Central Europe

VIENNA, 4 December 2018 – The Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM), together with the International Press Institute (IPI), will present on 10 December A Dark Place, a full-length documentary highlighting the experiences of female journalists who have been targeted by online harassment. The documentary, part of the RFOM’s Safety of Female Journalists Online (SOFJO) project, will premiere at Stadtkino in Vienna on International Human Rights Day, as part of This Human World film festival.

A Dark Place focuses on the stories of women journalists, as well as experts on gender and media from a number of OSCE participating States – Finland, Serbia, Spain, the Russian Federation, Turkey, the UK and the USA. The documentary encourages global audiences to discuss and better understand the impact of online harassment on media pluralism and media freedom.

The Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, will open the premiere. The film will be followed by a panel discussion with some of the journalists interviewed in the documentary, including Banu Güven, Linda Pelkonen, Marija Vučić and Arzu Geybullayeva, as well as the Director of the film, Javier Luque, and OSCE Media Freedom Project Officer Jennifer Adams. They will address the phenomenon of online harassment of female journalists, and how it goes beyond the issue of gender equality by directly affecting the quality of democracy and the fundamental human right of access to a plurality of information. 

For further information about the SOFJO project, please visit: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/safety-female-journalists-onlineFollow @OSCE_RFOM to join the discussion on Twitter using the hashtag #SOFJO.

Journalists are invited to cover the documentary screening and panel discussion on Monday, 10 December 2018 at 20:00, at Stadtkino, Akademiestrasse 13, 1010, Vienna.

Contact person for members of the media:

Jennifer Adams, Media Freedom Project Officer, Office of the OSCE Representative on

Freedom of the Media

Tel: +43 514 36 6813E-mail: jennifer.adams@osce.org

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He/she provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more atwww.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Kunduz Rysbek SDGs SDGs:  6 - Clean water and sanitation 15 - Life on land

Throughout 2018, the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek helped conduct a study of political and institutional frameworks for financing environmental protection causes in the province of Jalal-Abad. The results of the study, entitled “Financing Environment Protection with focus on Biodiversity and Climate Change Adaptation in Jalal-Abad Province: Public and Private Expenditure Review”, will be published with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek by the end of this year and then transferred to the Ministry of Finances of the Kyrgyz Republic.    

The examination of water and soil samples during the study revealed serious environmental problems in the province of Jalal-Abad. Firstly, hazardous wastewater containing nitrates, chlorides, chromium, sulphates, oil and oil products and salts of heavy metals are discharged untreated into open reservoirs and watercourses. Water samples from the local Mailuu-Suu River showed that the maximum allowable concentrations (MAC) for iron (2-12 MAC) and manganese (1.6-2.5 MAC) are exceeded.

Secondly, deforestation, forest fires, overgrazing, extensive land use in forest areas, mass tourism, reduction of natural forest ecosystems, and environmental pollution are also among the problems that the Jalal-Abad community is facing.

Lastly, the intensification of animal farming has also decreased the number of species, threatening biodiversity and depleting ecosystems.

The review is aimed at providing governments, municipal authorities, enterprises, organizations and the public with information on the most pressing environmental issues, also with a view to effective budget planning for environmental protection activities.  

MINSK, 4 December 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 4 December 2018:

“Despite the efforts of the TCG and the sides’ guarantees, tensions in and around the conflict zone have not declined.

Instead of looking for a peaceful solution to the conflict, the sides seem to be moving in the opposite direction.

I am deeply concerned about this situation, and once again I urge the sides to do their utmost to prevent any escalation.

In the Security Working Group, the participants further considered additional measures for ensuring a sustainable ceasefire and prepared for renewed ceasefire in connection with the Christmas and New Year holidays.

The Economic Working Group discussed such topics as water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbasa" supply systems as well as payments of pension for the residents of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR).

The Humanitarian Working Group continued discussion on the issues related to the exchange of detainees. Besides, preparations for the envisaged transfer of detainees not related to the conflict from CADR and CALR to the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government were carefully considered.

The Political Working Group continued exchanges on its traditional agenda – the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR as stipulated by the Minsk agreements.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission followed up on reports of a man injured due to gunfire in Betmanove, Donetsk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations assessed as inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.*
• The SMM observed fresh damage to one of the wooden ramps on the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
• It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema as well as an assessment of a water pipeline near Popasna. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 210 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 35 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (eight explosions). Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk).

A man injured due to gunfire in Betmanove

On 30 November, at the hospital in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man (45 years old) with his left leg bandaged. The man told the SMM that in the afternoon of 25 November, while standing at a bus stop in Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk), he had felt pain and fell to the ground. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the man had been admitted on 25 November with a large bullet wound in his left thigh.  

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 2 December, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge recorded two projectiles, assessed as rounds of a propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7) or a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm), in flight from north-west to south-east and one projectile in flight from north-north-east to south-south-west, all at an assessed range of 0.8-1.5km north-north-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 3 December, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM saw a fresh hole (about 30cm in width) on the southern wooden ramp on a broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, about 30m north of the forward position of the armed formations. It also saw numerous wood splinters on the ground beneath the aforementioned ramp. The SMM was unable to assess the weapon used or the direction of fire. During its presence on site, the SMM saw several pedestrians descending and ascending the affected wooden ramp, avoiding the hole.

On the evening of 2 December, the SMM camera in Zolote[3] (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), recorded one projectile in flight from east-north-east to west-south-west at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the morning of 3 December, positioned in Zolote, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-10km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 2 December, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) about 2km west of the area’s eastern edge and about 500m south of its northern edge; a new position and a 30m-long trench (not visible in imagery from 8 November 2018) about 1.5km south of the area’s northern edge and about 500m east of its western edge, as well as an IFV (BMP-2) about 1.2km east of its western edge and about 1km south of its northern edge (all of the above were assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces). 

The same UAV spotted, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck north of a checkpoint of the armed formations, as well as two military-type trucks near previously observed trenches and positions of the armed formations inside the Zolote disengagement area, about 100m north of its southern edge and about 800m west of its eastern edge.

During the day on 3 December, the SMM observed a calm situation in the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas:

3 December:

• A surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) 1km south of Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol), heading south-south-west;
• A probable towed mortar (type undetermined) at the entrance of Zhelanne Druhe (29km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

2 December:

-  An SMM mini- UAV again spotted three tanks (T-72) near   Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

3 December:

• Four self-propelled howitzers (2S7 Pion, 203mm) near Novyi Komar (73km west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas:

2 December:

• An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km north-west of Luhansk).

3 December:

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (two BTR-70 and an MT-LB) near Chermalyk (77km south of Donetsk);
• an APC (MT-LB) near Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk); and
• an APC (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

2 December:

• An SMM mini-UAV spotted two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23) near Mykolaivka (15km east of Luhansk).

Mine hazard signs

The SMM saw two tree trunks covered by tree branches laying 4m apart from each other on a local road about 2.5km east of Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk). Each tree trunk covered about 3m in width of the aforementioned road and impeded movement for opposite directions of traffic. On one of the tree trunks, the SMM saw a handwritten sign reading “Stop Mines” in Russian language. On the opposite side of the road, it saw a handwritten sign on a stick with the inscription “no passage for cars” in Russian language.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to enable assessments of a water pipeline near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Protest in Kyiv

In Kyiv, the SMM saw about 25 men (20-40 years old) gathered at 101A Zhylianska Street outside the building of a TV channel, some of them wearing insignia and carrying flags of a political organization. One participant told the SMM that they considered the aforementioned TV channel to be pro-Russian, adding that protests would continue. The SMM observed 30 National Police officers securing the entrance to the building.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 3 December 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint  of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Hranitne and Krasnohorivka were not operational during the reporting period..

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] After further review, ceasefire violations recorded by the SMM on 30 November when positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit, initially assessed as “six outgoing salvos (about ten rockets each) of multiple rocket systems (MLRS) (type undetermined)” in the SMM Daily Report 1 December 2018, were assessed as about 60 undetermined explosions.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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405242 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The protection of persons deprived of their liberty in the OSCE region in the context of immigration detention was the focus of a second regional meeting of representatives of national mechanisms for the prevention of torture and civil society organizations active in this area. The meeting was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in co-operation with the Geneva-based Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) in Milan on 3 and 4 December 2018.

Senior representatives from 26 national preventive mechanisms (NPMs) and 21 local NGOs gathered for the meeting. They were joined by international and regional experts from ODIHR, the United Nations Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture and the Office of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the Council of Europe. The event resulted from a consultative process with NPMs and civil society from across the OSCE region.

The participants discussed ways to strengthen regional cohesion and joint advocacy efforts for the rights of persons in immigration detention, including raising public awareness about related issues and following up on recommendations by different actors in the field. They exchanged views on the issue of legal grounds for the detention of migrants, including children. They also explored ways to effectively monitor forced returns and the material conditions in detention facilities, with a focus on the prevention of torture and other ill-treatment.

Throughout the meeting, the participants discussed challenges in the interaction and co-operation between NPMs and civil society organizations active in detention monitoring.

“The effective prevention of torture and other ill-treatment, including in the context of the administrative detention of migrants, requires a comprehensive approach, including collaboration between all actors in the field of monitoring,” said Omer Fisher, Head of the ODIHR Human Rights Department. “Building on our previous work with NPMs in the OSCE region, the discussion of experiences, challenges and good practices between NPMs and their national NGO counterparts will strengthen their respective missions and help better prevent torture and ill-treatment.”

Barbara Bernath, the APT’s Secretary General, said: “This exchange is very timely. Next week in Marrakech, states will sign the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. It is key for NPMs and civil society to strengthen their co-operation in holding states accountable, especially regarding the commitment to use immigration detention only as a measure of last resort.”

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

 OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO) and one first responder[1]. The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 9,585 to 8,264 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[2].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 38 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. 

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 29 this week (compared to 23 last week); 18 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 11 into Ukraine (79 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, one family was observed crossing into the Russian Federation and 11 were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when four families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and ten into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (332 compared to 353 observed during the previous week). There were 180 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 152 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv, Pervomaisk – Sevastopol – Yalta, Luhansk –Yevpatoria, Luhansk – Kyiv- Moscow.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 732 to 748 (200 at the Gukovo BCP and 548 at the Donetsk BCP); 398 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 350 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation and in Belarus.

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 46 (compared to 40 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 102 to 157: of the total number of trucks scanned, 81 trucks (52 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 76 trucks (48 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[3] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly decreased from 159 to 131 vehicles; 65 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 66 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 17 occasions, compared to 26 last week; the OTs assessed that seven trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and ten to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

 Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. The OM also noticed vehicles with Georgian and Lithuanian licence plates.

During the reporting period, the OT noted one Russian police vehicle that arrived at the Donetsk BCP on 30 November at 11:10. The vehicle drove behind the main building and was not visible from the OT position. At 13:20 the same day, the vehicle returned to the Russian Federation.

On 1 December at 13:38 at the Donetsk BCP, the OM observed the arrival of a Russian police vehicle. Due to the heavy traffic the OM could not observe any details except that the vehicle returned to Russian Federation at 14:20 the same day.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 30 October to 4 December 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] First responders are OSCE staff or Mission members deployed to another mission for a short period of time

[2] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[3] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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BELGRADE, 4 December 2018 – Aleksandar Alimpić, Governor of the Sremska Mitrovica Correctional Institution; Mileva Malesić, Director of TV Forum from Prijepolje, Dejana Milijić Subić, Deputy Director of the Institute for the Improvement of Education; and Dragomir Milojević, President of the Supreme Court of Cassation will be presented with the 2018 OSCE Mission to Serbia’s Person of the Year Award at a ceremony today in Belgrade.

This award celebrates citizens of Serbia who contribute to the promotion of OSCE values in the country.

Aleksandar Alimpić, Governor of the Sremska Mitrovica Correctional Institution, has shown exceptional openness to innovative approaches in the rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders into society, leading to the reduced risk of them reoffending.  For example, his institution is implementing a project where inmates run a dog shelter and prepare the dogs for adoption, while at the same time acquiring professional skills and helping to alleviate the problem of stray dogs in Sremska Mitrovica.

Mileva Malesić,  Director of TV Forum, Prijepolje, receives the award for encouraging professional and quality news reporting among young journalists. Malešić has also significantly contributed to the activities of Lokal Press, an association of local media, by organizing debates on the status and the future prospects of local media in Serbia, the role of women in the media, and improving media literacy.

Dejana Milijić Subić, Deputy Director of the Institute for the Improvement of Education, is recognized for her outstanding engagement in drafting and updating the curricula and learning outcomes for teaching and learning of Serbian as a non-mother tongue. Milijić Subić was the driving force behind the reform in this domain, contributing to the improvement of Serbian language proficiency among national minorities and thereby enhancing their social inclusion. 

Dragomir Milojević, President of the Supreme Court of Cassation, is awarded the distinction for his dedication to the independence, accountability and efficiency of the judiciary. He has consistently emphasized the importance of inclusive debates among all stakeholders on draft constitutional amendments regarding the judiciary.  In the constitutional reform process, he played a decisive role in keeping the issue of judicial independence in focus.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

NEW YORK, 3 December 2018 – Strengthening the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s co-operation with the United Nations was the focus of meetings today in New York. Chair of the OSCE PA’s Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism (CCT) Makis Voridis (Greece) was visiting UN headquarters to discuss the PA’s counter-terrorism activities and build synergy on counter-terrorism.

Voridis met with Vladimir Voronkov, Undersecretary General of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, which co-ordinates the UN’s counter-terrorism efforts. In discussions with Voronkov, Voridis welcomed the office’s contribution towards the coherent implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006.

In a meeting with Ambassador Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, Chair of the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), and Michèle Coninsx, Assistant Secretary General and Executive Director of the CTC, Voridis commended the work of the UN in countering terrorism and stressed that the OSCE PA is working to leverage its strengths to promote more informed and co-ordinated actions at the parliamentary level.

“Comprehensive, co-operative and creative approaches are needed from the international community to effectively prevent violent extremism and counter terrorism,” said Voridis. “This means that engagement from parliamentarians is essential in order to develop the broadest strategy, one that reduces redundancy and identifies top priorities. To deal with this threat we all must work together.”

The sides discussed the UN’s priorities and how they could better engage members of parliament in the UN’s counter-terrorism strategies. Voridis expressed the PA’s eagerness to strengthen its co-operation with relevant UN entities and emphasized the importance of safeguarding fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.

He described the CCT’s achievements in strengthening parliamentarians’ engagement on counter-terrorism by leveraging their lawmaking and oversight functions, including by promoting the implementation of international obligations in the context of returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters.

Earlier in the day, Voridis was joined by U.S. Congressman and Vice-Chair of the CCT Richard Hudson for meetings at New York's Port Authority.

Voridis’s meetings continue this week in Washington, where he will participate in a briefing at the United States Helsinki Commission on Tuesday and meet with members of the U.S.’s OSCE PA delegation, as well as representatives of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Centre, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

He also expects to discuss counter-terrorism strategies with leading experts from civil society and academia.

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VIENNA, 3 December 2018 - Today, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir expressed concern over the decision by the Canadian Supreme Court to uphold a lower court ruling obliging VICE reporter Ben Makuch to hand over his private communications with a source.

In 2016, Makuch was obliged, through a court approved order, to disclose his private communications on a series of interviews he conducted in 2014 with a Canadian citizen who joined Islamic State. Makuch refused to hand over the communications, appealed and lost in a lower court. The Supreme Court of Canada later decided to hear his case.

“The confidentiality of journalistic communication is an important element of media freedom, widely recognized and protected by international standards and Canadian legislation. “Infringing on journalists' confidentiality rights can lead to the silencing of sources, thereby undermining the ability of the media to report on issues of public interest,” said Désir. “Protection of sources should also include communication and raw data collected by the journalist.”

Désir noted that the Supreme Court's ruling requires positive changes to be made in how law enforcement obtains warrants and court orders from news outlets.

The new Journalistic Source Protection Act, known as Bill S-231, that was adopted last month includes strong protection of sources. “I wish that in the future this protection would also apply the protection of journalists’ communications,” concluded Désir.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Between the evenings of 30 November and 1 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period.
• Between the evenings of 1 and 2 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM observed fresh damage in a residential area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM observed military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM again observed multiple launch rocket systems in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted near Zaichenko, Sosnivske and Novoazovsk, as well as near Voznesenivka, an area close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 30 November and 1 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 185 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and north-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 1 and 2 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 90), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk and west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 30 November and 1 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (about 115 explosions). Between the evenings of 1 and 2 December, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including eight explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

Fresh damage in a residential area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 1 December, the SMM observed fresh damage to a civilian property in a residential area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), assessed as caused by an explosion of an undetermined weapon round fired from a southerly direction. At 42 Kotovskoho Street, the SMM saw a one-storey house with four south-facing windows broken (and covered in plastic sheeting) and burn marks on its south-facing wall. The SMM also saw a south-facing fence 2m south of the house with broken wooden planks. It observed a tailfin of a recoilless-gun round on the ground 2m south of the house. A resident (woman, aged 70) told the SMM that she had been inside the house on 26 November around 13:30 when shelling had occurred in the area and her house had been hit.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 1 December, the SMM observed a calm situation in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk). During the day on 2 December, positioned at the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the Mission again saw a blue laser light about 800m south.

During the day on 1 December, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw, on two occasions, two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel inside a military ambulance exiting the disengagement area and heading north. It also saw an armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel walking inside the disengagement area on the eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). On the morning of 2 December, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard three explosions 3-4km north, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 1 December, the SMM observed a calm situation in the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk). On the morning of 2 December, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire 2km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas:

1 December:

• An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) west of Bokovo-Platove (54km south-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 1 December 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

1 December:

• An SMM mini-UAV spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

1 December:

A mini-UAV spotted:

• 17 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm; and nine 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Khrustalnyi (54km south-west of Luhansk); and
• six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 11 towed howitzers (five 2A65 and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) west of Bokovo-Platove (see SMM Daily Report 1 December 2018).

Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn[3]

Weapons storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region:

1 December:

• 15 towed howitzers (D-30) were present
• 12 MLRS (BM-21) and 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) remained missing

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas:

1 December:

• An infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Zolote
• An armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BRDM-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)
• An IFV (BMP variant) near Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk)
• An APC (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)
• Two IFVs (BMP variant) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk)

2 December:

• An IFV (BMP-1) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk)
• An APC (BTR-80) in Pionerske (14km east of Mariupol)

Civilian infrastructure

On 1 December, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable assessment of a water pipeline near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and another near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). On 2 December, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the assessment of a water pipeline near Popasna. On both days, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas not under government control

On 2 December, while at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two pedestrians exiting Ukraine as well as two cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and nine pedestrians, including two children, entering Ukraine. After ten minutes at the crossing point, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 19 trucks (cargo not visible) (17 with Ukrainian licence plates, two with “DPR” plates), two buses, two minivans (all four with Ukrainian licence plates) and 13 cars (nine with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation, one with Lithuanian and one with Georgian licence plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw three buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates), 31 cars (six with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 16 with “DPR” plates) and a minivan (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.

Other observations

On 30 November, the SMM saw about ten women (mixed ages) gathered inside the building of the Kherson Municipal Council at 37 Ushakova Street, some of them holding banners featuring statistics on domestic and gender-based violence at the municipal and national level. Participants told the SMM that they were calling on municipal officials to establish a shelter for survivors of domestic and gender-based violence.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 1 December, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from traveling west toward Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south toward Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• On 1 December, at a checkpoint east of Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from entering the village, citing “orders from their superiors”.
• On 2 December, at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 2 December, at a checkpoint at the northern entrance to Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), four members of the armed formations (three of them armed) again prevented the SMM from traveling south, citing “orders from their superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM cameras in Hranitne and Krasnohorivka were not operational during the reporting period. The SMM camera located 1km south-west of Shyrokyne was not operational between the evenings of 30 November and 1 December.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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405110 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

The OSCE Mission to Moldova accompanied and supported a Moldovan delegation to the plenary meeting of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) held under the Alliance’s Italian Chairmanship in Ferrara, Italy, from 27 to 29 November 2018. The event brought together more than 200 experts and governmental representatives from around the world to discuss ways to promote Holocaust education, remembrance and research.

The Moldovan delegation included a representative from the Jewish Community of Moldova and state officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Research, as well as the Agency for Inter-ethnic Relations.

During the plenary, the Moldovan delegation updated participants on the progress in implementing the 2017-2019 Action Plan on Holocaust Remembrance and Education, which seeks to increase awareness and understanding of the Holocaust in the local context. The delegation, among other things, also attended IHRA Working group meetings on Memorials and museums, Education, as well as the Committee on Anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial.

“Participation in the IHRA plenary meetings allowed our delegation to learn first-hand about other countries' experiences and good practices in combating anti-Semitism and fostering Holocaust remembrance and education, which we will use when advancing our national action plan,” the head of the Moldovan delegation to IHRA, Ambassador–at-Large Larisa Miculet, said.

Moldova joined the IHRA as an observer country in 2014. Three years later the Moldovan Government adopted an Action Plan the field of Holocaust education and remembrance to support an open discussion about painful periods of the country’s history and to promote a culture of tolerance.

The Government has been co-operating with the OSCE Mission to implement some aspects of the Action Plan, in particular reviewing the school curricula and textbooks to accurately reflect the Holocaust in a local context, building the capacity of history teachers and opening a Museum of Jewish History in Chisinau.

ALMATY, Kazakhstan, 3 December 2018 – Some 120 university lecturers, school managers, teachers, trainers and experts from all the Central Asian states, Mongolia and the wider region gathered in Almaty, Kazakhstan, today for the opening of the five-day Regional School on Multilingual and Multicultural Education for Integration and Sustainable Development. The annual event is organized by the office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), in co-operation with the ORLEU National Centre for Professional Development.

Opening the Regional School, which focuses on Central Asia, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, Ambassador György Szabó, highlighted the important role of multilingual and multicultural education programmes for the integration of diverse societies. “The benefits of bilingual and multilingual education are not limited to the field of education,” he said. “It is a catalyst for interaction and an asset that permits citizens to find mutual understanding regardless of ethnicity.”

Addressing participants on behalf of the HCNM, Senior Adviser Marc Fumagalli emphasized that the participants’ practical capacities developed during the Regional School and the exchange of experiences between teaching professionals are crucial for successfully implementing multilingual and multicultural education programmes.

Over the course of the week, participants will also visit kindergartens and schools in Almaty that have Uyghur and Russian as the language of instruction and which are implementing or piloting multilingual and multicultural education programmes with the aim of maintaining education in the mother tongue as well as promoting knowledge of the state language, a key factor for integration.

The event was supported by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan; the UNESCO Almaty Cluster Office for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Kyrgyzstan.

Since 2012, the HCNM has been implementing the Central Asia Education Programme which aims to develop bilateral and multilateral co‑operation in the region as well as to improve the education of national minorities and the integration of diverse societies through multilingual and multicultural education.

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404783 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A five-day regional course, Introduction to Improvised Explosive Devices (I-IED), organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe in the framework of the Integrated Co-operation on Explosive Hazards Programme concluded on 30 November 2018 in Dushanbe. 

The course was hosted by Tajikistan’s Defence Ministry and facilitated by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe in partnership with the United States Army Central (USARCENT).

Twenty-one participants from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan attended the course. The course participants represented Afghanistan’s Ministry of the Interior; the United Nations Mine Action Service; Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s Ministries of Defence; Tajikistan’s National Mine Action Centre, the National Guard of Tajikistan, the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence, the Union of the Sappers in Tajikistan and the Norwegian People's Aid Tajikistan.

The first part of the training course consisted of demonstrations of modern personal protective equipment and detection methods.  It was held at the OSCE premises in Dushanbe, including practical exercises with the direct involvement of the participants based on mixed teams.

Tim Gaetcke, the representative of Vallon GmbH, Germany, one of the most prominent manufacturers of metal detectors and dual sensors, also delivered a presentation to the course participants on contemporary detection devices.

Tomislav Vondracek, Programme Officer at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe said: “Co-operation is the only way forward. The utilization of this learning platform also serves as an opportunity to share knowledge and experiences. We are grateful to our partners, USARCENT and Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Tajikistan for their support and encouragement to continue to conduct such events.”

The second part of the practical training course included a study visit to the Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre in Chimteppa (17 kilometres south-west of Dushanbe) as well as a practical exercise on IED disposal at the training site in Lohur, some 25 kilometres south of Dushanbe.

Greg Niles, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Chief from the United States Army Central stated:  “Combating the challenges of explosive hazards throughout Central Asia can only be accomplished with continued co-operation between regional partners.  Our long-standing relationship with the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, the Integrated Co-operation on Explosive Hazards Programme has been vital to bolstering partner nation capabilities.”

The next part of the training cycle, the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Regional Course, is scheduled for 2019. The final training course, the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Level 3+ Improvised Explosives Devices Disposal Regional Course, is planned for 2020.

Željka Šulc

The second OSCE-supported intercultural camp in Brčko was held from 29 November to 3 December 2018. The OSCE Mission to BiH, in partnership with the OSCE Mission to Serbia and the Education Department of the Brcko District government, organized the follow-up camp to heighten the participants’ awareness of their potential role in promoting civic education, human rights, inter-cultural dialogue, as well as in tackling peer violence and other security threats.

A total of 60 students from Brčko and Novi Pazar gathered for the event, including 40 students who attended the first camp and 20 new students. Meetings with the Brčko Government and Assembly officials were organized as well as a tour of the Brčko District.

“By working today, by speaking out, by making their voices heard, youth can alter the course of events and mould the future of their countries into something that they would be proud to inherit. I recognize that this is not always easy – youth opinions are often ignored, the platforms to voice them are scarce, and the pressure to accept the status quo is great. But words and ideas can really move mountains,” said Bruce G. Berton, Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The programme included thematic workshops designed to promote interaction among the young people and strengthen their resilience to violent radicalization and extremism by fostering tolerance and intercultural understanding.

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the OSCE Mission to Serbia are committed to assisting youth organizations in both countries in strengthening youth connectivity and in creating opportunities for dialogue between young people towards long-term peace and stability in the region.

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Forty frontline officers from Tajikistan’s Border Troops and Customs Service learned how to effectively detect and eliminate weapons of mass destruction at border checkpoints.

The training courses were organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe in November 2018, and further strengthened the capacity of Tajikistan to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The courses consisted of theoretical and practical training sessions, of which the latter were held in the Dushanbe Regional Training Centre on weapons of mass destruction, non-proliferation and export control for Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The aim of the training was to assist Tajikistan in the implementation of international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolution 1540 regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

“Operational preparedness is crucial to effectively mitigating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear warfare hazards. It is very important to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement agencies in this area, and improve inter-agency co-operation in taking protective measures,” said Vyacheslav Abramets, Border Management Adviser to the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

405077 Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) presented a report titled ‘Two schools under one roof’: The Most Visible Example of Discrimination in Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 3 December 2018 in Sarajevo.

This report addresses the practice of ‘two schools under one roof’ as the most visible manifestation of discrimination in the education system of the country and includes recommendations to advance the vision of a peaceful, stable and multi-ethnic BiH.

“This report outlines several practical steps that can be taken toward ending discrimination and segregation in education,” said Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Bruce G. Berton.  “Steps involve political dialogue, increased interaction between children, comprehensive implementation of the Common Core Curriculum based on Student Learning Outcomes, respect for court decisions and legal and administrative unification of schools, which we see as a positive start toward ending ‘two schools under one roof’. These steps require only the commitment of BiH’s elected leaders.”

Today, ‘two schools under one roof’ persists in 56 schools in BiH. These include primary schools and secondary schools, both branch schools and central schools. They vary in specific characteristics, size and location.

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to advocate with authorities at the highest level for respect for human rights, including the right to an education free from all forms of discrimination, in line with OSCE commitments.

Reports in official languages of BiH and English are available for download at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/404990

WARSAW, 3 December 2018 ─ On the International Day of Persons with Disabilities, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), called on participating States to take measures to further ensure that electoral processes and information are accessible to persons with disabilities.

“Across the OSCE region, persons with disabilities face various obstacles to exercising their right to vote and be elected. This includes restrictions on legal capacity, inaccessible polling stations and electoral information, as well as limited support and lack of knowledge among electoral officials,” said Ingibjörg Gísladóttir. “OSCE participating States should increase their efforts to make electoral rights available to persons with different kinds of disabilities on an equal basis with others, in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards.”

The right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections is a fundamental right that should be protected for all, including persons with disabilities, without discrimination. Equal and effective participation in elections, as voters, candidates and election officials, is a prerequisite to guaranteeing that persons with disabilities are participating in political and public life, and are contributing their experiences, views and opinions to decision-making processes.   

Through awareness-raising activities and positive practice exchange, the Office encourages political parties, parliaments, public officials and civil society to recognize the prevailing invisibility of persons with disabilities in public life and to take steps in becoming more inclusive and representative. Using the methodology outlined in the Handbook on Observing and Promoting the Electoral Participation of Persons with Disabilities, ODIHR election observers identify the legal and practical barriers that obstruct inclusion. They also monitor the extent to which persons with disabilities are actively participating in elections as voters, candidates and election officials, and recommend improvements.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed multiple launch rocket systems in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The SMM followed up at entry-exit checkpoints on possible impacts of the introduction of martial law.
• The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Zaichenko, Novoselivka Druha and at compounds on both sides of the contact line.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, but more explosions (about 185), compared with the previous reporting period (about 160 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east and south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) and areas east of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 115 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 55). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas in and near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 29 November, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five undetermined explosions and two projectiles in flight (one from west to east and one from east to west), all at an assessed range of 0.5-2km south-south-east. On 30 November, positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) for about an hour, the SMM heard six outgoing salvos (about ten rockets each) of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (type undetermined), 50 explosions (assessed as from impacts and from outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons) and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-8km south-east. In the same location, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-8km east and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west. All abovementioned ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the disengagement area.   

During the day on 30 November, the SMM observed calm situations in the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas:

30 November:

• Four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

29 November:

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• six MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) at a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk);
• eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 22 MLRS (BM-21) near Bokovo-Platove (54km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

30 November:

• Two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) on trucks near Yurivka (32km south-west of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas:

29 November:

• A tank (type undetermined) near a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 21 tanks (20 T-72 and one T-64) at a training area near Ternove;
• 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), seven tanks (T-72) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at a training area near Miusynsk;
• two tanks (T-72), 17 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and nine 2A65) near Khrustalnyi (56km south-west of Luhansk); and
• six self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 11 towed howitzers (five 2A65 and six D-30) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Bokovo-Platove. 

Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn:[3]

Weapons storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region:

29 November:

• Five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present and eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six MLRS (BM-21) and 12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) remained missing. 

Weapons storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region:

30 November:

• 39 towed howitzers (13 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and 26 2A65) and 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Weapons verified as withdrawn:

A permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

29 November:

-  11 tanks (four T-64 and seven T-72) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas:

29 November:

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk);
• two ACVs and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

30. November:

• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk);
• An  armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk);
• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk);
• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk);
• An APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• A combat engineering vehicle (IMR variant) near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

29 November

• Three IFVs (BMP or BTR variant) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk); and
• An SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Styla (34km south-west of Donetsk).

30 November:

• An IFV (BMP variant) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk)

Civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable assessment of a water pipeline near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) on 29 November, for about an hour, the SMM saw 37 cars (14 with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates and 15 with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. Amongst the cars entering Ukraine, the SMM saw a convoy of seven Mercedes cars with tinted black windows escorted by a car labelled “police”. The SMM also saw two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), 28 cargo trucks (24 with closed trailers and four with empty open trailers) (17 with Ukrainian, four with Belarusian, one with Russian Federation licence plates and six with “DPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine, and one car with Russian Federation licence plates exiting Ukraine.  

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) on 30 November, for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw a car with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine.

Possible impact of the introduction of martial law

On 29 and 30 November, Ukrainian Armed Forces and State Border Guard Service officers at several entry-exit checkpoints in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region told the SMM that they had not received special orders related to changes in procedures following the introduction of martial law. Some officers said that they had been instructed to perform more thorough inspections of people’s belongings.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 28 November 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a heavy weapons holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, three members of the armed formations (two armed) denied the SMM access, citing orders “not to allow the SMM to enter”.
• At a permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, an armed member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from entering, demanding the SMM sign a logbook before entering.
• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one armed) again prevented the SMM from traveling west toward Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the SMM’s safety”. The Mission was allowed to travel south toward Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access to a compound near Novoselivka Druha (government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), after the SMM patrol members refused to show their passports.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place in the past 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Hranitne and Krasnohorivka were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian injured due to shelling in Holmivskyi.
• The SMM observed anti-aircraft guns and infantry fighting vehicles inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed tanks in violation of the withdrawal lines near Novoselivka.
• In Lviv, the Mission followed up on reports of arson attacks at two Alfa-Bank branches.
• In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a protest.
• The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as in Valuiky and near Starolaspa.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, and a similar number of explosions (about 160), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and around the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 55 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 160 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

A civilian injured due to shelling in Holmivskyi

In Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM followed up on reports of injuries sustained by a 19-year-old woman. On 28 November, the woman’s mother told the SMM that around 19:00 on 15 November, while inside the family’s apartment at 4 Zhydkova Street, she had heard a loud explosion and subsequently found her daughter in shock and lying on the floor in the apartment’s corridor with visible injuries to her left ankle. She said her daughter had been outside walking on the street at the time of the explosion. About 60m west of the building, on the opposite side of the street, the SMM saw a crater, assessed as caused by a mortar round fired from a north-north-easterly direction. On 16 November, a staff member of the ambulance department of a hospital in Horlivka had told the SMM that on the evening of 15 November an ambulance had been dispatched to Holmivskyi to provide medical care to a woman with an ankle injury who was subsequently transferred to a hospital in Horlivka. On the same day at that hospital, medical staff had refused to provide information to the SMM regarding the woman’s injuries (see SMM Daily Report 17 November 2018).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 28 November, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), about 30m north of its southern edge along road T1316, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a military-type truck as well as two military-type jeeps, all assessed as belonging to the armed formations. The same UAV spotted another anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military-type truck inside the disengagement area, about 130m north of its southern edge along road T1316, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

The same UAV again spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2) and another IFV (BMP-1) at locations south of the railway tracks, inside the disengagement area, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 

On the evening and night of 28-29 November, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 12 projectiles and a burst of an undetermined weapon, all in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east at an assessed range of 1-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 29 November, the same camera recorded a projectile in vertical flight at an assessed range of 0.5-1km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.7-1km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 29 November, the SMM observed calm situations in the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas:

28 November:

• An SMM mini-UAV spotted five tanks (probable T-72) near Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk) (an SMM mini-UAV also spotted five probable T-72 tanks at the same location also on 29 November).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

28 November:

• A self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska, 152mm) near Kalynove (31km north-west of Donetsk)

29 November:

• Three tanks (T-64) near Manhush (25km south-west of Mariupol)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Non-government-controlled areas:

28 November:

• Two IFVs (probable BMP-2) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk)
• An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
  • An anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) near Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) and
  • Three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-80) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk).
• An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
  • An APC (MT-LB) in a compound near Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk);
  • Two IFVs (BMP-1) about 2m from residential houses in Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk) as well as another IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Veselohorivka;
  • Two IFVs (one BMP-2 and one BMP-1) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk); and
  • Three APCs (MT-LB), two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (VT-55) near Kadiivka.

29 November:

• An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR variant) near Novoselivka.

Government-controlled areas[4]:

28 November:

• An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
  • Two probable APCs (MT-LB) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk); and
  • An IFV (BMP variant) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk).

29 November:

• An IFV (BMP-2) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk)
• An APC (BTR 70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk)
• An APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)

Civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable assessment of a water pipeline near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Presence of mine hazard signs

Near the main road in Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time five mine hazard signs. The Mission also saw a wooden stick with red rag tied to the top, assessed as an improvised mine hazard sign, near a cemetery in Taramchuk.

Follow up on reports of arson attacks at two Alfa-Bank branches in Lviv

On 28 November, the SMM followed up on reports of arson attacks at two branches of Alfa-Bank in Lviv. Inside one of the branches at 45 Chornovola Street, the Mission saw scorch marks around a plastic cover over a broken window as well as burnt debris on the floor. It also noted the smell of smoke. A staff member of the branch – which was open – told the SMM that the damage had been caused by a fire around 03:30 on 28 November. She added that another branch at 2 Politekhnichna Street had also been damaged by a fire on the same night. At the latter branch, the SMM saw a large plastic cover over a window as well as a sign on the front door announcing its closure until further notice. In a public statement, police announced that an investigation into both incidents had been launched under Article 194 of the Criminal Code (willful destruction or endamagement of property).

Protest in Kyiv

In Kyiv, on the evening of 29 November, the SMM saw about 50 people (three women, the remainder men, mixed ages) gathered on Maidan Nezalezhnosti. The SMM saw 100 police officers as well as 30 National Guard officers in full gear. After 45 minutes, the SMM saw participants march towards the building of the Ministry of Interior Affairs at 10 Akademika Bohomoltsia Street, some of them throwing party poppers and smoke grenades along the way. In front of the above-mentioned building, some of the participants poured fuel on the ground and lit it on fire. The SMM observed 100-200 police officers, including 100 National Guard officers in full gear, securing the building.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 28 November 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint in Valuiky (government-controlled, 70km north-west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier prevented the SMM from travelling through the village. Another Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the SMM not to fly a UAV in the area.
• At a checkpoint near Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from travelling through the village, citing “orders from their superior”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Hranitne and Krasnohorivka were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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Edita Buçaj

From 26 to 30 November 2018, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo delivered training course on international standards and the Kosovo legal framework on protection of property rights to 145 law students of Prishtinë/Priština University. 

The students learned about the concepts of expropriation, property tax, illegal occupation, social housing, spatial planning and land allocation. They were also familiarized with the roles and responsibilities of the institutions working in these fields.

“The workshop was useful for our students as it complements the theoretical part they study at the university with practical knowledge from the OSCE’s expertise,” said Haxhi Gashi, Dean of the Law Faculty.

Following the training, the students are expected to better understand the functioning of institutions dealing with property rights, as well as international standards and legislation protecting the property rights of all communities.

The OSCE Mission plans to continue supporting young lawyers through training in 2019.