Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die politische Geographie Kaschmirs hat sich in den letzten Monaten grundlegend ver­ändert. Ausgangspunkt war die Entscheidung der indischen Regierung vom 5. August 2019, den Bundesstaat Jammu und Kaschmir in zwei Unionsterritorien aufzuteilen. In Reaktion darauf veröffentlichte Islamabad am 4. August 2020 eine Karte, die ganz Kaschmir als Teil Pakistans darstellte. Ende September 2020 kündigte die chinesische Regierung den bisherigen Status quo mit Indien in der Region Ladakh/Aksai Chin auf. Damit deutet sich eine neue Phase im Konflikt um Kaschmir an, in der China und Pakis­tan enger zusammenarbeiten könnten. Zudem wird der Konflikt um eine neue geo­politische Dimension erweitert, denn die Auseinandersetzung mit Indien ist für China jetzt auch Teil des Ringens mit den USA um die künftige Machtverteilung im Indo-Pazifik.

Spätestens seit dem sicherheitspolitischen Epochenjahr 2014 (Russlands Annexion der Krim) und den Nato-Beschlüssen von Wales, zuvor aber schon mit dem Strategischen Konzept des Nato-Gipfels von Lissabon 2010 rückte die kollektive Verteidigung wieder in den Mittelpunkt der Bündnisanstrengungen. Der Nordatlantikrat stellte sie gleich­rangig neben die weltweiten Einsätze zur Krisenintervention. Ungeachtet dessen wurde in Deutschland die Organisation der Bundeswehr 2011 noch stärker auf inter­nationales Krisenmanagement als Schwerpunkt ausgerichtet. Erst mit dem Weißbuch 2016 und der Konzeption der Bundeswehr 2018 erfolgte politisch die notwendige Korrektur. Wesentliche Auswirkungen auf die zuvor eingenommenen Strukturen sind bislang noch nicht erkennbar, wohl aber Fehlentwicklungen. Deshalb sollte jetzt mit den erforderlichen Veränderungen begonnen werden.

Around 2009, China’s economy has become the largest greenhouse-gas emitter. Climate protection policies have gradually entered the ‘high politics’ sphere in China particularly when climate and environmental protection have proved to be effective tools in achieving other political goals. When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China has entered into the “new normal” with a more comprehensive economic strategy that includes or even elevates a wide range of climate and environmental protection policies. China’s economic development is now shifting the balance of growth away from heavy-industrial investment and toward a more sustainable growth. Why – and how – did China change its tune? The key driver of change on the political importance of climate and environmental protection is China’s effort to recentralize governance. At the same time, while acknowledging that centralization is itself not the end but also a means to other political goals, this paper focuses on how the securitization of climate change and environmental protection has effectively served multiple purposes. It serves as a guiding principle on socioeconomic development and it serves as legitimacy to reestablish control by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with Xi at the helm. With the linkage of climate and environmental protection to these political goals, China’s experience becomes distinct from the usual securitization process. Also, China shows that while most political processes do not formally include democratic deliberation or the direct approval of an audience, climate and environmental protection does encourage more latent forms of participation not only of citizens, but of experts. Therefore, the process of securitization is also feasible in non-democratic societies

Around 2009, China’s economy has become the largest greenhouse-gas emitter. Climate protection policies have gradually entered the ‘high politics’ sphere in China particularly when climate and environmental protection have proved to be effective tools in achieving other political goals. When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China has entered into the “new normal” with a more comprehensive economic strategy that includes or even elevates a wide range of climate and environmental protection policies. China’s economic development is now shifting the balance of growth away from heavy-industrial investment and toward a more sustainable growth. Why – and how – did China change its tune? The key driver of change on the political importance of climate and environmental protection is China’s effort to recentralize governance. At the same time, while acknowledging that centralization is itself not the end but also a means to other political goals, this paper focuses on how the securitization of climate change and environmental protection has effectively served multiple purposes. It serves as a guiding principle on socioeconomic development and it serves as legitimacy to reestablish control by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with Xi at the helm. With the linkage of climate and environmental protection to these political goals, China’s experience becomes distinct from the usual securitization process. Also, China shows that while most political processes do not formally include democratic deliberation or the direct approval of an audience, climate and environmental protection does encourage more latent forms of participation not only of citizens, but of experts. Therefore, the process of securitization is also feasible in non-democratic societies

Around 2009, China’s economy has become the largest greenhouse-gas emitter. Climate protection policies have gradually entered the ‘high politics’ sphere in China particularly when climate and environmental protection have proved to be effective tools in achieving other political goals. When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China has entered into the “new normal” with a more comprehensive economic strategy that includes or even elevates a wide range of climate and environmental protection policies. China’s economic development is now shifting the balance of growth away from heavy-industrial investment and toward a more sustainable growth. Why – and how – did China change its tune? The key driver of change on the political importance of climate and environmental protection is China’s effort to recentralize governance. At the same time, while acknowledging that centralization is itself not the end but also a means to other political goals, this paper focuses on how the securitization of climate change and environmental protection has effectively served multiple purposes. It serves as a guiding principle on socioeconomic development and it serves as legitimacy to reestablish control by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with Xi at the helm. With the linkage of climate and environmental protection to these political goals, China’s experience becomes distinct from the usual securitization process. Also, China shows that while most political processes do not formally include democratic deliberation or the direct approval of an audience, climate and environmental protection does encourage more latent forms of participation not only of citizens, but of experts. Therefore, the process of securitization is also feasible in non-democratic societies

Le bras de fer que se livrent la France et la Turquie depuis quelques mois, notamment en Méditerranée orientale, connaît depuis une semaine une nouvelle intensité. Après avoir mis en cause la santé mentale d’Emmanuel Macron, le président turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan a appelé au boycott des produits français. Comment expliquer ces tensions ? Explications avec Hakim El Karoui, senior fellow à l’Institut Montaigne et auteur du rapport …

La laïcité s’invite de nouveau dans le débat public en France, notamment à la suite de la présentation d’un plan d’action contre le séparatisme le 2 octobre dernier par Emmanuel Macron. Cette spécificité française, souvent incomprise, fait régulièrement l’objet de beaucoup de commentaires voire de critiques dans le monde, et en premier chef aux États-Unis. Comment expliquer une telle situation ? De quelle manière cette question est-elle traitée aux États-Unis,…

Cette lettre ouverte a été co-écrite par François Godement et Ashley J. Tellis et co-publiée par Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (en anglais) et l'Institut Montaigne.

 

 

Au Président élu des États-Unis
5 novembre 2020…

Le topos des "individus aux deux visages" (两面人) a une longue tradition au sein du discours politique chinois. À la différence de Janus, le dieu romain des commencements et des fins, qui les symbolise de manière neutre du point de vue de la morale et qui est communément représenté par deux visages à l’horizontale (Ianus Bifrons), l’expression prise dans le contexte chinois désigne un désordre moral se lisant à la verticale. En…

Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hält sich angesichts der Corona-Krise weitere Lockerungschritte offen. DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher kommentiert die heutige Sitzung des EZB-Rats:

Die Erwartungen an die EZB steigen, noch mehr zur Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskrise zu tun. Die EZB hat deutlich signalisiert, dass sie sehr bald weitere Maßnahmen beschließen wird. Denn die Risiken durch die zweite Corona-Infektionswelle sind hoch und nehmen weiter zu. Die EZB steht durch die Krise zunehmend vor zwei großen Herausforderungen: Zum einen, wie sie ihrem Ziel der Preisstabilität wieder näherkommen kann, da die Preisentwicklung sich gefährlich der Deflation nähert. Und zum anderen, wie sie mit den Risiken für die Finanzstabilität umgehen soll.

Ich erwarte, dass die EZB im Dezember eine Ausweitung um 500 Milliarden Euro und eine Verlängerung ihres Anleihekaufprogramms PEPP bis Ende 2021 bekannt geben wird. Gerade in diesen Zeiten, in denen die EZB nur beschränkte Möglichkeiten hat, die Krise zu bekämpfen, spielt die Finanzpolitik eine umso wichtigere Rolle. Daher bleiben sowohl eine expansive nationale Fiskalpolitik als auch eine zügige Umsetzung des europäischen Wiederaufbauprogramms enorm wichtig.

Although the roots of the European Union lie in economic integration, the EU’s economic policy competences and possibilities are narrowly limited in European primary law. Nevertheless, the influence of the EU, and in particular the European Commission, on economic policies of the member states is clearly visible and tangible.

The focus of European economic policy is on the coordination of member state policies by the European Commission. It uses strategic planning in­struments such as 10-year strategies, guidelines, and reform recommen­dations, which it bundles within the European Semester.

European economic policy-makers are actually faced with the task of limiting the acute socio-economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic on the one hand, and finding answers to the structural challenges posed by globalisation, digitisation, and climate change on the other. A com­mon European economic policy is becoming increasingly necessary, and expectations are growing.

The European Commission is trying to combine these two tasks – the stimulation of the European economy and the sustainable transformation of national economies – with the new European recovery fund “Next Generation EU”. The European Green Deal will become the guiding prin­ciple for both economic policy coordination and economic policy at the national level.

This reorientation of European economic policy towards sustainable and decarbonised growth will promote the Europeanisation and, in the long term, the unitarisation of national economic policies.

 

 

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Several United Nations peacekeeping missions are deployed in highly complex environments, marked by stalled political agreements, significant protection challenges, direct threats to the security of peacekeepers, vast theaters of operations, and a range of partners. Many of the challenges faced by these missions underscore how contemporary armed conflict is evolving. In response, peacekeeping has had to evolve.

On October 28th, IPI, with cosponsors the Permanent Missions of Sweden and Egypt to the UN, held a virtual panel discussion on how the operational capabilities of contemporary UN peacekeeping are changing; whether these reforms are yielding the desired effects; what impact these changes have on peace operations’ ability to effectively deliver on their mandates; and what more needs to be done to maintain momentum for reform.

Anna Karin Enestrøm, the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN, acknowledged that “significant efforts” were already underway to reform peacekeeping in doctrine and in resourcing missions with funding, personal equipment, and technology. But lagging behind, she said, were actions expanding the participation of women. “We must act now to increase the number of civilian and uniformed women in peacekeeping at all levels and in key positions. As of May 2020, only 5.4 % of the United Nations military and 15.1% of the police personnel were women, compared to 3% and 10%, respectively, in 2015. This pace is simply too slow. We must redouble our effort to implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda in peacekeeping.”

Mohamed Fathi Ahmed Edrees, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the UN, spoke of how the COVID-19 pandemic had impacted peacekeeping and made even more urgent the need for reforms. “The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the peacemaking reality and worsened the already complex environments where peacekeepers are deployed. This new reality requires collective efforts from all peacekeeping stakeholders to adapt and further advance A4P (Action for Peacekeeping) implementation.”

General Dennis Gyllensporre, Force Commander, UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) said there were two rationales behind the adaptation in his mission. “The first one is the threat situation that we experience in the country to the civilian population, but also to the personnel of MINUSMA, where we are a target for some of these illegal armed groups, and also more recently, the very fluid situation that we have at the political level with the coup in August, translating, in some respects, to unrest on the ground.

“The second reason why the adaptation was necessary for us was the fact that the Security Council decided in its most recent mandate renewal that we would have another additional strategic priority to focus on the center of the country in addition to supporting the implementation of the peace accord. Basically, we have to do more with the same resources because there was no added resource that came with this priority. The Security Council also outlined the need for doing a mission-wide adaptation, and it’s not just the military part, but all the pillars of the mission. And now we are in the process of implementing the COVID-19 situation—obviously an obstacle, a delaying factor. Nevertheless, we’ve taken steps forward.”

He explained that those steps dealt with the three pillars: protection, posture, and partnering. On the posture, he reported that in addition to performing its traditional peacekeeping role with infantry battalions providing area coverage and trying to understand what’s happening on the ground, the mission had added a mobile component to the force so it could concentrate forces in certain areas for limited periods. “From that point of view, we are also in the process of generating and getting new capabilities, more aviation, more intelligence collection assets to make sure the composition reflects this new posture.” General Gyllensporre said that in addition to the change in composition, this represented “a change in mindset for us to conduct our operations more proactively and engaging with the population, engaging with other stakeholders, and leading the way if needed.”

As for protection, he said the mission had an approach that was more “population-centric.” In military terms, he explained, that meant acting from temporary operating bases to ensure that there are soldiers present continuously in the vicinity of exposed villages and areas where the threat to the population is thought to be imminent. “And we also make sure that we employ intelligence as a driving factor for operations. The ability to protect has to start with a good intelligence assessment from all components of the mission.”

On the subject of partnering, he said, “This is the way to leverage the efforts of the mission, making sure that the Malian authorities, civilians and military, are stepping up and extending their responsibilities in the areas that are threatened.” He added that the mission had a mandate to provide support for “partner forces” like the Malian armed forces and the G5 Sahel. He said that though the reform process was in its early stages, he was encouraged by the positive response from the local population and local leaders. “When we are able to come in quick, insert soldiers and provide some assistance, that is a good indicator that this adaptation is indeed the right way to go.”

Rania Dagash, Chief of the Policy and Best Practices Service, Department of Peace Operations, shared details of adaptations at three UN missions. She said that MINUSMA had developed an SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) on early warning and rapid response, “two mechanisms that help us respond better. A rapid verification and dissemination of early warning information is critical based on what the Force Commander just said about the constantly shifting nature of the threat.”

She said that MINUSCA, the UN mission in the Central African Republic, has created joint special security units to demobilize armed group combatants. “What this joint special security unit does is establish mixed units, including CAR’s military and armed group elements to jointly carry out security. The training of these units has been completed, and they have already been dispatched to boost protection.” In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, she said, MONUSCO has increased connections between its far-flung field offices. “What this has led to is increased coordination on threat analysis and response between field missions, and a senior management group on provincial protection was held.”

Major General Jai Shanker Menon, Director, Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships, pointed out that the reforms decentralize the management of resources to senior managers in the field who have mandate implementation responsibilities and direct responsibility for the safety and security of peacekeepers. He pronounced this “a positive development that can have an impact on the ground.

Now, for this to be effective, definitely the mindset of those in UN headquarters needs to shift from one of directing missions to one of truly acting in a support role to the missions.”

General Menon said his own experience of commanding missions had taught him the value of leadership and decisive decision-making. “In my opinion, there should be absolutely no procrastination. Decisions must be given after due thought, but they must be capped with the limit of time and information. A bad decision may be better than no decision at all. In my present job, I often see a lot of systemic issues in the mission like trauma care, base defense, integrated offices not working together, and these often stem from a lack of giving simple and clear-cut decisions.”

The two essential talents that UN mission leaders must have, he said, were “political acumen” and managerial ability. “Leaders must be multi-skilled to run a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation and must possess managerial skills. Leaders must preferably have previous UN experience to understand the organization, its functioning, and the myriad policies, rules and regulations. Trust me, it can be overwhelming the number of policies, rules and regulations that come flying at you when you’re trying to run a mission.” He lamented that the UN didn’t have enough job mobility and clear career paths to better develop more seasoned leaders and weed out potential failures.

Ihab Awad, Deputy Foreign Minister of Egypt, chose to focus on MINUSMA where Egypt is a major troop-contributing country. “The MINUSMA adaptation plan was an important step forward to reorient the focus and operational capabilities of the mission, but it’s still a work in progress and, given the recent turmoil in Mali following the election, perhaps there is a need to continue to ensure that the adaptation plan is actually adapted to the emerging political and operational challenges facing the mission. So while there is a plan in place, I would like to really call on adapting this adaptation to the version of the realities.”

Ambassador Awad brought up the great variances in the country contexts in which UN missions operate. “This is where the reforms of peacekeeping will actually make a difference, and those are different contexts that require different context-specific adaptation of both the mandate, operation capabilities, and resources.”

In the question and answer period, General Menon had what sounded like the last word. “What the organization, what we need to do is to adapt faster. More flexibility, more adaptability. We need to get the capabilities faster, otherwise the situation and the environment will keep changing. And your force adaptation plan, like someone said, will have to be further adapted.”

Moderating the discussion was Jake Sherman, IPI Senior Director of Programs.

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Dans les débats chinois sur l’avenir de la politique économique du pays au cours de la prochaine décennie, et sur la manière de faire valoir les intérêts de la Chine dans la guerre commerciale et technologique avec les États-Unis — in fine, sur comment vaincre les États-Unis dans la compétition pour l'hégémonie mondiale —, "l’innovation" semble être perçue comme la solution unique à tous les maux de la Chine. Cette prise de conscience de la…

La mycose des pieds est une infection fongique qui touche 10 % de la population française. Démangeaison des orteils, ongles de pieds très épaissis, vous soupçonnez une mycose. Pour vous en débarrasser et redonner forme humaine à vos pieds, plusieurs sont les solutions que vous pourriez exploiter. Une fois expérimentées, certaines précautions vous permettront de définitivement dire adieu à cette maladie qui ne vous rend pas fière de vos pieds au moment de les étaler pendant le doux soleil d’été.

La mycose plantaire est contagieuse. C’est pourquoi il est conseillé d’appliquer les soins nécessaires aussitôt que vous constatez l’apparition des lésions entre les orteils. Des médicaments existent pour ce faire. Premièrement, procédez au traitement par voie naturelle.

Les antifongiques

Ils sont réputés dans le traitement des mycoses. Gel, spray, crème, les antifongiques sont disponibles en de multiples formats. Il existe même des formats vernis. L’application devra se faire après un nettoyage rigoureux de vos pieds. En guise de précaution, lavez minutieusement vos mains avant l’application pour écarter toute autre contamination et juste après. La durée du traitement n’est pas le même chez tout le monde. Ainsi, il peut prendre un mois dans certains cas, une année entière dans d’autres.

Quelle que soit la durée du traitement, ne l’interrompez sous aucun prétexte, au risque de voir le champion récidiver. Bonne nouvelle ! Il existe un traitement unique à base de solution antimycosique administrée en une seule application pour se débarrasser une fois pour de bon de l’infection. Il n’est cependant réservé qu’aux adultes. De même, les deux pieds devront y passer et devront être gardés hors d’atteinte de toute humidité pendant 24 heures.

Un traitement oral

Si les antifongiques ne vous satisfont pas, il est conseillé de consulter votre podologue qui éventuellement pourra vous prescrire des médicaments. Ce traitement oral peut s’étendre sur une période de deux à six semaines.

L’automédication

Certains traitements sont possibles sans ordonnance. Il suffit de juste remplir une fiche en ligne pour s’en procurer. À titre d’exemple, le fluoconazone, le terbiunafil, le diflucan, et le lamisil sont très efficaces contre les infections fongiques. Il existe également des vernis antifongiques connus pour leur vertu curative dans le traitement des ongles infectés.

Un traitement naturel

Il s’agit du traitement au bicarbonate de soude. Deux possibilités s’offrent à vous. Premièrement, ajoutez quelques gouttes d’eau au bicarbonate de manière à obtenir une pâte. Appliquez-la sur la mycose. Laissez reposer pendant dix minutes, rincez puis appliquez une petite poudre de bicarbonate une fois la partie sèche. Secundo, faites un bain de pied aux bicarbonates de soude. Trempez-y vos pieds 15 à 20 minutes puis sortez-les de la cuvette – à ce propos, vous savez qu’il existe des produits conçus pour vous aider à améliorer cette expérience ?Je vous recommande de cliquer sur ce lien.

L’aromathérapie ou traitement par les huiles essentielles

Ces extraits de plantes possèdent des propriétés antifongiques. Il s’agit des huiles essentielles comme celles de :

• De l’arbre à thé
• D’eucalyptus glonulus
• De lavande
• De géranium rosat

Il suffit de les appliquer trois fois par jour sur la mycose. Rincez quelques minutes après chaque application – à propos … Comment fonctionne un diffuseur d’huile essentielle ?

La phytothérapie

Il s’agit du traitement par les teintures. Certaines d’entre elles possèdent de véritables propriétés antifongiques, surtout sur les peaux glabres. La teinture mère de calendula à utiliser en double application journalière sur la lésion. Après un mois, vous serez débarrassé de vos infections. La teinture de propolis également peut faire l’affaire.

Le traitement par homéopathie

Plus pour la prévention contre les cas de récidives, ce traitement vient renforcer celui fait par les antifongiques.

L’article Comment se débarrasser de la mycose des pieds ? est apparu en premier sur RMES.