Africa

By Anis Chowdhury
SYDNEY, Apr 7 2026 (IPS)

Bangladesh is scheduled to graduate from the least developed country (LDC) status in November this year after more than half a century. Bangladesh joined the UN club of LDCs in 1975 and consistently met all three graduation criteria – per capita Gross National Income (GNI), human asset and economic vulnerability – since 2018.

Anis Chowdhury

However, there is resistance and the current government has requested the UN for a delay. This is not surprising given the capture of the state by the business class, especially the ready-made garments (RMG) sector. In FY 2024-25 alone, the RMG sector received more than USD 1.3 million (BDT 16 crore) in cash subsidies and tax concessions despite the Interim Government’s effort to gradually phase out cash incentives.

RMG’s dominance and failure to diversify

Bangladesh is indeed a leading, often the highest, user of Duty-Free Quota-Free (DFQF) facilities among LDCs, largely driving its RMG sector growth through the European Union (EU)’s Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme. This reliance on preferential access has made Bangladesh a dominant exporter among LDCs.

However, the RMG sector’s dominance also made Bangladesh highly vulnerable. In the late 1970s when the RMG sector started its journey, it accounted for less than 5% of Bangladesh’s total exports. By the end of the 1990s, this proportion had reached about three-fourths. After more than four decades, since 2013, it has been hovering between 80-85%, according to the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA).

Bangladesh’s heavy reliance on a single export item makes its export basket one of the least diversified among the global economies. This is starkly different from South Korea, a country from which Bangladesh received technical assistance to usher in its RMG sector. South Korea’s textile industry accounted for 33.3% of exports in 1970; it declined to 22.6% within two decades in 1990 as the economy diversified. By 1975 South Korea became a major exporter of electrical machinery and appliances, transport equipment and various other manufacturing products.

Bangladesh’s vulnerability does not arise only from its export product concentration. Bangladesh’s export market is also not diversified with close to 60% going to the EU and UK with apparel comprising more than 90%. The USA, which does not provide any LDC related preferential market access, accounts for about 16% Bangladesh’s exports.

Here, too, Bangladesh’s experience differs from that of South Korea. With the diversification of the economy, South Korea’s exports by destination also became less concentrated. For example, while around 63% of South Korea’s export went to Japan alone in 1960, the combined market share of Japan and the USA fell to around 56% by 1975.

The South Korean State’s autonomy from groups with a vested interest is well documented. Thus, its policies were driven by broader national interest. On the other hand, Bangladesh’s policy space has been captured by the RMG sector.

Undoubtedly, the preferential treatment by the state helped the RMG sector expand rapidly; but at the high cost of failure to diversify. Professor Munir Quddus of Prairie View A&M University and President, Bangladesh Development Initiative (BDI) compared the RMG sector’s support environment with Leather exports to demonstrate the RMG sector’s state capture. His findings, summarized below, are revealing:

The usual justification for such preferential treatment is that RMG is the “largest export sector and foreign exchange earner”. But the argument is perverse. Given some of these subsidies have been in existence for nearly 50 years, prudent policymaking demands that it is high time to redirect scarce resources to support other potentially dynamic export sectors.

Being used to state support, the RMG sector ignored the need for raising productivity. The sector’s average labour productivity is lower than Bangladesh’s competitor countries except Cambodia. The sector’s compliance with the environmental and labour standards has also come under scrutiny. However, it seems by becoming too big through state support, the sector’s demand cannot be ignored.

The cosy relationship between the RMG sector leaders and the fallen kleptocratic regime is well-known. The regime allowed them to flourish through loan defaults and state subsidies and in return the business leaders were cheering on the fascist regime hoping to see its continuation. Understandably, they were fearful that they might not enjoy the same crony relationship with the Interim Government led by Nobel Laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus; thus, they cried foul and campaigned for a postponement of LDC graduation.

LDC graduation as structural transformation

The Interim Government accepted the White Paper’s recommendation and viewed the LDC graduation momentum as an opportunity to accelerate structural transformation of the economy. Despite bureaucratic inertia, it did succeed in improving business environment, such as significant reductions in times to obtain business licenses/certificates/permits, simplifications of customs procedures and fast-tracked implementation of national logistic and national tariff policies. It also identified the bottlenecks for potential sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, leather & footwear, electronics, light engineering and fishing & agro-based industries and took measures to remove or ease them.

No doubt a lot still needs to be done as part of an ongoing process of reform and policy adjustment. But that cannot be used as a justification to request a delay on the basis that the preparation is inadequate, particularly when Bangladesh’s macroeconomic performance is far better than the most LDCs, including Nepal and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), the two countries scheduled to graduate along with Bangladesh.

Thanks to the macroeconomic management of the Interim Government which succeeded in preventing a total collapse of the economy; it restored discipline in the financial and banking sector, rebuilt the country’s foreign exchange reserves, stabilized the exchange rate and earned the confidence of international financial leaders to re-open trade financing and maintain foreign investment inflows. It earned the diaspora community’s confidence resulting in increased remittances. The Interim Government concluded Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan in record time, ensuring duty-free market access for 99.9% of its products. It also initiated EPA talks with other major trade partners, including the EU.

Graduation delay: Bad signal for LDCs and win for vested interest

The UN-DESA uses three criteria for LDCs – GNI per capita, human asset index (HAI) and economic vulnerability index (EVI). Its evaluation in February 2025 shows that Bangladesh is in a much better position than Nepal and Lao PDR in terms of GNI per capita and EVI. Bangladesh with higher GNI per capita is economically less vulnerable than Nepal and Lao PDR, both of which suffer from additional disadvantages of landlockedness.

Bangladesh’s economy is projected to grow at a faster rate (around 5.0%–5.1% in FY 2005-26 and 5.7% in FY 2026-27 according to the ADB) than both Nepal and Lao PDR despite slightly elevated inflation rates. Bangladesh also performs better in logistics, ranked 88th out of 139 countries by the World Bank compared to Nepal’s rank of 114th and Lao PDR’s 115th. Bangladesh also has better productive capacity according to the UNCTAD’s productive capacity index.

Bangladesh will continue to enjoy DFQF market access for three more years after its graduation as endorsed by the WTO. Australia and Canada indicated extended periods of DFQF access until at least 2034. The UK will allow 92% Bangladesh products duty-free access after 2029. Therefore, a delay for a better performing Bangladesh will be a bad signal for the LDCs aspiring to graduate from LDC status.

It will also mean a win for the vested interest groups and stalling of the momentum towards accelerated structural transformation. The state capture by the RMG sector has already become clear; a highly professional and successful central bank governor has been replaced with a failed (loan defaulter) garment sector businessperson with no background in banking or international macroeconomics. The Transparency International Bangladesh views “such a decision risks turning the central bank once again into an instrument of business lobbies dependent on defaulted loans and political connections, rather than safeguarding national interest, as was the case during the authoritarian kleptocratic regime”.

Bangladesh will be better off spending its diplomatic efforts to secure GSP+ facilities in the EU and EPA with its trading partners instead of lobbying for a LDC graduation delay. It should worry more about EU’s new, stricter and mandatory Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) regulations. Whereas ESG failure may cost Bangladesh 30% of EU exports, strict compliance can function as powerful catalysts for production upgrading and accelerating structural transformation while achieve sustainable development goals (SDGs).

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com

IPS UN Bureau

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

Workers in Kiribati were building sea walls to protect against rising sea levels from climate change. Credit: UNFPA/Carly Learson

By Andie Fong Toy, Nobuko Kajiura and Peter Emberson
BANGKOK, Thailand, Apr 7 2026 (IPS)

Rising seas, intensifying storms, saltwater intrusion and shifting coastlines are the lived realities of Pacific communities today. Families are making difficult decisions about whether to stay, adapt or move. Some communities have already relocated. Others are preparing for that possibility. Many are determined to stay for as long as possible on lands that hold ancestral meaning and identity.

Climate mobility is not simply a policy category. It is about people, culture, dignity and the future of Pacific societies. With the endorsement of the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility in 2023, Pacific leaders articulated a collective approach grounded in human rights, community leadership and regional solidarity.

But frameworks alone do not move communities to safer ground. Implementation does.

A Pacific vision anchored in community

At the heart of the Framework is a simple but powerful principle: Climate mobility must be guided by the voices and priorities of Pacific communities themselves. This is not abstract diplomacy. It reflects lived experience, where communities are asking how to preserve identity, protect livelihoods and ensure that mobility, if necessary, occurs with dignity rather than desperation.

The Framework seeks to ensure that these decisions are not forced by crisis, but shaped through planning, consultation and collective responsibility. Mobility has long histories through voyaging and internal migration in the Pacific, but climate change introduces new pressures requiring coordinated governance.

Stories from community representatives who have already experienced planned relocation show that this is not merely a technical exercise. It is a human process touching identity, belonging, spirituality and intergenerational memory.

A deeply personal story shared by people forced to leave their village during a period of social conflict in Fiji’s colonial past is a reminder that movement has long been part of human history. What matters is whether that movement occurs with dignity, opportunity and support, or under conditions of hardship and loss.

Climate mobility policy, when relocation becomes necessary, should open pathways to resilience rather than trauma.

A regional responsibility

Communities across the Pacific face similar challenges, yet each context is unique. Regional cooperation allows sharing lessons, strengthening capacities and solidarity expressed in practical ways.

But collaboration must also be genuine.

The Pacific has long benefited from strong partnerships with development partners, including technical work that contributed to the development of the Framework.

Yet, a quiet caution as implementation begins. Climate mobility cannot become another item on the international development checklist.

Too often, global processes risk becoming procedural: workshops are convened, reports produced, partnerships announced, while communities remain marginal in decision-making.

This approach will not suffice. Partners must genuinely listen. Communities, relocated or contemplating relocation, carry knowledge that cannot be replicated in technical reports. Their experiences reveal the social, cultural and emotional dimensions of mobility that policy frameworks must address.

Effective climate mobility governance requires sustained cooperation across institutions and sectors, civil society practitioners and various development partners. No single agency can carry this work alone.

But coordination must be guided by humility. International partners must recognise that Pacific communities are not passive beneficiaries of policy. They are custodians of knowledge and agents of their own futures.

The global context: A critical moment

Later this year, the global climate community will gather once again for negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change when the human dimensions of climate change are becoming increasingly visible around the world.

Yet global governance mechanisms for addressing these realities of climate-driven displacement and migration remain fragmented.

The Pacific’s approach offers important lessons.

Pacific leaders have proactively confronted the issue, acknowledging mobility as part of the climate response landscape while emphasising rights, dignity and community agency.

The Pre-COP dialogue, to be hosted by Fiji and Tuvalu, provides an opportunity to bring Pacific perspectives into the global climate negotiation process directly, reminding the international community that climate mobility is not an abstract concept.

From framework to action

The Implementation Plan for the Framework is in place. Governance mechanisms are emerging through technical working groups and partnership platforms.

Now these commitments must translate into real outcomes for communities.

This means investing in community-led planning processes, supporting governments to strengthen legal and institutional frameworks and ensuring that relocation, where necessary, is accompanied by adequate resources, land access and long-term livelihood opportunities.

It also means recognising that mobility is only one part of the broader climate resilience agenda. Many Pacific communities remain determined to stay on their lands for as long as possible, supported by adaptation measures and protective infrastructure.

Climate mobility policy must therefore operate alongside, not instead of, ambitious climate mitigation and adaptation efforts.

The ball is now in our court

The Pacific has demonstrated leadership in confronting the complex dimensions of climate change, but implementation will require sustained commitment from governments, development partners, regional organisations and communities themselves.

The ball is now in the court of all stakeholders and partners.

Engagement must be genuine. Partnerships must be meaningful. Listening must precede action.

Above all, the work must remain anchored in the aspirations and dignity of Pacific peoples.

Climate mobility is not simply about moving people. It is about safeguarding cultures, protecting rights, and ensuring that communities can navigate a changing climate with agency and hope.

Andie Fong Toy is Head of ESCAP Subregional Office for the Pacific); Nobuko Kajiura is Economic Affairs Officer, ESCAP Subregional Office for the Pacific and Peter Emberson is Consultant, ESCAP Subregional Office for the Pacific.

IPS UN Bureau

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

Selon une source, l'accord de coopération avec l'université de Téhéran remonte à 2007

The post Le Vatican condamne la guerre mais maintient ses liens avec une institution liée à l’Iran appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Cette affaire relance le débat sur les limites du contrôle des discours en France au nom de la lutte antiterroriste

The post L’affaire Rima Hassan interroge l’immunité des députés européens et leur liberté d’expression appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Five civilians were killed by the gunmen and their bodies were recovered at the scene, the army said.

Également dans l'édition de mardi : la lettre de Brunner, le nouveau visage de l'euro, les coupes de cheveux militaires, les bases britanniques à Chypre

The post Le Danube en eaux troubles appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Credit: US Department of Defense / Wiki Commons

By Herbert Wulf
Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

 
Donald Trump ran on a platform of ending wars. After his success in Venezuela, he is intoxicated by his military achievements and is banking on regime change in several countries.

In a swift and decisive move, US forces abducted Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife to the United States. The current government in Caracas has little choice but to largely submit to Washington’s dictates. Trump’s motives for the war against Iran remain unclear, partly because the US president has cited various reasons: to finally destroy the Iranian nuclear program, to end the Iranian threat to the Middle East, to support the Iranian people, and to overthrow the terrible regime in Tehran. He remains vague about his reasoning and seems to make off the cuff suggestions for regime change. Trump had a lofty idea at how he envisions the end of this war. He has suggested “unconditional surrender,” followed by his personal involvement in the selection of a successor: I must be involved in picking Iran’s next leader.

The swift victory against Iran failed to materialize, an end to the war is not in sight, and a new leader has been chosen without Trump’s involvement. The structures of the mullah regime appear so entrenched that the anticipated regime change following the rapid decapitation of the leadership did not occur. Yet Donald Trump had proclaimed: “What we did in Venezuela is, in my opinion, the perfect, the perfect scenario.” The Atlantic calls this attitude a “hostile corporate takeover of an entire country”. Now the US government expects Cuba to surrender. “I think I could do anything I want” with Cuba, Trump declared, now that the island is virtually cut off from energy supplies and its economy is in ruins. He is demanding the removal of Cuban President Diaz-Canel.

In the business world hostile corporate takeovers sometimes work, sometimes they fail. Similarly with Trump’s idea of swift government surrenders. In the case of Iran, he was misguided by the Wall Street playbook. Irresponsibly, he called on Iranians to overthrow the government before the bombing campaign started. Regime change in Iran has now been forgotten and Trump is agnostic about democracy. He is interested to get the oil price down and the stock market up.

Lessons from the past

The concept of regime change—replacing the top of the government to install one more agreeable to the US—is not new to US foreign policy. Proponents of regime change usually point to Japan and Germany as positive examples of successful democratization. Often, however, the goal is not, or at least not primarily, democratization, but rather the installation of a government that is ideologically close to the US or amenable to them. But the “Trump Corollary”, as explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, is not new either. In reality, it was already the Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush doctrine.

Both Trump’s idea of regime change and his rigorously pursued territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal) are reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, particularly the version of this doctrine expanded by President Roosevelt in 1904. This doctrine legitimized American interventions in Latin America. At the beginning of the 20th century, the US intervened in numerous Latin American countries in ‘its backyard’, using military and intelligence means: in Colombia, to support Panamanian separatists in controlling the Panama Canal; repeatedly in the Dominican Republic; they occupied Cuba from 1906 to 1909 and intervened there repeatedly afterward; in Nicaragua during the so-called ‘Banana War’, to protect the interests of the US company United Fruit; in Mexico, as well as in Haiti and Honduras.

The New York Times recently suggested that Trump’s current enthusiasm for regime change is most comparable to that of Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his two terms in office from 1953 to 1961, the once coldly calculating general allowed himself to be seduced into a downward spiral from one coup to the next. In 1953, the US succeeded in overthrowing the elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh with Operation Ajax. Mossadegh wanted to nationalize the British-owned oil industry. The coup succeeded with CIA support. The US installed the Shah as its puppet. He ruled with absolute power until the so-called Iranian Revolution and the dictatorship of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. After the successful overthrow of the government in Iran, Eisenhower decided to intervene in Guatemala. The elected president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, who initiated far-reaching land reform laws, was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1954 and replaced by the pro-American colonel, Castillo Armas.

During this period, the US government also formulated the so-called domino theory, which aimed to prevent governments, particularly in Asia, from aligning themselves with the Soviet Union. The assumption was that if one domino fell, others would follow. It was during this time that the costly war in Korea ended in an armistice. Therefore, countries like Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and others were on Eisenhower’s domino list. However, the destabilization campaigns carried out by the CIA sometimes had the opposite effect. Governments in Indonesia and Syria emerged strengthened from the interventions. Eisenhower left Kennedy with the loss of American influence in Cuba. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, intended to overthrow Fidel Castro, was the starting point for the decades-long blockade of Cuba, which Trump is determined to end now through regime change.

The most dramatic example of failed regime change in recent history is undoubtedly the Iraq War, which began in 2003 under President George W. Bush. The stated goal was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. The war led to the overthrow of the regime. The United Nations and US teams found no weapons of mass destruction despite intensive on-site investigations. Attempts to establish an orderly state in Iraq failed. These experiences, and especially the disastrous outcome of two decades of military intervention in Afghanistan, discredited the concept of regime change.

What are the implications?

The most important lesson taught by efforts to affect externally forced regime change is that interventions often lead to crises that were ostensibly meant to be prevented or solved. The temptation was too great for Trump to miss the opportunity to depose the despised Maduro government.

Scholarly studies of the numerous attempted regime changes and democratization efforts reveal three key findings. First, simply removing the government from power (whether through assassination, as in the case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or now in Iran, or through kidnapping as in Venezuela) is insufficient, as such actions often lead to chaos, state collapse, or even civil war. Thus, it will be interesting to watch further developments in Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran.

A second lesson from empirical studies of regime change is that democratization is more likely to succeed if democratic experience already existed in the country. However, this is often not the case.

Finally, if the real goal is democratization (and not just to secure spheres of influence or oil supplies etc.), it is far more promising not only to hold elections (as in Afghanistan, for example), but to renounce violence and initiate a long-term program with development aid and support for civil society.

Whether the US government will be impressed by these findings, or even acknowledge them, is doubtful. Currently, the American president is euphoric, despite the strong reaction from the Iranian government which he, surprisingly, did not expect. His promises to end the senseless wars and not start any new ones, however, seem to have been forgotten.

Related articles:
The US: Good at Starting but Bad at Ending Wars
Failure of US–Iran Talks Was All Too Predictable — But Turning to Military Strikes Creates Dangerous Unknowns
The ‘Donroe Doctrine’
The Return of the Ugly American

Herbert Wulf is a Professor of International Relations and former Director of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC). He is presently a Senior Fellow at BICC, an Adjunct Senior Researcher at the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg/Essen, Germany, and a Research Affiliate at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand. He serves on the Scientific Council of SIPRI.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

Credit: Mamunur Rashid/NurPhoto via AFP

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

Bangladesh’s first credible election in nearly two decades delivered a landslide win for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its leader Tarique Rahman, son of a former prime minister, just back from 17 years of self-imposed exile.

The election was made possible by a Generation Z-led uprising that security forces sought to repress by killing at least 1,400 people. The protest that began when young people rose up against a job quota system that functioned as a tool of patronage grew into a movement that brought down a government. Many protesters wanted something beyond the ousting of an authoritarian government, calling for old politics to be swept aside and young people to have a genuine say in government. What’s resulted falls short of that, and Bangladesh’s new government should be aware that unless it delivers genuine change, protests could rise again.

The uprising

The 2024 protests that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina began when Bangladesh’s High Court reinstated a 30 per cent quota for descendants of 1971 independence war veterans, leaving less than half of public sector jobs open to recruitment based on merit. In a country with acute youth unemployment, frustrated young people rejected this system as a vehicle for Awami League patronage. Coordinated by the Students Against Discrimination network, the movement spread nationwide through road and railway blockades.

The government’s response turned a policy dispute into a political crisis. Members of the Awami League’s student wing attacked protesters. Authorities imposed a nationwide curfew with a shoot-on-sight order, shut down the internet and directed security forces to fire lethal weapons into crowds. But the repression backfired. People used their phones to document every incident, and footage circulated widely after internet access was partly restored, directly undermining the government’s narrative that cast protesters as violent agitators. The killing of student coordinator Abu Sayed, filmed as he stood unarmed with arms outstretched before police opened fire, became the uprising’s defining image.

On 5 August 2024, facing a mass march on her residence, Hasina fled to India on an army helicopter. As CIVICUS’s 2026 State of Civil Society Report sets out, Bangladesh’s Gen Z-led uprising went on to inspire subsequent protests in Indonesia, Nepal and beyond.

Reforms in the balance

Three days after Hasina fled, Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as Chief Adviser of an interim government. This was a victory for the student movement, which had made clear it would not accept a military-backed administration. His government established reform commissions covering the constitution, corruption, judiciary, police and public administration, and negotiated the July National Charter with political parties: 84 proposals designed to reduce the concentration of power in the prime minister’s office and make it structurally harder for any future government to capture the state the way Hasina had. Most parties signed it in October 2025.

But the path to the election was neither clean nor consensual. The International Crimes Tribunal, a domestic judicial body reinstated by the interim government, convicted Hasina in absentia for crimes against humanity and sentenced her to death. In May 2025, the interim government banned the Awami League under anti-terrorism legislation. International observers warned that excluding the country’s largest party risked disenfranchising millions and undermining the election’s democratic credibility.

The election timing was also bitterly contested: the BNP, eager to capitalise on its frontrunner status, pushed for an early date, while the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), founded by Gen Z protesters, wanted more time to organise and for institutional reforms to be locked in first. The BNP prevailed.

A dynasty returns

The BNP and its allies won 209 of 299 contested seats, securing a decisive two-thirds parliamentary majority. The right-wing Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami — whose 2013 ban the interim government lifted — emerged as the main opposition with close to 80 seats, its best-ever result. The NCP won just six of the 30 seats it contested.

The NCP’s poor showing had partly structural causes — formed in February 2025, it had barely a year to build an organisation with limited funds and no networks beyond urban centres — and was partly self-inflicted. A decision to ally with Jamaat-e-Islami as part of an 11-party coalition alienated many young voters who had hoped for genuinely new politics. Prominent NCP figures resigned in protest and stood as independents. NCP leader Nahid Islam, just 27 years old, did win a seat, and the party has pledged to rebuild in opposition.

The election itself was a genuine improvement on Bangladesh’s recent history. Turnout reached 60 per cent, up from 42 per cent in the fraud-ridden 2024 poll. Over 60 per cent of voters endorsed the July Charter in a referendum that was held alongside the election, giving the reform agenda a democratic mandate the new government will find difficult to ignore. Yet the vote would have been more legitimate had all parties been permitted to compete freely, and the campaign was not fully free of violence either: rights groups documented that at least 16 political activists were killed in the run-up to polling day.

Now the BNP inherits a state apparatus politicised over decades of one-party dominance and holds a two-thirds parliamentary majority with no meaningful check on its authority. Whether it will govern differently from those it replaced, or simply settle into the same logic of power, remains to be seen. The young people whose uprising made this election possible are watching. They have already brought down one government. The new one would do well to remember this.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

Several footballers have absconded in the past leaving behind what rights groups call a repressive government.

Several footballers have absconded in the past leaving behind what rights groups call a repressive government.

Albert Mazibuko sang in the iconic South African choral group for more than 55 years.

There are fears South Sudan may be plunged back into a civil war less than a decade after it ended.

Smoke rises in downtown Dhaka, the capital of Capital, during the July-August 2024 youth-led anti-government protests. Credit: UN Bangladesh/Mithu

By The Institute of Development Studies
BRIGHTON, UK, Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

Urgent steps need to be taken to rebuild the relationship between citizens and state to stem the decline of democracy globally. Experts point to inequality and political exclusion as two of the biggest drivers for democratic backsliding, with the exclusion of citizens from a role in policy and decision-making spaces leading to ‘hollow citizenship’.

A report, published by the Institute of Development Studies, comes as Europe, Africa, Latin America, Asia and the US, have seen a rise in support for populist leaders on the left and right stoking division and weakening democratic safeguards, such as free and fair elections and free media.

This has led to key aspects of democracy declining during the last decade and now 74% of the
world’s population (6 billion) live in autocracies.

In response, the report authors call for an urgent rethink of democracy – which evidence shows delivers better social and economic outcomes than other regimes – to focus on people, power and inequality and less on institutions.

The experts say that past efforts to strengthen democracy globally focused too much on strengthening institutions, like legislature, judicial systems and electoral commissions and neglected the needs of people.

To sustain and strengthen democracies for the future, the reports call for urgent action to ensure people are included and engaged in democracy at local and national levels.

Shandana Khan Mohmand, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, said: “After decades of unsuccessful efforts, and millions of dollars spent by Western powers to try and strengthen democracy globally, we need to learn the lessons about what does and doesn’t work.

“While supporting democratic institutions like electoral commissions, judicial systems and independent media are all critically important, evidence shows that the missing ingredient is people – and the extent that they can engage in democracy in meaningful ways. Whether in local council decisions about community parks or on a nation’s policy on green energy, or going to war, citizens need to be included and feel that they are heard in decision making.”

While there was optimism that digital technology, and particularly social media, would act as a force for democratisation and improving transparency and accountability, the research finds that has only led to limited gains.

Instead, the evidence shows that digital technology has been harnessed by regimes to support a descent into authoritarianism, using tactics like mass surveillance and internet shutdowns to suppress dissent and human rights.

The report also finds that the notable youth-led uprisings, such as in Bangladesh, Nepal and Madagascar attracted the headlines but that it is the more everyday acts of young people demonstrating inclusion and collective decision-making, rather than the mass protests, that are more significant for strengthening democracy and peace.

Marjoke Oosterom, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, said: “The scale of democratic backsliding globally serves as a warning to leaders of high, middle and low-income democracies alike. They ignore inequality and political exclusion at their peril as both are being exploited by anti-democratic politicians to stoke division, and lead people to question whether democracy works for them.

“The evidence shows that democracy is still the best model for an inclusive and fair society and urgent action is needed to halt the current democratic decline we are seeing in continents around the world.”

Despite the budget cuts by governments across Europe and the USA which significantly reduced initiatives designed to strengthen democracy globally, the report includes several recommendations for ways that states, policymakers and philanthropist funders can help strengthen democracy.

Those include fixing the relationship between states and citizens via greater inclusion of people in governance and politics, making space for diverse opinions and ideological positions, and public policy to address the needs of marginalised groups and reduce inequality, which in turn builds trust in democracy.

IPS UN Bureau

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 6 2026 (IPS)

The US has spelled out in detail its own concept of what a restructured United Nations should look like: after drastic reductions in staff, cutting down its budget, avoiding duplication in mandates, slashing peacekeeping operations worldwide and deploying artificial intelligence (AI) for translations and interpretations in six languages.

As the biggest single contributor to the UN budget – and despite nearly $4.0 billion in unpaid dues —it is using its perceived financial clout to help radically change the world body.

The US says it wants to “make UN great again (MUNGA)”—variation of President Trump’s oft-repeated slogan “Make America Great Again (MAGA)”.

But will it work? And is it feasible?

Ambassador Mike Waltz, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, addressing a Congressional Field Hearing on UN Reform, said last week: “As I stated in my confirmation hearing, the UN truly does need to get what we’re calling back to basics and back to its original mission, from its founding, back to maintaining international peace and security.

As I’ve mentioned in my hearing then, the UN’s budget in the last 25 years has quadrupled. We have not seen, arguably, a quadrupling of peace and security around the world commensurate with those hard-earned dollars, he said.

“So, we are pressing it. We’re pressing it to streamline its bureaucracy, to eliminate duplication. We’ve made it clear that we will cease participation in some UN agencies that undermine our sovereignty and cannot be reformed.”

Earlier this year, he pointed out, President Trump did announce “our withdrawal from 66 international organizations. That review is ongoing. And from my perspective, let me be clear, the U.S. will not fund organizations that act contrary to our interests.”

On UN compensation and personnel, he said, we’re leading reforms to what is often exorbitant compensation and benefit standards that the over 100,000 UN staff receive. The UN pays 17% more than U.S. equivalent civil servants, even though many of them are right here in New York.

They also have additional generous benefits packages far exceeding what our great civil servants, both here and abroad, receive. And staff costs alone are 70% of their regular budget of these things we’re trying to bring back in line.

“So, we need to, and we are working to bring those compensation and benefits packages back in line with common sense standards. Part of that will be the pension. There’s over $100 billion in management, in the UN pension with 16% – I don’t know of an employer or a government out there that contributes 16% to their pension”.

And there’s other reforms, he said.

For example, the number of interpreters and translators – times six for the six UN languages here – technology can be used, AI can be used, remote translation can be used that will save a lot of the travel and the conference costs, said Waltz.

Stephen Zunes, Professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco and director of Middle Eastern Studies, who has written extensively on the politics of the United Nations, told Inter Press Service (IPS) this is not about cost-cutting or fiscal responsibility.

“Like cutbacks to important U.S. government agencies and domestic programs, the Trump administration appears determined to dismantle the system itself.”

This should be understood in the context of pulling out of international organizations and treaties, the establishment of the so-called “Board of Peace,” the Iran War, and the recently-announced dramatic increases in military spending–it is about undermining international legal institutions and replacing it with an imperial order backed by raw military force, said Dr Zunes.

Richard Gowan, Program Director, Global Issues and Institutions, at the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, told IPS in the first half of 2025, U.S. policy towards the UN was pretty chaotic, and diplomats from other countries really had no idea what Washington wanted from the world organization.

Like it or not, he said, Mike Waltz and his team have brought some message discipline and are clarifying their goals for the UN pretty sharply.

“Most diplomats say that Waltz can be reasonable in private and that ultimately, he and his team want to reshape the UN rather than just wreck it. There are times when Waltz goes out of his way to bash the UN and individual UN officials on social media, but I think that is partly him playing to the Republican base”.

Waltz is clear that he wants a slimmed-down UN, Gowan pointed out, and it is worth admitting that this is a popular message among many UN member states. The U.S. is not alone in thinking that the organization’s bureaucracy has grown too big and needs a tough financial diet.

“Trump, Rubio and Waltz are pretty consistent in arguing that the UN should focus on peace and security issues. But I think the administration has not really convinced most other UN members that it has a plan to make the UN deliver on conflict prevention and diplomacy again.”

Instead, he said, the U.S. appears to have a very selective and instrumentalist approach to when and how it uses the UN as a security partner. It wants the UN to help in Haiti but to get out of the way in Lebanon. I do not think there is really a coherent vision at work here. It is a very ad hoc, case-by-case approach.

“Trump’s boosting of the Board of Peace as a potential alternative to the UN has complicated Waltz’s position too. The fact that Trump is willing to flirt with the Board, even if it is not a very serious institution, makes it harder to believe that Washington really wants the UN to regain credibility on peace and security,” declared Gowan.

Meanwhile, excerpts from Ambassador Waltz’s testimony include:

–“On budget and staffing cuts, the UN should be doing less and doing it better. Let’s get it more focused and actually achieve more results. The 2026 UN regular budget was estimated at $3.45 billion. The U.S. funds roughly a fifth of that at $820 million in 2025 alone.

–Again, I think we need to reduce the UN’s size and assure every taxpayer dollar is spent responsibly, and thanks to the strong efforts by the United States, led by Ambassador Bartos here and his team in what we call the UN’s Fifth Committee, which approves its budget, we are working towards a leaner and better prioritized 2026 budget going forward.

–In December, we led Member States to adopt a historic 15% cut. $570 million out of the UN’s regular budget. That will eliminate nearly 3000 headquarters positions. And for our contribution, it will reduce our assessment by $126 million. So just in the six months that we’ve been here, we will see going forward, $126 million savings to the U.S. taxpayer.

–We’ve also pushed for a 25% reduction in peacekeeping troops, and I’ll talk a bit about other peacekeeping reforms in a moment that will also save us tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars while enabling what we call here the repatriation, the sending home of poorly performing peacekeeping troops.

–From an oversight perspective, beyond the salaries and benefits, oversight is essential. We’re leading efforts to empower oversight bodies to root out waste, fraud, and abuse, and misconduct.

On peacekeeping reform, he said, the administration has been clear about focusing on the core mandate of peace and security, and we’re leading efforts to wind down some of these ineffective and costly peacekeeping missions.

Some of them have been around for 30, 50, even 80 years. So, it’s one thing to stop a conflict, to insert an international force, to part ways with warring, with the two sides, or to separate them, to create the space for a political resolution.

But it can’t then become an excuse to not have a political resolution. When you have a peacekeeping force, for example, in DRC and Congo, at the cost of a billion dollars a year, that’s been there for 30 years – you can do the math and see how we have a mission creep.

So, what we’re looking to do is, as these peacekeeping forces come up for renewal, usually on an annual basis, tie them to a political process and use that as an opportunity to drive efficiencies along those lines, again, led by our reform team here that we have an ambassador, someone of an ambassador rank dedicated to.

This is just as a quick aside, the reimbursement for the equipment that these peacekeeping forces bring, sometimes to the tunes of 10,000 18,000 soldiers. It’s quite significant. These countries were being reimbursed whether they use the equipment or not.

All they had to do is bring it. So, there was an obvious incentive in place – and we received this feedback from the field, to not use the equipment very much, don’t have a lot of wear and tear, and countries would still receive the same level of reimbursement.

We just negotiated new rules, first time ever that put standards in place that the equipment actually has to be used for the peacekeeping force before you receive reimbursement. These are the kind of common-sense reforms that I think are pretty hard to argue with, although we received a lot of push back, because for a lot of these countries, it’s a money maker for their ministries of defense. We were able to just get those reforms.

Just a few examples as we look to streamline these mandates, we’re also looking to draw some of them down. UNIFIL and Lebanon, we’ve made it clear hasn’t achieved its goals, hasn’t lived up to its mandate and should be drawn down in the next year.

We’re looking at a strategic review of the peacekeeping force in Western Sahara that has been there for 50 years. We are putting benchmarks in place for the peacekeeping force that’s in Southern Sudan. We just oversaw the orderly closure of UNAMI in Iraq, which will reduce costs by $87 million annually.

We just pressed for closure of the special political mission in Yemen that will save $25 million annually. We streamlined missions in Colombia and Haiti, saving approximately $20 million annually. So again, these peacekeeping missions that solve problems not exist indefinitely.

On the humanitarian system, just as a personal aside, as someone who has served across Africa and the Middle East, I can’t tell you how many times I would pull up to this tiny ministry in a small country in Africa or in South Asia, and you have more UN vehicles in the parking lot than they have in their entire ministry from 16, 17, 18, different agencies, often with overlapping missions – all meaning well, all trying to help.

But we’ve now pulled a lot of our funding that will force these agencies to use the same warehouses, use the same aviation, use the same vehicle fleets, and eliminate a lot of that duplication of waste in their back offices.

So, moving forward, these reforms have made some significant steps. We have a long way to go – as I’m sure we’ll hear about today – to create a more focused, leaner and effective UN. We are just getting started.

We’re building on this momentum heading into the next year with both long overdue changes, the UN’s compensation system and pension plan, streamlining these peacekeeping missions, halting waste that undermine the effectiveness. And we’ll work with the UN leadership to align our reform agenda with the Secretary-General’s – what he calls his UN 80 mandate.

We will have a new Secretary-General elected this year, and we’re having those conversations now with the candidates of what they seek to keep and continue, or what new they seek to put in place, but reform is at the top of our list as we meet with some of these candidates.

So, this is a critical moment with senior leadership transitions approaching here over this next year. We need to have a clear message. We will prioritize qualified Americans. Representative DeLauro, along the lines of what you sought to do so many years ago, of having qualified Americans in UN leadership positions, not just here, but across the ecosystem in Geneva, in Vienna, and Nairobi and other places where you have UN agencies.

And I’ll just conclude with echoing President Trump’s own words.

As he said most recently at the General Assembly: the UN has tremendous potential. My charge from him is to help it realize that potential. We are dedicated to making the UN live up to that promise, to making the UN great again – if I can say so our new acronym, MUNGA.

The UN is the one place where everyone can talk. If we walked away tomorrow – which I nor the president, are advocating – it would be reinvented somewhere else. I will push hard and continuously to have it right here in the United States where it belongs.

And I look forward to keeping open dialogue with your committee. I thank you for the legislation, Chairman, that you pushed through. It adds additional arrows in our quiver to help make the UN great again,” declared Waltz.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

S'agit-il d'une opération de diversion téléguidée par Moscou ? Les autorités serbes ont affirmé dimanche avoir déjoué une attaque contre le gazoduc Turkstream qui relie la Serbie et la Hongrie. Viktor Orbán a aussitôt désigné l'Ukraine... Kiev dément toute implication.

- Le fil de l'Info / Une - Diaporama - En premier, Une - Diaporama, Serbie, Relations régionales, Défense, police et justice, Orban Balkans, Ukraine, Courrier des Balkans, Énergie Balkans

Malawian Martha Ongwane, brought low by her daughter's autism, found a rare support group.

Geplante Ferien werden zum Albtraum: Selim K. will mit seiner Familie ein paar Tage im verschneiten St. Moritz verbringen. Was der Familienvater nicht weiss: Er ist auf ein gefälschtes Inserat auf Booking.com hereingefallen. Dank Blick kommt es zum Happy End.

Kijev "határozottan visszautasítja azokat a próbálkozásokat", amelyekkel "megpróbálják Ukrajnát összekapcsolni" a Szerbiában, a Török Áramlat vezeték közelében talált robbanóanyaggal - közölte Heorhij Tihij ukrán külügyi szóvivő vasárnap.

Az amerikai bevándorlási hatóság őrizetbe vette az iráni Iszlám Forradalmi Gárda egykori parancsnoka, Kászem Szolejmáni közeli hozzátartozóit, akik állandó tartózkodási engedélyét már korábban visszavonták.

Am Samstagabend brannte ein Mehrfamilienhaus an der Kreuzstrasse in Romanshorn TG. Die Einsatzkräfte bekämpfen den Brand mit einem Grossaufgebot.