OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. It observed recent damage to civilian properties caused by shelling in residential areas of Staromykhailivka. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk - close to the border with the Russian Federation – as well as near Oleksandrivske, Bezimenne, Zaichenko and Troitske.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema, power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on media reports of searches at apartments and offices of two activists.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 220), compared with the previous reporting period (about 235 explosions).[2]

On the evening and night of 5-6 November, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded seven undetermined explosions and 70 projectiles in flight (from west to east), all at an assessed range of 0.5-4km south and south-south-west.

On the evening of 5 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 380 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-7km east and south-east. During the day on 6 November, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions and about 100 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-7km south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening and night of 5-6 November, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded six undetermined explosions and 85 projectiles in flight (mostly from easterly to westerly directions and from westerly to easterly directions), all at an assessed range of 2-5km south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening and night of 5-6 November, the SMM camera about 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 17 explosions (three assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons and the remainder undetermined) and about 210 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north), all at an assessed range of 2-6km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (ten explosions).

On the morning of 6 November, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) to facilitate repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard a single shot of small-arms fire 60-100m east-south-east. The SMM immediately left the area.

The SMM observed recent damage to civilian properties caused by shelling in residential areas of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk). On 5 November, accompanied by members of the armed formations, the SMM saw damage at six impact sites, assessed as caused by 30mm armour piercing rounds fired from a west-south-westerly direction. At each impact site, residents told the SMM that shelling had taken place in the area on the evening of 29 October.

At 2 Zhukovskoho Street, from inside a residential one-storey house, the SMM saw a hole in the west-south-west-facing side of the roof and a hole in the east-north-east-facing side of the same roof (covered on the outside with an asbestos roofing material sheet), assessed to be the exit hole of the same round.

About 300m west-north-west from the first impact site, at 17A Zhukovskoho Street, the SMM saw a small fresh hole in the west-facing exterior wall of a one-storey house as well as damage to the brickwork, assessed as due to impacts of rounds, in the west-south-west-facing and west-facing exterior walls.

About 30m east-south-east from the second impact site, at 17 Zhukovskoho Street, the SMM saw a hole in a west-south-west-facing metal gate near a one-storey house.

About 25m east-south-east from the third impact site, at 16 Zhukovskoho Street, the SMM saw multiples holes in a west-south-west-facing concrete fence, a west-south-west-facing wooden wall and the chimney of a one-storey house.

About 30m east-south-east from the fourth site, at 14 Zhukovskoho Street, the SMM observed a hole in the west-facing exterior wall of a one-storey house and a corresponding hole in the east-facing interior wall of the house’s kitchen.

About 15m east-south-east from the fifth site, at 13 Zhukovskoho Street, the SMM saw a hole in a west-south-west-facing brick fence and the imprint of the side of a round in the west-south-west-facing door of a garage as well as pieces of freshly stripped bark from the west-south-west-facing side of trees 15m away from the house.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[3] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-4km south-east and two shots of small-arms fire 0.6-1km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 1 November, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of six multiple launch rocket systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 24 October 2018).

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 3 November, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk). On 5 November, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted six tanks (T-64) near Pidlisne (70km north-west of Luhansk). On 6 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Ozarianivka.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 1 November, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 17 tanks (type undetermined) and three surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and 12 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018). Aerial imagery available to the SMM also revealed the presence on 1 November of 42 tanks (type undetermined), five pieces of self-propelled artillery and 12 pieces of towed artillery in a training area near Miusynsk (see above), 29 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 26 October 2018), and 22 tanks (type undetermined), nine pieces of self-propelled artillery and 18 pieces of towed artillery in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018).

The same aerial imagery available to the SMM also revealed the presence of 66 armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Buhaivka, 28 ACVs (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Shymshynivka and 78 ACVs (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Myrne.[4]

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 5 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Valerianivka (51km south-west of Donetsk), six tanks (type undetermined) near Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Maloianisol (78km south-west of Donetsk), two tanks (T-64), two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Manhush (25km south-west of Mariupol) and four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) located behind a non-functional school in Azovske (121km south of Donetsk). On 6 November, the SMM saw a mortar (type undetermined) near Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 1 November, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 20 pieces of towed artillery in a training area near Buhaivka.

The SMM observed ACVs and anti-aircraft guns in the security zone.[5] In government‑controlled areas, on 3 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4, Shilka, 23mm) and a modified armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) near Ozarianivka. On 5 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two APCs (undetermined variant), an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), three ACVs (undetermined variant) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-2) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk). On 6 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4) and a modified APC (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) near Ozarianivka. On the same day, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Hirske (63km west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (see above), power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka, as well as to enable demining activities in Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM visited two border areas outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 11 cars (two with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about ten minutes, the SMM saw six cars (two with Russian Federation, one with Lithuanian and one with Armenian licence plates as well as two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on media reports of searches carried out by Ukrainian law enforcement authorities at apartments and offices of two activists at Sichovykh Striltsiv Street and Shovkovychna Street on 6 November. At the first address, the Mission observed a fire truck, an ambulance and four firefighters entering the building. At the second address, it observed a calm situation. It was later announced that the searches had been conducted under a warrant issued by the Pechersk District Court of Kyiv City in the framework of criminal proceedings under Article 109 (Actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of the constitutional order or take-over of government) and Article 111 (High treason) of the Criminal Code.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint near Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel allowed the SMM to proceed through the checkpoint but asked the patrol not to drive further than 100m away from the checkpoint on the other side, citing “orders from his superiors”. The SMM refused the condition and did not proceed through the checkpoint.
• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the presence of a sniper in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west along road M14, citing “possible shelling in the area”. While present, the SMM saw a civilian car travelling east through the checkpoint.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from travelling east through the checkpoint, citing “an ongoing police operation in the area”. While present, the SMM saw several civilian cars passing the checkpoint in both directions.
• On two occasions, at a checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from travelling east towards Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing “an ongoing exercise”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[6]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations requested to see the SMM’s patrol plan. The SMM declined and was allowed to proceed through the checkpoint after about 20 minutes.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 5-6 November, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over areas near Maloianisol.[7]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2] During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] This hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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MINSK, 6 November 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 6 November 2018:

“According to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), the current situation in the conflict area in eastern Ukraine is far from being calm. Unfortunately, a relatively high level of ceasefire violations has been registered lately.

In this regard – as I did last time – I once again solemnly urge all the sides to prevent such a development and to show full restraint.

Accordingly, the overall security situation in the conflict area was again in the focus of the TCG and its Security Working Group.

As you know, on October 27, 2018 a SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle went missing on the territory of certain areas of Donetsk region.

In connection with this incident, I once again call on the signatories of the Minsk agreements to take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and security of SMM personnel and assets and to provide conditions for the Mission’s unimpeded operation in accordance with its mandate.

I would like to emphasize that the SMM in Ukraine is the largest and most costly mission in the OSCE history and is financed by taxpayers of all the OSCE participating states. Also in light of the above, a detailed investigation of the incident is needed.

The Economic Working Group focused on the issues related to water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbasa" supply systems as well as on the improvement of Vodafone-Ukraine mobile communications in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR).

The Humanitarian Working Group further considered questions related to the exchange of detainees and the crossing conditions at the contact line via entry-exit checkpoints.

The participants of the Political Working Group exchanged views, in particular, on the modalities of the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’ in light of the sides’ latest decisions.

Against this background, the issue of the so-called “elections” in CADR and CALR announced for the upcoming Sunday was raised in the TCG plenary session. In this context, let me reiterate my already uttered position: I consider that the holding of the so-called “elections” does not correspond either to the letter or to the spirit of the Minsk agreements”.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. It observed damage caused by gunfire in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas and military presence inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk and Dovzhanske – close to the border with the Russian Federation – and near Zaichenko, Bezimenne and Naberezhne.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Vesela Hora and to damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. In Odessa, the SMM followed up on reports of vandalism to a monument. In Kropyvnytskyi, Kirovohrad region, the SMM followed up on reports of a grenade attack against a social activist.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 235), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 260 explosions).[2]

On the evening of 4 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions and about 250 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-7km at directions ranging from east to south-west. During the day on 5 November, at the same location, the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions and about 480 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-6km south-east.

On the night of 4-5 November, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded two undetermined explosions and about 90 projectiles in flight (mostly from south to north), all at an assessed range of 2-5km at easterly directions.

During the day on 5 November, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1.5-5km north and in south-westerly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including ten explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 420 explosions).

The SMM followed up on reports of damage from gunfire in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM saw a hole, about 3cm in size, in both layers of a double-glazed south-west-facing window of a second floor apartment in a four-storey building at 49 Lenina Street. The SMM assessed that the fire came from a south-westerly direction. The resident of the apartment (woman, 51 years old) told the SMM that she had noticed the broken window about two weeks previously and had not been at home when the damage had occurred.    

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[3] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned 400m north of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-8km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The SMM also saw three empty cargo trucks with Russian Federation licence plates moving from the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area north-east inside the disengagement area. About 30 minutes later, the SMM saw two of these trucks loaded with coal heading south-west inside the disengagement area.

On 3 November, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, a 16m extension of an existing trench about 500m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area and 1.4km east of its western edge, as well as a 17m extension of an existing trench about 850m north of the southern edge of the disengagement area and about 1.9km east of its western edge (both extensions were not visible in imagery from 2 November 2018). On the same day, inside the disengagement area, the same UAV spotted five people, assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, near existing defensive positions.

Positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 3 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 27 tanks (T-72) (most of them with the engine cover opened) and two self-propelled howitzers (one 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and one 2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) in the Leninskyi district of Donetsk city and a tank (T-72) near Sarabash (26km south of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 4 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Chystyi Kliuch (26km north-west of Donetsk) and two towed howitzers (probable D-20, 152mm) near Rybynske (49km south of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 4 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted ten towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Novomaiorske (64km south-west of Donetsk) and two tanks (T-64) on transporters near Stara Krasnianka (92km north-west of Luhansk). On 5 November, the SMM saw three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) on train cars travelling south near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft guns and other indications of military presence in the security zone.[4] In government‑controlled areas, on 3 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 13 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (both BTR-70 and BTR-80) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) parked near residential houses in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2), three IFVs (BMP-1) and four APCs (MT-LB) near Zoloti Pisky (12km north-west of Donetsk); four probable APCs (MT-LB) and three probable IFVs (BMP-1) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk); and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk). On 4 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a new 40m trench extension about 7km north-east of Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2, 23mm) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Chystyi Kliuch, an ACV (type undetermined) near Halytsynivka (29km north-west of Donetsk), two ACVs (type undetermined) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk), an IFV (type undetermined) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Bohdanivka and an IFV (BMP-2) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Starohnativka.

On 5 November, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km north-west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP-1) outside the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an IFV (BMP-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), an APC (BTR-80) in Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded an IFV (BMP-1) near Kriakivka in a location where multiple ceasefire violations were recorded (see table below).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 3 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six APCs (two BTR-70/80 and four MT-LB), 32 IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2, assessed as not operational) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in the Leninskyi district of Donetsk City; two IFVs (BMP-1) and four APCs (one BTR-70/80 and three MT-LB) in Kalmiuske (42km south-east of Donetsk); and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Styla (34km south of Donetsk). On 4 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk), an APC (BTR-80) near Petrivske (about 1km east of  the disengagement area) and an IFV (BMP-1) in the western outskirts of Petrivske (outside the disengagement area, about 80m north of its northern edge). On 4 November, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) near Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to electrical power lines near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities in Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM observed demining activities and new mine hazard signs. Near Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk), on both sides of road P-66, the SMM saw seven people in civilian clothing clearing vegetation. About 800m south-east of Kaplany (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM encountered for the first time a barrier of large tree branches spanning the road and a red mine hazard sign with a skull and crossbones and “Stop Mines” in Russian and “Danger Mines” in English, also seen for the first time. The SMM also saw a barrier of large tree branches across another road about 800m south of Kaplany, and a black sign with a white skull and crossbones and “Mines” written in Russian.

The SMM continued to monitor the conditions of civilians at the Stanytsia Luhanska entry-exit checkpoint. The Mission saw a man (45 years old) being transported by medical emergency services after they said he had fainted while waiting to pass the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint. Medical staff added that he had been transported to a hospital in Stanytsia Luhanska, and that based on his symptoms the patient had suffered a stroke. Five people at the entry-exit checkpoint separately told the SMM that it had taken them one hour to pass through the checkpoint of the armed formations and three more hours to enter government-controlled areas at the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.    

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw five cars (three with Ukrainian and two with Russian federation licence plates) and two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine and seven cars (two with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation, one with Georgian and one with Lithuanian licence plates) and three covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. Two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Odessa, the SMM followed up on media reports of vandalism to a monument related to the 1918 Bolshevik Uprising in the city. At Kulykove Pole, on 4 November, the SMM saw fresh writing ("Glory to Ukraine" and "Glory to the nation!")  spray-painted in Ukrainian language and six red-and-black flags painted on the corners of the monument (for a similar incident at the same location, see SMM Daily Report 3 July 2018).

In Kropyvnytskyi (206km west of Dnipro), Kirovohrad region, the SMM followed up on media reports of a grenade attack against a social activist. On 4 November, in a courtyard of a two storey house at 23/1 Bratyslavska Street, the SMM observed a small crater with splash marks in the asphalt surface surrounding the crater, assessed as consistent with damage caused by an explosion of a grenade, as well as shrapnel damage to nearby aluminum window frames (filled in with polymer), metal house siding and a rain gutter. The resident of the house, a social activist who said he was campaigning in favor of the construction of a cathedral for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate in the town, told the SMM that around 03:00 on 12 October 2018, while he had been at home at the same address with his wife and their six-year-old child, he had been woken up by the sound of an explosion in the courtyard of their house. Regional police told the SMM that the attack had been registered under Article 296 of the Criminal Code (hooliganism).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko, an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from superiors”.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west along road M14, citing “orders from their superiors”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, an armed member of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing south through to the city and accessing Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), citing “special measures and orders from superiors”. The SMM was allowed to proceed west through the checkpoint. While present, the SMM saw several civilian cars passing the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• In Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage to the western areas of the village, citing “security concerns”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that there had been no demining activities in the area south of the bridge. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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402134 Communication and Media Relations Section

New approaches and practical tools to prevent corruption at the local level were the focus of a two-day expert seminar organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) in partnership with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (OECD/ACN) in Vienna on 5 and 6 November 2018, which gathered over 70 experts and practitioners from some 30 OSCE participating States.

The seminar covered experiences and challenges from the entire OSCE region with a special focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. The participants included representatives of central government bodies and local level officials responsible for integrity and corruption prevention in cities and regions as well as experts from international organizations and civil society.

“The topics discussed here today are extremely important in the fight against corruption,” said Ermelinda Meksi, Deputy Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities. “Transparency in decision-making and the delivery of public services will prevent the government at every level from misusing power and public funds. This in turn will increase citizens’ confidence in their local institutions, ensure sustainable development and stability and security in the OSCE region.”

Matteo Pianca, Deputy Head of Mission for the Economic and Environmental Dimension at Italy's Delegation  to the OSCE, and representing the 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship said: “Italy attaches great importance to the anti-corruption component of the OSCE’s economic and environmental dimension. Our Chairmanship’s decision to appoint Professor Paola Severino as the first-ever OSCE Special Representative on combating corruption is a confirmation of our wish to further support the OSCE in assisting its participating States to implement their commitments in good governance and anti-corruption. Thanks to her engagement these commitments have been further promoted across the OSCE region, also through several country visits during which former Italian Justice Minister Severino shared her knowledge as well as lessons learned from the Italian experience with relevant stakeholders.”

The seminar’s discussions focused on how to best leverage the impact of anti-corruption policy and initiatives on economic development and improving the business climate; and how to transform local integrity plans into practical tools that can guarantee broader engagement and achieve change.

Invited experts also spoke about innovative approaches, successful practices and solutions in planning and executing local budgets in order to minimize corruption risks in procurement at the local level.

Other sessions explored good practices of reducing corruption risks in regulatory activities, undertaking risk assessments, and on guidance tools developed by international organizations. There was also a practical exercise.

Olga Savran, OECD/ACN Manager, added: “This seminar is an important step in the OECD/ACN project that aims to develop a thematic study on corruption prevention at the local level. The study will review trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and include examples of good practices from the region and from several OECD countries. This seminar is also an excellent example of fruitful cooperation between the OSCE and OECD where we combine our efforts to help countries in the region to prevent corruption.”

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO).The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly increased from 10,210 to 10,434 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 20 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 19 as the previous week; seven of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 12 into Ukraine (68 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, eight families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and five were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when three families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and two into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (393 compared to 433 observed during the previous week). There were 206 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 187 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Rovenky-Kyiv; Luhansk-Yalta and Stakhanov- Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 751 to 684 (240 at the Gukovo BCP and 444 at the Donetsk BCP); 389 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 295 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in the Russian Federation and in Belarus.                                                                                          

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 47 (compared to 42 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 134 to 91: of the total number of trucks scanned, 51 trucks (56 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 40 trucks (44 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly decreased from 172 to 169 vehicles; 87 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 82 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 23 occasions, compared to 27 last week; the OTs assessed that 13 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with German, Georgian and Uzbek licence plates.

On 3 November at 20:17, the OT observed a police vehicle entering the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle drove behind the main building. At 20:43 vehicle crossed back into the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 10 October to 6 November 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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VIENNA, 6 November 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed concern regarding the lengthy detention of journalist Igor Rudnikov in Kaliningrad in the Russian Federation and reiterated his call on the country’s authorities to release him.

“The lengthy arrest of Igor Rudnikov for more than a year and repeated extension of his detention is very worrying and raises serious concerns,” Désir said. “I call on the Russian authorities to release the journalist and allow him to continue his important journalistic work without undue interference.”

On 1 November 2017 Rudnikov, editor and founder of the Noviye Kolyosa newspaper, was forcefully detained by representatives of the Russian Federal Security Service on allegations of extorting money from a high-level law enforcement official in the Kaliningrad region. His detention has been extended several times, and the current one is scheduled to end in March 2019. The journalist and his newspaper are well known for their investigative journalism, particularly in relation to the activities of local authorities.  

The Representative has previously raised this case (see www.osce.org/fom/354601).

In March 2016, Rudnikov was attacked and received multiple stab wounds in an incident condemned by the Representative (see www.osce.org/fom/230601).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Ivana Milatovic, OSCE Mission to Serbia

BELGRADE, 6 November 2018 – The OSCE Mission to Serbia, in close partnership with the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) on 6 and 7 November organized a training course for building police capacities in cyber forensics and investigating cybercrime. 

The course was the first in a series of four which will take place across Serbia by April 2019, with the aim to establish a countrywide network of 60 cyber forensics investigators.

Experts from the MoI’s Department for Suppression of Hi-Tech Crime, who conducted the training with the OSCE’s support, formed a mobile team of trainers that will travel and spread its expertise in this domain among police officers countrywide.

To support them in this endeavour, the OSCE Mission to Serbia donated ten laptops and one projector to the mobile training team.

The Head of OSCE Mission to Serbia, Ambassador Andrea Orizio, and the Police Director, Vladimir Rebic, addressed the participants at the opening of the training in Belgrade.

“Keeping up to date with world-wide trends while building local networks of experts is the only way to be on top of investigating 21st century cybercrime and cyber forensics.  By supporting this training course and donating IT equipment, the OSCE Mission to Serbia is fostering close partnership with the MoI, which has already yielded important results in the Ministry’s efforts to combat cybercrime. The ultimate goal is full local ownership of these accomplishments,” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to Serbia, Ambassador Andrea Orizio.

“The OSCE Mission stands ready to further support the MoI in building a  pool of cybersecurity experts in the police force across Serbia,” he added.

This activity is a part of the OSCE Mission to Serbia’s project “Strengthening Serbian Authorities in the Fight against Organized and Transnational Crime”. It also complements activities in the second stage of the regional project “Capacity Building for Criminal Justice Practitioners Combating Cybercrime and Cyber-enabled Crime in South-Eastern Europe”, implemented by the Serbian MoI and the OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s Strategic Police Matters Unit, with the assistance of the OSCE Mission to Serbia.

WASHINGTON D.C., 6 November 2018 – The international observers for the mid-term elections in the United States will present their preliminary post-election statement at a news conference on Wednesday, 7 November, in Washington D.C.

The mission is a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA).

The statement will be delivered by George Tsereteli, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission, followed by Isabel Santos, Head of the OSCE PA delegation, and Tana de Zulueta, Head of the ODIHR limited election observation mission.

The International Election Observation Mission is comprised of a total of some 140 observers from 35 countries, including 84 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA and 55 long-term observers and election experts deployed by ODIHR.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 2:00 p.m. on Wednesday, 7 November, in the Junior Ballroom of the Washington Marriott at Metro Center, 775 12th Street NW, Washington D.C.

Live stream of the press conference will be available at: www.facebook.com/osce.odihr and www.oscepa.org.

For further information, contact:

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, (202) 423 5511 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Nat Parry, OSCE PA, +45 60 10 81 77, nat@oscepa.dk      

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 2 and 3 November, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 3 and 4 November, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a sharp increase in ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. On 4 November, the Mission heard an explosion 300-400m north of its location in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka as well as at least 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 500m from its location in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted in Holmivskyi, near Novoazovsk – an area close to the border with the Russian Federation – and Verkhnoshyrokivske, and again near Zaichenko and Bezimenne.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining near Zolote-2/Karbonit and Nyzhnoteple. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering organized in memory of Kateryna Handziuk, a Kherson city council official and civil society activist who died on 4 November after having suffered severe acid injuries in an attack on 31 July 2018.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 2 and 3 November, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 370 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 230 explosions). Between the evenings of 3 and 4 November, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 260 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.[2]

On the evening and night of 2-3 November, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an explosion assessed as an incoming round, seven undetermined explosions and about 200 projectiles in flight (mostly from westerly to easterly directions), all at an assessed range of 1-5km at southerly directions. On the following day, the same camera recorded 12 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons 1-2km south, as well as 37 undetermined explosions and about 40 projectiles in flight (mostly from westerly to easterly directions), all at an assessed range of 1-5km at southerly directions. On the evening and night of 3-4 November, the same camera recorded three undetermined explosions and 19 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-westerly to south-easterly directions), all at an assessed range of 1-2km at south-westerly directions.

During the day on 3 November, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions and about 300 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-6km at directions ranging from south to north-north-west. On the following day, at the same location, the Mission heard 23 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-5km north-north-east and south-west.

On the same day, positioned on the eastern edge of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and ten bursts of small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-east. The following day, positioned on the eastern edge of Kamianka, the SMM heard 22 explosions (16 assessed as outgoing rounds, two as impacts and the remainder undetermined) and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-4km north-north-east and south-south-west.

During the day on 4 November, positioned at the central railway station in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions and about 50 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-4km north-east and north-north-west.

On the evening of 2 November, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 5-7km west-south-west and north-west. On the evening and night of 3-4 November, at the same location, the Mission heard 110 undetermined explosions and about 160 bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) cannon (30mm), anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-6km south-west, west-north-west and north-west.

On the evening of 2 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and about 300 shots and bursts of automatic grenade launcher, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-east. The following day, the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions and 42 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 3-7km south.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 2 and 3 November, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (ten), compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). Between the evenings of 3 and 4 November, the SMM recorded almost twice as many ceasefire violations (about 1,000), including about 420 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. Most ceasefire violations were recorded in areas near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and between Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk) and Zholobok (non-government-controlled, 47km west of Luhansk).

During the day on 4 November, positioned in Sentianivka, the SMM heard about 220 undetermined explosions and about 330 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 3-6km west-north-west and north-west.

On the same day, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 110 explosions at an assessed range of 10-15km north-north-east and north-north-west.

On the same day, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion (assessed as an airburst ) 300-400m north, six bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 300-500m north-west, as well as seven undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-2km north.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote and Petrivske[3] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 2 November, the SMM camera at Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two outgoing explosions at an assessed range of 0.3-1km north-north-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area), as well as an undetermined explosion and 30 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-easterly to south-westerly directions) at an assessed range of 0.3-1.5km north-west, north-north-west and north (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the same evening, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded 12 projectiles in flight (five from west to east and seven from northerly to southerly directions), all at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south and south-south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On the same evening, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and about 120 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1.5-6km south-south-west and south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. The Mission also heard four undetermined explosions and about 300 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 2-6km south-south-west and south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 4 November, positioned 250m south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard at least 15 bursts of small-arms fire 500m north-north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same day, positioned 1km south-south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the Mission heard two bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On the evening and night of 2-3 November, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area, and six projectiles in flight 2-5km east-north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. During the day on 3 November, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the same day, the SMM saw a tanker truck painted in camouflage colours driven by a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier entering the disengagement area from the north-eastern outskirts of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

During the day on 4 November, positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard 20 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km north-north-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area, as well as 32 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-7km north-north-east and 12 bursts and shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. The same day, positioned in Zolote, the SMM heard 40 shots and bursts of automatic grenade launcher, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 3 November, positioned north of Petrivske, the SMM heard two bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On 4 November, at the same location, the Mission observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 2 November, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted again a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152 mm) near Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk).

In violation of the withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 2 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K31, Strela-1) and a probable mortar south of Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 2 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted ten towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Novomaiorske (64km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. On 4 November, in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10), eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and two tanks (T-64), and noted that two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), 27 MLRS (BM-21) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns as well as new trenches and firing positions in the security zone.[4] In government‑controlled areas, on 2 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) parked near houses, as well as in total 100m of trenches (not seen in imagery from 29 August 2018) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP variants) near Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk), three IFVs (BMP-2) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP variants) near Katerynivka, three IFVs (BMP-1) near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP-1) east of Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk). On 3 November, the SMM saw three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) in Novoselivka Druha (36km north-east of Mariupol).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 2 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Lozove (52km north-east of Donetsk); an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted atop an APC (MT-LB) and three probable IFVs (BMP-1) south of Kalynove (at the same location as the above-mentioned probable mortar and surface-to-air missile system) and six APCs (MT-LB), one with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23), and four probable IFVs (BMP variants) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted new trenches totalling 400m on the eastern side of the road between Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk) and Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 29 August 2018) about 500m south from previously observed trenches (see SMM Daily Report 5 July 2018) and a 50m-long trench extension about 2.5km north-west from Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM saw a probable IFV (BMP variant) in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). On 4 November, the Mission saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) loaded on the back of a military-type truck in Donetsk city.

On 3 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted ten new firing positions next to previously observed trenches on the eastern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk). The mini-UAV also spotted ongoing upgrades of previously spotted trenches on the north-eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, broken cupboards and closets used to fortify and cover them and six armed persons in camouflage clothes nearby. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 1 November 2018).

On 2 November, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least 38 craters assessed as caused by artillery rounds: 18 on the western edge of Zholobok and 20 about 1km south-east of Zholobok (all not seen in imagery from 15 October 2018). The Mission assessed that the rounds had been fired from north-north-westerly and north-westerly directions.

The SMM saw demining activities. On 4 November, the Mission saw 12 people (six men, six women) wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization conducting demining activities in a field east of road T1309 3km north of Shyrokyi (government-controlled, 38km north-east of Luhansk). A representative of the demining team told the SMM that the area being cleared of mines was about 28,000m2 in size and that it would take up to five months to complete mine clearance (for previous observations from this area, see SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018). The Mission also saw people wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization conducting demining activities in a forested area and an agricultural field about 4km north-east of Krasna Talivka (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) and Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

On 4 November, the SMM saw heavy engineering equipment and about 20 Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers conducting repair works at a bridge on road T0504 south-west of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 12 September 2018).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line. On 3 November, two women (in their sixties) in Zolote-4/Rodina told the SMM that the security situation in the village was very tense and heavy shelling and shooting occurred on a daily basis. According to the women, about 40 people remain in Volnyi Hutor, the neighbourhood of Zolote-4/Rodina closest to the contact line, which, they said, was completely without electricity. 

On 2 and 3 November, the SMM saw a billboard on the northern side of the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhansk reading in Ukrainian: “The SBU warns: participating in the CALO elections constitutes a high treason”.

The SMM visited two border areas outside government control. On 3 November, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 60 minutes, the SMM saw 44 cars (eight with Ukrainian, 18 with Russian Federation and two with Georgian license plates, and 16 with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw three minivans (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation license plates, and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. The same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point in Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw no cross-border traffic.

On 4 November, in Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering organized in commemoration of Kateryna Handziuk, a 33-year-old Kherson city council official and civil society activist who died on 4 November. She had suffered severe injuries in a 31 July acid attack (see SMM Daily Report 2 August 2018). The Mission saw about 400 people (60 per cent men, 40 per cent women, 20-60 years old), including representatives of political parties and civil society, attending the commemoration in front of the building of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Ukraine at 10 Akademika Bohomoltsia Street. It observed at least 20 people (ten men, ten women, 25-45 years old) holding banners with messages “She was killed!” and “Who killed Kateryna Handziuk” written in Ukrainian. The participants paid tribute by observing a minute of silence and laying flowers and candles. The SMM observed police officers in riot gear standing around the corner of Pylypa Orlyka Street and that Akademika Bohomoltsia Street was blocked off at both ends by three police cars.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 3 and 4 November respectively, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing risks “to the SMM’s security” on 3 November and “ongoing shelling in the area” on 4 November.
• On 3 and 4 November, at a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west along road M14, citing “orders from their supervisors” on 3 November and “ongoing shelling in the area” on 4 November.
• On 3 and 4 November, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city. On both days, the SMM observed cars proceeding through the checkpoint.
• On 3 November, in Holmivskyi (non-governmentcontrolled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying it “was dangerous for the SMM”.
• On two occasions on 4 November, at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from traveling east after the SMM refused to show its patrol plan. The Mission saw cars passing through the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 3 and 4 November, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[5]
• On 3 and 4 November, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.5
• On 3 November, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 3 and 4 November, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over areas near Temriuk (non-government-controlled, 18km south-east of Donetsk), Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk) and Syhnalne (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2] Between the evenings of 2 and 3 November, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and in Svitlodarsk were not operational. Between the evenings of 3 and 4 November, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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402050 Kunduz Rysbek "Development of E-business & E-commerce in Central Asia"

How to promote economic prosperity and growth through e-business and e-commerce was the focus of an international conference in Bishkek held on 1 and 2 November 2018, which was organized jointly by the Ministry of Economy of the Kyrgyz Republic and the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.

The conference brought together more than 130 participants from across the Central Asian region, countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Europe. They included representatives of the private sector, specifically tech companies and financial institutions, academia and a number of international organizations such as the World Customs Organization as well as the 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship.

The participants highlighted the benefits of e-business and e-commerce and how to develop these in the Central Asian region, such as the role of governments in introducing relevant legal measures and simplifying customs and tax procedures.

Ambassador Pierre von Arx, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, noted the need for countries in the region to harmonize legislation and administrative and customs procedures.

“The development of sustainable e-business and e-commerce naturally requires international co-operation, including addressing the challenges they face. The OSCE has a role here as a platform for dialogue,” he said.

Eldar Abakirov, Deputy Economy Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic, said digital markets offer great potential in providing new opportunities for the private sector in reaching new customers, various business partners for co-operation, and expanding their markets.

The conference provided attending government representatives with a fresh outlook on the legal framework necessary to encourage e-business and support small and medium-sized enterprises, thereby enhancing their knowledge in the development of digital business.

Participants also discussed their experiences and shared good practices in building sustainable e-businesses and in improving data and privacy protection strategies, as well as cybersecurity, in digital markets.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk and Sievernyi – areas close to the border with the Russian Federation – as well as Zaichenko and Bezimenne.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka and the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema, as well as to enable demining near Novotroitske, Zolote-2/Karbonit and Nyzhnoteple.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 230), compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions).  

On the evening and night of 1-2 November, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 115 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-south-west to east-north-east) at estimated ranges of 2-4km east and east-south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) recorded three explosions (one assessed as an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon and two undetermined) and about 120 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-west to south-east and from south-east to north-west), all at estimated ranges of 2-5km north-east and east-north-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion and about 160 projectiles in flight (mostly from east to west and from west to east), all at estimated ranges of 1-4km east, south-south-east and south.

During the day on 2 November, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard and saw three explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 1km west-south-west, nine explosions assessed as impacts: one of an artillery round 1km south-west, one of an automatic grenade launcher (AGL) round 1-2km south, seven of undetermined weapons rounds 2-4km south-west, as well as an undetermined explosion 3-5km south-west. It also heard four explosions assessed as outgoing AGL rounds 1-3km south and south-west, an explosion assessed as the impact of a mortar round 3-4km south-west, as well as three explosions assessed as impacts of undetermined weapons rounds and about 65 undetermined explosions and about 390 bursts and shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at estimated ranges of 1-6km at easterly, southerly and northerly directions. On the same day, positioned in the same location, it also heard two shots of small-arms fire 200m south-west.

During the day on 2 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) for about three hours, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and eight shots of small-arms fire 400-500m east and east-south-east, as well as 25 undetermined explosions at estimated ranges of 1-7km at directions ranging from east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 70), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

On the morning of 2 November, positioned in Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions at estimated ranges of 4-5km west-south-west.

On 1 November, while it was flying a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM had heard 40 shots of small-arms fire 2.4km north-north-west of its position (see SMM Daily Report 2 November 2018). Further analysis of the UAV footage shows a man between Zhovte and Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 23km north-west of Luhansk), in an area under government control, firing a rifle at the UAV.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 2 November, while at the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an estimated range of 2.5-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the morning of 2 November, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area for about 15 minutes, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions at estimated ranges of 3-5km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same morning, positioned in the southern outskirts of Zolote for about 20 minutes, the SMM heard six explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons and five shots of small-arms fire, all 2km south-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same morning, positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons 10km south-south-east and a shot of small-arms fire 1-2km south, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable mortar (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) near Lopaskyne. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four tanks (T-72) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk) and a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152 mm) near Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable mortar (type undetermined) near Zhovte. 

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in Chervonyi Zhovten (40km north of Luhansk) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, the SMM saw seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) – four of them without missiles or covers. On 2 November, the SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33): one near Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk) and one near Kasianivka (22km north of Mariupol).

The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that 11 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft guns [3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government‑controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three ACVs (type undetermined), a modified armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) and a probable modified APC (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Lopaskyne. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk); three IFVs (BMP-1) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk); three IFVs (one BMP-1 and two BMP-2) near Zolote-4/Rodina (60km west of Luhansk); four IFVs (three BMP-1 and one BMP-2) and two APCs (one MT-LB and one BTR variant) near Prychepylivka; three IFVs (BMP-1), three APCs (one BTR-70, one BTR-60 and one MT-LB6M with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on top) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk); and an APC (BTR-70) near Hirske (63km west of Luhansk). On 2 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on a military truck and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in a military compound near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), an APC (BTR-80) in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 1 November, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk) as well as 50 metres of new trenches running from north-east to south-west between residential houses in Zhovte (not visible in imagery from 9 October 2018). On 2 November, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol) and 11 APCs (MT-LB) – three of which had mounted anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2) – near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) and Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and recorded about 740 ceasefire violations within a 15km radius around the DFS, including about 150 explosions (see ceasefire table below).

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw six pedestrians (one man around 70 years old and five women around 50 years old) entering Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko, an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing risks “to the SMM’s security”.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west along road M14, citing “orders from their supervisors”. At the same time, the SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, two members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city and accessing Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk). The SMM observed cars proceeding through the checkpoint.
• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• An SMM mini-UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal due to signal interference while flying near Zernove (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk).[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission heard small-arms fire assessed as directed at its mini-unmanned aerial vehicle flying near Zhovte. The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area, including an impact explosion 200-500m from its positon. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted near Novoazovsk and Voznesenivka – areas close to the border with the Russian Federation – Luhansk city and again near Zaichenko.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, to damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka and to critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions).  

On the evening and night of 31 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 80 explosions and nearly 500 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-7km at southerly directions.

The same evening, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 explosions (23 assessed as outgoing, the remainder undetermined) and seven bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-7km at north-westerly directions.

Also on the evening of 31 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded four undetermined explosions and about 160 projectiles in flight (mostly from westerly to easterly directions), all 2-4km at easterly directions.

During the day on 1 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1-2km south-east followed by another undetermined explosion less than 500m east of its position. The SMM immediately departed the area.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions).

On the night of 31 October, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-east and north-east and 26 undetermined explosions 10-17km north-north-east.

Small arms fire was again assessed as directed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). While conducting a mini-UAV flight in the southern outskirts of Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 40 shots of small-arms fire about 2km north-north-west of its position, in the area where the UAV was flying, and assessed it as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV without damage and left the area.*

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the late afternoon of 31 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an explosion 1-2km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and seven projectiles in flight 1-2km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 1 November, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 4-8km east-north-east and south-west, respectively, followed by an explosion assessed as an impact 200-500m east of its position (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). The SMM felt the shock wave from the impact explosion and immediately departed the area. While in Zolote‑4/Rodina, the SMM had been told by two residents that they face shelling and shooting on a daily basis.

On 1 November, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned on the northern edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 7-10km north-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On the morning of 1 November, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded the muzzle flash of a mortar round (type undetermined) 200-300m south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 1 November, positioned in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, near Smolianynove  (government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa).

The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted as missing 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 28 mortars (12 M-120 Molot, 120mm; 15 2B11 Sani, 120mm; and one BM-37, 82mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government‑controlled areas, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) and a probable armoured command vehicle (BMP-1 Ksh Potok 2) near Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk) on 31 October. On 1 November, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Zolote‑2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote.

In non-government-controlled Luhansk city, on 1 November, the SMM saw two APCs (undetermined types).

In Myrne (government-controlled, 63km south of Donetsk), the SMM noted that two covered wooden boxes mounted on pillars of a railway bridge (see SMM Daily Report of 19 October 2017) had been removed. National Guard personnel had previously told the SMM that the boxes contained explosives.

The SMM observed demining activities near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol). On the southern side of road T0519, the SMM observed two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers using portable metal detectors and a tractor with mine sweeping equipment in its rear.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the water pipeline near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw no cross-border traffic. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM observed a train consisting of two locomotives and 40 cargo wagons heading west.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), claiming ongoing demining in the area. The SMM observed a car proceeding through the checkpoint towards Pikuzy.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), near the border with the Russian Federation, three members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city and accessing Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), citing orders from their superiors. The SMM observed nine cars proceeding through the checkpoint.
• A member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from accessing certain areas within a compound in Luhansk city where the SMM observed armoured combat vehicles.
• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations again  told the SMM to leave the area.
• At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, two members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from entering the railway station and told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While it was flying a mini-UAV in the southern outskirts of Zhovte, the SMM heard 40 shots of small-arms fire 2.4km north-north-west of its position, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV. The SMM was able to land the UAV safely and departed the area.
• A member of the armed formations prohibited the SMM from taking cameras and telephones into a compound in Luhansk city where the SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (see above) and insisted on accompanying the SMM at all times while it was within the compound.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The role of new technologies in the electoral process was the focus of an international conference organized by the Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan with support from the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, in Kazakhstan’s capital on 1 and 2 November 2018. The conference was held on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Commission.

The event brought together some 120 experts and representatives of the Central Election Commission, the parliament, state agencies, political parties, NGOs, diplomatic missions and international organizations, as well as central election bodies from 15 countries.

The conference provided a platform to discuss the use of modern technologies during elections, building public trust in political processes and improvements to the administration of elections. International experts and the members of central election bodies from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, India, Jordan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Turkey shared experiences and best practices in the administration of elections in their countries.

Berik Imashev, Chairperson of the Central Election Commission, noted possible challenges and risks associated with the use of digital technologies in the election process and said that the international community should develop norms and standards in order to protect national elections from manipulation in cyberspace. He stressed the OSCE’s special role in this regard.

György Szabó, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, said: “Today new technologies are used in nearly all stages of the electoral process. In order to build public trust in new technologies used during elections, it is important that the principles of universality, equality, transparency, vote secrecy, accountability and fairness of elections are guaranteed and applied regardless of the type of deployed modern technologies.”

The event is part of the Programme Office’s continuous efforts to enhance the transparency and accountability of electoral processes and strengthen democratic institutions in compliance with OSCE principles and commitments.

YEREVAN / BAKU, November 2, 2018 - The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stéphane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America), together with the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk, visited the region from 29 October to 2 November. 

The main purpose of the visit was to discuss the results of the conversation between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the margins of the CIS summit in Dushanbe in September, outline next steps in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, and review the overall evolution of the situation on the ground.

The Co-Chairs met with Acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Yerevan on 29 October and with President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on 1 November.  In both capitals, they held consultations with the respective foreign ministers and defense ministers.  On October 30-31, Co-Chairs met with the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh and visited the districts of Kelbajar and Agdam.  On October 31, they participated in an OSCE ceasefire monitoring mission along the Line of Contact near Agdam.  In Baku, the Co-Chairs met with representatives of Azerbaijani communities affected by the conflict.  While in the region, the Co-Chairs discussed the situation with representatives from the ICRC and UNHCR.

In their meetings with the Co-Chairs, the leaders in both capitals confirmed that the level of violence has fallen significantly since they reaffirmed in Dushanbe their commitment to reduce tensions.  In their consultations, the Co-Chairs received additional details about the implementation of the Dushanbe understanding, including with regard to the establishment of direct communication links.  The Co-Chairs welcomed these developments, commended the sides for implementing constructive measures in good faith, and expressed support for the leaders’ readiness to continue their dialogue.

The Co-Chairs stressed the importance of sustaining a climate of trust for intensive negotiations on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

The Foreign Ministers agreed to meet again before the end of the year. 

The Co-Chairs will soon travel to Vienna to brief the OSCE Permanent Council and the members of the Minsk Group.

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Marina Živaljević

A second meeting of the Regional Youth Co-operation Office (RYCO) Advisory Board, supported by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro in an effort to strengthen the Board’s role and visibility, was held on 31 October 2018 in Podgorica.

Some 20 members of the Advisory Board discussed the body’s rules and regulations, terms of reference and procedures. They assessed the work already done and discussed improvements of the forthcoming RYCO call for project proposals.  RYCO Advisory Board has a structure with a unique diversity of skills being that its members come from different backgrounds and professions which resulted in the proposal to establish specific working groups that would reflect RYCO’s key aspects, such as working group in action, advocacy, in mobilizing resources, working group in Youth in RYCO structures.

The Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, congratulated the Board for the outstanding results delivered so far and assured it of the Mission’s continuous and stable future support to RYCO and its structure.

The Mission to Montenegro assists the RYCO Montenegro Office in many aspects, including capacity building, outreach and visibility. The Mission has had a sound partnership with the RYCO branch since its establishment.

RYCO was founded in July 2016 as an independent institutional mechanism to promote a spirit of reconciliation and co-operation among youth through youth exchange programmes.

401903 Communication and Media Relations Section

More than 150 experts and law enforcement officials from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation took part in the OSCE’s Second OSCE-wide Seminar on Passenger Data Exchange organized by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s Border Security and Management Unit on 1 and 2 November 2018 in Vienna.

The seminar aimed at helping participants better understand their international obligations related to border management included in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396, to identify their technical assistance needs and determine how the OSCE can support states in implementing their obligations.

Resolution 2396, which was adopted in 2016 amid an increased risk of returning foreign terrorist fighters following the loss of territory by terrorist groups in conflict zones, mandates states to strengthen border security by establishing passenger data exchange systems and developing systems to collect biometric data, and by sharing this information bilaterally and multilaterally.

“Implementing Resolution 2396 will be a challenge for us all,” said Rasa Ostrauskaite, Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats. “However, we cannot stand still and hope that the threats around us disappear. We must meet the challenge, co-operate more effectively and fully utilize all available tools to deal with the threat posed by terrorists and their networks.”

Experts from OSCE participating States and commercial service providers delivered presentations on the Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems, and also highlighted the financial and technical support available from donor states and international organizations in implementing these systems.

The Biometrics Institute and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism discussed their work in supporting states in collecting and processing biometric information, while representatives of INTERPOL, the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA), and the United States highlighted how the effective use of regional and international databases can enhance information sharing between states.

The seminar also functioned as the Sixth Thematic Meeting of the OSCE Border Security and Management National Focal Point Network. The Network, which is comprised of 103 contact points from 53 OSCE participating States, was established in 2006 to facilitate the exchange of information and best practices between national borders services.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Thomas Rymer

Sixteen OSCE participating States invoked the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism on 1 November 2018 to look into alleged human rights violations in the Chechen Republic, Russian Federation.

The Moscow Mechanism, last invoked in 2011 in relation to Belarus, provides the opportunity for participating States to send missions of experts to assist in the resolution of a particular question or problem relating to the human dimension. For further information, please see: https://www.osce.org/odihr/human-dimension-mechanisms

Any information relevant to the work of the Moscow Mechanism can be sent to the following email address: moscowmechanism2018@odihr.pl. The information will then be forwarded to the expert mission, once established.

The sixteen countries who have invoked the Moscow Mechanism in this case are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

SKOPJE, 2 November 2018 – The OSCE Mission to Skopje marked the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists in Skopje today by launching a guidebook on safety of journalists while covering critical events.

The guidebook aims to bridge the communications gap between journalists and the authorities and includes recommendations for increasing the safety of journalists.

The event is co-organized with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Association of Journalists, whose president, Naser Selmani, stated that “Impunity for violence against journalists incites self-censorship of media.”

Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje Clemens Koja said that all too often in the OSCE region, journalists face retribution for simply doing their jobs, while crimes against them go unpunished: “Impunity is poisonous and unacceptable - it leads to self-censorship, limiting the space for free media and ideas and opinions to be shared widely.”

“As a Mission but also as the OSCE as a whole, we will continue to call upon state authorities to uphold their international obligations and OSCE commitments to protect journalists and media workers, and to promptly, thoroughly, impartially and effectively investigate alleged crimes against them and bring the perpetrators to justice,” said Koja.

The Minister of Internal Affairs, Oliver Spasovski, said: “The evident commitment of the Interior Ministry since June 2017 to clear the cases of attacks on journalists must be emphasized. During this period all registered physical attacks on journalists were cleared. Precisely, clearing of the cases is a basic prerequisite for dealing with this phenomenon.”

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401816 Communication and Media Relations Section

A one-week training course for 15 Serbian border guards to enhance their skills in detecting forged and fraudulent documents as well as imposters was held from 29 October to 2 November 2018 in Belgrade. The course was organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department.

The course examined the latest trends in counterfeiting and the methodologies of identifying forgeries. Practical exercises focused on differences between original, forged and false documents, and the effective use of equipment such as magnifying lenses to identify forged document.

The OSCE also donated equipment, including professional magnifying lenses, which could be used for passport control exercises during training activities.

Danilo Stevanovic, Assistant Head of the Border Police Directorate within Serbia’s Interior Ministry, opened the course by thanking the OSCE for organizing the course and the donation of equipment. The course was conducted by two experts from the Directorate using training materials approved by the OSCE and the European Union’s border agency FRONTEX.

Alessandro Nanni, Border Adviser at the OSCE Border Security and Management Unit, said:  “The OSCE welcomes the opportunity to provide the necessary skills to the Serbian border guards, in the current global context characterized by transnational threats. The guards need to know the new methods adopted by criminals to forge and counterfeit documents; the criminals are continuously evolving their operations to skip border controls.” 

Umberto Severini, Senior Organized Crime Adviser within the OSCE Mission to Serbia, said: “The training course complements the work of the OSCE Mission to Serbia in supporting the local authorities in combating transnational threats, and supporting the border guards in updating their detection methods.”

The course follows a series of several courses on the detection of forged travel documents organized by the OSCE Border Security and Management Unit since 2015 in different countries, especially in South-Eastern Europe.

VIENNA/ROME, 2 November 2018 – At the invitation of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Italian Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero Milanesi, the 25th Ministerial Council of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) will take place on 6 and 7 December 2018 in Milan, Italy.

The Ministerial Council is the central decision-making and governing body of the OSCE. The annual meeting provides the Foreign Ministers of the 57 OSCE participating States an important opportunity to review and assess the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area as well as the organization's action in all its fields of activity.

Journalists are invited to cover the event, which will be held at the Milano Convention Center (MiCo), Via Gattamelata, 20149 Milan.

Advance accreditation of media representatives is mandatory. Accreditation takes place on a self-registration basis via https://osce-2018.org/mi/mediahome.aspx. The deadline for media registration is Tuesday 4 December 2018.

Please note that journalists already accredited for regular OSCE coverage need a separate accreditation for the Ministerial Council.

Detailed information about media facilities, instructions for accreditation, booking of hotels and the visa application procedure is available at https://osce-2018.org/mi/mediahome.aspx.

Media representatives shall make their own travel and accommodation arrangements. If desired, accommodations can be found through the dedicated email osce@bcdme.it handled by a private agency.

Visa requirements must be met before arrival in Italy. Accredited journalists are invited to make their own visa arrangements as soon as possible.

The official website of Milano Congressi: https://www.micomilano.it/Home_it.html.

Follow the Hashtag #OSCEMC18 for further information.

Contacts

OSCE Communication and Media Relations Section

OSCE Secretariat

Office: + 43 1 514 36 6756 (From 8:30-17:30 Vienna time, weekdays)

Mobile: + 43 676 71 74 592 (For urgent and out of office hours requests) press@osce.org

Press Accreditation Office

Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation - Rome

Office: +39 0636913432/8573

stampa-oscemilano18@esteri.it

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