Diplomacy & Crisis News

Les voix singulières sont rares, de celles qui envoûtent ou mettent mal à l'aise. C'est le cas de Scott Walker, crooner baryton passé de la pop des années 1960 à l'avant-garde actuelle après une traversée du désert et l'adaptation émerveillée de Jacques Brel en anglais. Né à Cleveland, aux Etats-Unis, (...) / États-Unis, Cinéma, Histoire, Musique, Personnalités - 2015/07

Tout au long du siècle dernier, des luttes sociales et politiques ont cherché à permettre à chacun de s'approprier l'art théâtral. Avignon sera le premier emblème de ce vaste mouvement d'émancipation par la « décentralisation ». Depuis une trentaine d'années, ce projet s'est peu à peu dévoyé. / France, (...) / France, Art, Culture, Histoire, Mutation, Politique, Région, Théâtre, Associations - 2014/07

« L'Europe est-elle en train de préparer de nouveaux accords Sykes-Picot ? » Conséquence de l'effondrement du vieux système datant de la fin de la première guerre mondiale, les frontières du Proche-Orient se sont totalement effacées. / Europe, Irak, Liban, Proche-Orient, Syrie, Turquie, Conflit, État, (...) / Europe, Irak, Liban, Proche-Orient, Syrie, Turquie, Conflit, État, Histoire, Islam, Nationalisme, Religion, Violence, Frontières, Panarabisme - 2014/07

Paru en 1966, « Islam et capitalisme », du célèbre orientaliste Maxime Rodinson, n'avait encore jamais été réédité. Réfutant l'idée selon laquelle il existerait des règles propres aux pays du monde musulman, radicalement distinctes de celles qui régissent l'Occident, Rodinson préfère adopter pour son (...) / Arabie saoudite, Égypte, Proche-Orient, Monde arabe, Capitalisme, Économie, Histoire, Idées, Idéologie, Islam, Nationalisme, Religion, Socialisme, Marxisme - 2014/04

Photo Credit: Daphne Carlson Bremer/USFWS

How Britain and the US decided to abandon Srebrenica to its fate
By Florence Hartmann and Ed Vulliamy
The Guardian

Dubbed the worst massacre in Europe since World War II, the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 has long been considered a stain on Western efforts to secure peace in the Balkans. But another recent investigation sheds new light on the West’s involvement, or lack thereof, during those weeks in July.

Elephant Watch
By Peter Canby
The New Yorker

As demand for ivory in Asia rises, offering more monetary incentives for poachers throughout the region, poachers are going to great lengths to harvest ivory, threatening Africa’s already-dwindling elephant population even further. Canby looks into poaching as it is practiced today in countries like the Central African Republic and the Congo, and profiles the scientists, activists and politicians working to end the noxious practice.

The Rule of Boko Haram
By Joshua Hammer
The New York Review of Books

While it’s one of the wealthiest and most oil-rich countries in Africa, Nigeria has been chasing political stability for quite some time. Corruption and a series of military dictatorships have weakened the country significantly, making the rich richer and the poor much, much poorer. It’s within this context that Boko Haram emerged, with its roots in one of the poorest parts of Nigeria. In this review of Mike Smith’s Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War, Hammer looks into the terrorist group’s roots, the damage it’s done to the country and the military efforts against it.

Well Aimed and Powerful
By Margaret Lazarus Dean
Longreads

In this excerpt from Dean’s latest book, Leaving Orbit, Dean looks at space travel and the strange phenomenon of moon landing conspiracy theories. In recent years, the theory has, for whatever reason, picked up steam, and a staggering number of “doubters” have come forward. An era of ignorance, it seems, about spaceflight is upon us.

The Mixed Up Brothers of Bogota
By Susan Dominus
The New York Times Magazine

Two sets of fraternal twins; one big mix up. Dominus tells the story of how it happened and how they found out.

Blogs:

The Overlooked Roots of the Greek Crisis by Scott Monje
Unleashing the Patriotic Dragon by Gary Sands
Israel has Hired a Cartoonist by Josh Klemons
The Diplomatic Erosion of the SALT II Treaty: Russia Builds a New ICBM by Richard Basas
Tensions Between Russia and the West Play Out Over Srebrenica by Hannah Gais

A boy at a grave during the 2006 funeral of genocide victims at the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center. Photo Credit: Emir Kotromanić

Twenty years on, one of the largest massacres in Europe since World War II continues to spur controversy, now threatening to further divide Russia and the West.

The event in question is the Srebrenica massacre — the systematic killing of over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in and around Srebrenica in July 1995 during the Bosnian War. Srebrenica, which had been declared a “safe area” under the protection of U.N. peacekeeping units, was stormed by the Bosnia Serb Army (VRS) in the afternoon of July 10, 1995. At the time, U.N. officers in the region put out an urgent call to stop the VRS from overrunning the town. Despite repeated requests, NATO did not attempt to provide air support until July 11. Without substantial assistance, the VRS was able to drive out the U.N. peacekeepers and Dutch forces stationed there and seize the town, killing thousands.

Ten years later, U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan called it “the worst [crime] on European soil since the Second World War.”

Still, whether or not the event should be classified as a genocide continues to be a major point of contention for a number of countries, including some of Serbia’s closest allies. That controversy has reignited over Russia’s veto of a recent U.N. resolution put forward to the U.N. Security Council for a vote on Wednesday. The resolution would have formally recognized the massacre as a genocide on the eve of its 20th anniversary.

Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s ambassador to the U.N., accused the resolution of being “not constructive, confrontational and politically-motivated.” He further argued that the text, at least as it stands now, would “doom the region to tension” because it singled out war crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs.

But a number of Western diplomats have taken issue with Churkin’s characterization of the resolution, particularly because the vote had actually been delayed in order for British, American and Russian diplomats to come to a compromise on some of the language.

“We had very, very close contact with the Russians throughout all of this. Indeed, we would’ve held this debate yesterday — we postponed it for a day in order to allow for last-minute consultations with the Russians to try and get the widest support possible for this resolution,” Peter Wilson, the U.K. ambassador deputy permanent representative to the U.N., told the BBC.

“People recognize that you can’t make progress in the way that Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to make progress if you don’t recognize what happened in the past.”

Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., took an even more aggressive stance, saying, “Russia’s veto is heartbreaking for those families and it is a further stain on this Council’s record.”

“This Council did everything in its power to get Russia on board with this simple resolution that did not even name the perpetrators. But Russia had a red line; the resolution could not reference the genocide in Srebrenica. It could not reference a fact.”

These diplomatic efforts aside, Russia’s veto is not tremendously surprising. Russia and Serbia are close allies. Both Putin and Medvedev have repeatedly backed Serbia’s condemnations of Kosovo’s independence, calling its efforts “immoral and illegal.” Still, with Serbia sniffing out a possible EU membership, Russia does have some cause for concern. It has seen other former Soviet satellite states fall out of its sphere of influence and gravitate toward the West. Fears of Serbia doing the same are not unfounded. Backing Serbia and its narrative about Srebrenica (Serbia denies the killings were genocidal in nature) is one way to try and keep the country in Russia’s orbit.

Students and pro-democracy activists were among those who marched to the Hong Kong government’s headquarters to protest the new curriculum, which authorities are encouraging schools to begin using when classes resume in September. Students and pro-democracy activists marching to the Hong Kong government’s headquarters in 2012 to protest the new patriotic curriculum. Vincent Yu / The Associated Press

An exhibition to commemorate the World War II victory over Japan is Beijing’s latest attempt to prop up nationalism and is part of a greater effort at patriotism that could eventually backfire. The “Great Victory and Historical Contribution” exhibition opened on Tuesday at the Museum of the War of the Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing. The opening marked the 78th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, regarded as the first battle of the second Sino-Japanese war. The exhibition was visited later that day by Chinese President Xi Jinping and all of the top leadership of the seven-man Politburo Standing Committee.

The exhibition comes at a time when relations between Beijing and Tokyo have soured over the last few years, largely as a result of Beijing’s dissatisfaction with the depth of Japanese apologies for war suffering and heightened tensions over competing claims to islands in the East China Sea, alternatively known as the Diaoyu or Senkaku. Beijing also frets over Japan’s recent constitutional push for greater militarism, while Tokyo claims Beijing is becoming more aggressive in asserting its maritime territorial claims.

While the exhibition includes the usual weaponry and gruesome photos, it differs little from similar war-time exhibitions found in other countries, as it is intended to serve as propaganda for furthering patriotic education. Yet the seemingly harmless exhibition can be viewed as but one in a series of efforts toward the promotion of nationalism, following last year’s creation by Xi of three new annual national holidays linked to the war. Also this week, Beijing announced on Monday the staging of 183 war-themed performances, and the screening of new movies, television shows, and documentaries intended “to increase patriotism.” Beijing will also hold a military parade in September to mark the anniversary of the end of the war in Asia.

Unfortunately, the enhanced drive by Beijing to create nationalists and promote citizen patriotism has worrisome parallels to its attempt to promote stock ownership among its citizens. The party’s attempt at hyping stock ownership and propping up share values has only increased expectations of higher and unreasonable returns, as the average price-earnings ratio reached 64 for the Shenzhen exchange (anything above 25 is considered expensive). These high valuations eventually proved unsustainable, with fears causing the markets to crash over 30 percent from their peak on June 12 and forcing Beijing to restrict trading in close to half of the market’s shares. The inability of Beijing to impose effective stabilization measures to limit the downward spiral of share selling has many Chinese now wondering just how effective their government is at overall control measures.

Could the same downward spiral happen because of rising nationalism? Were changes to the Japan constitution to allow for greater militarization, could Tokyo seek to aggressively assert its claim over the Senkaku island chain, thereby prompting a strong (and face-saving) response from Beijing? With growing patriotism and today’s social networking capabilities, angry nationalistic mobs could rise up more quickly and coordinated in provinces and cities throughout China. We have already witnessed rampant Chinese nationalism against the Japanese in recent years, as patriotic citizens burned a Panasonic factory in Qingdao, looted a Toyota dealership and Japanese restaurants, and torched Japanese-branded cars (being made in China by Chinese workers). Meanwhile, Chinese fishermen have amassed in huge flotillas to challenge fishing rights in disputed waters.

Xi’s willingness to foster a greater patriotism among his citizens is a method copied from Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution with his backing of the Red Guards. The growth of nationalism and the encouragement of a New Red Guard in China is potentially as dangerous, as it raises expectations which may spiral out of control. Growing nationalism and subsequent support for Chinese companies vis-a-vis foreign companies (through increased regulation) also has the potential to scare off new foreign direct investment. Japanese manufacturers are already reconsidering investing in China and other countries may follow.

While the excesses of Mao’s Red Guard cannot currently compare with the patriotic fervor Xi has begun to promote, China is not strengthening its cause by encouraging these nationalistic forces to draw attention in international media and is failing to draw international sympathy for its cause. Instead, China is heightening anxieties among neighboring nations and inadvertently stoking the nationalist fires of other countries who are racing to upgrade their military capabilities. By firing up nationalism, the party is shooting itself in the foot as it weakens its ability to partner with these countries (and others not directly involved in maritime territorial disputes) to secure the resources it needs for its somewhat diminished, but continued, growth.

This escalation of nationalism will no doubt backfire as countries realize the extent the party will go to in order to secure its own interest — to the detriment of its trade partners. Perhaps most importantly, though, the party must be careful not to raise the nationalistic expectations of its patriotic populace in similar ways it raised the materialistic expectations of its profiteering populace — witness the recent anger and resentment over the all-powerful party’s inability to stem losses on the Shanghai and Shenzen stock markets. The new party leadership under Xi should reconsider its approach to promoting nationalism, in light of its failure to control the stock markets, and reign in its latest effort to promote nationalism, for as Mao Zedong once said, “It only takes a spark to start a prairie fire.”

 

L'Allemagne trône au cœur de cet espace où chaque Etat devient le prédateur potentiel de ses voisins. Alors, que faire ? / Allemagne, Europe, France, Banque, Capitalisme, Démocratie, Économie, Finance, Histoire, Idées, Inégalités, Crise économique, Crise financière, Néolibéralisme - (...) / Allemagne, Europe, France, Banque, Capitalisme, Démocratie, Économie, Finance, Histoire, Idées, Inégalités, Crise économique, Crise financière, Néolibéralisme - 2014/03

Coincée entre deux puissances qui voient en elle tantôt un grand marché, tantôt un pion géopolitique, l'Ukraine, sous la conduite de son gouvernement autoritaire, zigzague sur une voie étroite. / Europe, Europe de l'Est, Russie, Ukraine, Économie, Énergie, Géopolitique, Nationalisme, Relations (...) / Europe, Europe de l'Est, Russie, Ukraine, Économie, Énergie, Géopolitique, Nationalisme, Relations internationales, Relations bilatérales - 2013/12

« L'artiste parle directement avec ce qu'il a de plus humain. L'art réinvente le monde, en montre d'autres, devine le futur, découvre le passé... » Cette sentence d'une prêtresse du candomblé, jadis la religion des esclaves au Brésil, éclaire tout le propos de Paulo Lins. C'est porté par cette (...) / Amérique latine, Brésil, Art, Culture, Inégalités, Littérature, Mouvement de contestation, Musique, Pauvreté, Ville - 2015/07

Il est facile d'entrer dans le monde de Lutz Seiler, tant il paraît simple et innocent ; il est difficile d'en sortir, tant il vous enveloppe comme les fils d'un cocon à travers lequel on voit ensuite le monde alentour. Seiler ne fait pas que raconter : il donne à la perception une couleur qui (...) / Allemagne, Culture, Idées, Littérature, Travail, Ville - 2015/07

Cette recension d’ouvrages est issue de Politique étrangère (2/2015). Jean-Arnault Dérens propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Jacques Rupnik, Géopolitique de la démocratisation. L’Europe et ses voisinages (Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2014, 331 pages).

Ce livre, qui recueille de stimulantes études de cas, des Balkans au Caucase en passant par la Moldavie, part du constat que l’Union européenne traverse aujourd’hui une crise majeure : « une crise de confiance interne vis-à-vis de son projet et une crise externe marquée par la déstabilisation simultanée de ses voisinages à l’est comme au sud », comme le note Jacques Rupnik dans son introduction. Cependant, malgré les intéressantes approches comparatives que ce livre suggère, il n’engage pas de réflexion sur les causes de cette double crise.

Alors que l’objectif de paix est au cœur du projet européen, l’UE, pourtant lauréate en 2012 du Prix Nobel de la paix, ne sort pas d’une contradiction manifeste depuis le début des années 1990. Si elle peut effectivement se targuer d’avoir neutralisé les guerres sur son territoire, elle s’accommode toujours d’une dangereuse conflictualité à ses confins – hier dans les Balkans, aujourd’hui en Ukraine, au Sahel ou au Proche-Orient. Il semble pour le moins étonnant de prétendre, comme le fait Jacques Rupnik, que l’intervention militaire au Kosovo en 1999 « fit des Balkans le terrain privilégié de la réhabilitation de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune », quand cette intervention fut décidée par l’OTAN et ne fit pas l’objet du moindre consensus parmi les partenaires européens. On pourrait même penser que cette intervention a, bien au contraire, sonné le glas d’une politique étrangère commune, les enjeux de sécurité étant « abandonnés » à une structure extra-européenne. Et la « crispation russe » s’explique beaucoup plus, depuis la guerre du Kosovo, par les ambitions croissantes de l’OTAN que par les perspectives d’élargissement européen.

D’une manière générale, la réflexion entamée sur ces « espaces intermédiaires » que sont l’Ukraine, la Moldavie ou le Caucase – voire les Balkans – peut-elle se limiter à une approche militante, le « mal » étant naturellement identifié à Moscou et le « bien » à un « Occident » aux contours incertains ? Cette approche manichéenne amène notamment à négliger la diversité des priorités et des stratégies des différents pays européens, que met justement en lumière la « comparaison » esquissée dans un passionnant dialogue entre Jacques Rupnik et Gilles Kepel à propos des voisinages européens à l’est et au sud.

Enfin, les auteurs partagent comme une évidence un point qui fait pourtant de plus en plus débat, celui d’une équivalence, d’une quasi-synonymie, entre « européanisation » et « démocratisation ». Affirmer que « la diffusion du modèle démocratique de l’UE à l’est du continent » demeure le plus grand succès de l’Union résonne avec une certaine ironie quand la Hongrie, membre de l’UE depuis 2004, est régulièrement pointée du doigt pour ses entorses aux principes démocratiques les plus élémentaires. De plus, les exemples de la Serbie ou de la Macédoine montrent comment des régimes autocratiques peuvent utiliser « l’argument européen » pour faire taire leurs oppositions, museler la presse et conforter sans cesse leur pouvoir. Se réjouir, comme le fait Pierre Mirel, de la « conversion à l’Europe » engagée par les nationalistes serbes relève d’un étonnant optimisme, qui confine à l’aveuglement.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

Public anger over austerity in Greece. Via: Flickr by how will I ever

There seems to be a widespread belief that Greece is in the trouble it is in today because it will not implement the policies that Europe has demanded of it. While it has neglected some reforms, it has adhered to Europe’s key austerity demands more faithfully than any other country in Europe. It appears, however, that this very policy, far from constructing the anticipated sound foundation, has driven the Greek economy into the ground. That is why Greece does not want to follow that path any more.

A Structure without Institutions

You could argue, I suppose, that the roots of the Greek crisis go back to the failure of traditional Keynesian economics to explain the “stagflation” of the 1970s. Stagnation and inflation were not supposed to happen at the same time. Thus, many academic economists began to move away from Keynes and his assumptions. Governments, too, were becoming less enthusiastic about Keynesian fiscal policies, in particular, which were rarely nimble enough to deal with the relatively quick fluctuations of the routine business cycle. As a result, there were fewer active efforts to manipulate the economy to avoid recessions and inflation and toward a greater reliance on markets to regulate themselves.

When the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was built within the European Union (EU) in the 1990s, it followed this model. As several countries moved toward the use of a single currency (eventually called the euro), a European Central Bank (ECB) was built, but its functions were limited to fighting inflation. No common fiscal institutions were created whatsoever. Instead, member countries retained their own sovereign fiscal institutions and policies. They were instructed to keep their budget deficits within three percent of GDP and national debt within 60 percent of GDP, but these restrictions have been routinely violated by member countries without triggering sanctions.

Germany, the largest economy in the European Union, was particularly fond of the new arrangement (indeed, it had insisted on it), given its own focus on balanced budgets and inflation. Germany had been scarred by the hyperinflation that it suffered in the early 1920s. (In November 1923, a loaf of bread cost 200,000,000,000 marks.) One of its highest priorities was to prevent any of the less disciplined countries of Europe from imposing inflation on it through the new monetary union. That, however, has not prevented Germany from violating its own restrictions on deficit and debt.

A System That Feeds Imbalances

Most EU members transitioned to the euro as the common currency from 1999 to 2002. Greece’s acceptance into the EMU was delayed until 2001 because of its unacceptable deficits and inflation rate, and many Europeans were skeptical of its prospects even then. Once the “eurozone” was born, it created the impression that lenders were dealing with a single politico-economic entity, that buying euro-denominated bonds from the Greek treasury was the equivalent of buying euro-denominated bonds from the German treasury. Money began flowing freely out of core European economies into Greece and other peripheral economies.*

In Greece, interest rates fell, inflation grew and relative productivity plummeted. Current accounts were soon out of balance in both core and periphery. The periphery ran large deficits, while the core ran correspondingly large surpluses, as the peripheral economies used the money to buy things from the core economies. The core economies were, in effect, growing at the expense of the weaker peripheral economies, which financed their deficits by borrowing even more from German, French, and other European banks.

Then, in 2010, the euro crisis hit, the Greek bubble burst and demand collapsed. The unemployment rate in Greece peaked at 28 percent, and has been holding steady at 25 percent. Youth unemployment approaches 50 percent.

A Remedy Worse than the Disease

Despite the appearance of a single European politico-economic system, when the crisis hit, Greece was not able to rely on overall European fiscal resources, but on its own meager capacity, immediately generating a fiscal crisis at the national level. When the Germans and other members of the European core looked at Greece, they saw the profligate and sometimes fraudulent borrowing accompanied by corruption, widespread tax evasion, an unaffordable pension system and other fiscal problems.** These problems were real and needed to be addressed, although arguably the middle of an economic crisis was not the best time for some of them. Yet the leaders of the core economies failed to recognize their own contribution to the problem, or even raise the issue of addressing their own current-account surpluses, which continued to siphon money out of Greece.

Because Greece was a member of the EMU, certain policy options available to other countries in crisis were not available to it. For instance, it could not improve its current-account balance by devaluing its currency relative to its major trade partners because they were using the same currency. (As a consequence of the single currency, German companies that export outside the eurozone benefit every time the Greek crisis drives the value of the euro lower.) Greece could not expand its money supply in an effort to lower interest rates and boost domestic demand because it had no control over monetary policy. Monetary policy was decided at the continental level, primarily in ways consistent with Germany’s preferences, which are the opposite of Greece’s needs.

While Greece’s fiscal problems required reducing its budget deficits, a logical accompaniment to that would have been for Germany to expand its own economy and buy more things from Greece. That would have given a boost to demand in the Greek economy and helped reduce the imbalance in their mutual current accounts. Instead, European leaders offered Greece a bailout consisting of even more loans, the proceeds of which were dedicated not to easing a Greek fiscal transition but almost entirely to paying back European banks for older loans. In return for this, Greece was expected to eliminate its budget deficits through austerity — by increasing taxes and reducing government spending and pensions, laying off workers and privatizing state-owned assets.

The austerity approach has proved to be counterproductive. That may not be true in every situation, but it is true in the conditions prevailing since the global economic crisis of 2008, a situation in which consumer demand and corporate investment collapsed and interest rates are stuck near zero. The problem of insufficient demand cannot be remedied by depressing demand even further, which is the consequence of reducing government spending. Even if other reforms were to succeed in improving productivity, companies will have no reason to take advantage of that productivity if there are no consumers. The IMF’s own research department, after studying the impact of Europe’s austerity policies in the aftermath of 2008, concluded that for every $1.00 cut from government spending, economic activity was reduced by roughly $1.30. Thus, austerity has depressed economies even further, and no country in has pursued austerity more than Greece.

The Greek bailout of 2010 had to be followed by another in 2012. That one involved writing off 75 percent of Greece’s debts and the transfer of most of the remaining debt from private banks to public European institutions (shielding the core economy banks in the event of a Greek default). It appears that yet another bailout is required now.

From 2007 to 2014, Greece reduced government spending by more than 20 percent, far more than any other country in the EU, including countries held up to Greece as models. In the same period, Greek GDP has contracted by 20 percent, and per capita consumption by even more. (Keep in mind that 20 percent of GDP is much more than 20 percent of the budget, even in Greece.) Greece’s debt burden (that is, its debt-to-GDP ratio) has worsened under the recovery plan not only because of the additional loans but because its GDP is smaller. Whereas the Troika supervising Greece’s economic recovery program (the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF) predicted in 2010 that their program would turn the Greek economy around in 2011 and have it approaching precrisis levels by now, the Greek GDP still remains 20 percent below that figure. While Greece showed signs of growth in 2014 (0.8 percent) for the first time since 2007, it slipped back into recession in 2015.

Greece’s deficit reduction (first bar) has been substantially greater than any other European country’s. (Graph: European Commission, via Paul Krugman’s blog, Conscience of a Liberal, www.nytimes.com)

The Syriza government that came into office in Athens in January sought to renegotiate the terms of Greece’s recovery program. The latest offer from the Troika, which officially expired on June 30, would have required Greece to increase austerity further, raising the country’s primary budget surplus (i.e., revenues minus expenditures excluding interest payments on outstanding debt) in stages from 1 percent of GDP this year to 3.5 percent of GDP starting in 2018. Although Greece did achieve a primary budget surplus in 2014, it is back in deficit in 2015.

All this comes at the same time that the IMF is acknowledging that Greece will never be able to pay its debts in full even if it follows the Troika’s demands to the letter. Some observers see this as a European conspiracy to keep Greece down, yet that does not seem right either. European leaders appear to believe in the healing effects of austerity; the entire continent has followed the austerity path, albeit not as extremely as Greece. They do not want to bend the rules for Greece in large part because they fear that other countries will then demand to be released from the general austerity prescription. Yet, according to some economists, austerity is the reason that the entire European continent is barely keeping its collective economic nose above water — and has repeatedly threatened to drive the global economy back into recession — regardless of the repeated proclamations of success coming out of Brussels. In 2009, unemployment was 9.5 percent in both the United States and the eurozone; in 2015, unemployment is 5.4 percent in the United States and 11.1 percent in the eurozone.***

Now, of course, the United States also has states with different economic trends and different levels of development, just like Europe, but because the United States considers itself a single country, it handles fiscal issues differently. Florida did not have to deal with its real estate crisis on its own in 2008; if it had, it would have suffered bankruptcy as well. Federal funds flow freely from state to state. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has calculated that Mississippi, for example, receives $500 per capita more in federal transfers than it pays in federal taxes, whereas Delaware pays $13,000 per capita more in federal taxes then it receives in federal transfers. This goes on perpetually. Since we all live in the same country, however, we do not see it as a crisis, do not call it a bailout, do not demand that Mississippi pay the money back, and do not exact punishment for the state’s failure to cover its own expenses. It is simply government functioning.

Since 2010 the ongoing euro crisis has prompted the EU to strengthen some of its economic and financial institutions. Still, Jean Monnet’s dream of a United States of Europe clearly is still a long way off.

 

 

*In the case of Greece, the government borrowed large amounts. In Spain and Ireland, large amounts flowed into the private sector, fueling large real estate bubbles. When the crisis hit, both of those countries suffered despite the fact that their government budgets were actually in surplus at the time. Greece is really the only country where government debt played a substantial role in the crisis, which suggests at least the possibility that the Greek crisis could have happened even if the government had not borrowed so much.

**The Greek pension system manages to be a significant fiscal burden (about 18% of GDP, half of which comes out of the national budget) without being especially generous on an individual level. For nearly half the recipients it is below the poverty line, and for many households (especially these days) it is the only source of income. Unfortunately, this makes it extremely difficult to forge a compromise.

***The United States has probably focused too much on deficit reduction, slowing its own recovery, but not as much as Europe.

Recently, the Foreign Ministry of Israel released a cartoon mocking (Western) reporters, portraying them as clueless and ignorant.

The cartoon shows a blonde American reporter missing all of the obvious atrocities happening around him as he reports live from Gaza.

“We are here in the center of Gaza, and as you can see, people here are trying to live quiet lives. There are no terrorists here, just ordinary people,” he says.

In the meantime, a militant launches a missile in the background, and a Hamas official carries off an LGBT activist with a bag over his head, presumably for execution.

The cartoon was in English, clearly intended for a foreign audience.

It was released to preempt the publication of a U.N. Human Rights Council report critical of Israel’s war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip last summer.

Then, Israel released another cartoon this week. It was tweeted out by account of the Prime Minister of Israel (as opposed to Bibi’s personal account) and shared through their Facebook account. In fact, at the time of this writing, @IsraelPM has it as a pinned tweet and the Prime Minister of Israel‘s Facebook account has it as a pinned post.

The cartoon presents the case that Iran is just like ISIS:

“The Islamic State of Iran.
Like ISIS.
Just much bigger.”

Again, the cartoon is in English.

Neither cartoon got much of a warm reception online, or from the press. If Israel was hoping to change hearts and minds, they need look no further than the YouTube comments of the most recent video to see they fell short. It has twice the number of thumbs down as thumbs up, and that was the polite response. The comments are particularly nasty.

Many have compared both videos to be of the “South Park style.” Neither swayed anyone who didn’t already agree with their point, and both gave ample room for mockery, if not outright anger.

If nothing else, whoever was tasked with creating this videos should be reprimanded for keeping the comments section open on YouTube.

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

The threat of nuclear war was diminished greatly in the early 1980s after the SALT II treaty between the United States and Soviet Union created an agreed upon reduction of nuclear arms. The emergence of MIRVs, missiles that could release multiple warheads on various targets using one rocket as its base, was considered to be a significant risk to both sides. MIRVs and similar systems were limited and eventually banned by the SALT I and SALT II treaties. However, in 2013, the Russian government announced it was going to replace their late generation SS-18 Satan missiles with a new system. The new system, named Sarmat, will begin testing in October 2015. This new ICBM will likely be the newest and most advanced system to be put into service in a generation.

The re-establishment of Russian and NATO military units across the borders is ramping up while diplomacy in Ukraine continues to be usurped by active battles in Eastern Ukraine. NATO’s commitment to place heavy tank and artillery divisions in countries bordering Russia has given Russia the narrative and catalyst to increase its military presence on its own border. Russia’s 2015 May Day parade showed several new ground systems being introduced into their arsenal based on the T-14 Armata tank hull and chassis. Air defense systems similar to that of the BUK-M1 were also on display, such as the related BUK-M2, TOR-M2E and Pansir-S1. Russia’s public demonstrations of new equipment used to be the way Western powers saw how the Soviet army’s capabilities changed from year to year. It seems like this tradition will continue with the “Armata” parade

Mobile nuclear missile systems like the SS-25 Sickle have been the mainstay of Russian nuclear forces for the last few years. The May Day parade featured the SS-27 system, an updated SS-25, along with the new Armata-based systems. Another recent announcement that Russia will start to upgrade more TU-160 strategic bombers after years of stalled production also confirmed a return to the Cold War status quo that was diminished at the end of the 1980s.

The return to large and complex weapons systems might require a shift in U.S. policy in order to compete with new Russian equipment. If the United States and NATO are unable to balance Russian forces on the border, diplomacy may only come after deterrence neutralizes any future “hot” conflict in Eastern Europe.

Jusqu'à présent, Washington a fait du traité transpacifique de libre-échange une arme pour contenir le géant asiatique. Pékin lui-même est resté à distance, préférant lancer sa propre alliance. Il y a fort à parier que les deux capitales évolueront en parallèle. / Asie, Chine, États-Unis, États-Unis (...) / Asie, Chine, États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Japon, Agroalimentaire, Commerce international, Économie, Libéralisme, Mondialisation, Multinationales, Propriété intellectuelle, Pacifique, Services - 2014/11

“Nhiệm Vụ Tối Mật” – “Secret Mission” 2015 by Pham Huy Thong

Just when the memories of anti-Chinese protests and rioting have started to fade among the Vietnamese, the Chinese are stoking the fires again with another salami-slicing maneuver.

Last Thursday, Beijing announced the redeployment of the deepwater oil rig Haiyang Shiyou-981 to the waters near the disputed Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands. The placement of the rig this time around is in waters south of the Gulf of Tonkin and northwest of the Paracels, according to the website of the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration, and is expected to be operational up until August 20.

The website announcement also requested passing vessels to stay at least 2,000 meters away, perhaps fearing a repeat of last May’s confrontation, where several Vietnamese coast guard boats, fisheries surveillance ships, and fishing boats were rammed by Chinese naval vessels for coming too close to this same Chinese rig deployed offshore but within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.

This year, however, the Chinese have located the rig outside the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam, in a grey zone currently being negotiated between Vietnam and China. According to a Vietnamese Coast Guard source, should the Chinese oil rig violate Vietnam’s sovereignty, the Coast Guard would “make announcements.”  This small, possibly incremental step by Beijing can be described as “salami-slicing”, or “Salami tactics,” a term first coined by the Hungarian Communist leader Matyas Rakosi in the late 1940s to describe the destruction of the non-Communist parties by “cutting them off like slices of salami.”

The announcement of the rig’s arrival by Vietnamese media follows a visit by Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh to Beijing on June 17 to 19 for the eighth meeting of the Vietnam-China Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation. During the meetings, both sides agreed to use negotiations to keep territorial disputes under control, avoid any actions to complicate disputes, emphasize the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (East Vietnam Sea/West Philippine Sea) and make progress toward a Code of Conduct. Given the lack of outrage here in Vietnam over the rig’s deployment, the positioning of the Chinese rig was also likely negotiated between Hanoi and Beijing, with Beijing promising to strengthen economic, trade and investment ties.

So far, the Vietnamese people appear to have accepted the deployment of the Chinese rig, as there have been no reports of anti-Chinese protests or rioting despite media coverage. However, some Ho Chi Minh resident representatives voiced their strong opposition to China’s recent actions in the East Sea on Monday to State President Truong Tan Sang and Tran Du Lich, head of the NA delegation of the city. Residents there called for a strong, official response from the National Assembly to China’s violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty, which President Sang acknowledged has not been strong enough.

The arrival of the Chinese rig also coincides with the delivery of a fourth of six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines to Vietnam, under a $2 billion deal signed in 2009. Vietnam may be able to tolerate some salami-slicing by the Chinese, but for this tactic to work most effectively, the true long-term motives should be hidden and cooperation emphasized. Given Vietnam’s long history of successfully fighting off the Chinese, the Vietnamese are traditionally skeptical of Chinese motives and cooperation, and should Beijing choose to slice too much, history tells us the Vietnamese will be ready once again.

Photo Credit: CH’7K via Flickr

A leading naval strategist asks: Could cyberattacks actually prevent war?

In this two-part series, leading thinkers from a prior era of globalization directly inform our understanding of critical issues today. Part 1 examined the lessons for current maritime security concerns from naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan and Nobel laureate Norman Angell. Part 2 considers their competing insights into a very modern challenge: cybersecurity.

Mahan’s ideas of the late 19th century set the track for U.S. naval policy for decades, including growing and strengthening the fleet and developing reliable resupply stations worldwide. Angell described in 1909 that war had become futile as a means to enhance state power and wealth, but not impossible because men sometimes act irrationally. Each saw enormous potential from the surges of trade and technology by the turn of the 20th century. Mahan saw mostly threats; Angell saw more possible benefits.

For Angell, the extent of trade and investment created an “interdependence” among European powers, so that “war, even when victorious, could no longer achieve those aims for which peoples strive.” His ideas are found in international relations theories that developed nearly a century later: complex interdependence, democratic peace, and even constructivism. In each of these, states choose paths other than conflict-for-power and power-for-conflict. The Internet would have made perfect sense to Angell: Social networking, online commerce, and “Twitter revolutions” across borders and cultures increase national wealth, standards of living and human aspirations.

For Mahan, the analysis is more complex, and the policy implications more surprising. Mahan’s cybersecurity policies depend upon his views on “freedom of the seas” and on populations used to material comfort. Freedom of the seas popularized by Grotius’s 1609 Mare Liberum, which asserted that the high seas are open to all, especially for commerce. This idea has been supported by the American Continental Congress, Elizabeth I, Woodrow Wilson and the U.N. During the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR generally left alone one another’s seaborne trade.

But for Mahan, commerce produces the national wealth necessary for military power:

Ships and cargoes in transit upon the sea …are national wealth engaged in reproducing and multiplying itself, to the intensification of the national power…[commerce is] therefore a most proper object of attack.

Additionally, Mahan argued that modern populations had an “excessive sensitiveness” to their new wealth. Attacking international private (commercial) sea trade was actually a benefit to mankind, “more humane, and more conducive to the objects of war, than the slaughter of men.”

The lessons for cybersecurity are evident. Mahan’s realism would endorse state-on-state cyberattacks, like digital spying, Stuxnet, or degrading the military systems of a country you are planning to attack. But Mahan essentially validates cyberattacks on civilian and commercial interests as well. Where private property is the ultimate source of national power, he argues, it is a legitimate target. When populations are “exasperated by the delicacy of financial situations,” not used to widespread discomfort or “privation,” cyberattacks might be used to achieve the intended goals of the attacker without the extensive violence and casualties traditional warfare.

In this way, cyberattacks among great states might serve as proxy wars did during the Cold War: great power contests with minimal casualties to the principals. The risks of this approach then and now, of course, are multiple. Cyber casualties can still occur from economic, financial, industrial or infrastructure damage. Cyberattacks can begin or escalate a conflict which leads to kinetic warfare. Mistaken attribution of cyberattacks can widen the conflict to unrelated or unintended parties.

If Mahan is right, a number of implications follow. Countries are already developing offensive and defensive cyberstrategies – these need to be fully integrated into national security and economic means and ends. (As Peter Singer and Allan Friedman note, whether these questions are fully understood by the key decision makers remains a question.) Governments must work closely with other public and commercial organizations – preventing a cyberattack on finance, industry, and infrastructure as they would from a terrorist or traditional warfare. Many countries are already well into these kinds of discussions, including with each other. Too often though, security measures have proven inadequate. The recent U.S. government’s loss of millions of employees’ personal and security data is just the latest example. Internet security firms like Mandiant and Symantec have detailed intense ongoing efforts, not merely hypothetical ones.

The Internet offers “interdependence” far beyond what Angell could have imagined. But the natures of conflict, spying, industrial espionage, organized crime, and “attack” are all very different from what Mahan understood. By Mahan’s logic, withholding energy exports as diplomatic leverage, theft of commercial intellectual property, manipulating industrial controllers or breaches of financial institutions may be “more humane” alternatives to conventional war.

But Mahan’s logic helped lead the great powers into war.

This post and the previous one are drawn in part from J.Quirk’s article in the Mediterranean Quarterly, June 2015.

L’Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) vient présenter à Moscou, vendredi 3 juillet, le dernier numéro de sa revue Politique étrangère (2/2015), consacré à la Russie et dont le dossier, « La Russie, une puissance faible ? », est l’objet de l’attention de nombreux médias.

La crise en Ukraine a eu un impact profond sur tous les États concernés – l’Ukraine, la Russie, les pays de l’Union européenne et ceux du voisinage – et leurs relations. Plus d’un an et demi depuis le début de la crise, le débat semble toujours polarisé autour de la question « Qui est coupable ? ». Or, la profonde divergence entre l’Occident et la Russie – qui semble décidée à incarner une alternative au modèle occidental – pose la question fondamentale du fonctionnement du système international dans son ensemble.

L’ambassade de France en Russie, l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) et le groupe RBK vous invitent à assister à la table-ronde « La crise en Ukraine : quel impact sur l’évolution de la Russie et du système international ? », le vendredi 3 juillet, de 11h à 12h15, au Centre de presse de RBK (oul. Profsoiouznaïa, 78).

Modérateur : Nicolas Miletitch, chef du bureau de l’AFP à Moscou.

Intervenants :

• Fiodor Loukianov, professeur à la Haute École d’Économie de Moscou, rédacteur en chef de la revue « Россия в Глобальной политике», Moscou.
• Thomas Gomart, directeur de l’Ifri, Paris.
• Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, Responsable du centre Russie/NEI de l’Ifri, Paris.
• Vladislav Inozemtsev, chercheur associé à la DGAP à Berlin, chercheur associé non résident au CSIS à Washington.

Accréditation auprès du service de presse de l’ambassade : Svetlana Terzi/Anna Tikhomirova.

Photo Credit: Theophilos Papadopoulos via Flickr

Greece’s far-left may have reached its day of reckoning far faster than anticipated.

As negotiations between Greece and the troika came to a screeching halt last week over the terms of a multibillion-euro bailout — a few days before the country is expected to vote on the troika’s terms and conditions for a bailout — the country’s already-weakened economy has come to a standstill. Just hours before the deadline for the country’s 1.6 billion euro debt payment on Tuesday, markets were relatively calm, but capital controls to prevent cash from flowing rapidly out of the country have been in full effect. Banks have been forced to close as well and will remain so until July 7, and withdrawals, if one can find a working ATM, are severely limited.

But for Alexis Tsipras and his party, Syriza — both of whom rode into Athens on a wave of popular frustration with Greece’s pro-austerity political establishment — what comes next will be the make-or-break moment for the party’s ability to lead in difficult times.

As far as leadership is concerned, Tspiras’ motives for backing such a referendum are clear. Putting the creditor’s offer to a vote takes some of the weight of his shoulders and opens up the opportunity for the party to lead the country through a time of trial without (presumably) as much backlash. In essence, it’s a way of saying: Whatever road we choose to take, we’re all in this together.

It’s no surprise, then, that Tsipras has presented the referendum not as a vote on Greece remaining in the eurozone, nor as a vote between the euro or the drachma. Rather, for Tsipras, the referendum is a democratic imperative — an exercise in sovereignty before all else.

“Greece, the birthplace of democracy, should send a resounding democratic message to the European and global community,” he said in his address on the referendum on June 27.

“I am absolutely confident that your choice will honor our country’s history and will send a message of dignity worldwide. In these critical times, we all have to remember that Europe is the common home of all of its peoples.”

Whether or not the referendum is a practical exercise has been the matter of some controversy. Those opposing the referendum, including a number of former Greek government officials, have framed the vote as “yes” or “no” to Europe. Even Former Prime Minister George Papandreou — who carried out a similar referendum in 2011, which he has since defended — has repeatedly condemned the July 5 referendum, referring to it as a “tactical ploy” and a sort of negotiating weapon.

Still others have argued much of the blowback comes from the fact that the European project wasn’t all that democratic to begin with. Writing in The Guardian, economist Joseph Stiglitz noted, “[W]hat we are seeing now, 16 years after the eurozone institutionalized those relationships, is the antithesis of democracy.” European leaders, Stiglitz continues, want Tsipras and Syriza out, and they want a Greek government in power that is willing to accept the terms and conditions of eurozone membership without a fight.

What happens on July 5 is up to the Greeks, and only the Greeks, to decide. No matter that outcome, it’s impossible to deny that this is the moment for Syriza. Tsipras’ government is young, but it’s already had its share of fights. They’ve already confronted the EU — but will they capitulate?

“More than ever we must be clear that there is no middle course between confrontation and capitulation,” wrote Stathis Kouvelakis, a member of Syriza’s central committee, after the party was elected in January 2015. “The moment of truth is at hand.”

Those words couldn’t be more relevant now.