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Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

A hatvanas években három komolyabb, halálos áldozatokat követelő tűzeset történt az amerikai haditengerészet repülőgép-hordozóin. A USS Forrestal fedélzetén 1967. július 29-én és a USS Enterprise-on 1969. január 15-én történt esetek mellett kevésbé ismert az első, amely a USS Oriskany repülőgép-hordozón keletkezett 1966. október 26-án. A helyzet nem indult olyan drámaian, mint a másik két hordozón, és az első pillanatban még kezelhető lett volna, de a pánik hatása alatt hozott hibás döntés végül 44 életet követelt és repülőgépek, helikopterek elvesztését okozta.

Amikor a britekkel vívott függetlenségi háború egyik csatájáról, a mai New York állam területén lévő Oriskanynál 1777-ben lezajlott ütközetről elnevezett Essex osztályú repülőgép-hordozót 1945. október 13-án vízre bocsátották, már véget ért a második világháború. Nem is siettek hadrendbe állítani, végül csak 1950. szeptember 25-én került sor rá. A USS Oriskany járt az európai vizeken, majd „áttette székhelyét” a nyugati partra, Kaliforniába, és már onnan indult el, hogy repülőgépeivel részt vegyen a koreai háborúban. Azt, hogy mit művel egy tűz a hangárfedélzeten, már ekkor megtapasztalhatta a hajó akkori legénysége. 1953. március 6-án egy bevetésről visszatérő légcsavaros Corsair pilótája nem tudta leoldani az egyik bombáját, és azzal szállt le ez Oriskanyn. A fedélzetre érkezés erejétől a bomba leesett, kettőt pattant és felrobbant. A repeszek a fedélzetet átütve kilyukasztották a hangárfedélzeten álló sugárhajtású F9F-3 Panther gépek üzemanyagtartályát és a kiömlő kerozin meggyulladt. A tűzoltóknak akkor sikerült gyorsan úrrá lenniük a lángokon és megfékezni a tüzet.

[...] Bővebben!

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As the Islamist military group al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat to Somalia, the United States continues to take action. In February, the administration announced its plan to build five new military bases for Somalia’s Danab brigade, an elite special operations unit of 3,000 soldiers trained and equipped by U.S. troops to fight terrorist group al-Shabaab.

However, the U.S.’s continued emphasis on security over democracy in its dealings with African countries is not making the continent any safer. The data is clear on this point: Africa has seen a twenty percent uptick in fatalities from Islamist violence (with 83 percent of those fatalities occurring in the Sahel and Somalia) alongside six coups since 2021.

These issues are inextricably linked to U.S. policy. American policymakers’ efforts to combat Islamist groups via regional military assistance have inadvertently spurred military coups. Instead, the United States must alter its emphasis on military aid towards diplomacy and democracy to combat these groups’ influence effectively.

Niger offers a case study of this phenomenon. Although the United States eventually ended military aid to the country after the July 2023 coup led by Nigerien General Abdourahmane Tchiani, it continues to operate an “expensive and ineffective” drone base that houses 1,100 American troops. At least five members of Niger’s junta received military training from the United States, including Tchiani, who attended a seminar on counterterrorism at the National Defense University in Washington, DC from 2009 to 2010.

The link between military training and coups is no coincidence. While discussing their 2017 article, Jesse Dillion Savage and Jonathan Caverly noted, “By strengthening the military in states with few counterbalancing civilian institutions, U.S. foreign military training can lead to both more military-backed coup attempts, as well as a higher likelihood of a coup’s success.” According to the authors, the “professional identity” of the military gives soldiers a sense of separation and superiority in relation to their government, which could lead to a “temptation to intervene in political affairs.”

The chain of events for these coups is clear. The United States provides security assistance to the military of a state facing an insurgency, only for that military to turn against the civilian government in the name of fighting said insurgency. The leadership of the juntas in Burkina Faso and Niger both claimed that the civilian government had failed to deal with insurgent violence. Meanwhile, civilians continue to suffer under the rule of repressive regimes and face violence from insurgents and soldiers alike.

Despite these failings, the Biden administration is pursuing the same policy in Somalia. Security assistance to Somalia is not a new policy, as the United States provided $500 million in assistance to the Somali military between 2010 and 2020, notwithstanding the additional $2.5 billion it has sent to different African Union missions in the country. While President Trump withdrew all 700 U.S. troops from Somalia in 2020, President Biden later reversed this decision and returned an estimated 450 soldiers to the country. The United States has also supported the Somali military with drone strikes, launching 262 attacks since 2007.

But this aid has not led to the defeat of al-Shabaab. Although a recent offensive by the Somali National Army and its clan militia allies, along with drone strikes by the United States and Turkey, had success in taking back towns and villages in Hirshabelle and Galmudug in central Somalia, al-Shababb has proven to be a national fixture. The group gains $100 million in annual revenue from extorting taxes from Somali civilians and intimidates local businesses in Mogadishu through attacks with improvised explosive devices.

Al-Shabaab’s success is directly linked to the ineffectiveness of governing institutions in Somalia. The rule of law is nearly nonexistent—as indicated by its 0/16 score across all “Rule of Law” categories in Freedom House’s 2023 rankings. Political authority remains divided, and corruption is rampant. Grievances from these conditions assist the group’s recruitment while also allowing al-Shabaab to take on a governing role by providing essential services to local populations and implementing a Sharia-based legal system.

The Somali government’s weakness means that al-Shabaab will retain its influence for the foreseeable future. If the government remains weak as the military gets stronger through U.S. aid and training, a military takeover becomes more likely—and Somali civilians will continue to suffer.

The United States must reject its military-focused approach to Somalia to prevent this outcome and engage with its civil society. This approach requires the United States to adjust its target. “Western governments must therefore be ready to engage not only a junta and its supporting forces but also local officials, civil society groups, and religious and community leaders,” argued Joseph Sany and Kehinde A. Togun in Foreign Affairs.

Engaging with local groups and businesses through conversations and displays of mutual recognition will help promote democracy by empowering Somalia’s civil society. From this position of strength, these groups can better advocate for policies to improve the lives of Somalians—such as by improving infrastructure or implementing business-friendly policies—despite facing repression from the central government and al-Shabaab.

Another tangible step the United States could take in this regard is to increase bilateral trade between the United States and Somalia, specifically by accepting Somalia’s application to the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which provides African countries increased access to U.S. markets through the removal of import tariffs on African goods. The increased investment resulting from improved trade ties can improve Somalia’s poor economic growth, helping set the conditions for higher wages and better access to education and healthcare. Somali businesses and workers should not be punished for the democratic failure of its government, as the Biden administration decided regarding Gabon, Niger, Uganda, and the Central African Republic.

Unfortunately, none of these proposals can be effectively implemented in the throes of a civil war. This means that the Somali government must engage with al-Shabaab and local authorities to achieve some consensus on governance for Somalia. The United States ought to focus on helping leaders open lines of communication through proactive negotiations so that both sides can gain a deeper understanding of each other’s long-term objectives while also working towards a ceasefire that allows for the free flow of people and goods. Complete agreement on a proper course of action is unlikely. Still, U.S. and Somali leaders alike should focus on creating the conditions for all sides to mutually exist without conflict, whether this includes integration or another approach.

There is no magic formula for making Somalia—and Africa as a whole—generally safer for its people. But it’s clear that an emphasis on democracy, diplomacy, and economic growth will go further than the U.S.’s continued prioritization of military aid.

William Rampe is a Young Voices contributor studying Government at Hamilton College. His commentary on foreign policy has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Reason, CFR.org, and the Organization for World Peace. Follow him on Twitter @WRampe7.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Members of the U.S. military are sitting ducks in the Middle East, and in December 2023, eighty-four members of the Senate voted to keep them there because fewer U.S. troops in the Middle East could be a “gift” to Iran. In early December, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) brought forth a bill to remove 900 U.S. troops from Syria amid the barrage of drone attacks in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan by Iranian-backed militias. Roughly a month after that vote, a drone attack on Tower 22 in Jordan killed three U.S. service members and injured dozens more. After the deadly January 28 attack, the Biden administration found itself trying to balance an impossible scale. How could it satisfy political pressure without inadvertently escalating tensions into a regional conflict?

On the surface, removing U.S. troops due to rising instability seems counterintuitive, but the question of reducing the number of troops is emblematic of a larger problem. The soldiers were initially deployed to a location without congressional authorization and remained there long after their original military mission was accomplished. The U.S. presence in Syria is part of a U.S.-led coalition, Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), which began in 2014 to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Congress did not specifically approve OIR since the Obama administration relied on the 2001 and 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military Force as a legal justification. By bypassing Congress, the Obama administration circumvented Congressional oversight mechanisms and a framework that may have established clearer guidelines for concluding OIR.

Since the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) regained control of Al-Baghouz in 2019, the United States declared that ISIS had been defeated but made no moves to reduce troop presence. OIR is still active, but instead of fighting to regain ISIS-held territory, the mission has shifted to the broader goal of ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS. The United States already has a mechanism to prime the SDF to counter ISIS activities, the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), a program passed by Congress in 2014 to train, advise, and fund Syrian and Iraqi security forces. This perceived redundancy begs the question of whether or not troops deployed under OIR are necessary for preventing an immediate resurgence of ISIS or if a gradual reduction of troops coupled with continued CTEF support would be just as effective.

The drone strikes by militia groups and retaliatory strikes by the United States are also increasing tensions between the United States and Iraq. In response to the February 7 retaliatory drone strike that killed a senior member of Kataib Hezbollah, a spokesperson for Iraqi Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani, Yahya Rasool, called the U.S. presence in Iraq “a factor for instability” which “threatens to entangle Iraq in the cycle of conflict.”  The statement indicates a shift in perspective for Iraq and other host countries. Even though the U.S. troop presence initially provided stability against the threat of ISIS, the continued presence represents an opportunity for local militia groups to target Americans. On February 14, the United Arab Emirates imposed restrictions aimed at preventing the United States from launching retaliatory airstrikes on Iranian proxies from U.S. military bases in the UAE.

With the relationship between the United States and partner countries in the Middle East under strain due to the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas and Iranian-backed militias targeting U.S. forces, it is time for the Biden administration and members of Congress to ask themselves if the existing troop presence is worth losing more American lives while also risking a broader war in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Department of Defense must reevaluate the goals and scope of ongoing troop deployments to the Middle East. Even if continued cooperation with partner security forces is essential for preventing a resurgence of ISIS, the Biden administration should consider options that avoid asking American troops to dodge rocket and drone attacks far from home.

Bree Megivern has a Master‘s degree in Security Studies from Georgetown University. Her areas of interest are U.S. foreign policy, transatlantic security cooperation, and global development.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Summary: On May 23, 1941, the German battleship Bismarck, a symbol of Nazi naval power, embarked on Operation Rheinübung to disrupt Allied shipping. After sinking the HMS Hood and damaging the HMS Prince of Wales, Bismarck faced relentless pursuit by the Royal Navy. Despite initial successes, Bismarck was crippled by a torpedo that jammed its rudder, leading to a concerted attack by British forces. On May 27, after sustaining heavy bombardment, Bismarck sank in the North Atlantic. This event highlighted the effectiveness of combined arms and marked a pivotal moment in naval warfare, demonstrating the Royal Navy's commitment to avenging the Hood and protecting Britain.

The Sinking of the Bismarck: A Pivotal WWII Naval Battle

On May 23, 1941, the Battleship Bismarck was on a roll. The largest and most powerful ship in the German Navy, the mighty Bismarck had broken out into the Atlantic Ocean, sunk a Royal Navy battlecruiser, badly damaged a battleship and was poised to add its guns to a naval blockade that threatened to strangle Great Britain.

Ninety-six hours later, heavily damaged, the battleship was on the bottom of the North Atlantic. Bismarck’s swift reversal of fortune was the result of a heroic effort by the Royal Navy to hunt down and destroy the battlewagon, and avenge the more than 1,400 Royal Navy personnel killed in the Denmark Strait.

The German battleship Bismarck was the the pride of the Kriegsmarine, Nazi Germany’s naval service. Construction began in 1936, and the ship was commissioned in April 1940. It and its sister ship, Tirpitz, were 821 feet long and displaced fifty thousand tons, making them by far the largest warships ever built by Germany. Despite its size, twelve Wagner steam boilers made it capable of a fast thirty knots.

Like any battlewagon, Bismarck’s firepower lay in its main gun batteries. Bismarck had eight fifteen-inch guns in four large turrets, each capable of hurling a 1,800-pound armor-piercing, capped projectile 21.75 miles. This gave it the ability to penetrate 16.5 inches of armor at eleven miles.

The relatively small size of Germany’s World War II navy made it incapable of taking on the British and French navies head-on. Instead, the Kriegsmarine was given a much more limited role, of shepherding invasion fleets and cutting off the flow of commerce to Great Britain. On May 18, 1941, Bismarck and its escort, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, embarked on Operation Rheinübung, a campaign to sink Allied shipping in the North Atlantic and knock Britain out of the war.

On May 24, southwest of Iceland, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen tangled with the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the aging battlecruiser HMS Hood. Trading armored protection for speed, Hood’s designers had left it dangerously exposed to enemy fire. Hits from the German task force ignited an ammunition fire that raged out of control on Hood. Within ten minutes a titanic explosion shook the Denmark Strait as the fire reached the aft magazine. Hood broke in half and sank, taking 1,418 men with it.

Bismarck, despite its stunning victory, had not emerged from the battle unscathed. Hit three times by Prince of Wales, it lost some of its fuel supply to seawater contamination, sustained damage to its propulsion, and suffered a nine-degree list to port. Its captain, desperate to get away from the site of the battle and a slowly coalescing Royal Navy force eager for revenge, refused to slow down to allow damage control to effect repairs.

Bismarck’s captain was correct. The Royal Navy was assembling a large force to sink it, and indeed had ordered every ship in the area to join in the search to find it. The much larger Royal Navy was able to assemble a force of six battleships and battlecruisers, two aircraft carriers, thirteen cruisers, and twenty-one destroyers to hunt Bismarck. Unfortunately, many of the larger ships were of World War I vintage, and could not catch up with the wounded, but still fast Bismarck.

Although Bismarck outclassed nearly all the heavy capital ships that chased it, naval aviation was another matter. The German task force’s location was betrayed by oil leaking from the battleship and the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious was sent to slow it down. An air strike by six Fairey Fulmar carrier-based fighters and nine Fairey Swordfish carrier torpedo bombers managed a single hit on Bismarck. The torpedo explosion did minor damage, but the evasive maneuvers conducted by Bismarck’s captain to evade the torpedo attack caused even more damage, slowing the mighty battleship to sixteen knots.

Although it was eventually able to get back up to twenty-eight knots, the temporary loss of its speed advantage allowed a Royal Navy task force, Force H, to catch up to it. Established to take the place of the surrendered French Navy in the western Mediterranean, Force H was based at Gibraltar. It consisted of the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, the battlecruiser Renown and a light cruiser.

But Force H had to find it first. British intelligence had decoded some of the Kriegsmarine’s message traffic, which stated that the Bismarck was going to Brest for repairs. Reports from the French resistance that the Luftwaffe was assembling at Brest to provide an air umbrella for the battleship corroborated the report. So did a sighting of the battleship by a U.S. Navy Catalina seaplane that put it a day away from the French port. All of this happened very quickly throughout the morning of May 26.

At 9 p.m. on the twenty-sixth, an initial air strike of Fairey Swordfish torpedo planes was aborted after the strike force mistakenly attacked the light cruiser HMS Sheffield. The bungled attack proved beneficial, however, in that the new torpedo detonators failed to work properly. Had the Swordfishes found their mark, the attack would have been for nothing. The new detonators were swapped out for the older, reliable ones, and a second attack was launched.

The second Swordfish attack correctly located Bismarck. A single torpedo found its target, jamming the ship’s rudder. The mighty battleship was reduced to sailing in circles in the North Atlantic, unable to straighten out and continue onward to Brest. To make matters worse, a combined force of Royal Navy and Polish destroyers made repeated torpedo runs on the ship, exhausting the crew.

Bismarck’s crew proved unable to repair the rudder. At twenty minutes to midnight, Bismarck’s captain radioed German forces in France: “Ship unmaneuverable. We will fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer.”

The next day, May 27, the Royal Navy moved in for the kill. At 8:47 a.m., the battleships HMS Rodney and HMS King George V opened fire on the wounded German battleship, striking it several times. Bismarck returned fire, but its inability to steer and list made accurate return fire nearly impossible. One of Bismarck’s shells landed just sixty feet from Rodney’s bridge, drenching it with water, but the German battleship was unable to damage its assailants in any meaningful way.

Eventually Rodney and King George V defanged the their German counterpart. Turrets A and B were destroyed within the first hour and twenty minutes of the battle, while Turret D was put out of action when a shell exploded inside one of the main gun barrels. The last turret, C, ceased fire ten minutes later, at 9:31 a.m. Bismarck’s main guns were totally out of action.

Still, the fifty-thousand-ton battleship refused to sink. King George V blasted away at a range of 1.5 miles with all ten guns, point-blank range for battleships. The heavy cruisers Norfolk and Dorsetshire joined in the battle. The ship’s superstructure was turned into scrap, and the ship was burning from many fires. Hundreds of crew lay dead or dying, and a pillar of black smoke followed it.

By 10 a.m., Rodney had expended 380 sixteen-inch shells on Bismarck, and King George V 339 rounds of fourteen-inch shells. The secondary 5.5- to 6-inch guns of both battleships, plus the guns of the two heavy cruisers, expended a total of 2,156 shells on the battleship, plus numerous torpedo attacks. While not every shell hit many did, especially after the Bismarck was unable to return fire.

At 10:39 a.m., after two more rounds of torpedo attacks by air and sea, Bismarck finally sank. Its list gradually increased to twenty degrees, then to the point where its port secondary guns were almost submerged. Finally, it capsized to port and sank. Although hundreds of men made it to the water, a U-boat scare sent the Royal Navy ships collecting survivors heading for safety. Of the 2,200 officers and enlisted personnel that manned Bismarck, only 116 survived.

Bismarck’s sinking was an excellent example of combined arms at sea working together to take down a more powerful opponent. No single element of the Royal Navy present at the battle was strong enough to defeat Bismarck singlehandedly, but together a force of aging aircraft carriers and torpedo bombers, twenty-to-thirty-year-old battleships, and more than a dozen scrappy cruisers and destroyers were able to ensure that the mighty German battleship would never reach refuge in France.

About the Author

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami. This piece was first featured in December 2016 and is being republished due to reader's interest. 

Summary: The USS Mississippi (BB-41), a New Mexico-class battleship, served the U.S. Navy with distinction from World War I into the atomic age, enduring over forty years of service. Remarkably, it witnessed two major tragedies in the same turret twenty years apart, each resulting in the loss of numerous sailors due to a "flare back" during gunnery exercises. Despite these somber events, Mississippi contributed significantly to naval operations in the Pacific during World War II and later played a crucial role in testing and developing the U.S. Navy's first surface-to-air missile, the Convair RIM-2 Terrier. Decommissioned in 1956 and sold for scrap, the legacy of the USS Mississippi continues in the Virginia-class submarine bearing its name, SSN-782.

From World Wars to Missile Tests: The Long Voyage of the USS Mississippi

The USS Mississippi is home to one of the most intriguing naval coincidences of all time. Built while America was a neutral party in World War I, Mississippi sailed into the atomic age and later served as a massive test platform for surface-to-air missiles. Despite her forty years of service, Mississippi was bound to tragedy, experiencing two major accidents in the same turret, in the same gun, twenty years apart.

USS Mississippi (BB-41) was the second of three ships of the New Mexico-class battleships. Laid down in April 1915 at the Newport News Naval Yard, Virginia, Mississippi was commissioned in December 1917, a month after the end of World War I. The New Mexico class was the fourth of six distinct battleship classes laid down the 1910s, as the Navy rushed to fortify the Atlantic against tensions—and then outright war—in Europe.

Mississippi was a heavily armed battleship by the standards of the day. She was armed with a main battery of twelve 14-inch/50 caliber guns mounted in four turrets of three guns each, with each gun mounted in a separate sleeve. The main battery was distributed two turrets forward and two aft. She also featured twelve 5-inch/51 caliber guns, eight 3-inch anti-aircraft guns and two submerged 21-inch torpedo tubes.

As a battleship, the Mississippi was heavily armored to slug it out with enemy ships. The New Mexico-class ships had 13.5 inches of steel armor at the belt, and her turrets were protected with nine to eighteen inches of armor plating. The deck was armored to 3.5 inches and the conning tower to sixteen inches.

The mighty warship was 624 feet long with a beam of 97.5 feet, and displaced 33,000 tons fully loaded. She was powered by nine Babcock and Wilcox boilers and her four screws were driven by four Curtis turbines producing a maximum 32,000 horsepower. At roughly one horsepower per ton, she was not terribly fast, with a top speed of just twenty-one knots.

On June 12, 1924, Mississippi found herself off the coast of California conducting gun trials. The 14-inch/50 caliber gun was plagued with technical issues, a major problem considering it was the primary armament on the majority of serving U.S. Navy battleships. On the eighth salvo, turret two, gun two suffered a rare “flare back.” The four powder bags inserted into the breech, totaling 470 pounds of explosive powder, caught fire and ignited other bags waiting to be loaded. Forty-eight sailors were killed, and only one of the sailors manning the turret survived.

Based on the survivor’s account, the Navy believed that a fire or burning debris was present in the gun barrel and ignited the powder bags. Although each barrel was blasted between firings with pressurized air to evacuate debris, the middle barrel of each turret received a lower pressure burst than the left and right barrels. This could have led to dangerous debris remaining in the breech when the gun crew assumed it was safe to load.

A bizarre accident occurred afterward while the Mississippi was anchored in San Pedro Bay. The hand of a dead crewman in the number two turret accidentally hit the firing switch for the port gun, firing it. The shell flew harmlessly out to sea.

Nearly twenty years—and a major refit later—the USS Mississippi went to war in the Pacific. In 1943, the big battleship was off the coast of Makin Island, providing naval gunfire support to a landing force preparing to secure the island. After an extensive preliminary bombardment, the Marine assault force headed towards the beach and Mississippi and the other ships increased their rate of fire.

Suddenly, in the midst of the barrage, smoke and gas erupted from the rangefinders on either side of the number two turret. Incredibly it had happened again: in their haste to lay down a rain of shells on the Japanese, the gunners of number two turret had apparently experienced yet another flare back. Debris from firing the big guns had again ignited powder bags, causing the same accident and the same damage. Forty-two sailors were killed and another sixteen wounded. The battleship’s three remaining turrets continued firing until the naval support phase of the invasion had ended.

After the war, Mississippi was effectively defanged, with three of her four main battery turrets removed. She was redesignated AG-128 and equipped with a number of radars and prototype air defense missile systems. Mississippi was instrumental in the testing and eventual fielding of the Convair RIM-2 Terrier, the U.S. Navy’s first surface-to-air missile.

The old warship was decommissioned in 1956, sold for scrap. The aging battlewagon had served longer than most ships at the time, but it had also experienced two rare tragedies, in the same place, under similar circumstances. Today her name lives on in the Virginia class nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Mississippi (SSN-782).

About the Author: Kyle Mizokami 

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. 

Summary: The VA-111 Shkval, a Soviet-era supercavitating torpedo, revolutionized underwater warfare with its unprecedented speed of up to 200 knots, thanks to a rocket engine and the phenomenon of supercavitation. By vaporizing water into steam at its nose, Shkval creates a gas bubble that drastically reduces drag, allowing for rapid movement through water.

The VA-111 Shkval: How Russia's Rocket Torpedo Changed Undersea Combat

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union placed heavy reliance on its submarine fleet to negate America’s advantage in naval forces. The U.S. Navy was not only tasked to help protect the flow of reinforcements into Europe in the event of World War III, it also threatened the Soviet Union directly and would have hunted down and sunk her ballistic missile submarines. The USSR at first used sheer numbers of diesel-electric submarines, then more advanced nuclear attack submarines, to whittle down the odds.

One of the most innovative underwater weapons developed by the Soviet Union was the VA-111 Shkval (“Squall”) supercavitating torpedo. Highly classified, Shkval was virtually unknown before the end of the Cold War and only became common knowledge in the mid-1990s. Powered by a rocket engine, it was capable of astonishing speeds of up to 200 knots an hour. But in a world where physics ensured most ships and underwater weapons topped out at 50 knots, how did Russian engineers accomplish such a breakthrough in speed?

Traditionally, torpedoes use propellers or pumpjets for propulsion. Shkval, on the other hand, uses a rocket engine. That alone is enough to make it fast, but traveling through water creates major drag problems. The solution: get the water out of the path of the torpedo. But how, exactly does one get water of the path of an object in the middle of an ocean?

The solution: vaporize liquid water into a gas.

Shkval solves this problem by diverting hot rocket exhaust out of its nose, which turns the water in front of it into steam. As the torpedo moves forward, it continues vaporizing the water in front of it, creating a thin bubble of gas. Traveling through gas the torpedo encounters much less drag, allowing it to move at speeds of up 200 knots. This process is known as supercavitation.

The trick with maintaining supercavitation is keeping the torpedo enclosed in the gas bubble. This makes turning maneuvers tricky, as a change of heading will force a portion of the torpedo outside the bubble, causing sudden drag at 230 miles an hour. Early versions of Shkval apparently had a very primitive guidance system, and attacks would have been fairly straight torpedo runs.

Considering the warhead would have been nuclear, that would probably have been good enough to destroy the target. It’s clear the Soviet Union believes there were times when torpedo speed was more important than maneuverability.

Shkval was originally designed in the 1960s as a means of quickly attacking NATO nuclear missile submarines, delivering a nuclear warhead at previously unheard-of speeds. The torpedo is of standard 533-millimeter torpedo diameter and carries a 460-pound warhead. It has a maximum range of 7,500 yards. Shkval began mass production in 1978 and entered service with the Soviet Navy that year.

Like any weapon, there are drawbacks. For one, the gas bubble and the rocket engine are very noisy. Any submarine that launches a supercavitating torpedo will instantly give away its approximate position. That having been said, such a fast-moving weapon could conceivably destroy the enemy before it has time to act on the information, as the enemy suddenly has a both an enemy submarine and a 200-knot torpedo to contend with.

Another drawback to a supercavitating torpedo is the inability to use traditional guidance systems. The gas bubble and rocket engine produce enough noise to deafen the torpedo’s built-in active and passive sonar guidance systems. Early versions of the Shkval were apparently unguided, trading guidance for speed. A newer version of the torpedo employs a compromise method, using supercavitation to sprint to the target area, then slowing down to search for its target.

Is there a future for the supercavitating torpedo? The U.S. has been working on such a weapon since 1997, apparently without a deployable weapon. Indeed, the U.S. Navy is currently in the process of upgrading the venerable Mark 48 submarine torpedo for service into the foreseeable future. Then again, the Navy’s requirements were far greater than Shkval’s capabilities, including turning, identifying, and homing in on targets.

In the meantime, Russian submarines are the only subs in the world equipped with supercavitating torpedoes, modernized versions of Shval armed with a conventional warhead. Russian industry also offers an export version, Shkval E, for sales abroad. Iran claims to have a supercavitating torpedo of its own it calls Hoot, and which is assumed to be a reverse-engineered Shkval.

In 2004, German defense contractor Diehl-BGT announced the Barracuda, a technology demonstrator torpedo meant to travel up to 194 knots. Barracuda was meant to be launched from submarines and surface vessels, and test models could travel straight and curved paths. However, the program apparently never translated into a marketable weapon.

A noisy—but effective—weapon, Shkval smashes the paradigm of undersea warfare. A 200-knot torpedo is a very attractive capability, and as naval competition heats up in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, we may see even more navies adopting supercavitating designs and adjusting their undersea tactics accordingly. Undersea warfare is about to get a whole lot louder—and deadlier.

About the Author: Kyle Mizokami

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. 

Summary: The Forrestal-class carriers, monumental in the evolution of U.S. naval aviation, were a response to the advent of carrier-based jet aircraft, necessitating larger decks and more fuel and munitions storage. Introduced in the mid-1950s, these sixty-thousand-ton behemoths were informed by earlier designs and marked a significant departure with innovations like the angled flight-deck, optical landing systems, and steam-powered catapults. Serving through the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, their combat roles and operational challenges showcased the complexity of naval warfare and technological advancement. Despite their formidable presence, the Forrestal-class faced issues like catastrophic fires and became subjects of decommission and scrapping by 2017. Their legacy, however, paved the way for modern supercarriers, embodying a critical transition in naval strategy and carrier design.

The Forrestal-Class Carriers: Pioneers of Modern Naval Aviation

As the United States prepares to deliver its second one-hundred-thousand-ton Gerald Ford-class supercarrier later in 2019, it’s easy to forget that until the mid-1950s the Navy’s carriers displaced between a third or half that much.

The Essex and larger Midway-class carriers built during World War II were designed to launch smaller, slower piston-engine warbirds. But a new generation of carrier-based jet aircraft took up more deck space, required longer decks to takeoff and land, and consumed more fuel.

In 1948, the country’s first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, ordered the USS United States, a supercarrier displacing seventy thousand tons designed to carry up to eighteen large strategic bombers off its deck. The CVA-58 attack carrier was essentially the Navy’s bid to compete with the Air Force’s plans for a large force of B-36 Peacemaker nuclear bombers. However, mere days after the United States was laid down, Forrestal’s successor Louis Johnson canceled construction, resulting in an inter-service furball detailed in a companion article.

Though the Navy’s reputation emerged battered by United States controversy, months later the Korean War broke out—and the Navy’s Essex-class carriers and their jet fighters more than proved their worth. Thus by 1951 the Navy finally had the prestige and funding to take a second crack at ordering a super carrier, which began construction the following year. By then, new carrier-based jets like the A-3 Skywarrior carrying lighter-weight nuclear weapons had rendered the carrier-strategic-bomber concept unnecessary.

Nonetheless, the sixty-thousand-ton CVA-59, fittingly named the Forrestal, was clearly informed by the canceled CVA-58—including initially attempting to incorporate smokestacks and an island superstructure that could telescope downwards for a ‘flush’ deck during flight operations. This proved too complicated to implement, so the Forrestal ended up with two islands instead, mounting multiple radars and electronic warfare systems.

Like the preceding Midway-class, Forrestal had an armored flight deck—but its deck was more robustly integrated as a load-bearing element of the hull rather than as a superstructure. As the Midway-class had proven infamously top-heavy and unstable, the Forrestal featured a deeper draught, keeping her deck drier and affording her much better handling. Three starboard side elevators served two catapults on Forrestal’s bow; and a lone port-side elevator was situated in front of two additional catapults.

Three critical innovations first developed by the Royal Navy were retrofitted in the middle of the construction of Forrestal and her sistership Saratoga in Newport News, Virginia. These included an angled flight-deck, allowing for longer takeoff distances; an optical mirror-landing system; and steam-powered catapults. Cumulatively, these greatly facilitated operations of faster and heavier jet aircraft.

These technologies were initially tested on Midway-class carriers, but the Forrestal was the first U.S. carrier to launch with them already installed.

The Forrestal’s increased length (326 meters) and displacement equated to drastically greater internal volume. Its cavernous hangar deck could accommodate eighty to one hundred jets, up from the Midway class’s sixty to seventy-five. Compared to the Essex class, the Forrestals carried three times more aviation fuel (1.3 million gallons) and 154 percent more munitions (1,650 tons) for their air wings, as well as 70 percent more fuel for cruising. By one calculation, this meant the Forrestals could remain operational 96 percent of the year, compared to 60 percent for the Essex-class.

Following the launch of Forrestal and Saratoga in 1955 and 1956, construction of the Ranger and Independence began, with an angled flight deck planned from the outset. As a result these two ships have only one island structure instead of two and a slimmer forward deck. The Independence finally launched in 1958, the only one of four vessels to be built in New York. Four more planned Forrestals were instead laid down as part of a revised Kitty Hawk-class.

The gigantic super carriers soon were routinely deployed on diplomatic missions and shows of force in response to the crise du jour. For example, the Independence participated in the blockade of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis, while Ranger cruised by North Korea following the seizure of the USS Pueblo.

However, the large vessels had their flaws. The port elevator’s location forward of two catapults meant it could not be used during landing or takeoff operations. The sponsons for the eight 5” anti-aircraft guns took on water, and were mostly removed in the 1960s. The ships also extensively incorporated asbestos, later resulting in asbestos-related illness among their crews.

Four Decades of Service

The Forrestals all deployed for at least one combat tour during Vietnam. The Saratoga’s air wing launched thousands of sorties bombarding North Vietnamese forces in 1972–1973, losing six aircraft to enemy fire and shooting down two MiGs.

The Forrestal’s Vietnam service is best known for the tragic incident on July 29, 1967, when a Zuni rocket accidentally launched from an F-4 Phantom on the flight line blasted into an A-4 Skyhawk in front of it. The resulting fire caused an unsafe M65 bomb to detonate, triggering chain reaction of explosions and fiery conflagration that nearly destroyed the carrier and killed 134 crewmembers. The Forrestal limped home and had to be extensively rebuilt.

The nightmarish accident, combined with two other cataclysmic carrier fires, forced the Navy to implement major reforms of its safety culture—but the Forrestal experienced additional damaging fires in 1972 and 1978. The Ranger, meanwhile, was sabotaged by sailors opposed to the Vietnam War, culminating in the trial of an anti-war Navy fireman who purportedly disabled one of the carrier’s reduction gears used to generate power.

During the 1970s through 1980s, the Forrestals (save for the Ranger) underwent twenty-eight-month Service-Life Extension Programs. The carriers were re-designated general-purpose CVs as they incorporated F-14 Tomcat interceptors and S-3 Viking anti-submarine aircraft into their air wings which smaller Midway-class carriers could not operate. Eight-cell Sea Sparrow missile launchers and automated twenty-millimeter Close-In Weapon Systems replaced antiquated flak guns.

The 1980s proved eventful for the aging carriers. The Independence spearheaded the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada, dispatching Navy SEAL teams and A-7 Corsair jets for close air support. F-14s from the Saratoga forced down airliner carrying terrorist hijackers in 1986 and accidentally shot down an Air Force Phantom jet in 1987. Her strike planes also destroyed a Libyan surface-to-air missile sight that had earlier opened fire on U.S. aircraft.

During the 1991 Gulf War, the Saratoga deployed to the Red Sea and Forrestal to the Persian Gulf. Between them, the two carriers dispatched hundreds of sorties, but lost one FA-18 Hornet to an Iraqi MiG-25 and two A-6s to ground fire. Saddam Hussein even specifically claimed to have sunk the Saratoga, following an attempted Scud missile attack that missed by over one hundred miles.

As they each approached forty years of service, the Forrestals were decommissioned one-by-one between 1993 and 1998—but stayed busy right until then. In 1993, Ranger deployed off of Somalia and provided photo reconnaissance, logistics and air support for Operation Restore Hope as it faced opposition from warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid.

 In 1992 the Saratoga accidentally fired a Sea Sparrow missile at the Turkish destroyer Muavenet during an exercise, killing five crew.

The Independence concluded her career with forward-deployment to Yokosuka, Japan, and participated in a 1996 cruise down the Taiwan Strait that famously ruffled Beijing’s feathers.

 The Forrestals remained mothballed through 2013 and there were multiple campaigns to transform them into museum ships which all came to naught. Finally, between 2014 and 2017, all four vessels were scrapped in Brownsville, Texas—each operation paid for with a single penny.

 The Forrestal-class marked the point at which U.S. carriers decisively evolved into larger platforms intentionally designed for jet fighter operations, pioneering technologies we now take for granted in today’s super carriers. While the art of super-carrier design would be further refined, the Forrestals marked an influential first step.

About the Author

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

Summary: In an innovative operation during World War II, the Soviet Air Force launched a daring raid on the Romanian city of Constanta using a unique "parasite" fighter-bomber combination, what some akin to a flying aircraft carrier. Three TB-3 bombers, carrying I-16 fighters under their wings, targeted critical infrastructure, including the King Carol I bridge over the Danube, vital to Axis supply lines. This operation, part of the Zveno ("Link") project led by designer Vladimir Vakhrimov, demonstrated an early attempt to extend the range and payload of fighter aircraft by hitching them to larger bombers. Despite achieving significant success, the Zveno-SPB program was limited by the availability of suitable aircraft and the arrival of more advanced bombers, leading to its eventual discontinuation. However, the concept of extending operational range through air-to-air refueling lives on in modern military aviation, highlighting the enduring legacy of this innovative approach to aerial warfare.

Zveno-SPB: The Soviet Union's Ingenious WWII Parasite Fighters (Flying Aircraft Carrier?)

Early in the morning of August 10, 1941, three boxy Soviet TB-3 bombers took off from the airbase at Yevpatoria in the Crimean Peninsula, bearing a most unusual cargo under their gargantuan wings: two manned, stubby-nosed I-16 fighter planes, their Shvetsov radial engines chortling and propellers spinning to help propel the sluggish four-engine TB-3s they were attached to.

One of the aircraft-carrying motherships had to abort mission due to technical problems. The six remaining aircraft assumed an eastward course across the Black Sea towards the Romanian city of Constanta roughly 250 miles away, cruising at roughly 155 miles per hour.

Six weeks earlier, Romanian troops had joined Nazi Germany in a surprise invasion of the Soviet Union that had steamrolled unprepared border defenses. As Axis forces steadily advanced towards the critical Soviet ports of Odessa and Sevastopol, the beleaguered Soviet Air Force and Navy did their best to strike back. One key target was the King Carol I bridge spanning the River Danube, which measured over a miles long and up to seventy meters high, and also stood over a vital pipeline connected to the Ploesti oil fields.

Soviet DB-3 bomber had repeatedly attacked the bridge with high-altitude horizontal bombing runs without landing any hits. The older, slower TB-3s themselves would likely have fared little better had they tried.

But these special TB-3s, called Sveno (“Link”)-SPBs, were not carrying any bombs at all. Instead, the I-16 Type 24 fighters braced under the bomber’s wings each carried two 250-kilogram bombs.

Ordinarily, an I-16 loaded with nearly third of its weight in bombs could not have taken off, let alone have possessed the range for a round-trip mission across the Black Sea. But these I-16s were drawing on the fuel supply of the TB-3 bombers they were latched onto.

The Sveno-SPBs were the ultimate product of a decade-long research program run by designer Vladimir Vakhrimov, who experimented with numerous ways to mate ‘parasite’ fighters onto bombers to extend their range and payload, as described in a companion article.

This was the second raid undertaken by Shubikov’s Circus, as the 2nd Special Squadron of the 32nd Fighter Regiment was known. The first on July 26 had taken the Axis defenders by surprise and resulted in the destruction of an oil depot. But the Soviet raiders were unlikely to benefit from surprise a second time.

At 5:50 AM, as the TB-3 pilots flew within nine miles of the Romanian coastline, they flipped a switch and yellow light flashed next to the cockpits of the I-16s. Seconds later, the fighter pilots released the latches clamping their I-16s to their motherships.

The bomb-laden fighters surged towards the bridge and then from slightly over a mile high, nosed down at a near ninety-degree angle, causing them to accelerate to nearly four hundred miles per hour.

The bridge’s defenders were on alert, as described by I-16 pilot Boris Litvinchuk in The Angry Sky of Tauris by fellow aviator Vassily Minakov.

Squalls of fire shot up towards the heavily loaded warbirds. Automatic guns bristled with fire from both sides of the Danube, from the islands, from the special cradles suspended from the trusses of the bridge, even from the tops of the seventy-five-meter-high spans . . . Nevertheless, the I-16s broke through to fly directly above the bridge. It raced towards them . . . just four hundred meters away. Bombs came rushing down . . .

A direct hit in the central span! A gigantic steel span breaks like a giraffe’s neck, and plunges into foaming water. Burning oil gushes out of a broken pipeline under the flooring, a continuous flame raging downstream on the water . . .

All four I-16s escaped unscathed and landed and refueled at Odessa at 6:40 AM, where they were promptly redirected towards an incoming formation of Ju-88 bombers headed for the Soviet port city. The Junkers dumped most of their bombs in the sea and belted for home, and Shubikov and his comrades then rejoined their TB-3 motherships at their home base in Yevpatoria.

Three days later a strike by three Zveno-SPB’s scored five direct hits, destroying one of the bridge spans completely. On their return flight, the I-16s nosed back down to low altitude to strafe assembling Romanian infantry at Sulina.

The same day, the SPB’s designer Vladimir Vakhmistrov requested diverting additional TB-3 bombers to Shubikov’s Circus. The unit received two. However, Stalin personally ruled against further reinforcement: the TB-3 was out of production, and the Sveno used a rare, late-model variant with higher-power AM34 engines that were urgently needed for transport duties.

Shubikov’s Circus nonetheless continued launching long-range precision strikes,as detailed in Vakhmistrov’s Circus by author Mikhail Maslov. On August 17, six I-16s destroyed floating dry dock in Constanta’s harbor. Then, on August 28, four I-16s blasted a bridge crossing the Dniepr River near Zaphoroshye, Ukraine two hundred miles to the north.

Still the Axis war machine ground closer and closer to the Crimean Peninsula, and the unit specialized in long-range strikes was increasingly thrust into frontline ground support roles. Even though range became less of a problem, the unit still depended on the TB-3s to lift the bomb-laden I-16s into the air.

By September 8 the unit was hitting a bridge crossing at Berislav only one hundred miles away, covered by Yak-1 fighters when it was bounced by German fighters. A Yak and I-16 went down in flames. The following day, four I-16s of Shubikov’s circus claimed two 109s in a swirling dogfight following another raid. This was quite an achievement as the Bf 109 was much faster and more heavily armed than the I-16, though not quite as maneuverable.

Finally, on October 1, Shubikov’s luck ran out on October during a raid striking German heavy artillery at Ishun that was bombarding Soviet troops defending Perekop—one of the narrow land bridges connecting the Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine. The unit leader was shot down by enemy fighters, and posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin. Odessa fell later that month.

Apparently, the 2nd Special Squadron continued flying sorties into 1942, totaling thirty combat mission altogether. The Zveno-SPBs were finally withdrawn, ostensibly due to their vulnerability to enemy fighters, as well as the fact both the TB-3 and I-16 were outdated, out-of-production airframes.

Nonetheless, unlike most experimental weapons with brief combat careers, the Zveno-SPB proved surprisingly effective—consistently inflicting significant damage to key targets deep behind enemy lines and suffering relatively light loss rates compared to most VVS units.

Vakhmistrov had invented an ingenious solution to squeezing longer range out of increasingly outdated aircraft—but his idea was decisively overtaken by the advent of more advanced airplanes. New twin-engine Pe-2 and Tu-2 bombers were faster, could carry much heavier payloads, and had longer-range than the I-16 and were sufficiently maneuverable to perform dive-bombing attacks.

After World War II, the United States experimented unsuccessfully with the XF-85 Goblin parasite escort fighter, and briefly operationally deployed RF-84K Thunderflash reconnaissance jets attached to B-36s bombers in the 1950s.

However, Vakhmistrov was farsighted in seeing the inherent potential of using larger planes to keep smaller but more agile fighters airborne over longer distances. While the parasite fighter may have amounted to a blind lead, jet fighters today routinely “dock” with airliner-like tanker planes to multiply their operational radius several times over.

About the Author

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.