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The time-limit for challenging mortgage enforcement proceedings in progress when a judgment of the Court of Justice was implemented in Spain is contrary to EU law

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Le délai d’opposition pour contester les saisies hypothécaires dont l’exécution était en cours au moment de la mise en œuvre d’un arrêt de la Cour en Espagne est contraire au droit de l’Union

There are concerning parallels between pre-1914 Europe and today’s security tensions in maritime Asia. The Asia-Pacific region has been witnessing an emerging bifurcation between a 21st century economic order geared towards integration, and a regional security order with an increasingly sharp, 19th century edge.

Leaders in Asia can nevertheless draw policy lessons from Europe’s recent history. It was, in part, this tragic history of competing nationalisms that led me, as Prime Minister of Australia, to propose an Asia-Pacific Community (APC). When I launched this initiative back in 2008, I stressed that although the great powers of the Asia-Pacific region may live in harmony today, history should remind us not to assume that ‘peace in our time’ can ever be guaranteed. That was seven years ago. And as we all know, security tensions in the region have now become much sharper.

An APC would, of course, be significantly different from the original concepts of European co-operation. The Asia-Pacific region itself is vastly different to Europe. The history of 20th century Asia has primarily been a colonial and post-colonial history. By contrast, Europeans over the same period were the colonisers. Europe has evolved the notion of the nation-state steadily since the 15th century, whereas this was less formal across Asia. Further, despite its division into often competing nation-states, and despite the wars of religion, Europe evolved from a common Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman culture, whereas that is not the case with the vastly different civilisational trajectories of Asia.

“The challenge for Asia-Pacific leaders is to square the circle by recognising the uniqueness of Asian regionalism, while avoiding Europe’s mistakes by drawing pertinent lessons from its history”

We can, however, see the need in both Europe and Asia for the evolution of a common political and security architecture to manage regional tensions. The same idea of a long-term Asia-Pacific Community comes from this premise. An APC would foster deeper inter-dependence over time, together with new habits of transparency, trust and co-operative norms. Such mechanisms could help Asia cope with crises by managing them peacefully and reducing the strategic polarisation we are beginning to see emerge between Washington and Beijing. The concept of an APC could begin with basic confidence and security-building measures between regional states.

I did not think then, nor do I think now, that it would be easy to create an APC overnight. It would take years of consensus building. Back in 2008, I nominated 2020 as a realistic objective for the establishment of an APC with the membership, mandate and institutional muscle to make a difference to regional security.

The long menu of traditional and non-traditional security challenges confronting Asia has not changed fundamentally since I first proposed the Asia-Pacific Community seven years ago. What has changed is the way these challenges have become more salient and more urgent. The great power harmony we seemed to enjoy in 2008 now resembles the halcyon days of a distant past.

The Asia-Pacific security order is under significant strain from rising strategic frictions among great powers and regional states, driven in large part by a series of unresolved territorial disputes. Asia’s economic order, long built on the back of trade liberalisation, also shows signs of bifurcation between trading blocs that seek to exclude one another.

Watching these trends unfold, the intellectual and political leaders of the Asia-Pacific region face a clear-cut choice. The first is to look on aghast as events shape our future. The second is to accept that our future “is not in our stars, but in ourselves”. If we lean towards the second school of thought, as I believe all national leaders in Asia do, then the next question to ask is: What can we do to steer the course of events away from these rocky shoals?

Building an APC by 2020 is one possible objective for Asia. Throughout 2009, I outlined my vision of an APC to senior officials and heads of state at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the East Asia Summit and at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. In an effort to open a regional discussion, the Australian government hosted a conference on the APC that year, and appointed a senior official to travel to 21 countries to consult with more than 300 officials, 30 ministers and eight national leaders. Five points of consensus emerged. Back then, there was:

• A high level of regional interest in the APC proposal;
• A recognition that existing institutions could not adequately manage the region’s full range of economic, security and political challenges;
• A limited appetite for the creation of new institutions in addition to existing ones;
• An agreement that ASEAN must be at the core of any future APC;
• There was strong interest in giving more substance to the APC proposal.

The Asia Society Policy Institute in New York, which I joined as inaugural President last year, has launched a Policy Commission to consider the future of Asia-Pacific regional architecture, including the possibility of an APC. Our ongoing work aims to advance consensus on the reform of regional architecture, and to elaborate the details of what an Asia-Pacific Community might look like in practice.

An early critique of the APC proposal concerned whether an EU-type institution was an appropriate model for the Asia-Pacific region. The EU is by no means a one-size-fits-all model which Asian leaders should simply impose on the region. As noted above, our history, security challenges and strategic context are starkly different, so any Asia-Pacific Community should be built on a foundation of common regional norms and foreign policy realities. We cannot understand Asia’s history and future needs solely through “Western spectacles… by imitating the tinsel of the West,” as Gandhi said in 1947. It is for good historical reasons that Asian regionalism is and will be different to that of Europe.

When building the EU on the ashes of World War 2, exhausted European empires slowly contracted and withdrew from Asia. Asian states simultaneously rediscovered national sovereignties and political independence that all except Thailand had lost for a century. Whereas Europe sought innovative ways to dilute national sovereignty – which the EU’s founders blamed for the war – Asian states sought to preserve and protect their hard-earned sovereignty. This is the reason that Asian regionalism is based on the principle of non-interference and a stronger state-centric regional order than that which prevails in modern Europe.

“The EU is by no means a one-size-fits-all model which Asian leaders should simply impose on the region. Our history, security challenges and strategic context are starkly different”

At the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, one of the earliest attempts at Asian regionalism, delegates resisted setting up a permanent regional body. The 1955 regional conference at Bandung in Indonesia again decided not to bureaucratise Asian regionalism. It was not until 1967 that we saw the founding of ASEAN, then APEC in 1989, the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, and the East Asia Summit in 2005.

The differences between Asian and European regionalism shouldn’t blind us to the fact that even though history doesn’t repeat itself, it often rhymes. I stand by what I said in 2008: what we can learn from Europe is that it is necessary to take the first step. In the 1950s, sceptics saw European integration as unrealistic. But most people would now agree that, despite current difficulties in the European economy and the unfolding refugee crisis, Europe’s visionaries have succeeded in evolving a European Union where the thought of one member state going to war again against another is simply unthinkable. That was simply not the case for the Europe of the previous 500 years. It is this spirit we need to capture in the Asia-Pacific.

European history is also a sobering reminder never to take peace for granted. Had a nascent pan-European security institution existed in July 1914, it might have made a decisive difference in leaders’ assumptions and the fateful choices that they made. Without a robust security institution, or even a mature security dialogue, there was no political “shock-absorber” between contending nationalisms. And we should never forget that Europe’s advanced state of economic inter-dependence at the dawn of the 20th century was not enough to prevent war.

Not only has Europe’s integration reduced historical security tensions in Europe. Other institutions have also played a role. For example, without the military transparency and confidence-building measures of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE), the Cold War frictions of those times might well have escalated to war. The CSCE didn’t resolve the Cold War and couldn’t prevent crises, but it was often able to create breathing space for pragmatic leaders on both sides to negotiate the keystones of international security – such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The challenge for Asia-Pacific leaders is to square the circle by recognising the uniqueness of Asia’s regionalism, without mindlessly repeating centuries of European mistakes. We in Asia need to draw pertinent lessons from Europe’s history.

A possible roadmap towards a future Asia-Pacific Community is as follows:

• Transforming the East Asia Summit into an APC by 2020 based on the existing Kuala Lumpur declaration of the EAS in 2005;
• Bringing the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ meeting under the umbrella of the EAS/APC;
• Establishing a permanent EAS/APC secretariat in an ASEAN capital – Singapore, Kuala Lumpur or Jakarta being the most likely candidates. In time, the region will need its own equivalent of a Brussels-type institution, although without the European model’s pooling of sovereignty;
• Annual meetings at Heads of state and government level to ensure high-level political direction and buy-in. This should be held in the first half of the year as a stand-alone summit, not as a “tack on” to other regional summits like APEC;
• Its first task should be to elaborate a comprehensive set of regional confidence and security-building measures, including military hotlines, transparency measures and pan-regional protocols to handle military incidents at sea and in the air;
• As a second priority is developing a fully integrated natural disaster response mechanism across the region, under an integrated virtual command, in the event of a major environmental, climatological or other incident of regional scale;

None of the above will happen magically in an Asia that is now the subject of increasing polarisation. Setting the region on autopilot would steer us along a certain path – but not necessarily a path of our long-term choosing. Building an Asia Pacific Community must begin today so that we may one day declare, as Jean Monnet wrote to Robert Schuman in 1948, that “we have moved on from preparing for war, and we are now preparing to prevent war.” The EU’s founding fathers disagreed on the practical limitations, the means and the final goal of the European project, but their achievements are undeniable. Speaking of the EU as a potential example for Asia may appear misplaced at a time when a potential Brexit, eurozone growth difficulties and an unresolved refugee crises continue to dominate international news. Nonetheless, the European community succeeded in its historic mission of eliminating centuries-old security dilemmas between France and Germany, and making a modern war at the heart of Europe unthinkable, if not impossible. Ours should be a similar aspiration for Asia.

The post Asia needs its own EU more than ever appeared first on Europe’s World.

„Fue milagro!” – wie “ein Wunder“ gestaltete sich der Wahlabend am 25. Oktober 2015 in Argentinien. Die Wahllokale schlossen um 18 Uhr. Die ersten offiziellen Ergebnisse sollten um 23 Uhr verkündet werden.

A műsorvezető egy teljes hetet töltött Angolában egy olyan kampány keretén belül, amely a tetanuszfertőzés ellen lépett fel. Nóri az mesélte, rengeteg borzalommal szembesült, amit sem elképzelni, sem elfelejteni nem lehet.

Le 92e séminaire IHEDN-Jeunes de l’Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN) s’est déroulé, du lundi 19 octobre au samedi 24 octobre, ...

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Swiss ADATS Dual Purpose Air Defense and Anti-Tank Missile System

(Own report) - Disputes over US military provocations are accompanying the German chancellor's current visit to China. After a US Navy destroyer transited through the maritime waters claimed by Beijing near the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, the Chinese government summoned the US ambassador. German government sources have confirmed that this conflict will play a role in the talks, Angela Merkel will hold today in Beijing, and expect discord. Berlin is already in a difficult position. The transformation of China's economy from an investment-driven to a consumer- and service-driven growth model will be of disadvantage to the German industry. "German capital goods and automobiles" will most likely "no longer enjoy the same levels of demand growth in China as previously," according to Sebastian Heilmann, Director of the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin. Because of the structural transformation of China's economy, the "country’s demand for access to finance and currency markets, as well as general demand for service-related know-how" has increased massively. In this respect, Great Britain "is much better positioned than Germany." A "strategic shift is taking place in European-Chinese relations" - away from Berlin and towards London.

In reaction to recurrent tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea, the European Union (EU) has adopted a series of measures seeking to improve the protection of migrants trying to reach the borders of the EU by sea and to share responsibility among countries involved by increasing cooperation with transit countries. This study focuses on the existing and planned EU policies and actions to protect the human rights of migrants before entering the EU by sea or after they have left the territory of the EU. The picture that emerges from the evaluation of EU policies and actions is a mixed one. On the one hand, it cannot be denied that instruments of sea borders surveillance and instruments of cooperation with third countries have now generally included human rights safeguards. On the other hand, implementation, monitoring and control remain problematic. Furthermore, the primary aim of existing EU policies and actions still seems to be the protection of the external borders against so-called ‘illegal’ immigration and the return of illegally staying migrants, rather than the development of effective strategies to protect human rights of migrants and the saving of lives on the Mediterranean. The study therefore offers specific recommendations to ensure a coherent human rights-based EU approach to improve the protection of the rights of migrants aiming to reach the EU.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Specnaz (Speznaz) ist die russische Abkürzung für Besondere Einsatzkräfte (specialnogo naznacheniya). Bedeutung und Wirkung dieser Eliteeinheiten wurden im Westen vor allem aufgrund ihrer Einsätze im Afghanistankrieg der UdSSR von 1979-89 sowie durch verschiedene Publikationen des abgesprungenen GRU-Agenten Viktor Suworow[1] bekannt. In der UdSSR wurde die Bildung von Eliteeinheiten für die Sabotage hinter den feindlichen Linien sowie für die Liquidationen gegnerischer Kommandanten zum ersten Mal in den dreissiger Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts angedacht. Bei Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkrieges bildete der Generalstab der Roten Armee Einheiten für die Aufklärung und Sabotage, die im Einsatz den Frontkommandanten unterstellt wurden. Auch die Vorgängerorganisation des KGB, der NKWD, verfügte über solche Einheiten während des Krieges. Aber erst in den fünfziger Jahren wurden eigentliche SPEZNAZ-Kompanien gebildet, die dem Nachrichten- und Spionagedienst des Generalstabes GRU unterstellt wurden. In den 70er und 80er Jahren erhielten auch der KGB und der MWD (Innenministerium) SPEZNAZ-Einheiten für besondere Einsätze, wie Liquidationen, Sabotage und Aufklärung. Seit 2013 sind alle SPEZNAZ-Einheiten der Streitkräfte entsprechend dem amerikanischen Vorbild dem neugebildeten Kommando für besondere Operationen (SOCOM) unterstellt.[2] Jeder der vier Militärbezirke verfügt über SPEZNAZ-Brigaden.[3]

SPEZNAZ-Einheiten sind von Moskau in verschiedenen Kriegen eingesetzt worden. Der bekannteste Einsatz war die Liquidation des damaligen Präsidenten Afghanistans, Hafizullah Amin, und seiner Leibwache von 100-150 Mann Ende Dezember 1979 durch SPEZNAZ-Einheiten des KGB (Alpha) und des GRU (Zenith).[4] Während des gesamten Krieges setzte Moskau SPEZNAZ-Kommandos für die Liquidation von Mujaheddin-Kommandanten in Afghanistan ein. So wurde am 28.01.1985 in Siah Koh, Nangarhar-Provinz, der Kommandant Qari Abdus Samad getötet und zur gleichen Zeit im Kunar-Tal ein ganzes Dorf durch SPEZNAZ- oder Luftlandeeinheiten massakriert.[5] Die Entvölkerung der östlichen Provinzen Afghanistans und damit die Vertreibung von Millionen von Menschen aus Afghanistan nach Pakistan kann auf den Einsatz der sowjetischen SPEZNAZ und Luftlandetruppen zurückgeführt werden.

Im Zweiten Tschetschenienkrieg (ab 1999) wurden die Kommandanten der Tschetschenen durch SPEZNAZ des FSB (Nachfolgeorganisation des KGB), des MWD und des GRU liquidiert. Eine grosse Aktion von SPEZNAZ war die Befreiung von Geiseln in Beslan, Nord-Ossetien (2004), die zum Tod von 334 Menschen führte.

Für die Besetzung der Krim 2014 setzte Wladimir Putin SPEZNAZ des GRU (45. SPEZNAZ-Regiment)[6] ein. Der Einsatz dürfte auch in seinem hybriden Krieg in der Ost-Ukraine erfolgt sein. Der Einsatz von SPEZNAZ für die Liquidierung tschetschenischer und islamischer Kommandanten im nördlichen Kaukasus dauert nach wie vor an.

Moskau soll jetzt für die Unterstützung der syrischen Armee und für die Liquidation von Kommandanten der Opposition gegen Assad SPEZNAZ-Einheiten, die bis anhin in der Ost-Ukraine im Einsatz waren, nach Syrien abkommandiert haben.[7] Sehr bald dürfte die Wirkung ihrer Liquidierungsaktionen bekannt werden.

[1] Suworow, V., GRU, Die Speerspitze, Scherz Verlag, Bern, München, Wien, 1985, S. 199-223.

[2] Carlsson, M., Norberg, J., and F. Westerlund, The Military Capabilities of Russia’s Armed Forces in 2013, in: Hedenskog, J., and C.V. Pallin (eds), Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2013, FOI, Stockholm, December 2013, p. 30.

[3] Carlsson, M., et al, p. 26.

[4] Boltunow, M., Terror Profis, Geschichte der geheimsten KGB Einheit, Verlag Das Neue Berlin, Berlin, 1994, S. 57-107.

[5] Stahel, A.A., und P. Bucherer, Afghanistan 1984/85, Besetzung und Widerstand, ASMZ—Beilage, Dezember 1985, S. 6.

[6] Carlsson, M., et al, p. 30.

[7] Grove, Th., Russia Shifts Ukraine Units to Syria, in: The Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2015, p. A3.

Wladimir Putin und seine militärischen Informationsbeauftragten heben gegenüber den westlichen Medien immer wieder die angebliche Präzision der russischen Bombardierungen gegen die syrischen „Terroristen“ hervor.[1] Dabei verschweigen er und sein militärischer Stab wohlweislich, dass die vor allem eingesetzten 24 nicht mehr ganz modernen russischen Kampfflugzeuge Su-24 und Su-25 aus der Sowjetzeit nur zielungenaue Freifallbomben mitführen und abwerfen können[2], die mit Priorität die moderate Opposition gegen Assad treffen und auf die syrische Bevölkerung indiskriminierend wirken. So hat das britische Syrian Observatory for Human Rights festgestellt, dass durch diese russischen Bombardierungen bis anhin 151 Zivilisten, 189 Mitglieder der moderaten Free Syrian Army und lediglich 31 Jihadisten der Nusrah-Front und 75 Jihadisten des Islamischen Staates getötet worden sind.[3] Gemäss Human Rights Watch sollen durch zwei russische Angriffe am 15. Oktober auf Ter Ma’aleh und auf ein anderes Dorf im nördlichen Homs mindestens 59 Zivilisten getötet worden sein. Davon waren 46 Angehörige einer einzigen Familie.[4] Des Weiteren sollen die russischen Bombardierungen als Vergeltung für die Erfolge der Opposition ein Spital in Latamna zerstört haben. Dabei sollen ein Mitarbeiter des Spitals getötet und alle anderen Mitarbeiter des Spitals verletzt worden sein. Als Folge der russischen Bombardierungen sollen Tausende von Menschen aus den Provinzen Aleppo, Hama und Idlib auf der Flucht sein.[5]

Entgegen den Meldungen aus dem Kreml soll gemäss den Informationen der Opposition – so der Armee der Eroberung (Jaysh al-Fateh) und der Free Syrian Army – die durch die russischen Bombardierungen unterstützte Offensive auf Aleppo mindestens gestoppt, wenn nicht sogar gescheitert sein.[6] Die Rebellen hätten laut dieser Informationen die von der CIA gelieferten Panzerabwehrlenkwaffen BGM-71 TOW mit grosser Wirkung gegen die Truppen und Milizen von Assad, gegen die Kämpfer der libanesischen Hisbollah, gegen Angehörige der iranischen Revolutionsgarde und gegen die russischen Berater eingesetzt. Bei Latakia ist mindestens ein russischer Soldat getötet worden.[7] Innert 24 Stunden wurden nahe von Hama 3 Panzer des Regimes zerstört und 15 syrische Soldaten getötet. Auch sollen zwei Dörfer nahe von Aleppo zurückerobert worden sein.

Interessant an diesen Meldungen ist auch, dass, wie seinerzeit in Afghanistan, aufgrund der indiskriminierenden Bombardierungen der Russen, vor allem unter der moderaten Opposition eine Einheitsfront im Entstehen ist. Damit hätte Putin mit seinen Bombardierungen das Gegenteil von seinen ursprünglichen Zielen erreicht; Anstatt die Opposition zu schwächen, trüge er dazu bei, sie zu stärken.

[1] Isachenkov, V., New Russian military might on full display in Syria, Associated Press, October 24, 2015.

[2] Antidze, M., and J. Stubbs, Before Syria, Russia struggled to land air strikes on target, Reuters, October 26, 2015.

[3] Weiss, M., CIA-Armed Rebels March on Assad Homeland, The russian bombs were supposed to be helping Syria’s dictators. Instead, the rebels are advancing, in: TheDailyBeast.com, October 24, 2015.

[4] Fahim, K., and M. Samaan, In Huge Spike, Civilians Flee Syria Violence, in: New York Times, October 27, 2015, P. A1.

[5] Fahim, K., and M. Samaan.

[6] Weiss, M.

[7] Sonne, P., Russia Acknowledges Soldier’s Death in Syria, in: The Wall Street Journal, October 28, 2015, P. A3.

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Signature of the Amending Protocol to the Agreement between the European Community and the Principality of Liechtenstein providing for measures on taxation of saving income in the form of interest payments, by Pierre GRAMEGNA, Luxembourg Finance Minister of Luxembourg Presidency, Pierre MOSCOVICI, European Commission in charge of Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs, and Aurelia FRICK, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Education and Culture of Lichtenstein.

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