Africa - INTER PRESS SERVICE

Credit: Amanda Cotton / Ocean Image Bank

By Gareth Johnstone and Jan Thomas Odegard
OSLO, Norway, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

As Norway undertakes Vendepunkt, or “Turning Point,” its reflection on the future of Norwegian development policy, it is critical that oceans remain a priority. Donors around the world are running similar audits, deciding which long-term partnerships to keep, and why. Norway has decades of expertise to offer, but also something significant at stake: healthy and well-governed oceans underpin food, livelihoods and economic activity in partner countries while supporting global seafood supply chains in which Norway itself participates.

West Africa demonstrates what sustained investment in oceans can achieve. More than a decade of cooperation on illegal fishing has helped countries strengthen their own capacity to monitor and protect their waters. But the ocean cannot be managed country by country. Fish stocks are shared, vessels move across borders, and climate change is shifting marine resources into new waters. Strong national capacity must therefore be matched by the ability of countries to cooperate.

That cooperation depends on the relationships between countries that allow information to be shared, trust to develop and authorities to act together. These relationships are not simply a by-product of capacity building. They are essential development infrastructures particularly when the resources being protected cross borders.

Gareth Johnstone

Fisheries are also fundamental to food security on each side of this relationship. In West Africa, fish is a critical source of nutrition for millions of people and supports the livelihoods of coastal communities. FAO estimates that aquatic foods make up 19 percent of consumed animal protein across Africa on average, rising above 50 percent in some countries. In Norway, seafood is both part of the national food supply and the foundation of a major industry. Protecting fish stocks and ensuring they are sustainably and legally managed is as much an economic question as it is an ecological one.

The connection between West Africa and Norway makes this tangible. Fish caught off West Africa enters international supply chains as fishmeal and fish oil, including feed used in aquaculture thousands of kilometres away. A fish caught off Guinea-Bissau can ultimately help feed a salmon in a Norwegian fjord. In one investigation supported by TMT, authorities took action against the factory vessel TIAN YI HE 6 after it received fish from a Turkish-flagged vessel, with the resulting fishmeal transported onwards to international markets. The case resulted in fines for unauthorized fishing operations, illegal transshipment and obstruction of inspectors.

Jan Thomas Odegard

In January 2026, Guinea-Bissau banned fishmeal and fish oil production. Within months, vessels involved in the trade had moved to Sierra Leone. Enforcement can improve in one jurisdiction while the challenges simply moves to another.

Technology has transformed what fisheries authorities can do. An inspector can now examine a vessel’s movements and history before deciding whether it should enter port. Recorded use of the Vessel Tracking Tool, developed by fisheries intelligence organisaiton, TMT, more than doubled between 2024 and 2025.

Despite this, turning information into action requires trained officials, functioning institutions and trust between agencies and countries. In the West African region where TMT, and its partners have focused support, the relationships resulted in the deterrence of illegal fishing took more than a decade to build. An independent assessment by Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management of this work, supported by Norway, found that some of the strongest results came when governments shared information regionally.

One case began with a concern raised by a fisheries inspector in Ghana about the vessel NOVA ZEELANDIA. Officials in Côte d’Ivoire, Angola and South Africa checked their records and shared information. Angola subsequently fined associated trawlers for unauthorized transshipment and barred NOVA ZEELANDIA from its waters, while Cameroon separately fined the vessel owners US$2.1 million for breaches of inspection rules.

The vessel later changed its name and flag and remains in operation. It is a reminder that effective ocean governance requires sustained cooperation across jurisdictions.

Relationships are development infrastructure

Development programmes routinely count the numbers of people trained, systems established and institutions strengthened. The value of the relationships built alongside them is harder to measure. Yet a fisheries officer knowing who to contact in a neighbouring country can be as important as the technology on their desk.

These relationships take years to build and can be fragile. One or two funding cycles may establish a system or deliver training, yet they are less likely to embed the institutional memory, expertise and relationships that allow it to survive and adapt.

Long-running development partnerships and support should therefore not automatically be viewed as evidence that localisation has failed to materialise. A better test is whether they are evolving toward stronger national institutions, greater regional leadership and with less dependence on external technical expertise, while preserving cooperation where challenges remain shared.

Oceans belong in Norway’s Turning Point

Norway brings decades of experience in fisheries management, marine research and ocean governance. Norway is itself a fishing and aquaculture nation, connected through the same ocean systems and global seafood supply chains.

Norway’s investment in oceans can therefore combine locally led capacity with international cooperation because illegal vessels do not respect borders.

The evidence from West Africa shows why sustained investment matters. National enforcement capability and regional networks have been built over more than a decade. Withdrawing support before those systems are sufficiently resilient risks losing hard-won gains, continuing to invest allows national leadership to deepen and relationships to mature.

Norway’s challenge is not unique. Development partners are increasingly being asked to make harder choices and reduce dependency without dismantling the relationships and cooperation needed to address problems that are inherently international. As Turning Point asks where Norway has particular strengths and where its development cooperation can have greatest impact, oceans deserve a prominent place in the answer.

The question should not simply be which partnerships Norway can eventually leave. It should also be which are worth sustaining and deepening because the same fish stocks, vessels and networks are what is at stake. Strong national capacity and international relationships are not competing goals. One makes the other possible. And in an ocean that connects Guinea-Bissau’s fishing communities with Norway’s fjords, Norway has both the expertise and the interest to keep investing in both.

Gareth Johnstone is the Executive Director of Norwegian based fisheries intelligence organization, Trygg Mat Tracking (TMT). He has over 30 years’ experience as an environmental scientist, researcher and policy expert. He is also the former Director General of WorldFish.

Jan Thomas Odegard is a Norwegian environmental and development expert with 30 years’ experience spanning the UN, NGOs, private sector and research. He is co-founder and Chair of the Trygg Mat Tracking Board and former Secretary General of Friends of the Earth Norway.

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

Excerpt:

As Norway considers the future of its development cooperation, West Africa offers an important lesson: investing in the same seas can create benefits on both sides of the partnership.

Credit: IAEA
 
IAEA’s 70th General Conference highlights growing strains on safeguards and nuclear security as attention shifts to the first review of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty.

By Katsuhiro Asagiri
VIENNA, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

The international nuclear order is facing another test as governments move from an inconclusive review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York to renewed disputes over safeguards and nuclear security in Vienna—and toward the first Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) later this year.

The 70th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), held in Vienna from September 14 to 18, came less than four months after the 11th NPT Review Conference ended without consensus on a substantive outcome.

It was the third consecutive NPT Review Conference, following those in 2015 and 2022, to conclude without agreement on substantive conclusions and recommendations—underscoring the growing difficulty of reaching consensus amid heightened nuclear risks and geopolitical tensions.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed disappointment at the outcome while reaffirming the NPT as a cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

The IAEA does not negotiate nuclear disarmament. Its responsibilities include promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and applying safeguards to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Yet the issues confronting the Agency—from Iran and North Korea to Ukraine and naval nuclear propulsion—show how safeguards, nuclear security and armed conflict are increasingly intertwined with wider questions about the future of the international nuclear order.

Map of Iran

Iran Puts Verification Under Pressure

Iran remains one of the most difficult issues facing the Agency.

For the IAEA, the central question is not simply the political dispute surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, but whether it can maintain the continuity and credibility of independent verification.

Restrictions on access and uncertainty surrounding nuclear material, including highly enriched uranium, have intensified concerns about the effectiveness of safeguards.

The issue has taken on an additional dimension following attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. Beyond competing political and military claims lies a wider question for the international community: how can nuclear facilities—and the verification system surrounding them—be protected during armed conflict?

Ukraine Tests Nuclear Safety in Wartime

Ukraine presents another challenge.

The war has placed major nuclear facilities in or near areas of military operations, with the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remaining at the centre of international concern.

The IAEA has maintained experts at the site as part of efforts to reduce risks to nuclear safety and security.

Russia and Ukraine have repeatedly accused each other of actions threatening nuclear installations. While those claims remain contested, the underlying issue extends beyond this war: international nuclear governance mechanisms must now operate in circumstances where a major nuclear facility can be exposed to prolonged armed conflict.

Water is used to cool processes at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. Credit: IAEA/Fredrik Dahl

North Korea and the Limits of Verification

Credit: journal-neo.org

North Korea remains another major test of the non-proliferation regime.

The IAEA continues to monitor developments in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from outside the country and maintains its readiness to resume verification activities should political circumstances permit.

The case illustrates a fundamental limitation of international verification: even sophisticated monitoring institutions ultimately depend on access and cooperation.

More broadly, the Vienna conference reflected the growing difficulty of achieving consensus. Political divisions are increasingly affecting debates even within an institution whose work is largely technical, encompassing safeguards, nuclear safety and security, and peaceful nuclear applications.

At the same time, progress in other safeguards cases shows that multilateral verification can produce results when governments provide access, transparency and sustained cooperation.

Civil Society Bridges the NPT and TPNW

Hideto Matsuura, head of Nihon Hidankyo, addresses an event hosted at the sidelines of the 2026 NPT Review Conference. Credit Naureen Hossain/IPS

The debate over the future of nuclear disarmament is not confined to governments.

At the 2026 NPT Review Conference, Soka Gakkai International (SGI) was among civil society organizations advocating nuclear disarmament education, nuclear risk reduction and greater attention to the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons.

On April 30, SGI and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation co-organized a side event examining extended nuclear deterrence through the lens of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Hideto Matsuura, an atomic bomb survivor representing Nihon Hidankyo, described how radiation-related illnesses continue to affect Hibakusha more than eight decades after the atomic bombings.

The discussion raised a question that lies at the heart of the continuing debate over nuclear deterrence: whether security should be viewed primarily from the standpoint of states or also through the lens of human security.

Such civil society engagement provides a link between the NPT process and the humanitarian approach that contributed to the emergence of the TPNW.

From Vienna to New York

The next major stage of the 2026 nuclear diplomacy cycle now moves back to New York.

From November 30 to December 4, states parties to the TPNW will hold the treaty’s first Review Conference at United Nations Headquarters.

United Nations Headquarters. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri

The TPNW does not replace either the NPT or the IAEA.

The NPT combines three pillars—nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—while the IAEA provides much of the safeguards and verification machinery supporting the non-proliferation regime.

Credit: IAEA

The TPNW approaches the nuclear question from a different direction. It prohibits activities including the development, testing, production, possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and establishes a legal framework aimed at their elimination.

The three frameworks therefore address distinct but interconnected dimensions of the nuclear order.

The 2026 NPT Review Conference demonstrated the difficulty of reaching political agreement on disarmament and non-proliferation. Vienna, meanwhile, highlighted the practical challenges confronting verification and nuclear security amid armed conflict, regional proliferation disputes and geopolitical divisions.

The first TPNW Review Conference will now examine what the prohibition treaty can contribute under these conditions.

Nuclear-armed states remain outside the TPNW, placing clear limits on what the treaty can achieve on its own. At the same time, its states parties and supporting civil society organizations have placed the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and their elimination at the centre of international debate.

When delegates gather in New York on November 30, the discussion will therefore extend beyond the implementation of a single treaty.

After another NPT Review Conference ended without substantive consensus, a broader question remains: how can established and newer multilateral frameworks work alongside one another to reduce nuclear risks, strengthen verification and advance nuclear disarmament?

From Vienna to New York, that question is set to remain at the centre of nuclear diplomacy in 2026.

This article is brought to you by INPS Japan in collaboration with Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

By James Alix Michel
VICTORIA, Seychelles, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

After decades in which the high seas were too often treated as a distant frontier—vast, ownerless and beyond meaningful protection—the High Seas Treaty entered into force on 17 January 2026.

It was a landmark achievement for international cooperation and a reminder that, even in an increasingly divided world, nations can still come together in defence of the common good. But celebration must not be confused with protection. A treaty on paper will not restore depleted marine life. It will not prevent harmful activity and it will not ensure that the benefits of ocean science are shared fairly. Nor will it secure a healthy ocean for future generations unless the international community gives it the resources, institutions, scientific capacity and political courage necessary to succeed. That is the real test now before us.

The Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement, also known as the High Seas Treaty, creates a framework for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. It addresses four essential areas: the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from marine genetic resources; marine protected areas and other area-based management tools; environmental impact assessments; and the capacity-building and transfer of marine technology. These areas will secure the future of the global ocean—and, by extension, the future of every nation whose climate, food security, economy and heritage depend upon it.

For small island developing states, it is our climate regulator, our food source, our economic space, our history and our future. We do not look at the sea as a faraway expanse beyond our borders. We live with it every day. We prosper or suffer according to its health.

During my years as President of Seychelles, this understanding shaped my conviction that the ocean had to be placed at the centre of national development. Seychelles chose to pursue a blue-economy vision at a time when the phrase was less familiar than it is today. We worked to protect large areas of our maritime space, advanced marine spatial planning, and explored innovative approaches to ocean finance, including debt-for-nature arrangements and the blue bond.

Our actions were not driven by the illusion that a small island nation could fix a global crisis single-handedly. Instead, we acted out of a core conviction: true leadership belongs to more than just the largest landmasses, the richest economies, or the most dominant militaries. While we are a small island state in land, we are a vast ocean nation. We possess a wealth of experience, strategic maritime vision, and deep resolve. It is this exact spirit—proving that stewardship is measured by commitment rather than geographic size—that must anchor and define the High Seas Treaty.

The treaty rightly recognises the special circumstances of developing states, including small island developing states and coastal African states. It acknowledges that access to data, research, equipment, technical knowledge, monitoring systems and trained people is essential if all countries are to participate meaningfully in ocean governance. However, this principle must now be honored in practice. Too often, developing countries are invited to global negotiations only to discover that the real advantages remain concentrated elsewhere: locked away in distant laboratories, research vessels, satellites, and data systems. If the benefits arising from marine genetic resources are to be genuinely shared, then access to the knowledge and tools required to understand and use those resources must also be shared. The ocean cannot become another arena in which wealthier nations draw the greatest benefit while poorer and more vulnerable countries are asked merely to endorse the rules.

The first Conference of the Parties for the High Seas Treaty, scheduled to take place in early January 2027, will be a critical moment. It must not become a narrow exercise in procedure or a meeting dominated by those already best equipped to influence outcomes. It should establish an implementation culture based on ambition, inclusion and urgency. It must ensure that the financial mechanism is strong enough to support developing countries, that scientific cooperation is meaningful, and that capacity-building is not reduced to occasional workshops or vague promises. The treaty’s decision-making body is expected to convene within its first year in force, making the coming months decisive for how this new era of ocean governance is shaped.

There is another important lesson here. The world has too often separated environmental protection from development, as though nations must choose between conserving nature and improving the lives of their people. For island states, this is a false choice. A healthy ocean is development. It supports fisheries and livelihoods. It protects coastlines. It regulates climate. It sustains tourism, culture and community. It offers scientific discoveries that may help humanity confront disease, food insecurity and environmental change. To protect the ocean is not to turn away from progress. It is to redefine progress so that it can endure.

This is why the High Seas Treaty matters so deeply. It offers a chance to move beyond a culture of reaction—responding only after a fishery declines, a species disappears, a reef bleaches or an ecosystem is damaged beyond repair. It gives the international community an opportunity to act with greater foresight: to assess environmental risks before they are allowed to grow, to establish protected areas before the last refuge is lost, and to place stewardship alongside opportunity. But no agreement, however historic, can substitute for political will.

The treaty will need champions: governments willing to invest in its success; scientists willing to share knowledge; institutions prepared to support fair access; civil society determined to hold leaders accountable; and young people who refuse to accept that the ocean’s future should be decided without them. Seychelles has long believed that the world must see the ocean not as a boundary between nations, but as the great connector of humanity. That belief is even more urgent today.

The high seas belong to no single country and its condition affects us all. The High Seas Treaty is therefore more than a legal instrument. It is a test of whether multilateralism can still respond to the challenges that no nation can solve alone.

The ocean has a law and now the world must give it life.

James Alix Michel, is Former President of the Republic of Seychelles

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

Dr. Agnes Kalibata, speaking at the opening ceremony of the Africa Food Systems Forum in 2019. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

By Agnes Kalibata
NAIROBI, Kenya, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

I was born in Rwanda, but my family soon became refugees in Uganda during the conflict and unrest on the cusp of independence. My father was a teacher and went to great lengths to make sure I was well educated. My parents were also smallholder farmers, and I saw firsthand the challenges my parents and other refugee families faced.

After I received my doctoral degree from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, I returned to a new Rwanda in 2005, managing a World Bank agriculture project with the government. In 2008, I became Minister of Agriculture and Animal Resources, and over the next six years, I oversaw the country’s transition from food deficit to food security, as Rwanda cut its global hunger index by more than 50 percent. We implemented what we understood to be true: effective deliberate agricultural investment drives poverty down.

Agricultural growth is up to four times more effective at reducing poverty than growth in other sectors, and it underpins food security besides. Yet despite that evidence, Africa’s agriculture sector faces an estimated $200 billion annual financing gap.

Less than a year ago, I joined the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) as Co-Chair of the Steering Committee because I have seen firsthand how GAFSP is a collaborative platform that connects governments, farmers, civil society and leverages the private sector and multiple partners to tackle food insecurity. Among its inaugural investments was a 60 million dollar investment in Rwanda’s Land Husbandry and terracing program which allowed farmers to reclaim degraded land by mobilizing more than 10 times this initial capital, reached hundreds of farmers and contributed to land restoration, food security and poverty reduction all at the same time.

GAFSP’s Business Investment Financing Track (BIFT) has made its second allocation (its first allocation was to the African Development Bank). Announced at the Africa Food Systems Forum “Investing in Africa’s Agri-Food Systems: Nourishing Nations, Growing Jobs, Building Resilience,” Rwanda’s BIFT allocation is a concrete step toward the GAFSP vision that sharing risk deliberately, and cooperatively, rather than leaving it with farmers alone, moves capital that reduces food insecurity. This $6 million allocation has already unlocked $15 million more from IFAD, the Bank of Kigali and Aceli Africa – 2.5 times GAFSP’s own contribution – reaching an expected 215 farmers’ organizations and 35,000 smallholders.

What is most encouraging about this funding is the paradigm shift it represents against the challenging context of reduced Overseas Development Assistance. Capital structured to absorb risk can shift lender considerations to bring private finance into a domain the private sector has avoided, catalyzing transformational change for smallholder borrowers.

The central obstacle isn’t capital or conviction – it’s risk. Agricultural lending is constrained by the risk of accelerating climate shocks and by the practical cost of financing smaller loans. Roughly 90 percent of staple food production in Sub-Saharan Africa depends on rain-fed agriculture, leaving households with no buffer when a season fails. Farmers in low-income countries bear the highest burden of worsening weather conditions, while African countries lose the most GDP to escalating natural disasters, from drought to surging storms. Finally, the loans these farmers need are relatively small, and small loans cost lenders more to appraise and administer.

As Rwanda’s Agriculture Minister, coordinating across ministries to run programs like the Land husbandry program mentioned above alongside the One Cow per Poor Family – a critical source of nutrition for poor families taught me that risk-sharing across government agencies, communities and financiers is what makes ambitious programs work.

It is now a question of scale. What worked for smallholders in Rwanda can work for millions more, if development finance institutions and private lenders treat risk-sharing as standard practice. I have spent my career watching farmers do more with less. Give them the finance they’ve earned, and there is no question they will transform the food system to be more efficient, resilient and a stronger driver of prosperity at scale.

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

Credit: Matt Palmer / Unsplash
 
This guest post is authored by V. Ram Ramanathan, Durwood Zaelke, and Marcelo Suárez-Orozco and is informed by a presentation that Ramanathan is set to give at the Vatican on September 26.

By V. Ram Ramanathan, Durwood Zaelke and Marcelo Suárez-Orozco
NEW YORK, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

Among the three of us, we have 15 decades of high-level experience in climate science, policies and actions, and we have never been more alarmed than we are at this moment. The United Nations has just officially declared that the world has failed in limiting global warming to a safe level. During the last decade, heat-trapping pollutants nearly doubled the rate that heat is being added to the planet—a rate that will push temperatures across the 1.5°Celsius threshold in five years or less and breach the first barrier of the Paris Agreement. This will further destabilize natural climate systems and amplify weather extremes, which are already costing the world economy more than $ 2 trillion annually. At the current rate of warming, the global temperature is likely to cross 2° Celsius in about 15 years, the outer limit of the Paris Agreement, taking us into a climate not witnessed by homo sapiens, ever.

High altitudes in the Tibetan-Himalayan region and the Alps are already warming at two to three times the global average (which may be implicated in the recent Nepal / Tibet floods that left 1400 confirmed dead and 5,000 missing). Other disastrous impacts of reaching 2°Celsius include the the transition of the Amazon from a forest into a savanna. The health impacts could be the worst of all. At 2°Celsius, heat deaths in 2050 could reach a staggering two billion in a worst-case analysis by actuarial experts at Exeter University.

If that weren’t bad enough, a new scientific study raises the possibility that the current rate of warming, if continued, could eventually shut down the ocean current called the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation—AMOC. The Gulf Stream is a major part of this vital ocean current, which plays a dominant role in winter weather over north America and Europe. Worryingly, AMOC is already slowing down.

At today’s rate of warming AMOC could begin to collapse at warming as low as 2° Celsius, which could be crossed by the time today’s infants are in college. Impacts would be punishing, stranding heat in the already too hot tropics, while robbing northern countries of heat now transported north to keep temperatures temperate, leading to bitter winters. If AMOC collapses, currently a low-probability event, it could trigger massive forced internal and international displacements, ushering in the world’s largest crisis of forced migration ever.

Crossing 2°Celsius will trigger other irreversible impacts too, further amplifying warming through the loss of sea ice and glaciers. The depletion of ice and snow will make the planet darker, resulting in more absorption of incoming solar radiation, amplifying warming by 25% or more.

The good news is that we can avoid this fate if we cut the rate of warming quickly—by 50% within 15 years, which is feasible in two parts.

First, we need to cut the super-pollutants of climate. These include hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), methane, lower-atmosphere ozone, and black carbon soot from diesel and cooking smoke. These short-lived climate pollutants are called super pollutants because they are tens to thousands of times more potent than carbon dioxide in heating the planet and are currently contributing more than half of the warming the planet has witnessed. However, and this is crucial–they dissipate from the atmosphere within two decades, whereas carbon dioxide, the best-known climate pollutant, takes multiple decades to a century to significantly decline.

Technologies exist to quickly and affordably reduce the super pollutants. In many cases we have the policies and laws as well. HFCs are being cut through the 2016 Kigali amendment to the successful Montreal Protocol—the treaty that has slowed warming by several decades while restoring the protective stratospheric ozone layer.

Methane pollution is getting more attention recently, including from Prime Minister Mia Mottley of Barbados, who is recommending a binding international agreement —inspired by the Montreal Protocol—to prevent the oil and gas industry from wasting natural gas, which is 90% methane. Other local solutions can reduce or even eliminate methane from landfills, starting by reducing food waste. There are many other such practical, off-the-shelf solutions.

The immediate task at hand is to thin the invisible heat trapping blanket. If we implement super pollutant solutions before 2030 and scale to full potential in less than10 years, the rate of warming can be reduced by 30% by 2040s. But we need to cut the rate of warming by half, i.e. 50%. The super pollutants should be our first target, because the technologies and policies are there and once we put them into action, the blanket-thinning will start immediately.

Second, as the recent IPCC report affirms, we need to focus on removing CO2. The human-made CO2 blanket up there weighs about 1,200 billion tons and we have to thin it by 5%, or 60 billion tons. Nature-based solutions are currently removing about 2 billion tons per year. Chemical/biological/technological solutions are actively pursued. Scaling to 4 billion tons per year would remove the needed tons in 15 years.

Together, these two measures would halve the rate of warming from today’s nearly 0.4° Celsius per decade to less than 0.2° Celsius per decade. We know of no other measures of thinning the heat-trapping blanket to provide the rapid cooling needed to allow us to survive and thrive. Even with rapid actions, climate disruption will continue for decades. We must make people and ecosystems resilient. Since we are all interconnected, we require global cooperation to make people and ecosystem climate resilient. Towards this global cooperation, we propose creating: One Million Climate Advocates to empower the public to support local and national actions; and One Million Climate Champions to connect civil society, governments, and industries to turn climate mitigation policies into actions at the local to the global level.

It’s time to move forward, always forward. Adelante, Siempre Adelante. Those were among the last words Pope Francis offered one of us (Suárez-Orozco). Not forward when the politics are perfect or opposition relents. Forward now, with the urgency of a species that has finally seen the iceberg but still has time to turn the tiller toward safety.

V. Ram Ramanathan is a distinguished research professor at the University of California at San Diego and the winner of the 2026 Crafoord Prize from the Royal Swedish Academy.

Durwood Zaelke is president of the Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development and adjunct professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Marcelo Suárez-Orozco is chancellor of the University of Massachusetts Boston & the UCLA Wasserman Dean Emeritus.

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

Excerpt:

Guest contributors V. Ram Ramanathan, Durwood Zaelke, and Marcelo Suárez-Orozco write that we can cut the rate of warming by 30% to 50% within 15 years. “And we must.”

Credit: United Nations

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 24 2026 (IPS)

The world’s ongoing arms race is threatening to extend beyond planet earth—and spillover into outer space.

The US has deployed weapons in space and will use them to defend American forces, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink said last week, according to Cable News Network (CNN). His comments marked the first public acknowledgment of such capabilities, though he offered no details about the weapons or when they were put into orbit.

“Today we continue to ensure we remain ready to meet the challenges of evolving threats wherever they exist,” Meink told the Air, Space and Cyber Conference, an annual gathering hosted by the Air & Space Forces Association in National Harbor, Maryland.

The disclosure comes as the US faces an advancing space arms race with China and Russia, which are testing sophisticated offensive capabilities.

Specifically, American officials have said they are monitoring China’s development of a nuclear-capable partial-orbit hypersonic missile. US intelligence has also suggested Russia is developing a space-based nuclear weapon that could knock out satellites critical to weather forecasting, navigation, banking, shipping and emergency services — a claim Moscow denies, according to CNN.

The New York Times quoted Guo Jiakun, a spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry as saying: ‘We urge the US side to stop expanding its military force and preparing for war in outer space”.

There have also been reports that “Russia could be planning to put a nuclear weapon in space, a threat that could disrupt satellite networks that are vital to everything – from communications to military operations.”

The multiple UN Conferences on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE), have served as landmark global summits to shape international cooperation and policy for space exploration.

Convened at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna from 14 to 27 August 1968, UNISPACE 1 focused on the practical benefits of space technology and scientific exchange

Tariq Rauf, former Head of Verification and Security Policy, at the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told Inter Press Service (IPS) , while appreciating the transparency shown by the US, this disclosure is the most consequential open acknowledgement by any spacefaring State of weaponised on-orbit capability since the erosion of the informal post-Cold War taboo on space weapons.

The testing began with the 2007 Chinese ASAT test and the 2008 and 2021 Russian ASAT tests., the 2008 US and 2021 Russian ASAT tests, and India’s 2019 Mission Shakti ASAT test — building on earlier direct-ascent ASAT programs pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union from the 1960s through the 1980s.

The US deployment converts a long-suspected capability gap into a declared fact, and it will be read by other delegations as confirmation that at least one major power has moved decisively from space “control” doctrine to operational deployment, he said.

For the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), the announcement raises four immediate questions:

(1) whether the deployment is compatible with the existing Outer Space Treaty regime; (2) what it means for the stalled draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) and the EU Code of Conduct (EU International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities); (3) how the expert and policy community is interpreting the move; and (4) what practical steps the Committees can recommend to prevent a cascading arms race in space.

Rauf proposed five recommendations:

1. Convene an urgent joint briefing between COPUOS’s Scientific and Technical and Legal Subcommittees and the CD’s PAROS Ad Hoc Committee to develop a shared factual record of the announcement and its technical implications, avoiding duplicated or contradictory assessments across the two bodies.

2. Both PAROS Ad Hoc Committee and COPUOS should issue an urgent call for a moratorium on placing weapons in Space, urge the US to take down space weapons it has deployed and urge all spacefaring States to preserve Space as the common heritage of humankind and weapons-free.

3. Request, through the Conference on Disarmament Secretariat, that all spacefaring States with counterspace capability — not only the United States — provide voluntary technical briefings on the general character (though not classified specifics) of any on-orbit weapons systems, to reduce the information asymmetry currently driving worst-case assumptions.

4. Task the Legal Subcommittee with producing a technical working paper clarifying the scope of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty as applied to conventional (non-WMD) on-orbit weapons, and the interaction of Articles III and IX with counterspace operations, to give delegations a common legal baseline rather than competing unilateral interpretations.

5. Encourage major space powers to reaffirm, at head-of-delegation level, existing voluntary moratoria on destructive kinetic ASAT testing, and invite additional States to associate themselves with such moratoria pending progress on a binding instrument.”

Jonathan Granoff, President Global Security Institute, told IPS placing offensive weapons in space is a very risky proposition.

The Outer Space Treaty has been instrumental in ensuring numerous benefits of outer space, including satellites and exploration. All major nations are parties including United States, Russia, China, India, Japan, and all member states of the European Space Agency. The Treaty in its first article establishes that space exploration and use shall only be for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind, ensuring free and non-discriminatory access for all states.

The deployment of weapons in space by the United States could easily be interpreted as violating that peaceful uses principle, he pointed out.

“However, there is an argument that putting weapons in space for defensive purposes only helps protect against abuses of the peace which is in the interest of all nations. This is not frivolous. The problem with that argument is that weapons used for defensive purposes can also be used offensively and the deployment of such weapons would indeed violate the the Treaty. Moreover, such a deployment by one nation will surely stimulate an arms race.”

There are several important questions, he said.

Should the entire world trust that the weapons the US places in space would only be used defensively to preserve the peace? If the US places weapons in space would this new interpretation of the Treaty stimulate other nations to do the same? Would it be wise to trust they would only use their weapons defensively?

Recall that President Reagan, addressing such questions, offered to share his Star Wars deployments of space based missile defenses with the Soviet Union. Would it be a good idea for the US to share space weapons technologies with other nations?

“The entire world benefits very much from the current military uses of outer space which allows the observation of the military activities of all nations thus helping stability. Such uses should affirmatively be protected and encouraged. Other uses that will lead to a new arms race should be prohibited. A protocol to the OST to prohibit offensive weapons in space as well as any anti-satellite weapons should be obtained”, declared Granoff..

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

 

 

 

By CIVICUS
Sep 23 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses public art, gender-based violence and censorship in Iraqi Kurdistan with Tara Abdullah, a multidisciplinary visual artist from Sulaymaniyah who is currently based in Oslo, Norway as part of the Safemuse – Safe Havens for Artists residency.

Tara Abdullah

In Iraqi Kurdistan, where conservative religious and social norms prevent open discussion of gender-based violence, femicide remains a persistent, under-reported crisis. Artists who take these issues into public space, instead of confining them to galleries or private institutions, risk backlash from religious authorities, legal action and the withdrawal of state permits and funding.

How did you become an artivist?

I’m from Sulaymaniyah in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and I’ve been using art to express myself since I was a child. I fought hard to get into art school. After ninth grade, I joined the Institute of Art and studied there for five years, then studied for four more years at the College of Fine Arts at the University of Sulaymaniyah and graduated in 2020. All in all, I spent almost a decade studying art and learning new materials and methods I could bring into my work.

Since I graduated in 2020, I’ve used art in many different forms, and over the past six years I’ve tried to bring art and activism together, mainly around environmental conservation and women’s rights.

Doing art as a woman here isn’t easy. Dogmas around culture, religion and tradition mean most forms of art are considered haram, or forbidden. Even inside the art community, I’ve found a kind of disgust towards certain forms of art, with people saying some things are too provocative or politically wrong. But reading monthly data on femicide and violence against women has pushed me further to try to use elements of the culture and society I grew up in to try to break the red lines set for women.

What was the Feminine Project?

It was a project I started in 2020, in which I collected clothes from women who had faced violence. I went door to door across thousands of homes in the city and surrounding towns to interview the women and collect a piece of clothing along with their story. I stitched the pieces together and hung them along a five-kilometre stretch of the city’s main street, leading from the main court to the public park.

This was my idea of a peaceful protest. Women here can’t speak openly about the violence they face. If they did, they’d face immediate backlash. Their clothes themselves carry shame. When women hang their washing out, they cover their underwear so it isn’t seen by anyone. I wanted to show that not even women’s clothes have the freedom to be touched by the sun, let alone the women themselves.

I put up a public installation rather than a gallery, because I wanted the public exposed to it, not just the small art community that already agrees with these ideas. By the end of the first day, people started tearing the piece down and burning parts of it, and it triggered a huge backlash online and offline.

What project did you work on then?

After the Feminine Project, I had thousands of stories from the women I’d interviewed. So in late 2022 I started my Voice Project. I turned the stories into a two-minute speech carrying the weight of all of it: honour killing, suicide, violence. Women here are expected to keep a low voice and never give their opinion. Decisions are made for them by men. So I created a voice for them.

I played the message through 66 synchronised speakers across four cities and three surrounding towns in Sulaymaniyah province, all at the same time. I used megaphones deliberately. They’re symbolically loaded because they are used in mosques by mullahs for the call to prayer. In most countries, anyone can speak, but here it’s always a man’s voice, whether it’s calling people to prayer or selling groceries. I wanted to show women also had a voice.

This caused an even bigger backlash than the first project. People started shutting down the speakers, and the mullahs pushed to bring me to court, accusing me of an immoral act against our culture, religion and tradition. They accused me of promoting homosexuality, which genuinely surprised me, because the piece was straightforwardly about violence against women. When the judge called me in for a statement, he asked whether I was promoting ‘queer ideology’. I replied that my work promotes individual freedom. The case was eventually dismissed, but I had to get out of the country and stay away for a few weeks until things settled down.

I think the backlash comes from the visibility. The art community is tiny, and art typically stays inside galleries where very few people see it. But when you bring it out into the public space, it exposes feelings the public didn’t know were there.

How do you manage the risks that this work brings?

For the Feminine Project, building trust with the women was very difficult. I had to reassure them I wasn’t taking photos or recording their voices, and let them check this was true. Even then, some rejected the idea outright, saying things like, ‘So what are you going to do, are you superwoman? Things won’t change’, or accusing me of trying to destroy their families.

None of the clothes in the final installation were tied to a name, so the women’s safety was protected. That meant all the pressure landed on me. I come from a very traditional, religious family who never approved of me going into art. When I was preparing the Feminine Project, I told them I was doing charity work. When the truth came out, there was a huge conflict at home, including violence. But this didn’t make me back down. Instead, it made me more determined.

I know that by undertaking these projects I risk being taken to court, being denied permission to work or receiving online smears and threats. But if I don’t do this, who will? I’m proud of what I’ve done and I’ll keep doing it.

What support have you received?

There are always going to be people for and against, but honestly, most public reaction leans against this kind of work. But I’ve also received some encouragement. Following the Feminine and Voice projects, many women contacted me anonymously to tell me how much relief the work gave them, as someone was finally saying what they’d wanted to say themselves.

However, most of the support I receive comes from outside Iraq. After the Voice Project, I was blacklisted and I couldn’t get any funding or permission for public installations, so I started applying for international prizes instead.

In 2023 I was shortlisted for the Future Generation Art Prize in Ukraine, out of 12,000 applications, for an installation building a bridge between Kurdish women’s experience of violence and war and Ukrainian women living through the current conflict, and I won the special prize in 2024. I also received the Alpine Fellowship Visual Art Prize in 2023 and the Prince Claus Seed Award in 2025. Researchers have written papers about my work, and in 2025, I showed a rough-cut documentary about the Voice Project in Warsaw and an indoor installation about Kurdish women’s experience in Kraków, Poland. That international attention keeps me going, and I use the exposure and funding to keep building pressure back home.

How do you collaborate with others?

I work as an individual artist. I bring in craftspeople and freelancers to help make each piece, but most of them ask me not to use their names. They want the money, not the association. I always explain the risk honestly to people, and many back out.

When I can, I bring in local women to do the work and pay them. For the Feminine Project I had dozens of women doing the sewing. For my environmental work, I try to involve as many women and young people as possible. For a water festival in 2025, I made giant puppets out of reed and recycled biodegradable material alongside 20 people, running workshops over 10 days so they could learn to use art to deliver their own messages.

Collaboration carries risk. When I ran a seminar on art and peace, security forces raided it on the second day and took me in for questioning. But my message to anyone facing suppression or violence is not to be afraid. Talk about it; bring it out into the open. You don’t have to be accepted by a corrupted environment around you to accept yourself.

For me, art is a whole universe you can fit everything into: your ideas, your beautiful things and the problems around you. You can use art to try to fix things. It’s the only weapon that doesn’t hurt or kill.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

GET IN TOUCH
Website
Instagram

SEE ALSO
Iraq: ‘The proposed amendments to the Personal Status Law are an attack on women’s rights’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Mohammed Juma 07.Dec.2024
Iraq: ‘Tolerance for abuses against LGBTQI+ people has now been made explicit through legislation’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Sarah Sanbar 26.Jun.2024
Iraq: ‘We’ve submitted many bills, but parliament refuses to adopt a law against GBV’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Alyaa Al Ansari 07.Mar.2022

 

 

 

 

A street market in Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city. Residents are anxious about high inflation and also fear recent floods will drive food prices higher. Credit: Ant/IPS

By Guy Dinmore, and a reporter in Yangon
YANGON, Myanmar, Sep 23 2026 (IPS)

Isolated and at constant war with itself, Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis is deepening as global challenges far exceed the capacity to respond of a military regime increasingly focused on its own survival.

The climate crisis, soaring commodity prices triggered by wars in Europe and the Middle East, plus worldwide cuts in donor aid are all hitting Myanmar hard. The regime’s inability to govern a fragmented and restive country with nearly four million internally displaced people has been exposed to the full since it seized power over five years ago.

Widespread floods caused by heavy monsoon rains since July have affected over 470,000 people, according to an assessment by the World Health Organization. Cases of malaria and dengue have been increasing, as well as outbreaks of cholera.

“Everyone is starving and cut off. Yes, everyone is facing food shortages,” said an activist calling himself Bruce, describing the situation in Shwebo township in the north-central Sagaing region, one of the main conflict zones and rice transshipment centres hit by floods.

Local and international aid organisations struggle to get help through conflict zones where the military is fighting a shifting array of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and local resistance groups while syphoning off what it can.

“Armed hostilities, movement restrictions and administrative requirements continue to block access, underscoring the need for safe, sustained and unhindered humanitarian reach to vulnerable communities,” the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said in a July bulletin.

“Myanmar remains one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises, with more than 16 million people in need as conflict, displacement, protection risks and access constraints intensify urgent needs nationwide,” OCHA said, noting that by end-March “humanitarian partners” had managed to reach 1.6 million people.

Floods have driven up food prices, already exacerbated by rising costs of fuel and fertilisers caused by Russia’s war on Ukraine and Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz following attacks by the US and Israel.

All sides exact a price in Myanmar, Bruce said, with cargo trucks moving north from the regime-controlled city of Mandalay to Shwebo having to pay fees at multiple military checkpoints and those run by other armed groups. Farmers in neighbouring Shan state growing rice and tomatoes are also facing “devastating losses” and being driven into deep poverty, he said.

Shwebo has experienced power blackouts of up to 20 consecutive days. As darkness falls, residents do not dare venture outside for fear of forced conscription by the regime, especially in rural areas. Households pay levies to avoid conscription, even those with only single women.

Some people are being forced into a second round of conscription as the military struggles to replenish its ranks, stretched across the country. Over 100,000 people have been conscripted, according to some estimates.

At night authorities inspect mobile phones. If they find online games, evidence of Starlink use or unauthorised communication devices then the individuals are immediately taken for military service.

Inflation and extortion reach deep into prisons too, said Bruce, a former political prisoner. Skin diseases like scabies are common, and the cost of a particular drug bought by relatives has soared more than eight times, while even traditional medicines like neem leaves have gone up fivefold.

Prison staff and those manning checkpoints even take their cuts of peanut snacks, driving up prices paid by prisoners.

The numbers displaced by conflict continue to rise. Fighting in the central Magway region in recent months has added over 200,000 more since May, according to some UN estimates. People fleeing conflict are moving to safer areas, but host communities have limited capacity to accommodate them.

U Than is a farmer in the Ayeyarwady delta and was struggling to make ends meet even before recent floods hit the major rice-growing region, destroying crops and jeopardising the next planting season. Fortunately his land has been spared destruction, but everyone is keeping a close eye on nearby levees.

“Farming has become a cycle of borrowing just to survive,” he said, complaining that the cost of fertiliser has risen five-fold and that fuel is increasingly expensive and difficult to obtain.

“We are working harder, borrowing more, and spending more, but the income from our harvest is no longer enough to cover the cost of farming or even our basic living expenses.” Families are forced to cut back their spending on health and education.

Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city, feels somewhat insulated from the recent natural disasters and ongoing civil war. But inflation is hitting the pockets of its six million people, including city officials and their families, who squeeze more money from residents on trumped-up charges or bribes to avoid conscription.

“The junta stooges are resorting to all sorts of methods, legal or illegal, to recruit people while at the same time making money in the process,” one long-time resident told IPS.

“Life in Yangon is morphing into a new normal, with people feeling less safe about their lives as crimes are widespread. So many cases of theft and robberies go unreported or under-reported.”

A cholera outbreak in central Yangon in August, the second in two years, was blamed on poor hygiene among street vendors whose cheap food is even more attractive as inflation bites. The regime responded by shutting down their businesses in six city townships. Outbreaks have also been reported in Sittwe, one of the last regime strongholds in Rakhine State, as well as flood-affected areas.

Reports that CCTV artificial intelligence and facial scanning technology were deployed at a checkpoint in Mandalay city have raised fears that the regime is adopting widespread surveillance controls pioneered by China, its closest ally.

Min Aung Hlaing, leader of the 2021 coup, has proved resilient and uncompromising in directing a brutal retaliation against the popular resistance and was confident enough to swap his general’s uniform for a civilian suit as president after tightly orchestrated elections this year.

The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, set up by the UN Human Rights Council, stated in its annual report that its findings “show a pattern of deliberate aerial attacks on civilians, arbitrary detentions, torture and sexual violence committed by the Myanmar military.”

The military escalated its aerial attacks and other crimes against civilians in the lead-up to the elections, and these have continued unabated, the IIMM said, listing the targeting of homes, schools, medical facilities, religious buildings and camps for internally displaced persons.

“This underscores the urgent need to hold those responsible to account,” it said. The IIMM is also investigating alleged atrocities involving armed groups opposed to the military.

For the moment, accountability seems a distant prospect, at best.

Since Min Aung Hlaing’s assumption of the presidency in April, the former general has been accepted on official visits to Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, India, China, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand. The Trump administration has not rolled out the red carpet but has eased sanctions against some of the regime elite and is engaging on matters of particular concern to the US, such as scam centres.

The regime’s growing de facto recognition abroad poses a further threat to the struggling efforts to exert its authority in liberated areas by the parallel National Unity Government (NUG). Established by lawmakers ousted in 2021 when Aung San Suu Kyi and other prominent leaders were jailed, the NUG managed to conclude agreements in March with several major ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) in an attempt to forge a unified political and military resistance.

Calling themselves the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), the alliance has stated its commitment to a negotiated political solution that would end military rule and exclude the generals from politics.

“To get there we’re pursuing all available avenues, including military means,” a senior resistance official told IPS.

However, there is scepticism that Min Aung Hlaing will deal with the new collective entity and will continue to insist on bilateral ceasefire talks with individual EAOs while refusing to recognise the NUG as an interlocutor. Several major armed groups dependant to varying degrees on neighbouring China have also kept the SCEF at arm’s length.

“Substantive negotiations between the Tatmadaw [the Myanmar military] and SCEF members are likely to prove challenging,” Morgan Michaels, a southeast Asia defence expert, wrote in a recent analysis for the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

“Meaningful progress in Myanmar – whether political, economic or humanitarian – would need to start with a broad conflict de-escalation, which at a minimum would require ceasefires between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs. Unfortunately, the path to de-escalation is likely to be long and fraught with dilemmas.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

 

 

 

Related Articles

• Myanmar Looks Back in Fear and Anger after Military Coup
• Life-Changing Humanitarians Empower Women Against Violence in Papua New Guinea’s Highlands
• https://www.ipsnews.net/2026/09/life-changing-humanitarians-empower-women-against-violence-in-papua-new-guineas-highlands/

Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and Afro-descendant Peoples protest exclusion and lack of recognition at the UNCCD COP17 in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. Credit: Lucas Wasson for Rights and Resources Initiative

By Bayarsaikhan Namsrai, Gregoria Jimenez Amaya, Isabel Davila Pereira and Stephen Basele
ULAANBAATAR, Mongolia, Sep 23 2026 (IPS)

Rightsholders came to Ulaanbaatar from across the world, carrying declarations, demands and years of experience defending the lands on which their communities depend. Indigenous Peoples, local communities, Afro-descendant Peoples, women and youth were equally clear about what they needed from COP17. But being in the room is not the same as having power in the room.

In a year when the International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists and the three Rio Conventions were supposed to create momentum for rights, recognition and implementation, the negotiations showed how quickly those gains can be diluted when the people concerned are not able to shape the language that governs their lands.

What happened in Ulaanbaatar should concern anyone advancing land restoration, climate resilience and biodiversity conservation. These cannot succeed while the rights of the people who govern these landscapes remain negotiable.

Ahead of COP17, the demands were clear: 2026 could not be a symbolic year. It had to be a year when secure and customary tenure for Indigenous Peoples, local communities, pastoralists, Afro-descendant Peoples, women and youth was translated into real protections and implementation across the Rio Conventions.

Pastoralists, Mobile Peoples, Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant Peoples and local communities are proven leaders in land stewardship, biodiversity conservation and climate resilience. Achieving global restoration goals requires recognizing their rights, knowledge and leadership.

Secure and flexible tenure and mobility rights were an urgent ask in the context of the IYRP. RRI’s legal analysis of seven countries found that only Nepal and Niger recognize pastoralists as distinct rightsholders and only Niger considers mobility as a fundamental right. Even where rights exist on paper, they routinely fail against agricultural encroachment, mining, conservation expansion and green energy projects. Tenure should not be secondary to these initiatives, but a pre-condition before any projects are attempted in community lands.

Communities requested land and customary governance rights as a formal and permanent agenda item following past land tenure decisions, with customary institutions recognized as implementing bodies rather than consulted stakeholders and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) as a precondition for any Land Degradation Neutrality action.

Finance is not a technical question. It is a question of power. At a COP supposedly focused on implementation, it should have been a central matter that communities cannot implement priorities they did not define, using resources they do not control. Yet too much climate, biodiversity and land finance still travels through institutions far removed from the communities whose territories generate environmental benefits.

For communities, direct and flexible finance is about more than getting money to the last mile. It is about trusting organizations and customary institutions to decide what resilience, restoration and development mean in their own territories.

Rightsholders were ready to advance their distinct rights during COP17. The presence of pastoralists at COP17 was significant, but presence alone does not translate into influence. Pastoralists arrived organized, with a global declaration and clear demands, yet the experience of the negotiations showed that meaningful participation requires more than being present in the conference halls. It requires the knowledge, resources, relationships and sustained capacity to follow negotiating texts, understand procedures, build alliances and influence language as decisions are being shaped.

On Land and People Day, the Indigenous Peoples Caucus delivered the Sacred Lands Declaration directly to the UNCCD Executive Secretary, demanding recognition grounded in self-determination, a permanent seat on the Committee on Science and Technology, and a dedicated fund for Indigenous-led restoration.

The local communities caucus asked for institutional status equal to the Indigenous Peoples’, Gender and Youth Caucuses rather than as a facilitative mechanism sidelined when convenient, plus a self-determined representation model and sustained funding for its operation.

Afro-descendant Peoples asked for what the other two Rio Conventions have already conceded: to be named. Afro-descendant Peoples across Latin America and the Caribbean steward territories degraded or acutely at risk — drylands, deforested frontiers, dry forests, riverine and coastal lands. They asked the UNCCD to open an Afro-descendant desertification agenda for the first time.

Women’s demands cut across all of this. Parties have built agreed gender language across three COPs. The ask was that it hold and be implemented.

For youth, being called “the future” has become another way of postponing their participation in the present. Young rightsholders are already living the consequences of drought, shrinking mobility, changing economies and pressures on their territories. They are not waiting to inherit these challenges. What they need is more than a voice now, it is representation, resources and authority in the institutions making decisions about their future. Their minimum requests included recognition as drivers of present-day adaptation, a permanent space within UNCCD processes, culturally appropriate education, and direct financing for youth-led organizations.

How the Negotiations Went

Based on prior COP decisions, COP17 should have been the continuation of a road towards implementation. Instead, the days in Ulaanbaatar became much more focused on protecting past progress rather than operationalizing it.

The institutional failures began on day one. At the opening plenary on 17 August, only two State Parties objected to agenda items, yet no vote was held and instead the presidency provisionally adopted the agenda. Future Strategic Framework, synergies with other conventions, gender, and participation of civil society were all deferred pending consultation. The COP closed with no decision at all on civil society participation, the Riyadh mandate to bring the Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus and the Local Communities’ Caucus to full Terms of Reference under Decision 5/COP.16 was pushed to COP18, and Rio synergies were removed from all decisions. Gender never reached the negotiation floor; instead, a quiet Gender Caucus convened in Plenary as the agenda block was sustained.

Still, IYRP advocacy proved successful to some extent. Parties agreed to recognize the critical role of pastoralists as stewards of rangeland ecosystems, including the importance of transboundary mobility. However, compromise language was adopted, replacing “traditional knowledge” with “knowledge accumulated by pastoralists” in order to remove wording related to Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

This distinction matters. Pastoralist knowledge is not simply a body of information accumulated over time; it is embedded in living institutions, relationships, territories and systems of customary governance. When knowledge is separated from the peoples and institutions that hold and transmit it, it becomes a technical resource while the rights and authority of its holders remain unrecognized. Draft decisions on land tenure and sand and dust storms also advanced, but only by leaving the naming of rightsholders behind. The lack of language on Indigenous Peoples and local communities was one of the biggest gaps. Many negotiators backed Indigenous Peoples’ and local communities’ rights in plenary, but behind closed doors, agreed to language so general it protects no one in particular. Language proposed replacing references to Indigenous Peoples with “common places” or “common people.” In the land tenure text, “affected areas” was pushed toward “common areas,” a phrase with no grounding in any multilateral mechanism and no obligations attached.

This dilution of language is particularly consequential as pressure on rangelands grows from competing global agendas. Rangelands are increasingly being presented as spaces for carbon sequestration, renewable energy, conservation and large-scale restoration, often without adequately recognizing the pastoralists who already govern and steward these landscapes.

And this is where the politics of rangelands becomes unavoidable.

Rangelands are increasingly being seen as spaces for carbon, renewable energy, conservation and large-scale restoration. The danger is that landscapes already governed and stewarded by pastoralists begin to be treated as empty spaces available for solving someone else’s global environmental problem.

A green transition cannot become a new form of land dispossession.

If pastoralists are displaced in the name of renewable energy, excluded in the name of conservation, or turned into carbon credits in the name of climate action, then changing the colour of development does not change its underlying politics.

Climate, biodiversity and land restoration objectives must not be pursued by treating pastoralist territories as empty spaces or global environmental infrastructure while sidelining the people whose livelihoods, cultures and institutions are rooted in them.

The same principle applies to emerging carbon and other environmental markets. Pastoralist rangelands cannot be reduced to carbon sinks whose value is defined externally while the cumulative ecological, economic and cultural value of pastoralism remains invisible. Any financing or market mechanism operating in these territories must begin with secure tenure, meaningful participation, Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), and fair recognition of the rights and contributions of pastoralist communities.

Right through the final day, negotiators discussed whether to reference synergies among the Rio Conventions, and whether to include gender at all. These questions were either resolved by adopting ambiguous and broad language that betrays the protection from past COP decisions or by simply delaying any decisions to COP18.

Across every draft negotiating text currently available, rangelands, drought, sand and dust storms, land tenure, Afro-descendant Peoples do not appear at all. Not contested and diluted; simply absent. On the year of the three Rio Conventions, this demonstrates how UNCCD is lagging. CBD Decision 16/6 made the Convention on Biological Diversity the first Rio Convention to name them explicitly and at UNFCCC COP30 they appeared in core negotiating text. The bridge that could have carried that recognition into the UNCCD was the synergies item blocked on day one. These synergies are urgent to deal with the intersections across climate, land degradation and biodiversity conservation.

When it came to drought, the COP also fell short. Decision ICCD/COP(17)/L.15 runs to four operative paragraphs: continue discussions at COP18 with a view to adopting a decision on proactive drought management; make drought a stand-alone agenda item; ask the secretariat and Global Mechanism to keep supporting Parties; and report back. After deferring at COP16 and again here, the working group toward a binding instrument did not materialize; the next window is 2028. In the current text, Indigenous Peoples and local communities appear as people affected by drought and consulted, rather than as rightsholders.

COP17 presented an unprecedented situation in which a small number of Parties blocked key issues from meaningful consideration. There is no Land Degradation Neutrality without human rights, no resilience without gender equality, no sustainable land governance without Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant Peoples and local communities.

COP17 also taught us something uncomfortable about participation. It is possible to be visible everywhere at a COP and still have very little influence over what finally enters the negotiating text.

Influence requires preparation. It requires people who understand the Convention, know the procedures, follow the text, build relationships with negotiators, organize across constituencies and remain engaged long after the cameras leave. Pastoralist movements have strong knowledge of their lands and livelihoods. What they need now is equal investment in the political and technical capacity required to defend that knowledge and those rights in global decision-making spaces.

If pastoralists want to shape the next COP, they cannot only prepare declarations. They must prepare negotiators.

What Happens Next

The answer cannot be another declaration.

The remaining COPs of 2026 must turn recognition into implementation. That means three things: name the peoples whose rights are at stake; put resources directly into the hands of their organizations and institutions; and give them meaningful authority over the decisions affecting their territories.

At CBD COP17 and UNFCCC COP31, Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant Peoples and local communities must be recognized as rights-holders and implementing partners, not folded into generic “vulnerable groups” language. At UNCCD COP18, the gains made on pastoralists, tenure and customary governance must not be allowed to disappear into vague language.

But the responsibility does not rest with the conventions alone. Pastoralist movements must also build the capacity to influence these processes. The period between COPs must be used to coordinate positions, prepare negotiators, track decisions and negotiating texts, build alliances across the Rio Conventions and engage governments between sessions. Pastoralist organizations need investment not only to attend COPs, but to understand and shape what happens inside them.

COP18 must deliver the adoption of Terms of Reference for the Indigenous Peoples’ and Local Communities’ Caucuses, restore gender and synergies to the agenda, open an Afro-descendant desertification agenda, advance a drought decision with the communities who live its consequences first, and restore the full recognition of traditional knowledge.

Vague language does not merely fail to establish obligations. It blurs the content of rights and leaves earned recognition in a regression limbo.

Naming peoples is the beginning of recognition, not the end of it. Recognition must lead to rights, rights must be backed by institutions and finance, and those institutions must have the authority to shape the decisions that affect their territories.

The peoples who shepherd the vast majority of the world’s lands do not need another symbolic year. They need their names written into the decisions, and their voices, institutions and authority protected long after the COP is over.

Bayarsaikhan Namsrai (Steps Without Borders), Gregoria Jimenez Amaya (CITAFRO/ODECO), Isabel Davila Pereira (Rights and Resources Initiative), Stephen Basele (Pastoralist Goals Foundation)

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

Helen Clarkson, CEO, Climate Group at Climate Week NYC. Credit: Climate Group

By Naureen Hossain
NEW YORK, Sep 22 2026 (IPS)

The Climate Group’s annual conference in New York City has attracted thousands of attendees this year, among them world leaders, corporate heads, philanthropists, and climate advocates. Those leaders present at the opening ceremony of Climate Week have made clear calls to collectively tackle climate issues.

Climate Week NYC’s opening ceremony and conference began on Monday in conjunction with the United Nations General Assembly Debate and High-Level Week (21-29 September). In addition to the main conference, held in the Glass House on 12th Avenue, there are multiple events hosted across New York City—more than 1,500. This is slated to be the biggest Climate Week yet, according to the Climate Group, the organizers of this week-long event.

Each year, Climate Week focuses on the most urgent issues when it comes to tackling climate change, from the transition to renewable energy, corporate and government responsibility, and scaling climate and economic progress.

The consequences of climate change, including extreme weather events, rising temperatures, and sea levels, are being felt worldwide. Global conflicts like the war between Russia and Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East have disrupted the world’s energy supply of oil and gas, which has put developed and developing countries alike in prolonged stress over energy needs.

Australian PM M Anthony Albanese. Credit: Climate Group

It is the latter point that the day’s first speakers urged on, as even in the face of mounting evidence that clean energy is more affordable, countries still rely on fossil fuels. But blaming the situation solely on fossil fuel companies would not be accurate. Helen Clarkson, the founder of Climate Group, pointed out in her opening remarks that incumbents still use and rely on fossil fuels for their energy needs. She also pointed her finger at right-wing pundits in traditional and social media that spread misinformation about renewable energy and politicians who “weaponize people’s fear.” Meanwhile, some leaders and even media outlets choose not to use the word ‘climate’ in relation to these issues in a form of erasure or denial. Silence is a form of inaction, Clarkson noted soberly, and that inaction leads to more climate change.

“It’s time to face the truth, and that’s hard in a world where truth has lost so much of its currency. But the truth is, we’ve been making ourselves smaller and quiet at the exact moment we should be bigger and louder,” said Clarkson.

Climate and nature loss should also be treated as a matter of national security, said Ed Miliband, the United Kingdom’s Foreign Minister. Miliband, who served as the energy secretary under Prime Ministers Gordon Brown and Keir Starmer, remarked that climate destruction was once treated as a peripheral matter that was separate from economic growth or energy security. The job growth in the clean energy sector proves their potential for a sustainable transition. The latest conflicts in Ukraine and Iran underline the dependence of countries on fossil fuels while also highlighting the “energy independent imperative” of clean energy.

Ed Miliband, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom at Climate Week. Credit: Climate Group

Countries struggle with the overlapping consequences driven by climate change, for they are no longer confined to borders. In 2026 alone, over 150 million hectares burned in the first four months. This year has also confirmed a “super” El Niño that will likely drive global recorded temperatures and extreme weather events to new levels.

“This is why these facts, what is happening in our world, and why climate breakdown, in my view, must be an issue for foreign ministers and prime ministers, as well as energy and climate ministers,” said Miliband.

Miliband recommended governments pool information on climate issues so that it can be used to inform forecasts and early warning systems to “[act] before the crisis hits, rather than picking up the pieces afterwards.”

This sense of collective responsibility between countries was the core of the keynote speech, delivered by Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.

“The global community cannot afford to be frozen in time while the world falls around us,” said Albanese. “Australia understands the dangers of global warming and the emergency of climate action as well as any nation. We’ve seen it up close from increasingly intense bushfires and floods.”

Albanese also spoke to the specific context of the Pacific region, where states are uniquely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and have been among the most vocal advocates for climate action. He cited Australia’s efforts to fund and support Pacific Island states in their climate resilience plans. There is also the Pacific Resilience Facility, established last year, which he claimed was the first Pacific-led climate financing mechanism.

Adopting climate-friendly and sustainable initiatives is possible and better in the longterm to build necessary resilience. Iceland provides one such example, as a country that holds geothermal reserves but had been running on imported oil until the early 1970s during the oil crisis that disrupted their supplies. Through financing, political will, and cutting-edge technology, Iceland began developing large-scale geothermal heating districts across the country. Today, over 90 percent of households in Iceland are heated by geothermal energy. For Prime Minister Kristrún Frostadóttir, the lesson that countries should take from their example is to invest in climate-friendly infrastructure and initiatives before the next shock.

“The transition each of you is managing—in energy, in supply chains, in infrastructure, in economic competitiveness—won’t be won by the country or the company that reacts fastest to the next disruption. It’ll be won by the one that has already built the capacity to absorb it, years before it arrives. Resilience, in other words, isn’t a response. It’s a foundation you pour long before anyone tells you the storm is coming,” Frostadóttir said.

As Frostadóttir and the other world leaders remarked in their addresses, the solutions to climate change already exist. But it will require an equal measure of financing and political will to push through with the necessary steps. It cannot be a matter of waiting for the next climate or geopolitical shock to adopt those changes.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

 

 

 

Treating the polycrisis as one undifferentiated agenda has never worked; treating them as three coherent families might. Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IPS

By External Source
APEX, North Carolina / SAN FRANCISCO, California / VIENNA, Austria / SHEFFIELD, United Kingdom / GENEVA, Switzerland, Sep 22 2026 (IPS)

In March 2025, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres launched “UN80”. Recognizing that the world is in a state of dramatic and rapid change at a time when funding for the UN is under threat from budget cuts, Guterres declared that, on the anniversary of the UN’s 80th birthday, a review of its work was long overdue. Now, UN80 is coming to a head with a set of recommendations that cover almost every aspect of the UN’s work.

Some of the recommendations are focused on reducing budgets. With some major governments cutting their funding and heavily in arrears, the UN needs to cut its spending.

The current target is a reduction of roughly 20%. This has already resulted in a decision to shift staff from high-cost duty stations like New York or Geneva, to lower-cost locations such as Bonn and Nairobi.

There has also been more “structural and programmatic alignment”—in other words, finding ways to make different parts of the UN work together more efficiently, or even merge different groups. So far, this has included the UN General Assembly agreeing to merge the UN System Staff College (UNSSC) and the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) into the UN Institute for Capability and Learning Innovation.

On the research side, the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) has been integrated into the UN University. Meanwhile, the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) has been absorbed into the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Finally, in the development agenda, there have been proposals to merge the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and to join together the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women, while also integrating the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) into existing programs.

 

Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation: Improving Multilateral Environment Agreements

But what about all-important environmental issues? Does UN80 address the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution?

The short answer is, yes. UN80 includes “Work Package 27” dealing with the environment. We are delighted to see the inclusion of several issues we believe would improve how multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are organized, including the idea of “clustering.”

The UN80 process of the past 18 months has generated some excellent ideas. The window for acting on them is narrower than it looks: a new Secretary-General takes office in January 2027, and proposals that have not been anchored in a mandate by then will be inherited by someone who did not make them. Now is the time to bring them to fruition

Over the past year, we have advocated taking up an idea first mooted by UNEP’s Executive Director Klaus Töpfer back in the 2000s. He proposed grouping—or clustering—MEAs and making them work more closely and effectively together. These could be grouped along the lines of the triple planetary crisis (or “polycrisis”): (i) chemicals, waste and pollution; (ii) biodiversity loss and (iii) climate change.

The logic of the groupings matters. Chemicals and waste are fundamentally about pollution and health; biodiversity is about conservation and sustainable use, while climate change sits at the nexus of these challenges. This means effectively exploiting all synergies. Treating the polycrisis as one undifferentiated agenda has never worked; treating them as three coherent families might.

Achim Steiner, who took over from Töpfer as Executive Director of UNEP in 2006, made the first attempt at clustering. The chemicals and waste conventions—Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm—agreed a synergies process that produced joint decisions and, from 2010, back-to-back conferences of the parties, a shared secretariat structure and common administrative services.

It has been largely a success on the terms it set itself: it improved collaboration and cut costs, even if programmatic integration has gone less far than administrative integration.

Steiner also started efforts to cluster MEAs focused on biodiversity. However, this process was never completed. We believe UN80 provides an ideal opportunity for this to be revisited and moved forward.

We are pleased to see that UN80 recommends establishing “a time-limited, independent and regionally representative Consultative Group of Ministers or High-level representatives of UN Member States to evaluate benefits, feasibility and possible options for MEA consolidation.” (Action 5.1)

This group should focus on two areas: clustering the three biodiversity conventions administered by UNEP—the Convention on Biological Diversity, CITES and the Convention on Migratory Species—with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework as a unifying umbrella; and bringing the Minamata Convention on Mercury closer to the other chemicals and waste MEAs (Basel, Rotterdam, Stockholm).

If achieved, such clustering would strengthen both the treaties seeking to address biodiversity loss and those dealing with chemicals and waste.

Clustering the three UNEP-administered biodiversity conventions is only the start: working relationships will also be needed with the biodiversity-related conventions outside UNEP—Ramsar (wetlands), World Heritage, the Plant Treaty, and Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) —and with the other Rio conventions.

We already have more than a decade of experience of what the chemicals and waste cluster has achieved and believe there is much to learn from it, and to replicate.

 

Better Science

Another recommendation that should be implemented is the better coordination of environmental science, and closer links between science and policy.

This matters because so many environmental issues, such as biodiversity loss and climate change, are interlinked. Connecting the scientific work in these areas helps us “join the dots” and also develop and implement better policy.

The UN80’s recommendations include several very good ones on science coordination and science policy. For instance, it proposes that we:

• “Institutionalize a periodic science–policy dialogue anchored in UNEP’s science function that informs UNEA, as well as MEAs and other UN entities governing-bodies, as appropriate.” (Action 2.1)
• “Promote structured coordination and collaboration among chairs of MEA scientific and technical bodies and other science-policy interfaces, using existing mechanisms while respecting mandates.” (Action 3.1)
• “Build a user-driven, modern knowledge ecosystem and repository of environmental science and knowledge as a shared UN asset, linking country-to-global data and existing science platforms through shared standards and interoperable search.” (Action 3.2)

These are also the cheapest recommendations on the list, and the ones with the widest benefit. It is worth making this very clear at a moment when everything is being weighed against a 20% savings target: coordination costs very little and duplication costs a great deal.

With the global community appearing to be so divided and splintered across so many issues, we understand that not all ideas will command universal support.

This is why we applaud the idea of developing “coalitions of the willing” or communities of practice around various MEAs. We believe UNEP can and should play a convening role in this, as well as related discussions about how the Rio treaties dealing with climate change, desertification and biodiversity loss can work more closely and effectively together.

 

Environmental Interlinkages

When UNEP was set up in 1972, one of its key missions was to help coordinate environmental work by different UN bodies. Much of this has fractured over the years as new MEAs and organizations have emerged to address major environmental issues like climate change. However, we believe it is time to reinvigorate UNEP’s mission.

UN80 addresses this by proposing that the UN’s Environment Management Group (which is chaired by the head of UNEP) should:

• “Develop and roll-out a new EMG strategy and operating model. (Action 4.1)
• “Adopt a common UN system-wide results framework for environmental mainstreaming.” (Action 4.2)
• “Establish effective linkages with the UN Secretary-General and key governing bodies (e.g., UNEA, World Health Assembly, Human Rights Council, World Meteorological Congress, etc.).” (Action 4.3)

It is worth being clear about which of these the UN can simply decide to do, and which it cannot. The science function, the knowledge ecosystem and a reinvigorated Environment Management Group are Secretariat matters: they can be delivered by the UN system itself. Clustering conventions is not.

MEAs are autonomous treaties, and only their Parties can agree to consolidate them. That is precisely why Action 5.1 proposes a group of ministers rather than an administrative decision—and why governments, not officials, will determine whether this part of UN80 goes anywhere.

 

Strengthening Political Leadership

What else should be done? In 2025, we proposed reintroducing the Global Ministerial Environment Forum—a body that met annually through the 2000s in conjunction with UNEP’s Governing Council, until it was superseded by the creation of the UN Environment Assembly. The Forum’s goal was to elevate discussions on environmental issues to a high political level.

Work Package 27 suggests a slightly different approach, but with similar aims. It suggests a Global Environment Leaders’ Summit, to be held every four years and attended by heads of state and government. We support this (or similar) initiatives intended to bring presidents and prime ministers to the table. In short, we need decision makers at the highest level coming together to address global environmental matters.

But four years is almost too long given the speed and acceleration of global environmental change. A simpler answer is available: a ministerial segment attached to each session of the Environment Assembly, which already meets every two years and already has universal membership, with a leaders’ summit every four. That adds almost no additional costs, and it builds political attention into a cycle that already exists rather than competing with it.

 

A New Secretary-General — and the Question of Who Carries This Forward

There is one complication none of this can avoid. UN80 is António Guterres’ initiative, and his term ends in December 2026. The recommendations in Work Package 27 have been prepared for a Secretary-General who will not be in office to implement them.

Whoever succeeds him will inherit these proposals rather than own them—and on the evidence of the selection process so far, will arrive with no particular commitment to them. Eight candidates have published vision statements and taken part in interactive dialogues with the General Assembly since April.

So, what can we expect? Continuity on the efficiency agenda, almost certainly. Every candidate has endorsed UN80 in some form, and the Organization’s financial position leaves little choice.

Several have committed to sustained mandate discipline, which the General Assembly’s March 2026 resolution on the creation, implementation and review of mandates now underpins. That is genuinely useful, and over time it should reduce reporting burdens across the system.

But it carries a risk worth naming. Mandate discipline affects Secretariat mandates. It does not reach the treaty bodies, whose mandates are made by their own Parties.

If an incoming Secretary-General treats Work Package 27 primarily as a savings exercise, clustering becomes consolidation by austerity. This means the functions most likely to be cut are precisely those with no treaty constituency to defend them: science coordination, the knowledge ecosystem, the Environment Management Group.

Two practical conclusions follow. The first is that the Consultative Group proposed under Action 5.1 should be established now, with a mandate and a reporting line designed to survive the transition, rather than left to a successor to constitute. The second is that in whatever dialogue remains before the appointment, candidates should be asked a question none has yet been put to them: what do you intend to do with Work Package 27?

 

Optimism and Action

The suggestions in UN80 and Work Package 27 offer a new approach to environmental issues and show great potential. A more empowered UNEP could provide stronger systemwide coordination across the UN and significantly enhance the integration and coherence of science, policy, and environmental protection.

To succeed, decision makers will need to be bold and to move forward quickly and decisively. The UN80 process of the past 18 months has generated some excellent ideas. The window for acting on them is narrower than it looks: a new Secretary-General takes office in January 2027, and proposals that have not been anchored in a mandate by then will be inherited by someone who did not make them. Now is the time to bring them to fruition.

 

Prof. Felix Dodds and Chris Spence have participated in United Nations talks on climate change and other environmental negotiations since the 1990s. They co-edited Heroes of Environmental Diplomacy: Profiles in Courage (Routledge, 2022) and wrote Environmental Lobbying at the United Nations: A Guide to Protecting Our Planet (Routledge, 2025). Their next book, Political Heroes of the Environment: Profiles in Courage, is due for release in 2027.

Hugo-Maria Schally is former Head of the Multilateral Environmental Cooperation Unit at the Directorate-General for Environment, European Commission.

Peter Bridgewater is an Associate Researcher at the Advanced Wellbeing Research Centre, Sheffield Hallam University, UK.; Adjunct Professor at the University of Canberra, Australia; a former Director of the Division of Ecological Sciences in UNESCO; and former Secretary General of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands.

Craig Boljkovac is Executive Director of Green Cross International, a Geneva-based Senior Advisor with a Regional Centre for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, and an independent international environmental consultant with over 35 years of experience in relevant fields. He has participated in several INCs and related meetings for the global plastics agreement.

The opinions expressed in this article are the personal views of the individuals listed and do not necessarily reflect those of the organizations with which they are affiliated.

For many couples cohabitation has become an alternative to marriage rather than simply a step toward it. Credit: Shutterstock

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Sep 22 2026 (IPS)

Marriage is declining in many countries, with fewer people marrying and many postponing marriage until later in life. At the same time, increasing numbers of men and women are choosing cohabitation instead of marriage.

Various social, economic, and legal factors have contributed to this shift from marriage to cohabitation. Moreover, cohabitation is increasingly not simply a prelude to marriage but, in many cases, an alternative to it. Although its prevalence varies considerably across regions and countries, cohabitation among unmarried couples has continued to rise in many parts of the world.

Historical demographic trends indicate that marriage has become less common over the past several decades, with particularly pronounced declines among younger adults. Nearly 90% of the world’s population lives in a country where marriage rates are declining. This change in union formation is part of the broader transformation in family and household patterns around the world.

In the mid-20th century, about 65% to 70% of adults worldwide were married. By 2021, however, the global share had declined to approximately 50% to 55%.

The proportion of married adults has declined across major age groups. In the United States, for example, the share of adults who were married decreased across all major age groups between 1960 and 2010 (Figure 1).

Source: U.S Census Bureau.

In addition, declines in marriage rates have been accompanied by substantial delays in marriage. Several decades ago, women in many countries typically married in their early or mid-twenties. Today, the median age at first marriage for women has risen to the late twenties or early thirties in many developed countries.

Historical demographic trends indicate that marriage has become less common over the past several decades, with particularly pronounced declines among younger adults. Nearly 90% of the world’s population lives in a country where marriage rates are declining. This change in union formation is part of the broader transformation in family and household patterns around the world

Marriage is therefore becoming less common in an increasing number of countries. At the same time, cohabitation has become increasingly widespread.

Once more common among people with lower levels of education and socio-economic status, cohabitation has in recent decades spread across educational and socioeconomic groups, making it a more broadly established form of partnership.

Cohabitation is particularly common in Central and South America, where levels are among the highest in the world. Rates of 40% or more of all unions are found in Panama, Nicaragua, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.

Brazil provides another striking example. In 2022, nearly 40% of couples were in consensual or cohabiting unions, compared with about 38% in civil and religious marriages. For the first time, consensual unions surpassed civil and religious marriages as the most common form of union.

The rise of cohabitation in Latin American countries has also been accompanied by increasing proportions of children being born outside of marriage. From roughly 2016 to 2020, approximately 75% of children in Latin America were born outside marriage. The proportions ranged from about 60% in Guatemala and Ecuador to more than 80% in Colombia and Panama.

By contrast, cohabitation remains less common in Asia and the Middle East. These lower rates are generally attributed to the continuing influence of traditional family structures, marriage practices, and cultural and religious norms.

In addition, some countries have cultural restrictions and laws prohibiting sex outside of marriage, effectively making cohabitation illegal. These include Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. In most of these countries, a large majority of adults aged 18 to 49 are married.

Various factors have contributed to the shift from marriage toward cohabitation in many countries. Unlike marriage, cohabitation generally involves fewer legal procedures, costs, and formalities and may avoid some of the financial and legal complications that may arise from divorce (Table 1).

Source: Author’s compilation.

Cohabitation also gives men and women opportunities to get to know each other, assess their compatibility, financial circumstances, and make decisions about their future without immediately assuming the legal obligations of marriage. For many couples, therefore, cohabitation has become an alternative to marriage rather than simply a step toward it.

The widespread availability of modern contraceptives has given men and women greater flexibility in forming personal relationships and greater control over the timing and number of their children. Other important factors include urbanization, rising educational attainment, increasing female labor-force participation, financial pressures and unemployment, changing priorities regarding careers, personal growth, and independence, and evolving social and economic roles of men and women.

Additional factors include the rising costs associated with marriage, the potential financial consequences of divorce, changes in laws governing unmarried couples, and growing social acceptance of cohabitation.

Among OECD countries, about 12% of adults aged 20 and older lived in a cohabiting union around 2023. The proportions were considerably higher in some OECD countries, including Iceland (22%), Sweden (20%), and France (19%).

As in many Latin American countries, a large proportion of the births in OECD countries now occur outside marriage. A half century ago, fewer than 10% of children were born outside of marriage in most OECD countries. By 2020, that share had risen to more than 30% in most countries and to more than half in several, including Denmark, Estonia, France, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.

In sum, although substantial regional variations persist, particularly in more traditional and religious societies, marriage has declined significantly in most countries over the past several decades. Many men and women are also postponing marriage until later in life. At the same time, cohabitation among unmarried couples has become increasingly common, reflecting a broader transformation in partnership patterns.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer and a former director of the United Nations Population Division.

 

A public streetside sign advocates against gender-based violence in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea. Credit: Catherine Wilson/IPS

By Catherine Wilson
SYDNEY, Australia, Sep 22 2026 (IPS)

In the remote Highlands region of Papua New Guinea (PNG), humanitarians are life-saving beacons to women and girls facing myriad forms of violence. Despite years of awareness programmes and advocacy, the incidence of domestic and sexual violence is not declining. But Janet Kilea is one survivor who has rejected the fear and stigma of her experience and now dedicates her energy to transforming other women’s lives.

“I feel for other women who are going through the challenges I went through,” Kilea, who works in communities with the international medical humanitarian organisation Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in the mountainous Jiwaka Province, told IPS. “I need to use my experience to advocate for and empower women. Women should come out and not be silent about gender-based violence.”

Globally, about 31.6 percent of women have been subjected to physical or sexual violence, reports the World Health Organization (WHO), compared to an estimated 64 percent, more than double, in PNG, which has a population of about 10 million. Yet abuse of women, whether physical, psychological or economic, is of worldwide concern. It affects women and girls in both developed and developing countries, with the WHO claiming that SDG 5.2, which aims to eliminate it, is severely off-track and will not, on current trends, be achieved by 2030.

MSF’s Community Engagement Supervisor, Janet Kilea (L), with Community Health Worker, Judith (C), and Village Health Volunteer, Cathy (R), in Mondumil Village, Jiwaka Province, PNG. Credit: Sophie McNamara/MSF

And, in the PNG highlands, there are numerous barriers to changing the behaviours that endanger women’s lives and getting medical and support services to those who desperately need them. Most people live in isolated communities scattered across a vast rugged terrain of impenetrable forests, arduous high-altitude areas and deep valleys. Many do not have access to roads, while state services, including law enforcement, rarely reach far beyond major towns.

Across the Pacific, rural women and girls are particularly vulnerable, given they are twice as likely to live in poverty as those in urban centres, reports the UN Women, and face entrenched customary beliefs and practices that reinforce notions of gender inequality. Polygamous marriage, for instance, increases the risk of intimate partner violence by 24 percent, according to the World Bank. In the Pacific, “men still see women and girls as their property and believe that they are entitled to control them. And so far there are no efforts led by men to change the situation,” Colin Tukuitonga, Professor of Public Health at New Zealand’s University of Auckland, told IPS.

“In Jiwaka Province, it is estimated that 60 percent of women and girls are experiencing some form of violence,” Frédérique Butez, co-ordinator of MSF’s project in Jiwaka Province, told IPS. And “right now there is only one operational facility in Minj town, one facility providing family support centre services, which are integrated services within the public health facility with medical consultations and direct first aid and support. And then appropriate referrals to protection or legal services, according to the needs of the survivor,” she elaborated.

The suffering of survivors can be immense. Their ordeals may have involved weapons, such as knives or machetes, and resulted in chronic pain, sexually transmitted diseases, reproductive health issues, severe trauma or depression. The provision of external support services is crucial, too, as women frequently contend with stigma and pressure within families and communities to not report their abuse to authorities.

But that has not diminished Kilea’s resolve to make a difference. Gender-based violence (GBV) “is a very sensitive issue in our culture, which is taboo. So, when we go into the community, we talk with the women about their daily lives. We then talk about the root causes of GBV and start a conversation with the women. We create a space to share experiences,” Kilea explained.

MSF also trains village-health volunteers, critical first responders who are trusted within communities. “They are the heart of the project, because they are the focal point inside each community to give the first crucial aid care. They are the ones giving women access to the support and care that they need,” said Butez.

Jiwaka is a relatively new province established on the PNG mainland in 2012, and the provincial government, which provides for a rural-based population of about 343,987 people, is still developing its service outreach. “In terms of the scale of the needs and services, it is quite huge,” Butez said. But MSF, in partnership with Jiwaka Province, is using its expertise and resources to boost the skills of local healthcare workers and the capacity of medical and psychosocial services and support the government’s policy planning.

The scale of the public health needs is also recognised at the national level. Legislation, including the Criminal Code and 2013 Family Protection Act, outlaw domestic violence and violence against women and children. PNG’s gender-based violence response strategy promotes zero tolerance and outlines objectives, such as the development of effective response and service delivery to those affected and the scaling up of public message programs aimed at prevention.

Some political leaders have also spoken out. In March, Prime Minister James Marape told the PNG parliament that ‘domestic violence is a no amidst us. You cannot chest-beat as a leader if you are abusing your wife at home. Simple. Period,’ he declared, claiming that the country ‘will not progress if the fundamental fabric of our society is weakened.’

Nevertheless, women are still struggling to access timely support, and impunity continues for the vast majority of perpetrators. A progress review by the National Gender-Based Violence Secretariat last year reported a fall in the proportion of respondents witnessing domestic violence in their homes from 70 percent in 2016 to 51 percent in 2025. But, in contrast, it found a 210 percent increase in reported cases of violence against women since 1986 and a major shortfall in objectives being implemented. ‘Governance structures remain fragmented and under-resourced, with only 5 of 22 provinces having functional GBV secretariats and just 12 receiving annual funding,’ claims the report, while ‘the justice system is failing survivors with conviction rates for GBV cases as low as 0.5 percent in some regions.’

“Implementation is a challenge across the [Pacific Islands] region,” Tukuitonga emphasised. One hurdle is that strategic plans often exceed the budgetary capacity of governments, and “the second issue is that there are often not the skills locally to implement the plans effectively.”

Kilea, in coming to the aid of women and girls facing life-threatening situations every day, is part of efforts to address the latter. “I remember a woman I supported, who had three sons and one daughter. Her husband beat her regularly and took the money,’ Kilea recounted. She had no income and wasn’t working. She was also illiterate and uneducated and found it very difficult to know what to do. But Kilea was able to guide her on how to be patient and focus on her children while searching for opportunities to gain financial independence. “Soon she heard about an opportunity to do voluntary work, which has now led to daily paid work,” enabling her to leave the abusive relationship she was in and move to safer accommodation with her children.

Butez is buoyed to see the project leading to successes and being welcomed in the province. “The communities really accept us. And, as an organisation, it is very important that the trust with the communities is there, because without it we couldn’t work,” said Butez. “It is something that we are really proud of.”

The work of humanitarians will be critical now and in the future, to addressing the hardships and suffering that gender-based violence causes, with PNG’s GBV secretariat predicting that it could affect up to 8 million women in the country by 2046.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

 

 

 

Related Articles

• Extreme Heatwave Escalates Urgency of Climate Adaptation in Europe
• New Caledonia’s Election to Set the Stage for New Talks With France on Its Political Future

Solar energy panels installed in a dry rural landscape powering agricultural irrigation infrastructure alongside a traditional windmill. Credit: Katja Forster/iStock

By Debisi Araba
KIGALI, Rwanda, Sep 22 2026 (IPS)

Africa is emerging as the world’s fastest-growing technology market, with its innovation ecosystem attracting increasing global investment. The European Investment Bank’s recent €40 million commitment to the sector underscores this growing confidence.

However, this surge in technological innovation has yet to address some of the continent’s most persistent challenges – hunger, food insecurity, and poverty. Agricultural productivity still depends more on land expansion than on innovation and efficiency gains. The recently concluded Africa Food Systems Forum in Kigali focused on investing in Africa’s agrifood systems, exploring policy interventions to attract investment, boost productivity, build resilience to multidimensional shocks, and improve livelihoods. Discussions at the 9th Africa Agriculture Science Week in Abuja reinforced a clear message: Africa must invest far more in agricultural innovation systems and capabilities.

The continent’s population is projected to reach nearly 2.5 billion by 2050, thereby accounting for a quarter of the world’s population. Rapid urbanization and changing diets are accelerating food demand, creating significant opportunities for market expansion. However, climate shocks and slow-growing productivity have stalled progress toward food security.

The productivity gap is not rooted in a lack of promising technologies. Rather, it reflects limited adoption, weak complementary investments, and high transaction costs that constrain farmers and markets alike. Accelerating progress toward ending hunger and eradicating poverty in Africa will therefore require a coordinated bundle of technical, institutional, and socio-political innovations, designed not only to raise yields but also to strengthen the systems that enable productivity gains to take hold and endure.

Shaping Africa’s Technological Transformation: The Policy Landscape

Africa already possesses sound policy frameworks designed to promote technology-driven transformation. Agenda 2063, the continent’s blueprint for sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development, places technology at the center of Africa’s long-term trajectory.

Similarly, the Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa sets out a continental framework to harness digital technologies for inclusive growth, job creation, poverty reduction, and the narrowing of digital divides, while safeguarding Africa’s ownership of its digital future.

Together with the recently adopted Kampala Declaration, these frameworks lay important foundations for technological acceleration.

How, then, can Africa make the technological leap? The answer lies not in a proliferation of new pilot projects, but in the systematic deployment and scaling of existing technologies, backed by coordinated action across institutions and sectors.

The “technology frontier” is therefore not a single breakthrough, but the integration of biological, digital, engineering, ecological, and institutional innovations within a supportive political economy that enables scale, equity, and resilience.

Scaling Technological Interventions for Africa’s Agrifood System Transformation

Across the continent, the building blocks of technological advancements are already visible. From climate-resilient seeds and precision irrigation to AI-enabled advisory platforms and digital marketplaces, many of the tools needed to raise productivity and strengthen food security are already being deployed.

For example, in Mali and Senegal, AI-enabled geospatial tools are improving yield forecasting, helping farmers plan further ahead. Meanwhile, digital advisory platforms in Kenya are improving decision-making and market access, helping farmers increase productivity and sell their produce. Advances in gene-edited crops, such as drought-tolerant and pest-resistant crops, are narrowing yield gaps and strengthening resilience in countries like Nigeria, where improved maize and cowpea varieties are already delivering measurable productivity gains.

The challenge is coordination and scale. The 17th edition of the Annual Trends and Outlook Report underscores this point, calling for deliberate, system-wide interventions to expand the application of existing and emerging technologies and ensure their widespread, efficient use.

Africa’s Path to Technology Leadership

Against the backdrop of a rapidly expanding portfolio of complementary tools, Africa is well-positioned to translate its technological potential into system-wide performance. Realizing that ambition, however, will require coordination across five key areas.

First, Africa must invest in its innovation ecosystems. Frontier technologies cannot scale without strong science institutions, stable R&D financing, and coherent regulatory systems. Scaling new technologies demands long-term public investment and regional collaboration, not episodic pilot projects.

Second, technological dissemination must become inclusive and structured. Technologies spread fastest when embedded within trusted networks. Digitally enabled producer organizations, strengthened extension systems, and service-market models for mechanization and irrigation can aggregate demand, lower transaction costs, and ensure that marginalized groups and small-scale farmers are not excluded from the benefits of innovation.

Third, digital and climate intelligence infrastructure must expand. Precision agriculture, digital twins, and AI forecasting depend on reliable geospatial data, weather networks, compatible data standards, and rural connectivity. In this data-powered era, digital public infrastructure will become as essential to agriculture as roads and irrigation canals.

Fourth, climate adaptation and resilience must be mainstreamed into technological agendas. Drought-tolerant crops, solar-powered irrigation, water-efficient production systems, low-emission livestock practices, and circular bio-based innovations are not optional enhancements but prerequisites for resilient growth across the continent as it battles the harshest impacts of climate change.

Finally, governance and accountability must keep pace with innovation. An estimated US$77 billion in annual financing will be needed for transforming Africa’s agrifood systems by 2030. Coordinated public–private partnerships, harmonized regulatory frameworks, and transparent monitoring systems will be key to mobilizing private capital, boosting productivity, scaling innovation, and sustaining reforms – while placing farmers at the center of Africa’s agrifood transformation.

With its vast arable land, youthful workforce, and expanding digital capacity, Africa is uniquely positioned to pioneer climate-smart, resource-efficient agricultural models. The continent does not need another wave of breakthrough inventions to transform its food systems; what it requires is a decisive shift from fragmented adoption to system-wide modernization. The challenge is no longer to experiment at the margins, but to redesign the system at scale.

Debisi Araba is Managing Director, AKADEMIYA2063

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

Julia Braunmiller, Senior Private Sector Development Specialist with the World Bank Group’s Women, Business and the Law, and Antonia Kirkland, Director of Legal Equality and UN Liaison at Equality Now, discuss the importance of family law reform during the UNGA side event, The Gender Equality Dividend: Investing in Women’s Economic Prosperity Through Family Law Reform. Credit: IPS/Oritro Karim

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 22 2026 (IPS)

On September 16, at the lead-up to the 81st UN General Assembly, Equality in Family Law (GCEFL), Equality Now, TrustLaw, and the World Bank Group convened in New York City for the event titled The Gender Equality Dividend: Investing in Women’s Economic Prosperity Through Family Law Reform. Hosted by APCO, the event introduced new data on barriers to family law reform and highlighted strategies to help the international community maximize women’s economic participation.

Bringing together experts in legal reform and economic development, the event marked the launch of a landmark joint brief by the World Bank Group and Equality Now, titled Unlocking Women’s Economic Rights through Family Law Reform: Lessons from Case Studies across Five Regions. Drawing upon data collected from Chile, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, and Nepal, the brief examines the legal, social, and economic barriers that hinder gender equality, economic growth, and sustainable development.

Targeting the reform of 20 discriminatory laws by 2030, the report highlights the persistent and widespread disparities that women around the world continue to face in marriage, divorce, inheritance, and household decision-making. At the event, Antonia Kirkland, Director of Legal Equality and UN Liaison at Equality Now, stressed that no country has achieved full legal equality for women in terms of economic autonomy and social freedoms.

Additional data from the World Bank Group’s Women, Business, and the Law 2026 project reveals that 22 economies still lack laws granting women equal rights to immovable property, while 43 economies continue to deny women equal inheritance rights. Furthermore, women are estimated to be 33 percent less likely than men to participate in the formal labor market.

Over the past 50 years, family law reform has enabled more than 600 million women to access better economic opportunities, while approximately 118 countries have enacted laws that allow women improved access to employment. However, progress has stalled in recent decades, largely because family law reform is rarely treated as an interconnected policy, cultural, and economic issue.

Removing systemic discriminatory barriers against women yields immense social, financial, and developmental benefits. Granting women control over economic and financial resources can significantly strengthen their household bargaining power, foster greater individual autonomy, and considerably expand their access to formal employment.

Julia Braunmiller, Senior Private Sector Development Specialist with Women, Business and the Law, informed reporters at the briefing that if women had equal access to employment, global GDP could increase by up to 20 percent. Figures from UN Women’s Gender Snapshot 2026 report show that not a single indicator on the Sustainable Development Goal for gender equality (SDG 5) is on track to be met by 2030.

“Family law is economic policy. It is not something private,” Braunmiller said. “Marriage, divorce, and inheritance; these are the rules that can change who can work, who can own property, who can make financial decisions, who can earn and spend money. When rights are restricted, we are limiting the productive potential of half our societies. Family law is an overlooked driver of growth, productivity, and economic resilience.”

When women have equal access to formal employment, they are able to achieve significantly greater influence in decision-making, household affairs, and the ability to support themselves, separate from their husbands. In Nepal, landmark legal reforms have enabled widows to access marital assets and property, allowing families to stay afloat during periods of economic hardship.

“Many women, particularly in rural areas, who have lost their husbands or are divorced are in financially precarious situations. Obtaining a share of marital property enables them to invest in income-generating opportunities, educate their children, and even obtain further education themselves to better their lives,” said Gyanu BC, a Nepali women’s rights advocate.

Furthermore, improved family laws could significantly accelerate national productivity, strengthen social security systems, and benefit all household members. Control over family resources, such as access to credit, inheritance, and immovable property, is directly linked with household wellbeing.

Amy Hutchinson, Chief Development Officer of Equality Now, noted that working women invest roughly 90 percent of their incomes in their families, which has “profound” impacts on child nutrition, development, and education. National economies could also save significant aid dollars in social services and programs addressing and preventing gender-based violence by investing in family law reform. According to Hutchinson, women who lack access to formal employment are “infinitely” more vulnerable to violence and exploitation.

“This is not charity, this is an investment that is not just in women and girls, but in sustainable development and economic prosperity for all,” said Hutchinson. “It’s an investment in families, communities, and our global economies…this is an opportunity to invest in ground-floor systemic solutions that scale, not just mitigating the symptoms in perpetuity. Unfortunately, gender equality has become very polarizing and political.”

All of the speakers at the event emphasized that continued support from the international community in establishing legal equality is a crucial first step in closing persistent gender gaps, underscoring the global benefits in driving sustainable growth, preventing gender-based violence, and strengthening community resilience to economic shocks. GCEFL, Equality Now, TrustLaw, and the World Bank Group continue to work alongside national governments to close these gaps and secure a safe and equitable future for all.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

 

 

 

By Anis Chowdhury
SYDNEY, Sep 21 2026 (IPS)

The UN General Assembly will soon vote – most likely favourably – on Bangladesh’s request to postpone the country’s graduation from the UN’s Least Developed Country (LDC) category, currently scheduled for November this year. The request for a 3-year extension was endorsed by the ECOSOC following the recommendation of the UN’s Committee for Development Policy (CDP). It is highly likely that the extension will also be justifiably granted to Nepal and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao, PDR) – the two other countries scheduled to graduate with Bangladesh, given the fast deteriorating global economic situation and recent natural disaster in Nepal. In fact, the same argument for an extension may be admissible to all prospective graduating countries, such as Solomon Islands (2027), Cambodia (2029) and Senegal (2029).

Anis Chowdhury

However, this raises some serious questions regarding the LDC category itself and the successive 10-year support programmes for LDCs.

The background

The United Nations established the LDC category in 1971 for low-income countries facing severe structural barriers to sustainable development and to direct special international support toward them such as preferential market access, financial aid, and technical cooperation. The idea of a special category for low-income, structurally weak countries originated in the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.

Since the creation of the LDC category, the UN organised five international conferences, the first being in 1981, to draw up comprehensive ten-year frameworks for supports with specific goals. The current programme is the Doha Programme of Action (DPOA) for the Decade 2022–2031, preceded by the Istanbul Programme of Action (IPOA) for the Decade 2011–2020.

The decision to establish a separate LDC category was undoubtedly commendable. The global consensus around the comprehensive action programmes also reflected the goodwill of the international community.

However, none of the programmes could reduce the vulnerability of LDCs. The number of LDCs steadily increased from the 1971 list of 25 countries, reaching a peak of 51 countries in 2003. The number now stands at 46, still nearly double that of the original list. Only 9 countries exited the list – one, Sikkim, through India’s annexation in 1975.

Although the inclusion of newly independent countries partly explains the lengthening of the LDC list, one cannot avoid the judgement of an overall failure of the international community’s good-intentioned programmes. This is especially so in light of the development successes of countries which did not join the group despite their eligibility.

The Reckoning

The failure became staggering by the time the international community met in Istanbul in 2011. After four decades since the special LDC category was created, only three countries – Botswana, Cabo Verde and Maldives – exited the group. Furthermore, the post-graduation experience has been disappointing.

For example, life-expectancy in Botswana, the first country to exit the LDC group, declined from 61.6 years in 1988 to 50.08 years in 2003, while it remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, holding the 9th highest income Gini coefficient globally. Botswana, although hailed for macroeconomic stability, failed to transform structurally with the share of manufacturing hovering below 6% of GDP, and it remains extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in international commodity markets, especially diamond. Thus, growth has declined significantly since the mid-2000s and the unemployment rate has increased to very high levels, around 26%.

Therefore, the core goals and targets of the IPOA included:

• Enable half of all LDCs to achieve graduation status by 2020.
• Attain sustained, equitable, and inclusive economic growth of at least 7% annually.
• Strengthen education, health, and nutrition.
• Build productive bases and diversify economies to generate decent jobs, especially for youth

Unfortunately, only 6 countries – Maldives, Samoa, Equatorial Guinea, Vanuatu, Bhutan and São Tomé and Príncipe graduated – during 2011-2024, and 3 countries – Bangladesh, Nepal and Lao PDR – became eligible to graduate this year. Again, the experience is not very encouraging for the graduated countries, while the fear of graduation has gripped the countries soon to graduate.

In 2021, UNCTAD concluded that 50 years of LDC experience is “sobering”. It found that half of the LDCs fell behind the rest of the world in terms of per capita income and other dimensions of development. Hence, the economic gap between these countries and the rest of the world has widened over the last 50 years.

Rejecting “LDC insult”

Zimbabwe, a land-locked country, rejected the UN’s recommendation to be classified as a LDC in 2006 despite facing severe economic hardships. Zimbabwe viewed the UN recommendation “to be downgraded to LDC status” as an insult, while the neighbouring land-locked Zambia was among the first group of countries classified as an LDC in 1971.

When Zimbabwe’s per capita GDP plunged to USD341 in 2008, resource-rich Zambia’s per capita GDP was around USD1,376. Today, after more than half a century as an LDC, the per capita GDP of Zambia, one of the world’s leading producers of copper, cobalt, and semi-precious gemstones like emeralds, is around USD1,318, while Zimbabwe’s per capita GDP recovered within a decade to around USD3,445 in 2017.

Vietnam, coming out of a quarter century long devasting war in 1975, facing the challenge of unifying the country during the worst global economic situation with a paltry per capita income of around USD85, chose not to join the LDC group. Instead of aid dependence, it opted for the trade and investment route to development. Today, its per capita GDP is approximately USD5,066, while Bangladesh which joined the LDC group in 1975 with a per capita income of around USD230 could manage to raise its per capita GDP to approximately USD2,960.

The Republic of Korea (ROK), one of the poorest countries of the world in the 1960s, could also join the LDC group in 1971 when it was created; but it did not. Maintaining its policy independence and choosing the trade and investment route, ROK has become a full-fledged developed country in 1996 (member of OECD) within three decades. It managed to increase its per capita GDP from USD158 in 1960 to USD36,227 in 2025.

What may have gone wrong?

UNCTAD attributed the “sobering” experience to the LDCs’ inability to exploit international support measures (ISMs) strategically to develop their productive capacity. Others offered different reasons such as failure to understand the complex development process and appreciate the dangers associated with increased integration of structurally weak economies to the rapidly changing global economic system.

Add to these, complicity. Countries joining the group took ISMs as guaranteed; they did not take serious steps to mobilise domestic resources, diversify their economies and expand markets. Take the case of Bangladesh, a country regarded as the best utiliser of ISMs.

Bangladesh’s tax-GDP ratio is dismally low, experiencing a decline from a peak of around 10% to around 7%. Its ready-made garment (RMG) sector’s dominance increased from around 67% of export earnings in 2018 when the country first met the graduation criteria to around 85% by 2025 while it should have been declining as the graduation deadline was approaching.

Bangladesh has also failed to diversify its export markets away from the EU and the USA, accounting for close to 80% of RMG exports. It does not have any meaningful trade agreement with any country or trading bloc, while Vietnam has 17 bilateral FTA and is a member of Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership as well as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest free trade agreement, covering roughly 30% of global GDP.

Ironically, the sector that propelled Bangladesh’s industrialisation, made the country more vulnerable. Worst, too big to ignore, the RMG sector has captured Bangladesh’s political and policy space. The CDP’s recommendation in favour of Bangladesh’s extension request has been made subject to the country’s commitment to reforms. However, political will for reforms may waver when the state is captured by a dominant sector.

Curse or Boon?

Thus, what was supposed to be a boon, for many LDCs, the category has become a curse, trapping them in a perpetual state of underdevelopment and vulnerability. It fits the narrative of William Easterly’s The White Man’s Burden; unfortunately, the international community may feel burdened and grant an extension to the “fearful” LDCs even when its “good-intentioned” efforts have produced so little good.

Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com; a.chowdhury@westernsydney.edu

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

Related Articles

• The Tale of Three Countries: Policy Independence Matters for Development
• The Political Economy of Bangladesh’s LDC Graduation

A group of armed defectors from the RSF arrives in the west of Omdurman on 19 August 2026. Credit: Ebrahim Hamid/AFP

By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Sep 21 2026 (IPS)

Sudan’s civil war grinds on. It’s close to three and a half years since the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia began their battle for supremacy, and the two forces and their allies continue to slaughter civilians with impunity. As a recent UN report makes clear, the killing is enabled by numerous foreign powers that continue to supply weapons, personnel and logistical support. They have made a civil conflict their proxy war, and their self-interest is sustaining the killing.

Drone warfare

Things are relatively quiet in the capital, Khartoum, where the curfew was recently lifted following its recapture by the SAF last year, but the RSF still controls significant areas, with fighting concentrated in the Darfur and Kordofan regions to the west and Blue Nile state in the southeast.

Both sides now extensively use drones to kill civilians. In February, a suspected RSF drone strike on an aid convoy in South Kordofan killed three humanitarian workers and wounded four more. In May, a suspected SAF drone strike on a crowded market in Ghubaysh, an RSF-controlled town in West Kordofan, killed 28 people as they shopped for food. In August, another likely SAF strike on a court session in an RSF-controlled village killed 35 people.

The RSF are attacking El Obeid, a city of around half a million people in North Kordofan. RSF drones have hit hospitals and schools. People fear a repeat of what happened when the RSF took the city of El Fasher last October. The UN’s Fact-Finding Mission concluded that the ensuing massacre, in which the RSF killed at least 60,000 people, bore the ‘hallmarks of genocide’, with ethnically targeted killings and widespread sexual violence.

Humanitarian and civic space emergency

The war has caused the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Over 11 million people have been forcibly displaced within Sudan or to surrounding countries, and around 20 million are experiencing acute food insecurity.

There’s a great need for the help civil society offers, but it’s hard for humanitarian organisations to provide aid because of security dangers and access and movement restrictions. The Sudanese government is also attacking the ability of civil society organisations to operate. In February, authorities revoked the licences of four organisations with missions to provide aid, help victims and promote peace.

Journalists, particularly women journalists, are under attack, making it harder to tell the truth about what’s happening on the ground. In January, the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate recorded that 14 journalists and other media workers had been killed in 2025. In December 2025, it was reported that 40 per cent of women journalists had experienced sexual assault, physical violence, harassment or threats.

Foreign powers behind the war

Sudan’s people can expect little help from the deadlocked UN Security Council. In August, the US government proposed a resolution to expand an arms embargo that currently applies to Darfur to the whole country, explicitly including drones. The Sudanese government condemned the proposal and Russia rejected it, which, given its veto power as a permanent member, means the resolution won’t advance further unless significantly watered down.

Russia initially sold weapons to both the RSF and SAF but more recently has swung behind the SAF, becoming a major arms supplier in return for gold and a potential Red Sea naval base. It’s joined by several other states with a direct stake in the conflict. The UN’s Fact-Finding Mission has set out how the SAF are using foreign-supplied drones while transnational networks are keeping the RSF supplied.

Alongside Russia, states that supply arms or other military support to the SAF, or have done so at some point since the war began, include Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Turkey and Ukraine. Those that have backed the RSF in various ways include the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda and, most notoriously, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Weapons originating from countries including Canada, China, Israel and the UK have also been used. In most cases, states deny involvement.

There’s ample evidence that the UAE extensively supplies the RSF with mercenaries and weapons via African transit routes, in return for gold and in the hope of securing a regional foothold. The UAE funded Colombian mercenaries who played an active role alongside the RSF in the slaughter in El Fasher. It was recently revealed that individuals and entities linked to the RSF’s leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, have acquired properties worth over US$24 million in Dubai, likely paid for with smuggled gold.

The UAE’s reliance on states that border Sudan to allow its convoys to cross brings the risk of conflict spillovers, as seen in alleged SAF airstrikes on a military convoy in Chad in August.

Push for accountability

A new initiative to hold foreign figures accountable offers some hope for justice. In June, the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights and a group of civil society organisations made a legal submission to the International Criminal Court (ICC), asking it to investigate several foreign officials for aiding and abetting crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes in Sudan. The submission provided evidence of the involvement of the governments of Egypt, Iran, Turkey and the UAE.

The ICC has an ongoing investigation into the situation in Darfur, scene of a 2003-2005 genocide. It has confirmed that human rights crimes committed during the current war fall under its jurisdiction as part of this investigation, and in June it announced it had ‘concrete evidence’ linking RSF leaders to atrocities in El Fasher.

It’s vital that leaders responsible for human rights crimes face justice, and this must include the leaders of the countries waging a proxy war. If there is to be peace and justice, the impunity of the foreign powers that are sustaining the war must be challenged.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

 

 

 

President Mahmoud Abbas of Palestine. Credit: UN Photo

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 21 2026 (IPS)

When Yasser Arafat was denied a US visa for his second visit to New York to address the United Nations back in 1988, the General Assembly defied the United States by temporarily moving the UN’s highest policymaking body to Geneva—perhaps for the first time in UN history—providing a less hostile political environment and a platform for the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Arafat, who first addressed the UN in 1974, took a swipe at Washington when he prefaced his statement in Geneva by remarking, “It never occurred to me that my second meeting with this honorable Assembly, since 1974, would take place in the hospitable city of Geneva.”

The US last week denied visas to the Palestinian delegation, led by President Mahmoud Abbas, who was due to address the General Assembly on September 24. The delegates were also denied visas last year.

In the official list of speakers released last week, Abbas has been designated “Head of State” (HS) of the “State of Palestine.”

The U.S. State Department criticized Abbas and the Palestinian Authority (PA) for pursuing the “unilateral recognition of a conjectural Palestinian state” through international bodies rather than negotiated bilateral talks.

As a rebuff to the US, the General Assembly voted overwhelmingly last week to allow President Abbas and other high-level Palestinian officials to participate and address the annual gathering of world leaders via video, outsmarting the US—electronically.

The resolution was adopted with a 152-3 vote (with four countries abstaining). This decision directly addresses the decision by the United States to deny entry visas to the high-level Palestinian delegation—including Abbas—marking the second consecutive year the delegation has been barred from attending the UN high-level meeting of world political leaders.

The resolution was opposed only by the United States, Israel, and Paraguay, with Colombia, Honduras, Panama, and Peru abstaining.

So far, the UN expects about 73 Heads of State, 45 Heads of Government, 49 Ministers, 11 Vice-Presidents, and one Crown Prince to address the General Assembly through September 28.

Alongside the mandated meetings, there are about 168 events that are scheduled during the high-level week, and last week, Member States have submitted about 1,000 requests for bilateral meetings amongst themselves.

The bilateral meetings with the Secretary-General are also in the process of being scheduled.

The UN has also issued 1,935 press passes for visiting journalists and an additional 1,290 press passes for official media.

Dr. Stephen Zunes, a professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of San Francisco, where he serves as coordinator of the program in Middle Eastern Studies, told Inter Press Service (IPS) under the 1947 US-UN Headquarters agreement that the United States is obliged to allow foreign leaders to address the General Assembly.

“That’s why previous administrations allowed even the likes of Muammar Qaddafi, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Idi Amin, Suharto, and other nasty characters to visit.”

(According to one definition, “ruthless autocrats” are political leaders who hold absolute power and use severe oppression, violence, and censorship to maintain control. Throughout history, these dictators have suppressed political opposition, eliminated civil liberties, and caused massive human suffering.)

Now, however, the Trump administration is banning representatives of the government of Palestine—a permanent non-member state of the United Nations—from coming to New York despite their recognizing Israel, renouncing terrorism, and calling for peace, said Dr. Zunes.

And there have been no objections, he said, from Democratic leaders in the US Congress. The problem, therefore, is not that the State of Palestine is a brutal dictatorship or violating international legal norms—the United States has no problems with that.

“The problem is that they are Palestinians. This is bigotry, pure and simple,“ he said.

The General Assembly could have relocated to Geneva, as they did in 1988. However, concerns about the costs and the carbon footprint, combined with access to modern communications technologies, have led them to allow the Palestinian leadership to Zoom in, said Dr. Zunes.

While going to Geneva would have been a more powerful statement, the support by such an overwhelming majority of the world’s nations can still be seen as a rebuke of Washington’s continued opposition to Palestine’s right to exist, declared Dr Zunes.

Mouin Rabbani, Managing Editor, Jadaliyya, an independent ezine produced by the Arab Studies Institute, told IPS the United States has once again demonstrated itself to be unfit to play the role of host nation of the United Nations. It considers the Host Country Agreement as something to be honored on a voluntary basis rather than a series of binding obligations.

The US government considers it perfectly normal to behave like a gangster state and openly violate its obligations by refusing entry to foreign delegates on the most specious of pretexts, he pointed out.

This is not a matter of the Trump administration. Nearly four decades ago, its predecessor, the Reagan administration, also refused entry to a Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat.

What is particularly noteworthy on this occasion, he said, is that the US government is explicitly identifying the Palestinian recourse to the ICJ and ICC as legitimate grounds to refuse the participation of the Palestinian leader in the GA.

“This is the conduct of one gangster state acting on behalf of another (Israel) and demonstrates in the clearest manner possible that the US cannot and should not be entrusted with hosting the UN HQ.”

The Palestinians should of course be demanding that the GA conduct its session outside the US. The problem is that they are led by the exceptionally weak-kneed Mahmoud Abbas, who seems to continue to believe that absorbing these outrageous violations without confronting them forcefully will earn him brownie points with Trump and Netanyahu, which of course they won’t, declared Rabbani.

Meanwhile, responding to questions from journalists, UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric said last week the Secretary-General deeply regrets the announcement by the United States extending sanctions that would deny visas to members of the Palestine Liberation Organization and officials of the Palestinian Authority to participate in meetings of the United Nations.

“The Secretary-General is concerned about the impact of this decision on the ability of the State of Palestine to participate fully in the work of the United Nations. The full participation of all delegations in the work of the organization is essential to its proper functioning”.

The Secretary-General takes note of the arrangements adopted yesterday by the General Assembly for the participation of the State of Palestine in the eighty-first session.

The Secretary-General urges the host country to ensure that visas are issued to all delegations in accordance with its obligations under the Headquarters Agreement and will continue to engage with the United States authorities to this end.

Meanwhile, key details of the General Assembly decision include the following:

• Scope of Virtual Access:

• The approved measure not only permits President Abbas to deliver his address virtually but also extends video-participation rights to any senior Palestinian officials for any UN meetings or conferences over the next year if they remain blocked from traveling to the U.S.

• The U.S. Stance:

• The Trump administration extended existing visa sanctions, citing security concerns and accusing the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of failing to comply with legal commitments and attempting to “internationalize” the conflict through global tribunals.

• On-the-Ground Representation:

While the high-level traveling delegation was barred, Palestinian diplomats who are already permanently accredited to the UN in New York will continue to represent them.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

 

 

 

The link between urbanization and poverty may be determined by how cities are planned and governed, according to UN reports. Credit: Benjamin Shurance/Unsplash

By Shuli Wong
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 18 2026 (IPS)

Urbanization can help concentrate jobs, services, and investments; however, it can also concentrate unaffordable housing, insecure employment, and unequal exposure to contamination and environmental threats. A recent report from the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, argues that the difference is not urbanization itself, but how cities are planned, governed, and financed.

Elena Díaz Galán’s report, Cities and Poverty, issued earlier in July and examines social exclusion and the structural drivers of poverty in cities. In it, Galán looks at how land use, housing infrastructure, public services, and participation can either exacerbate or mitigate poverty.

In an exclusive interview with Inter Press Service, Anacláudia Rossbach, UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN-Habitat, highlighted how the report’s findings closely align with UN-Habitat’s priorities, particularly in how “the central challenge lies not in urbanization itself, but in addressing the inequalities, deprivations and climate risks that accompany it, which affect people differently based on factors such as gender, age, or socio-economic status.”

UN-Habitat’s World Cities Report 2026: The Global Housing Crisis – Pathways to Action paints a bleak picture of the global housing crisis. Worldwide, at least 3.4 billion people lack access to adequate housing, with 1.1 billion people living in slums or informal settlements. As informal settlements become home to a significant and growing share of the world’s urban population, Rossbach emphasized how “informal settlements hold significant potential to contribute to more inclusive and sustainable urban development”. Informal settlements are often characterized by inadequate housing, limited access to basic services, infrastructure deficits, and insecure tenure; however, “they provide housing, livelihoods, social networks, and opportunities for millions of urban residents.”

Addressing Galán’s point in her report that urbanization has the power to reduce poverty or deepen inequality, Rossbach shared how UN-Habitat’s Strategic Plan 2026-2029 focuses on housing, land, and basic services as the foundation for sustainable development.

“We work to ensure that urbanization contributes to improving living conditions and increasing access to adequate housing, while preventing the deepening of existing inequalities and vulnerabilities, particularly for women and other groups that face multiple and overlapping forms of exclusion,” said Rossbach.

The Cities and Poverty report illustrated how poverty and inequality appear in spatial patterns. For example, low-income individuals are often pushed into more outlying and environmentally hazardous areas, leaving them vulnerable and lacking access to services, jobs, schools, and healthcare. Examples within the report illustrated how informal settlements in Dandora and Korogocho, located near Nairobi’s main landfill, are exposed to toxic environments, including polluted air and groundwater. Cycles of poverty often reinforce themselves in informal settlements. For example, in the peri-urban areas of Woldia, Ethiopia, due to the lack of formal water, sanitation, and electricity networks, the price of water can be up to 1,645 percent more than the price paid by those with private water pipes. These examples and additional costs illustrate the unequal cost of urban life. Showing how people who have the fewest resources are often times forced to pay more for lower-quality essential goods and services.

Building off of these points, Rossbach told IPS how UN-Habitat considers participatory in-situ upgrading as the most effective approach for improving living conditions in informal settlements. Instead of focusing on the eradication of settlements, policy responses should build on the social, economic, and environmental potential in these settlements and support their progressive improvement.

As informal settlements house a growing share of the world’s urban population, they hold potential for contributing to more inclusive, sustainable urban planning. Credit: Nikko Balanial/Unsplash

Successful interventions engage residents along all phases, from design, implementation, and maintenance, to ensure that local priorities, needs, and context-based solutions are taken into account. Most importantly, successful interventions require coordinated responses to integrate informal settlements into the wider urban fabric.

“When combined with broader housing policies and planning reforms, participatory in-situ upgrading can contribute to more inclusive, sustainable, and equitable urban development outcomes,” Rossbach said.

The Cities and Poverty report discussed urbanization through the lens of the processes that lead to it and the impact on human rights. Two urbanization models were included, the first of which is the “15-minute city”. The 15-minute city is an inclusive vision of urban development which seeks to ensure that all residents have access within a short walk or bicycle ride to essential daily services and opportunities. Examples include Shanghai’s Anshan Xincun 15-minute community life circles, which have shown increased mobility in the aging population, helping to make more equitable and inclusive cities.

However, greater accessibility within these 15-minute cities can also lead to gentrification. “When neighbourhoods become more attractive and better connected, land values and housing costs can rise, potentially displacing existing residents,” said Rossbach. In order to protect existing residents and ensure that these changes do not lead to displacement or exclusion, Rossbach proposed three principles for protection:

1. Proximity-based planning should help reduce spatial inequalities, not reinforce them.
2. Neighborhood improvements need to go hand in hand with measures to protect housing affordability and tenure security.
3. The communities and residents need to be involved at all levels and should have a meaningful role in deciding what is developed and how.

“The success of a 15-minute city should not be measured only by how quickly people can reach services, but by whether existing residents can continue to live in their communities and benefit from the improvements around them,” said Rossbach.

The second urbanization model discussed was ‘smart cities’. Smart cities utilize digital technologies, big data analytics, and artificial intelligence to improve upon the management and delivery of urban services. However, the report also warns that digitization and smart cities can reinforce existing inequalities and create a sense of double vulnerability where material poverty combines with exclusion from devices, connectivity, and digital skills.

Rossbach discussed how UN-Habitat promotes a “people-centered smart cities approach that puts people and their needs, rather than technology, at the center.” In particular, services and digital services need to be designed to address the realities of low-income neighborhoods and informal settlements, many of which lack affordable connectivity, devices, digital skills, and formal addresses. Most importantly, Rossbach said, “digitization should close existing inequalities, not reinforce them.”

UN-Habitat is working to close these existing inequalities through programs such as the United Nations Innovation Technology Accelerator for Cities (UNITAC). It developed the Building and Establishment Automated Mapper (BEAM), which helps cities better understand informal settlements and fast-growing urban areas by rapidly mapping buildings from aerial imagery. BEAM provides municipalities with better information to plan infrastructure, target upgrading programmes, and improve basic services.

Nonetheless, data itself does not ensure or create more equitable cities. The Cities and Poverty report emphasized how developing human rights indicators are essential, and so are inputting monitoring tools to evaluate the efficiency of government policies and action. Rossbach added that “inclusive digital transformation is about making people visible — both in data and in decision-making”.

Rossbach and Galán, through her report, have called for urban planning that puts human rights at the center. This means promoting affordable housing in well-connected areas, secure tenure, universal basic services, and more equitable investments across neighborhoods. Implementation needs to be people-centered and measured by whether existing residents can remain in their communities and share in the benefits.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

 

 

 

Migrants now send home more money than foreign aid, and this is pulling rural families out of poverty, according to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). A new report, Sending Money Home, released this week, asserts that remittances have become the world’s largest and most resilient source of household finance during overlapping economic, environmental […]