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General : EP President Martin Schulz will be awarded the 57th International Charlemagne Prize at a ceremony on Thursday 14 May in Aachen. The prize goes to Mr Schulz for his work to promote democracy, not least by making the European Parliament more visible, audible and understandable, and for his role in the "Spitzenkandidaten" process ahead of the 2014 European elections.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

General : EP President Martin Schulz will be awarded the 57th International Charlemagne Prize at a ceremony on Thursday 14 May in Aachen. The prize goes to Mr Schulz for his work to promote democracy, not least by making the European Parliament more visible, audible and understandable, and for his role in the "Spitzenkandidaten" process ahead of the 2014 European elections.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

CHISINAU, 13 May 2015 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) will hold a press conference in Chisinau on Thursday, 14 May for the formal opening of the limited election observation mission for the 14 June 2015 local elections in Moldova.

Mr Kimmo Kiljunen, the Head of the OSCE/ODIHR limited election observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities. The press conference will also provide an opportunity for questions from journalists.

The OSCE/ODIHR limited election observation mission will partner with a delegation from the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities for observation and the release of a preliminary statement of findings and conclusions on the day after the elections.

The mission's deployment follows an invitation from the authorities of Moldova.

The OSCE/ODIHR limited election observation mission and the OSCE Mission to Moldova operate separately and independently under their own mandates.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 13:00, Thursday, 14 May, in the Summit Events & Conference Center, Tighina Str. 49/3, Chisinau.

For further information, please contact Giuseppe Milazzo, Media Analyst with the limited election observation mission, at +373 68 671 251 or at giuseppe.milazzo@odihr.md (e-mail).

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, at + 48 609 522 266 or thomas.rymer@odihr.pl. 

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"Kislányom, már megint nem etted meg az ebédet? Bezzeg Afrikában az éhező gyerekek hogy örülnének neki!" - Te is gyakran hallottad ezeket a mondatokat a szüleidtől, vagy esetleg te magad szoktad így megrendszabályozni csemetédet? Tedd a szívedre a kezed, valóban érdekel az Afrikában éhező gyermekek sorsa, vagy csak egy jól hangzó frázisként dobálózol ezekkel a szavakkal?

Stabilisierung autoritärer Herrschaft am Rande des Arabischen Frühlings

VIENNA, 13 May 2015 – Legislation designed to fight terrorism now being considered by the Parliament of Canada may limit free expression rights, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatović told Foreign Minister Rob Nicholson in a letter last week.

The legal review of Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act 2015, was commissioned by the Representative’s Office and carried out by attorney Toby Mendel, executive director of the Centre for Law and Democracy in Nova Scotia.

Among other things, the legal review notes that it is well established under international law that there is an important difference between mere advocacy or promotion of something, regardless of its harmfulness, and incitement to a harmful result.

“The proposed legislation criminalizes the unclear concepts of advocating or promoting acts or being reckless in recognizing they may be committed,” Mijatović wrote. “Limits on the right to free expression should not be introduced into law when based on such vague notions.”

The legal review suggests changes to the proposed law that would bring it in compliance with international standards and OSCE commitments.

The legal review is available at www.osce.org/fom/156261.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. She provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more atwww.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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In the first quarter of 2015, the growth of the German economy was slower than predicted. The reasons for this are the anti-Russian sanctions and euro crisis, DWN reported.

You can read here the article on the impact of Kenan Evren on Turkish politics written by Research Fellow of ELIAMEP and Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis. This commentary was published in Kathimerini on 12 May 2015. The content is available in Greek.

May 13th is Top Gun Day.

This video proves that the F-14 Tomcat was much more than a  capable fleet defender.

Clips taken from the Tomcat HUD and TCS, show that the F-14 could win against some of the best and most agile fighters ever built, such as the F-16, the MiG-21, the MiG-29, the F/A-18, the Mirage 2000, the F-15 and the MiG-23 during DACT (Dissimilar Air Combat Training) and/or real dogfight sessions.

Although we don’t know the Rules of Engagement (ROE) of the mock aerial combat in the footage, this video shows that, despite its size, the Tomcat was an amazingly agile and nasty dogfighter.

 

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Goran Sekulovski, spécialiste de la Macédoine, professeur à l’Institut Saint-Serge, répond à nos questions :
– Dans quel contexte politique et social se sont tenus les affrontements en Macédoine ? Existe-il un lien avec le conflit de 2001 ?
– Ces troubles sont-ils le fait de conflits interethniques ou de la crise politique que traverse la Macédoine actuellement ?
– La communauté internationale a-t-elle un rôle à jouer dans l’apaisement des tensions ? Comment réagissent les pays voisins de la Macédoine ?

The dominant perception in the 1980s was that reactionism, unreliability, and unpredictability characterized Greek foreign policy. Since the mid-1990s, the pattern has been one of a more pragmatic, reliable, and rational foreign policy—although to different degrees according to the government in office. This is due mainly to the influence and impact of the deep Europeanization process that has shaped various facets of Greek political, economic, and social life. The deepening of the EU remains Greece’s top strategic objective, despite the country’s current problems.

Concerns about economic survival overshadowed the importance of foreign policy issues during the past five years. Now, Greek foreign policy in principle looks much more ambitious, scoring a level of ambition of 4.5 out of 5. But Athens also needs to rapidly readjust to a changing regional and global security and economic environment.Even before the economic crisis, Greece was consistently punching below its weight on most foreign and security policy issues, allowing itself to lose some of its regional role in Southeastern Europe and letting its active role inside the EU atrophy. An inward-looking and passive mentality led to few foreign policy initiatives and to limited exploitation of opportunities for multilateral initiatives or new tactical and strategic alliances.

An assessment of the impact of the crisis on Greek foreign policy would conclude that the country’s image, prestige, and credibility have been dealt a serious blow, and that Greece’s influence both in the EU and in the union’s neighborhood has been negatively affected. Defense expenditures have been significantly reduced, although Greece still spends the equivalent of 2 percent of its GDP on defense. In this context, Greece’s participation in international peacekeeping and other operations has already been trimmed down. Greek facilities are still being offered for use in NATO (and U.S.) operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the benefits of Greek membership are probably suboptimal for both the country and the alliance.

Yet Greece remains important for the West’s geopolitical interests for five reasons.

First, in the Western Balkans, Greece is still an important actor in terms of economic investment and political influence. The dispute over the name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is a major obstacle to Greece’s policy of strong support for EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. Athens objects to the country’s use of the name “Macedonia” without a qualifier, to avoid monopolization of the name by any of the three interested parties: Greece, FYROM, and Bulgaria. No substantial progress should be expected on this issue in the short term because of domestic factors in Athens and, especially, Skopje.Greece’s position on Kosovo, whose independence it has not recognized, will continue to evolve; and Athens may be expected to try to strengthen its ties with its EU neighbors Bulgaria and Romania, as well as with Serbia and Albania.

Second, the management of migration and refugee flows, the movement of jihadist fighters, and the threat of radicalization remain issues with important external and internal dimensions for the EU. Greece, alongside Italy, is located at the EU’s most sensitive external border and is struggling to deal with these challenges efficiently. Athens needs all the support it can get from its EU partners.

Third, Greece can make a contribution to European energy security through the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, the proposed gas interconnector between Greece and Bulgaria, as well as the exploitation of potential hydrocarbon deposits in Greece’s maritime zones. Participation in the so-called Turkish Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea should not be excluded, provided the project conforms to EU regulations.

Fourth, following the example of its European partners, Greece is exploring available opportunities for improving economic and political relations with Russia and China. A quick diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis is a priority for Athens. On this issue, Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea bears a remote but existent similarity to Turkey’s 1974 occupation of Cyprus.The Greek government is critical of the Western sanctions imposed on Russia after its actions in Ukraine and believes that Russia is a difficult neighbor for Europe. But at the same time, Athens regards Moscow as an indispensable element of the European security architecture and would support a combined policy of deterrence and engagement. Greece aspires to become a complementary bridge between Europe and Russia by being Europe’s voice to Russia, not the other way around.

Fifth, Greece occupies a geostrategic location in a difficult neighborhood and offers key facilities, especially Souda Bay, arguably the most important—and dependable—allied military facility in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, Greece has a rather privileged relationship—of varying degrees—with Israel (where the emphasis will be on building deeper strategic ties without abandoning Greece’s traditionally good relations with the Palestinians), the Arab world, and Iran.Athens could play the role of a complementary facilitator in the Middle East, in addition to being a reliable regional partner for the West and promoting regional cooperation schemes. Of course, this presupposes that Greece would be willing and able to successfully implement a more active and effective foreign policy.

Beyond these five issues, Greek-Turkish relations will remain at the top of the Greek foreign policy agenda. Overall, the two countries are better off today than in the past in terms of bilateral relations, including trade and people-to-people contacts. Neither side appears prepared to make any meaningful concessions to fully normalize bilateral relations, and that will probably remain the case for the immediate future, especially in view of Ankara’s ambitious but rather unpredictable foreign policy.

On Cyprus, Athens will remain supportive of a settlement to the island’s division but will defer to Nicosia on the substance of an agreement.

Greek foreign policy makers will function for the foreseeable future under the Damoclean sword of the country’s economic crisis. The threat that Greece might leave the eurozone either by design (“Grexit”) or by default (“Graccident”) is imposing a number of constraints and limitations. Greece needs to find its own niche in the distribution of regional roles and convince its partners and allies of its own added value in managing common security challenges. By necessity, the key concept for Greek foreign and security policy in the next few years will be the smart use of the country’s resources. The best option—as it could have a multiplier effect for Greek efforts to accumulate diplomatic capital—would be to actively participate in shaping the new EU, especially vis-à-vis the Mediterranean and the Middle East (where Greece is promoting the protection of remaining Christian communities), and in formulating transatlantic regional policies. At the same time, however, Athens should not ignore the need for national initiatives and the further multilateralization of its foreign policy.

Despite its high ambition, Greece’s ability to deliver will be hampered by limited economic means and institutional capacity, as well as the diplomatic inexperience and lack of ideological homogeneity of the new left- and right-wing coalition government. The jury is still out on whether Athens can overcome these obstacles.

Source: Carnegie Europe

Déployés lors de l’opération SENTINELLE en région parisienne, le caporal-chef de 1e classe Tsimijaly et le sapeur de 1e classe Benjamin du 3e régiment du génie ont secouru une personne âgée qui venait de se blesser grièvement à la tête suite à une chute sur le trottoir.

Le vendredi 8 mai 2015, pour la première fois, des soldats allemands ont participé sur le sol français à la commémoration du 8 mai 1945 en France.

A Román Légierő (RoAF) és a Thai Királyi Légierő (RTAF) a Lockheed Martin által gyártott „Sniper” célmegjelölő konténert (ATP – Advanced Targeting Pod) fogja rendszeresíteni az F-16-osaira. Ezzel a döntéssel megszerezték a 18. és 19. helyet a berendezést használó országok sorában.