Feed aggregator

Nach den blutigen Auseinandersetzungen in Mazedonien scheint Ruhe eingekehrt zu sein. Die schweren Kampfhandlungen vom vergangenen Wochenende werfen indessen viele Fragen auf.

A Moscow court turned down Wednesday a request to replace Russian opposition activist Alexei Navalny’s suspended sentence for stealing timber from state-run company KirovLes with a real prison term, a RIA Novosti correspondent reported from the courtroom.

The post-2015 development agenda will constitute a different mission for UN Development than the current one driven by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Unlike the MDGs agenda, the new sustainable development goals (SDGs) aim to integrate the economic, social and environmental pillars of sustainable development while emphasising global challenges to a greater extent. The growing interconnection between local and global development challenges will be a key feature of the SDGs.
Current governance arrangements of UN Development, however, impose a constraint on the organisation’s ability to meet the integration requirements of the SDGs.
To deliver on the post-2015 development agenda in an integrated and coordinated manner, UN Development will require governance capacity that can foster policy coherence and interoperability in programming and operations. This means that governing boards will have to be able to coordinate their work more effectively than in the past, with a view to balancing agency and system-wide interests, as well as the local and global perspective in their decision-making. Such changes required in the capability of governing bodies also offer Member States the opportunity to rethink what constitutes legitimacy in governance.
Three options are particularly proposed to address the governance demands of the post-2015 development agenda:

1. ECOSOC as a system-wide governing body: On the basis of a system-wide strategy, the UN Development Group (UNDG) becomes formally accountable to ECOSOC and the General Assembly for the implemen-tation of system-wide objectives. This would strengthen horizontal governance of development operations;
2. Fulltime Joint Executive Board: Merging the four executive boards of the funds and programmes with major development operations; and
3. Fulltime Development Board: A single board for the governance of operational activities of the 19 funds and programmes reporting to the central bodies of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

In making the governance of UN Development “fit-for-purpose”, Member States would fundamentally recharge multilateral cooperation, whose appeal is withering, despite the reality of growing interconnectedness, complexity and uncertainty in today’s globalising world.

En souvenir des soldats de montagne qui se sont affrontés durant l’hiver 1944-1945, lors des combats les « plus hauts d’Europe » (sur le glacier du Géant à 3 500 m), l’Ecole militaire de haute montagne (EMHM) a organisé une cérémonie commémorative, le jeudi 7mai, au refuge des Cosmiques (Chamonix).

The Italian Air Force is developing a new indigenous jet trainer.

The Italian Air Force has identified the new trainer that will replace the SF-260EA in the role of initial flight screener of its student pilots.

The mock-up of the new indigenous project, dubbed T-344 V.E.S.P.A. (Very Efficient Smart Power Aircraft) was unveiled during a press open day organised at Cameri airbase as a side event of the EURAC (European Air Chiefs’ Conference) on May 7.

The T-344 is based on the Caproni C-22J, a light jet-powered aircraft developed in the 1980s: it features a side-by-side digital cockpit, two 170-kg thrust engines, retractable tricycle undercarriage, maximum speed of Mach 0.48 and service ceiling of 25,000 feet.

The cockpit is not pressurized, meaning that the pilots will have to use the flight helmet and oxygen mask.

The V.E.S.P.A. is being developed through Reparto Sperimentale Volo (Italian Air Force Test Wing based at Praitca di Mare) by the ItAF itself, that will assign production to an aerospace company at a later stage.

With the new jet trainer the Italian Air Force will complete the renewal of its fleet of trainers that in the future will be based on three flight lines: T-344, T-345 (ItAF designation for the M-345 HET) and T-346 (already in service at 61° Stormo multinational training hub).

Interestingly, other innovative projects were showcased at Cameri.

Among them, the AgustaWestland HH-101A Caesar, the new CSAR (Combat Search And Rescue) helicopter that the ItAF will use for Special Forces support, Personnel Recovery in hostile environments, MEDEVAC (Medical Evacuation) and SMI (Slow Mover Intercept) missions; the Alenia Aermacchi MC-27J Praetorian, a gunship version of the successful C-27J Spartan equipped with pallettized machine guns, targeting sensors and C3I-ISR (Command, control, communications and intelligence – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems; the AgustaWestland AW-149, that could find its way to the ItAF SAR fleet in the future; and the P.1HH HammerHead UAS (Unmanned Aerial System), that the ItAF has already procured (three UAS systems, consisting of six aircraft and three ground stations and complete with ISR configuration, that will be delivered early next year).

Even a scale model of the MALE 2020 medium-altitude, long-endurance UAV project developed by Italy, France and Germany.

Among the future project, even some very known ones, including the Eurofighter Typhoon, the T-346A (carrying dummy IRIS-T missiles), the mock-up of the M-345/T-345 in the Frecce Tricolori color scheme, and the HH-139 SAR helicopter.

Also one the two F-35s assembled in Italy and destined to the Aeronautica Militare could be seen at Cameri, along with the two types the Joint Strike Fighter is going to replace in the ItAF, the Tornado and the AMX, as shown by the much interesting image below:

Image above: Italian Air Force

All the images in this post were taken by The Aviationist’s photographer Iolanda Frisina during the press day at Cameri airbase unless otherwise stated.

Related articles

• KC-767 performs special bio-containment flight to transport Italy’s first case of Ebola
• Stunning Photographs of the Polish Mig-29s and Italian Typhoons of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing
• Italian Police Forces to use Air Force’s Predator drones
• Italy to operate a small fleet of MC-27J Praetorian gunships, special operations planes
• MQ-1C Predator footage of repatriation of Italian nationals from Libya
• First AgustaWestland HH-101A “Caesar” for the Italian Air Force makes first flight
• Boeing KC-767 next generation tanker as you have never seen it before: Buddy Refueling

Europe faces new opportunities for cooperation with China. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, comprising the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’, which envisages a comprehensive network of railways, roads, air and sea links, pipelines and transmission grids connecting China to Europe and the wider world. Before that, many in Europe were talking of building a free trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok so partners would not have to choose between Moscow and Brussels.

These developments would push forward intercontinental cooperation between China and Europe. Overland and maritime Silk Roads could link Central Europe with Eastern Africa and connect the Pacific and Indian oceans to the Mediterranean. This would not only drive the rise of China and India and consolidate Asia’s growth momentum, but also create a more inclusive globalisation, closing gaps between coastal and inland areas. By opening up to the West, One Belt One Road would encourage the development of China’s western regions as well as Central Asia and Mongolia. It would also create an opportunity for Europe to rediscover its ties with China and take East-West integration to new levels.

Global geopolitics may be reshaped through OBOR, returning Eurasia to its historic place at the centre of human civilisation. The two great civilisations of East and West were linked until the rise of the Ottoman Empire cut off the ancient Silk Road. That forced Europe to move seaward, leading to globalisation through colonisation and a further decline of the Silk Road. Eastern civilisations turned conservative, and the world became centred on the West. With the rise of the United States, Europe entered into a decline which recent attempts at integration have been unable to be reverse. Europe is now faced with a historic opportunity to return to the centre of the world through the revival of Eurasia.

China’s One Belt One Road offers the EU opportunities spanning from Europe itself to the Pacific and beyond, beginning with fulfilling European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s plan to inject €315bn into the EU economy over the next three years. European economic growth would be stimulated through the two-way connections extending the EU single market into Eurasia. The number of middle class consumers in OBOR regions is estimated to reach 3bn by 2050, while over the coming decade OBOR will create $2.5 trillion in trade among 65 countries.

“For a long time, the EU has been unable to prioritise between its Eastern and Mediterranean partnerships”

The initiative could also spur an upgrade the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership. The European interconnection plan, linked with OBOR, will enable “five-way” connection in policy, trade, transportation, currency and people to mesh with China and Europe’s “four great partnerships” of peace, growth, reform and civilisation. Poland and Greece will become new gateways for China’s access to Europe under the 16+1 framework of dialogue between China and countries in central and eastern Europe. China and Europe can discover new sectoral dialogues in maritime and cyber issues.

For a long time, the EU has been unable to prioritise between its Eastern and Mediterranean partnerships which both have problems in implementation. With the Ukraine crisis tearing Europe apart, it seems that in order to strengthen European integration, actions cannot be confined to the present Union. One Belt One Road would turn central and eastern Europe into China’s new European portal, and vice versa.  In addition, the inclusive development advocated under OBOR should be seen as an opportunity for integration, helping a dozen Chinese provinces to establish close economic partnerships and investment ties with European regions.

Through such increased connectivity, OBOR may even lead to EU-Russia reconciliation. Since the end of World War II and the establishment of NATO, “keeping Russia out” has been a clear strategic goal for the West. The current Ukraine crisis is a consequence of that strategy. EU-Russian reconciliation could be the cornerstone of stability in Europe. One Belt One Road aims to “keep Russia in” by working with Russia’s development projects in the Far East and organisations like the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Organisation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has realised that, since we are unable to choose our neighbours, Europeans must interact with the Eurasian Economic Union. This could help resolve the Ukraine crisis and forge long-term peace and stability.

Further East still, OBOR is an entry point for the EU into Asia-Pacific affairs. Since the United States put forward its “return to Asia” strategy, the EU has been concerned it will be marginalised. EU efforts to accelerate the promotion of free trade agreements with Asian countries have made less-than-satisfactory progress. OBOR would make it much easier for Europe to participate in Asia-Pacific affairs.

OBOR would enhance the EU’s global influence, promoting green, sustainable and inclusive development, and the high labour and environmental standards long promoted by the EU. Many of the countries along the route are Europe’s former colonies who need to draw from European experience in global and local governance. There will be a greater opportunity for China and the EU to cooperate in markets like West Africa, the Indian Ocean and Central Asia. Europe’s experience, standards and historical and cultural influence are valued by China, and One Belt One Road will uphold the spirit of the Silk Road, namely solidarity, trust, equality, tolerance and mutual benefits to produce win-win cooperation.

Europe will also find the opportunity to balance its transatlantic relationship. Since World War II, Europe has relied heavily on transatlantic relations but found it hard to get out of an asymmetric position with the United States. The hope of “speaking with one voice” has remained elusive. OBOR, on the other hand, emphasises openness and inclusiveness. It transcends the bi-lateral exclusivity of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and does not seek to exclude any country, to create spheres of influence nor to engage in military expansion. Engaging with OBOR will make the EU both a Eurasian power and an Atlantic power more equal to the U.S. By promoting China-EU cooperation on Silk Road security, it may also contribute to bolstering Europe’s position in NATO.

“There will be a greater opportunity for China and the EU to cooperate in markets like West Africa, the Indian Ocean and Central Asia”

China-EU cooperation brings benefits for both sides. It enhances the potential for bi-lateral cooperation and world influence through the joint development of third-party markets, ultimately bringing regional integration and inclusive growth. Such are the shared expectations of both China and the EU. Europe should grasp the opportunities of One Belt One Road to realise its dream, which is complementary to the Chinese dream.

The New Silk Road Initiative could help redirect the centre of geopolitical gravity away from the U.S. and back to Eurasia. Europe is faced with an historic opportunity to return to the centre of the world through the revival of Eurasia. From this perspective, Europe should support new infrastructure and other development projects. The recent decision by France, Germany, Italy and the UK to join the China-led  Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) goes in this direction, and represents a major shift in European attitudes towards Asia, and China in particular, that clearly departs from the U.S. position.

 

IMAGE CREDITS: CC / FLICKR – President of the European Council

The post One Belt One Road: Opportunities for Europe-China cooperation appeared first on Europe’s World.

Parti dans les tous premiers jours de décembre, le sous-marin nucléaire d’attaque (SNA) Améthyste a retrouvé il y a quelques jours le port de Toulon, où sont basés les six SNA français, après cinq mois de déploiement en océan Indien.

— Italian police were found guilty of torture in their brutal handling of protestors at the 2001 G-8 meeting in Genoa. Those beaten and detained were subjected to a variety of cruel treatments. Some police reportedly sang old fascisti songs while misbehaving.

— Speaking of Italy, I didn’t know that Ezra Pound is from the same town in Italy as Bowe Bergdahl—Hailey, Idaho. The great thing about Idaho is that it keeps Texas from being the craziest state in the country, and I speak as someone related to the founder of Rexburg. Checking just now on Bergdahl, I didn’t know he was discharged from Coast Guard boot camp.

— The fine writer Phil Klay is writing a movie with Judd Apatow. I’ve read all of Klay’s book, but I’ve never finished watching a movie by Apatow, so Klay looms larger in my world than Apatow.

— There are now nine members of the House of Commons of Pakistani origin, including one who is from Scottish Nationalist Party.

— Things I still don’t know: How long before someone whacks L’il Kim.

Wikimedia Commons

La Commission européenne a proposé mercredi que 20.000 migrants soient accueillis et répartis à travers l'Union au cours des deux prochaines années. Une proposition décriée par la Grande-Bretagne, qui bénéficie pourtant d'une clause d'exemption.

Just when you think that you’ve heard it all: I learned from General McChrystal’s new book that in early 2003, when McChrystal was on the Joint Staff, that Central Command, then led by Gen. Tommy R. Franks, “initially prohibited the Pentagon staffs from viewing their internal Web site out of a (common) fear of giving ‘higher headquarters visibility into unfinalized planning products.”

McChrystal comments that, “Such absurdities reflect that most organizations are more concerned with how best to control information than how best to share it.”

Mark Wilson/Getty Images

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by third parties and security considerations*. The SMM observed fighting continued around Shyrokyne and Donetsk airport. The SMM continued to visit heavy weapons holding areas, and noted that some weapons had been removed.

The SMM continued to observe ceasefire violations in the hotspots of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) and surrounding areas, and in and around Donetsk airport.[1] Shyrokyne remained tense with sporadic small-arms and mortar fire heard by the SMM from their position at government-controlled Berdianske (2.5km west of Shyrokyne). In government-controlled Luhanske (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 50 explosions from incoming heavy artillery (152mm calibre). In the Luhansk region the SMM heard four explosions emanating from government-controlled Toshkivka (57km north-west of Luhansk).

The Ukrainian Armed Forces Major-General, Head of the Ukrainian side at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) headquarters in government-controlled Soledar (77km north of Donetsk), expressed concern to the SMM over the deaths of four Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in the last 24 hours. According to him, three died in the area of Donetsk airport, with one fatality in the area of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol). This information was corroborated by the Russian Colonel-General, Representative of the Russian Federation Armed Forces to the JCCC.

The SMM went to “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (37km north-northeast of Donetsk) to observe damage caused by shelling on 7 May. The SMM saw damage to a kindergarten (broken windows and a destroyed entrance). JCCC representatives from the Horlivka office - both Russian Federation Armed Forces and Ukrainian Armed Forces officers - and local residents said one projectile exploded in the yard of the kindergarten on 7 May and caused no injuries. The impact area was repaired, making crater analysis impossible. The SMM was however, able to determine that artillery was used. At a second impact area, 300 metres from the kindergarten, damage was observed by the SMM in a residential area. Crater analysis was not possible as the impact area was repaired. No causalities were reported.

In government-controlled Kramatorsk (80km north of Donetsk) the SMM met a representative of the non-governmental organization (NGO) SOS (affiliated to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church) that assists internally displaced persons (IDPs) with food and financial support. According to the representative, at the end of April, approximately 1,500 non-registered IDPs arrived from “DPR”-controlled Horlivka.

At the village council building in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed a protest against the ban (according to the Aidar volunteer battalion commander at the bridge, the result of a directive from the Governor) on crossing the bridge between government-controlled and “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled areas (see SMM Daily Report 5 May 2015, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/155346). A crowd of approximately 200 people (70% of whom were women, mostly middle-aged) took part. Protesters told the SMM that around half of local residents work in “LPR”-controlled areas, most at the psychiatric hospital near Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk), just three kilometres from the bridge, and find it difficult to reach their place of work due to the ban. Employees are forced to make a long detour to reach their place of work.

The SMM spoke with residents of two villages near the contact line in “LPR”-controlled areas. Two middle-aged residents (one man, one woman) in Obozne (18km north of Luhansk) told the SMM that they have had no electricity since shelling damaged the local power station in April. The same power station also supplied energy to nearby Khrystove (18km north of Luhansk). A woman in this village confirmed that residents are also without electricity.

The SMM continued to visit heavy weapons holding areas. In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw three heavy weapons holding areas. At one location six Grad systems were missing. The “DPR” “commander” told the SMM that the weapons were removed for training purposes. At a second site, four of six self-propelled Howitzers (2S1, 152mm calibre) were removed - according to persons at the site - for training. On the other hand, the SMM located seven mortar systems (120mm) at this site that had not been noted previously. At a third location, all weapons previously recorded were in situ. The SMM made return visits to two Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas. At one location the SMM was denied access by Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, because the commander was not present. The SMM had previously attempted to access this site on 7 May (see SMM Daily Report, 8 May, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/156046) but was denied, with the same reason given.

Despite claims that the withdrawal of heavy weapons was complete, the SMM observed the following weapons’ movements in areas that are in violation of Minsk withdrawal lines. In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw four tanks (T-72). In areas under the control of the “LPR”, the SMM saw four tanks. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw six tanks (five T-64s, one T-72) and one 122mm towed howitzer gun.

The SMM Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) observed three Ukrainian Armed Forces artillery pieces (likely towed 152mm cannon) near the government-controlled village of Pionerske (13km east of Mariupol) (previously reported in SMM Daily Report, 11 May, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/156416). More than 20 boxes of ammunition were at the site.

The SMM monitored a demonstration in Kherson held in front of city hall and a subsequent meeting inside the building by protestors calling for the ouster of some officials. About eighty protestors (mainly middle-aged, both men and women) including inter alia representatives of Pravyy Sektor (Right Sector), the Radical Party and the Ukrainian Republican Party, called for the dismissal of the city’s deputy mayors for their alleged inability to prevent the display of Communist Party and Opposition Bloc symbols during a 9 May commemorative event. An agreement had been reached between the governor, political parties and activists to abstain from displaying political symbols (see SMM Daily Report, 11 May 2015, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/156416).

The SMM observed a protest outside the building of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine in Kyiv of mothers, wives and daughters of soldiers from the Kyiv Rus 11th Ukrainian Armed Forces battalion. The protestors demanded rotation of the aforementioned battalion. According to them, there is no sign that the planned 15 May rotation of the battalion will take place. Twenty women (between the ages of 20 and 50) took part. Four members of the battalion itself were present. Five male police officers observed.

The SMM observed a discussion at the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) on a proposal to allow foreigners to sign contracts with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence in order to join the Ukrainian Armed Forces. After discussion, and despite some dissenting voices, the Parliament passed the measure.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv.

* Restrictions on SMM access and freedom of movement:

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by third parties and security considerations including the lack of information on whereabouts of landmines. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the cease-fire does not hold everywhere.

• The SMM was stopped at a Ukrainian Armed Forces-controlled checkpoint in Vilkhove (22km north-east of Luhansk) and asked for a password. The SMM was unable to provide a password and was not allowed to proceed.
• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near Novohnativka (41km south-south-east of Donetsk) the SMM was told to take a military vehicle escort because of security concerns. The SMM was escorted by a military truck up to the junction with Buhas (41km south-east of Donetsk).
• The SMM were stopped for 30 minutes at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol) as personnel present said the vehicles displayed the “wrong plate numbers”.   

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

Related Stories

• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 11 May 2015
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 10 May 2015
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 8 May 2015

Dix-neuf stagiaires de l’école d’application de l’aviation légère de l’armée de Terre (EAALAT) ont participé au cours de formation des commandants d’unité (CFCU) qui se déroule pendant 4 mois. Du 12 au 24 avril, le groupe a effectué les exercices tactiques en régiment qui clôturent le CFCU.

I mean, our admirals had been watching the British fight German submarines for years. Yet there seems to have been no thought given on how to have land-based aircraft carry torpedoes and work with the surface Navy. As FDR (who had been a civilian official of the Navy Department in his younger days) wrote to Churchill in March 1942, “My Navy has definitely been slack in preparing for this submarine war off our coast.”

Australian War Memorial/Wikimedia Commons

The presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, may be on a mountaintop — but the March 14 talks there between President Barack Obama and representatives of the Gulf monarchies will not be a summit. The absence of Saudi King Salman is being spun by the White House as of little consequence, but it is hard not to conclude that the Saudi decision is anything less than a huge and intentional diplomatic snub.

The principal issue is, without doubt, Iran and the emerging deal over its nuclear program, which in the Gulf’s eyes validates Tehran’s nuclear status and strokes its aspirations to be the regional hegemon. Despite Secretary of State John Kerry’s efforts during his visit to Riyadh last week, the Gulf Arabs appear unconvinced by the substance of the deal and downright skeptical of U.S. views of its implications for stability in the region.

King Salman’s cancellation came less than a day after the White House had said there would be a one-on-one meeting between Obama and the Saudi monarch. So far, the White House has not spun Salman’s boycott in terms of a logistical challenge, such as the king’s refusal to be flown in a helicopter. (His predecessor, King Abdullah, “did not do helicopters,” one official in George W. Bush’s administration told me. When staffers arranged a meeting at Bush’s Texas ranch, the monarch was forced to travel, like some rock star, in a luxury bus.)

Despite soothing words from new Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, the real Saudi position became more apparent when the king’s substitutes — Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef and Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman — stopped in Paris on their way to the United States for talks with French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, who has taken the hardest line in the negotiations with Iran. The meeting comes just a week after French President Francois Hollande was guest of honor in Riyadh at a GCC meeting, the agenda of which was essentially a dress rehearsal for the Camp David summit.

For those keeping count, Hollande met four GCC heads of state in Riyadh, while Obama will meet just two in Washington this week. Of the other royal no-shows, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates and Oman’s Sultan Qaboos are probably not well enough to travel, while Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa likely acted out of monarchial solidarity with King Salman. The two heads of state who are heading to Washington are Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah, aged 85, and Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani of Qatar, aged 34.

Gulf societies are traditionally hierarchical, with a focus on position and age, so managing the protocol of the sessions — particularly the “portrait” at the end of the Camp David meeting — could be challenging. In King Salman’s absence, arguably the key character will be his son, Mohammed bin Salman, who is often described as thirty-something but who may be only 29 — and who certainly has better lines of communication to the Saudi monarch than his older cousin, Mohammed bin Nayef, who officially leads the Saudi delegation.

Will Mohammed bin Salman be present at the expected bilateral meeting with Obama, making a one-on-one into a two-on-one? At the very least, the summit will give the president a chance to get to know the king’s son. The only public information about his attitude toward the United States is a Wikileaks memo that noted he refused to go to the U.S. embassy to receive a visa, because it would require him to be fingerprinted, in the words of the current king, “like some criminal.”

Mohammed bin Nayef is regarded as bureaucratic Washington’s favorite prince for his cooperation on counterterrorism in his other role as interior minister. The White House, however, may not share this view: In a recent interview with the New York Times’s Tom Friedman, Obama blamed Gulf interior ministers like bin Nayef for enforcing a system where there are “no legitimate political outlets for grievances.”

While Saudi Arabia is receiving all the attention, the summit could also shed light on how other Gulf royals are adapting to Washington’s outreach to Tehran. Will Emir Sabah of Kuwait, who advocates conciliation rather than confrontation but whose territory lies closest to Iran, be given center stage? And what may Emir Tamim of Qatar, a state that is traditionally the maverick within the GCC, be plotting? Some hint may emerge at a briefing by Qatar Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Muhammad al-Attiyah to Washington foreign policy types on the early afternoon of May 13.

The most energetic person at the summit may be Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi, who is leading the UAE delegation. Though he doesn’t brief the media or think-tankers, he is rumored to be as disappointed as anyone with the Obama administration’s perceived naiveté on Iran. But the crown prince is walking a fine line: he believes the way forward is simultaneously to hug the United States while aligning himself with Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman, who he perceives as the future leader of the kingdom — sooner rather than later.

The elephant in the room will obviously be Iran, which the GCC blames for supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, exerting a malevolent influence over Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government, backing the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and inciting mischief among Shiites in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province. But there will be a smaller elephant in the room as well: Israel.

Jerusalem’s opposition to the Iran deal is compounded by the evident mutual distrust and dislike between Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Until King Salman’s cancellation, it seemed as if Netanyahu could be painted as being the odd man out at the party. As the Washington Post‘s David Ignatius, often a good proxy for Obama White House thinking, wrote last week: “It’s a peculiar reversal of roles, in which the Gulf Arabs … are becoming the responsible and conciliatory opposition, while Netanyahu … remains at loggerheads with Obama.” Although it is probably too much to think of an open Israeli alliance with Gulf Arabs against Iran, it does seem that the Gulf capitals find the Israeli perspective on Tehran’s intentions more convincing than U.S. offerings.

For Israel, a louder Gulf chorus voicing concerns about any deal is probably too much to hope for. The White House’s bottom line for Camp David is to stop any condemnation of the emerging deal with Iran by the Gulf Arabs. That is still possible — but the other signal likely to emerge from the summit is the Gulf states’ persistent disquiet with the Obama administration’s diplomacy, which is sure to be noted by both Tehran and in the capital of every U.S. ally across the world.

Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images

Május 9-én, Moszkvában a katonai parádén jópár ország egysége vett részt a díszmenetben. A szervezők alfabetikus sorrendben vonultatták fel a katonákat, így az orosz ábc és az országnév alapján Azerbajdzsán után következett Örményország (Армения). Az azeri hadügyminisztérium honlapján megjelent kép szerint meg nem. Legalábbis a zászlaja Örményországnak eltűnt. Most akkor kinek hihet az ember, az élő közvetítésnek, vagy a hivatalos Bakunak?

Read more...

Cette recension d’ouvrage est issue de Politique étrangère (1/2015). Yannick Prost propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Jean-Marc Châtaigner, Fragilités et résilience. Les nouvelles frontières de la mondialisation  (Paris, Karthala, 2014, 482 pages).

Le sous-titre indique une ambition qui dépasse le contenu de l’ouvrage, lequel porte en fait sur l’évolution de la réflexion concernant l’aide au développement. À l’origine, les limites de l’efficacité de cette aide ont suscité les travaux de think tanks anglo-saxons, dont les conclusions ne sont pas toujours partagées par les chercheurs et praticiens français. Les contributions à cet ouvrage dirigé par un haut fonctionnaire du Quai d’Orsay, connu pour ses travaux notamment sur les États fragiles, mêlent les regards d’auteurs du Nord et du Sud, afin d’éviter un point de vue ethnocentriste. Elles présentent de longs développements sur la pertinence et les limites du concept de résilience, pour lequel, parmi les nombreuses définitions citées, on choisira celle de l’Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE) : « la capacité des individus, des communautés, des États et de leurs institutions à absorber les chocs et à s’en remettre, tout en adaptant et en transformant de façon positive leurs structures et leurs moyens de subsistance face à des changements de long terme et à l’incertitude  ».

Cette résilience s’analyse donc à plusieurs niveaux : elle caractérise les ménages ou les individus qui parviennent à reconstituer leurs « capabilités » – au sens d’Amartya Sen – après un événement traumatique. Elle peut s’étudier pour des groupes sociaux – voir le chapitre sur les nomades pasteurs – ou des territoires – un chapitre définit les conditions de la ville résiliente, qui saurait allier de saines politiques publiques sociales à un plan d’aménagement urbain et des pratiques de développement durable. Elle caractérise surtout les États. Si le nombre des guerres a diminué, la violence et les troubles sociaux demeurent importants. Pire, il semble que les accidents climatiques voient leur fréquence et leur intensité augmenter. Dès lors, il faut préparer ces entités à subir le choc et à rebondir par des politiques ex ante et ex post, qui dépassent la simple intervention d’urgence. C’est bien la conclusion principale qui se dégage des diverses contributions : il faut mieux coordonner l’action de développement à long terme et l’aide humanitaire. Cette mise en cohérence doit se décliner selon les différents secteurs de l’action publique, et viser à maintenir les capacités des individus et des États.

Les crises alimentaires ont mis en exergue les carences des États concernés, mais aussi des interventions humanitaires traditionnelles. Les chapitres portant sur le Sahel et la Corne de l’Afrique montrent ainsi que les nouveaux dispositifs découlant du Linking Relief, Reconstruction and Development – démarche adoptée par la Commission européenne –, ou du « redressement rapide » – prôné par le Programme des Nations unies pour le développement (PNUD) – ont eu des effets positifs : l’Alliance globale pour l’Initiative résilience au Sahel (AGIR), l’Initiative sur les moyens de subsistance pastoraux, ou encore le Programme de filet de sécurité productif (Éthiopie), etc.

Il demeure que le succès de ces programmes dépend des équilibres locaux : le chapitre sur la Colombie rappelle que la sortie d’un conflit exige que soit traitée la question de fond : celle de l’injustice sociale. Plus généralement, l’exigence de résilience entraîne un impératif de bonne gouvernance effective, qui exige davantage que les simples apparences de démocratie mises en place dans certains États. Une problématique classique de l’aide au développement, en quelque sorte.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Általános : Martin Schulz, az Európai Parlament elnöke május 14-én átveszi az aacheni Nagy Károly-díjat, amelyet az európai kölcsönös megértés előmozdítóinak ítélnek oda. A korábbi díjazottak közül nyolcan is ott lesznek a díjátadón, köztük Jean-Claude Juncker, az Európai Bizottság mostani elnöke. François Hollande francia elnök és II. Abdullah jordániai király beszédben köszöntik majd Schulzot.

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2015 - EP