The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for January 2025.
On January 15, 2025, Greece’s Ambassador to the United States Ekaterini Nassika met with the two newly sworn-in Greek-American members of Congress, Congresswoman Maggie Tamposi Goodlander (D-NH) and Congressman Mike Haridopoulos (R-FL). Shortly after they took office, both Representatives welcomed Ambassador Nassika to their offices, where she congratulated both lawmakers on their recent elections, expressing pride in their achievements and underscoring the significance of their roles in strengthening Greek-American relations.
Donald Trump was sworn in as the 47th US President on January 20. Prominent members of the Greek-American community with close ties to Trump were present at the Capitol for the new US President’s inauguration ceremony. Among the attendees was Konstantina Karampatsoli, the only Greek politician at the Trump inauguration. Karampatsoli, a member of the ruling New Democracy party, traveled to Washington DC after receiving an official invitation to the event from Republican Congressman Gus Bilirakis of Florida’s 12th District. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis congratulated President Trump on his return to the White House in a post on X.
On the same day as the US presidential inauguration, US Ambassador George Tsunis’ tenure ended, with Deputy Chief of Mission Maria Olson designated to serve as the top US diplomat in Athens until the new US ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle, arrives and presents credentials to the head of state. Guilfoyle is expected to assume her duties as the US Ambassador to Greece by April 2025, pending confirmation by the Senate.
The Greek Minister of National Defence, Nikos Dendias, visited on 22 January the Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence in Oklahoma, which houses the Army’s Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) University. The Minister had the opportunity to be informed by the Commander of Fort Sill, General Major Winston P. Brooks, about academic training in the field of counteracting Unmanned Aircraft Systems, as well as about the development of state-of-the-art innovations and defence tactics for dealing with new threats. The Minister of National Defence also had the opportunity to meet with Officers of the Hellenic Army, undergoing training in modern Artillery fire directing technologies there.
More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#
Éppen egyik cikkem illusztrációjához keresgéltem régi papírképeim között, amikor kezembe akadt egy Ferihegyen parkoló kék-fehér Fokker F27-es fotója. A kép fényes nappal készült, de egy éjszakai repülés emlékét idézte fel. Feljegyzéseimbe lapozva a repülés dátumát is megtaláltam és mivel ennek éppen 25 éve – ráadásul a kargópilótákról ritkán esik szó – gondoltam, a dolog megér egy visszaemlékezést.
Az ezredforduló környékén egy gyorsposta-szállítással foglalkozó, svájci központú légiforgalmi cég magyar leányvállalata, a Farnair Hungary a legismertebbek között volt. Számos pilótának volt ugródeszka a közforgalmi repülés világába, mert akkoriban a nemzeti légitársasághoz, a Malévhez kevés fiatal jutott be. Ennek többnyire nem szakmai okai voltak. Fogalmazzunk úgy, hogy a kapcsolati tőkéjük még nem nyugodott biztos alapokon. Ők aztán csomagszállító L-410-eseken és Fokker F27-esen alapozhatták meg karrierjüket, majd ülhettek át a rövidesen megjelenő diszkont légitársaságok Airbus 320-asaira vagy Boeing 737-eseire.
Russland strebt offenbar an, vom Ladogasee aus Ziele in der Ostsee-Region angreifen zu können. Das Gewässer befindet sich nördlich von Sankt Petersburg und ist nur 40 Kilometer von der finnischen Grenze entfernt. Seit 2023 erprobt Russland dort die Stationierung von Korvetten, die mit Marschflugkörpern ausgestattet sind. Solche Kriegsschiffe haben bereits im Syrien- und im Ukraine-Krieg aus großer Entfernung Landziele beschossen. Ihr Einsatz im gut zu schützenden Ladogasee würde die ohnehin komplizierte Verteidigung der nordöstlichen Nato-Staaten weiter erschweren. Abschüsse von dem Gewässer aus sollen im Herbst 2024 erstmals simuliert geübt worden sein. Im Westen fehlt es jedoch an Informationen über den Ladogasee. Die Entwicklung dort unterstreicht, dass es der Fähigkeit zu konventionellen Schlägen ins russische Hinterland bedarf, um Moskau wirkungsvoll abschrecken zu können.
La Cour de Bosnie-Herzégovine a rendu son verdict : le président de la Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik a été condamné à un an de prison et à une interdiction de six ans d'exercer la fonction de président de la RS. Des milliers de sympathisants manifestent à Banja Luka.
- Articles / Bosnie-Herzégovine, Relations régionales, Politique, RS sécession, Courrier des BalkansAn Istanbul prosecutor has launched two legal investigations against Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, amidst a judicial crackdown on municipalities run by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). The indictment charges İmamoğlu with “insulting and targeting a public official” and “attempting to influence a trial”, and demands a prison sentence of at least two years and eight months. The first hearing will be held on 11 April 2025. Finally, on 22 February, another investigation was opened against İmamoğlu, this time claiming that his university diploma was “forged”.
The legal manoeuvres only deepen concerns that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan aims to neutralise İmamoğlu, who is currently the CHP’s strongest potential challenger for the 2028 elections. This marks a qualitative leap in Turkey’s authoritarian trajectory, a shift from merely repressing the opposition to using judicial means to systematically eliminate the most viable electoral challengers.
Towards full authoritarianismTurkey’s political system has been undergoing a gradual authoritarian consolidation for years. President Erdoğan controls most of the media and effectively dictates judicial decisions. Turkey remains one of the worst jailers of journalists, and the government continues to suppress protests and harass civil society groups. While political rights and freedoms erode, the opposition faces growing threats from the government.
Criminalising the oppositionKurdish opposition leaders have long been subject to repression. Selahattin Demirtaş has been imprisoned since 2016 alongside many other Kurdish politicians. A former leader of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (HDP), he is arguably the opposition’s most charismatic figure. And for years now the state has been appointing trustees (kayyum) to govern municipalities won by the HDP and its successor, the Democracy Party (DEM). Mayors are removed on terrorism charges within months of their election, and state administrators take over. Terrorism charges are used sweepingly to suppress opposition leaders and civil society actors. While public attention often focuses on high-profile cases like Demirtaş or businessman Osman Kavala, millions of ordinary citizens – including teachers, academics, civil servants and small business owners – have also faced terrorism investigations.
Despite the shrinking political space, Turkey’s electoral system has remained resilient, allowing the opposition to secure local election victories in major cities in 2019 and 2024. While political competition is increasingly restricted, the electoral process itself has been historically resistant to outright fraud.
Now, however, Erdoğan is taking steps to eliminate electoral turnover entirely. Repression that historically focussed on Kurdish politicians has now expanded to target the broader opposition. The recent prosecution of nationalist leader Ümit Özdağ and renewed legal action against Gezi Park protestors from the cultural scene signal a wider crackdown.
The targeting of Ekrem İmamoğluThe escalating lawfare against Istanbul’s CHP mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu underscores this shift. A state trustee has been appointed in Esenyurt district in Istanbul, the first time this has happened in a metropolitan municipality outside the Kurdish-majority areas. The investigation into alleged corruption in Istanbul’s local administration appears designed to eventually implicate İmamoğlu. This is not the first time İmamoğlu has been targeted. In 2022, a trial for allegedly insulting judges was used to prevent his nomination as the opposition’s presidential candidate in 2023.
If Erdoğan continues dismantling opposition forces the next elections may be a mere formality. He has already signalled his intention to run again in the next presidential election, despite term limits. Turkey’s political future is at a critical juncture. If Erdoğan succeeds in neutralising İmamoğlu and the broader opposition, the next elections may be little more than a sham, marking the final transition to a fully authoritarian regime.