OSCE

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Business ethics and compliance mechanisms in the healthcare sector were the topics of a two-day training seminar for healthcare regulators and professionals organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan (PCUz) on 19 and 20 November 2018 in Tashkent, in support of the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The first day of the seminar brought together nearly 60 participants from government agencies (of whom nearly 20 were female representatives), while around 50 attended the second round of training aimed at healthcare professionals, 15 of whom were female participants. Both training seminars were conducted by Jaroslave Strecelnoks, a Latvian expert who previously held the position of  Chief of the Latvian Corruption Prevention Bureau (KNAB) and who familiarized the participants with the concept of business ethics and the specific corruption risks prevalent in the healthcare sector. In this context, special attention was given to conflicts of interest and the culture of gift giving. Other topics included international standards in anti-corruption legislation, including standardized benchmarks and compliance mechanisms. 

In interactive sessions of the seminar, the participants were encouraged to share their own experience with corruption in their professional lives and were presented with  case studies.

The training seminar was held within the framework of a two-week anti-corruption programme organized by the General Prosecutor’s Office, in co-operation with the PCUz and other international organizations.

The PCUz has been active in the field of anti-corruption since 2012, currently working under the project Support Uzbekistan in Implementing and Promoting Business Integrity Standards.

403559 Marina Živaljević

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro, in partnership with the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights and the Department for Gender Equality, delivered three two-day workshops during October and November 2018 to gender equality focal points from 12 Montenegrin municipalities on how to train their colleagues on understanding gender equality and gender mainstreaming.

The workshops, held in Podgorica on 24-26 October, 1-2 November and 13-14 November 2018, provided participants with an opportunity to learn how to plan and deliver training courses and organize awareness-raising events within their respective municipalities. Through an interactive approach, the experts strengthened the participants’ knowledge of gender mainstreaming, explained the legal framework in relation to gender equality, and presented training techniques and skills.

Towards the end of the workshop, each participant delivered a presentation after which they received comprehensive feedback from the experts.

The workshop is part of the OSCE Mission’s ongoing support to the work of the designated municipal gender equality focal points.

Edita Buçaj SDGs SDGs:  4 - Quality education

On 19 November 2018 the OSCE Mission in Kosovo completed the installation of indoor and outdoor surveillance cameras in the primary school Ali Hasi in the village Cërmjan/Crmljane, located in the municipality of Gjakovë/Djakovica, with the aim of reducing violence in schools. This brings the total number of schools equipped with cameras by the OSCE Mission to 15.

The project is part of the Missions efforts to support community safety initiatives by Local Public Safety Committees (LPSCs). Members of LPSCs have identified violence in schools as a persistent problem.

“Through these activities, we are working to continuously promote the community policing concept and support the LPSCs in implementing safety projects throughout Kosovo. The project reflects the concerns of parents and community leaders. We hope that the cameras will contribute to a safer educational environment for pupils and teachers,” said Jan Braathu, Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.

The OSCE Mission plans to continue with the installation of surveillance cameras in other schools in Kosovo in 2019.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo is mandated with the protection and promotion of human and community rights, as well as with democratization and public safety sector development. It supports the community safety forums in contributing to safety, security and quality of life in local communities and all police regions, through capacity building and donation of relevant equipment.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The OSCE Programme Office in Astana supported a roundtable discussion on steps Kazakhstan could take to regulate the release and marketing of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) - any organism or microorganism, including agricultural products, whose genetic material has been altered by means of genetic engineering - on 20 November 2018 in Astana.

Experts from Kazakhstan and Ukraine presented their analysis of Kazakhstan’s current legislation to see what changes would be necessary if the country ratified the Aarhus Convention Amendment on “Public Participation in Decisions on Deliberate Release into the Environment and Placing on the Market of Genetically Modified Organisms" known as the “GMO Amendment”.

The GMO Amendment stipulates requirements for public participation in decisions concerning the deliberate release of GMOs. It aims to address public concerns related to health, loss of biodiversity and citizens' environmental rights. It provides a clear regulatory framework to ensure the effective engagement of the public in decision-making on GMOs. This includes early access to information and effective mechanisms to give individuals an adequate opportunity to provide feedback on the decision before it is taken.

Ratification by Kazakhstan’s parliament would require further changes to the country’s legislation to ensure compliance with the GMO Amendment.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the Energy Ministry and brought together some 20 participants from government entities, research institutes and the expert community. It was part of the Programme Office’s multi-year activities to promote good environmental governance and to assist the host country in meeting its commitments under the Aarhus Convention.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

A training seminar dedicated to the monitoring of media coverage during elections concluded in Astana on 20 November 2018.  The event was organized by the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan (CEC) in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). 

Some 50 CEC members and state officials, who may also serve as election observers for OSCE/ODIHR and other international observation missions, learned about the role of media monitoring during elections, the ODIHR mandate and OSCE commitments, as well as practical aspects of media monitoring in international observation missions.  

Konstantin Petrov, Deputy Chairman of the Central Election Commission, emphasized the importance of the freedom of expression as enshrined in OSCE and other international documents. He noted that the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas should be exercised without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. “Any restrictions on such rights must always be clearly set forth in law and comply with international standards”. 

“Freedom of speech and freedom of the media play an important role in any democratic process and the assessment of media coverage during election campaigns is a fundamental part of the election observation,” noted Diana Digol, Deputy Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana. “During any election, media is an invaluable channel for information exchange between the candidates and the public.”

“OSCE participating States have mandated ODIHR to conduct comprehensive observation of all aspects of the election process,” said Radivoje Grujic, ODIHR Election Adviser, addressing seminar participants. “Any observation effort should pay significant attention to the activities of media and their coverage of elections”.

The event was part of the Office’s continuous efforts to enhance the transparency and accountability of electoral process and strengthen democratic institutions in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments.

403361 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Youth involvement in promotion of gender equality, lessons learnt and experience in supporting the advancement of women and girls in their communities and among families, friends and peers were the focus of a roundtable discussion conducted by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe on 14 November 2018 in Dushanbe.

The event marked the first anniversary of the Tajik gender champions’ network established by the Office. It brought together 45 participants, including 30 women and 15 men representing youth wings of different national political parties and civil society organizations of the Dushanbe, Khatlon and Sughd regions. The network addresses the underrepresentation of women in leadership positions and decision-making processes, education for girls and other relevant matters by raising awareness through peer-to-peer approach, debate clubs and mobile theaters. Within a year of the establishment of the network, the gender champions were able to recruit 15 new members, including ten boys and five girls.

The EU Ambassador to Tajikistan, H.E. Marilyn Josefson, said: "It is impressive to see how much this network of creative and dynamic young gender champions have been able to achieve in one year. Gender equality is a crucial matter to all of us, men and women, boys and girls, old and young, as well as in all parts of the country. It is therefore very encouraging to see how the OSCE, through this network, has been able to mobilize enthusiastic gender champions in all strands and parts of the Tajik society. I'm looking forward to following and supporting their progress towards their next anniversary."

Vesna Ivanovikj-Castarede, the Gender and Anti-Trafficking Officer of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, explained: “These young people were selected at our mobile community training courses. They were handpicked to be further motivated, inspired and supported as gender advocates in order to tackle gender stereotypes in their communities.” She added that in the upcoming months, they will work on different assignments, such as leadership for women, entrepreneurial possibilities for young rural women and domestic violence issues. “We are proud to see their devotion and commitment and the OSCE will further continue working closely with these young people,” Ivanovikj-Castarede said.

This report is for the media and the general public.

• Between the evenings of 16 and 17 November, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period.
• Between the evenings of 17 and 18 November, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both regions, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM saw recent damage caused by shelling to civilian properties in Zolote-5 and Kruta Balka.
• The SMM observed heavy weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a gathering in relation to attacks against civil activists, including Kateryna Handziuk. It also monitored a pre-announced gathering in support of transgender rights and saw two female participants being treated for pepper spray irritation.
• The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Bezimenne, Novolaspa and Dovzhanske, an area close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 16 and 17 November, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations was recorded in areas south and south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and south-east and south of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 17 and 18 November, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of the ceasefire violations was recorded in areas south of the DFS, south-east of Svitlodarsk and south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 16 and 17 November, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (ten explosions). Between the evenings of 17 and 18 November, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and north-west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Damage caused by shelling in residential areas

At 15/1 Dundycha Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), on 16 November, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel embedded in the west-facing side of a two-storey apartment building and a broken window on the same side. The Mission assessed the damage to have been caused by a round of an undetermined weapon fired from a north-westerly direction. A neighbour told the SMM that shelling had occurred near the building at 18:00 on 14 November.

In Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), on 18 November, the SMM saw two fresh impacts (scorch marks) on the north-facing side of a single-storey house and a broken window on the same side, assessed as caused by round(s) of an undetermined weapon. The Mission was unable to assess the direction of fire. A resident of the house told the SMM that at around 14:00 on 17 November, while at home, he had heard explosions and seen the abovementioned damage.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 17 November, positioned near the entry-exit checkpoint inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1km east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. The following day, the SMM observed a calm situation.

During the day on 17 November, positioned about 5km north-north-west of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions assessed as artillery rounds and 18 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 5-10km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same day, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight from south-south-east to north-north-west at an assessed range of 3-5km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the early evening of 18 November, the same camera recorded six projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east at an assessed range of 2-5km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 18 November, the SMM observed a calm situation in the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.  

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas:

17 November:

• 21 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 8 November 2018)
• Four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk)

Weapons storage sites beyond withdrawal lines

Heavy weapons permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region:

17 November:

• 13 MLRS (BM-21), 17 towed howitzers (16 D-30 and one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing
• New weapons observed present for the first time

Permanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region:

18 November:

• Five tanks (four T-64 and one T-72) remained missing
• A new weapon observed present for the first time

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas:

17 November:

• One armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk)
• One infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) in the yard of a house in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk)

Non-government-controlled areas:

16 November:

• Mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three 10m-long trenches (not visible in imagery from 9 July 2018), each in the yard of houses in the Marivka neighbourhood of Zolote-5

17 November:

• Five APCs (four MT-LB and one BTR-80) in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk)
• Tracks assessed as those of a tank (T-72) leading to an area near the contact line, north-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk)

Civilian infrastructure

On 17 and 18 November, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints

On 16 November, the SMM saw two shelters (one under construction), a tent for heating and seven sanitary facilities at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol). A woman (in her sixties) told the SMM that she had been waiting to cross for one hour, expressing concern over the lack of covering which protects pedestrians from weather.

On 17 November, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw about 400 people waiting for a bus to non-government-controlled Luhansk city. The Mission also saw an ambulance arrive at the site. A paramedic from the ambulance told the SMM that a man (aged 75) had required cardiac treatment and had been taken to a hospital in Luhansk city.

Border area not under government control

On 18 November, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for half an hour, the SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation, and one with Belarusian licence plates) and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine and two buses (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

Gatherings in Kyiv

On 17 November, the SMM monitored a gathering in relation to investigations into attacks against civil activists, including Kateryna Handziuk (see SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018). The Mission saw about 130 protesters (mostly men, aged 17-45) gathered at 2 Volodymyrskyi Descent. It heard some of them complain about the reaction of law enforcement agencies. Later, the SMM saw a convoy of vehicles carrying half of the protesters drive to Minsk Avenue, where two police officers were present. Some of the protesters were carrying signs with messages, including “Who ordered the murder of Katya?” The Mission saw some of them spray-paint similar messages on the exterior wall of the residence of a government official and light flares. The SMM did not observe further incidents.

On 18 November, the SMM monitored the “Trans-March 2018” organized by the LGBTIQ community in support of transgender rights. The Mission saw around 50 people (20-40 years old) gathered on Shevchenko Boulevard. Some of them were holding rainbow and transgender flags. The SMM also saw about 40 young men gathered nearby – later joined by an additional 60 people (mostly men), some of them holding Katekhon and Tradition and Order flags – and heard some of them chanting messages critical of the LGBTIQ community. About 40 police officers in riot gear were separating the two groups. The Mission later saw paramedics of a non-governmental organization treating two female participants for pepper spray irritation. The SMM did not observe further incidents during its presence.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 17 November, at a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west toward road E58, citing “orders from superiors”.
• On 18 November, at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “security issues”. 
• On 18 November, at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The SMM continued be restricted in its access to the three disengagement areas, as well as in the ability to travel on certain roads identified by the Mission as important for effective monitoring due to the presence of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• During the night of 17-18 November, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference[5]near government-controlled areas of Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk), Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk), Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk) and Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and near non-government-controlled areas of Alchevsk (40km west of Luhansk), Rozkishne (9km south of Luhansk), Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk), Vesela Tarasivka (17km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Hranitne and near Shyrokyne were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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ASTANA, 19 November 2018 – OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) commended today Kazakhstan’s strong support of the OSCE and its active participation in the Parliamentary Assembly as a sign of the country’s commitment to the success of the Organization. 

“Since chairing our Organization and hosting the last OSCE summit in 2010, Kazakhstan has continued to demonstrate its unconditional commitment to our work through continuous engagement in our activities,” said Tsereteli. “Following our recent Autumn Meeting in Bishkek, this visit is another important step to underscore Astana’s efforts to promote regional and international co-operation including through the OSCE, and to further underline our strong commitment to security in Central Asia.” 

The OSCE PA President was accompanied in meetings in Astana by his newly appointed Special Representative on Central Asia, Austrian parliamentarian Roman Haider, Deputy Secretary General Semyon Dzakhaev and the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, Ambassador Gyorgy Szabo. 

On 19 November, they met with the Chairman of the Senate and Head of Kazakhstan’s Delegation to the OSCE PA, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the Chairman of the Mazhilis, Nurlan Nigmatulin, and Foreign Minister Kairat Abdrakhmanov to discuss a wide range of issues including strengthening parliamentarism, nuclear non-proliferation, economic reforms and enhancing social welfare of citizens, promoting the rule of law through police and judiciary reform, as well as regional co-operation and the role of the OSCE in promoting regional security and addressing transnational threats such as terrorism. 

“This past year has shown that we can find inspiration in the diplomatic breakthroughs that have taken place in Central Asia, and I look forward to the continued active engagement of Kazakhstani parliamentarians to address the region’s challenges in our discussions and debates,” said Haider. “I believe it is important that we continue to work together towards the fulfillment of every country’s OSCE commitments, whilst also learning more about the successes and challenges faced by individual participating States.” 

The OSCE PA delegation also met with Ambassador Gyorgy Szabo and the staff of the Programme Office in Astana. Representatives of civil society engaged in OSCE-supported reforms aimed at modernizing the police and enhancing citizens’ trust in the judiciary system also stressed the importance of engaging civil society in the reform process to help ensure the sustainability of reforms. 

The OSCE PA delegation is scheduled to meet on 20 November with the Chairman of the Supreme Court, Zhakyp Assanov, as well as officials at the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to further discuss the status of police and justice reform. President Tsereteli and Special Representative Haider’s visit to Central Asia continues on 21 November in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, where they will meet with senior officials. The President will also attend the Asian Forum on Human Rights in Samarkand on 22-23 November, together with the Chair of the OSCE PA General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions Margareta Kiener Nellen.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Modernizing the system to select judges and activities of the High Judicial Council in Kazakhstan were the topic of an OSCE-supported international roundtable discussion held in Astana on 16 November 2018.

The event gathered some 100 high-level government officials, parliamentarians, representatives of the judiciary, non-governmental organizations, and local and international legal experts.

Participants discussed issues related to the objectivity and transparency of the selection process and the role of the legal community and civil society in the composition of bodies deciding on judicial selection. Representatives of the High Judicial Council presented key novelties in the procedure of competitive selection of judges and related qualification criteria.

Talgat Donakov, the Chairperson of the High Judicial Council, said: “The establishment of an independent and fair judiciary is one of the priorities of state policy. Today’s event is aimed at presenting the results of implemented measures to improve the system of selection of judges for public consideration.”

”Transparency is a key element for recruiting the best candidates for judicial posts and minimizing potential political influence in judicial decision-making. How these processes are undertaken is also essential for gaining public trust,” said György Szabó, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana.

Experts from Italy and Spain shared experiences on the selection of judges in other countries and representatives of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights focused on standards and practices in the selection and appointment process of judges in the OSCE region.

The event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the High Judicial Council, and the Supreme Court, with support from the Foundation of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – Elbasy. It was part of the Programme Office’s long-term efforts to support criminal justice reform in Kazakhstan.

403229 Kunduz Rysbek

The Second International Conference on Islam in a Contemporary Secular State took place in Bishkek on 15 and 16 November 2018. The Conference was opened by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Sooronbai Jeenbekov and brought together representatives of government agencies, academics and independent experts working on religious issues from 20 countries across Asia and the Middle East, as well as representatives of embassies and international organizations based in Bishkek. 

The event was organized by the State Commission for Religious Affairs and supported by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the United Nations in Kyrgyzstan.

Building on the Bishkek Declaration adopted in 2017, the Second International Conference focused on ways to integrate Islamic traditions into a modern and secular state and approaches to harmonizing relations in Muslim communities. The participants developed recommendations for improving the effectiveness of democratic governance in the religious sphere, and brainstormed about new ways to prevent radicalization and the spread of extremist ideas.

Praising Kyrgyzstan’s multinational and multi-confessional space, President Jeenbekov said: “Kyrgyzstan has declared complete freedom of religion and confessions and religious organizations have been given the opportunity to develop freely. Modern Kyrgyzstan is a state in which religion is separated from the state.” The President expressed his disapproval of the misuse of Islam by certain groups who try to impose their traditions and culture on the Kyrgyz people.

Referring to Kyrgyzstan’s strategic approach to the issue, Pierre von Arx, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek said: “Just this month, the National Strategy for Sustainable Development 2040 was adopted. The document is comprehensive and it includes an entire chapter on religion in a democratic state, underlining the guarantee of civil rights including freedom of religion and belief by the Kyrgyz Republic.”

Von Arx added that the Office is also supporting the educational pilot project Basic History of Religious Culture, which introduces the history of world religions to secondary school students. The government made educating students about world religions mandatory for all schools in 2019.

403367 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

A group of Ukrainian civil society representatives improved their human rights monitoring skills, as well as their capacity to take measures to increase their own safety and security during a training course organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, from 12 to 17 November 2018.

The participants were ten women and seven men who work on various issues in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, including the human rights of Roma, women, LGBT persons, journalists, internally displaced persons and youth. They gained skills in applying a human rights-based approach in their monitoring work, improving professional conduct during field visits and verifying online evidence of human rights violations. They also learned techniques for improving their mental well-being during monitoring activities and how to use encrypted communication channels and secure their digital storage equipment.

“In addition to training the participants on how to conduct gender-sensitive human rights monitoring in a safe and secure manner, we built their capacity to develop and implement evidence-based advocacy activities and use effective communications methods and techniques to address human rights violations,” said Marc van Gool, Human Rights Adviser at ODIHR.  

Participant Olha Poliakova from Dnipro said: “This training was very useful. The new information I received and the tools we explored will be useful in my daily work, and also in future activities to monitor the position of women in police forces in the Dnipro region.”

Three women representatives of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) also took part in the training.

The training was organized as part of ODIHR’s project on strengthening dialogue among civil society and with key governmental stakeholders in Ukraine to address important human rights issues in the country. During the project, ODIHR has trained over 150 human rights defenders from Ukraine, as well as 20 representatives from Ukrainian state institutions, through capacity-building workshops on human rights monitoring, and has supported  a number of human rights monitoring and dialogue projects carried out by human rights defenders in Ukraine.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The sixth meeting of the Working Group on environmental protection under the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Chu-Talas Water Commission took place on 16 November 2018 in Bishkek. The meeting was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek in close co-operation with the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Chu-Talas Water Commission.

Some 20 water specialists from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan discussed the results of laboratory water quality assessments conducted in the transboundary Chu-Talas river basin by both countries with the support of the OSCE field operations in Astana and Bishkek. The participants shared opinions on how to harmonize approaches to assessing water quality and discussed opportunities for future collaboration.

In April, June and October, the Office supported the research of Kazakhstan’s Hydro-Meteorological Centre’s territorial unit which analysed water samples at the Chu-Talas river basin in the Zhambyl region, covering16 different sites and conducting 17 different tests to identify possible contaminants. Based on the laboratory results, a national expert will produce a final report on water quality in the basin, which will be shared as part of a data exchange initiative between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

The Chu-Talas Water Commission promotes bilateral co-operation between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and aims to improve access to information by involving stakeholders in the process of river management and promoting activities for the protection of water ecosystems.

The event is part of the both Offices’ multi-year efforts to raise awareness and build capacity of state institutions in the area of water governance and to contribute to the transboundary dialogue on managing water resources.

Marina Živaljević

With the aim to strengthen Parliament’s administrative capacities, in particular in the area of research, documentation and outreach, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized a working visit to the Italian Senate for six officials of the Parliament of Montenegro on 12-13 November 2018.

The heads of the departments of budget service, research, protocol as well as reports and official communications services presented their experience in the Senate and engaged in productive discussions with the Montenegrin delegation on these important matters for the work of the institution.

During the visit, the Secretary General of the Italian Senate Elisabetta Serafin and the Secretary General of the Montenegrin Parliament Aleksandar Jovićević, shared their experience and underlined the importance of exchanges to further improve their work and bilateral cooperation.

“It was interesting to learn that we share some of the same practices regarding protocol, publications and youth initiatives, but also to hear new and different approaches in dealing with these matters, said Jovićević. He added that they also greatly appreciated information received on budgetary matters and parliamentary research, which was an important segment in supporting the legislative and oversight function of any parliament.

To better understand the importance of the documentation and research processes, as well as of the public outreach, the delegation was informed about on-line publications and had the opportunity to visit the Senate Library, which boasts a collection of more than 600,000 volumes, including ancient ones.

As part of the visit, the delegation was greeted by Ms Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati,  President of the Italian Senate, at the opening of the 57th seating of the Senate on 13 November 2018.

Communication and Media Relations Section

A two-day seminar on delimitation and demarcation practices in the OSCE area concluded on 16 November 2018 in Athens. The event was jointly organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece.

Some thirty eight officials and experts from sixteen participating States took part in this interactive seminar. Specific bilateral experiences in co-operation related to delimitation and demarcation practices from across the OSCE area were presented to the participants. . They also discussed past and on-going border demarcation and delimitation processes and exchanged lessons learned and good practices in this field. In addition, they engaged in a practical exercise, based on a fictional scenario on boundary delimitation, demarcation and management by identifying ways to manage poorly demarcated borders .  

The seminar marked the launch of the English version of the Guidebook on Delimitation and Demarcation Practices in the OSCE Area, developed by the Border Security and Management Unit with the support of national experts Zenonas Kumetaitis of Lithuania and Alexander Arkhipov of Belarus. The Russian version of the Guidebook was launched in 2017 in Minsk, Belarus.

“This seminar, which launched the English guidebook on border delimitation and demarcation practices, is the culmination of sustained and successful collaboration across the OSCE area. The participants’ enthusiastic embrace of this guidebook inspires us to continue our work in this important area,” said Dennis Cosgrove, Head of the Border Security and Management Unit.

Challenges regarding delimitation and demarcation remain high on the agenda of the OSCE, as it was reiterated by the participating States in a number of fora in 2018. This event is the eighth seminar on this topic and builds on the success and recommendations of the previous events.

Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Mihajlo Lahtov, OSCE Mission to Skopje

Representatives of the municipal administration, local institutions, civil society, education sector, youth, women as well as religious and local community leaders gathered at an OSCE roundtable in Tetovo on 19 November 2018 to discuss the  implementation of the National Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Strategy and Action Plan at the local level.

The activity, organized by the OSCE Mission to Skopje in co-operation with the National Co-ordinator for Countering Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism, is a first in a series of ten roundtable discussion, planned to be held throughout the country.

“The OSCE recognizes the need to place local stakeholders at the forefront of prevention efforts, as part of a whole-of-society approach,” said the Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, Jeffrey Goldstein.

Goldstein said that supporting the development of resilient and socially cohesive communities can be the best defense against violent extremism taking root. “While working together, communities can counter the corrosive appeal of violent extremism by promoting tolerance, mutual respect, pluralism, inclusion, and cohesion. These are the core values and principles of the OSCE: only through dialogue can we bridge our differences,” he said.

The OSCE Mission previously assisted the government with public consultations for the drafting of the National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism and the Action Plan in March 2018.

Apart from Tetovo, similar discussions will take place in the following municipalities, Skopje, Cair, Gostivar, Veles, Strumica, Kumanovo, Struga, Kichevo, Prilep and Shtip.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed a recent impact on a road in a residential area of Debaltseve. The SMM observed military-type presence and anti-tank mines in the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as at a military compound near Starohnativka and near Leonove, close to the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to houses and essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line in the Vilnyi neighbourhood of Zolote-4/Rodina. In Odessa, the SMM monitored a protest against illegal construction.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 110), compared with the previous reporting period (about 285 explosions).

On the evening of 15 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 54 undetermined explosions and about 430 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-6km south-east and south-south-east. The following day, while in the same location, the SMM heard about 20 undetermined explosions, all at an assessed range of 2-5km south-south-east.

During the day on 16 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-6km east, south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 15-16 November, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded two explosions assessed as impacts of undetermined weapon(s) rounds and about 110 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south), all at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 15-16 November, the SMM camera located 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion and about 85 projectiles in flight (mostly from south to north and from north to south), all at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however fewer explosions (ten), compared with the previous reporting period (18 explosions).

On the morning of 16 November, positioned about 1.5km north-north-west of Kalynove- Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 4-5km north-east.

The SMM observed a recent impact on a road in a residential area of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). At 21 Lenina Street, on 16 November, the SMM saw a crater in the middle of an asphalt road, about 8m from the closest residential building, assessed as caused either by the impact of a projectile or by the explosion of a grenade. A woman (aged 40-50), who said she was a resident of the neighbourhood, told the SMM that she had heard an explosion on the evening of 15 November.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 15 November, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted in excess of 300 anti-tank mines (TM-62) placed in three rows running over about 500m from east to west about 60m west of road T1316, about 500m north-north-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area. The same SMM mini-UAV also spotted in excess of 300 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in six rows from a trench of the armed formations running west to east over about 500m, about 700m north-east of the above-mentioned checkpoint. About 200 of these anti-tank mines were seen for the first time (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 April 2018). The same SMM mini-UAV spotted a new trench about 150m in length (not visible in imagery from 15 October 2018) with two people inside assessed as members of the armed formations about 1km north-north-west of the above-mentioned checkpoint, as well as a camouflaged-style jeep about 30m north-west of the same checkpoint, all inside the disengagement area.

On 16 November, positioned on the south-western outskirts of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire, 3-4km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.[3]

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 16 November, the SMM saw a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 16 November, the SMM saw four MLRS (BM-21) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 14 November, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 18 tanks (type undetermined) and three surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and 11 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (see also SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018). Aerial imagery available to the SMM also revealed the presence on 14 November of 29 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018), and 22 tanks, nine pieces of self-propelled artillery, 18 pieces of towed artillery in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (see also SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018).

The same aerial imagery available to the SMM also revealed the presence of 76 armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Buhaivka, 23 ACVs (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Shymshynivka and 79 ACVs (type undetermined) in the above-mentioned training area near Myrne.[4]

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM visited two such sites and saw eight towed howitzers (six 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and two D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm).

The SMM revisited two permanent storage sites, including one site which continued to be abandoned, whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal line in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and noted that, in total, 18 tanks (ten T-64 and eight T-72) were missing.

In a non-government-controlled area, on 14 November, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 27 pieces of towed artillery in the above-mentioned training area near Buhaivka (see also SMM Daily Report 16 November 2018).

The SMM observed ACVs[5] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 15 November, the SMM saw two armoured personal carriers (APC) (a BTR-70 and a BTR-80) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). On 16 November, the SMM saw an APC (BTR variant) near a residential house in Malynove (19km north-east of Luhansk), an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk), an APC (BTR-70) near Mariupol, an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Pionerske (14km east of Mariupol), as well as seven infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BREM-Ch) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 16 November, the SMM saw an ACV (type undetermined) near Petrivske (outside the disengagement area).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), water pipelines between Zolote and Popasna and near Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM continued to observe civilians facing hardships at checkpoints. On 15 November, at a checkpoint on highway H-15 near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw that the road was blocked due to the high number of civilian vehicles and pedestrians queuing. A man (aged 50-60) told the SMM that the passengers of approximately 50 cars had spent the night (14-15 November) in their vehicles after waiting all day the previous day to pass through and not being able to do so before the end of the day.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living along the contact line. In the Vilnyi neighbourhood of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), a resident (woman, aged 60-70) told the SMM that the neighbourhood has been without electricity for almost a month. Other residents in previous days had separately told the SMM that the area was without electricity for a month. In Zolote, the Head of the Zolote Civil-Military Administration (man, aged 50-60) told the SMM that many houses in the neighbourhood do not have heating and electricity.

The SMM monitored a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the SMM observed no traffic. Two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 15 November, the SMM monitored a protest at Gagarin Plateau in the Arcadia neighbourhood of Odessa. At 9А Rishelievska Street, the SMM saw about 45 people (mixed ages, mixed genders) including seven participants wearing jackets with insignia of the National Corps blocking the intersection between Rishelievska Street and Hretska Street. The SMM observed banners in Russian language with messages critical of illegal construction. The SMM observed that about ten law enforcement officers were present. Shortly thereafter, the SMM saw the same group of people in front of the City Hall building at 1 Dumska Square, as well as seven police officers. The protest ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a border crossing point near Leonove, two armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• Two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access to a compound in Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) citing the need to obtain “permission from their superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[6]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said that there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC. 6

Other impediments:

• Medical staff at a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to provide the SMM with information about a civilian casualty without permission from senior members of the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera located at the Oktiabr mine and the SMM camera located 1km south-west of Shyrokyne were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed military-type presence in the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Verkhnoshyrokivske and again near Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to houses and essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line, as well as to enable demining near Nyzhnoteple. The SMM followed up on reports of vandalism to crosses commemorating Polish prisoners in Kolomiya during World War I. In Kyiv, the Mission followed up on an attack on St. Andrew’s Church and a ceremony in honour of political prisoners. The SMM observed the first meeting of the temporary parliamentary commission charged with investigating the death of Kateryna Handziuk. In Kherson, the SMM observed a court hearing related to the detained Mekhanik Pogodin tanker.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 285), compared with the previous reporting period (about 265 explosions).

On the evening of 14 November, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 37 undetermined explosions, ten bursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) fire, about 225 bursts of heavy-machine gun fire and at least six minutes of uncountable heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at an assessed range of 1-4km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west. The following day, from the same location, the SMM heard 43 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 2-4km south-south-east.

During the day on 15 November, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km south-west and 27 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 6-12km south-east. Positioned on the north-western edge of Horlivka the same day, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-6km east-north-east and six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km in south-westerly directions.

During the evening of 14 November, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded ten undetermined explosions, an airburst, a muzzle flash and 40 projectiles in flight (mostly from south-easterly to north-westerly directions), including two projectiles fired from the south-east that subsequently exploded, impacting inside the entry-exit checkpoint area near the processing booths for civilians crossing the contact line, all at an assessed range of 0.1km-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 18 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions).

On the morning of 15 November, positioned on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 6-10km south-south-east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 14 November, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted about 100m of trenches and at least two firing positions, all seen for the first time (not visible in imagery from 15 October 2018), north of the railway line north-east of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), between 10-70m west of the western edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

On 15 November, along road T1316 inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed about 1km north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM saw a portable rocket launcher (RPO-A Shmel, 93mm). (See SMM Daily Report 14 November 2018.)

Positioned at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and north of Petrivske, the SMM observed calm situations in the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 14 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three towed howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Zarichne (44km west of Luhansk), a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a compound near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and ten towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM observed eight towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) at a military compound in Dianivka (38km north-west of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 14 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted ten tanks (T-72) in a training area near Shymshynivka; 21 tanks (type undetermined), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30) and eight towed mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk); and 20 tanks (type undetermined), eight towed mortars (2B11) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in a training area near Buhaivka.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 14 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-1 and one BMP-2) near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk), an ACV (type undetermined) near Zolote 4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), an ACV (type undetermined) near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk). On 15 November, the SMM saw two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70 and BTR-80) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and one APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

On 14 November, the SMM saw about 100 spent assault rifle (AK-74) shell casings (5.45mm) and two casings of rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-22), all assessed to be one or two months old, scattered on the edge of a road next to residential houses in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk).                                                              

In non-government-controlled areas, on 14 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two ACVs (type undetermined) near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk), five ACVs (type undetermined) and an APC (BTR variant) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk), three ACVs near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk), two APCs (BTR variant) on the western outskirts of Luhansk city, four APCs (MT-LB) near Katerynivka, four ACVs (type undetermined) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk). On 15 November, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) in Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) and an APC (BTR variant) near Vasylivka (47km south of Donetsk).

On 14 November, an SMM long-range UAV spotted new defensive positions about 30m in length about 1km south-east of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk), as well as to enable demining activities near Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The SMM monitored a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for over an hour, the SMM observed 32 cars (six with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates, and 15 with “DPR” plates) and 22 cargo trucks (seven with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and six with Belarusian licence plates, and eight with “DPR” plates, all cargo not visible) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also observed 21 vehicles (four with Ukrainian license plates, nine with Russian Federation, two with Georgian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates), a cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates, cargo not visible) and a bus (with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine.

In Kolomyia (Ivano-Frankivsk region), on 12 November, the SMM followed up on reports of vandalism to crosses at a cemetery commemorating Polish prisoners in Kolomiya during World War I. The head of a Polish civil society organization responsible for maintaining the cemetery told the SMM that on the night of 4-5 November, 94 crosses commemorating Polish prisoners to Kolomyia had been uprooted from the ground. A police representative told the SMM that they had found nearly 100 crosses on the ground, had identified suspects and an investigation had been launched under article 296 (hooliganism). The SMM visited the cemetery and saw that the crosses were in place and freshly dug and moved soil had been placed around the base of the crosses.

In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on media reports of an attack on St. Andrew’s Church.[4] Around 10:00 on 15 November at the church located at 23 Andriivskyi Descent in Kyiv, the SMM saw pieces of a shattered brown glass bottle and a bottle cork scattered around the doorstep of a side door to the church, and noted a strong gasoline smell in the vicinity of the area. The SMM saw ten police officers present at the scene and that the area around the door was blocked off by tape. Two men (both 60-70 years old), who identified themselves as security guards of the church, told the SMM that between 07:00-07:15 on the same day, they had been standing outside the church when they had heard a “crashing sound” and then seen two men (age unknown) in civilian clothing. One of the security guards added that he had unsuccessfully tried to stop the two men and was sprayed with pepper gas in his eyes.

In Kyiv, the SMM observed a ceremony in support of Ukrainian political prisoners. At Mykhailivska Square, the SMM saw senior Ukrainian officials and family members of Ukrainian political prisoners reportedly held in the Russian Federation, on the Crimean peninsula and in non-government-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine. The SMM saw empty chairs with the names of Ukrainian political prisoners written on them, including Stanislav Aseev, a blogger being held in a non-government-controlled part of Donetsk region.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored the first meeting of the temporary parliamentary commission charged with investigating the death of Kateryna Handziuk, an anti-corruption activist and Kherson city council official who died after having been attacked with sulphuric acid on 31 July 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 5 November 2018). Sixteen Members of Parliament serving on the commission as well as representatives of civil society, the State Security Service of Ukraine, the General Prosecutor's Office and the National Police attended the meeting.

On 14 November, in Kherson, the SMM attended a court hearing at the Kherson Administrative Court related to the detained Mekhanik Pogodin tanker by the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in the port of Kherson. The court ruled that the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine should provide it with copies of communication related to the detention of the tanker ship within seven days and the next hearing was scheduled for 3 December 2018. (See SMM Daily Report 9 November 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 12 November 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint south of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the area, saying that the SMM needs “permission” from an unspecified “ministry.”
• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from proceeding, citing risks to the “security of the SMM” and saying that the SMM needs “approval” from an “administration” in Novoazovsk to travel there.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• During the evening and night of 14-15 November, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference[6] (dual GPS jamming) near government-controlled areas of Vyskryva (76km west of Luhansk) and Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk) and in the vicinity of non-government controlled areas of Zarichne, Khoroshe, Stepove (27km west of Luhansk), Dovhe, Zemliane (11km north-west of Luhansk), Katerynivka, Rozkishne (9km south of Luhansk), Luhansk city and Peremozhne (19km south of Luhansk).
• At a hospital in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), while attempting to follow up on reports of a civilian casualty, medical staff denied the SMM’s request to meet with the victim, citing the “need for permission” from a “ministry” of the armed formations in Luhansk city.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] On 18 October, the SMM monitored a plenary session in Parliament at which members of Parliament adopted the law “On peculiarities of the usage of the St. Andrew’s Church of the ‘Sophia of Kyiv’ National Reserve” with 237 votes in favour. The law foresees the lease of the St. Andrew’s Church to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople for use to perform religious services.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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403274 Communication and Media Relations Section

The key steps in joining a technologically advanced ePassport verification system - the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Public Key Directory (ICAO PKD) – were explored at a regional workshop organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in Budva, Montenegro on 15 and 16 November 2018.

The workshop brought together the heads of the Travel Document Issuing Authorities, chiefs of the IT Departments of the Travel Document Issuing Authorities and heads of the Passport Verification Departments from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro, to get acquainted with the ICAO PKD, which enables countries to effectively validate the chip stored in electronic passports.

Electronic passports are fraud resistant travel documents which make it harder for terrorists and criminals to forge travel documents. But having ePassports is not enough, the workshop’s experts said. The receiving authorities need to confirm that the ePassport belongs to its holder, and the ICAO PKD enables this.

"Joining the ICAO PKD is a proactive approach in fighting recurring organized crime, illegal migration and the movement of Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” said Jean Salomon, a Border Security and Identity Management Expert, and member of the ICAO Implementation and Capacity-Building Working Group. “To sustain and further develop an efficient management of safe borders and achieve stability in the long run requires an unwavering commitment: Embracing the PKD to bolster the secure world usage of ePassports.”

Christiane Dermarkar, representing the ICAO, said: “States participating in the ICAO PKD will facilitate international travel for their citizens - citizens from PKD Participant States will be more trusted at foreign borders and can enjoy easier border crossings.”

Representatives from each state presented the ePassport systems and the National Public Key Infrastructures they currently have in place, enabling the experts to assess which of the requirements they meet in order to join the ICAO PKD. 

Jeen de Swart, a senior information architect from the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security, described how the PKD was implementation in the Netherlands. The workshop concluded with participants drafting national road maps on joining the PKD.

As a follow-up, the OSCE will arrange country visits to encourage decision-makers to join the ICAO PKD. This will be followed by technical support to provide on-site practical guidance and operational support in developing national compatibilities with the ICAO PKD.

403247 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Fifteen prosecutors and police officers completed a three-day workshop on investigating transnational cases of trafficking in human beings on 15 November 2018 in Chisinau. The workshop was organized jointly by the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the Moldovan General Prosecutor’s Office and the General Police Inspectorate, with the support of the European Union Judicial Co-operation Unit (Eurojust).

The best practices of setting up and managing joint investigation teams (JITs) were the focus of the hands-on course delivered by the Eurojust experts, who specialize in providing financial, legal and practical support to the operational activities of JITs. A JIT is an effective tool used by states to improve the speed, efficiency and co-ordination of investigating and prosecuting transnational crimes. The setting up of JITs on human trafficking cases is one of activities envisaged under the 2018-2020 Action Plan of the Moldovan Anti-Trafficking Strategy, which was developed with the support of the OSCE Mission.

Under the guidance of the trainers, the participants elaborated a standard inter-state JIT agreement, organized a mock JIT co-ordination meeting and identified strategies to raise funds to support operations of a joint team.

“Participation in this training will help us to establish contacts with, and build trust among the international partners to ensure the speedy exchange of information and intelligence as well as the collection of evidence to facilitate the detection and investigation of cases of trafficking,” said Sergiu Russu, the chief of the Section to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings at the General Prosecutor’s Office.

This workshop is part of capacity-building efforts on combating trafficking in human beings undertaken by the OSCE Mission’s human rights programme. The Mission’s work in the field of human rights is in line with the priorities of the Human Rights sub-Working Group, reconvened by Moldova and Transdniestria this year.

403268 Event participants discuss activities and draft a road map to contribute to implementing the country’s action plan on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. 13 November 2018, Osh. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Increasing civil society’s potential to partner with state institutions in implementing the recently adopted action plan on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in Kyrgyzstan was the focus of two capacity building events, which the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) organized in Osh on 12 and 14 November and in Bishkek on 14 and 15 November 2018.

The two events gathered 40 representatives (28 women and 12 men) of human rights and women’s organizations, who discussed the action plan’s provisions, gendered approaches to the oversight of the security sector and ways to become more engaged in the country’s efforts to promote the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

“Security sector reform processes, political will and first-hand experience of conflict have all been ingredients for advancing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Kyrgyzstan,” said Graziella Pavone, Human Rights Officer at ODIHR. “An effective implementation of the Action Plan, the third one adopted by the country, will now depend on the degree of engagement by all stakeholders and on co-operation between state institutions and civil society.”

The participants identified practical areas where they could contribute to the implementation of the action plan. This includes the development of monitoring and evaluation tools, such as indicators and checklists tracking the progress of the plan’s implementation, the provision of expert advice and training to central and local authorities on gender aspects of security and close co-operation with security sector oversight mechanisms, such as national human rights institutions and public councils.  

“The experience of women’s organizations in the country demonstrates that NGOs are ready to provide expertise and methodological support to the authorities on policy and practice, both at the central and the local levels,” said Arsen Ambaryan, a lawyer at the Osh-based Positive Dialogue NGO. “However, given the scope of the UNSCR 1325, all human rights organizations can take part in its implementation and work to integrate the Women, Peace and Security Agenda into all their endeavours.”

The events were part of ODIHR’s efforts to promote human rights-compliant and gender-sensitive security, which entails empowering external oversight bodies with knowledge and skills.

Anara Niyazova, professor of law, gender expert and one of the trainers, said: “While not being formal implementers of the Action Plan, civil society organizations can be significant drivers in the implementation process. Acknowledging this role calls for supporting non-governmental organizations, including with resources for their institutional development.”