European Union

On 25 April 2017, the Council adopted a directive on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, which revises and complements existing directive 91/477/ECC. 

“The new Firearms Directive provides for more rigorous controls on the acquisition and possession of firearms, in particular so that legitimate channels and regulatory set-ups for the acquisition and possession of firearms are not abused by criminal groups or terrorists. The directive is therefore an important step forward, particularly since it balances security concerns with the need to preserve legitimate activities. It is however, vital for the EU and its member states to continue working towards shutting off illegal channels for the acquisition of firearms by criminal groups and terrorists.”

Carmelo Abela, Maltese Minister for Home Affairs and National Security

The amendments address risks for public safety and security, and focus on:

Enhanced traceability of firearms

The revision strengthens the rules on the marking of firearms, by including, among other things, a new obligation to mark also all their essential components. Harmonizing the rules for the marking of firearms and establishing the mutual recognition of marks between member states will improve the traceability of firearms used in criminal activities, including those which have been assembled from components acquired separately. 

This information also has to be recorded in national data-filing systems. For this to happen, member states will now have to ensure that dealers and brokers register any transaction of firearms electronically and without any undue delay. 

Measures on deactivation and reactivation or conversion of firearms 

The rules on the deactivation of firearms have been strengthened, not least through a provision requiring the classification of deactivated firearms under category C (firearms subject to declaration). Until now, deactivated firearms have not been subject to the requirements set by the directive. 

The revision also includes a new category of salute and acoustic weapons, which were not covered by the original directive. These are live firearms that have been converted to blank firing ones, for example, for use in theatres or television. In the absence of more stringent national provisions, such firearms could be purchased freely. This posed a risk, given that their reconversion to live ones was often possible with limited efforts (they were for example used in the Paris terrorist attacks). The new wording of the directive ensures that these weapons remain registered under the same category as the firearm from which they have been converted. 

Stricter rules for the acquisition and possession of the most dangerous firearms 

The most dangerous firearms, classified in category A, can only be acquired and possessed on the basis of an exemption granted by the relevant member state. The rules for granting such exemptions have now been significantly strengthened. Possible grounds for exemption, such as national defence or the protection of critical infrastructure, are now set out in a limited list and exemptions may only be granted where there is no risk to public security or public order. 

When a firearm of category A is required for  sport-shooting, it can only be acquired according to strict rules which include proven practice recognised by an official shooting sport federation. 

Article 7 para 4a provides the possibility of confirming authorisations for semi-automatic firearms (new point 6, 7 or 8 of category A) legally acquired and registered before the directive comes into force. 

Banning civilian use of the most dangerous semi-automatic firearms 

Some dangerous semi-automatic firearms have now been added to category A and are therefore prohibited for civilian use. This is the case for short semi-automatic firearms with loading devices over 20 rounds and long semi-automatic firearms with loading devices over 10 rounds. Similarly, long firearms that can be easily concealed, for example by means of a folding or telescopic stock, are also now prohibited. 

Improving the exchange of relevant information between member states 

The new rules enable the Commission to propose the establishment of a system for the exchange of information electronically between member states. The information would cover cases where the transfer of a firearm to another member state has been authorised as well as where the acquisition and possession of a firearm has been refused. 

The directive sets out minimum rules and does not prevent member states from adopting and applying stricter rules. 

Next steps 

The Council and the European Parliament now need to sign the adopted directive. The signed text will be published in the EU Official Journal and will enter into force 20 days later. 

Background 

Council directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons was originally designed as a measure to balance internal market objectives and security imperatives regarding "civil" firearms.

The amending proposal was submitted by the European Commission on 18 November 2015 against the backdrop of a series of terrorist acts that took place in Europe and which revealed gaps in the implementation of the directive. The current review is a continuation of the 2008 revision and also aligns EU legislation with the provisions on the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms.

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Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

‘France has voted like it never did before’, was the headline of Spiegel Online on Monday morning, and many other foreign observers expressed similar views on the manner in which the traditional parties of the Left and Right were kicked out of the competition by an overwhelming desire of renewal of the political class.

The old new fault line.

But once the dust has settled on this shake-up and on the performance of Emmanuel Macron, who may well be the most surprising shooting star French politics has ever seen, it will become clear that the basic voting patterns of the French electorate have hardly changed at all over the last quarter of a century.

It suffices to compare the map below published by Le Monde yesterday with the maps of the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in September 1992 and the referendum on the European Constitutional treaty in April 2005. In an excellent post-referendum booklet named ‘The Day France said No’, edited by the Jean Jaurès Foundation and published by Plon (2005), demographer Hervé Le Bras (see his 2017 analysis here, published yesterday on the nouvelobs site) very convincingly demonstrated to what extent ‘The memory of the territories’ determined electoral behaviour over time. And Sunday’s first election round is a compelling confirmation of his findings, despite the undeniable progress of the Front National in the North, the South and the East, including the Alsatian region (though not in the urban centres Strasbourg and Colmar).

Which provides once again striking evidence for the thesis that the deepest fault line across French society is the one between what Christophe Guilluy famously named ‘peripheral’ France and what I would (less famously) call ‘participating’ France, a dichotomy which is not exactly synonymous to ‘rural’ and ‘urban’, but which is in certain ways well rendered by the maps above. It’s the dichotomy of openmindedness and opportunity-seeking as opposed to the withdrawn, reproachful, self-fulfilling pessimism that the French themselves sum up in the well-known sigh ‘Tout fout le camp!’ (‘Everything’s going down the drain’). If it did not sound so simplistic, I would simply refer to it, beyond economic indicators, as ‘happy’ and ‘unhappy’ France.

And the most dividing issue, the one which crystallises it all, is … Europe, and everything that it stands for: globalisation and free markets, open borders and multiple cultures, shared sovereignty and common currency. Grossly simplified, last Sunday’s results suggest that half of the French population – the 50% who voted for Macron, Fillon and Hamon – is pro-European, with considerable variations in enthusiasm – and the other half of the electorate (including extreme right, extreme left, and fringe candidates) is resolutely against the European Union, even if their motives and the manner in which they voice their discontent vary.

What is new and different, however, is the explicit salience of the old fault line. Emmanuel Macron took three major symbolic risks in his fundamental ideological layout of the En marche! movement. Not only did he decide to be resolutely positive and optimistic in a country haunted by pessimism, but he also boldly set out to give the adjective ‘libéral’ a new meaning outside the semantic dogmas of the Socialist Party. And last but not least, he was unapologetic about being enthusiastically European, bringing together his personal conviction and the firm belief, as MEP Sylvie Goulard pointed out to Politico, that a rather silent majority of French citizens were profoundly attached to the ‘acquis communautaire’ of cooperation and friendship, especially with Germany.

Emmanuel Macron in Nantes, 19 April.

In marketing terms, European enthusiasm was Macron’s ‘unique selling point’ – and what seemed to be a niche market has turned out to be a rather large, untapped market share, whose potential was reinforced by the lucky circumstance of having the likes of Farage, Trump, Wilders, Putin and Erdogan reminding everybody in a timely manner that the EU may actually be worth defending. Surprisingly, Macron even managed to underpin his pro-EU arguments with a symbolic renewal. Following Le Pen’s demand of removing the European flag – tenderly nick-named ‘your oligarchic rag’ by the FN’s No. 2, Florian Philippot – for a television interview, he turned his rally in Nantes into a genuine profession of faith, waving the European flag and having the audience sing the Ode to Joy. Totally surrealistic for everyone who has followed the political debate in France since … 1992.

The post-election TV debates on Sunday evening already foreshadowed that Europe and the Euro will be used by both remaining candidates as one of the major ‘key differentiators’ over the next two weeks. It will no doubt also be one of the central issues of the television showdown scheduled for 3 May.

Needless to say: whatever the result of the second round of the presidential election and the looming legislative elections, the fault line will remain. The polarisation of society has not yet reached American levels, but it will take a person of outstanding negotiating and compromising skills to bridge this deep divide. European leaders – most of all the next German government – would be well advised to help Macron make European integration (and everything that it stands for) acceptable again to the 50% of the French population who have so vigourously voted against it last Sunday and who have been hardened in their opposition by the insistent rhetoric of the populists and the efficient frustration machine that the Fifth Republic has become.

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 19 on the French 2017 election marathon.
All previous posts can be found here.

The post France 2017: Old fault lines, new salience appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune : "Parce que l'Europe vaut bien une défense"
par André Dumoulin et Nicolas Gros-Verheyde
Editions du Villard (3 avril 2017)

Pour tout comprendre à l’Europe de la défense, il y a enfin une solution. Un manuel complet sur la « politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune », le premier d’une longue série, publié aux éditions du Villard.

Une vraie « bible » sur l’Europe de la défense

C’est une première car il n’existe aujourd’hui, aucun ouvrage en français, à jour, faisant le tour de toutes les questions que pose l’Europe de la Défense, de façon claire et pédagogique. Ce qu’on appelle la « Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune » (PSDC) reste encore un no man’s land, bourré de fantasmes et largement méconnu.

Une politique encore méconnue

Née dans les Balkans, cette politique européenne devenue commune a évolué par à-coups. Certains la rêvent comme une « armée européenne » ou une alternative à l’OTAN. D’autres vilipendent sa faiblesse ou sa lenteur. La PESD devenue PSDC n’a ni ces ambitions ni ces tares. Au contraire ! Et elle recèle des avantages, mal connus. C’est tout l’enjeu de cet ouvrage : savoir comment fonctionne réellement l’Europe de la Défense.

Un ouvrage à quatre mains

Cet ouvrage est rédigé à quatre mains, par un universitaire et un journaliste, qui ont allié leur commune expertise : André Dumoulin (chargé de cours à l’université de Liège et professeur à l’Institut royal militaire – belge) et Nicolas Gros-Verheyde (rédacteur en chef de B2, ancien auditeur à l’IHEDN, correspondant de Sud-Ouest auprès de l’UE et de l’OTAN). Le premier apporte le recul historique pour comprendre, le second donne une mise en relief de l’actualité.

En savoir plus

Tag: PSDCAndré DumoulinNicolas Gros-Verheyde

OPINION on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast)
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Ramona Nicole Mănescu

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

An EU scheme to mobilise €44 billion in private sector investment in Africa and the EU’s neighbourhood should focus on the poor, said committee MEPs on Monday.
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Committee on Development
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

An EU scheme to mobilise €44 billion in private sector investment in Africa and the EU’s neighbourhood should focus on the poor, said committee MEPs on Monday.
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Committee on Development
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The House of European History aims to encourage citizens to reflect upon and debate the history of Europe and of European integration. Its goals are to increase knowledge, arouse curiosity and, over time, become a place for the exchange of ideas, reflection and debate about Europe and its history, linking up people, institutions and networks dealing with European history. Visitors will be challenged to critically assess European history, its potential and its future.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 25 April 2017 the Council agreed its negotiating position, also referred to as a general approach, on the multi-annual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea. The plan will be the first comprehensive long-term strategy for the North Sea aimed at managing a variety of species, fishing vessels and interested parties.

As soon as the European Parliament votes on its report, negotiations between the institutions can start.

"The North Sea plan is key to the implementation of the reformed Common Fisheries Policy and this is why the Maltese Presidency devoted substantial resources to this file to attain a Council position in record times", said Roderick Galdes,  Parliamentary Secretary for Agriculture, Fisheries, and Animal rights, "Once adopted, the plan will be the basis for sustainable fisheries in the area. The Council looks forward to negotiating with the European Parliament and to achieving the best possible outcome for our seas and the fishing industry".

The Council position on the North Sea plan is in line with the recently agreed multi-annual plan for the stocks of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea. It simplifies the Commission proposal by focusing the scope of the regulation on the targeted fisheries over their entire area of distribution, and it provides the means that will guarantee the management of fish stocks through maximum sustainable yield (MSY) ranges. In line with the Common Fisheries Policy, the general approach also provides a very clear approach for the management of choke species in the case of mixed fisheries.

The Council confirmed the Commission proposal in relation to conservation measures for the covered stocks, and increases its effectiveness by also rationalising the scope of the landing obligation in order to achieve the objective of more sustainable fisheries in all sea basins.

The administrative burden linked to the new legislation and stemming from additional control provisions should be reduced as a result of the changes proposed by the Council, which also address the issue of consultations with third countries for jointly-managed stocks to ensure a level-playing field for Union operators.

Next steps

The general approach adopted today is the Council's position for talks with the European Parliament. The Parliament should adopt its position on this proposal in June 2017. This would allow negotiations to start before the summer break. Both institutions must agree on the text before it can enter into force.

Background

The Commission submitted its proposal for a multi-annual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks on 3 August 2016. The proposal covers those fish species that live and feed near the bottom of the sea.

It is the second multi-annual plan adopted in line with the reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) that came into force in January 2014. The objective of the proposal is to implement in the North Sea key aspects of the reform CFP, such as: the achievement of exploitation rates above maximum sustainable yield, the establishment of safeguards related to the state of biomass, the move towards long-term multi-species management, the implementation of the landing obligation and the use of regionalisation for the adoption of technical measures.

On 25 April 2017 the Council adopted a regulation aimed at improving the collection, management and use of data in the fisheries sector.

The new rules simplify and strengthen the current system for the collection of biological, environmental, technical and socio-economicdata. They will allow in particular for the gathering of extensive and reliable information on issues such as the state of fish stocks, fisheries management measures, and mitigation measures, and will make data available at regional and European level, thereby providing a solid basis for scientific advice and policy making.

The aim of the new regulation is to align EU rules with the objectives of the reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), including the protection of the marine environment, the sustainable managementof all commercially exploited species, and in particular the achievement of good environmental status in the marine environment by 2020.

Next steps

The regulation will enter into force on the twentieth day following the publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

For more information see our press release from 7 December 2016 (link below).

On 25 April 2017 the Council adopted conclusions on the United Nations strategic plan for forests with a view to EU participation in the 12th session of the UN forum on forests.

The conclusions highlight the importance of the first-ever UN Strategic Plan for forests 2017-2030 and the related four-year work programme. The plan will be a key instrument to promote synergies and mutually supportive implementation of the policies and programmes for forests of the different UN bodies. The conclusions  also confirm full EU support for the plan and commitment to enhancing the implementation of global forest-related issues at international, regional and national level.

The conclusions pave the way for EU participation in the 12th UN forum on forests (UNFF 12) on 1-5 May 2017 in New York. The UNFF is a subsidiary body aimed at promoting “the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests and to strengthen long-term political commitment to this end”.

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Berlin and Brussels are breathing a hefty sigh of relief this morning on the news that Emmanuel Macron will face off against far-right leader Marine Le Pen in the second round of the French presidential election, with the centrist former economy minister firmly installed as the frontrunner.

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On 25 April 2017, the Council adopted a directive on the protection of the financial interests of the EU (PIF Directive). This will improve the prosecution and sanctioning of crimes against EU finances, and facilitate the recovery of misused EU funds. These common rules will help to ensure a level playing field and improved investigation and prosecution across the EU.

The directive will also be a major part of the law to be applied by the future European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) which is to be created by a number of member states through enhanced cooperation.

Owen Bonnici, minister for Justice of Malta said: "The protection of the EU budget is key to ensuring the most efficient and effective use of European taxpayers' money. Having common definitions, common rules, and common minimum sanctions is a step forward for fighting fraud across the EU. This directive will be an important tool for the new European Public Prosecutor's Office".

The directive provides common definitions of a number of offences against the EU budget. Those offences include cases of fraud and other related crimes such as active and passive corruption, the misappropriation of funds, money laundering, amongst others. Serious cases of cross border VAT fraud will also be included in the scope of the directive when above a threshold of €10 million.

The directive finally includes minimum rules on prescription periods, within which the case must be investigated and prosecuted, as well as minimum rules on sanctions, including imprisonment for the most serious cases.

Next steps

Once voted by the Parliament, the directive will be published in the Official Journal and member states have 24 months to implement the provisions at national level.

Participating member states

Ireland has notified its wish to take part in the adoption and application of this Directive. The United Kingdom and Denmark are not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and are not bound by it.

Place:        European Convention Center Luxembourg
Chair:        Dr. Ian Borg, Parliamentary Secretary for the Presidency and EU Funds

All times are approximate and subject to change

from 08.30
Arrivals

+/- 09.00
Doorstep by Deputy Prime Minister Grech

+/- 10.30
Beginning of Council meeting (Roundtable)
Adoption of legislative A items (public session)

Modification of the rules on the European structural and investment funds (public session)

Adoption of non-legislative A items

Bringing cohesion policy closer to our citizens

Implementation of EU macro-regional strategies

+/- 14.30
Press conference (live streaming)

Some of us have been pulling the alarm for years, warning not just of the growing power of populist parties across Western democracies but of their increasingly obvious capacity to attract middle-of-the-road voters to their brand of politics.

For years, a long-held (and understandable) worry about the extreme right prevented most analysts from detecting the very real shift that was occurring on the ‘robust right’ of the political spectrum. Parties that began as heirs to mid-20th-century Nazism or fascism were starting to adopt broader, more hybrid stances. They couched their racism in talk of defending Western values. They moved away from their petty bourgeois base, broadening their appeal to the Left’s natural constituencies by focusing on joblessness and declining incomes. They converted unease with mass immigration into welfare chauvinism. A mix not so terribly different from fascism’s, but with softer rhetoric and sharper suits. Overall, they fed the anxieties of vast swathes of Western electorates who felt abandoned and fearful.

Add to this a steady stream of terror threats and the great gaping chasms created by social media channels and, suddenly, everything – Brexit; an erratic billionaire authoritarian in the White House; gloating, plotting gatherings of right-wing populists in small German cities – starts to make sense. If not ‘good’ sense.

As polls and surveys gave narrow leads to mainstream political options throughout 2016, voters went to the polls and simply turned their back on the status quo. They plumped instead for options that would have seemed near-impossible a year ago. 2017 unleashes a series of further challenges, notably the French and German elections, to see whether Europe as an idea and as a set of institutions will continue to be hollowed out by the forces of populism.

“Ordinary voters feel left behind by elites who have failed to protect them against the harsher winds of globalisation”

Populism may not be the perfect term, but it is useful enough for our purposes. The series of revolts we see across Western economies all fit quite well under this broad (and contested) heading: ordinary, middle-class or lower-income voters feeling left behind by elites who have failed to protect them against the harsher winds of globalisation. This feeling stems from falling wages and deindustrialisation, an ebbing of the comforts that many had come to expect after the Second World War, a sense of being less culturally ‘relevant’, or a combination of all three.

Regardless of the specific grievances, the sentiment voiced by a large minority, and sometimes a majority, is that a governing elite mandated to ensure their prosperity and well-being failed to do so, privileging its own more liberal interests above those of the ‘home team’. Trying to separate out the economic grievances from the cultural or social ones is a fool’s game: it is quite clear that the irrelevance felt and the ‘relegation’ experienced are about how economic power and social and cultural status are intertwined.

This populist revolt, a political chameleon, takes on the hue of its cultural and social context: bombastic, capitalist and aggressive in the US; insular, pragmatic and penny-pinching in the UK; grandiloquent, historic and paranoid in France; taboo-breaking, Kleinbürger-ish and technical in Germany. But the shared trait is that of populism: a menu of nostalgia, nationalism, outraged sentimentality, anti-elitism, suspicion of experts, all washed down with a large helping of xenophobia.

As the initial shock and consternation ebb, many on the non-populist side have been given to belated soul-searching. How could people who share a political and social space be so far apart in understanding the way forward and what would bring individual and collective well-being? The answer, of course, is that there is little shared political and social space (especially given the self-selection vice-grip of social media) and so little chance of there being a shared diagnosis, or a shared set of solutions.

The soul-searching is followed by a mea culpa phase that consists of good liberal self-flagellation. ‘We should have detected the distress earlier on’. ‘We should have paid more attention to the excluded from our own country’. ‘We should have looked out for the white-working class who missed the benefits of globalisation’. ‘We should have skilled-up our workforces more effectively to face this global workplace’.

All of this is true. It prompts all of us who have woken up to smell the Brexit coffee (and the whiff of other nationalist parochialisms) to pay more attention and range a lot more widely in our sources of information and social exchanges. And it is precisely why it is so important now to be proactive.

“The people who ‘have spoken’ are the people who speak from their guts and without hesitation”

At the moment, what seems to dominate is a sort of mantra: ‘the people have spoken and this is the kind of politics they say they want’. But are we not adding insult to injury by caving into this view, merely as a way of assuaging guilt or cutting our losses? Is this really what ‘the people’ want?

It’s a fundamental question. First, because it forces us to ask ‘who’, or ‘what’, is ‘the people’. Second, because it forces us to ask ourselves what we think ‘they’ want. And the two are, of course, intimately linked.

For most populists of the right, the people are defined in part according to a form of nativism. The true people are the natives. But some natives are ‘traitors’ (for example, the ‘elites’), so the ‘real’ people are also those who are defined by their capacity for common sense, their rejection of intellectualism, and their ability to see through the fog of expert knowledge. This knowledge is suspected of being used to bamboozle ordinary people to let an over-educated elite get its way. So the people who ‘have spoken’, as Theresa May put it, are the people who speak from their guts and without hesitation.

But what do ‘they’ want?

The current situation across Western economies suggests that what populist supporters want is a mix of better protection, wage guarantees, and the sense that their contribution both to a country’s economy and its cultural identity is valued. These understandable demands for forms of respect and recognition are interpreted and replayed by populist leaders as a need to ‘take back control’. In other words, legitimate (if not uncomplicated) demands are played back and articulated as an infantile fantasy designed to suspend any disbelief. Promising to deliver on this constructed fantasy – by building borders and walls, or limiting access – puts words into voters’ mouths, thereby limiting what they want. It is also dangerously counter-productive in economic terms.

The consequence is more uncertainty for everyone – but especially for those who the populists claim to help: those who have the most to lose from economic stagnation, a shrinking tax base, and lower investment in the skills they will need to face the world in the 21st century.

IMAGE CREDIT: michaelpuche/Bigstock

The post Give the people what they want? appeared first on Europe’s World.

Parliament's Press Service is holding a seminar on the work that is being carried out by MEPs to revise the existing Audiovisual Media Services Directive. This revision aims to respond to market, consumption and technological changes and thereby achieve the overarching objective of bringing about a balance between competitiveness and consumer protection. This thematic digest provides selected policy department publications prepared to support the committees in their work related to these issues.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Wednesday 26 April 2017
13.00 Meeting with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker (Berlaymont)

Friday 28 April 2017
17.15 Meeting with Prime Minister of Croatia Andrej Plenković

Saturday 29 April 2017 
08.30   Meeting with Prime Minister of Slovenia Miro Cerar
10.00 European People's Party summit (Sofitel)
12.30 Special European Council (Art. 50) 

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The machine gun attack on the capital’s famous Champs-Elysées boulevard has left one policeman dead, two others seriously wounded and another person injured. The attacker was also killed, and ISIS has claimed responsibility.

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AMENDMENTS 19 - 217 - Draft opinion Union Resettlement Framework
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 255 - Draft report on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council concerning the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP