1/ L’occidentalisme cherche une puissance sans limite…
La démesure, l’extension sans limites de la puissance, couplée à la suffisance de la suprématie et au vertige de l’accélération, rendue possible notamment par les technologies numériques et l’IA, témoignent de notre temps du monde. Celui de la revanche des empires, dont l’empire américano-israélien en Méditerranée est une des expressions les plus manifeste. Une telle puissance sans limite devient dévastatrice si elle ne rencontre pas de contrepoids, et en particulier la force du droit, face au droit à la force. La quasi destruction de Gaza et du Sud Liban aujourd’hui, comme celle de l’Irak hier, et peut-être de l’Iran demain, requièrent des limites. C’est ce que Camus appelait justement la pensée de midi, une pensée de la mesure face à la démesure. Mais la revanche des empires ne s’inspire pas seulement de l’occidentalisme, l’empire russe comme l’empire chinois ne sont pas en reste dans la quête d’une puissance sans limite…
2/ L’islamo-centrisme s’effrite ?
Depuis la fondation du mouvement des Frères musulmans, il y a un peu plus d’un siècle, l’islamo-centrisme est devenu ascendant et a déployé son emprise dans les sociétés arabes comme dans les imaginaires politiques. La révolution islamique iranienne, en 1979, a accéléré plus encore cette tendance jusqu’à considérer, telle une évidence que « l’islam est la solution ». Ce n’est plus vraiment le cas aujourd’hui, depuis les « printemps arabes », dont la référence n’était pas islamique. « Le peuple veut », « pouvoir civil, madania » et non islamiya, furent les slogans de ces mouvements populaires. Malgré leurs échecs, ces tendances de fond perdurent et comme le souligne justement le juriste tunisien Yadh ben Achour : « Une interprétation démocratique de l’islam est possible ». C’est tout l’enjeu et le défi pour les années à venir. C’est ce qu’une « Europe sans rivages » devrait conforter, plutôt que des pouvoirs militaires et dictatoriaux. Ces ponts, entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée, ces traits d’union peuvent favoriser des convergences dont nous avons tous le plus grand besoin. C’est ce que j’appelle la voie méditerranéenne…C’est l’exact inverse de ce qui se passe actuellement au Sahel.
3/ Qu’est-ce que pour vous la Méditerranée créatrice ?
Ce fut une hypothèse, il y a un peu plus de trente ans, lors de la publication de ce premier livre collectif. (Editions de l’Aube, 1994) Il s’agissait, pour commencer, de ne plus conjuguer la Méditerranée au passé. La Méditerranée des temples et des ruines, la Méditerranée du patrimoine et de l’héritage antique, la Méditerranée de papa ! Une telle vision passéiste et euro-centrique du monde méditerranéen passait justement à côté de l’effervescence créatrice des jeunes générations, qui sont très largement majoritaires sur les rives Sud et Est de la Méditerranée. Les européens ont bien trop tendance à l’oublier et à se faire une idée de la Méditerranée qui est fossile. Cette hypothèse d’il y a trente ans, d’une Méditerranée créatrice, là où « les inventions d’inconnu réclament des formes nouvelles », pour le dire à travers une formule lumineuse d’Arthur Rimbaud, est désormais une réalité visible. Les scènes artistiques contemporaines sont très vives désormais et s’affirment à l’échelle internationale, dans les arts plastiques, le cinéma comme la photographie, la danse ou la musique, et ce ne sont pas des épiphénomènes, mais des expressions profondes de ces sociétés. J’en donne de nombreux exemples dans le livre… Il a par là une sève, une vivacité créatrice à travers laquelle s’invente un avenir. C’est à partir de là que nous devrions dessiner un avenir commun, plutôt que de se replier derrière une illusoire Europe citadelle, prisonnière de ses haines et de ses peurs.
Après l’Occident et la fin de la « vassalisation heureuse » vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis, l’Europe pourrait imaginer une nouvelle politique de l’esprit, comme disait Paul Valéry. « Une politique de l’esprit qui ne vise pas à ordonner le reste du monde à des fins européennes », et qui ne soit donc pas un nouveau projet d’empire. Il y a un possible sursaut et un nouvel horizon qui pourrait être dessiné, à travers cette voie méditerranéenne, qui relie autrement les deux rives de la Méditerranée.
A l’horizon de vingt ou trente ans c’est possible et c’est pensable, et cela n’est pas plus illusoire que la construction européenne. Pensons à ce qui est advenu entre les années 1930 et les années 1960, au XXème siècle… Heureusement qu’il y a eu alors quelques personnes pour imaginer l’avenir, au-delà de la guerre perpétuelle en Europe, et singulièrement entre l’Allemagne et la France. Pourquoi serions-nous condamnés au désastre et au pire ? Consentir aux ténèbres est une forme de renoncement. La Méditerranée créatrice est une « salve d’avenir » et une source d’inspiration pour notre XXIème siècle.
4/ Vous écrivez que si Israël persiste à être le bastion avancé de l’Occident dans la région, il risque de connaître le même destin que l’État croisé jadis. Dans quelle mesure la puissance militaire et l’arme nucléaire marquent cependant une différence ?
La puissance militaire et l’arme nucléaire ne peuvent rien face à la désagrégation intérieure. Comme le souligne le chef d’état-major de l’armée de terre, le général Pierre Schill, dans un entretien récent avec Gilles Gressani : « si les armées gagnent les batailles, ce sont les nations qui remportent les guerres ».
L’expérience de l’Etat-Nation pour Israël est récente, elle ne date que de 1948, alors que le monde juif est lui plus que millénaire dans le monde méditerranéen. C’est une composante structurelle et même fondatrice. Je parle dans le livre de cet « héritage oublié », judéo-arabe, qui a été marginalisé, alors qu’il fut central sur le plan historique et intellectuel. Pensons à l’héritage de Maïmonide, qui écrivait en arabe. N’oublions pas que les juifs expulsés d’Espagne par les Rois catholiques, au nom de l’Occident chrétien, ont trouvé refuge dans le monde musulman, et que ces liens sont durables et profonds. Il y a une intimité judéo-arabe, que l’on connait bien, par exemple au Maroc, qui a existé également en Egypte, comme l’a si bien montré le grand historien Shlomo Dov Goiten, à travers la Geniza du Caire, ou en Irak, comme l’a raconté Ella Shohat. Toute cette histoire n’est pas celle de l’« Occident », étranger à cette région du monde et aux réalités profondes des sociétés méditerranéennes. C’est pourquoi je fais référence dans le livre aux « intercesseurs », à tous ceux qui peuvent relier et relier encore, alors que nous sommes dans le pire du pire actuellement, avec le régime politique suprémaciste israélien, qui inspire un État meurtrier.
Comment sortir d’une telle impasse israélo-arabe ? Par la force, l’humiliation, la torture, la prison, les bombardements incessants sur les civils et les attaques répétées contre la plupart de ses voisins… Où va Israël ?
Comme le disait si justement Camus, à propos de l’Algérie : « Il ne s’agit pas de crever séparèment, mais de vivre ensemble ». Cela suppose de la justice et de l’égalité. Sinon ce sera une forme de désagrégation intérieure, irréparable.
L’article « Face aux empires : la voie méditerranéenne » 4 questions à Thierry Fabre est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
By External Source
Jun 2 2026 (IPS)
2025 was one of the three hottest years ever recorded.
The years from 2015 to 2025 were the hottest eleven years on record.
The planet is now about 1.43 degrees Celsius warmer than the pre-industrial average.
The oceans are absorbing heat at a staggering rate — about eighteen times humanity’s annual energy use each year over the last two decades.
Sea levels remain near record highs.
And for people, the risks are immediate.
The IPCC estimates that 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts highly vulnerable to climate change.
The World Health Organization projects that, between 2030 and 2050, climate change could cause about 250,000 additional deaths each year from undernutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress alone.
Yet the gap between promise and action remains wide.
UNEP says current policies put the world on track for 2.8 degrees Celsius of warming this century.
Even full delivery of new national climate pledges would still leave warming at around 2.3 to 2.5 degrees.
This is why June 5th matters.
World Environment Day was established by the UN General Assembly in 1972 and is led by UNEP.
In 2026, World Environment Day is focused on climate action.
Azerbaijan will host the global commemoration in Baku, under the national campaign message:
“Inspired by Nature. For Climate. For Our Future.”
UNEP’s global call is simple:
Act #NowForClimate.
The message is not that the future is lost.
It is that choices still count.
Cleaner energy.
Stronger early warning systems.
Smarter cities.
Protected ecosystems.
Restored land.
Every action reduces risk.
Climate action is not only an environmental issue.
It is a health issue.
A development issue.
A justice issue.
And a survival issue.
This World Environment Day, June 5th, join the movement.
Act now.
Speak up.
Choose change.
For nature.
For climate.
For our future.
IPS UN Bureau
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
After World War II, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) started from low levels of socioeconomic development. Especially health indicators were worse than in most other world regions. This changed drastically when MENA countries became independent and started to invest into the social protection of citizens against health risks. They built up powerful social health insurance schemes, and today, many of their health indicators are almost on the same level as in Europe or North America. During the 1980s and 1990, however, most MENA governments reduced healthcare spending again as an element of structural adjustment programs, and focused increasingly on health services that are particularly important for the urban upper and middle classes, their main allies in society, but not so much for the poor. Therefore, MENA health systems suffer again from significant deficits regarding fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. Financial, legal, and geographical obstacles restrict access for large parts of the population. The coexistence of multiple social protection schemes for different population groups reflects and intensifies already existing social inequalities. Deficits in quality and tidiness and the prevalence of informal fees charged for “good” treatment reduce further the value of public health services. Efficiency suffers from irrational prioritizations in fund allocation and from a lack of customer orientation. And the effects of MENA health systems, although not really bad, could still be better, which has become more than obvious during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
After World War II, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) started from low levels of socioeconomic development. Especially health indicators were worse than in most other world regions. This changed drastically when MENA countries became independent and started to invest into the social protection of citizens against health risks. They built up powerful social health insurance schemes, and today, many of their health indicators are almost on the same level as in Europe or North America. During the 1980s and 1990, however, most MENA governments reduced healthcare spending again as an element of structural adjustment programs, and focused increasingly on health services that are particularly important for the urban upper and middle classes, their main allies in society, but not so much for the poor. Therefore, MENA health systems suffer again from significant deficits regarding fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. Financial, legal, and geographical obstacles restrict access for large parts of the population. The coexistence of multiple social protection schemes for different population groups reflects and intensifies already existing social inequalities. Deficits in quality and tidiness and the prevalence of informal fees charged for “good” treatment reduce further the value of public health services. Efficiency suffers from irrational prioritizations in fund allocation and from a lack of customer orientation. And the effects of MENA health systems, although not really bad, could still be better, which has become more than obvious during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
After World War II, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) started from low levels of socioeconomic development. Especially health indicators were worse than in most other world regions. This changed drastically when MENA countries became independent and started to invest into the social protection of citizens against health risks. They built up powerful social health insurance schemes, and today, many of their health indicators are almost on the same level as in Europe or North America. During the 1980s and 1990, however, most MENA governments reduced healthcare spending again as an element of structural adjustment programs, and focused increasingly on health services that are particularly important for the urban upper and middle classes, their main allies in society, but not so much for the poor. Therefore, MENA health systems suffer again from significant deficits regarding fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. Financial, legal, and geographical obstacles restrict access for large parts of the population. The coexistence of multiple social protection schemes for different population groups reflects and intensifies already existing social inequalities. Deficits in quality and tidiness and the prevalence of informal fees charged for “good” treatment reduce further the value of public health services. Efficiency suffers from irrational prioritizations in fund allocation and from a lack of customer orientation. And the effects of MENA health systems, although not really bad, could still be better, which has become more than obvious during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
After World War II, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) started from low levels of socioeconomic development. Especially health indicators were worse than in most other world regions. This changed drastically when MENA countries became independent and started to invest into the social protection of citizens against health risks. They built up powerful social health insurance schemes, and today, many of their health indicators are almost on the same level as in Europe or North America. During the 1980s and 1990, however, most MENA governments reduced healthcare spending again as an element of structural adjustment programs, and focused increasingly on health services that are particularly important for the urban upper and middle classes, their main allies in society, but not so much for the poor. Therefore, MENA health systems suffer again from significant deficits regarding fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. Financial, legal, and geographical obstacles restrict access for large parts of the population. The coexistence of multiple social protection schemes for different population groups reflects and intensifies already existing social inequalities. Deficits in quality and tidiness and the prevalence of informal fees charged for “good” treatment reduce further the value of public health services. Efficiency suffers from irrational prioritizations in fund allocation and from a lack of customer orientation. And the effects of MENA health systems, although not really bad, could still be better, which has become more than obvious during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
After World War II, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) started from low levels of socioeconomic development. Especially health indicators were worse than in most other world regions. This changed drastically when MENA countries became independent and started to invest into the social protection of citizens against health risks. They built up powerful social health insurance schemes, and today, many of their health indicators are almost on the same level as in Europe or North America. During the 1980s and 1990, however, most MENA governments reduced healthcare spending again as an element of structural adjustment programs, and focused increasingly on health services that are particularly important for the urban upper and middle classes, their main allies in society, but not so much for the poor. Therefore, MENA health systems suffer again from significant deficits regarding fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. Financial, legal, and geographical obstacles restrict access for large parts of the population. The coexistence of multiple social protection schemes for different population groups reflects and intensifies already existing social inequalities. Deficits in quality and tidiness and the prevalence of informal fees charged for “good” treatment reduce further the value of public health services. Efficiency suffers from irrational prioritizations in fund allocation and from a lack of customer orientation. And the effects of MENA health systems, although not really bad, could still be better, which has become more than obvious during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
After World War II, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) started from low levels of socioeconomic development. Especially health indicators were worse than in most other world regions. This changed drastically when MENA countries became independent and started to invest into the social protection of citizens against health risks. They built up powerful social health insurance schemes, and today, many of their health indicators are almost on the same level as in Europe or North America. During the 1980s and 1990, however, most MENA governments reduced healthcare spending again as an element of structural adjustment programs, and focused increasingly on health services that are particularly important for the urban upper and middle classes, their main allies in society, but not so much for the poor. Therefore, MENA health systems suffer again from significant deficits regarding fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. Financial, legal, and geographical obstacles restrict access for large parts of the population. The coexistence of multiple social protection schemes for different population groups reflects and intensifies already existing social inequalities. Deficits in quality and tidiness and the prevalence of informal fees charged for “good” treatment reduce further the value of public health services. Efficiency suffers from irrational prioritizations in fund allocation and from a lack of customer orientation. And the effects of MENA health systems, although not really bad, could still be better, which has become more than obvious during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
Male employees were working in a paper factory in Thimpu, Bhutan. Accession to WTO will enhance business opportunities for local SMEs. Credit: Unsplash/Bradford Zak
By Jing Huang, Mikiko Tanaka and Rajan Ratna
THIMPU, Bhutan, Jun 2 2026 (IPS)
Bhutan’s decision to restart its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) comes at an important junction. Since graduating from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2023, the country is entering a new phase of development, which requires stronger competitiveness, deeper global engagement and greater economic resilience.
Yet Bhutan’s experience is not only about joining a global institution. It also offers an important lesson on why South-South cooperation matters in an increasingly uncertain world.
Global trade today is becoming more fragmented and unpredictable. Geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions and shifting trade alliances are reshaping the engagement of countries with the global economy. For small developing economies, the challenge is particularly complex.
Accessing international markets is no longer only about expanding exports, it is also about navigating changing rules, building institutional readiness and strengthening resilience against external shocks.
Based on this, the decision to restart the WTO accession from Bhutan is particularly significant. After years of standstill, Bhutan has resumed discussions on the terms of accession under the WTO Working Party process.
For a small economy transitioning beyond LDC status, WTO accession represents an opportunity to strengthen long-term economic foundations, improve investor confidence and integrate more effectively into regional and global markets.
However, the WTO accession is never easy, particularly for small economies with limited institutional capacity. Negotiating accession requires the readiness of the domestic market and industry, but also government capacities to navigate highly technical issues and in-house analysis for self and competitors’ assessments, from market access commitments and regulatory reforms to notification obligations and legal frameworks.
Officials must understand not only the rules themselves but also the practical implications of commitments that will shape national economic policy for years to come.
For many developing countries, the most useful policy lessons often come from peers facing similar realities. Countries across the Global South frequently operate under comparable constraints: limited institutional resources, competing development priorities and the need to balance openness with domestic policy space.
In these contexts, learning from neighbouring and comparable economies can often be more practical and relatable than relying solely on textbook models or distant examples. Bhutan’s WTO preparations offer a good example of the approach can work in practice.
In response to a request from the Royal Government of Bhutan, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) through its Subregional Office for South and South-West Asia, partnered with Indian think tanks to support Bhutanese officials as they prepare for WTO accession.
Rather than focusing solely on theoretical understanding, the initiative emphasized practical learning, negotiation experiences and peer exchanges with experts and former trade negotiators who had worked directly on WTO processes.
The approach responded directly to Bhutan’s needs. Officials serving on Bhutan’s WTO Negotiating Team and Technical Working Groups were able to deepen their understanding of complex accession issues, including market access negotiations, institutional reforms, scheduling commitments and post-accession obligations. More importantly, they engaged directly with practitioners who understood the realities of policymaking and negotiations in developing country settings.
Peer learning also brought an important practical pillar. Discussions moved beyond legal provisions and technical terminology to focus on real experiences what challenges emerge during accession, how governments navigate difficult trade-offs and what institutional arrangements work in practice.
Exchanges on economic diversification, including lessons related to Special Economic Zones (SEZs), also offered useful reflections for Bhutan as it considers pathways to sustainable economic growth.
At a time when multilateralism faces growing pressures and geopolitical divisions increasingly influence trade relations, regional cooperation and peer learning are becoming more important. Small and developing economies often face similar structural constraints and often attempt to navigate major transitions in isolation.
Trusted regional partnerships can help countries access practical expertise, reduce learning costs and build confidence in undertaking complex reforms.
Bhutan’s WTO journey reminds us that successful South-South cooperation is not simply about technical assistance or transferring knowledge. It works best when countries define their own priorities, partnerships respond to genuine demand and peers contribute practical experiences with humility and mutual respect.
As Bhutan moves forward in its WTO accession process, its experience offers an important lesson for the wider region. In a fragmented and uncertain global economy, developing countries are often strongest when they learn from one another.
South-South cooperation may not remove every challenge, but it can help countries navigate difficult transitions with greater confidence, stronger institutions and more practical solutions.
Jing Huang is Economic Affairs Officer, ESCAP Subregional Office for South and South-West Asia; Mikiko Tanaka is Head of ESCAP Subregional Office for South and South-West Asia & Rajan Ratna is Coordinator, DAKSHIN-Global South Centre of Excellence.
IPS UN Bureau
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
A kétezres évek közepén, elsősorban a nemzeti légitársaságnál uralkodó hangulat miatt már a fiatalabb, kisebb tapasztalattal rendelkező pilótageneráció is szétnézett a nagyvilágban, előrelépési lehetőség után kutatva. Hasonlóképpen gondolkodott Szentgyörgyi Dezső is, aki 2001 óta repült a Malév Boeing 737-es első tisztjeként. A lehetőségek között felbukkant a magyar pilóták által akkor már jól ismert Tajvan és a Boeing 747-es. Szentgyörgyi Dezső történetének második része következik.
Milyen élményt jelentettek számodra a hosszú távú útvonalak?
- Az amerikai gyakorló útvonal lényege a Csendes-óceán északi részének átrepülése volt, aztán már mindegy volt, hogy Vancouverbe vagy Los Angelesbe érkezel. Jót tett az egómnak, amikor harminc évesen, első tisztként először megérkezem Los Angelesbe egy Boeing 747-essel. Akkor én azt is elhittem, hogy a vízen is tudok járni. Los Angeles olyan, hogy két mérföldenként jönnek a gépek, egy Jumbo, egy 737-es, egy Airbus. Az amerikai irányítót nem úgy kell elképzelni, mint az európait, hogy szabvány kifejezésekkel dolgozik, hanem beszélget veled, és közben rágógumizik. Nekem például azt mondta, hogy a „második gurulóút és át a hídon”. Ott ment a gurulóút és alatta az autópálya, én meg életemben először voltam ott, de ő már nem foglalkozott tovább velem, mondta az engedélyt a következőnek. Amikor egyszer valamit nem értettem az időjárásban és rákérdeztem, hogy volna kedves és segítene nekem, a válasza az volt, hogy az nem az ő dolga.