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Actualité :Mali : la France entre Barkhane et le G5 Sahel
Dossier Rwanda : Allons-nous enfin savoir qui sont les assassins du président Habyarimana ?- Le curieux missile du Kivu- Que contient le dossier du juge Herbaut, successeur du juge Trévidic ?
Livres :Sétif, encore et encore...

Editorial de Bernard Lugan
Face au chaos libyen qu’ils ont provoqué, s’obstinant à nier le réel et encalminés dans le néocolonialisme démocratique, les « Occidentaux » ont prétendu reconstruire la Libye autour d’un fantomatique gouvernement d’ « Union nationale ». Présidé par M. Fayez Sarraj, ce GUN est en réalité l’otage des milices islamistes de Tripolitaine et des Frères musulmans de Misrata. Face à cette politique « hors sol », la Russie a déroulé un plan reposant sur les rapports de force militaires. Sa conclusion fut le voyage que le général Haftar - l’homme avec lequel la « diplomatie » européenne refusait de parler directement -, effectua à Moscou les 27 et 28 novembre 2016. Du jour au lendemain, les nains politiques de l’UE réalisèrent alors que le « rebelle obstacle à la démocratisation de la Libye » était en réalité le maître de la Cyrénaïque, qu’il disposait de la seule force militaire du pays, qu’il contrôlait 85% de ses réserves de pétrole, 70% de celles de gaz, 5 de ses 6 terminaux pétroliers, 4 de ses 5 raffineries, et qu’il avait l’appui de la confédération tribale de Cyrénaïque ainsi que celui des tribus kadhafistes de Tripolitaine[1].Le 25 juillet 2017, le président Macron a organisé une rencontre entre Fayez Sarraj et le général Haftar, ce dernier voyant ainsi sa stature internationale confortée. Les deux hommes ont conclu un accord non signé et non ratifié. Que peut-il en résulter alors que le général Haftar est le maître de la Cyrénaïque quand Fayez Sarraj ne contrôle même pas Tripoli et vit sous la menace permanente des milices ? Les deux hommes se sont engagés à organiser des élections. Certes, mais la Libye a déjà connu plusieurs scrutins qui n’ont à aucun moment permis d’avancer sur le chemin de la paix. De plus, comme le Conseil des tribus n’a pas été partie prenante à cet accord, si Seif al-Islam Kadhafi n’y est pas associé d’une manière ou d’une autre, il demeurera lettre morte.
*La situation s’aggrave au Mali où, en dépit de l’accord de paix, les groupes armés signataires s’entretuent. Le climat sécuritaire du pays est plus mauvais aujourd’hui qu’il y a quatre ans, quand le président IBK a été élu. A l’insécurité dans le nord, s’ajoute en effet le centre du pays où, pudiquement, les observateurs parlent de « violences communautaires » pour ne pas dire  guerre ethno-tribale, l’islamisme n’étant ici que la surinfection d’une plaie ethnique.
*Les Casques bleus de la mission de paix au Congo (Monusco) ont mis la main sur un missile sol-air récupéré sur une milice du Kivu armée par Kigali. Il porte les mêmes numéros de série et a été fabriqué à la même date (avril 1987), que les deux missiles qui ont abattu l’avion présidentiel rwandais le 6 avril 1994. Ces éléments sont contenus dans un rapport officiel de la Monusco dont le rédacteur demande qu’il soit transmis au P5 (les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité) ou au P3 (les trois membres occidentaux du conseil de sécurité), à défaut, aux autorités judiciaires françaises en charge de l’enquête concernant l’attentat du 6 avril 1994. Ce rapport a maintenant plus de 10 mois. Si l’ONU ne l’a pas encore transmis au juge Herbaut, cela démontrerait une fois de plus que certaines puissances ne veulent toujours pas, 22 ans après l’attentat qui fut le déclencheur du génocide du Rwanda, que la vérité soit faite sur son (ses) commanditaire(s).
[1] Pour tout ce qui concerne les tribus de Libye et leurs alliances, voir de Bernard Lugan Histoire de la Libye des origines à nos jours. 

A Balatoni Fejlesztési Tanács pályázati kiírása alapján a Balaton Kiemelt Üdülőkörzet településeinek fejlesztései támogathatóak: a parti sétányok, a települési zöldterületek, a partvédőművek fejlesztése és a felhagyott temetők, kegyeleti parkok rehabilitációja. A támogatási kérelmeket önkormányzatok, vagy a 100%-os tulajdonukban lévő vagyonkezelő, településüzemeltető gazdasági társaságok nyújthatják be. A pályázási időszak 2017. augusztus 7-től 2017. október 2-ig tart.  Bővebb információ és ingyenes előminősítés alább! 

Magyarország közel 6 millió euró támogatást kap az Európai Bizottság egészséges táplálkozást népszerűsítő programja keretében. Az elképzelés közvetve több ezer mezőgazdasági gazdálkodónak nyújt támogatást - olvasható a Nemzeti Agrárgazdasági Kamara honlapján.

A Kormány eddig mintegy 9 milliárd forintot helyezett ki a Vajdaságba a gazdaságfejlesztési programján keresztül, és ezzel több mint 6200 vállalkozót támogatott - hangsúlyozta Magyar Levente, a Külgazdasági és Külügyminisztérium parlamenti államtitkára szerdán Szabadkán, ahol a magyar kormány vajdasági gazdaságfejlesztési programjának újabb nyertes pályázóival írtak alá szerződéseket nagyléptékű mezőgazdasági fejlesztésekről.

The archbishop's visit aims to recognise the plight of refugees and hold together the Church of England.

Russia will see a politician one day, who will be able to reestablish the country and negotiate conditions for Russia to surrender with honors. He will be a pragmatic patriot, free of imperial ambition and obsessed with an idea to save the nation. It is only Russia that must take steps towards the West, whereas the West should not do anything

Le 20 juillet dernier, Vladimir Poutine promulguait "Le fondement de la politique d'Etat de la Fédération de Russie dans le domaine naval pour la période jusqu'à 2030", un texte de 22 pages qui annule et remplace la doctrine datée de mai 2012 et qui portait...

Se prononcer sur les externalisations, l'exposition juridique des militaires en zone de guerre, la façon
Plus d'infos »

C'était le dernier gros JO de nominations : une liste des promus et affectés est sortie ce matin. Aucune
Plus d'infos »

The Council has adopted a decision authorising a stabilisation action in the central regions of Mali, in the Mopti and Segou governorates. In response to the invitation from the Malian authorities, the European Union (EU) will deploy a team of experts to support Malian national plans and policies, in order to counter the growing insecurity and to re-establish and expand the civilian administration in these regions. The action's primary objective is to help consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and gender equality by strengthening general governance in this region for the benefit of the local communities.

The EU stabilisation team will be responsible for advising the Malian authorities in Mopti and Segou on governance-related issues, and supporting the planning and implementation by the Malian authorities of activities aimed at reinstating the civilian administration and basic services in the region. The team will be able also to support an enhanced dialogue between the Malian authorities and the local communities.

The stabilisation team will consist of 10 people and will have a budget of €3.25 million for an initial operating phase of one year. It will be based within the EU Delegation in Mali and will operate in Bamako, Mopti and Segou. This action will complement those of the EU Delegation in Mali and the CSDP missions deployed there (EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali), and is part of the EU's integrated approach in Mali. The stabilisation team will also work in close cooperation with other international actors in the region, particularly the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

This stabilisation action is decided by the Council on the basis of Article 28 of the Treaty on European Union, which states that 'where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.' This is the first time that a Council decision has been decided in that context. The decision was adopted by the Council by written procedure.

Mi is lenne jobb ebben a kánikulában, mint a Balkán kedvelt nyári étele, a hideg uborka leves, vagy ahogyan Bulgáriában nevezik, a tarator?

De hogyan készítik a horvátok?

Hozzávalók:

2 gerezd fokhagyma

1 teáskanál só

1 sózott dió

2 szelet száraz kenyér

2 evőkanál olíva olaj

2 sózott joghurt

4 kisebb kígyóuborka

2 evőkanál citromlé

1 marék kapor

Elkészítése:

A fokhagymát nyomjuk össze. Tegyük a turmix gépbe a sózott diót és a száraz kenyeret. Mixeljük össze, majd tegyük egy tálba.

Adjuk hozzá az olíva olajat, a fokhagymát, sót, a joghurtot és keverjük össze. Adjuk hozzá a citromlevet. Ehhez a keverékhez reszeljük hozzá az uborkát.

Körülbelül egy órára tegyük hűtőszekrénybe.

Tálalás előtt, ha szükséges adjunk hozzá egy kis hideg vizet, hogy leves állagú legyen. 

A maradék diót vágjuk apróra és a kaporral együtt szórjuk a leves tetejére egy pár csepp olíva olajjal.

 

Jó étvágyat!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Az Európai Uniónak mihamarabb változtatnia kell a migrációs válság kezelésének jelenlegi módján, és előtérbe kell helyeznie a külső határok hatékony védelmét - derült ki a Századvég közvélemény-kutatásából, amit 28 uniós tagállamban végeztek el. A felmérés szerint az uniós polgárok mind a bevándorlásügyet, mind az energia- és rezsiköltségek megállapítását a tagállamok hatáskörében szeretné látni.

On the road of corruption, there must often be a mechanism or legal shield in order to protect past crimes by individuals, parties or governments that have had their hands in the public purse for their personal gain or that of their party.

Silence may not protect high ranking politicians and corrupt community leaders from prosecution if public outrage and activist judicial authorities are able to break through the barrier of silence and power and find those who have committed crimes against the public interest. Brazil is an example where the powerful have been tied to corrupt practices, and while not a perfect and wholly agreed upon solution, moves towards de-legitimizing corruption in Brazil has begun.

Often the concentration of power to one individual or party comes with the presentation of actions that will improve the public good. Altering an election system to make individual votes more balanced is something that any citizen of any country would approve of, but when it installs one party and one President or Prime Minister indefinitely by legal means, it de-legitimizes the law and assures that a small cabal of powerful people has almost total control of the society with no effective means to remove them from power. In many cases, these actions come on the heels of issues linked to corruption or are formalized in a manner that protects powerful politicians from being subject to transparency.

Another abuse of power that often follows this normalization of corruption is that opposition to the government change in policy is labelled and ostracized so they lose legitimacy in their perspective, or in some cases are outright arrested for working against the state itself.

There are no true international mechanisms to assure that elections will not install corrupt governments when the national legal framework is changed to suit the powerful few over the public. An international standard of legal alterations that would avoid the absolute corruption of a legal and political system would be useful, but would require unified and legitimate political will.

Venezuela as a case in point has legalized a committee that will change their constitution to make it into one that permits a concentration of power into a one party state. Protests have been met with violence, and with the current government’s stockpile of advanced weapons over the last twelve years, there is a good chance that Venezuela will resemble the 2009 mass protests in Iran, with their own Neda and silence from the international community. In 2017, it seems as if international crimes and the natural response to promote justice are limited by illegitimate legal power in places like Venezuela, and silence from most international media while local media is threatened and imprisoned.

This combination guarantees that the worst elements of dictatorships almost always succeed in our current generation.

The post Venezuela is on the Road to a One Party State appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Az Ománi Királyi Légierő 2017. július 29-én a Masirah légibázison hivatalosan is átvette az első Hawk Mk.128 típusú harci-kiképző repülőgépeit, melyeket a brit BAE Systems vállalat szállított le.

EDA has opened a call for papers from defence industry, academia and research institutes on the topic of Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS). The call for papers is focused on the RPAS Air Traffic Integration (ATI) in European airspace in the timeframe 2025-2030. This call is in response to the EDA’s revised approach towards establishing a structured dialogue and enhanced engagement with industry based on a set of priority actions, supported by the EDA Ministerial Steering Board on 18 May 2017. In the RPAS ATI context, and in line with the coordinated approach amongst the main European stakeholders, EDA has set up an Industry Exchange Platform on RPAS Air Traffic Integration.

The purpose of this Exchange Platform is:

• To establish a regular dialogue with industry on a key priority: MALE RPAS integration in the European ATM System in the 2025 – 2030 timeframe.
• To share information on current R&D initiatives and strategies also on industry side in the RPAS ATI domain.
• To identify technology gaps and solutions that can benefit both civil and military applications.

The present call for papers aims at selecting the initial scope and membership of this Exchange Platform, which will hold its next meeting beginning of November 2017. Participation in this call for papers is open to companies of any size as well as academic, research institutes and associations or grouping of industrial suppliers. All proposals must conform to the eligibility criteria set out in this call for papers.  
 

How to submit 

• Download the call for papers here: Call for Papers Industry Exchange Platform on RPAS ATI
• Send your completed files to cps@eda.europa.eu with a copy to juanignacio.delvalle@eda.europa.eu 
• Deadline for submissions is the 29th of September 2017
   

Contact

Juan Ignacio DEL VALLE
Project Officer Air Programmes
juanignacio.delvalle@eda.europa.eu
T+32 2 504 29 26

 

 

 

 

Chers lecteurs. Comme chaque année, Mer et Marine fait une pause estivale. Nous reprendrons l’édition quotidienne du site à la fin du mois d’août. Nous vous remercions de votre fidélité et vous souhaitons à tous un très bel été.

La rédaction de Mer et Marine

 

• Lire la suite de Mer et Marine : Retour de l’information quotidienne fin août

Annoncée le 21 juillet, la polémique suscitée par la baisse de 5 euros de l’aide personnalisée au logement (APL) des 6,5 millions de bénéficiaires, en France, n’en finit pas.

Propulsés dans leur rôle d’élu, les nouveaux députés de tous les groupes politiques racontent leur découverte d’une institution dont ils espèrent faire bouger les pratiques

Depuis quelques semaines, de menus détails bousculent les habitudes de l’Assemblée nationale, à commencer par ceux qui y siègent.

As everyone (semi-)winds down for the August break, and the pace of events slows, it is a useful point to consider Article 50 and Brexit once more.

While I have usually looked at this from the British end, this time I’d like to look at it from the EU’s perspective, not only because I’m now in a large research project with Hussein Kassim doing just this, but also because the structure and process of Article 50 is very much driven by the EU.

Moreover, I have a number of thoughts that I’m trying to marshal together and this is as good a time as any.

With all that in mind, I want to suggest that the EU’s position is conditioned primarily by salience, and only secondarily by substance.

Salience as a key driver

The opening observation is that the EU faces a wealth of issues and difficulties at any given time, by virtue of its size and nature. Because it reaches into a very large number of policy areas and because it covers many states (both as members and as external partners), there is always copious scope for something to go wrong.

Moreover, at present, the EU faces a particularly large number of grave problems, above and beyond the normal noise. Most obviously, the long-running eurozone crisis remains highly problematic, despite nearly a decade of efforts to address it, with a model of economic governance that still lags far behind monetary centralisation. The migrant/refugee crisis might not be quite as hot as in 2015, but it is still highly political and increasingly pervasive in its effects. And Russian challenges to security are as poor as they have been at any point in the post-Cold War era.

And that’s just to pick on the three most obvious candidates, alongside Brexit.

But Brexit differs in one crucial aspect. It looks manageable, in a way that the others do not.

By this, I mean that it is a ‘going-away’ problem, a bit of difficulty that is contained to one country that wants to get away. Sure, it’s still tricky to work out the details, but the basic intent of the UK appears to be to get further away, not closer. By contrast, the other issues are ‘coming-closer’ ones, pervasive and structural, with higher cost implications for the EU. Put differently, if nothing’s now, the UK will stop being the EU’s direct problem, while the others will just get worse.

To be clear, this is an attitudinal view, rather than an objective one, as we’ll discuss below. But the point remains that in the grand scheme of (EU) things, Brexit is low down the list.

You can find markers of this all over the place.

The European Parliament Think Tank’s review of 2016 European Council conclusions showed that only 5% of space was devoted to Brexit, as against 50% on migration, 20% on economic governance and 20% on foreign policy. Also consider how most EU27 discussions of Brexit have also been bound up in (and increasingly are subservient to) wider discussions about the future of the Union. It also accounts for the common view across the continent that the British have been crazy to decide to visit Brexit on themselves when there are many more important things to be dealing with. More prosaically, Jean Claude Juncker spends maybe some more time than half-an-hour per week (as claimed by his chief of staff), but evidently not much more.

In short, for most member states and most institutions, there are more pressing issues to deal with than Brexit.

The upshot of this is two-fold:

Firstly, it means that EU preferences are formed primarily by those who do find the matter salient. And secondly, it means that the EU’s position might not be as stable as it currently looks.

When actors care

Taking each of those points in turn, we can observe that there have been parts of the EU that have seen Brexit as a key priority for action.

Exhibit one includes the Commission and the President of the European Council. As guardian and figureheads of the Treaties they have been the logical point of contact in the initial phases of the process, firstly as Donald Tusk managed the renegotiation, and then as the Commission slotted into its conventional role as negotiating partner in Article 50. From the day after the referendum, both have worked together to pull together a management plan and then a negotiating mandate. This latter is clearly informed by the central idea that the EU’s legal order needs to be preserved, not least because to have otherwise would compromise their own positions within the Union: if a departing state can change the treaty architecture, then what might a extant member state require or demand?

These bodies are thus pursuing both their official role and engaging in an (indirect) defence of their position: recall that in June 2016, it wasn’t clear what would happen with populists in the Netherlands, France, Hungary, Poland or elsewhere. Brexit was (and is) an opportunity to demonstrate the value of membership to all and sundry.

Exhibit two is Ireland. Of all of the EU27, this is the member state that most obviously has a stake in how Brexit unfolds. It is no accident that the border question is included in the opening round, since Irish politicians and diplomats worked very hard indeed to get it positioned there, working on the basis that the UK didn’t seem to be too bothered about it all. Quite aside from the apparent intractability of the matter, the willingness of the country to make such a strong push reflects on this idea of salience: economic modelling suggests Ireland will suffer much more than any other member state as the UK transitions.

Exhibit three are the ‘odds and sods’ group, which currently includes Spain and Croatia. The former saw an opportunity to include references to the status of Gibraltar in the mandate, while the latter has become the only vocal critic of that mandate, focusing on free movement restrictions that arise from the on-going transition arrangements the country has had since joining in 2013. While neither of these have been big issues, they highlight how particular issues can become important as negotiations progress.

What matters

Of course, to argue that most member states don’t care is misleading. And the argument here is that low salience combines with a Commission-led mandate that addresses most concerns, leading the rest to leave this to one side until a more critical juncture. That juncture will be at the end of the process, when decisions are actually made. As such, we might expect that the relative harmony of the EU over Article 50 is conditional, not structural.  To pick just a couple of  examples, the European Parliament might decide it needs more on citizens’ rights before it accepts a deal, while accommodations in any transition deal might cause problems around the financial settlement, to the displeasure of net budget contributors.

It is also important to underline that Article 50 is not the whole game of Brexit. Equally as important is the way in which the UK’s departure will change the balance of the EU. Those countries that saw the UK as a counter-weight to Germany or France, or who used it to promote liberalising, Atlanticist agendas will now find that the environment is less conducive. Security will be a key part of this, as there is a potential to return to the old cleavages and a structural boost to Europeanist models.

This means that states have to think about what Brexit means for the rest of the UK’s relationship with Europe, through NATO, WEU and all the dense network of multi- and bilateral agreements. And it also means that states have to think about how to adapt their EU strategy: there will have to be a realignment of alliances and coalitions.

And this brings us back to the starting point: Brexit qua Brexit is only ever going to be part of a much larger picture for most member states, and much of what will matter will be in their own hands and have little to do with the choices that are reached within Article 50. That leaves a lot of opportunity for those who do care to shape matters.

The post A tentative model of the EU27′s approach to Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.