previous CONT committee criticism on board, and CONT proposed that Parliament grant discharge to the Commission, all executive agencies and for the European Development Funds for 2021. However, it also drew attention to the need for stronger control on spending by national authorities and non-governmental organisations. Parliament voted to grant discharge in all cases, except for the Council and European Council.

Methane emissions reduction in the energy sector

Members continue to focus on efforts towards mitigating climate change. The oil, gas and coal sectors are responsible for more than a third of man-made methane emissions worldwide. Members debated and adopted a position on the European Commission’s proposal for an EU strategy to reduce energy sector methane emissions, based on a joint report by Parliament’s Committees on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and on Industry, Research and Energy. Parliament can now start interinstitutional negotiations on this basis. Among other changes, the report seeks to oblige the Commission to set a binding 2030 methane emissions reduction target for all actors in the sector.

Empowering consumers for the green transition

Members debated a Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) report that seeks to strengthen protection and legal certainty for consumers and economic operators alike, in the context of a Commission proposal to empower consumers for the green transition. The adopted text sets Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council.

EU accession to the Istanbul Convention on violence against women

Members considered and followed a joint recommendation from the Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), voting to give Parliament’s consent for ratification of EU accession to the Istanbul Convention. First proposed in 2016, six EU countries have refused to ratify the Istanbul Convention on violence against women. However, as the European Court of Justice has ruled that unanimity in the Council is not necessary in this case, the way is open for EU accession to an agreement that addresses gender-based violence (GBV).

2022 reports on Serbia and Kosovo

Members debated and adopted two Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee reports, following up the Commission’s annual reports for 2022 on Serbia and Kosovo. In the first, on Serbia, the committee welcomed the country’s continued ambition for EU membership. However, it regrets Serbia’s failure to align with EU sanctions against Russia and its continued difficult relations with Kosovo. Normalising relations between Belgrade and Pristina would be an important step forward on Serbia’s path to EU membership. Although the second report, on Kosovo, calls for a commitment to genuine dialogue with Serbia, the AFET committee commended Kosovo’s progress on reforms and fighting corruption, and particularly praised Kosovo’s condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Stop Finning – Stop the trade’

Members held a debate on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Stop Finning – Stop the trade‘ which, with over 1.1 million signatures, has earned support across the EU. The initiative aims to ban fin trading – other than when naturally attached to the shark’s body – in the EU, which remains one of the biggest exporters and transit centres for shark fins. Indeed catching sharks is now largely carried out for the purpose of fin trading, according to the ECI’s organisers, in particular with the aim of exporting to Asian regions.    

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed without a vote several mandates to enter interinstitutional negotiations, from the Budgets and Budgetary Control (BUDG/CONT) Committees on amendments to the EU’s Financial Regulation, from the Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) Committee on labelling of organic pet food, from the Foreign Affairs and Industry, Research and Energy (AFET/ITRE) Committees on European defence industry reinforcement through a common procurement act, and from the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee on protection of workers from asbestos.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – May I 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Cécile Remeur.

At a time when global and cross-border crises are highlighting the interconnections between health, environment, peace, food security and energy sufficiency, notions such as externalities, public goods and biodiversity boundaries are gaining renewed interest, as a strong grasp of the various aspects of challenging situations becomes essential to help frame policy responses.

The notion of externalities is about asking whether all elements have been accounted for in price setting. When this is not the case, the mismatch is described as a positive or negative externality. The question then is how to correct the situation through pricing and with a price signal – something that can be achieved through taxation or regulation.

Beyond pricing, public goods – as opposed to private goods – are goods and services that can be enjoyed by all. They bring advantages to society as a whole, and their geographical scope can vary from local and regional to global.

Moving one step further, it is necessary to consider the effects on public goods of activities that might not be seen or occur at the same time or in the same place as the activities themselves. This relates to notions such as tipping points, footprints, sustainability and the preservation of biodiversity.

This briefing aims to shed light on those invisible effects, to complement existing discussions and pave the way for new tools to address environmental challenges.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding silent and invisible assets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon with Alessandra De Martini.

On 15 April 2023, violent armed clashes flared up again in Sudan between the main two military factions battling for control of the country: the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by former Sovereign Council leader General Muhammad Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagolo; and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), headed by Sudan’s de facto President, General Abdel Fattah Al‑Burhan. The armed attacks are causing numerous civilian casualties as well as massive population displacements to neighbouring countries, while foreign powers are evacuating their citizens. Despite a succession of ceasefires, the conflict seems likely to continue for the near future, with major repercussions for the regional balance of power.

Background

After Al-Bashir was deposed by a coup d’état in April 2019, Sudan attempted a transition to democracy. A transitional government led by a civilian Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, and a Sovereign Council, headed by Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah Al‑Burhan and General Muhammad Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagolo, shared the power. The two military officers represented the competing military pillars of Al‑Bashir’s government: Al‑Burhan is a former Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) commander in Central Darfur State and in Yemen, and Hemedti is chief of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – a paramilitary group in control of the mining sector (mainly gold in Darfur).

In November 2021, the military dissolved the Sovereign Council and the transitional government fell. After weeks of mass protests, Hamdok was reinstated as Prime Minister, but resigned in January 2022 due to a political deadlock. Al‑Burhan took control of the government and established a new ruling Sovereign Council, declining African Union (AU) and EU-Norway-UK-US mediation to resolve Sudan’s political crisis.

After months of negotiations and peace talks, political and military leaders and civilians signed a framework agreement in December 2022, envisaging the removal of the military’s involvement in the government and economy and establishing a 2-year transition period with a civilian-led administration prior to elections. In March 2023, the same stakeholders agreed to adopt a new constitution and to transfer the power to a civilian administration the following month.

The power struggle continued, however, and these deadlines were not met. One of the main disputes between the two military factions is the integration of the RSF into the national armed forces: Hemedti wants to postpone this procedure for 10 years, while Al‑Burhan aims to unite the two military forces within 2 years.

Current political and humanitarian situation

Fighting between the main two military factions reached a new level of violence in the capital on 15 April 2023. Khartoum emerged as the epicentre of the uprising, as it hosts some key locations, including the national intelligence services, the international airport and institutional buildings. The fighting quickly spread around the country, becoming a serious threat to regional stability. Some analysts have also reported a sharp increase in inter-tribal violence in the country’s west and south, owing to the current political and economic instability. Furthermore, they warn about the repercussions of refugee displacement to neighbouring countries, such as Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia or the Central African Republic. On 27 April 2023, the two sides agreed to extend a 72‑hour Saudi-US-mediated humanitarian ceasefire (which began on 24 April), for another 72 hours. On 1 May 2023, the United Nations envoy in Sudan, Volker Perthes, announced that Al-Burhan and Hemedti were willing to enter into talks. On 2 May, South Sudan announced it had brokered a 7‑day ceasefire between the RSF and SAF from 4 to 11 May.

The ceasefires failed and the spiral of violence is increasing daily. Air attacks and shooting persists and neither the RSF nor the SAF have manifested an intention to withdraw. Meanwhile, living conditions for civilians are dramatic. Civilian deaths are estimated at over 400, but statistics are difficult to gather. On 2 May 2023, UN agencies estimated that over 100 000 people had fled Sudan to neighbouring countries, including refugees from these countries – and this figure may quickly amount to 800 000. More than 330 000 people have been displaced within the country. Most of the hospitals are closed, or operate only in some emergencies. Stores, markets and banks have halted business, fearing bomb attacks. Accordingly, food prices are rising and the already acute food and drinking water shortage is worsening. The humanitarian needs are escalating rapidly as 65 % of Sudan’s population lived below the poverty line even before the latest clashes. Western embassies are evacuating their nationals.

Regional and international repercussions

Sudan’s power struggles will have severe repercussions on the country’s attempts to transition to democracy, as well as on stability at regional level. Previously, the AU, the EU and the US have strongly supported the implementation of democratic reforms and provided considerable funding. However, this has failed to help achieve the negotiated targets (which included establishing a transitional civilian government, transitional justice and security and military reform).

Both sides have been trying to strengthen alliances inside and outside the country. Al‑Burhan has the support of veteran Darfuri rebels and some Islamist groups. Hemedti won ‘the favor of some democrats by criticizing the Islamists’ strong return‘, according to a Sudanese editorialist. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as the Wagner Group, reportedly provided weapons, training and troops for Hemedti’s RSF.

Several regional and international powers have economic and political interests in the sub‑Saharan country, which a democratic transition could have threatened. Egypt has sided with Al‑Burhan, until recently an ally against the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the River Nile, and ‘probably to try to prevent a dangerous precedent of successful transition from military autocracy to civilian democracy’, according to one security expert.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported the overthrowing of Al‑Bashir in 2019, and have sided with Hemedti, who provided them with troops to fight in Yemen. China and Russia have invested heavily in extracting Sudanese natural resources and it is expected that they will try to preserve their economic and security interests. According to experts, the fighting will continue for the foreseeable future. Strong diplomatic efforts involving regional players, such as the AU, the Arab League and the Horn of Africa’s Inter‑Governmental Association for Development (IGAD) may play a significant role in preventing the escalation of the conflict and in providing humanitarian help for civilians to overcome the crisis. An International Crisis Group expert suggests that one of the Arab countries might drive the dialogue for the cessation of hostilities, as these countries are the most affected by the crisis.

EU involvement
The day before the outbreak of the crisis, the EU and its partners expressed concern about the tensions. Shortly after, the EU High Representative called for a ceasefire and for humanitarian corridors to be set up. The EU special representative for the Horn of Africa has entered discussions with the AU and other stakeholders on ending the conflict. On 24 April 2023, the EU Foreign Affairs Council discussed evacuation plans and mediation possibilities to prevent the escalation of the conflict. EU Member State-led operations have evacuated most of the 1 700 EU citizens present in Sudan, as well as non-EU citizens. Humanitarian supply distribution and refugee corridors are among the first EU humanitarian priorities. During the 24 April Council meeting, Finland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto, (Special EU Envoy to Sudan in 2021), highlighted the risks of further Wagner Group engagement in the region, considering the lack of involvement from Western democracies. Some analysts recommend that the EU should take on a mediator role to support civilian actors in the political process.
Members from the European Parliament‘s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) visited Sudan in September 2022, to urge ‘all parties to come to an agreement’ to resume the path to democracy. They also expressed their concern that ‘further delay in agreeing on the way out of the crisis [would…] aggravate the already immense challenges that the people of Sudan are facing’.
AFET and the Committee on Development (DEVE) discussed the situation in Sudan on 26 April 2023. A particular focus was on evacuation plans activated for EU citizens living and working in the country. The committees urged cooperation with regional powers, to reach an agreement to enhance peace, development and humanitarian access. The committees also highlighted the importance of avoiding the regionalisation of the conflict, or a prolonged ceasefire that would allow both militias to resupply.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Sudan crisis: Developments and implications‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gregor Erbach (1st edition).

Road transport is a major contributor to climate change, and CO2 emissions from heavy-duty vehicles have grown by 29 % since 1990, accounting for over a quarter of road transport CO2 emissions.

On 14 February 2023, the European Commission tabled a legislative proposal to revise Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 setting CO2 emission standards for new heavy-duty vehicles in the EU. The proposed revision would expand the scope of the regulation to include urban buses, coaches, trailers and other types of lorries. The average CO2 emissions of heavy-duty vehicles, compared with 2019 levels, would have to fall by 45 % from 2030, by 65 % from 2035, and by 90 % from 2040 onwards. The proposal sets CO2 requirements for new trailers and targets 100 % of newly registered urban buses to be zero-emission vehicles from 2030.

In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The Council is examining the proposal at working party level.

Versions

• May 2023: CO₂ emission performance standards and reporting obligations for new heavy-duty vehicles (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 as regards strengthening the CO₂ emission performance standards for new heavy-duty Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2023) 88 final
14.2.2023Rapporteur:Yannick Jadot (Greens/EFA, France)2023/0042(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jens Gieseke (EPP, Germany)
Christel Schaldemose (S&D, Denmark)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Members of the European Parliament meet in plenary from 8 to 11 May, a significant week in the European Union calendar, as Europe Day, celebrating peace and unity, falls on 9 May. That day, the Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, is due to attend the plenary to take part in the latest ‘This is Europe’ debate. The following day, the President of Portugal, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, is expected to address Members in a formal sitting. On Tuesday, The Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell is due to make a statement on the situation in Sudan, where violence is aggravating the already immense challenges the people of Sudan are facing in plenary on Tuesday.

The biggest issue on Parliament’s plenary agenda for this session is the EU budget. Members are expected to hold a joint debate on the current EU budget and own resources on Monday evening. The EU’s current financial situation is very tight, with rising EU recovery instrument (EURI) borrowing costs undermining the EU’s capacity to finance its priorities. Members are set to debate a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report urging a revision of the EU’s long-term budget before 2024. To avoid having to cancel existing programmes due to lack of funds, the committee calls on the Council to act urgently to adopt the stalled Own Resources Decision.

To ensure the transparent and democratic scrutiny of how public funds are spent, Parliament’s elected Members decide whether the EU institutions have disbursed their budget in accordance with the rules. On Tuesday, Members are due to discuss a number of files concerning the discharge procedure for the EU’s 2021 budget. The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommends granting discharge to all 33 EU decentralised agencies and 9 joint undertakings. However, the committee also draws attention to the European Court of Auditors’ recommendations, including the need for all joint undertakings to adopt common guidelines. In the light of the continued institutional differences between Parliament and the European Council and the Council, the committee once again proposes to postpone the decision on discharge of their 2021 budget. In the interests of transparency, Parliament has refused to grant discharge to the Council each financial year since 2009. In contrast, the CONT committee proposes to grant discharge to all other EU institutions and bodies, although it again makes observations on opportunities to improve budgetary management. For the first time, the discharge procedure for the European Commission will also apply to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Here, the Commission appears to have taken previous CONT committee criticism on board, and CONT proposes that Parliament grant discharge to the Commission, all executive agencies and for the European Development Funds for 2021. However, it also draws attention to the need for stronger control on spending by national authorities and non-governmental organisations.

Members continue to focus on efforts towards mitigating climate change on Monday evening. The oil, gas and coal sectors are responsible for more than a third of man-made methane emissions worldwide. Parliament’s Committees on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and on Industry, Research and Energy have examined the European Commission’s proposals for an EU strategy to reduce energy sector methane emissions and Members are due to debate their joint report on Monday evening, with the aim of fixing the institution’s position for trilogue negotiations. Among other changes, the report seeks to oblige the Commission to set a binding 2030 methane emissions reduction target for all actors in the sector.

To prevent companies making bogus claims about the environmental impact of their products, among other things, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) have prepared a report that seeks to strengthen protection and legal certainty for consumers and economic operators alike, in the context of a Commission proposal to empower consumers for the green transition. Members are due to debate the report on Tuesday evening, with the resulting text setting Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council.

In a joint debate also scheduled for Tuesday evening, Members are due to consider a recommendation from the Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) to grant the Council’s request for Parliament’s consent for ratification of EU accession to the Istanbul Convention. First proposed in 2016, six EU countries have refused to ratify the Istanbul Convention on violence against women. However, as the European Court of Justice has ruled that unanimity in the Council is not necessary in this case, the way is open for a broader EU accession to an agreement that addresses gender-based violence (GBV).

Each year, Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) reviews the Commission’s reports on reform progress in countries hoping to join the EU. Members are due to debate the committee’s findings on two of these reports, for 2022, on Tuesday evening. In the first, on Serbia, the committee welcomes the country’s continued ambition for EU membership. However, it regrets Serbia’s failure to align with EU sanctions against Russia and its continued difficult relations with Kosovo. Normalising relations between Belgrade and Pristina would be an important step forward on Serbia’s path to EU membership. Although the second report, on Kosovo, calls for a commitment to genuine dialogue with Serbia, the AFET committee commends Kosovo’s progress on reforms and fighting corruption, and particularly praises Kosovo’s condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

With over 1.1 million signatures, the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Stop Finning – Stop the trade‘ has earned support across the EU. Members are therefore due to debate the defence of sharks and rays on Thursday morning. The initiative aims to ban fin trading – other than when naturally attached to the shark’s body – in the EU, which remains one of the biggest exporters and transit centres for shark fins. Indeed catching sharks is now largely for fin trading, according to the ECI’s organisers, in particular with the aim of exporting to Asian regions.

Agenda Plenary Session May I 2023

• Situation in Sudan
• EU Budget Discharge 2021 – European Commission
• EU Budget Discharge 2021 – Other institutions
• EU Budget Discharge 2021 – Decentralised agencies
• Impact on the 2024 EU budget of increasing borrowing costs for the European Union Recovery Instrument
• Reducing methane emissions in the energy sector
• Empowering consumers for the green transition
• EU accession to the Istanbul Convention
• 2022 report on Serbia
• 2022 report on Kosovo
• ‘Stop Finning – Stop the Trade!’: European Citizens’ Initiative in defence of sharks and rays

Written by Nera Kuljanic with Michael Sicaud-Clyet.

Over the past 3.8 billion years, nature has been engineering itself to survive. It has also developed efficient and sustainable adaptation mechanisms against changing environmental conditions. To further the EU’s political ambitions, could we employ biomimicry to mitigate climate change and achieve climate neutrality?

Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, societies have gone from a set of metabolisms – using energy from water, wind and living beings – to a techno-industrial metabolism in which the economic and productive systems rely on carbon-based energy and excessive non-sustainable exploitation of natural resources. This new relationship between human beings and their environment has led to ecosystemic challenges such as climate change and diminishing biodiversity. Thus, over the past 200 years, the planet has been experiencing further biophysical transformations than what would otherwise have occurred naturally. While techno-industrial societies rely on fossil fuels, high temperatures and pressure to transform materials or create movement, natural ecosystems rely on molecular chemistry or physics, giving us clues on how we can use energy with maximum efficiency and adapt to changing environments.

Biomimicry comes from the Greek words bios (life) and mimikos (one who imitates). It is not a new practice; the most famous example of biomimicry is Leonardo Da Vinci’s flying machine inspired by birds. Biomimicry is a multidisciplinary approach that seeks to learn from nature’s biological mechanisms and imitate them to solve system problems. It is linked to biomimetics – the ‘interdisciplinary cooperation of biology and technology or other fields of innovation with the goal of solving practical problems through the function analysis of biological systems, their abstraction into models, and the transfer into and application of these models to the solution’.

There are three levels of practice in biomimicry. The organism level involves copying the form, shape or structure of a specific organism. The behaviour level involves imitating natural processes, such as the interaction between an ecosystem and its surroundings. The ecosystem level is about imitating the working principles of ecosystems, i.e. how different parts of an organism interact on a large scale.

Potential impacts and developments

At the organism level, most biomimicked structures fulfil an aesthetic purpose. Over the centuries, trees and plants have served as a source of inspiration for structures such as the ornamental structural columns in Greek and Roman classical architecture. In some rare cases, bio-inspired structures can interact with the environment. One such example is the Taichung Metropolitan Opera House in Taiwan, which can collect rainwater that is then filtered and reused.

At the behaviour level, biomimicry can make a greater contribution to fighting climate change and its impacts. A well-known example is the Harare Eastgate Centre, designed to resemble the shape and functioning of a termite mound. Termite mounds have a climate control function. Similarly, the way the centre extends upwards, the different wind velocities at its top and bottom, the fresh air that is drawn by means of a Venturi effect, as well as the heat emitted by the people and machinery on its premises give the building an impressively stable interior temperature, achieved without resorting to costly and energy-hungry air-conditioning. The building thus both mitigates climate change, by reducing energy consumption, and adapts to extreme heat events.

It is at the ecosystem level that biomimicry could have the biggest mitigating effect on climate change. An example includes the natural carbon removal process. Decomposition of organic matter ‘includes physical, chemical and biological mechanisms that transform organic matter into increasingly stable forms’. In boreal ecosystems, plant litter serves as a carbon source for micro-organisms that can degrade cellulose, hemicellulose and lignin. Bacteria provide trees with a number of substances (nitrogen, phosphorus, phytohormones and natural antibiotics) that improve their growth and protect them from disease. Fungi provide the forest ecosystem with nutrients, water and minerals. They also completely digest the lignin and produce humus, an organo-mineral complex that consists of about 60 % carbon, 6 % nitrogen, and smaller amounts of phosphorus and sulphur. The formation of this humic substance contributes to soil fertility and carbon storage. Fungi secrete glomalin (a glycoprotein made of glucose), which is estimated to contain a third of the carbon sequestered in the Earth’s soils. Finally, earthworms help to store carbon by mixing humus and clay provided by trees. Through all the above processes, decomposition plays an important role in the global carbon cycle by fixing nearly as much carbon as photosynthesis does. In 2019, natural land sinks, such as forests, grasslands and wetlands, fixed around 11.5 Gigatons of CO2, which is about 28 % of human-caused emissions. Thus, a whole ecosystem composed of trees, litter and micro-organisms produces an efficient process of carbon capture and storage.

There is currently no technology mimicking decomposition as a way to mitigate climate change. An ongoing ERC-funded project, CO2LIFE, ‘intends to develop a biomimetic chemical process that converts CO2 into valuable molecules using membrane technology’. CO2LIFE’s starting point is acknowledging nature’s effective mechanism to concentrate CO2 and fixate it into organic material, especially glucose, by means of enzymatic action. The findings of this project could make an important contribution towards developing a technology that imitates nature’s biological processes to mitigate climate change.

Anticipatory policy-making

An important issue regarding the further development of biomimetic solutions is the overall lack of financial investment in nature-based solutions and biodiversity restoration. Indeed, the development of biomimetic solutions could benefit from more substantial policy support, as is the case in the United States, where the government has provided funding for biomimicry research. In the EU, Germany hosts more than 100 public research institutions conducting biomimicry-related research and development, and a pioneering research centre in biomimicry was established in France in 2014. The EU has been funding work such as the Horizon 2020 AIRCOAT project and the Horizon Europe Nature4Nature project.

The role of education policy is important to further the understanding of the complexities of natural ecosystems. There are a number of higher education programmes in biomimicry in the EU – for instance, in the Netherlands, Spain and France – aimed at understanding nature’s capacity for solving system problems.

Finally, carbon-farming methods, where CO2 is removed from the atmosphere and stored in plant materials or soils, might need to be certified as part of the recently proposed regulation establishing a Union certification framework for carbon removals. Similar schemes could apply to future biomimetic technologies replicating chemical and biological processes from nature, to store and convert carbon.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if nature taught us to adapt to climate change?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if nature taught us to adapt to climate change?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Türkiye holds presidential and parliamentary elections on 14 May 2023, which could mark a political turnaround after two decades of increasing autocratic rule of the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan faces an unprecedented challenge from the main opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the head of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and presidential nominee for the six-party Nation Alliance bloc.

The elections take place amid a serious economic crisis and what analysts say is democratic erosion under Erdogan’s government. Polls predict a record voter turnout, and a tight race between the incumbent president and Kilicdaroglu. Under the Erdogan party’s rule, the Muslim country has abandoned its secularist tradition and turned into an increasingly difficult partner for the West, including the European Union and NATO.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Türkiye’s election, its relations with the EU and its internal and foreign policies.

Letter from Istanbul: Turkey has difficult years ahead
Brookings Institution, April 2023

Green politics could have an outsized impact on Türkiye’s elections
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

The strategic consequences of a Kılıçdaroğlu victory over Erdoğan
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

What the 2023 Turkish general election could mean for the EU-Turkey elections
Centre for European Reform, April 2023

Experts insights: Turkish elections
Clingendael, April 2023

Erdoğan is losing but the Turkish opposition is far from an assured victory
Democracy Paradox, April 2023

How the West should prepare for the Turkish elections
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

La Turquie, nouveau leader des non-alignés? Analyse de son repositionnement géostratégique
Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, April 2023

A new new Turkey? What an opposition victory would mean for Ankara’s foreign policy
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, April 2023

Un équilibre entre sécurité et innovation: La vision de l’opposition turque sur les politiques numériques du pays
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023

Les coalitions politiques en Turquie à la veille des élections de 2023
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023

Turkey goes to the polls: What lies ahead for its relations with the EU?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2023

EU-Turkey-UK triangulation: The key to Euro-Atlantic security
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2023

At a crossroads: What is at stake in Turkey‘s elections?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2023

What Turkey’s elections mean for Ukraine
Wilson Center, April 2023

Will earthquake be Erdogan’s Tarpeian rock?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, March 2023

The EU and Turkey after the elections: The start of a new chapter
Centre for European Reform, March 2023

Erdoğan is in danger
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

Has there been a rapprochement between Turkey and the West after the invasion of Ukraine
Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, March 2023

Turkey vis-à-vis Russia’s war against Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2023

Turkey’s foreign policy in the eastern Mediterranean: Peace-making in Cyprus at a cross-road
IPC-Mercator, March 2023

Consequences of the war in Ukraine: Two Areas of contention -Turkey and the Balkans
Rand Corporation, March 2023

Political and economic implications of the Turkish earthquakes:
Centralisation of power has eroded state capacity
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2023

The politics of Türkiye’s earthquake
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

Sailing through the storm: Türkiye’s Black Sea strategyaAmidst the Russian-Ukrainian war
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

Turkey’s neutral stance in Ukraine: How sustainable will it be?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, February 2023 

Turkey’s profound transformation matters to Europe
Carnegie Europe, January 2023

Is the EU ready for and/or willing to a change in Turkey?Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, January 2023

From aid to inclusion: A better way to help Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023

Turkey’s Kurds: Kingmakers in the upcoming elections?
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, January 2023

Governance practices in Turkey: A comparative perspective
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, January 2023

U.S., Turkey sanction ISIS financial network
Wilson Center, January 2023

Turkey’s global military footprint in 2022
Atlantic Council, December 2022

Turkey learns that hard power is a global common currency: Defense diplomacy elevates Ankara’s status on the international stage
Atlantic Council, December 2022

Understanding Turkey’s geostrategic posture
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

Bromance: Turkey’s activity in the Western Balkans
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2023

Turkey’s Eurasian ambitions at a time of geopolitical uncertainty
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Türkiye’s high-stakes elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask about the European Union’s rules regarding the Schengen Area and EU visa policy.

The Schengen area enables EU citizens and non-EU nationals, who are legally present in the EU, to travel between countries without being checked at national borders. It contributes to the free movement of citizens, allowing them to live, work and move around without formalities.

Twenty-seven countries are part of the Schengen agreement. They include most EU countries as well as four non-EU countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland).

The EU Member States Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland and Romania are not Schengen countries. Ireland has opted out of joining the agreement, while Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania are expected to join in the future.

Common rules for border checks

To ensure safe and controlled entry into the Schengen area, the Schengen Borders Code sets common rules for checks at the external border. These include checks on persons, duration of stay, as well as harmonised visa requirements for the Schengen area.

Member countries are evaluated regularly through the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism, to verify that the rules concerning the Schengen area are being applied.

In December 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code, which aims to improve the Schengen system’s resilience to serious threats, and to adapt it to new challenges. The proposal, which falls under the ordinary legislative procedure, is at the initial stage of the legislative process.

Common visa policy

The EU has established a common visa policy for travellers transiting or intending to stay for a short period in the Schengen area. It facilitates the entry of legal visitors into the EU, while strengthening internal security.

The most common type of visa for non-EU citizens is a short-stay visa, entitling a person to stay up to 90 days in a period of 180 days. Any of the Schengen countries can grant a visa, according to the Visa Code, which was updated in November 2021 to make the application process faster and easier, as well as to improve cooperation with non-EU countries. Visa requests for longer stays are managed by the EU country in which the visa applicant wishes to stay.

The EU has a common list of countries whose citizens must have a visa when crossing the external borders and a list of countries whose citizens are exempt from that requirement. These lists are set out in a 2021 regulation.

Temporary reintroduction of internal border controls

While the EU aims to keep the internal borders of the Schengen area open to facilitate free movement, member countries have the right to reintroduce internal border controls temporarily in exceptional circumstances, for instance:

• foreseeable events (e.g. sports events) drawing significant attention (renewable periods of 30 days, up to 6 months);
• immediate action that needs to be taken to respond to a threat (renewable periods of 20 days, up to 2 months);
• persistent serious deficiencies relating to external border control (3 renewals of any period up to 2 years).

These measures should only be introduced as a last resort to protect common interests within the Schengen Area. Recent examples include: some countries introduced internal border controls during the large-scale arrivals of migrants and refugees into the EU in 2015; and temporary internal border controls and travel restrictions from 2020 onwards, to prevent the spread of the coronavirus.

While sometimes necessary, internal border controls or closures can have a negative effect on both the economy and the fundamental freedoms of EU citizens. The European Parliament considers the Schengen Area a key EU achievement. In a 2021 resolution, Parliament expressed its commitment to safeguarding border-free movement.

Schengen enlargement

Croatia joined the Schengen area on 1 January 2023, following a period of intensive preparation and substantial efforts to meet all the necessary requirements.

Bulgaria and Romania have not yet joined the Schengen area, although they fulfil the criteria for full membership. The decision to allow new states to enter the border-free zone is taken unanimously by national governments. In a resolution on Bulgarian and Romanian accession to the Schengen area, adopted in October 2022, the European Parliament reiterated its long-standing position that Bulgaria and Romania should be allowed to join the Schengen area.

Further information

• The impact of coronavirus on Schengen borders, European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, April 2020
• Temporary border controls in the Schengen area, European Parliamentary Research Service, At A Glance, March 2020
• Revision of the common visa code, European Parliament, Legislative Train
• Schengen, Borders and Visa, European Commission

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages calling on the Parliament to defend the immunity of Clara Ponsatí Obiols, Member of the European Parliament (Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa, Spain), in the context of legal proceedings in Spain related to the 2017 Catalonia independence referendum.

Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject at the end of March 2023, when Clara Ponsatí was briefly arrested – and subsequently released – in Barcelona.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in Catalan, English, French, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese).

Main points made in the reply in English

The immunity of Members of the European Parliament is regulated by the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (Rules 7-9). A request by a Member for his or her immunity to be defended is announced in Parliament’s plenary and referred to the committee responsible – the Committee on Legal Affairs. The Committee examines the admissibility of the request, and may ask for any information or explanation which it deems necessary. The Member concerned is given an opportunity to be heard, and to present any documents or other written evidence.

Meeting in camera, the Committee on Legal Affairs adopts a recommendation to the whole Parliament to approve or reject the request. At the plenary session following the Committee decision, Parliament reaches a decision by a simple majority vote. Following the vote, the President immediately communicates Parliament’s decision to the Member concerned and to the competent authority of the Member State concerned.

On 29 March 2023, at the resumption of the plenary session in Brussels, the President of the European Parliament announced that Clara Ponsatí Obiols had submitted a request for defence of her parliamentary immunity in the context of legal proceedings in Spain. The request was referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs, following the procedure laid down in Rule 9 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure.

Main points made in the reply in Catalan

La immunitat dels diputats al Parlament Europeu està regulada pel Protocol sobre els privilegis i les immunitats de la Unió Europea i el Reglament intern del Parlament Europeu (articles 7 a 9). La petició d’un diputat perquè es defensi la seva immunitat s’anuncia al ple del Parlament i es remet a la comissió competent, que és la Comissió d’Assumptes Jurídics. Aquesta comissió examina l’admissibilitat de la petició i pot sol·licitar qualsevol informació o explicació que consideri necessària. El diputat interessat té l’oportunitat de ser escoltat i de presentar qualsevol document o altra prova escrita.

La Comissió d’Assumptes Jurídics adopta, a porta tancada, una recomanació a tot el Parlament perquè aprovi o rebutgi la sol·licitud. En el ple posterior a la decisió de la comissió, el Parlament pren una decisió per majoria simple dels vots. Després de la votació, el president comunica immediatament la decisió del Parlament al diputat interessat i a l’autoritat competent de l’Estat membre en qüestió.

El 29 de març de 2023, en la represa del ple a Brussel·les, la presidenta del Parlament Europeu va anunciar que la Sra. Clara Ponsatí Obiols havia presentat una sol·licitud de defensa de la seva immunitat parlamentària en el marc de procediments judicials a Espanya. La sol·licitud es va remetre a la Comissió d’Assumptes Jurídics, seguint el procediment establert a l’article 9 del Reglament intern del Parlament Europeu.

Main points made in the reply in French

L’immunité des députés au Parlement européen est régie par le protocole sur les privilèges et immunités de l’Union européenne et le règlement intérieur du Parlement européen (articles 7 à 9). La demande de défense de l’immunité d’un député est annoncée en séance plénière au Parlement et transmise à la commission compétente, à savoir la Commission des Affaires Juridiques. La commission examine la recevabilité de la demande et peut demander toute information ou explication qu’elle juge nécessaire. Le député concerné a la possibilité d’être entendu et de présenter tout document ou autre preuve écrite.

Réunie à huis clos, la Commission des Affaires Juridiques adopte une recommandation invitant le Parlement à approuver ou rejeter la demande. Pendant la session plénière suivant la décision de la commission, le Parlement se prononce par un vote à la majorité simple. À la suite du vote, la Présidente communique sans délai la décision du Parlement au député intéressé et à l’autorité compétente de l’État membre concerné.

Le 29 mars 2023, lors de la reprise de la session plénière à Bruxelles, la Présidente du Parlement européen a annoncé que Clara Ponsatí Obiols avait introduit une demande de défense de son immunité parlementaire dans le cadre d’une procédure judiciaire en Espagne. La demande a été transmise à la Commission des Affaires Juridiques, conformément à la procédure prévue à l’article 9 du règlement du Parlement.

Main points made in the reply in Spanish

La inmunidad de los diputados al Parlamento Europeo está regulada por el Protocolo sobre los Privilegios e Inmunidades de la Unión Europea y el Reglamento interno del Parlamento Europeo (arts. 7 a 9). Toda solicitud de un diputado con objeto de que se ampare su inmunidad se comunica al Pleno del Parlamento Europeo y se remite a la comisión competente, es decir, la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos. La Comisión examina la admisibilidad de la solicitud, pudiendo pedir toda información o explicación que estime necesaria. El diputado en cuestión tiene la oportunidad de ser oído y puede presentar los documentos o cualquier otra prueba escrita que proceda.

Reunida a puerta cerrada, la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos aprueba un documento en el que recomienda al Parlamento como institución que apruebe o desestime la solicitud. Durante la sesión plenaria subsiguiente a la decisión de la Comisión, el Parlamento toma una decisión por mayoría simple. Tras la votación, el presidente comunica de inmediato la decisión del Parlamento al diputado interesado, así como a las autoridades competentes del Estado miembro en cuestión.

El 29 de marzo de 2023, durante la reanudación de la sesión plenaria en Bruselas, la Presidenta del Parlamento Europeo comunicó que Clara Ponsatí Obiols había enviado una solicitud de amparo de su inmunidad parlamentaria, en relación con un procedimiento en España. La solicitud se ha remitido a la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos, de conformidad con el artículo 9 del Reglamento interno del Parlamento.

Main points made in the reply in Italian

L’immunità dei deputati al Parlamento europeo è disciplinata dal protocollo sui privilegi e sulle immunità dell’Unione europea e dal regolamento del Parlamento europeo (articoli da 7 a 9). Ogni richiesta presentata da un deputato in difesa dalla sua immunità è comunicata in Aula e deferita alla commissione competente, ossia la commissione giuridica. La commissione esamina l’ammissibilità della richiesta e può chiedere le informazioni o spiegazioni che ritiene necessarie. Al deputato interessato viene offerta l’opportunità di essere ascoltato e di presentare documenti o prove.

In una riunione a porte chiuse, la commissione giuridica adotta una raccomandazione all’intero Parlamento affinché quest’ultimo approvi o respinga la richiesta. Durante la sessione plenaria successiva alla decisione della commissione, il Parlamento adotta una decisione a maggioranza semplice. In seguito alla votazione, il Presidente comunica immediatamente la decisione del Parlamento al deputato interessato e all’autorità competente dello Stato membro in questione.

Il 29 marzo 2023, in occasione della ripresa della sessione plenaria a Bruxelles, la Presidente del Parlamento europeo ha comunicato che l’on. Clara Ponsatí Obiols aveva presentato una richiesta di difesa della sua immunità parlamentare nel quadro di un procedimento giudiziario in Spagna. Conformemente alla procedura di cui all’articolo 9 del regolamento del Parlamento europeo, la richiesta è stata deferita alla commissione giuridica.

Main points made in the reply in Portuguese

A imunidade dos eurodeputados é regulada segundo o Protocolo relativo aos Privilégios e Imunidades da União Europeia e pelo Regimento do Parlamento Europeu (Artigos 7 – 9). Um pedido de um deputado para a defesa da sua imunidade é anunciado em sessão plenária e enviado à comissão competente, a Comissão dos Assuntos Jurídicos. A comissão examina a admissibilidade do pedido e pode solicitar informações ou esclarecimentos que considere necessários para determinar se a imunidade deve ser levantada ou defendida. O deputado em causa deve ter a oportunidade de ser ouvido e pode apresentar todos os documentos ou outros elementos de prova escritos que entender oportunos.

Numa reunião à porta fechada, a Comissão de Assuntos Jurídicos adota uma recomendação para o Parlamento aprovar ou rejeitar o pedido. Na sessão plenária a seguir à decisão da comissão, o Parlamento chega a uma decisão com maioria simples. Após a votação, a Presidente comunica de imediato a decisão do Parlamento ao deputado em causa e à autoridade competente do Estado Membro em questão.

A 29 de março de 2023, no reinício da sessão plenária em Bruxelas, a Presidente do Parlamento Europeu anunciou o pedido de Clara Ponsatí Obiols para a defesa da sua imunidade parlamentar, no quadro de um processo em Espanha. O pedido foi enviado à Comissão de Assuntos Jurídicos, de acordo com os princípios do artigo 9.º do Regimento do Parlamento Europeu.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Mira Manini Tiwari, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic showcases major economic indicators for the six Western Balkan (WB) countries that are at various stages on the path towards the EU. All six exhibit a relatively consistent rise in GDP per capita, and they also show similar trends in falling unemployment rates. The female labour force participation rate hovers around 50 % (except for Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, with lower rates), similar to the EU. EU trade in goods (imports and exports) with the Western Balkans has risen steadily since 2006, whereas trade in services has experienced slower growth. The EU has almost equal imports and exports of services from the WB states, while in terms of goods the EU’s exports have continually exceeded imports, by roughly 30 % in 2021. Serbia leads the EU’s trade with the Western Balkans, holding 50 % of goods and 44 % of services trade respectively. This paper updates previous individual publications for each of the six countries.

Read this infographic on ‘Western Balkans: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Diaz Crego.

In 1993, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly declared 3 May World Press Freedom Day, acting on a recommendation adopted by UNESCO’s General Conference in 1991. This year will mark the 30th anniversary of the day, with UNESCO and other international partners organising special events around the world.

State of play of media freedom: From 1993 to the present

The date of 3 May was chosen to be World Press Freedom Day to mark the anniversary of the Declaration of Windhoek promoting an independent and pluralistic African press. Adopted by the journalists participating in a seminar organised by UNESCO in Windhoek, Namibia, in spring 1991, the declaration highlighted the essential link between democracy and independent, pluralistic and free media, and called on the African countries and the international community to strengthen media freedom on the African continent. Although the declaration focused on the challenges faced by African countries in ensuring a free and pluralistic media landscape in the early 1990s, many of these challenges remain valid to this day in Africa and the rest of the world.

Examples of these challenges include: capture of media outlets by governmental, political or economic powers; establishment of media monopolies; exposure of journalists to all kinds of repression, from murder to unlawful detention; fragility of professional associations of journalists and editors unable to protect their members’ interests and rights; and excessive administrative barriers obstructing the setting up of new media outlets.

Digital technologies have now taken the world by storm and changes in news consumption, often accelerated by the pandemic, have brought new challenges. Newspaper sales continue to plummet while the number of internet and social media users continues to rise. Readers and advertisers are increasingly choosing the internet as their source of information and the place to buy and sell products. All this is calling the economic viability of traditional media into question. Internet intermediaries are now the gatekeepers of freedom of expression and information, influencing critically the way we receive and impart information and sometimes acting as vectors or even accelerators of misinformation and disinformation. Governments around the world are resorting to internet shutdowns and other measures to silence online speech.

In light of these developments, the latest UNESCO Global report on world trends in freedom of expression and media development (2021/2022), with information from 144 countries, raised the alarm about the decline in press freedom worldwide. According to UNESCO, between 2016 and 2021, 85 % of the world’s population suffered an erosion of press freedom in their country. The report also identified three major challenges inhibiting access to information: the safety of journalists; the regulation of online speech and the functioning of digital gatekeepers; and the economic viability of the media. The latest Reporters Without Borders (2022, 2022) and Freedom House (2022, 2019) reports concur, pointing at record numbers of journalists imprisoned or killed and a deterioration of media freedom around the world.

Media freedom as a fundamental right and journalism as a public good

Against this backdrop, 3 May reminds us that freedom to seek, disseminate and receive information on issues of public interest is a public good and vital to building a healthy and pluralistic civic space in which democratic institutions can flourish. Without free and pluralistic media acting as public watchdogs, citizens cannot access to the information they need to make sound political choices, and accountability is severely impaired. The media also offer citizens analysis of ongoing events, serve as a public forum in which different voices can be heard, and interact with and help citizens to understand an increasingly complex world.

The meaningful role played by the media in healthy democratic societies is recognised by the main universal and regional treaties on human rights, which entrench media freedom and pluralism in their provisions on freedom of expression and information. Already in 1948, the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes freedom of speech as one of four rights that represent ‘the highest aspirations of the common people’ (the remaining three being freedom of belief, freedom from fear and and freedom from want). The declaration’s Article 19 enshrines freedom of opinion and expression, including the right not only to hold opinions but also to seek, receive and impart information and ideas ‘through any media and regardless of frontiers’. Freedom of information is also upheld in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 13) and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Article 21), as well as in the main regional treaties on human rights: the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 10), the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 13) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 9).

Considering the international obligations assumed by countries around the world, 3 May acts as a reminder of their commitment to respecting media freedom. However, it is not only about commitments. As highlighted by UNESCO and the UN, 3 May is also a day to pay tribute to journalists who have lost their lives in pursuit of a story, to defend media from attacks on their independence, to assess the state of play of media freedom worldwide, and to reflect about issues relating to press freedom and professional ethics.

EU actions to protect media freedom and pluralism

Within the European Union, media freedom and pluralism are also codified as fundamental rights in Article 11 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU. Moreover, the Court of Justice of the EU has systematically stressed the link between the safeguarding of those rights and the flourishing of a democratic and pluralistic society (C‑555/19; C‑719/18). In this vein, EU institutions are increasingly dedicating attention and resources to monitoring the state of play of media freedom and pluralism in the EU and addressing the risks identified through their monitoring work.

The European Commission monitors risks to media freedom in the EU Member States in its annual rule of law report (with editions from 2020, 2021 and 2022). Additionally, since 2014, the Media Pluralism Monitor project, co-funded by the EU, has been publishing reports assessing weaknesses in the EU Member States’ and candidate countries’ media systems that could hinder media pluralism. The 2022 editions of these reports show a negative shift as regards the journalistic profession, owing to an increase in the number of threats to journalists and strategic lawsuits filed against the media for providing information on issues of public interest (also known as SLAPPs). Both 2022 reports also highlight concerns about the high news media concentration in the EU, while also pointing to the need for further transparency of media ownership in many Member States and the need for stronger protection of the media (especially the public media) from political control.

The EU institutions have increasingly paid attention to the need to guarantee media freedom and pluralism within the EU. The European Parliament has been an outspoken advocate for freedom of information and the protection of journalists both within (2021, 2020, 2017) and outside (2022, 2021, 2019) the EU. The Council too has adopted conclusions on the protection and safety of journalists (2022) and on safeguarding a free and pluralistic media system (2020). In its European democracy action plan (2020) and its action plan to support recovery and transformation of Europe’s media (2020), the Commission has provided financial support for EU media companies to help them address their viability problems and face the twin digital and green transitions. It also focused on the safety of journalists in its recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists (2021), addressed to the EU Member States. The Commission’s legislative proposal for an anti-SLAPPs directive meanwhile aims to protect not only journalists but anyone exercising their freedom of expression and information as regards issues of public interest, from abusive and manifestly unfounded lawsuits. The Commission has also addressed the phenomenon of disinformation, including by giving support to the drafting of the 2018 Code of Practice on Disinformation, recently strengthened (2022) by Commission guidance.

The Commission recently put forward a legislative proposal for a European media freedom act. This far‑reaching proposal includes measures to protect journalistic sources and media and journalists from the use of surveillance technologies; enhance media ownership transparency and editorial independence of media providers providing news; establish common rules for a transparent and non-discriminatory allocation of state advertising to media; ensure further independence of public media; and address a number of issues concerning the provision of media services in the digital environment.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘2023 World Press Freedom Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Union faces a number of geopolitical challenges, which are often interwoven. Russia’s war on Ukraine is affecting the EU’s relations with China, and encouraging the EU to be more open to the Global South, not least to try to persuade these countries not to back Russia in the military conflict. The war reinforces the need to maintain strong security relations with the United States at a time of increasing technological, economic and military rivalry between Washington and Beijing.

The EU has a major stake in shaping the international regulatory order, notably in digital and climate change policies. The Union’s goal to be the global leader in the fight against climate change requires extra efforts to counter green technology subsidies in the US and China.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the EU’s global challenges. Earlier analyses on climate changes can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series. Papers on de-globalisation are gathered in another item in the series.

China and India: The future of the global consumer market
Brookings Institution, April 2023

Addressing the looming sovereign debt crisis in the developing world: It is time to consider a ‘Brady’ plan
Brookings Institution, April 2023

How Russia’s invasion of Ukraine tested the international legal order
Brookings Institution, April 2023

Can Europe forge a common China policy?
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

How can Europe help the next phase of the Summit for Democracy?
Carnegie Europe, April 2023

The EU-Africa partnership and development aid: Assessing the EU’s actorness and effectiveness in development policy
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023

Rising to the challenge: EU actorness in climate policy and its global impact
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023

Franco-German cooperation will be crucial for the future of European security
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023

How to fight back against China’s global media and information offensive
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023

Here are four things the West gets wrong about Africa
Egmont, April 2023

The CRM Act in a global perspective
Egmont, April 2023

Strengthening the global role of the euro
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, April 2023

It’s time to get a grip on Africa-EU relations: A test for two continents
Friends of Europe, April 2023

Xi’s visit to Moscow exposed Russia’s weakness
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2023

Russia’s mining strategy: Geopolitical ambitions and industrial challenges
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023

China/United States: Europe off balance
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2023

De la Russie à la Chine, Emmanuel Macron et l’illusion de la «puissance d’équilibre»
Institut Thomas More, April 2023

Global monetary order at the critical juncture: The impact of digitalisation and geoeconomic fragmentation
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2023

Taïwan et l’autonomie stratégique européenne
Institut Jacques Delors, April 2023

Internet governance and the UN in a multiplex world order era?
Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, April 2023

Key transatlantic implications of the Inflation Reduction Act
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2023

A threat to global food security
Wilson Center, April 2023

Is the global economy deglobalizing? And if so, why? And what is next?
Brookings Institution, March 2023

Much of the Global South is on Ukraine’s side
Bruegel, March 2023

Economic efficiency versus geopolitical resilience: Strategic autonomy’s difficult balancing act
Bruegel, March 2023

Putin and Xi are making the war in Ukraine a global contest
Carnegie Europe, March 2023

Learning to do no harm to democracy in engagement with authoritarian states
Carnegie Europe, March 2023

US-China rivalry in the Global South? Insights from a public opinion survey
Central European Institute of Asian Studies, March 2023

A digital connectivity masterplan for the Global Gateway
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2023

Different futures for a digitalised global financial system
Clingendael, March 2023

How to read Xi’s muscular message on China’s global role
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

Opening the Global Gateway: Why the EU should invest more in the southern neighbourhood
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023

China’s global security initiative
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2023

European defence partnerships
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2023

États-unis: Chine, la tension monte
Fondation Jean Jaurès, March 2023

What is the future for global cooperation on democracy?
Forum 2000, March 2023

Europe’s delicate balancing act
German Marshall Fund, March 2023

Is realism policy relevant? Evidence from Ukraine and Taiwan
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, March 2023

Xi the peacemaker? China’s rise on the global stage
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2023

Europe and Russia on the Balkan front: Geopolitics and diplomacy in the EU’s backyard
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2023

The Global South and the Ukraine war at the UN
International Crisis Group, March 2023

What does Russia’s war on Ukraine mean for the international order?
Rand Corporation, March 2023

The EU and the negotiations for a binding treaty on business and human rights
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2023

Climate versus trade? Reconciling international subsidy rules with industrial decarbonisation
Bruegel, February 2023

After Russia’s war against Ukraine: What kind of world order?
Carnegie Europe, February 2023

Getting global development back on track: Focus and start at home
Clingendael, February 2023

United West, divided from the rest: Global public opinion one year into Russia’s war on Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023

Progressive pathways to European strategic autonomy
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, February 2023

Multipolarity after Ukraine: Old wine in new bottles?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, February 2023

Global defence spending: Strategic vs economic drivers
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2023

The US-China technology war and its effects on Europe
Real Instituto Elcano, February 2023

Read this briefing on ‘The EU’s international challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.