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Summary: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, a post-Cold War initiative aimed at enhancing the U.S. Navy's green-water capabilities, has become a symbol of defense procurement failure. Initially costing $500 million per ship, the LCS was envisioned as a versatile, modular warship adaptable to various missions with a small crew and fast maneuverability. However, the reality has been far from the promise. Several LCS have been retired early, and others are frequently out of action, earning the nickname "Permanent Dry Dock Club" due to their frequent need for repairs. This situation underscores a broader issue of defense spending inefficiency, with high expectations leading to underperforming assets. As the U.S. enters a competitive global environment, the legacy of such missteps raises concerns about the military's readiness and strategic capabilities.

The Littoral Combat Ship: A Tale of Naval Ambition and Reality

Whenever a defense contractor or a Pentagon spokesperson starts talking about their new “cost-effective” program, just know that it’s a bunch of malarkey. The program is usually going way over budget, the product itself will not be as good as promised, and the systems will be delivered late – meaning that We, The People, as well as our military, are about to get hosed.

Such is the case with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The program introduced warships so awful that many in the U.S. Navy have taken to calling them "Little Crappy Ships.” 

Littoral Combat Ship: The Navy Wanted a Green-Water Navy

It seems strange today, with all the talk about China’s threat to the U.S. Navy and the possibility of a great-power war erupting, but there was a time in recent memory when the Navy was obsessed with the notion of building what is known as a green-water navy. 

The Cold War ended with most of the world’s powers laid low. Only America stood tall as the last remaining superpower. The enemies of the United States were a combination of terror groups and rogue states. Their power and reach were limited. 

So the U.S. military needed to devise new strategies and weapons to fight that enemy. Since these enemies had limited ability to project power, the Navy needed to get closer to where they were.

A green-water navy is basically a group of warships that operates very near the coastlines of other countries, or of its own. It cannot conduct independent operations in the blue waters of the deep oceans. So these smaller warships bring the fight to the enemy’s shores. The concept made sense in the 1990s and early 2000s. 

In theory, the Navy still needs a much greater green-water capability. Sadly, the Navy’s war planners chose to meet the demand by investing in the LCS at the cost of a whopping $500 million per ship.

The LCS: A Swiss Army Knife of a Warship

The origins of the LCS can be traced back to 2002,  when then-head of U.S. Naval Operations Adm. Vernon Clark visited a Danish destroyer. During that visit, he noted how the Danes swapped the warship’s weapons in less than 40 minutes. The American admiral quickly envisioned creating a Navy warship that could operate like a Swiss Army knife. 

The warship’s parts would be interchangeable depending on the mission. The LCS would be operated by a crew of 40 sailors — far smaller than any other warship the U.S. Navy had. It would be fast and lightly armed, but the plug-and-play model of the LCS would revolutionize Navy operations. 

After nearly two decades of commitment, the Navy has already begun retiring several of the LCSs, even though they are among the youngest warships in the Navy's fleet. Others are falling apart because they were never able to meet the demands of having interchangeable parts. As a result, the LCS is an even bigger boondoggle than the Zumwalt-class destroyer. 

The LCS and the Zumwalt class represent two evolutionary dead ends for the Navy. More painfully, they could have been avoided.

Almost from the start of the research and development phase of the LCS program, multiple high-level engineers on the project began voicing their concerns. Nevertheless, the Navy had decided. The bureaucracy was totally behind the LCS concept. There would be no stopping it. 

Too bad for everyone that, in this case, the naysayers were proven correct. 

The LCS: Standing Members of the Permanent Dry Dock Club

The LCS program was a total failure. The Navy’s next generation of warships are not currently sailing the high seas, despite having been operational since 2016. They spend more time in port being repaired, prompting some Navy officers to nickname these warships "Dry Dock One," since they spend so much more time being repaired than they do at sea.

What has that $500 billion per LCS unit gotten us? A whole lot of nothing. The Navy attempted to make the LCS a jack of all trades, and ultimately the LCS was a master of none. 

The Littoral Combat Ship is another example of how absurd the post-Cold War era was for the U.S. defense community. When America should have been pulling back from its defense commitments and focusing on enhancing itself at home, the “end of history” and “unipolar moment” types in Washington convinced themselves — and U.S. leaders — that the end of the Cold War was a green light to let loose, blowing the nation’s wealth on military products that were never going to live up to their expectations.

Now that the unipolar era is over and America is in a very competitive global environment, it is left with the bitter legacy of that post-Cold War policy decadence. 

The question now is: Can the U.S. military recover from these missteps in time to prevent a strategic catastrophe from befalling U.S. forces? 

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Summary: The Mark 7 16-inch/50-caliber gun, equipped on the iconic Iowa-class battleships, stands as a testament to U.S. naval engineering prowess during the mid-20th century. Developed as a compromise between firepower and treaty restrictions, the Mark 7, paired with the Armor Piercing (AP) Mark 8 projectile, rivaled the destructive power of larger caliber guns while adhering to displacement limits. Featuring advanced construction techniques including autofrettage and chromium-plated bores, the Mark 7 offered increased barrel life and superior firepower. Each gun was part of a three-gun turret system requiring a crew of 77 sailors for operation. The Mark 7's versatility was further demonstrated by its wide range of ammunition types, from conventional high explosive shells to the nuclear Mark 23 warhead, showcasing its adaptability and formidable combat capability.

Power & Precision: Unveiling the Legacy of the 16-inch Mark 7 Gun

The Iowa class was the last U.S. battleship ever built, and one of the most iconic. Fittingly, the class was equipped with what might be the most iconic naval gun, the celebrated 16-inch/50-caliber Mark 7. Let’s take a look at the Mark 7 to better understand what made the gun so superlative.

The Development of the Mark 7 16-Inch Gun on Iowa-Class

In the late 1930s, the U.S. commissioned a set of studies for “fast battleship” designs. The General Board, which considered design options, initially considered using an 18-inch/47-caliber gun that had been in use since the 1920s. The 18-inch gun was massive and formidable. But accommodating the gun would have meant increasing displacement above the 45,000-ton limit that, in the late 1930s, was still treaty-enforced.

Eventually, the General Board settled on the 16-inch Mark 7. The gun was originally designed to fire a lighter, 2,240-pound Armor Piercing (AP) Mark 5 projectile. But the Mark 7’s shell handling system was redesigned to handle the heavier, 2,700-pound AP Mark 8. The Mark 7, paired with the Mark 8 projectile, allowed the guns to achieve penetrating power similar to that of Japanese 18.1-inch guns, despite weighing less.

“In 1969, Capt. Edward Snyder of the USS New Jersey (an Iowa-class battleship) reported that the armor piercing shell could penetrate 32 feet of reinforced concrete,” Tim Migaki wrote. “Reportedly, the explosion of a High Capacity shell would create a crater 50 feet wide and 20 feet deep.”

Clearly, the designers had built a gun with considerable firepower. 

The design of the Mark 7

The Mark 7 was built with “a liner, A tube, jacket, three hoops, two locking rings, tube and liner locking ring, yoke liner,” Migaki wrote. “Some components were autofretted. The bores were also chromium-plated to increase barrel life.”

To build the Mark 7, each piece of the gun was heated and expanded, and then slid down over the tube. As the gun part cooled, it would shrink, creating a tight unit.

On the deck of an Iowa-class ship, the Mark 7 would be mounted in turrets on individual slides, which could be elevated independently of each other. The result was, technically, a three-gun turret, rather than a triple turret.

“Each turret assembly consists of a gun house with a rotating structure, a fixed structure, a barbette, and magazines,” Migaki wrote. “The gun house is the rotating armored structure that contains the guns, sighting, and rangefinder stations. The gun pit and machinery flat extend below the shelf plate of the hun house into the upper and lower barbettes.”

Remarkably, a bare minimum of 77 sailors was needed for the operation of a single Mark 7 turret.

The arming of the Mark 7 16-Inch Gun 

Of course, the Mark 7 could be loaded with different types of ammunition. These included Armor Piercing; High Capacity; High Explosive – Controlled Variable Time; Improved Conventional Munition; High Explosive – Electronic Time/Point Detonating; and later, the Nuclear Mark 23 with a 15-20-kiloton nuclear warhead.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Public Domain.

Facing growing scrutiny over his age, President Joe Biden came out swinging Thursday night with a forceful State of the Union address that set the tone for the 2024 general election. Will his performance assuage doubts about his fitness, at age 81, to lead the U.S. through an increasingly volatile global order? In this episode, Jacob Heilbrunn speaks with Harry J. Kazianis, executive editor of The National Interest. Kazianis previously served as part of the foreign policy team for Senator Ted Cruz's 2016 presidential campaign and worked for the conservative Heritage Foundation.

Joe Biden's Fiery State of the Union (w/ Harry Kazianis)

Summary: The USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67), the last conventionally-powered aircraft carrier built for the U.S. Navy, was decommissioned in 2007 after nearly 40 years of service, including key operations like the initial strikes in Operation Desert Storm. Succeeding it is the Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered supercarrier CVN-79, named the future USS John F. Kennedy, set to enter service in 2025 and make its maiden deployment with the United States Pacific Fleet. Despite being a year behind schedule due to an altered Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) strategy, the new carrier is 90% complete. This strategy aims to integrate necessary modifications and efficiency improvements learned from its predecessor, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), including adaptations for the F-35C Lightning II and the upgraded Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar. This approach, endorsed by Congress, replaces the previously considered dual-phase delivery with a more capable single-phase delivery, ensuring the carrier's readiness for deployment to the Indo-Pacific, thereby bolstering U.S. naval deterrence in the region.

Next-Gen Power: The Future USS John F. Kennedy Set for Pacific Deployment

During her nearly 40 years, the Kitty Hawk -class variant aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) – the last conventionally-powered flattop built for the U.S. Navy – saw more than a dozen deployments to the Mediterranean and also commenced the very first strike operations against Iraqi forces as part of 1991's Operation Desert Storm.

Decommissioned in 2007, the now-retired warship will be succeeded by the Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered supercarrier CVN-79, which was laid down in July 2015, and launched four years later. The future USS John F. Kennedy is now scheduled to enter service in 2025, but her initial deployment won't be in the same waters as the former carrier named for the 35th president of the United States.

Rather, it was announced last November that CVN-79 will become a unit of the United States Pacific Fleet when she makes her maiden deployment later this decade, Sea Power Magazine reported.

According to Captain Brian Metcalf, the U.S. Navy's program manager for the Ford-class aircraft carriers, following the commissioning and training workups, the nuclear-powered warship would make a deployment to the Indo-Pacific region and arrive at its new homeport on the U.S. West Coast. Metcalf made the comments while speaking at a panel of the American Society of Naval Engineers' Technology Systems and Ships seminar in November.

Metcalf also reaffirmed that the future USS John F. Kennedy was 90% complete at HII's Newport News shipyard, adding that the program office plans to complete much of the vessel's Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) work would be completed on during the construction and before commissioning, would enable the Kennedy to enter its basic training phase on time.

USS John F. Kennedy Aircraft Carrier: Behind Schedule – But Still Coming

The second nuclear-powered carrier of the Ford-class is currently about a year behind schedule according to Fiscal Year 2024 (FY24) budget documents released a year ago. The delays were due to the altered PSA.

"The Navy is implementing a strategy to pull baseline work from the Post Shakedown Availability (PSA) into the construction period in order to provide more capability at ship delivery," the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding budget documents noted, USNI reported.

That revised schedule would ensure that CVN-79 would be ready to deploy to the Indo-Pacific when she enters service.

"This approach will prepare CVN 79 as the first FORD class aircraft carrier to operate in the Indo-Pacific region and decrease the amount of time CVN 79 would be required to be at the shipyard after ship delivery to conduct the PSA," the documents added. "CVN 79s PSA will align to a traditional period of resolving discrepancies discovered during trials. The revised strategy maintains the overall 'ready for deployment workups' milestone for CVN 79."

Dual Phase Delivery Scrapped

The sea service had decided to switch from a dual-phase delivery for the carrier to a single-phase delivery, which added two years of work to the flattop's detailed design and construction contract.

Initially, the U.S. Navy had employed the dual-phase to save money on construction schedules in the shipyard while avoiding significant overlap between USS John F. Kennedy entering the fleet and USS Nimitz (CVN-68) leaving. However, under the dual-phase approach, the Ford-class carrier would have received retroactive modifications for the carrier-based Lockheed Martin F-35C after delivery.

Instead, following a mandate from Congress, HII's Newport News Shipbuilding provided the modifications for the F-35C Lightning II during the vessel's construction, while other issues that were found during the construction of the lead vessel USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) were also addressed. In addition, CVN-79 received the upgraded Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar.

"Shifting to single phase and incorporating the F-35C modifications will enable the delivery of a more capable and lethal carrier," said James Geurts, assistant secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition. "Initiating this work now will build on the lessons learned from USS Gerald R. Ford to maintain the optimal construction timeline for the shipyard and to avoid inefficiencies."

Progress on the carrier continues, and it was last month that Newport News Shipbuilding began topside testing of the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) on the carrier.

The U.S. Navy's newest nuclear-powered carrier, operating with the most advanced multirole fighter will be heading to the Indo-Pacific by the end of the decade – serving as a strong deterrent to China.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

The first recorded loss on an American made M1 Abrams tank in Ukraine was documented around the same time as the 2024 NATO Summit.

In a recent NATO meeting, the territorial losses Ukraine has recently suffered along with documented losses of Western equipment has put NATO and Ukraine’s allies in an anxious position. Claims by some NATO members that NATO troops could be sent to the front in Ukrainian territory would approach a Vietnam like scenario, where young people in Western nations would slowly see their friends and relatives enter live combat, hoping that laws requiring Conscription would not be passed in those countries. With this meeting coming at a time when Russia’s Opposition leader Navalny dying or being murdered in custody, bad policy decisions in the recent past may lead to some significantly terrible consequences for Western allies.

In addressing in the main threats to the West, there should be three different approaches to the three main threats in Asia, Europe and the Middle East. This is based on the actual popularity of the current governments in those regions as well as the relationship those governments have with their population in putting them and keeping them in power. This would affect the outcomes of challenging these actors, as each scenario is different as well as their end goals. The main issue in all three regions is that only half measures have been taken to discourage increased conflict or to abate it. Voting matters more than ever in 2024, as it is affecting everyone personally.

When consumer products mattered more to Western countries than the fate of Hong Kong’s democracy, and an Olympic Games was held close to a region where minority communities were suffering systemic human rights abuses, it was made perfectly clear that relations with China did not include actual human rights issues in its application. Ignoring core values in our democracies when dealing with foreign powers has resulted in eventual tensions with China. This lacking policy has damaged relations to the point where on Feb 27th 2024, the American news program The National Desk did a report on how the Fentanyl crisis in North America is wholly and directly related to China’s Government, even extending to operations in Mexico. With a nation changing foreign interference debate also taking place in Canada at the moment, the policy the West has had towards China is a direct outcome of ignoring our core values and beliefs.

It is difficult to know the popularity of China’s Government by its people, but it is well known that China’s biggest fear is an uprising by its citizens against the current Government. The first generation of the current Government in China is has not been experienced by this generation and has been re-characterized in a positive light in the recent past. A healthy economy is what is keeping China operating, and it is likely best for China to take actions to keep exports high as it is questionable how an open conflict with Taiwan or India would be taken by citizens in China, and what the outcome would be if the Government actually fell to a popular uprising. Since the West will not challenge China and does little to protect itself from China degrading their own youth in the US and Canada, it would be best that the West use China to displace its support for Russia’s war effort, while giving needed equipment and artillery to Ukraine. This of course should be done with an acknowledgment of local crises, and actions being taken to end the crisis, as opposed to policies that extend its destruction.

China and Russia are not natural allies, and have fought wars on their border over still simmering territorial disputes. While Russia can exchange oil for arms, it would be in China’s best interest to not be linked to one side of a conflict far from its borders. China is actively seeking to displace Russia’s arms sales and much of their artillery uses Soviet designed technology that can be used with old Soviet equipment; equipment also used by Ukraine. China also constructs fairly new and updated equipment faster than any other nations, so their retired artillery and anti-air systems from 2008 could be purchased directly or via a third party as China is actively promoting weapons sales abroad. If there is no stomach to challenge China and they are dependant on exports to Western nations, a displacement of arms to Russia as well as an effective policy to protect our own communities is essential to avoiding a larger conflict.

Russia’s long term goals were always plausible due to the high level of support Russia has in their own population as well as a sanctions regime by the West that is more virtue signal than action. While the US and Canada do little to nothing to displace Russian oil and gas export revenues, Russian oil and gas is still being purchased by Western countries via third countries, who themselves have questionable human rights records. NATO and Western allies that are not united in the objectives of ending funds that go to Russia’s war effort have helped produce a scenario where Ukraine is starting to lose territory. These same countries have diminished the support for Ukraine by enabling its support to be used for local political gain in countries that are suffering from high prices and energy costs due to a lack of displacement of energy, along with social crises as described like those above that result in local crime and chaos. Ukraine should consider openly questioning allies who contribute to Russia’s propaganda, energy funding, and military, and request that NATO inquire into these allies that are undermining the war effort directly or indirectly. Policies and stronger sanctions should not come only after we have lost Navalny, and there is little that can be done to change the support Russians have for their Government if we allow people like him to be detained indefinitely. We need to displace the funding to stop the arms factories, and we must end our own contributions as well as external supplies to their war effort.

Iran has famously lost much of its local support from its population, a freedom movement that have been frequently abandoned by the West as is common treatment with most of the pro-Western communities in the Middle East. So lacking is the support for their movement, that several opportunities have been given to abuse and harass those living in Iran, as well as against those in the larger Middle East. It should be noted that the first people to be conquered by the Iranian Regime was the Iranians themselves, and actions that leave them to be brutalised are the same ones that have lead to atrocities in the greater region that will expand abroad.

In the same time period that we found out that ballistic missiles from Iran were purchased by Russia, there was also a story about Western technology aiding in the design of Iranian drones used to murder innocent people in Ukraine, as well as networks in North America seeking to assassinate regime opponents in the United States directly. With so much conflict via proxies, via Yemen and arms exports to Russia, it would be wise to challenge threats to the West and its allies at its source as the passive approach has lead to a NATO that had to debate openly between its own leaders in a display of panic and weakness. When direct threats are oppressing their own citizens, innocents in the near region, and affect the entire global community, ignoring threats or taking half measures only ensured future conflict and the normalisation of brutality. While China can be financially managed and Russia can be fought into debt and attrition, when several incidences of Casus Belli take shape, passive responses will simply encourage a horrific outcome. If the West want to win or simply gain stability, they must take concrete actions to avoid a larger conflict.

 

Former President Trump is no stranger to controversy, but his recent remarks represent perhaps his most alarming challenge to transatlantic unity. During a campaign rally on February 10, the likely Republican presidential nominee declared that he would not defend a NATO ally that fails to meet the 2% GDP defense spending requirement. Beyond undermining deterrence and establishing conditions for an attack on NATO, this statement tramples on the alliance’s foundational ethos of indivisible security and “one for all, all for one.” With prospects of a second Trump presidency on the horizon, the specter of diminished American involvement hovers over NATO once again. This time, however, the alliance confronts a belligerent Russia to the east amidst a rapidly deteriorating global security environment.

On the other hand, the invasion of Ukraine has galvanized the transatlantic community, leading to a surge in defense spending across the board. With the Russo-Ukrainian war approaching its second-year mark on February 24, it is time to revisit the discourse surrounding NATO’s 2% minimum. Trump’s comments also prompt two disconcerting questions: will he withdraw from NATO, and can the world’s most powerful alliance survive without America’s guiding hand?

To be sure, Trump’s callousness departs from the norms of transatlantic diplomacy, but his association with the 2% controversy skews what is fundamentally a longstanding issue. Every administration since Eisenhower has lamented the inequitable distribution of defense costs within NATO, with Ike himself once bemoaning that the Europeans were “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam.” The disparity became even more pronounced after the Cold War, and by 2014, only three member states allocated at least 2% of their GDP to defense. From the perspective of the American security establishment and public, Europeans are free-riding off U.S. taxpayers despite America being more secure and arguably deriving less benefit from NATO. In fact, there is widespread consensus in the public policy community that Trump is correct about inequitable burden-sharing, but his modalities are ill-conceived and have only strained relations. Where Trump is wrong lies in his utter disregard for the sanctity and historical bonds that underpin U.S.-European ties.

Nonetheless, the tides are turning, and tangible changes are evident. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered a fundamental reassessment of how European nations conceptualize and define their security interests. In 2024, NATO anticipates that 18 member states will meet the minimum 2% defense spending requirement, the highest number to date. This uptick undoubtedly bolsters NATO’s capabilities, but it more significantly reflects a reinvigorated political determination and commitment to collective security.

While the U.S. should take satisfaction with this improvement, the ongoing debate places excessive emphasis on the numerical benchmark itself and insufficient focus on the fund’s allocation. Simply achieving the 2% GDP expenditure on defense does not inherently translate into a net benefit for the alliance. Take Greece, for example; it has historically met the threshold, but in 2014, 77% of its military budget covered personnel costs in the form of pensions and salaries. While compensating service members is necessary, many strategically vital activities lie beyond the scope of this requirement. Critical investments in logistics, infrastructure, and mobility play pivotal roles in operations but fall outside the umbrella of defense spending, raising questions about whether NATO should consider more flexibility in the existing criteria.

Despite incremental progress, the Russian invasion clearly showed that Europe continues to depend heavily on the U.S. for its security. Therefore, if Trump turned away from NATO or pulled out altogether, could the alliance endure in America’s absence? The answer is yes, but not without caveats. America’s withdrawal would severely degrade the alliance’s capabilities, cutting its tank and artillery fleet in half. NATO would also be devoid of strategic and stealth bombers, as well as assets like aerial control, reconnaissance, and, most critically, aerial refueling. While the remaining 30 members possess the expertise and wherewithal to adapt, such a transition would take years and substantial investment. For instance, Belgium would require $5-7 billion and several years to produce sufficient ammunition for merely two months of combat. Furthermore, providing additional assistance and weaponry to Ukraine while maintaining adequate stockpiles for conventional deterrence would be out of the question.

Nevertheless, the alliance would retain supremacy on the seas and in the skies. Most NATO members operate American-made F-16 and F-35 fighter jets, and the complementary French Rafales and Eurofighter Typhoons represent formidable weapons in their own right. France, the UK, Italy, and Turkey would ensure continued naval proficiency, while the British and French nuclear arsenals provide the alliance with a much-needed nuclear deterrent. Additional optimism accompanies its newest members in Finland and, pending approval, Sweden. While all members contribute strategic value, Sweden and Finland stand out with cutting-edge defense industries and relatively sizable armed forces. Still, no single or combination of members could fill the void left by the U.S., but the alliance, at the very least, could effectively stand its ground against Russia in due time.

Fortunately, given that Russia has its hands full in Ukraine, its military is in no position to initiate a conflict along the 1,500-mile-long Russian-NATO border. Moreover, chances of the U.S. leaving NATO are virtually nonexistent, even if Trump wins reelection. It is crucial to digest Trump’s comments within the context of American populism and the domestic support he garners through anti-NATO rhetoric. Furthermore, for reasons of bureaucratic inertia and logistics, America’s exit from NATO would incur far greater costs in terms of finances, time, and influence compared to the status quo. With approximately 100,00 troops stationed in Europe, the U.S. boasts 16 military bases, four naval stations, and eight air force bases across the continent. Washington also maintains around 150 nuclear weapons throughout Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Even if Trump intended to leave NATO, negotiating the transfer or dismantlement of these assets in a four-year timeframe is as impractical as it is impossible.

That said, if Trump secures reelection, the alliance will inevitably grapple with issues of cohesion, and the future of Ukraine is far less certain. However, one should take comfort that his anti-NATO rhetoric appears grounded in populist posturing and the costs associated with burden-sharing. NATO has endured thus far, and while present concerns are legitimate, there is ample reason to believe that history’s most powerful alliance will remain so in the foreseeable future.

Summary: The Iowa-class battleships stand as one of the most iconic symbols of naval power from the late 19th to the mid-20th century, epitomizing the zenith of battleship design and capability. Notably large, these ships measured 860 feet in length and displaced 58,460 tons, surpassing the limits set by international treaties due to strategic necessities. Armed with formidable weaponry, including the massive 16-inch Mark 7 naval guns, they were designed primarily to counter the Japanese Navy during World War II. The Iowa class boasted unparalleled firepower and speed, with a propulsion system generating 212,000 horsepower, enabling speeds over 32 knots. Only four were built, yet they served in multiple conflicts including World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm, marking a significant chapter in naval history and leaving a lasting legacy in military and public consciousness.

Iowa-Class Battleships: Titans of Naval Warfare History

One of the most iconic vessels in the history of naval warfare is the battleship. From the late 19th century through the mid-20th century, the battleship was the pre-eminent naval vessel and the lynchpin of the world’s most powerful naval forces. Memorialized with a board game, Hasbro’s Battleship, the battleship transcended military culture and entered the public consciousness. 

The battleship was, and in many respects is, what the general public thinks about when they think about a warship. And of all the different varieties of battleship, from Germany to America and from Britain to Japan, perhaps the most iconic of all was the Iowa class. 

Introducing the Iowa-Class

The Iowa class was a large ship. Measuring 860 feet at the waterline with a beam of 109 feet and a draft measuring 37 feet, it displaced 58,460 tons. In fact, the ships were so large that they would have violated an international treaty, which capped battleship displacement at 45,700 tons, had it not been for the elevator clause of the Second London Naval Treaty. That clause allowed for larger builds given Japan’s withdrawal from the original treaty. 

The Iowa wasn’t just large but well-armed, bristling with an array of devastating weaponry. Indeed, of all the battleships to ever sail, the Iowa was the most heavily armed. 

First laid down in 1940, the Iowa class was designed as a thwart to the formidable, and expanding, capabilities of the Japanese Navy. As such, its ships were fitted with nine breech-loading 16-inch (406mm)/50-caliber Mark 7 naval guns. These were housed in three 3-gun turrets, configured with two turrets forward and one turret after, in the “2-A-1” configuration.

Each of the Mark 7 guns measured 66 feet long – 50 times longer than their 16-inch bore. Only about two-thirds of the Mark 7 gun was visible, as the gun house obscured the other third. The Mark 7s were truly massive, weighing about 239,000 pounds apiece. Each Mark 7 could fire a 2,700-pound armor-piercing shell at a muzzle velocity of 2,500 feet per second, to a range of up to 24 miles.

The Mark 7 was not the only gun nestled on the Iowa’s deck. It was joined by the Mark 12. While smaller than the Mark 7, the Mark 12 still weighed nearly 4,000 pounds, with a bore length of about 16 feet. The Mark 12 fired shells at about 2,500 feet per second and was classified as a “dual-purpose gun,” or DP, because it could be toggled to target between surface and air targets.

For propulsion, the Iowa class used eight Babcock & Wilcox boilers and four double reduction cross-compound geared turbines, with each turbine driving a single shaft. The power plant was sufficient to generate 212,000 horsepower, which could propel the Iowa at more than 32 knots per hour. To keep the power plant engaged, the Iowa class would sail with 9,000 tons of fuel, which enabled an operating range of 18,300 miles.

Only four Iowa-class battleships were built, but they made an outsized impact, serving in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

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In collaboration with the Malala Fund and the Atlantic Council, IPI hosted a high-level panel discussion to mark International Women’s Day on March 8th. The event addressed the harrowing reality of millions of women and girls living under systematic oppression at the hands of the Taliban and highlighted the ongoing efforts of Afghan women and the international, legal, and research communities to ensure justice for these abuses—in particular, the momentum around efforts to codify the crime of gender apartheid.

The discussion placed thought-leaders of international law, human rights experts, Afghan women, diplomats, and activists in dialogue to offer insights on the lack of basic rights and fundamental freedoms for women and girls in Afghanistan since the Taliban’s repressive regime took over in August 2021. Panelists shed light on the crimes being perpetrated by the Taliban, called on the international community to recognize these crimes, and discussed developing tools for accountability. The event also offered a platform for the testimony of women and girls impacted by the Taliban alongside that of legal and policy experts on gender apartheid.

Participants heard directly from Afghan women and girls in the audio recordings of the initiative “Inside Afghanistan’s Gender Apartheid,” an interactive audio timeline and collaborative effort between the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the Civic Engagement Project. The initiative, which was publicly launched at the event, documents the first-hand accounts of life under gender apartheid and analyzes the impact of the Taliban’s increasingly entrenched and institutionalized legal system that curtails freedom, stifles potential, and erodes dignity.

Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico Alicia Buenrostro Massieu delivered opening remarks, situating the deteriorating state of Afghan women and girls within the larger international imperative to achieve and protect gender equality for all. Articulating the global backlash on women’s rights she instructed, “the pushback is intensifying and so must our response…it is high time to end the systematic exclusion of women and girls.”

Nayera Kohistani, women’s rights defender and teacher, spoke from her personal experience of “dehumanization” and being reduced to a “second-class citizen…with no human agency or dignity.” While she painted a vivid and grim picture of the situation that Afghan women face on the ground where “the Taliban has criminalized [their] whole existence and identity,” she also shared details of Afghan resistance and protest.

Nobel Peace Laureate Malala Yousafzai labeled the event a true moment of solidarity. She drew attention to the technologies of “highly calculated policies of oppression” that the Taliban relies on, noting that Afghanistan is the only country in the world that forbids girls from completing an education. She emphasized the need for solidarity from the global community with the girls who are “having their childhood and their future stolen” to not only change the conditions for Afghan girls but to also communicate to all girls around the world that their education, humanity, and human rights matter.

Panelists Penelope Andrews, anti-apartheid expert and Professor of Law and Director of the Racial Justice Project at New York Law School, and Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, Chair of the UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls, provided the legal and policy expertise on the codification of gender apartheid in international law. Drawing from a depth of knowledge on racial apartheid in South Africa, Professor Andrews identified the situation of women in Afghanistan as unequivocal gender apartheid based on the evidence of systemic, vicious, and comprehensive oppression and denial of basic civil and political rights on every level. She made an actionable request: include gender apartheid in the draft convention on crimes against humanity. To galvanize and focus efforts, she said, naming a harm is one of the most influential tools available so there is an imperative to recognize what is happening to Afghan women clearly: “This is gender apartheid – calling this what it is, we can create the conditions for people to be able to live dignified lives.”

Dorothy Estrada-Tanck identified the explicit codification of gender apartheid in Afghanistan as a priority for the UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls. While there are legal instruments currently available to address the rights violations women in Afghanistan are facing based on human rights tools built over the last 80 years, Estrada-Tanck pinpointed their insufficiency to identify and frame the mass nature and scale of this “state-sponsored, institutionalized and systematic oppression and subjugation.” Recognizing and codifying this as a crime against humanity is necessary to accurately name and understand the full scope of the elements of this regime and most importantly, to trigger action from the international community. Calling on the international community’s not just moral, but legal obligation to prevent and combat this crisis, she concluded, “This is a test for the multilateral system, where are we going to draw the red line?”

The event was co-sponsored by the Global Justice Center, Rawadari, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, and the Permanent Missions of Mexico and Malta.

Opening/Closing Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Peace Institute
H.E. Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Malta to the UN
H.E. Alicia Buenrostro Massieu, Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN

Speakers:
Malala Yousafzai, Nobel Peace Laureate
Nayera Kohistani, Afghan Activist and Expert
Penelope Andrews, John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law & Director, Racial Justice Project, New York Law School
Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, Chair, UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls

Moderator:
Jomana Karadsheh, International Correspondent, CNN

Summary: The concept of the CVV, a medium-sized aircraft carrier proposed over 50 years ago during Admiral Enzo Zumwalt's tenure as chief of naval operations, is gaining renewed interest in the U.S. Navy. Initially designed as a conventionally powered vessel to carry 55 to 65 fighter jets and helicopters at a lower cost than Nimitz-class carriers, the CVV idea was shelved with the increase in the military budget under President Ronald Reagan. However, contemporary challenges, particularly Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies by U.S. adversaries, have led to reconsideration of similar concepts. The Navy is exploring "Lightning Carriers" that can operate F-35B Lightning II stealth fighters, offering a versatile and risk-mitigated approach to maintain operational capability in contested regions like the South China Sea and near Taiwan, indicating a potential revival of the CVV concept to adapt to modern strategic needs.

CVV: Could Medium-Sized Carriers Be the Answer to the Navy's A2/AD Challenge?

The U.S. Navy fields the most aircraft carriers in the world. The service’s 11 supercarriers are complemented by several other warships that can double as light carriers when needed. 

The concept of the light aircraft carrier isn’t new. But the Navy has a mixed relationship with it, usually preferring fewer but stronger carriers for its fleet. 

More than 50 years ago, the Navy came close to fielding an interesting carrier. 

The CVV Concept 

In the 1970s, the Navy was undergoing a major change. Adm. Enzo Zumwalt was the chief of naval operations, the top officer in the Navy, and he was pushing for a naval force of more but smaller warships. 

As part of that push for numbers, Navy officials circulated the idea of an interim aircraft carrier. The Aircraft Carrier (Medium) CVV concept envisioned a conventionally powered warship that would be cheaper and smaller than the Nimitz-class supercarriers that were then under construction. 

With a displacement of more than 62,000 tons, a complement of about 4,000 men, and the ability to carry 55 to 65 fighter jets and helicopters, the CVV concept promised to diversify the Navy’s fleet. 

A single prototype was planned, and the Navy released artistic impressions of the ship. But the CVV concept perished when Ronald Reagan came to the presidency and unleashed the military’s budget. With money no longer a limiting factor, the Navy could just build more Nimitz-class aircraft carriers – vessels that could carry almost 100 aircraft and were also nuclear-powered. 

All of this took place more than 40 years ago, but today’s challenges might revive the CVV concept. 

Countering Adversary Strategies 

The idea for a CVV fleet might have died an inglorious death in the planning boards of the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., but the concept behind the medium aircraft carrier lives on. 

For several years now, U.S. adversaries have been developing Anti-Access/Aerial Denial (A2/AD) capabilities that aim to restrict America’s Nimitz- and Ford-class supercarriers from contested waters. Indeed, a well-placed hypersonic munition could damage, destroy, or sink a multi-billion dollar aircraft carrier like the USS Gerald R. Ford, which cost $13 billion. 

The Navy is looking for ways to counter A2/AD capabilities and continue to operate without restriction close to geopolitically important regions such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Black Sea. 

One of the concepts under development is that of the “Lightning Carrier.” The concept is similar to the CVV. A cheaper, smaller aircraft carrier comes with less risk for military planners, and it offers more solutions. The Navy has been pairing amphibious assault ships with the right aircraft – AV-8B Harrier attack jets and F-35B Lightning II stealth fighter jets. These aircraft have Short Take-off, Vertical Landing capabilities, meaning they can take off and land like helicopters. 

As the possibility of a near-peer conflict in the Indo-Pacific increases, the concept of the medium aircraft carrier is becoming more enticing to Navy planners. 

About the Author  

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: This remarkable journey of restoration and preservation for the USS Texas, a venerable symbol of naval history, stands as a testament to the enduring respect and dedication to maritime heritage. The USS Texas (BB-35), having served with distinction in both World Wars, represents a living bridge to pivotal moments in history. Its recent emergence from the dry dock at the Gulf Copper facility in Galveston, after extensive repairs that included the replacement of nearly 700 tons of steel, is not just a technical achievement but a renewal of its legacy.

Battleship USS Texas Is Now Back in the Water Once Again 

A historic warship is now back in the water after 18 months of repairs. The USS Texas (BB-35), the only surviving battleship to see service in both World Wars, has been undergoing repairs at the Gulf Copper dry dock in Galveston, where the warship's hull was recently patched and painted. Nearly 700 tons of steel was recently replaced.

The retired U.S. Navy battleship has served as a floating museum since 1948. It exited the dry dock on Tuesday morning, marking a significant milestone in the $75 million restoration effort to preserve the vessel for future generations.

"We feel great. It's been in the dry dock [for] 18 months. It was a major victory to get her here in the dry dock and this is a result of our hard work and what we’ve been doing for the last 18 months working on the hull," Tony Gregory, president and CEO of the Battleship Texas Foundation, told Houston-area TV station KHOU. 

It is still too early to celebrate, however. The ship will continue to undergo repairs for the next 18 to 24 months, during which time crews will replace the deck superstructure and refurbish the interiors.

"So we're going to be restoring 60 spaces inside or semi-restoring 60 spaces inside, as well as replacing the wood deck and repairing the superstructure. This is going to make it accessible to the public and relaunch it as an exciting, modern technological museum when we reopen to the public," added Matthew Pham, vice president of development for the Battleship Texas Foundation.

USS Texas: Returned for Former Glory

Restoration has focused on making the battleship appear as it did in 1945, at the end of the Second World War. As previously reported, above the boot top – the black band on the hull – the ship has been painted Navy Blue 5-N. That color was matched from existing examples found both internally and externally on the vessel.

Though the USS Texas was launched in 1914 and saw service in both World Wars, time and the elements have been her greatest enemies. Before she was moved to Galveston for repairs, the iconic 122-year-old dreadnought made its home at the San Jacinto Battleground State Historic Site for more than 70 years. All that time in the water took its toll on the old battle wagon, and in June 2017, a six-by-eight-inch hole about 15 feet below the waterline opened and caused the USS Texas to list six degrees. 

The historic battleship was only kept afloat by pumps as the vessel took on 2,000 gallons of water per minute. At one point the situation was so dire that there were concerns the warship might sink. Fortunately, efforts were made to ensure the warship won't be lost to the elements. While there is still much work to be done, significant progress has been made to restore the honorary flagship of the Lone Star State to her former glory.

Video footage of the USS Texas being floated for the first time in 18 months was shared on X.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Zu den Ergebnissen der jüngsten Sitzung des Rates der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) äußert sich Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die EZB hätte ein klares Signal für eine Kehrtwende ihrer Geldpolitik und eine baldige Zinssenkung geben sollen. Die Entscheidung der EZB und ihre Kommunikation sind eine verpasste Chance, mehr Klarheit zu schaffen und die Finanzierungsbedingungen zu verbessern. Damit bleibt die Geldpolitik eine der wichtigsten Bremsen für die Konjunktur und für die schwachen Investitionen in der Eurozone und in Deutschland.

Die EZB läuft Gefahr, ihren Fehler von vor zwei Jahren zu wiederholen und zu spät zu handeln, denn Geldpolitik entfaltet ihre volle Wirkung erst nach anderthalb bis zwei Jahren. Die Inflation in der Eurozone ist deutlich gesunken und die Inflationserwartungen sind schon jetzt konsistent mit der Preisstabilität. Die von der EZB immer wieder betonte Sorge vor sogenannten Zweitrundeneffekten – vor allem, dass die Inflation zu höheren Löhnen und einer stärkeren Nachfrage führt – hat sich bisher nicht bewahrheitet. Es ist richtig, dass Löhne steigen und auch die Lohnstückkosten zulegen. Aber dies sind notwendige temporäre Aufholeffekte. Es gibt keinerlei Anzeichen für permanente Effekte, beispielsweise durch eine Lohn-Preis-Spirale, durch die sich eine höhere Inflation verfestigen könnte.

Die Wahrscheinlichkeit ist heute höher, dass die EZB ihr Ziel der Preisstabilität über die nächsten drei Jahre unterschießen wird, als dass die Inflation zu hoch bleiben wird. Dies würde nicht nur die Glaubwürdigkeit der EZB erodieren, sondern könnte auch der Wirtschaft einen empfindlichen Schaden zufügen.

The Israeli cybersecurity firm Holistic Cyber (or HolistiCyber) is moving into decision support platforms with the launch earlier this year

Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev's re-election to a fifth term in early February has strengthened the hand of the state security

If you find yourself looking for a luxurious stay in the center of Kyiv, the five-star Premier Palace Hotel would

On 25 February, Latvian researcher Pekka Kallioniemi mocked London-based attorney Robert Amsterdam on X (formerly Twitter) as a tool of the Kremlin. Amsterdam, who

In the annual results published 26 February, US earth observation specialist BlackSky lifted the veil a little on the $50m contract it won from the Indonesian defence ministry for the supply of GEOINT services.

Túlélőképesség a levegőben.

Zord

Original date of publication on the UACES Ideas on Europe platform: 27 January 2016

The grandness of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy lies in its potential to render the existing conundrum of various EU strategies into a more orderly set of strands with a clear vision regarding their mutually complementary role.

Strategies are inbuilt in EU’s genome. These policy documents define EU’s aims, approaches in tackling challenges and addressing common issues.  EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (hereafter – EUGSFSP) is being designed with an aim to “enable the Union to identify a clear set of objectives and priorities for now and the future. On this basis the European Union can align its tools and instruments to ensure that they have the greatest possible impact”. The EUGSFSP refers to other existing initiatives, which should be streamlined according to the needs of this particular strategy. This short overview of several EU’s strategies is aimed at providing a broader context on how the EU Global Strategy of Foreign and Security Policy fits in the existing conundrum of EU strategies. Consequently, it provides few suggestions for consideration in the context of the EUGSFSP drafting and implementation process.

EU strategies are designed, coordinated and their implementation is overseen by Directorates-General of the European Commission, as well as European External Action Service. It is a common practice that prior to the drafting process a public consultation takes place. Then, during the drafting process of a strategy states come together to identify areas of mutual interest, where they see the added value of a joint action. It could be termed as the “business as usual” practice.

Broadly speaking, these policy documents are being discussed on two levels. The European level encompasses inter-service consultations and public consultations, as well as the European Council and its working groups. The national level is characterised by working groups which gather all national (and in certain cases subnational) entities involved in the implementation of the relevant strategy.

Overall, EU strategies vary in structure, level of details in terms of the implementation process, approach on measuring achievements, as well as vagueness or concreteness of goals. For example, DG MARE coordinates the EU Maritime Security Strategy (hereafter – EUMSS) which excels in its detailed approach towards actions to be pursued. One of DG REGIO’s facilitated strategies is the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (hereafter – EUSBSR), which, as its name suggests, has a regional focus and is characterised by broad descriptions of policy areas, getting closer to implementation once the flagship projects are explained. The European External Action Service is leading the EU Central Asia Strategy, which since 2007 defines a tailored approach to each of the five countries involved. These are just three examples of a much wider pool of EU strategies dedicated to regional matters or a specific policy area.

The reason why EU strategies are described as a conundrum is that they are far from being unique in terms of issues they are addressing and geographic areas they are aiming at covering. Here are few examples of overlapping responsibilities. Both the EUMSS and the EUSBSR aim at strengthening the cross-sectoral cooperation and synergies between information, capabilities and systems of various authorities in domains of maritime surveillance, preparedness for emergency situations and marine pollution. Moreover, the EUMSS has its own external dimension (called “Workstrand 1”), which defines actions to be undertaken in cooperation with the third parties. Similarly, EUSBSR encompasses cooperation with non-EU countries. In addition, the Strategic Review “The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world” covers regions which have already their specific EU strategies in place, such as the previously mentioned EU Central Asia Strategy.

Why is it worth pointing out these commonalities? The success of EU tools and instruments lies in their complementary nature. When it comes to the EUGSFSP, it would be advisable to go beyond the “business as usual” practice outlined above and render the existing EU strategic conundrum in a more orderly jigsaw. Namely, the EUGSFSP would explain the role of other relevant EU strategies and clarify their unique contribution to attaining the EUGSFSP goals. Such an approach would also help to pool the existing expertise for more coordinated actions and streamline initiatives taken under various EU frameworks, as well as avoid duplication of activities.

However, such an endeavour demands additional coordination of input and effort both from European and national levels. On the European level, it requires brainstorming regarding the future inter-service coordination of various strategies in order to increase the overall awareness of various EU strategies among different divisions of EU institutions. On the national level, it requires extended consultations. These discussions should not be limited to the so-called “usual suspects”, such as authorities dealing with foreign affairs, defence and military matters. It should incorporate inputs from other governmental bodies involved in the national steering of different EU strategies. All in all, if the EUGSFSP really is aimed at being grand, these suggestions might help to render the EUGSFSP impressive and overarching not only in words but also enshrine it in its nature and scope.

The post EU’s Conundrum of Strategies: Is There an Orderly Jigsaw on the Horizon? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Original date of publication on the UACES Ideas on Europe platform: 11 April 2016

Do you have at work one of these lovely collaborative brainstorming boards? I do. Here is my inspirational (inspirational / management) quote. In short, I have taken the liberty to add a new twist to the widely used Altshuler’s quote.

The impressive photo of F-22 was retrieved from Defense Industry Daily.

In case you find this collage inspirational and worth having in your office area, then feel free to download the JPG file.

The post Motivational Quotes For Work appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Original date of publication on the UACES Ideas on Europe platform: 15 October 2019

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

Foreword

The outlined science diplomacy research project is presented with a full appreciation of Adler-Nissen’s concise observation that ‘over the last 50 years, European states have come to view their nations as anchored so deeply within the institutions of the EU that their diplomats merge the promotion of national interests with those of the Union and states begin to speak with one voice’. ‘Science diplomacy’ is a term coined approximately ten years ago in order to launch a more in-depth discussion on the relations between science and diplomacy in shaping international ties. European Union (EU) is no stranger to science diplomacy. However, the overall pool of scholarly examined case studies remains rather thin. There is room for more insight into how individuals in various professional circles practice science diplomacy. This article provides an outline of how an analysis dedicated to the EU science diplomacy in the Southern Neighbourhood with a particular focus on Morroco (MA) and Tunisia (TN) throughout the time frame of 2014 – 2017 would contribute to the overall examination of science diplomacy, as well as establish ties to other topical theoretical strands of EU studies.

 

Science Diplomacy as a Component of the EU’s Structural Diplomacy

Since science diplomacy is not a term which would be widely integrated into the EU documents, the practices of this form of diplomacy, including those that are sometimes described as ‘public diplomacy’ or ‘academic exchange’ become the logic subjects for further examination. The implicit science diplomacy is understood as policies and implementation measures which are not called ‘science diplomacy’ but correspond to the basic definition of one of the three taxonomies of science diplomacy. ‘Diplomacy for science’, meaning, diplomacy exerted to establish cooperation agreements either between governments or certain institutions allowing one or several of the parties involved to benefit from ‘foreign science and technology capacity in order to improve the national capacity’ (Šime, 2018, p. 4; Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 8), is worth exploring in the European Southern Neighbourhood Policy context throughout the selected time frame of 2014-2017.

The novelty of such a choice or research project is its endeavour to enrich both the academic and policy expert thinking on the evolving ‘diplomacy for science’ understanding in the EU setting and embed it in a wider theoretical framework of structural diplomacy. In order to acquire a more nuanced understanding how the institutional set-up influences the perspectives of EU-based actors towards cooperation with the peer institutions located in the selected countries the actor-centered institutionalism is chosen as another theoretical building block. It implies analysing activities of certain entities as the causal link between macro-level processes and the governance regulations (Marks, 1996, p. 23).

Structural diplomacy, being an instrument of structural foreign policy, is a process of dialogue and negotiation by which actors in a system seek to influence or shape sustainable structures in the various sectors in a specific geographical area (Keukeleire & Justaert, 2010, p. 3; Keukeleire, Keuleers, & Raube, 2016, p. 200). Structural diplomacy and structural foreign policy are worth employing, firstly, due to a full appreciation of the funding schemes managed by key institutions representing the EU (namely, the sectoral Directorates-General of the European Commission), which ensure practical implementation of its defined external relations, such as the multilateral or bilateral agreements, corresponding funding programmes (Keukeleire, 2003, pp. 31-32, 49-50).

Secondly, the choice of structural foreign policy is motivated also by the acknowledgement that it is implemented with milieu goals (Keukeleire, 2003, p. 46) or endogenous local contexts (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 30; Keukeleire & Justaert, 2010, p. 8; Keukeleire et al., 2016, p. 204) in mind, associated with support for evolution of long-term structural changes with permanent results (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 28; Keukeleire & Justaert, 2010, p. 3; 2012, p. 2). In the Southern Neighbourhood, as some of the key context-specific traits the efforts directed towards promoting stability (Börzel & Lebanidze, 2017, p. 23) and state-building (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2011, p. 6) should be mentioned.

The research project is not preoccupied with the earlier identified democratisation-stability dilemma (Börzel, Dandashly, & Risse, 2015, p. 7; Börzel & Lebanidze, 2017, p. 23; Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, p. 1040). Instead it focuses on the stability-enhancing activities stemming from the ‘volatile dynamics of change’ (Bouris & Schumacher, 2017, p. 293), namely, the geopolitical developments which EU’s envisaged ‘ring of well governed countries’ (Barbé & Morillas, 2019, p. 5) or (later on rephrased as) ‘ring of friends’ (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, p. 1035) transformed into ‘the ring of fire’ (Blockmans, Kostanyan, Remizov, Slapakova, & Van der Loo, 2017, p. 136; Bouris & Schumacher, 2017, pp. 85-86; Gaub & Popescu, 2015, p. 5), leading to a full awareness about a policy problem and the overall acknowledged urgency to address such instability of the EU neighbourhood via dialogue on certain assistance measures. It is worth adding that the severity of the situation has been commented with even grimmer assessments that the EU’s choice of promoting ‘resilience’ was directed more towards stabilizing ‘itself’ (Barbé & Morillas, 2019, p. 8), thus shifting more towards the internal dimension of the ‘intermestic sphere’ (Bremberg, 2010, p. 170) characterising the Mediterranean space.

Furthermore, due to the continuous instability risks posed by the youth bulges (Gaub, 2019, p. 11), higher education and research sectors are selected from the whole panoply of ‘intermestic affairs’ (Barbé & Morillas, 2019, p. 13) in order to acquire a more nuanced insight into the practical developments supporting the above discussed policy goals.

 

Mare Nostrum’s Community of Practices

The proposed science diplomacy research project follows the whims of the ‘practice turn’ in EU studies (Adler-Nissen, 2016). It supports the arguments of Adler-Nissen and Didier Bigo (2011, p. 251) about Bourdieu’s relevance in exploring the individuals as ‘liaison agents’ who shape the characteristics of international ties by mediating and refracting elite policies (Adler-Nissen, 2016, p. 11). Thus, the aim is to look beyond the elite diplomatic circles in order to explore how the high-level discourses are echoed in the working-level routines of EU funded higher education and research cooperation.

The theoretical configuration taps into an earlier identified potential of new institutionalism to offer theoretical integration opportunities (Scharpf, 2000, p. 762). Due to the fact that both structural diplomacy and actor-centered institutionalism have several commonalities with most reflections on the future EU ‘diplomacy for science’, stronger ties to both schools of thought would allow accelerating the conceptual honing of this strand of the EU science diplomacy. In addition, adding a practice theory theoretical component to this constellation tallies well with the focus on implicit science diplomacy developments following the actor-centered institutionalism’s approach to ‘interaction-oriented policy research’, where ‘actors and their interacting choices, rather than institutions are assumed to be the proximate causes of policy responses’ (Scharpf, 2000, p. 764). The conscious or unconscious practitioner of science diplomacy is placed in the limelight.

Communities of practice are understood as ‘like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice’ (Bremberg, Sonnsjö, & Mobjörk, 2019, p. 626). Thus, the research project is founded on a theoretical assumption that EU funded project managers share certain common traits in their working habits which are aligned with the requirements defined by the EU funding schemes. The research project seeks to draw some generalisations what such a community of practice delivers vis-à-vis the overarching goals set in the key policy documents.

 

Scoping the Empirical Field

In Bourdieusian terms, the EU is considered as the transnational field which is characterised by certain permanent institutions (Bigo, 2011, p. 248) – Directorates-General of the European Commission and other services – which through the funding programmes (as the practical implementation means of the EU strategic frameworks) creates certain ad-hoc institutions – projects – aimed at accomplishing specific tasks by a defined set of consortium members within a limited time frame.

In order to render the empirical examination comprehensive, yet not too vague or overstretched, the roles of four EU institutions – European External Action Service (EEAS), Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD), Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC), Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) – would be put under the magnifying glass in terms of exploring the projects funded by their overseen programmes. Those would be the EU-MA and EU-TN Annual Action Programmes overseen by DG NEAR (as integral parts of the European Neighbourhood Instrument 2014-2017), Erasmus+ of DG EAC and the Framework Programme administered by DG RTD. Projects’ coordinators are the selected community whose practices in terms of perspectives on and experience in cooperation with MA&TN-based institutions are worth exploring in order to get a better understanding what judgements and lessons learnt form certain basis of the EU ties with the EU Southern Neighbourhood in higher education and research sectors.

The outlined EU institutions would be analysed with an awareness of one policy area requiring the engagement of several Directorates-General (Glover & Müller, 2015, p. 33; Šime, 2018, pp. 10-11), which does not necessarily translate into frequent policy innovations and new policy constellations due to the overall policy inertia and a general preference of status quo characterising multi-actor policy systems (Scharpf, 2000, pp. 768-769). Since none of the four EU institutions has been tasked to pursue science diplomacy, let alone diplomacy for science, the chosen conceptual constellation allows elaborating on the EU’s multiple voices (da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014), namely, what role EU-based research and higher education institutions acting as Lead Partners or Coordinators of EU funded projects play in the overall EU implicit science diplomacy exerted in relations with MA&TN throughout 2014-2017.

 

Priorities of EU Institutions in Short

The DG NEAR’s European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 2014-2017 defines three priority sectors, none of which entail clear references to research, science or innovation. The EU puts emphasis on ‘socio-economic reforms for an inclusive growth, competitiveness and integration; strengthening fundamental elements of democracy; sustainable regional and local development’ (European Commission, 2018). The thematic focus of the EEAS on building the societal resilience in the European Southern Neighbourhood and DG NEAR pursued three priority sectors are not treated as the EU dialogue and practical cooperation with MA&TN lacking any component of science, research or innovation.

The leverage to such lack of domain-specific prominence is DG RTD and DG EAC continuous engagement of MA&TN in initiatives funded by the Framework Programmes and Erasmus+. It allows placing the ENI 2014-2017 initiatives and resources allocated to their implementation via EU-MA and EU-TN Annual Action Programmes as the benchmark to test whether research and higher education-related engagements funded by other EU programmes offer more opportunities. Those would be DG RTD’s Framework Programmes’ funded measures, such as BLUEMED and Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions, especially in view of the comparative difference between the chosen cases. Namely, TN is an associated country of Horizon 2020 but MA does not enjoy the same status.

In order to enhance the structural dimension of the empirical analysis, the acquired data on the EU funded projects, where MA&TN are involved would also explore their segmentation, whether certain sciences were benefiting more from the EU offered cooperation and learning of good practices than others, thus potentially contributing more to the capacity building in certain sectors of socioeconomic value to both countries.

Moreover, the depth of analysis would not stop only at the examination of the statistical landscape of project engagements. Through the exploration of Coordinators and Lead Partners’ assessments of the engagement of MA&TN institutions in specific projects, a more nuanced understanding would be obtained about MA&TN capacity of learning and strengthening their research and higher education institutions via project engagement. Therefore, the research project aims at exploring not only the scope and science domain-specific coverage of MA&TN engagement in the EU funded measures, but also to analyse whether the experiences obtained through the implemented projects have been judged by the EU-based managers responsible for the project implementation, namely, to bring tangible benefits in the capacity-building of MA&TN-based research and higher education institutions.

This line of enquiry into the perspectives widely shared among the selected community of practice follows the conceptual logic of diffusion, especially its dependence on recipients, which, along the lines of the bounded rationality, are presumed to follow the ‘instrumental rationality or logic of consequences’ (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 5), as active shapers of results (Börzel & Risse, 2012b, p. 204). Thereby, strengthening the research potential and building capacities of research and higher education sectors in the Southern Neighbourhood is not just a matter of the EU’s proactiveness, but also depends on the responsiveness of MA&TN institutions to use the whole set of cooperation opportunities and ensuring the sustainability of project results.

 

Keeping the Focus on the EU

According to the new institutionalist logic of a bounded rational actor (van Lieshout, 2008, pp. 8-9) pursued along with the established social norms and values (Maggi, 2016, p. 22), the research project would explore what role the EU engagement both in the bilateral and multilateral dialogue on science, cooperation with MA&TN in this domain, play in the overall EU’s attempt to enhance resilience in its southern neighbourhood.

In order to keep a healthy level of focus and nuance ‘the target country perspective’ (Keukeleire & Justaert, 2010, p. 19) and three conceptualisations of alignment (Keukeleire et al., 2016, p. 205) – the value brought by an engagement in the EU funded projects of MA&TN researchers and higher education staff as seen from their own perspective – are kept outside of the scope of this specific suggested analysis. Instead, the emphasis is kept on exploring the perspective of EU-based institutions on their ties with the peer institutions in two selected countries of Southern Neighbourhood.

 

Methodology

Besides the acquisition of earlier described statistical data on projects implemented throughout 2014-2017 with the financial support of three EU funding schemes, the semi-structured interviews will give a new impetus to the research on the recent rediscovery of the value of Jean Monnet method in Northern Europe in advancing the EU goals (Ekengren, 2018). The selected method of interviews follows, the logic elaborated by Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot: ‘Not only is language the conduit of meaning, which turns practices into the location and engine of social action, but it is itself an enactment of doing in the form of ‘discursive practices’’ (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p. 6). The interviews serve as a way of exploring how project managers are walking the talk.

Self-censorship and self-legitimation (Adler-Nissen, 2016, p. 15) presented by the interviewed Coordinators and Lead Partners of EU funded projects and their narrated overall contextualisation (Adler-Nissen & Kropp, 2015, p. 164) of MA&TN engagement would be a good source of comparative insight between working-level deliverables and framework goals set in key EU policy documents and promoted among the EU’s high level representatives.

 

Ready to Look Beyond the ‘Golden Carrot’

To conclude, the outlined science diplomacy research project is crafted to take a fresh look at the earlier findings on the EU Southern Neighbourhood. It avoids the blind following of the assessment of Keukeleire and Justaert (Keukeleire & Justaert, 2012, p. 2), as well as Börzel and her colleagues arguing for the crucial role of the ‘golden carrot’ – EU membership (Börzel & Schimmelfennig, 2017, p. 278; Börzel & Hüllen, 2011, p. 7), namely, that the EU external action has less of an influence vis-à-vis those countries to which it cannot offer EU membership as the ultimate reward. A more nuanced insight into the stabilising efforts exerted via capacity building in higher education and research might offer some new food for thought, whether this assessment is still valid in the contemporary setting.

 

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