Africa

Credit: Sanjit Pariyar/NurPhoto via AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Mar 25 2026 (IPS)

Less than six months after Nepal’s Generation Z rose up in protest, the country has a new prime minister. A 35-year-old former rapper who soundtracked the protests swept to power in a landslide in the 5 March election.

Balendra Shah defeated former prime minister KP Sharma Oli, whose third stint as prime minister was cut short by the protests, beating him in his own turf. After years of fragile coalition governments, in which Sharma Oli and two other men of advancing age repeatedly swapped the role of prime minister, Nepal has chosen to change direction.

Gen Z-led protests

The September 2025 protests were triggered by the government’s banning of 26 social media platforms in an evident response to the ‘nepokids’ trend, in which people used social media to satirise the ostentatiously wealthy lifestyles of politicians’ family members, while most young people experienced daily economic struggles amid high inflation and youth unemployment. In a country where the median age is just 25, the ban was the final straw, activating long-simmering anger about corruption, poor public services and a political system that refused to listen to young people.

When young people took to the streets, the state unleashed violence. The deadliest day was 8 September, when some protesters broke into the parliamentary complex and police fired live military-grade ammunition, shooting many victims in the head. Nineteen people died that day, and overall at least 76 people died in the protests.

Rather than silence the protests, the state’s lethal crackdown swelled them, making clear this was about more than the social media ban; it was a struggle for Nepal’s future. Even more people took to the streets. On 9 September, Sharma Oli resigned. Some protesters turned to violence, while the army took over security and imposed a nationwide curfew. But events soon took a decisive turn. Chief Justice Sushila Karki was sworn in as interim prime minister on 12 September, kickstarting a process that led to the election. The interim government agreed to establish a Gen Z Council, a formal body designed to bridge the gap between the government and young people and enable them to hold it accountable and monitor implementation of reforms.

As the latest State of Civil Society Report sets out, Nepal’s movement inspired many of the year’s other Gen Z-led mobilisations. Nepali activists used the gaming platform Discord, including for a radical exercise in democracy that saw 10,000 people take part in online discussions that put forward Karki as interim prime minister. Morocco’s protesters also used Discord to coordinate their actions, while the Gen Z movement in Madagascar, where the army ultimately forced the government to quit, connected with Nepal’s Discord communities to learn from their organising. Movements in several countries adopted Nepal’s protest symbol, the skull-and-straw-hat flag from the One Piece manga, identifying themselves as part of the same global movement.

Around the world, Gen Z-led protests have commonly faced violent state repression but have forced real concessions: Bulgaria’s government quit, while politicians dropped unpopular policies in Indonesia and Timor-Leste. In Bangladesh, where a Gen Z-led protest movement ousted an authoritarian government in 2024, the country recently held its first credible election in almost two decades.

Time for change

The new energy unleashed by Nepal’s Gen Z-led protests was reflected in the registration of over 800,000 new voters, more parties standing than ever before, a profusion of younger candidates and an election campaign focused on corruption and good governance.

The result was a shock. Coalition governments are the norm in Nepal, but the centrist Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) won an outright majority, taking 182 of 275 House of Representatives seats after a campaign that made intensive use of social media. The three established parties all sustained heavy losses.

Shah used his music to attack corruption and inequality, resonating with the Gen Z movement during the protests, when one of his songs was viewed over 10 million times on YouTube. But he isn’t a completely new political figure, having become mayor of the capital, Kathmandu, in a surprise result when he ran as an independent in 2022. His track record there suggests grounds for concern. He’s rarely made himself available for media questioning, preferring to communicate directly via social media, where he’s known for making controversial outbursts. He also received criticism for deploying police against street vendors and launching ‘demolition drives’ to clear illegally built structures with minimal notice, leading to clashes between police and locals.

Shah now has a mandate to deliver change, and expectations are high. But he faces the challenge of reforming a typically resistant bureaucracy while delivering on his economic promises amid difficult global conditions worsened by the Israeli-US war on Iran, which threatens the remittances sent by the many Nepali workers based in Gulf countries, which constitute one quarter of the country’s GDP. He’ll need to navigate the difficult foreign policy balance between Nepal’s two powerful and often antagonistic neighbours, China and India. The new government must also ensure accountability for human rights violations during the 2025 protests, starting with releasing the report of a commission set up to investigate protest deaths, which hasn’t yet been made public.

The obvious danger, given these challenges and an outsized mandate, is that the government will adopt a heavy-handed approach, pushing through change while failing to listen. This is precisely when civil society is needed, to step in to hold the new government to account and ensure it respects human rights, including the right to keep expressing dissent.

Nepal’s Gen Z movement must guard against co-option by the new administration. The new government must acknowledge the vital role of Nepal’s outspoken young generation by moving quickly to form and resource the Gen Z Council and fully respecting its autonomy. The movement that helped bring Shah to power must stay engaged.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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On Wednesday, plenary debated the outcome of the 19 March EU summit with European Council President António Costa and Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

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Kaveh Madani, Director of the UN University’s Institute for Water, Environment and Health and lead author of the report entitled “Global Water Bankruptcy: Living Beyond Our Hydrological Means in the Post-Crisis Era” briefs reporters at UN Headquarters. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider

By Umar Manzoor Shah
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 25 2026 (IPS)

Professor Kaveh Madani of Iran has been named the 2026 Stockholm Water Prize laureate. The award will be formally presented by King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden in August during World Water Week in Stockholm.

The Stockholm Water Prize is widely regarded as the highest global honour in water science and policy. Often called the Nobel Prize for water, it recognises individuals and institutions for exceptional contributions to the sustainable use and protection of water resources. This year’s selection stands out for both scientific impact and the extraordinary personal journey of the laureate.

At 44, Madani is the first Muslim and the youngest recipient in the prize’s 35 year history. He is also the first United Nations official and the first former politician to receive the award.

Madani currently serves as Director of the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health. Once a senior official in Iran’s government, he later faced arrest, interrogation, and a sustained smear campaign that forced him to leave his country.

Born in Tehran in 1981, Madani grew up in a family deeply connected to Iran’s water sector. His early exposure to the country’s mounting water challenges shaped his academic direction. He studied civil engineering at the University of Tabriz before moving to Sweden to pursue a master’s degree in water resources at Lund University. He later earned a PhD from the University of California, Davis, followed by postdoctoral research at the University of California, Riverside.

By his early 30s, Madani had established himself as a leading systems analyst. He joined Imperial College, London, where his work focused on the mathematical modelling of complex human water systems. His research combined hydrology, economics, and decision sciences to improve policymaking in water management.

In 2017, he made a decisive move. Leaving a prestigious academic career in London, he returned to Iran to serve as Deputy Vice President and Deputy Head of the Department of Environment. Many viewed his appointment as a signal of reform and a bridge between Iran and its scientific diaspora.

During his tenure, Madani pushed for transparency and structural reforms in water governance. He used innovative public campaigns to raise awareness about environmental degradation. However, his efforts challenged entrenched interests.

State-aligned media accused him of espionage and labelled him a “water terrorist” and “bioterrorist”. Conspiracy theories circulated, linking him to foreign intelligence agencies and even to alleged weather manipulation schemes. His advocacy for international environmental agreements further intensified opposition.

In early 2018, a broader crackdown on environmental experts began. Madani was detained and interrogated multiple times. Several of his colleagues were arrested. One of them, Kavous Seyed Emami, died in custody under contested circumstances.

Facing mounting pressure, Madani left Iran and entered a period of exile. He joined Yale University, where he continued his research and advocacy. He began to focus more on bridging science and policy at the global level.

Madani’s academic contributions have been widely recognised. He is known for integrating game theory into water resource management. His work challenged traditional models that assumed cooperation among stakeholders. He demonstrated that individual incentives often lead to uncooperative behaviour, which makes many engineering solutions ineffective in practice.

This approach provided new tools to understand conflicts over shared water resources. It has been applied to transboundary water disputes and to policy design in regions with limited trust among stakeholders.

One of his most influential contributions is “water bankruptcy.” He introduced the term to describe a condition where water systems can no longer recover to their historical levels. Unlike a crisis, which implies a temporary disruption, water bankruptcy signals a long-term structural failure.

In a recent United Nations report, Madani argued that the world entered an era of global water bankruptcy in January 2026. The report highlighted that many river basins and aquifers have lost their capacity to regenerate. This framing has sparked debate among policymakers and researchers.

Madani uses simple financial language to explain complex ecological realities. He argues that humanity is no longer living off renewable water flows but is depleting long-term reserves. This framing has made the concept widely accessible and influential.

Beyond academia, Madani has built a strong public presence. With a large following on social media, he has used digital platforms to communicate scientific findings in accessible ways. His work includes documentaries and public campaigns aimed at increasing awareness and accountability.

He has also played key roles in international diplomacy. As Iran’s lead environmental diplomat, he participated in global negotiations and served as Vice President of the UN Environment Assembly Bureau in 2017. At the COP23 climate conference in Bonn, he called for greater attention to water in global climate agreements.

Today, as head of the United Nations water think tank, he continues to advocate for integrating water into climate and development policies. He has particularly focused on the Global South, where water stress closely links with food insecurity, migration, and conflict.

The Stockholm Water Prize Committee cited his “unique combination of groundbreaking research, policy engagement, diplomacy, and global outreach, often under personal risk” in awarding him the 2026 prize.

In an exclusive interview with Inter Press Service, Madani recalled the intense pressure and fear that defined his final days in Iran. He described repeated interrogations, surveillance, and a growing sense that his work had placed him in direct confrontation with powerful institutions.

Here are edited excerpts from the interview: 

IPS: You introduced the idea of “water bankruptcy.” How does this change how governments must act today?

Madani: Water bankruptcy is defined as a post-crisis state of failure in which the system is suffering from insolvency, meaning that water use has been more than the available water for an extended period, and also irreversibility, meaning that there are some damages to the ecosystem and the machinery of water production that are irreversible and cannot be fixed.

What that means is that some of the things that used to be just anomalies and abnormal conditions are now the new normal, and we’re no longer experiencing only a temporary deviation from what we are used to, but we have a situation that we have to get used to. Crisis management is about mitigation.

Bankruptcy management is about mitigating what can still be mitigated and adapting to new realities with more restrictions. Bankruptcy management calls for an honest confession, the admission of a confession that a mistake has been made, and the current business model is not working, so it calls for honestly admitting to the mistakes made and transforming the business model, that calls for a fresh new start and a change of course.

It is bitter. Bankruptcy is not a pleasant condition but admitting to it helps us prevent further irreversible damages and enables a future that is less catastrophic.

IPS: You faced arrest, exile, and serious accusations in Iran. What kept you going during that period?

Professor Madani: Hope. Hope is what kept me going because I had gone back there to help and at least at the start, I was trying to take what was happening to me as part of the job and as part of the adventure because I was there to make a positive impact, and if I had given up too quickly, then that would not have matched my essential motivation to help.

I knew that it would not be a very smooth path, but it turned out to be much more bumpy than what I had anticipated, and I think many also, you know, those who made that situation bumpy for me, also regret that today, but by the time they realised mistakes were made, it was too late to do anything about it.

Can you recall your arrest and interrogation? What do you remember most from that experience, and how did it affect you personally?

I think arrests and interrogations are very frustrating, especially when you haven’t done anything wrong.

What kills you is constantly worrying about what others think of you and coming up with different scenarios and conspiracy theories. Dealing with conspiracy theories and proving them wrong is not easy. Those were very hard times for me, but as you know, my background is in behaviour analysis. I was trying to put myself in the shoes of those who were suspicious of me, understand their concerns, and address them so I could help my homeland.

IPS: Many countries still treat water stress as a temporary crisis. What are the biggest policy mistakes they continue to make?

Madani: Yes, crisis management is all about mitigation. Those who deny the crisis and enter the bankruptcy state continue to borrow more from nature, build more infrastructure, dig deeper wells, add additional reservoirs and storage capacity, implement more water transfer projects and build more, and construct more desalination plants. Continuing to add to their supply, on the other hand, they think things would be temporary, and through some sort of rationing, things would be solved, but the continuation of that behaviour and the denial of that reality makes the problem worse.

They get drained into a deepening problem, and again, like the financial world, if your business model is not working and you’re in denial, you continue taking more loans and your expenses and your debt become higher and higher. By the time that people realise that there is no way out of that chaos and that failure, the cost is much, much higher. Remaining in denial would result in major significant irreversible damages that generations would have to pay for.

IPS: You combined science with diplomacy and public outreach. Which of these has had the most real impact on decision-making?

Professor Madani: It’s very hard to really say which one has the most impact, because they’re very complementary. The science is very good, but it’s not enough for decision-making. You still have to understand what the real world looks like and how incentives shape behaviour and actions and how interests promote conflicts and cooperation to be able to act.

Science, of course, opens doors and puts more solutions on the table, but still, without understanding the politics or navigating through politics, it would not work. Diplomacy is another one when it comes to the international scale; even when it comes to negotiating with stakeholders, that’s a skill that would be extremely helpful. So, in a way, these are the things that you need.

And on top of these, public outreach educates you about perceptions, how people and societies understand problems, how they judge different situations, and how their emotions and their perceptions shape their beliefs, and that tells you what you need to do when it comes to communicating your science better, changing their opinion, impacting their opinion, and even negotiating with them or convincing them that things might be different or a different pathway is required. I think they all help you create a recipe for something that might work.

IPS: Your work focuses on human behaviour in water management. Why do technical solutions alone often fail?

Madani: A lot of times, technical solutions developed by our computer models or in our labs don’t take into account the full elements of reality. When humans are involved, we deal with different motives, incentives, emotions, and psychologies, and that makes – that creates – some essentially unexpected realities that might tweak things. Simply put, a lot of times when it comes to developing a solution for a water problem or an environmental solution or a sustainability solution, we think that everyone agrees to making short-term sacrifices for the sake of long-term resilience, but that is not the case in reality because different stakeholders, different groups, farmers, urban users, and industrial users also have short-term goals.

They maximise profit, make sure that the quality of life is not impacted, and so on, which makes them non-cooperative to an extent. And if you miss this reality, then you think that the solution, the optimal solution, is very practical and everyone would cooperate, but then you get very disappointed.

Yet, you can take that into account to the extent possible, try to understand the behavioural element and incorporate those into your assessment and projections to be able to align those incentives and motives with the long-term interest to offer a solution that is more attractive and win-win.

IPS: You now advise governments globally. What is the one urgent action every water-stressed country must take in the next five years?

Madani: I think that by now, countries must understand the importance of water as an essential resource for establishing peace, national security, justice, prosperity, and development. I mean, it supports human development, health, and long-term resilience in society. So, countries must not take it for granted and understand that technological solutions would not be sufficient to address shortages.

They must revisit their practices. They must do a proper accounting to understand what, what’s, and how water is currently being spent and if it’s strategic – strategically speaking, that is the right way of doing things when it comes to matters of national security and long-term resilience. Bankruptcy management starts with accounting and transparency.

That’s something that is missing in many water-stressed and non-water-stressed countries, and I think that’s something that we can focus on, put the lens of science on, and not be afraid of accounting and measuring and monitoring what is happening in the system because that knowledge is required if you want to make improvements.

IPS: Thank you very much for taking the time and speaking to IPS  and congratulations again for the well-deserved award.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Excerpt:

It was hope that kept me going. – Professor Kaveh Madani 

As Mohamed Salah announces he will leave Liverpool this summer, BBC Sport asks you to rank the best forwards in Premier League history.

By Asoka Bandarage
COLOMBO, Sri Lanka, Mar 25 2026 (IPS)

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits member states from using threats or force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Violating international law, the United States and Israel attacked Iran on February 28, 2026. The ostensible reason for this unprovoked aggression was to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

The United States is the first and only country to have used nuclear weapons in war, against Japan in August 1945. Some officials in Israel have threatened to use a “doomsday weapon” against Gaza. On March 14, David Sacks, billionaire venture capitalist and AI and crypto czar in the Trump administration, warned that Israel may resort to nuclear weapons as its war with Iran spirals out of control and the country faces “destruction.”

Although for decades Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, opposed nuclear weapons on religious grounds, in the face of current existential threats it is likely that Iran will pursue their development.

On March 22, the head of the WHO warned of possible nuclear risks after nuclear facilities in both Iran and Israel were attacked. Indeed, will the current war in the Middle East continue for months or years, or end sooner with the possible use of a nuclear weapon by Israel or the United States?

Widening Destruction

Apart from the threat of nuclear conflagration—and what many analysts consider an impending ground invasion by American troops—extensive attacks using bombs, missiles, and drones are continuing apace, causing massive loss of life and destruction of resources and infrastructure. US–Israel airstrikes have killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and top Iranian officials.

Countless civilians have died, including some 150 girls in a primary school in Minab, in what UNESCO has called a “grave violation of humanitarian law.” Moreover, the targeting of desalination plants by both sides could severely disrupt water supplies across desert regions.

Iran’s retaliatory attacks on United States military bases in Persian Gulf countries have disrupted global air travel. Even more significantly, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz—the critical maritime energy chokepoint through which 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas pass daily—has blocked the flow of energy supplies and goods, posing a severe threat to the fossil fuel–driven global economy.

A global economic crisis is emerging, with soaring oil prices, power shortages, inflation, loss of livelihoods, and deep uncertainty over food security and survival.

The inconsistent application of international law, along with structural limitations of the United Nations, erodes trust in global governance and the moral authority of Western powers and multilateral institutions. Resolution 2817 (2026), adopted by the UN Security Council on March 12, condemns Iran’s “egregious attacks” against its neighbors without any condemnation of US–Israeli actions—an imbalance that underscores this concern.

The current crisis is exposing fault lines in the neo-colonial political, economic, and moral order that has been in place since the Second World War. Iran’s defiance poses a significant challenge to longstanding patterns of intervention and regime-change agendas pursued by the United States and its allies in the Global South.

The difficulty the United States faces in rallying NATO and other allies also reflects a notable geopolitical shift. Meanwhile, the expansion of yuan-based oil trade and alternative financial settlement mechanisms is weakening the petrodollar system and dollar dominance.

Opposition within the United States—including from segments of conservatives and Republicans—signals growing skepticism about the ideological and moral basis of a US war against Iran seemingly driven by Israel.

A New World Order?

The unipolar world dominated by the United States—rooted in inequality, coercion, and militarism—is destabilizing, fragmenting, and generating widespread chaos and suffering. Challenges to this order, including from Iran, point toward a fragmented multipolar world in which multiple actors possess agency and leverage.

The BRICS bloc—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, along with Iran, the UAE, and other members—represents efforts to create alternative economic and financial systems, including development banks and reserve currencies that challenge Western financial dominance.

However, is BRICS leading the world toward a much-needed order based on equity, partnership, and peace?

The behavior of BRICS countries during the current crisis does not indicate strong collective leadership or commitment to such principles. Instead, many appear to be leveraging the situation for national advantage, particularly regarding access to energy supplies.

A clear example of this opportunism is India, the current head of the BRICS bloc. Historically a leader of non-alignment and a supporter of the Palestinian cause, India now presents itself as a neutral party upholding international law and state sovereignty. However, it co-sponsored and supported UN Security Council Resolution 2817 (2026), which condemns only Iran.

India is also part of the USA–Israel–India–UAE strategic nexus involving defense cooperation, technology sharing, and counterterrorism. Additionally, it participates in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with the United States, Japan, and Australia, aimed at countering China’s growing influence.

In effect, despite its leadership role in BRICS, India is closely aligned with the United States, raising questions about its ability to offer independent leadership in shaping a new world order.

As a group, BRICS does not fundamentally challenge corporate hegemony, the concentration of wealth among a global elite, or entrenched technological and military dominance. While it rejects aspects of Western geopolitical hierarchy, it largely upholds neoliberal economic principles: competition, free trade, privatization, open markets, export-led growth, globalization, and rapid technological expansion.

The current Middle East crisis underscores the need to question the assumption that globalization, market expansion, and technological growth are the foundations of human well-being.

The oil and food crises, declining remittances from Asian workers in the Middle East, and reduced tourism due to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and regional airspace all highlight the fragility of global interdependence.

These conditions call for consideration of alternative frameworks—bioregionalism, import substitution, local control of resources, food and energy self-sufficiency, and renewable energy—in place of dependence on imported fossil fuels and global supply chains.

Both the Western economic model and its BRICS variant continue to prioritize techno-capitalist expansion and militarism, despite overwhelming evidence linking these systems to environmental destruction and social inequality. While it is difficult for individual countries to challenge this dominant model, history offers lessons in collective resistance.

Collective Resistance

One of the earliest examples of nationalist economic resistance in the post- World War II period was the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the creation of the National Iranian Oil Company in 1951 under Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. He was overthrown on August 19, 1953, in a coup orchestrated by the US CIA and British intelligence (MI6), and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was installed to protect Western oil interests.

A milestone for decolonization occurred in Egypt in 1956, when President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. Despite military intervention by Israel, the United Kingdom, and France, Nasser retained control, emerging as a symbol of Arab and Third World nationalism.

Following political independence, many former colonies sought to avoid entanglement in the Cold War through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), officially founded in Belgrade in 1961. Leaders including Josip Broz Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Sirimavo Bandaranaike promoted autonomous development paths aligned with national priorities and cultural traditions.

However, maintaining economic sovereignty proved far more difficult. Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected prime minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was assassinated in 1961 with the involvement of US and Belgian interests after attempting to assert control over national resources. Kwame Nkrumah was similarly overthrown in a US-backed coup in 1966.

In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa (“African socialism”) sought to build community-based development and food security, but faced both internal challenges and external opposition, ultimately limiting its success and discouraging similar efforts elsewhere.

UN declarations from the 1970s reflect Global South resistance to the Bretton Woods system. Notably, the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (Resolution 3201) called for equitable cooperation between developed and developing countries based on dignity and sovereign equality.

Today, these declarations are more relevant than ever, as Iran and other Global South nations confront overlapping crises of economic instability, neocolonial pressures, and intensifying geopolitical rivalry.

Dr Asoka Bandarage has served on the faculties of Brandeis University, Georgetown University and Mount Holyoke College. She is the author of Crisis in Sri Lanka and the World: Colonial and Neoliberal Origins, Ecological and Collective Alternatives and many other publications (De Gruyter, 2023).

IPS UN Bureau

 

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By the time the auction begins at Nangurukuru fish market in Tanzania’s southern Lindi region, the crisis is already visible. Wooden canoes that once returned from the Rufiji River with heavy catches now bring only a fraction of what they used to. Traders scan for the long-whiskered catfish that once defined the market but find […]

The WTO reform agenda is a distraction. The real prize is dismantling MFN through plurilateral precedents. Credit: WTO

By Chien Yen Goh and Kinda Mohamadieh
GENEVA, Mar 24 2026 (IPS)

As trade ministers gather in Yaoundé, Cameroon, for the WTO’s 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) on 26–29 March 2026, the preparatory process has produced a dense fog of competing reform proposals, draft ministerial statements, and work plans.

The facilitator-led consultations at the WTO headquarters in Geneva focused for the past few weeks on decision-making, development and Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT), as well as level-playing-field issues, while the United States, European Union and others tabled their own reform submissions.

The sheer volume and scope of this activity have muddied the picture of what exactly requires ministerial attention and decision.

This confusion, however, serves a purpose. It obscures the fact that the U.S. — which has done more than any other member to destabilise the multilateral trading system through unilateral tariffs, bilateral Agreements on Reciprocal Trade (ARTs), and paralysing the WTO Appellate Body — is not primarily interested in the reform or continued relevance of the WTO.

Its 2026 Trade Policy Agenda, released earlier this month, makes this plain: the US will push to reorient the WTO’s negotiating function by “favouring meaningful plurilateral agreements” and “urging reassessment of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle” so that trading nations can differentiate among partners in their liberalisation commitments.

The MFN rule is the foundational principle of the WTO that requires any trade advantage granted to one WTO member to be extended equally to all. The U.S. WTO reform paper submitted to the General Council in December 2025 (WT/GC/W/984) goes further, arguing that MFN “is not just unsuitable for this era” but actively prevents countries from optimising their trade relationships.

Outside the WTO, the U.S. is pursuing its trade interests through bilateral ARTs with Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and others. Since its Supreme Court struck down the legal basis for these ARTs, section 301 of the U.S. 1974 Trade Act has been activated. But within the WTO, the U.S. priority at MC14 is more focused and consequential than the reform agenda suggests.

The immediate objective is to secure adoption of the plurilateral Investment Facilitation Agreement (IFA) into the WTO’s legal architecture under Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement — despite the U.S. not having participated in the IFA negotiations and having no interest in being a party to it. U.S. Ambassador Joseph Barloon identified the IFA as one of a limited number of issues the U.S. wants decided at MC14.

Why would the US push through an agreement it will not sign? Because the IFA is not the end but the means. Its incorporation into the WTO — while its initiation, negotiation and addition have been formally contested — would establish that plurilateral agreements can be adopted and added to the WTO rulebook without the consent of all members. Once that door is opened, the principle of consensus in WTO agenda-setting and rule-making is effectively undermined.

This is precisely what the U.S. wants. Its December 2025 reform submission argues that plurilateral agreements should allow “likeminded trading partners committed to fair and reciprocal trade” to strengthen ties “within the architecture of the WTO agreements,” with benefits limited to consenting parties — that is, on a non-MFN basis.

The paper warns that without a path for plurilaterals, the WTO is “not a viable forum for negotiating.” Read together with the Trade Policy Agenda’s call to reassess MFN, the logic is clear: plurilaterals are the vehicle through which the U.S. intends to displace MFN as the organising principle of the multilateral trading system. Members that cannot or choose not to join will simply be left out.

The second U.S. priority reinforces this trajectory. Washington is pressing developing countries to make permanent the moratorium on customs duties on electronic commerce transmissions. First adopted as a temporary measure in 1998, the moratorium was last renewed at MC13 in Abu Dhabi, where members agreed it would expire at MC14 or 31 March 2026. The U.S. now wants to lock it in permanently and expand the scope of digital goods and services beyond customs authorities.

The stakes are high and direct. UNCTAD has estimated that the moratorium costs developing countries up to $10 billion annually in foregone tariff revenue, with 95 per cent of the losses borne by developing countries. For many, customs duties constitute 10–30 per cent of total tax revenue — for some, over 50 per cent.

The primary beneficiaries are the large technology firms in developed countries that dominate cross-border digital trade. Making the moratorium permanent would formalise this revenue transfer and strip developing countries of policy space to regulate digital imports as the digital economy grows.

Both these issues — the IFA and the e-commerce moratorium — involve developing countries giving up something concrete (MFN treatment, consensus-based decision-making, effective say over agenda setting, customs revenue and regulatory autonomy) in exchange for nothing.

The U.S. is not offering concessions on agriculture, S&DT, or the longstanding mandated issues that matter to developing country Members. It is not proposing to fix the dispute settlement system it broke. It is leveraging reform to extract structural concessions that tilt the WTO’s institutional machinery in its favour, while pursuing its trade interests bilaterally.

Once plurilaterals are entrenched and the moratorium made permanent, the U.S. will have a freer hand to set the WTO agenda without negotiating with developing country and Least Developed Country members. S&DT, already under pressure from demands to end self-designation and narrow its application, will recede further as a meaningful principle and integral part of the negotiations.

The reform agenda, for all its complexity, is secondary to the structural question: will the WTO remain a consensus-based institution where MFN and consensus decision-making ensure the smallest member has a say? Or will it be refashioned into a platform for variable-geometry agreements where the powerful set the terms and the rest face compliance or exclusion?

Developing countries have fought for decades to preserve a multilateral trading system in which trade could serve as a tool for their development. That system is now under direct threat — not from its irrelevance, but from a deliberate strategy to hollow it out from within.

Chien Yen Goh and Kinda Mohamadieh are trade and investment lawyers at Third World Network (TWN) based in Geneva.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Kuhaneetha Bai Kalaicelvan
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Mar 24 2026 (IPS)

In mid-1971, US President Nixon ended the dollar’s gold peg at $35 per ounce, triggering de-dollarisation. The 2025 gold and silver rush followed private speculators trying to profit from central banks hedging against perceived new risks.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

De-dollarisation
Some believed that flexible exchange rates, replacing earlier fixed rates, would resolve the ‘Triffin dilemma’ of the ‘dollar system’, due to its role as world reserve currency.

Many believe OPEC was allowed to raise oil prices from 1972, on condition petroleum purchases would be settled in dollars. ‘Petrodollars’ were thus believed to be the ‘black gold’ underlying the dollar system’s survival after 1971.

Although still the dominant world reserve currency, the dollar’s role has gradually declined over the decades. Trump 2.0’s rhetoric and actions appear to have accelerated de-dollarisation.

Trump’s 2 April 2025 ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs announcement triggered even greater uncertainty and volatility in foreign exchange and other markets worldwide.

Greater policy unpredictability has caused governments and investors to explore new options. Authorities worldwide are considering and developing alternatives to the dollar system.

Besides higher inflation, Trump’s threats and actions, particularly his tariffs, sanctions and wars, have pushed investors to sell dollar assets and seek alternatives.

Various factors have significantly accelerated de-dollarisation. In the first half of 2025, the dollar fell by over 10%, its sharpest fall since the 1973 oil crisis.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

Many countries in the Global South have been purchasing gold rather than dollar-denominated assets for reserve accumulation.

Geopolitical economy commentator Ben Norton highlighted an April 2025 note by the Deutsche Bank foreign exchange research head, noting:

“We are witnessing a simultaneous collapse in the price of all US assets [including stocks, foreign exchange, and bonds] … we are entering uncharted territory in the global financial system…

“The market is rapidly de-dollarising. In a typical crisis environment, the market would be hoarding dollar liquidity…The market has lost faith in US assets. They are actively selling down their US assets.

“US administration policy is encouraging a trend toward de-dollarisation to safeguard international investors from a weaponisation of dollar liquidity.”

Western confiscations
The weaponisation of central banks by the US, Europe, and their allies has caused other central banks to seek ‘safety’ by switching from dollar assets to gold.

Increased weaponisation of the dollar and Western confiscation of others’ assets under various pretexts have accelerated this trend.

Billions of dollars’ worth of Venezuelan central bank gold, held at the Bank of England, was confiscated by the UK government during the 2019 Washington-instigated Caracas coup attempt.

After the coup failed, the Bank of England refused to return the gold to Venezuela. Trust in Western governments and central banks thus continued to erode.

Similarly, the US Fed and European Central Bank confiscated over $300 billion worth of Russian dollar-, euro- and sterling-denominated assets after it invaded Ukraine.

European authorities have since pledged to transfer these Russian assets to Ukraine rather than return them to their owners.

Western confiscations of the central bank reserves of Iran, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Russia and others have alarmed authorities and publics worldwide.

Central banks’ reserve managers have increasingly viewed gold as safe despite greater volatility. Besides serving as a hedge, the precious metal also offered lucrative speculative gains.

Mitigating risk
Many monetary authorities have reversed their earlier accumulation of dollar-denominated US Treasury bills and bonds in their official reserves.

While US government debt has continued growing, inflationary pressures have mounted, albeit episodically. Gold and silver holdings are believed to help hedge against inflation and fiat currency debasement.

Gold holdings in central bank reserves increased significantly after the 2008-09 global, actually Western, financial crisis, followed by the Western turn to ‘quantitative easing’.

For the first time in three decades, central banks’ total gold holdings in their international reserves exceeded their US Treasury bond holdings in 2025.

About 36,200 tons, or a fifth of all gold holdings, is now held by central banks, rising rapidly over two years from 15% at the end of 2023!

Meanwhile, rising gold prices drew more speculative investments for profit. But such price spikes are not sustainable indefinitely.

Once gold was seen as overpriced, investors turned to other precious metals, notably silver, and other financial assets.

BRICS’ golden hedge?
After Lord Jim O’Neill identified Brazil, Russia, India and China as significant new financial powers outside the Western sphere of influence, BRICS was formed in 2009 by adding South Africa.

BRICS now has ten members and ten partners. Together, they account for 44% of world income, measured by purchasing power parity, and 56% of its people.

Russia, China, and India have been among the largest recent buyers of gold. Other major purchasers include Uzbekistan and Thailand, both BRICS partners.

Trump 2.0 has generated significant apprehension internationally. Without BRICS’ help, his weaponisation of economic policies and agreements has accelerated de-dollarisation.

Although Trump accuses the BRICS of conspiring to accelerate de-dollarisation, their precious metal purchases make sense as a hedge for their reserves.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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