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L’achat du groupe de presse Lapcom par Andy Vajna et celui du groupe de presse Russmedia par Heinrich Pecina, l’homme de paille de Lőrinc Mészáros, place l’ensemble des journaux régionaux hongrois entre les mains des proches de Viktor Orbán, ce qui constitue une nouvelle atteinte à la pluralité de la presse en Hongrie.
Ainsi que le rapporte un article d’András Jámbor paru lundi soir sur le blog Kettős Merce [1]EGYETLEN ÉV ALATT FELFALTA A TELJES MEGYEI LAPPIACOT A FIDESZ! jQuery("#footnote_plugin_tooltip_1387_1").tooltip({ tip: "#footnote_plugin_tooltip_text_1387_1", tipClass: "footnote_tooltip", effect: "fade", fadeOutSpeed: 100, predelay: 400, position: "top right", relative: true, offset: [10, 10] });, ces derniers jours ont donné lieu dans le domaine de la presse écrite à deux transactions qui bouleversent considérablement le paysage médiatique hongrois. La première transaction concerne le rachat du groupe de presse Lapcom, responsable de la parution des journaux régionaux pour les départements de Győr-Moson-Sopron (Nord-Ouest) et de Csongrád (Sud-Est) par le producteur de cinéma hongrois András "Andy" Vajna, proche du parti gouvernemental Fidesz.

La seconde porte quant à elle sur l’acquisition du groupe Russmedia, propriétaire des journaux régionaux des départements . . .

Comprendre l'Europe centrale pour 6€/mois Je m'abonne Je me connecte

Notes   [ + ]

1. ↑ EGYETLEN ÉV ALATT FELFALTA A TELJES MEGYEI LAPPIACOT A FIDESZ! function footnote_expand_reference_container() { jQuery("#footnote_references_container").show(); jQuery("#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button").text("-"); } function footnote_collapse_reference_container() { jQuery("#footnote_references_container").hide(); jQuery("#footnote_reference_container_collapse_button").text("+"); } function footnote_expand_collapse_reference_container() { if (jQuery("#footnote_references_container").is(":hidden")) { footnote_expand_reference_container(); } else { footnote_collapse_reference_container(); } } function footnote_moveToAnchor(p_str_TargetID) { footnote_expand_reference_container(); var l_obj_Target = jQuery("#" + p_str_TargetID); if(l_obj_Target.length) { jQuery('html, body').animate({ scrollTop: l_obj_Target.offset().top - window.innerHeight/2 }, 1000); } }

A Zsolnay Örökségkezelő 2017 októberében konferenciát szervez Pécsett a közönségfejlesztésről.

North Korea has proven  its determination once again to fulfill its aspiration as a self-proclaimed Nuclear Power State with a new ballistic test on July 27th. These tests marked the 64th anniversary of the signing of the Korean armistice. According to the US Department of Defense, an intermediate-range missile Hwasong-14 traveled 620 miles from a Jagang base before landing into the Sea of Japan, within Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

This test represents a new challenge to Washington, after Pyongyang conducted its first successful ICBM test last July 1st, which proved that the regime has now reached a new and dreadful stage in the acquisition of preemptive first strike capabilities. Despite the initial predictions, under Kim Jong-un’s leadership, the quest for nuclear weapons has achieved significant breakthroughs. The regime has reached an unprecedented level of sophistication in a number of vital areas, including the development of solid-duel rocket engines and the expansion of mobile launch capabilities.

While Pyongyang has made important progress in the acceleration of its intercontinental range ballistic missile program, North Korea’s regime pushes towards the acquisition of the miniaturization technology considered critical to arm a nuclear warhead. The nation could plausibly achieve this milestone in early 2018 as reported by an anonymous CNN source.

Many observers consider this new test additional evidence about Pyongyang’s determination to deliver a “stern warning to Washington in response to any attempt to alter the peninsula status quo”. North Korea’s warmongering to annihilate the U.S. could now be more than an empty threat since it appears that Pyongyang has acquired the capabilities to hit major cities beyond the West Coast. There is the possibility that the range of the North Korean missile could potentially reach New York City and Washington DC, fostering concerns over Pyongyang’s aggressive intentions.

In the aftermath of the recent missile test, two B-1B Bomber Jets have been deployed to the Korean peninsula, joining Japanese and South Korean fighter jets for training exercise purposes. The United States have also tested the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in Alaska by launching a mock ballistic missile in the Pacific Ocean to prove their ability to repel any incoming threat, and to inspire its allies over Washington’s adamant commitment to contrast any further expansion of Pyongyang’s nuclear threat.

The U.S. Pacific Air Forces Commander, Gen. O’Shaughnessy has warned North Korea that the U.S. may “respond with rapid, lethal and overwhelming force at a time and place of our choosing”, highlights that the defiant regime is getting close to Washington’s redline. Meanwhile, UN Ambassador Haley has stressed that the U.S. could pursue a different pact, including the deployment of “consistent military forces”, rather than relying on the UN Security Council to consider further actions. Washington has expressed its frustration several times for its inability to produce consistent results through conventional diplomatic tools to rein in Pyongyang, even acknowledging two decades of failed attempts to denuclearize North Korea.

Over the years, North Korea’s militaristic propaganda has several times made threats to Washington about serious military retaliations in response to any incoming threat to the survival of the Kim’s dynasty. Amid the growing tensions in the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang has further stressed and justified its path toward the acquisition of nuclear capabilities as a tool to achieve the natural vocation of the DPRK as a nuclear power nation as enshrined in its Constitution. The ultimate strategy is to further consolidate its position and eventually force Washington to normalize relations.

During the Obama Administration, Pyongyang offered a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War in return for Washington’s commitment to renounce the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, a de facto recognition of Pyongyang’s nuclear power status. Such a proposal was promptly rejected by Washington, urging for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as a prerequisite for restarting any new negotiation.

North Korea has become one of the most pressing priorities for the Trump Administration. Its resolution to tame the belligerent regime under the auspices of Beijing has so far produced little results. Trump’s Administration has also expressed its regrets for China’s limited efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear program, calling for a more radical engagement in restraining Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Since the Trump Administration took office, regular promises to“take care” of the North Korea issue have characterized the very last days of the previous “strategic patience” strategy.

Trump Administration’s initial entente with China and its attempts to convince Beijing to fully recalibrate its North Korean policy have not produced the expected results, raising tensions culminated in the recent threats of waging a trade war against China. Despite this, Beijing has expressed its frustration for not being able to regain control of the former communist ally, the Chinese leadership remains committed to preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime and the marked geo-strategic alteration that could emerge from the ashes of the hermit kingdom under the auspices of Washington.

Due to the increasing level of North Korea’s nuclear assertiveness, the discussion over a military intervention in the Korean Peninsula has become a recurring topic. The consequence of a military action would certainly expose Washington and its close allies to major retaliation, not to mention the disruption of the fragile balance of the regional security architecture.

Kim Jong-un’s decision to pursue nuclear development along with economic expansion has characterized his personal agenda (byungjin policy) leaves no doubts that the international sanctions and diplomatic pressure from China would not alter the direction taken by the North Korean leadership. North Korean leadership considers itself constantly exposed to foreign attack or internal coup that could destitute Kim’s family sharing the fate of other authoritarian regimes such as Ghaddafi’s Libya in the wake of his decision to abandon the nuclear program in return of expected economic aids under  Washington’s pressure.

North Korea’s regime is now one of the most immediate threats to US national security and also an additional challenge for the Trump Administration, constantly engaged in redefining the contours of American strategic architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. Albeit, Washington remains adamant in instilling faith in its closer allies towards its strategic commitment in the region while confronting the growing threat represented by the North Korean regime, the risk of igniting a conflict in the region, whose catastrophic effects could far outweigh the removal of Kim’s dynastic rule, must be avoided.

The post North Korea’s ICBM Test Jeopardizes Regional Balance of Power appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On 28 June 2017, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1148[1]. The Council Decision extends the existing restrictive measures until 31 January 2018.

The Candidate Countries Montenegro* and Albania*, and the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine align themselves with this Council Decision.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

 [1] Published on 29.06.2017 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L166, p. 35.

 * Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

L’Italie réclame toujours le contrôle des chantiers de Saint-Nazaire. La France refuse et propose une alliance élargie au secteur militaire.

Le rapport sur les incidents de la gare Montparnasse sera publié « jeudi ou vendredi », assure l’entreprise.

Redneken (Vrdnik) 15 kutya és 4 macska tulajdonosa jelentette, hogy a napokban megmérgezték házi kedvencüket.

A bosnyák nemzeti tizenegy egykori játékosa, Hasan Salihamidžić lett a Bayern München új sportigazgatója. A klubbal három éves szerződést írt alá. 

„Mindent beleadtam minden edzésen és minden mérkőzésen. Pontosan így fogok tenni sportigazgatóként is. Nagyon boldog vagyok” - mondta. 

Karl-Heinz Rummenigge ügyvezető igazgató és Uli Hoeness klubelnök mutatták be az új vezetőt.

„Salihamidžić személyében olyan embert kapunk a tisztségre, aki nagyon jól ismeri a Bayern” - mondta Rummenigge. 

A nagyon népszerű, sokak által csak a becenevén - Brazzo – ismert bosnyák szakember Matthias Sammert váltja.

Salihamidžić Jablanicában született (Bosznia-Hercegovina) 1977-ben. A boszniai háború elől a családja Németországba menekült, 1992-ben lett a Hambuger SV játékosa. 1998 és 2007 között a Bayer Münchenben játszott. A bajor csapattal hat német bajnoki címet, és a Bajnokok Ligáját is megnyerte, négy kupagyőzelem részese volt. A Bayern után leigazolta a Juventus FC és végül a Vfl Wolfsburg csapatánál fejezte be aktív pályafutását.

                     1996-2006-ig a bosnyák nemzeti válogatott középpályása volt.

 

 

La ministre des armées était au Tchad, au Mali et au Niger pour faire le point sur cette force africaine de 5000 hommes.

La ministre des armées était au Tchad, au Mali et au Niger pour faire le point sur cette force africaine de 5000 hommes.

"Wir sind nicht im Krieg. Wir wollen nur ein glaubwürdiges Wahlergebnis." So fasst es eine junge Kenianerin auf Twitter zusammen. Friedensnachrichten überfluten seit einigen Tagen die Medien in Kenia. #LigiSafi bedeutet in Swahili soviel wie friedliche, faire Wahlen. Das wünschen sich alle Kenianer. Es steht viel auf dem Spiel. Man erwartet ein knappes Ergebnis bei den Präsidentschafts- und Parlamentswahlen am 8. August 2017.

Le général Patrick Collet (53 ans) revient à sa spécialité initiale, les paras, après avoir pris, hier, le
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Szerbia és Montenegró Légiforgalmi Szolgálat (SMATSA) részletes tervezet fogadott el egy új irányító torony építéséről a belgrádi Nikola Tesla repülőtéren. A torony 75 méter magas lesz, ezzel a világ tíz legmagasabb irányító tornyainak egyike. 

Az új torony építése beleillik a szerb kormány terveibe a repülőtér koncesszióba adásáról. Az új technikai eszközök lehetővé teszik a forgalom további növekedését.

„A régi tornyot 1962-ben építették, amikor évi 300 gépes forgalmunk volt. Ezt ma egy forgalmasabb órában teljesítjük. Az új irányítótorony lehetővé teszi a repülőtér még jobb beláthatóságát és jobb munkakörülményeket teremt.” 

„Ez a légiforgalmi irányítás számára is nagyon fontos projekt, mert egy helyen leszünk mind, repülőtéri, körzeti és közelkörzeti irányítók.” 

A műszaki dokumentáció minden részlete 2018 júniusáig kerül kidolgozásra, a munkák 2018 őszén kezdődnek és a tervek szerint egy évig tartanak. A kivitelezők helyi cégek, vállalkozók lesznek. Az épületet az európai előírások és szabványok szerint tervezik, működtetése energiatakarékos lesz, az építéséhez környezetbarát anyagokat használnak.

 

 

 

The European Defence Agency’s 5th Helicopter Tactics Instructors Course (HTIC), which ran over several weeks at Royal Air Force (RAF) base in Linton-on-Ouse (North Yorkshire, UK) and Arvidsjaur Airfield in Lapland (Sweden), was successfully completed in July.

The course began in May with a four-week classroom phase, which included simulator exercises at Linton-on-Ouse, followed by a three week deployment to Arvidsjaur Airfield in Lapland/Sweden where participants engaged in live flying exercises. Supported by personnel from No 1 Helikopter Skvadron in Lulea, the flying phase included a complex operational scenario employing: dissimilar formation flying, evasion training against a range of airborne threats, Electronic Warfare (EW) against both ground-based and airborne systems and a variety of additional tasks such as Helicopter Assault, Convoy Escort, Mutual Support and Vehicle Check Points.

The Staff Instructors came from Sweden, Austria and the UK with several supporting air assets: Hawks from 100 Sqn (UK), Gripens from 211 and 212 Sqn (Sweden) and Alca Jets from the Czech Air Force (212 Sqn). In addition, EW assets and personnel was provided by RAF Spadeadam.

In total, 10 Bronze, 6 Silver and 3 Gold Badges were awarded ensuring that the international cadre of Helicopter Tactics Instructors has once again been strengthened and grown for the 5th year in a row.

 

Background

EDA’s Helicopter Tactics Instructors Course (HTIC) provides aircrew from participating nations with the skills and knowledge to teach advanced tactics to front-line aircrews from within their own national organisations and to assist in delivering the EDA’s Helicopter Exercise Programme (HEP), the Helicopter Tactics Course (HTC) and the future HTIC. Successful graduates from the course are awarded a qualification recognised by other Member States. HTIC development courses run over two years: in the first year, prospective instructors refine their own knowledge of advanced helicopter tactics to the maximum degree. In the second year, the emphasis shifts to develop the participants’ ability to teach those tactics. In turn, Instructors who have demonstrated above average abilities in delivering the course will be individually selected to come back a third time and teach alongside the existing instructional staff to finally achieve their Gold instructor qualification to become supervising instructors for future HTIC.
The three main elements of HTIC include Evasion Training, Electronic Warfare and advanced Operations. They are initially taught as stand-alone skills before being brought together in a complex, non-permissive environment in the framework of the planning and execution of Composite Air Operations (COMAO).

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2017). John Seaman, chercheur au Centre Asie de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Jean-François Huchet, La crise environnementale en Chine. Évolutions et limites des politiques publiques (Presses de Sciences Po, 2016, 152 pages).

Une conséquence néfaste de l’essor économique chinois – qui a permis de sortir plusieurs centaines de millions de personnes de la pauvreté – est le cauchemar environnemental qu’il a généré. Ce n’est certes pas une particularité de la Chine, mais comme l’explique Jean-François Huchet, la crise y est d’une ampleur inédite. Paradoxalement, c’est la vitalité de l’économie chinoise qui est à terme menacée, et donc la stabilité politique du pays.

S’engageant dans la voie ouverte par Benoît Vermander (Chine brune ou Chine verte ? Les dilemmes de l’État-parti, 2007), Jean-François Huchet, professeur à l’Inalco et spécialiste du monde économique et industriel chinois, concentre son propos sur l’étendue de la crise environnementale du pays, offrant une introduction concise mais sérieuse sur le sujet. Il commence par un inventaire assez complet des manifestations extérieures de cette crise (pollution atmosphérique ; épuisement des nappes phréatiques et pollution généralisée de l’eau en Chine ; dégradation des sols, érosion et désertification ; gestion insuffisante des déchets industriels et ménagers). Mais, de l’aveu de l’auteur, les coûts humains et économiques restent sous-étudiés, bien que certains soient clairement visibles.

Pour aller plus loin, les effets internationaux engendrés par cette crise restent aussi à explorer : l’impact sur le changement climatique est bien étudié, mais d’autres sphères, comme la biodiversité maritime ou la pollution transfrontalière, le sont moins, même de manière générale, dans la littérature spécialisée. Jean-François Huchet s’attaque ensuite à l’identification des causes structurelles de la crise, notamment une conception persistante, née sous Mao Zedong, des rapports homme-nature qui favorisent l’exploitation vers l’épuisement de cette dernière : le poids inéluctable de la question démographique, l’urbanisation frénétique, les choix énergétiques (place centrale au charbon) et, tout simplement, l’échelle absolue de l’économie chinoise.

Pour surmonter cette crise, la Chine se réveille certes, mais tardivement, et de manière encore insuffisante pour l’auteur. Il est vrai que la population chinoise – avec en premier lieu la classe moyenne urbaine – semble s’engager davantage, que les autorités à Pékin affichent désormais une volonté politique plus forte en matière de protection environnementale, que des réformes administratives et juridiques progressent dans le domaine, et qu’une transformation économique est amorcée, qui favorise (et se base quelque part sur) le développement des énergies renouvelables et des industries moins polluantes.

Toutefois, nous explique l’auteur, la Chine est bien loin de sortir du bois : les questions structurelles pèsent encore lourdement, et redessiner les liens complexes entre le développement économique, l’autorité politique et la protection environnementale à différents niveaux n’est pas chose facile (effets de la décentralisation, influence des lobbies industriels, culture de consommation prédominante…) La Chine restera pendant un certain temps un pays à deux vitesses sur la question : en marche vers le développement des solutions environnementales, tout en persistant dans des activités effrénées qui épuisent les écosystèmes chinois et planétaires.

John Seaman

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

 

Trotz eines in den letzten Jahren kontinuierlich hohen Wirtschaftswachstums von durchschnittlich 7 Prozent im Jahr profitiert nur ein Bruchteil der Bevölkerung von dieser Entwicklung.Das laotische Politbüro möchte den privat- und marktwirtschaftlichen Sektor besser unterstützen. Deshalb hat es den Think-Tank ‚National Institute for Economic Research‘ (NIER) gegründet.

Kraftwerke müssen ihre Schadstoff-Emmissionen reduzieren. Umweltverbände sehen als nächsten logischen Schritt, die weitreichende Schließung der grössten Umweltsünder - die Kohlekraftwerke.

The post Neue EU-Emissionsregeln – der Todesstoß für Kohlekraftwerke? appeared first on EURACTIV.de.

Everyone knows about Usain Bolt and Mo Farah. Steve Cram picks the other stars and British hopes for the World Championships.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted within the framework of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda are universal and apply to all countries, whereby each country is free to establish its own priorities. In order to address the concern that support for the problems of poverty endemic in developing countries could be curtailed in the process, industrial nations including Germany pledged to link national challenges with international objectives, particularly those relating to poor developing countries – in accordance with the Agenda's principle Leaving no one behind.
We analysed the revised version of the “German Sustainable Development Strategy,” (GSDS), adopted on 11 January 2017, which outlines measures designed to implement the 2030 Agenda, with regard to a primary concern of the developing countries, namely goal number 2: ending hunger, achieving food security and improved nutrition, and promoting sustainable agriculture.
Specifically, we analysed the indicators, i.e. the strategy’s measurable substance. However, the indicators cited in the GSDS fail to incorporate the developing countries’ immediate needs. Measures implemented at national level are aimed chiefly at improving ecological sustainability within the context of German agriculture. Here, particular reference is made to two verifiable indicators relating to the propagation of organic farming and the reduction of the nitrogen surplus in the agricultural sector.
These objectives are doubtless desirable for Germany, and may make a meaningful contribution towards the achievement of other SDGs (e.g. water, biodiversity, health). However, they hardly contribute to the essence of SDG 2. On the contrary, no account is taken of the possible consequences of these two indicators for food security efforts in developing countries, and, with this, their coherence in terms of development policy. Said consequences could include agricultural extensification and a tendency towards increased food prices. Other policy areas which (could) exercise a considerable influence on global food security, such as bioenergy and agricultural trade, are also overlooked.
Although important and necessary measures are described for the international context, which Germany must implement in order to achieve SDG 2, verifiable indicators and commitments that these efforts will be continued in future are lacking.
All things considered, the German Sustainable Development Strategy has so far failed to meet the requirements of the 2030 Agenda as regards SDG 2. Which changes are necessary for the further development of the GSDS, planned for 2018?

• In a national context, an indicator ensuring the (examination of and endeavours to achieve) development coherence in the field of national policy measures surround¬ing SDG 2 is required.
• As far as the international context is concerned, a credible safeguarding of the current engagements in the field of development cooperation (DC), or a voluntary commit¬ment to increasing the German contribution even after the end of the special initiative “ONE WORLD – No Hunger”, is essential.
• Indicators concerning the sustainability of German agriculture as a whole, the consumption of agricultural products, specifically animal products, and genetic diversity would be particularly expedient in this regard.

In diesem Sommer will Emmanuel Macron ein neues Arbeitsrecht durchsetzen, die Nationalversammlung gibt schon grünes Licht. Der junge Staatschef plant weitere Neuerungen - doch auch die Kritik an ihm wird lauter.

The post Macron will erneuern – und macht sich unbeliebt appeared first on EURACTIV.de.