Public works programmes (PWPs) are pervasively used to tackle poverty and unemployment, and to build infrastructure and skills in low- and middle-income countries. While their impacts on poverty, food security and labour outcomes have been widely documented, there is little research focusing on the role of PWPs in supporting household climate resilience in the global context of a deepening climate crisis. To fill this gap, we propose a conceptual framework that links the different components of PWPs – wages, infrastructure, and skills development – to household capacity to cope with, and adapt to, climate-related shocks. We use this framework to guide our review of empirical experimental and quasi-experimental evidence on the multiple short-term and long-term effects of PWPs on resilience to weather shocks, such as floods, droughts and cyclones. Such evidence mostly draws from a few programmes in India, Ethiopia and Malawi. Overall, we find that, through the wage component, PWPs can be effective in enhancing household resilience through increasing savings and productive investments. However, these benefits usually only materialize in the case of regular, long-term programmes, as opposed to ad-hoc/temporal PWPs. PWPs’ infrastructure component can play a crucial role in supporting households’ long-term capacity to adapt to shocks, especially in the case of “climate-smart” infrastructure, with positive externalities beyond direct programme beneficiaries to communities. There is a key evidence gap investigating the effects of PWPs through the infrastructure component on both beneficiaries and other community members, as well as on the role of on-the-job training and its capacity to strengthen resilience in combination with the infrastructure component. Evidence from different socioeconomic contexts is also scarce. Another key gap relates to the identification of the main mechanisms through which these relationships operate. Filling these gaps will support policy makers taking decisions about when to implement PWPs (especially in comparison with other social protection interventions), and how to design them to tackle vulnerability to climate change.
Public works programmes (PWPs) are pervasively used to tackle poverty and unemployment, and to build infrastructure and skills in low- and middle-income countries. While their impacts on poverty, food security and labour outcomes have been widely documented, there is little research focusing on the role of PWPs in supporting household climate resilience in the global context of a deepening climate crisis. To fill this gap, we propose a conceptual framework that links the different components of PWPs – wages, infrastructure, and skills development – to household capacity to cope with, and adapt to, climate-related shocks. We use this framework to guide our review of empirical experimental and quasi-experimental evidence on the multiple short-term and long-term effects of PWPs on resilience to weather shocks, such as floods, droughts and cyclones. Such evidence mostly draws from a few programmes in India, Ethiopia and Malawi. Overall, we find that, through the wage component, PWPs can be effective in enhancing household resilience through increasing savings and productive investments. However, these benefits usually only materialize in the case of regular, long-term programmes, as opposed to ad-hoc/temporal PWPs. PWPs’ infrastructure component can play a crucial role in supporting households’ long-term capacity to adapt to shocks, especially in the case of “climate-smart” infrastructure, with positive externalities beyond direct programme beneficiaries to communities. There is a key evidence gap investigating the effects of PWPs through the infrastructure component on both beneficiaries and other community members, as well as on the role of on-the-job training and its capacity to strengthen resilience in combination with the infrastructure component. Evidence from different socioeconomic contexts is also scarce. Another key gap relates to the identification of the main mechanisms through which these relationships operate. Filling these gaps will support policy makers taking decisions about when to implement PWPs (especially in comparison with other social protection interventions), and how to design them to tackle vulnerability to climate change.
Humanitarian aid is increasingly guided by strategic interests rather than humanitarian needs. Europe’s humanitarian commitments are under strain as geopolitics reshapes international solidarity. Rising nationalism, debt pressures and great-power rivalry have pushed European governments to prioritise strategic interests over humanitarian needs. European politicians are increasingly justifying aid disbursements to their public through the lens of national security and strategic influence.
• Authoritarian regimes weaponise these geopolitical trends to stoke distrust in the international community. They often label humanitarian actors as foreign agents, while state propaganda delegitimises international assistance as self-motivated and hypocritical, reframes aid as interference to justify crackdowns on the humanitarian space.
• That is why the way European donors talk about humanitarian aid matters as much as how they provide it. My experimental research in Turkey shows that transparent communication about the realpolitik behind humanitarian aid may help counter authoritarian propaganda in highly polarised middle-income countries with widespread anti-Western attitudes. My findings indicate that when donors openly acknowledge strategic motivations, propaganda messaging
may lose its effectiveness among conservative, nationalist and Eurosceptic constituencies in recipient countries, whose attitudes are often hard to shift. Transparent communication may reduce conspiracism among this group, increase their trust in Europe and their support for international trade, while their support for the incumbent government may decline. Winning over these constituencies would be critical to democracy protection initiatives, as they often lend normative and systemic support to autocrats.
• However, donors must strike a careful balance and adopt a dual approach. While strategic messaging can persuade Eurosceptics, it may also alienate pro-EU, cosmopolitan citizens who value unconditional solidarity. They may grow disillusioned with European donors if humanitarian aid appears too self-interested or transactional. Donors should communicate strategic interests with transparency but still remain anchored in humanitarian values.
• Further research is needed to fully explore the implications of geopolitical shifts in aid, especially in middle-income autocracies with widespread anti-Western attitudes. In particular, more research is required to fully calibrate transparent messaging and mitigate negative unintended consequences.
Humanitarian aid is increasingly guided by strategic interests rather than humanitarian needs. Europe’s humanitarian commitments are under strain as geopolitics reshapes international solidarity. Rising nationalism, debt pressures and great-power rivalry have pushed European governments to prioritise strategic interests over humanitarian needs. European politicians are increasingly justifying aid disbursements to their public through the lens of national security and strategic influence.
• Authoritarian regimes weaponise these geopolitical trends to stoke distrust in the international community. They often label humanitarian actors as foreign agents, while state propaganda delegitimises international assistance as self-motivated and hypocritical, reframes aid as interference to justify crackdowns on the humanitarian space.
• That is why the way European donors talk about humanitarian aid matters as much as how they provide it. My experimental research in Turkey shows that transparent communication about the realpolitik behind humanitarian aid may help counter authoritarian propaganda in highly polarised middle-income countries with widespread anti-Western attitudes. My findings indicate that when donors openly acknowledge strategic motivations, propaganda messaging
may lose its effectiveness among conservative, nationalist and Eurosceptic constituencies in recipient countries, whose attitudes are often hard to shift. Transparent communication may reduce conspiracism among this group, increase their trust in Europe and their support for international trade, while their support for the incumbent government may decline. Winning over these constituencies would be critical to democracy protection initiatives, as they often lend normative and systemic support to autocrats.
• However, donors must strike a careful balance and adopt a dual approach. While strategic messaging can persuade Eurosceptics, it may also alienate pro-EU, cosmopolitan citizens who value unconditional solidarity. They may grow disillusioned with European donors if humanitarian aid appears too self-interested or transactional. Donors should communicate strategic interests with transparency but still remain anchored in humanitarian values.
• Further research is needed to fully explore the implications of geopolitical shifts in aid, especially in middle-income autocracies with widespread anti-Western attitudes. In particular, more research is required to fully calibrate transparent messaging and mitigate negative unintended consequences.
Humanitarian aid is increasingly guided by strategic interests rather than humanitarian needs. Europe’s humanitarian commitments are under strain as geopolitics reshapes international solidarity. Rising nationalism, debt pressures and great-power rivalry have pushed European governments to prioritise strategic interests over humanitarian needs. European politicians are increasingly justifying aid disbursements to their public through the lens of national security and strategic influence.
• Authoritarian regimes weaponise these geopolitical trends to stoke distrust in the international community. They often label humanitarian actors as foreign agents, while state propaganda delegitimises international assistance as self-motivated and hypocritical, reframes aid as interference to justify crackdowns on the humanitarian space.
• That is why the way European donors talk about humanitarian aid matters as much as how they provide it. My experimental research in Turkey shows that transparent communication about the realpolitik behind humanitarian aid may help counter authoritarian propaganda in highly polarised middle-income countries with widespread anti-Western attitudes. My findings indicate that when donors openly acknowledge strategic motivations, propaganda messaging
may lose its effectiveness among conservative, nationalist and Eurosceptic constituencies in recipient countries, whose attitudes are often hard to shift. Transparent communication may reduce conspiracism among this group, increase their trust in Europe and their support for international trade, while their support for the incumbent government may decline. Winning over these constituencies would be critical to democracy protection initiatives, as they often lend normative and systemic support to autocrats.
• However, donors must strike a careful balance and adopt a dual approach. While strategic messaging can persuade Eurosceptics, it may also alienate pro-EU, cosmopolitan citizens who value unconditional solidarity. They may grow disillusioned with European donors if humanitarian aid appears too self-interested or transactional. Donors should communicate strategic interests with transparency but still remain anchored in humanitarian values.
• Further research is needed to fully explore the implications of geopolitical shifts in aid, especially in middle-income autocracies with widespread anti-Western attitudes. In particular, more research is required to fully calibrate transparent messaging and mitigate negative unintended consequences.
VIENNA/HELSINKI, 15 September 2025 — The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Finland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Elina Valtonen, will visit Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština from 15 to 16 September.
During the visit, she will hold meetings with high-level officials and discuss security issues across the region. Minister Valtonen will also engage with civil society representatives and visit the OSCE Missions in both cities. In Belgrade, she will meet with beneficiaries of the Center for Youth Integration, while in Prishtinë/Priština she will speak with representatives of the OSCE Dialogue Academy Network of Alumnae.
Press Opportunities
In Belgrade, Chairperson-in-Office Valtonen will deliver remarks to the press on 15 September from 16:05 at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Serbia. An invitation will follow from the Ministry.
There will also be a photo opportunity at 17:15, in connection with the meeting with beneficiaries of the Center for Youth Integration, address: Café 16, Cetinjska 15a.
In Prishtinë/Priština, Chairperson-in-Office Valtonen will deliver remarks to the press on 16 September from 11:45 at the OSCE Mission in Kosovo headquarters. An invitation will follow from the Mission.
Inquiries
Matias Pajula, Special Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, tel. +358 295 350 571
Marja Rosvall, Team Leader, Task Force for the Finnish OSCE Chairpersonship, tel. +358 295 350 347
The email addresses of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are in the format firstname.lastname@gov.fi.
Gideon Saar, le ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Israël était en visite en Croatie, à l'invitation de son homologue Gordan Grlić Radman. Il a aussi été reçu par le Premier ministre Plenković. le chef de l'État, Zoran Milanović, a vivement condamné cette initiative.
- Le fil de l'Info / Politique, Croatie, Relations internationales, Israël-Palestine , Courrier des BalkansLes États membres de l'UE sont divisés entre ceux qui souhaitent une politique plus stricte sur le sujet et ceux qui sont désireux de continuer à faire prospérer leur industrie touristique.
The post Les États membres de l’UE pourraient restreindre les visas touristiques russes appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Credit: Suriya Phosri/Getty Images via Gallo Images
By Samuel King
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Sep 15 2025 (IPS)
Algorithms decide who lives and dies in Gaza. AI-powered surveillance tracks journalists in Serbia. Autonomous weapons are paraded through Beijing’s streets in displays of technological might. This isn’t dystopian fiction – it’s today’s reality. As AI reshapes the world, the question of who controls this technology and how it’s governed has become an urgent priority.
AI’s reach extends into surveillance systems that can track protesters, disinformation campaigns that can destabilise democracies and military applications that dehumanise conflict by removing human agency from life-and-death decisions. This is enabled by an absence of adequate safeguards.
Governance failings
Last month, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to establish the first international mechanisms – an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance – meant to govern the technology, agreed as part of the Global Digital Compact at the Summit of the Future in September. This non-binding resolution marked a first positive step towards potential stronger regulations. But its negotiation process revealed deep geopolitical fractures.
Through its Global AI Governance Initiative, China champions a state-led approach that entirely excludes civil society from governance discussions, while positioning itself as a leader of the global south. It frames AI development as a tool for economic advancement and social objectives, presenting this vision as an alternative to western technological dominance.
Meanwhile, the USA under Donald Trump has embraced technonationalism, treating AI as a tool for economic and geopolitical leverage. Recent decisions, including a 100 per cent tariff on imported AI chips and purchase of a 10 per cent stake in chipmaker Intel, signal a retreat from multilateral cooperation in favour of transactional bilateral arrangements.
The European Union (EU) has taken a different approach, implementing the world’s first comprehensive AI Act, which comes into force in August 2026. Its risk-based regulatory framework represents progress, banning AI systems deemed to present ‘unacceptable’ risks while requiring transparency measures for others. Yet the legislation contains troubling gaps.
While initially proposing to ban live facial recognition technology unconditionally, the AI Act’s final version permits limited use with safeguards that human rights groups argue are inadequate. Further, while emotion recognition technologies are banned in schools and workplaces, they remain permitted for law enforcement and immigration control, a particularly concerning decision given existing systems’ documented racial bias. The ProtectNotSurveil coalition has warned that migrants and Europe’s racial minorities are serving as testing grounds for AI-powered surveillance and tracking tools. Most critically, the AI Act exempts systems used for national security purposes and autonomous drones used in warfare.
The growing climate and environmental impacts of AI development adds another layer of urgency to governance questions. Interactions with AI chatbots consume roughly 10 times more electricity than standard internet searches. The International Energy Agency projects that global data centre electricity consumption will more than double by 2030, with AI driving most of this increase. Microsoft’s emissions have grown by 29 per cent since 2020 due to AI-related infrastructure, while Google quietly removed its net-zero emissions pledge from its website as AI operations pushed its carbon footprint up 48 per cent between 2019 and 2023. AI expansion is driving construction of new gas-powered plants and delaying plans to decommission coal facilities, in direct contradiction to the need to end fossil fuel use to limit global temperature rises.
Champions needed
The current patchwork of regional regulations, non-binding international resolutions and lax industry self-regulation falls far short of what’s needed to govern a technology with such profound global implications. State self-interest continues to prevail over collective human needs and universal rights, while the companies that own AI systems accumulate immense power largely unchecked.
The path forward requires an acknowledgment that AI governance isn’t merely a technical or economic issue – it’s about power distribution and accountability. Any regulatory framework that fails to confront the concentration of AI capabilities in the hands of a few tech giants will inevitably fall short. Approaches that exclude civil society voices or prioritise national competitive advantage over human rights protections will prove inadequate to the challenge.
The international community must urgently strengthen AI governance mechanisms, starting with binding agreements on lethal autonomous weapons systems that have stalled in UN discussions for over a decade. The EU should close the loopholes in its AI Act, particularly regarding military applications and surveillance technologies. Governments worldwide need to establish coordination mechanisms that can effectively counter tech giants’ control over AI development and deployment.
Civil society must not stand alone in this fight. Any hopes of a shift towards human rights-centred AI governance depend on champions emerging within the international system to prioritise human rights over narrowly defined national interests and corporate profits. With AI development accelerating rapidly, there’s no time to waste.
Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
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Stakeholders in an India-UN Development Partnership Fund project in Fiji, focusing on developing a climate disaster risk financing framework and parametric insurance.
In recognition of the continued importance of South-South cooperation, the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 58/220, endorsed the observation of the United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation. 12 September marks the adoption of the 1978 Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), a pivotal framework for technical cooperation among developing countries.
By Omar Hilale and Dima Al-Khatib
NEW YORK, Sep 15 2025 (IPS)
As the United Nations commemorated the UN Day for South-South Cooperation last Friday, we are reminded that solidarity among the countries of the Global South is not just a matter of history or principle, but a proven pathway to building a fairer, more sustainable future.
This year’s commemoration took place at a defining moment.
We are past the midpoint of the 2030 Agenda, yet global progress is lagging. More than 800 million people still live in extreme poverty. Many developing countries continue to spend more on debt servicing than on essential public services like health, education, or infrastructure.
At the same time, shared crises – climate change, food insecurity, digital divides, conflict, and systemic inequalities – are colliding and compounding what the Secretary-General has called a polycrisis.
And yet, South-South and triangular cooperation are emerging as beacons of resilience and collective action. They are not abstract concepts, but vibrant modalities driving innovation, scaling tested solutions, and ensuring ownership by the communities most affected by today’s challenges. They show us that every nation – regardless of income level – has something to contribute to our common future.
Across the Global South, we see powerful examples of solutions that are both home-grown and widely adaptable. Through peer-to-peer learning and solidarity, countries are advancing digital transformation, expanding access to health coverage, creating resilient food systems, and mobilizing innovative financing such as blended finance, debt swaps, and impact investments.
Triangular cooperation – where Southern-led initiatives are complemented by the expertise of developed-country partners or multilateral actors – is amplifying these results, connecting experiences across regions and continents.
UNOSSC is providing best practices, offering peer-to-peer learning and innovation to connect and scale these efforts. Our South-South Galaxy makes tested solutions accessible to policymakers, practitioners, and development partners worldwide.
These range from climate adaptation strategies in Small Island Developing States to sustainable agriculture innovations in Africa and Latin America. Our new South-South and Triangular Cooperation Solutions Lab is incubating promising ideas and linking them with partners and financing mechanisms to achieve impact at scale.
But we must go further. At the 22nd Session of the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation earlier this year, Member States made clear that the financing gap remains a critical obstacle. They called for sustained, predictable resources — and for the UN system itself to design innovative financing windows that align with the scale of ambition required.
Meeting this call to action is essential if South-South and triangular cooperation are to reach their full potential. As the primary intergovernmental body guiding South-South cooperation within the United Nations, the High-level Committee plays a vital role in shaping global policies, mobilizing political will, and ensuring that the voices of the Global South are heard at the highest levels. Its leadership is indispensable to driving collective action and fostering equitable partnerships.
The theme of the 2025 United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation – New Opportunities and Innovation through South-South and Triangular Cooperation – resonated deeply. It reflected the choice before us: to recommit and reimagine partnerships that leave no one behind, and to harness the creativity, leadership, and resilience of the Global South to transform today’s challenges into tomorrow’s opportunities.
As we marked this Day, we called on all partners and stakeholders – governments, international institutions, the UN family, civil society, and the private sector – to join hands in strengthening South-South and triangular cooperation. We must scale up what works, deepen cross-regional ties, and invest in institutional architecture that enables collaboration, innovation, and resilience.
The stakes could not be higher. But with an economically empowered and innovative Global South, we can pave the way toward a more just, inclusive, and sustainable future.
As we marked the United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation last week, let us celebrate the spirit of solidarity that unites us – and let us recommit to making it the force that carries us forward to 2030 and beyond.
Omar Hilale is Ambassador of Morocco and President of the 22nd session of the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation; and Dima Al-Khatib is Director of the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation.
IPS UN Bureau
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